Dionysius the Areopagite on the Divine Names and…

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TRANSLATIONS OV CHRIS I'l AN LITERATURE

GENERAL Editors: W. J. SPARROW-SIMl'SON, D.I)., \V. K. LOWTHER CLARKE, li.l).

SERIES I

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DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

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Er IEAN5lAno:N5 OF CHKI5TIM LITEKATUHE . ^EEIE5 I

GREEK TEXT5

«-*DIONYSlUS ..«

THE AREOPAGITE -

ON THE

DIVINE NAMES

AND THE

MYSTICALTHEOLOGY

By C E ROLT.

in relation to the Son, and similarly the Son to the Father. But these are relations of " Beings," and are relations which are "eternal and unchangeable." Augustine does not afihm a supra-personal reality of God behind the Tiinity of manifestation. For Augustine the Father and the Son are ultimate realities. " But if the Father, in that He is called the Father, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Son ; and the Son, in that He is called the Son, were so called in relation to Himself, not to the Father ; then both the one would be called Father, and the other Son, according to substance. But because the Father is not called the Failier except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a Father, these things are not said according to substance ; because each of them is not so called in relation to Himself, but the terms are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other ; nor yet according to accident, because both the being called the Father, and the being called the Son, is eternal and unchangeable to them. Wherefore, although to be the Father and to be the Son is different, yet their substance is not different ; because they are so ca led, not according to substance, but according to relation, which relation, however, is not accident, because it is not changeable." — Aug., De Trin. v. 6. — Ed.]

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solely to the realm of eternal Manifestation when he says that They exist seainduvi Relativum and not' seciiiiduvi Substantiain?- Also he teaches the Supra- Personality of the Trinity when he says tiiat neither the undivided Trinity nor any of Its Three Persons is a particular individuality ; 2 and St, Thomas teaches the same thing when he says that the Human Soul of Jesus does ilot comprehend or contain the Word since the Human Soul is finite [i.e. a particular individuality) while the Word is Infinite.^

Thus while in the Undifferentiated Godhead the "Persons" of the Trinity ultimately transcend Them- selves and point (as it were) to a region where They are merged, yet in that side of Its Nature which looks towards the universe They shine eternally forth and are the effulgence of those " Supernal Rays " through Which, all light is given us, and whence all energy streams into the act of creation. For by Their interaction They circulate that Super-Essence Which Each of Them perfectly possesses, and so It passes forth from Them into a universe of Being.

For by Their interaction They circulate that Super-Essence Which Each of Them perfectly possesses, and so It passes forth from Them into a universe of Being.

Now the Godhead, while It is beyond all particular Being, yet contains and is the ultimate Reality of all particular Being; for It contains beforehand all the particular creatures after a manner in which they arc ultimately identical with It, as seems to be im- plied by the phrase that all things exist in It fused and yet distinct. Thus although It is not a particular being, It in a transcendent manner contains and is Particularity. Again It is beyond all universal Being, for universals are apprehended by the intellect,

^ De Jrin. v. 6.

^ See De yViii. viii. 4. "Not this and that Good, but tlie very Good . . . Not a good J'crsonality {animus) but good Goodness"; and vii. 11, where he condemns those who say the word persona is employed "in the sense of a particular man such as Abraham, Isaac, or Jacob, or anybody else who can be pointed out as being present."

3" Stun ma, Pars III. (). x. Art. i.

RELATION TO (RKATION ii

whereas the Gocllicad is incomprehensible and tlierc- fore is described as "formless." Nevertheless It con- tains and is the Ultimate Reality of all universals, for, even before the world was mack^, It eternally embraced and embraces all thin ^t«'de Use f And therefore, although the entire plane °f "f=^ 'O" interpenetrated by It, yet in Its ultimate iNa.uie It is

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beyond that plane and so "outside" it. Finite creatures though filled (according to their measure) with Its Presence, yet must, in so far as they are finite, look up to It as That which is Other than themselves. And, in this sense of being Other than they are. It must be described as "outside" them, even though (as their Principle of Being) It is within them.

Thus the two emanating streams, though they pass outside of the Super-Essence, yet actually are the Super-Essence Itself. And, in fact, the very term Emanation (ngoodog) like the collateral term Differ- entiation (diaxQioig) may even be applied not only to the two Streams but also to the Persons of th.e Trinity ; not only to the Magnets radiating Energy, so to speak, but also to its actual Surface.

This matter needs a few words of explanation.

There is in the undifferentiated (vneQrjvcojuerr]) Super-Essence a Differentiation between the Three Divine " Persons," which Dionysius compares to the distinction between different flames in the same indivisible brightness. And Each " Person " is an Emanation because Each is a Principle of outgoing creative Energy. There is also a Differentiation between the various qualities and forces of the crea- tive Energy, rather as (if we may further work out the simile of Dionysius) the light seen afar through certain atmospheric conditions is differentiated into various colours. And each quality or force is an ICmanation, for it is an outgoing current of creative Energy. Or, by a slightly different use of language, the entire creative process in which they flow forth may be called not merely a collection of emanations but simply " the Emanation." Thus an Elmanation may mean, (i) a Person of the Trinity ; (2) a current of the Universal Stream (e.g.^ Very Being, or Very Life, etc.); (3) a current of the Particular Stream {i.e.

