Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

Pada III. With the third pada of the second adhyaya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brah- man to obtain final release. The first point to be deter- mined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upa- nishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different jakhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly iden- tical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same sakha exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities ; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment ; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular jakha were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other .sakhas also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one sakha, may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other jakhas ; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be com- bined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed

INTRODUCTION. lxvii

by different individuals in different ways, cognition is de- fined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one medi- tation. The latter is the special task of the present pada.

Adhik. I and II (1-4 ; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyas, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be con- sidered as constituting several vidyas, or one vidya. only. Sankara remarks that the question affects only those vidyas whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu^am brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman ; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later adhikara//a, we may take for an example the so-called Sa^ilyavidya which is met with in Kh. Up. Ill, 14, again — in an abridged form — in Brz. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the 5atapatha- brahma^a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a medita- tion on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bharupatva), while others are peculiar to each separate passage (pra^a^ariratva and satyasa/^kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the AV/andogya Upanishad and Satapatha-brahma;za, but not in the Brz'hadaraTzyaka Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvavaritva, not referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedantin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through ; if, on the

lxviii vedAnta-s$tras.

other hand, the vidyd is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation. — The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only ; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.

Adhik. Ill (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgithavidyas of the .Oandogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the Brzhadara/zyaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities — such as bearing the same name and the udgitha being in both identified with pra^a — yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the iO&ndogya vidya is not the whole udgftha but only the sacred syllable Om, while the Brzhadara/zyaka Upanishad represents the whole udgitha as the object of meditation.

Sutra 9 constitutes in Ankara's view a new adhikara^a (IV), proving that in the passage, ' Let a man meditate ' (Kh. Up. I, 1, 1), the Omkars. and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, c Let a man meditate on that Owkara which/ &c. — Ac- cording to Ramanu£"a's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sutra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikara^a. — Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called pra^a- vidy&s and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the pra/^a, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to Sankara, the Sutras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the medi- tations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidya. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, men-

INTRODUCTION. lxiX

tioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special medita- tions.— Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to 5ankara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/^a Up. Ill, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidya only. — Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to 5ankara, that the Self spoken of in Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sutratman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitareyaka meditation.

According to Raman uga. the Sutras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/za whose subject is the same as that of ♦Sankara's sixth adhikara/za. Sutras 11-13 are> on tne whole, explained as by Sankara ; Sutra 12, however, is said to mean, ' Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation ; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be intro- duced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priya^irastva. — If priy&rirastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them ? — ' Because/ Sutra 14 replies, * there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious medita- tion.'— But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.) — ' Be- cause,' Sutra 15 replies/ the term " Self" (atma anandamaya) is applied to it.' — But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in atma pra/zamaya, Sec.) is applied to non- Selfs also ; how then do you know that in atma ananda- maya it denotes the real Self? — ' The term Self,' Sutra 16 replies, ' is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (atma va idam eka, &c), as we con- clude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.' — But, an objection is raised, does not the con- text show that the term ' Self,' which in all the preceding

lxx VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

clauses about the pra/zamaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage ? — To this question asked in the former half of 1 7 (anvayad iti ktt) the latter half replies, ' Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz. II, 1, ' From that Self sprang ether/

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the pra^asa^vada. — The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I. — Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature ; in Brz. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye ; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyas. — Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra/zaya- niya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding AT/zandogya vidya, because the stated difference of Brah- man's abode involves difference of vidya. — Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brahma;za passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads — as, for instance, a brahma;za about the maha- vrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-ara/zyaka — do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Sutras 27-30 constitute, according to Sankara, two adhi- kara/zas of which the former (XVI ; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place — not, as

INTRODUCTION. lxXl

the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world — but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body ; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken literally. — The latter adhikara^a (XVII ; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu^am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/zam brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place.