RELATION TO CREATION 17

a particular force) ; (4) the entire ])roccss whereby the two Streams flow forth. This sounds confusing, but the difficulty vanishes if we classify these various meanings under two heads, viz.: (i) an Emanating Principle {i.e. a "Person" of the Trinity), and (2) an Emanating Act (whether regarded as a whole or in detail). This classification covers all its uses.

These two heads, in fact, correspond exactly to the two main uses of the word " Differentiation " as applying respectively to the Super-Essential sphere and to the sphere of Being. And here Dionysius certainly does cause needless difficulty by employing the same word " Differentiation " with these two dis- tinct meanings in the same passage. The Persons of the Trinity are differentiated, but the Energy stream- ing from them is undifferentiated in the sense that it comes indivisibly from them all. In another sense, however, it is differentiated because it splits up into separate currents and forces. Each of these currents comes from the Undivided Trinity, and yet each current is distinct from the others. Dionysius expresses this truth by saying that the Godhead enters Undividedly into Differentiation, or becomes differentiated without loss of Undifference (7)vcojH€Vcog SiaKQLvszai) .

Let us follow this creative process and see whither it leads. The Super-Essence, as It transcends both Non-Existence and Existence, also transcends both Time and Eternity. But from afar It is seen or felt as Existence and as Eternity. That is to say Existence and Eternity are two emanating modes or qualities of the Universal Stream. The Particular Stream, on the other hand, is Time-non-existent as yet and struggling to come to the birth but unable to do so until it gain permanence through min- gling with Eternity. At a certain point, however (preordained in the Super-Essence wherein Time

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The Particular Stream, on the other hand, is Time-non-existent as yet and struggling to come to the birth but unable to do so until it gain permanence through min- gling with Eternity. At a certain point, however (preordained in the Super-Essence wherein Time

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slumbered), the two streams not only cross but actually mingle, and thus Time and the temporal world begin. The Particular stream no longer sinks wholly through the Universal, but is in part supported by it. Hence the world of things arises like a substance hitherto invisible but now becoming visible, and so, by this change, springing out of darkness into light.

Now, when the Particular stream begins to mingle with the Universal, it naturally mingles first with that current of it which, being most universal, ranks the highest and so is nearest the Source. It is only along that current that it can advance to the others which are further away. And that current is Being {amo- Elvai). Thus the world-process begins (as Dionysius had learnt from Genesis and from the teaching of Plato) as the level of dead solid matter, to which he gives the name of "merely existent " (ouoiw^rjg). Thence, by participating more and more in the Universal stream, it advances to the production of plant and animal and man, being by the process enriched with more and more qualities as Life [avzoCojij), Wisdom (avrooocpta), and the other currents of the Universal stream begin to permeate it one by one.

Thus the separate individuals, according to the various laws {?.6yoi) of their genera and species, are created in this world of Time. And each thing, while it exists in the world, has two sides to its exist- ence : one, outside its created being (according to the sense of the word "outside" explained above), in the Super-Essence wherein all things are One Thing (as all points meet at infinity or as according to the neo- Platonic simile used by IJionysius, the radii of a circle meet at the centre), and the other within its own created being on this lower plane where all things are separate from each other (as all points in space are separate or as the radii of the circle are separate

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at the circumference). This paradox is of the very utmost im[)ortance.

The various kinds of existences beini^ now created in this world of time, we can rei^ard them as rani^ed m an ascenchng scale between Nothingness and the Super-Essence, each rank of being subsuming the qualities of those that lie below it. Thus we get the following system in ascending order : Existence, Life, Sensation, Reason, Spirit. And it is to this scale that Dionysius alludes when he speaks of the extremities and the intermediate parts of the creation, meaning by the extremities the highest and the lowest orders, and by the intermediate parts the remainder.

And it is to this scale that Dionysius alludes when he speaks of the extremities and the intermediate parts of the creation, meaning by the extremities the highest and the lowest orders, and by the intermediate parts the remainder.

The diminution of Being which we find in glancing down the ladder is, Dionysius tells us, no defect in the s)'stem of creation. It is right that a stone should be but a stone and a tree no more than a tree. Each thing, being itself however lowly, is fulfilling the laws of its kind which pre-exist (after a transcendent manner) in the undifferentiated Super-Essence. If, however, there is a diminution of Being where such diminution has no place, then trouble begins to arise. This is, in fact, the origin and nature of evil. For as we ascend the scale of Being, fresh laws at each stage counteract the laws of the stage below, the law of life by which the blood circulates and living things grow upwards counteracting the mere law of inert gravita- tion, and again, the laws of morality counteracting the animal passions. And where this counter-action, fails, disaster follows. A hindered circulation means ill-health, and a hindered self-control means sin. Whereas a stone is merely lifeless, a corpse is not only lifeless but dead ; and whereas a brute is un-moral, a brutal man is wicked, or immoral. What in the one case is the absence from a thing of that which has no proper place in it, is in the other case the failure of the thing's proper virtues.

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IV. — The Problem of Evil

At wearisome length Dionysius discusses the problem of evil and shows that nothing is inherently bad. For existence is in itself good (as coming ultimately from the Super-Essence), and all things are therefore good in so far as they exist. Since evil is ultimately non-existent, a totally evil thing would be simply non-existent, and thus the evil in the world, wherever it becomes complete, annihilates itself and that wherein it lodges. We may illustrate this thought by the nature of zero in mathematics, which is non-entity (since, added to numbers, it makes no difference) and yet has an annihilating force (since it reduces to zero all numbers that are multiplied by it). Even so evil is nothing and yet manifests itself in the annihilation of the things it qualifies. That which we cajl evil in the world is merely a tendency of things towards nothingness. Thus sickness is a tendency towards death, and death is simply the cessation of physical vitality. And sin is a tendency towards spiritual death, which is the cessation of spiritual vitality. But, since the ground of the soul is inde- structible, a complete cessation of its being is impossible ; and hence even the devils are not inherently bad. Were they such they would cease ipso facto to exist.

But, since the ground of the soul is inde- structible, a complete cessation of its being is impossible ; and hence even the devils are not inherently bad. Were they such they would cease ipso facto to exist.

Dionysius here touches incidentally on a mystical doctrine which, as developed by later writers, after- wards attained the greatest importance. This doctrine of a timeless self is the postulate, perhaps, of all Christian mysticism. The boldest expression of it is to be found in Eckhart and his disciple Tauler, who both say that even the lost souls in hell retain unaltered the ultimate nobility of their being. And lest this doctrine should be thought to trifle with

THE ruoin.EiM oj- evil 21

^ravc matters, be it remembered tliat the sinfulness and L^ravity of sin are simply due to this indestructible nobility of our beini;. Man cannot become non-moral, and hence his capacity for wickedness. The soul is potentially divine, and therefore may be actually Satanic. The very devils in hell cannot destroy the imai^c of the Godhead within them, and it is this imai^e that sin defiles.

It follows from the ultimate non-entity of evil that, in so far as it exists, it can only do so through being mingled with some element of good. To take an illustration given by Dionysius himself, where there is disease tliere is vitality, for when life ceases the sick- ness disappears in death. The ugliness of evil Ues precisely in the fact that it always, somehow or other, ^ consists in the corruption of something inherently good.

It is, however, this ugliness of things that Dionysius fails to emphasize, and herein lies the great weakness of his teaching. Not only does he, with the misguided zeal of an apologist, gloze deliberately over certain particular cruelties of the Creation and accept them as finite forms of good, but also he tends to explain away the very nature of evil in itself. He tends to be misled by his own true theories. For it is true that evil is ultimately non-existent. St. Augustine taught this when he said : " Sin is nought " ; ^ so did Julian of Norwich, who " saw not siril' because she believes " it hath no manner of substance nor any part of being." 2 The fault of Dionysius is the natural failure of his mental type to grasp the mere facts of the actual world as mere facts. He is so dazzled with his vision of ultimate Reality that he does not feel with any intensity the partial realities of this finite universe. Hence, though his theory of evil is, in the

^ Com. on St. John i. 13. Cf. Cojtf. vii. iS ; xii. ii. 2 Revelations oj Divine Love, xxvii.

2 2 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

main, true, he does not quite grasp the true apphcation of his theory to this world of actual facts.

Hence, though his theory of evil is, in the

^ Com. on St. John i. 13. Cf. Cojtf. vii. iS ; xii. ii. 2 Revelations oj Divine Love, xxvii.

2 2 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

main, true, he does not quite grasp the true apphcation of his theory to this world of actual facts.

For this world is by its very nature finite. And hence, if the evil in it is (as Dionysius rightly says) but partial, it must also be remembered (as he for a monient forgets) that its very existence is but partial. And, therefore, though evil is ultimately non-existent, yet the bad qualities of things may, so far as this present world is concerned, have as much reality, or at least as much actuality, as their good qualities. And when we say that evil is ultimately non-existent we merely mean that evil ought to have no actuality here, not that it has none. ' Dionysius calls evil a lapse and faihire of the creature's proper virtues. But a lapse or failure has in it something positive, as he in the same breath both admits by using the word and also tries to explain away. It is as positive as the virtues from which it lapses. The absence of light from the centre of a wooden block is nothing, for the light has no proper place there, but the absence of light from the air, where light should be, is darkness and is a visible shadow. St. Augustine has crystallized this truth in his famous epigram, quoted above in part, which runs in full as follows : " Sin is naught, and men are naughtes when they sin." The void left by the want of a good thing has a content consisting in the want. Probably had Dionysius seen more of the world's misery and sin he would have had a stronger sense of this fact. And in that case he would have given more prominence than he gives, in his extant writings at least, to the Cross of Christ.

Two things should, however, be borne in mind. In the first place he is writing for intellectual Christians in whom he can take for granted both an understanding of metaphysics and a horror of sin. To such readers the non-existence of evil could not

Tllli PROliLEM OF ] hness.

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the Good we express in a transcendent manner by negative images.^ And if it is reverent so to say, even that which is not desires the all-transcendent Good and struggles itself, by its denial of all things, to find its rest in the Good which verily transcends all being.

4. Nay, even the foundation and the bound- aries of the heavens (as we forgot to say while

For worldly wisdom = self-seeking, but the Wisdom of Christ = self- abandonment. In fact Heavenly Wisdom = Love. Cf. i Cor. i. 25 ; iii. 18, 19.

^ That which Is Not = Evil {vt'de infra in this chapter). Cf. Inlr., p. 20. The Good is Non-Existent as being beyond existence ; evil is non-existent as being contrary to it. Thus evil is by its very nature trying as it were to be Good.

Cf. i Cor. i. 25 ; iii. 18, 19.

Tnis also looks like a barren paradox and yet it may contain a spiritual truth. Evil is, in the words of Goethe, " ihe spirit that denies" : It is destructive, e.g. injustice, cruelty, immorality, etc., undermine or overwhelm civilization and so destroy it. But the Good supersedes civilization and so in a sense destroys it. Cf. the eschatological teach ing of Christ. Civilization, art, morality, etc., are good so lar as they go, but imperfect. Being halfway, as it were, between Good and evil, and being of necessity neither wholly the one nor wholly the other, they must disappear wherever the one or the other completely triumphs. Christ's teaching on Marriage illustrates this. Marriage is sacred, and divorce is wrong, because it seeks to abolish Marriage. And yet Marriage is finally abolished in heaven. St. Paul's antithesis of Law and Spirit is another example. The Law is good and yet is not the Good. Sin is contrary to the Law, but the Spirit is contrary to the Law in another sense and so supersedes it. So too with art. A modern vandal is indifferent to beauty because he is below it, a Mediaeval Saint became sometimes indifferent to beauty by rising to a super-sensuous plane above it. Greek idolatry is a higher thing than Calvinism, but the Christianity of the New Testament is a higher thing than Greek idolatry. The Saints sometimes employ negatives in one sense and those who are not saints employ the same negatives in another ; whence disaster. Much of Nietzsche's language {e. g. the ))hrase "Beyond Good and Evil") might have been used by a Mediaeval Christian Mystic ; but Nietzsche did not generally mean what the Christian Mystic would have meant by it. Soo too with pain. All pain is in itself bad, being a negation of our personality. And yet a self-abnegation springing from Love which bravely bears pain is the liighest kind of Good. " The devil . , . put it into the heart of Judas to betray" Christ, and yet the Passion was in accordance with " the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God."

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And yet a self-abnegation springing from Love which bravely bears pain is the liighest kind of Good. " The devil . , . put it into the heart of Judas to betray" Christ, and yet the Passion was in accordance with " the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God."

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thinkini^ of other matters) owe their oric,n"ii to the Good. Such is this universe, which lessens not nor grows, and such the noiseless movements (if noiseless they be)^ of the vast heavenly revolution, and such the starry orders whose light is fixed as an ornament of heaven, and such the various wander- ings of certain stars — especially the repeated and returning orbits of those two luminaries to which the Scripture giveth the name of '* Great," ^ whereby we reckon our days and nights and months and years ; which define the round of time and temporal events and give them measurement, sequence, and cohesion. And what shall I say concerning the sun's rays considered in themselves ? From the Good comes the light which is an image of Good- ness ; wherefore the Good is described by the name of " Light," being the archetype thereof which is revealed in that image. For as the Goodness of the all-transcendent Godhead reaches from the highest and most perfect forms of being unto the lowest, and still is beyond them all, remaining superior to those above and retaining those below in its embrace, and so gives light to all things that can receive It, and creates and vitalizes and maintains and perfects them, and is the Measure ^ of the Universe and its Eternity,^ its Numerical Principle,-^ its Order, its

^ 61 ovTw xph (pdvaL. D. is alluding to the ancient belief in the Music of the Spheres.

2 Gen. i. 16.

^ fierpov. All things have their pre-existcnt limits in the Super- Essence.

* alwv — 7.1?. The Permanent Principle underlying its temporal process. This and the next phrase explain what is meant by the words "the Measure of the universe." The Good sets bounds to the world (i) temporally, because Eternity is the Fount of Time, (2) spatially, because Transcendent Unity is the Fount of Number. All temporal things are permanent in God ; and all diversities are one in Him.

^ All number has its roots in the Good. Elsewhere D. says that the Good being beyond Unity, is a Multiplicity as well as an Unity. Cf. Intr., p. 5.

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All temporal things are permanent in God ; and all diversities are one in Him.

^ All number has its roots in the Good. Elsewhere D. says that the Good being beyond Unity, is a Multiplicity as well as an Unity. Cf. Intr., p. 5.

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Embracing Power, its Cause and its End : ^ even so this great, all-bright and ever-shining sun, which is the visible image of the Divine Goodness, faintly re- echoing the activity of the Good, illumines all things that can receive its light while retaining the utter simplicity of light, and expands above and below throughout the visible world the beams of its own radiance. And if there is aught that does not share them, this is not due to any weakness or deficiency in its distribution of the light, but is due to the unreceptiveness of those creatures which do not attain sufficient singleness to participate therein. For verily the light passeth over many such sub- stances and enlightens those which are beyond them, and there is no visible thing unto which the light reacheth not in the exceeding greatness of its proper radiance.^ Yea, and it contributes to the birth of material bodies and brings them unto life, and nourishes them that they may grow, and perfects and purifies and renews them. And the light is the measure and the numerical principle of seasons and of days and of all our earthly Time ; for 'tis the selfsame light (though then without a form) which, Moses the Divine declares, marked even that first period of three days which was at the beginning of time. And like as Goodness draweth all things to Itself, and is the great Attractive Power which unites things that are sundered ^ (being as It is : the God- head and the Supreme Fount and Producer of Unity) ;

^ Here we get once more the Aristotelian classification of causes. The Good is : —

(i) Formal Cause (i) immanent in the world (Order — Ti\i%); (2) containing the world (Embracing Power — Trepioxv)-

(ii) Efficient Cause (Cause — alria).

(iii) Final Cause (End — reAos).

^ The lii^ht permeates water but it does not permeate a stone. It passes over the stone and permeates the water beyond it.

•* apxiavvayuiyos iari twv effKebaff/xevwu.

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(iii) Final Cause (End — reAos).

^ The lii^ht permeates water but it does not permeate a stone. It passes over the stone and permeates the water beyond it.

•* apxiavvayuiyos iari twv effKebaff/xevwu.

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and like as all thiiii^s desire It as their bcginniiii^, their cohesive power and end ; and like as 'tis the Good (as saith the Scripture) from which all thini^s were made and are (having been brought into exist- ence thence as from a Perfect Cause) ; and like as in the Good all things subsist, being kept and controlled in an almight}' Receptacle ; ^ and like as unto the Good all things are turned (as unto the proper End of each) ; and Hke as after the Good all things do yearn — those that have mind and reason seeking It by knowledge, those that have perception seeking It by perception, those that have no perception seek- ing It by the natural movement of their vital instinct, and those that are without life and have mere existence seeking It by their aptitude for that bare participation whence this mere existence is theirs ^ — even so doth the light (being as it were Its visible image) draw together all things and attract them unto Itself: those that can see, those that have motion, those that receive Its light and warmth, those that are merely held in being by Its rays ; ^ whence the sun is so called because it summeth*^ all things and uniteth the scattered elements of the w^orld. All material things desire the sun, for they desire either to see or to move and to receive light and warmth and to be maintained in existence by the light. I say not (as was feigned by the ancient myth) that the sun is the God and Creator of this Universe, and therefore takes the visible world under his special care ; but I say that the " invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things

^ i'S ej/ iTavroKpaTopiK(f TrvO/xepi. ~ (1) Man, (2) Animal, (3) Vegetable, (4) Matter. ^ This seems to imply that matter itself could not exist without the influence of the light. Perhaps this belief rests on Gen. i. i, 2. ■* r,\ios oTi TTOLvra aoWrj irotel. With the wa?/ etymology of. iv .5.

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that are made, even His eternal power and God- head." 1

5. But these things are dealt with in the'' Symbolic Divinity." Here I desire to declare what is the spiritual meaning of the name " Light " as belonging to the Good.^ The Good God is called Spiritual Light because He fills every heavenly mind with spiritual light, and drives all ignorance and error from all souls where they have gained a lodgment, and giveth them all a share of holy light and purges their spiritual eyes from the mist of ignorance that sur- rounds them, and stirs and opens the eyes which are fast shut and weighed down with darkness, and gives them first a moderate illumination, then (when they taste the Light and desire It more) He giveth Himself in cfreatcr measure and shineth in more

abundance on them " because they have loved much," and ever He constraineth them according to their powers of looking upwards.

6. And so that Good which is above all light is called a Spiritual Light because It is an Originating Beam and an Overflowing Radiance, illuminating with its fullness every Mind above the world, around it, or within it,^ and renewing all their spiritual powers, embracing them all by Its transcendent com- pass and exceeding them all by Its transcendent elevation. And It contains within Itself, in a simple form, the entire ultimate principle of light ; '^ and is

^ Rom. i. 20. The sun is not personal or supra- personal. But its impersonal activity is an emblem, as it were, of God's supra-personal activity.

^ Two worlds : (i) Nature, (2) Grace. God is revealed in both ; the former was apparently the subject oi \ht Symbolic Divinity; the latter is that of the present treatise.

^ i.e. Men and different orders of angels.

* Material lic^lit is diffused in space and hence is divisible. The Spiritual Light is indivisible, being totally present to each illuminated mind. Hence the Spiritual Light is simple in a way that the material light is not.

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the Transcendent Archetype of Light ; and, while bearing; the h'i;ht in its womb, It exceeds it in qiiah'ty and precedes it in time ; and so conjoineth together all spiritual and rational beings, uniting them in one.^ For as ignorance leadeth wanderers astray from one another, so doth the presence of Spiritual Light join and unite together those that are being illuminated, and perfects them and converts them toward that which truly Is — yea, converts them from their mani- fold false opinions and unites their different percep- tions, or rather fancies, into one true, pure and coherent knowledge, and filleth them with one unifying light.

7. This Good is described by the Sacred Writers as Beautiful and as Beauty, as Love or Beloved, and by all other Divine titles which befit Its beautifying and gracious fairness. Now there is a distinction between the titles " Beautiful " and " Beauty " applied to the all-embracing Cause. For we universally dis- tinguish these two titles as meaning respectively the qualities shared and the objects which share therein. We give the name of " Beautiful " to that which shares in the quality of beauty, and we give the name of " Beauty " to that common quality by which all beautiful things are beautiful. But the Super- Essential Beautiful is called " Beauty" because of that quality which It imparts to all things severally ac- cording to their nature,^ and because It is the Cause of the harmony and splendour in all things, flashing forth upon them all, like light, the beautifying com- munications of Its originating ray ; and because It summons all things to fare unto Itself (from whence It hath the name of '* Fairness "2), and because It

^ All our spiritual and mental powers are due to the same Spiritual Light working in each one of us. Cf. Wordsworth: "Those mys- teries of Being which have made and shall continue evermore to make of the whole human race one brotherhood."

2 Cf. ii. 8.

' uiS iravra irphs eavrh KaKovv {oQfv koX kolWos \4yeTai). Cf. iv. 4.

96 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

draws all things together in a state of mutual inter- penetration. And it is called " Beautiful " because It is All-Beautiful and more than Beautiful, and is eternally, unvaryingly, unchangeably Beautiful ; in- capable of birth or death or growth or decay ; and not beautiful in one part and foul in another ; nor yet at one time and not at another ; nor yet beautiful in relation to one thing but not to another ; nor yet beautiful in one place and not in another (as if It were beautiful for some but were not beautiful for others); nay, on the contrary. It is, in Itself and by Itself, uniquely and eternally beautiful, and from beforehand It contains in a transcendent manner the originating beauty of everything that is beautiful. For in the simple and supernatural nature belonging to the world of beautiful things,^ all beauty and all that is beautiful hath its unique and pre-existent Cause. From this Beautiful all things possess their existence, each kind being beautiful in its own manner, and the Beautiful causes the harmonies and sympa- thies and communities of all things. And by the Beautiful all things are united together and the Beau- tiful is the beginning of all things, as being the Creative Cause which moves the world and holds all things in existence by their yearning for their own Beauty. And It is the Goal of all things, and their Beloved, as being their Final Cause (for 'tis the desire of the Beautiful that brings them all into existence), and It is their Exemplar^ from which they derive their definite limits; and hence the Beautiful is the

^ The ultimate nature of all beautiful things is a simple and super- natural Element common to them all and manifested in them all. The law of life is that it has its true and ultimate being outside it. The true beauty of all beautiful things is outside them in God. Hence all great art (even when not directly religious) tends towards the Super- natural or hns a kind of supernatural atmosphere.

^ 7rapaSei7fiaTi/foV — i.e. the ultimate Law of their being, the Idea or 1 yj^e.

Till' DIVINE NAMES 97

The true beauty of all beautiful things is outside them in God. Hence all great art (even when not directly religious) tends towards the Super- natural or hns a kind of supernatural atmosphere.

^ 7rapaSei7fiaTi/foV — i.e. the ultimate Law of their being, the Idea or 1 yj^e.

Till' DIVINE NAMES 97

same as the Good, inasmuch as all thinc^s, in all causation, desire the Beautiful and Good ; nor is there anythiui^ in the world but hath a share in the l^eau- tiful and Good. Moreover our Discourse will dare to aver that even the Non-Kxistent ^ shares in the Beautiful and Good, for Non-Existence ^ is itself beautiful and good when, by the Negation of all Attributes, it is ascribed Super-Essentially to God. This One Good and Beautiful is in Its oneness the Cause of all the many beautiful and good things. Hence comes the bare existence of all things, and hence their unions,^ their differentiations, their identi- ties, their differences,** their similarities, their dissimi- larities, their communions of opposite things,^ the unconfused distinctions of their interpenetrating elements ; ^ the providences of the Superiors,'' the interdependence of the Co-ordinates, the responses of the Inferiors,^ the states of permanence wherein all keep their own identity. And hence again the intercommunion of all things according to the power of each ; their harmonies and sympathies (which do not merge them) and the co-ordinations of the whole

^ rh liiT] tiv — i.e. that mere nothingness which is maniTested either as (i) formless "matter" or (2) evil. See Intr., p. 20.

'^ Evil is non-existent in one sense. Tlie Good is Non-Existent in another. Cf. p. 90, n. i.

^ evwcrets, SiaKpiaeis, TavroTTjres, erepc^TTyTey.

* Hence parts are united into wholes and wholes articulated into parts, and hence each thing is identical with iiself and distinct from everything else.

^ e.^. Moisture interpenetrates the solid earth.

^ e.£. In a piece of wet ground the water ii water and the earth is earth.

' at irpovoiai toov vireprepccv. Lit, "the providences," etc., e.^Q: the influence of the light without which, D. holds, the material world could not exist. Or this and the following may refer to different ranks of angels, or to angels and men.

^ at iiTi(TTpo s ipwTOJv. I have ventured to amend fpwTwv to epwT€s. If the MS from which the received text is derived belonged to a family having seventeen or eighteen letters to a line then this word would probably come at the end of a line (since there are 260 letters to the end of it, from the beginning of the section), and would have the 6v- of uvrws just above it and the -ov- of ahTov6r\roi just above that, and ipwrwv at the end of the line next but one above that. This would make the corruption of epwres into ^pwTwv very natural.

. THE DIVINE NAMES 109

This would make the corruption of epwres into ^pwTwv very natural.

. THE DIVINE NAMES 109

powers, over which the entire mastery and primacy is in that Incomprehensible Causation of all yearnini^ which Cometh from lieyond them all, and whereunto the universal yearning of all creatures presseth upwards according to the nature of each."

17. Words of the same, from the same Hymns of Yeanling. " Let us once more collect these powers into one and declare that there is but One Simple Power Which of Itself moveth all things to be mingled in an unity, starting from the Good and going unto the lowest of the creatures and thence again returning through all stages in due order unto the Good, and thus revolving from Itself, and through Itself and upon Itself^ and towards Itself, in an unceasing orbit."

18. Now some one, perhaps, will say: "If the

^ "That which is not "= formless matter. Plotinus {^S//;/. i. 8. 3) defines the Non-Existent as the world of sense- perception. It is, as it were, the stuff" of which all things perceived by the senses are made. This stuff" cannot exist without some kind of " form," and therefore, if entirely bereft of all " form," would simply disappear into nothingness. Thus, apart from that element of "form" which it derives from the Good, it is sheer Non-Entity.

Each individual thing consists of "matter" and "form" — i.e. of this indeterminate "stuff" and of the particular qualities belonging to that thing. Remove those qualities and the thing is destroyed : e.g. remove the colours, shape, etc., of a tree, and the tree becomes non- existent. It crumbles into dust, and thus the "stuff" takes on a new form. If, as M. Le Bon maintains, material particles sometimes lose their material qualities and are changed into energy, in such a case the " stuff"" lakes on yet another kind of form. The individual thing, in every case, becomes non-existent when it loses its "form," or the sum total of its individual qualities, but the "stuff" persists because it at once assumes another "form."

Hence this "stuff," being non-existent /^r se., draws its existence from the Good Which is the Source of all "form." And thus the existence of this non-existent stuff is ultimately contained in the Good.

D. tries to prove that evil is non-existent by showing that there is nothing that can have produced it. Good cannot have produced it because a thing cannot produce its own opposite ; evil cannot have produced itself because evil is always destructive and never productive. All things that exist are produced by the Good or the desire for the Good — which comes to the same thing.

no DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

All things that exist are produced by the Good or the desire for the Good — which comes to the same thing.

no DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

Beautiful and Good is an Object of Yearning and desire and love to all (for even that which is not longs for It, as was said,^ and strives to find its rest therein, and thus It creates a form even in formless things and thus is said super-essentially to contain, and does so contain, the non-existent) '^ — if this is so, how is it that the company of the devils desires not the Beautiful and Good, but, being inclined towards matter and fallen far from the fixed angelic state of desire for the Good, becomes a cause of all evils to itself and to all other beings which we describe as becoming evil ? How is it that the devils, having been produced wholly out of the Good, are not good in disposition ? Or how is it that, if produced good from out of the Good, they became changed ? ^ What made them

^ The "matter" or stuff of which the universe is made, exists ultimately in the Good, but evil does not. All force exists ultimately in the Good, but the warping of it, or the lawlessness of it (which is the evil of it), does not exist in the Good. P'orce, or energy, as such is a relative embodiment of the Absolute : evil as such is a contradiction of the Absolute.

^ i. e. There is an element of good in evil things enabling them to cohere and so to exist. In this passage " Non- Existent " is used in three senses: (i) "Matter," or force, cannot exist without some form (which is its complement) and therefore is technically called non- existent. (2) Evil cannot exist at all on the ultimate plane of Being, nor in this world without an admixture of good (which is its contrary) and therefore is in an absolute sense non-existent. (3) The Good is beyond all existence and therefore is by transcendence Non-Existent.

^ The Good is beyond this world and beyond the stuff, or force, of which this world is made.

Evil, on the other hand, is below this world and the stuff composing it. Get rid of the limitations in this world {sc. the difference between one quality and another) and you have an energy or force possessing all the particular qualities of things fused in one. Get rid of the limitations inherent in this (/. e. intensify it to infinity) and you have the Good. On the other hand, destroy some particular object {e.s:^. a tree), and that object, being now actually non-existent, has still a potential existence in the world-stuff. Destroy that potential existence and you have absolute non-existence, which is Evil.

Thus the three grades may be tabulated as follows :

(i) Transcendent Non-Exislence (= the Good).

(li) Actual Non-Existence ( = the woild stuff, force or energy, of

THE DIVINE NAMES in

Destroy that potential existence and you have absolute non-existence, which is Evil.

Thus the three grades may be tabulated as follows :

(i) Transcendent Non-Exislence (= the Good).

(li) Actual Non-Existence ( = the woild stuff, force or energy, of

THE DIVINE NAMES in

evil, and indeed what is the nature of evil ? h'roni what orii^in did it arise and in what thing doth it lie? Why dici He that is Good will to produce it? And how, havini;- so willed, was He able so to do?^ And if evil comes from some other cause, what other cause can anythinc^ have excepting the Good ? How, if there is a Providence, doth evil exist, or arise at all, or escape destruction ? And why doth anything in the world desire it instead of Good ? "

19. Thus perhaps will such bewildered discourse speak. Now we will bid the questioner look towards the truth of things, and in the first place we will venture thus to answer : " Evil cometh not of the Good ; and if it cometh therefrom it is not evil. For even as fire cannot cool us, so Good cannot produce the things which are not good. And if all things that have being come from the Good (for it is natural to the Good to produce and preserve the creatures, and natural to evil to corrupt and to destroy them) then nothing in the world cometh of evil. Then evil can-

whicli material particles are a form. Modern science teaches that atoms have no actual existence. Thus the atomic theory has worked round to something very much like D.'s theory of the non-existent world stuff).

(iii) Absolute Non-Existencc ( ~ Evil).

The three grades might be expressed Ijy a numerical symbol as follows : If finite numbers represent the various lorms of existence, the Infinity (which contradicts the laws of finite numbers) = the Good: Unity (which is a mere abstraction and cannot exist apart from multi- plicity since every finite unit is divisible into parts) = the world stuff : Zero (which annihilates all finite numbers that are multiplied by it) = Evil.

^ The argument in the rest of the section is as follows :

Evil exists, for there is a radical difference between virtue and vice. I-.vil is, in fact, not merely negative, but positive : not merely destructive, but also productive. And hence it is necessary to the perfection of the world. To which D. replies in the next section that evil does not exist qua evil, nor is it positive or productive qua evil. It exists and is positive and productive solely through an admixture of the Good. (We might illustrate this by the fact that Zero, multiplied by Infinity, produces finite number.)

112 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

It exists and is positive and productive solely through an admixture of the Good. (We might illustrate this by the fact that Zero, multiplied by Infinity, produces finite number.)

112 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

not even in any wise exist, if it act as evil upon itself. And unless it do so act, evil is not wholly evil, but hath some portion of the Good whereby it can exist at all. And if the things that have being desire" the Beautiful and Good and accomplish all their acts for the sake of that which seemeth good, and if all that they intend hath the Good as its Motive and its Aim (for nothing looks unto the nature of evil to guide it in its actions), what place is left for evil among things that have being, or how can it have any being at all bereft of such good purpose ? And if all things that have being come of the Good and the Good is Beyond things that have being, then, whereas that which exists not yet hath being in the Good ; evil con- trariwise hath none (otherwise it were not wholly evil or Non-Ens ; for that which is wholly Non-Ens can be but naught except this be spoken Super-Essentially of the Good). So the Good must have Its seat far above and before that which hath mere being and that which hath not ; but evil hath no place either amongst things that have being or things that have not, yea it is farther removed than the Non-Existent from the Good and hath less being than it. ' Then ' (saith one perchance) 'whence cometh evil ? For if (saith he) ' evil is not, virtue and vice must needs be the same both in their whole entirety and in their corresponding particulars,' — i. e. even that which fighteth against virtue cannot be evil. And yet temperance is the opposite of debauchery, and right- eousness of wickedness. And I mean not only the righteous and the unrighteous man, or the temperate and intemperate man ; I mean that, even before the external distinction appeared between the virtuous man and his opposite, the ultimate distinction between the virtues and the vices hath existed long beforehand in the soul itself, and the passions war against the reason, and hence wc must assume something evil

THE DIVINE NAMES 113

whicli is contrary to goodness. For goodness is not contrary to itself, but, being come from One l^cginning and being the offspring of One Cause, it rejoices in fellowship, unity, and concord. Even the lesser Good is not contrary to the greater, for that: which is less hot or cold is not contrary to that which is more so. Wherefore evil lieth in the things that have being and possesseth being and is opposed and contrary to good- ness. And if evil is the destruction of things which have being, that depriveth it not of its own being. It itself still hath being and giveth being to its offspring. Yea, is not the destruction of one thing often the birth of another } And thus it will be found that evil maketh contribution unto the fullness of the world, and through its presence, saveth the universe from imperfection."

It itself still hath being and giveth being to its offspring. Yea, is not the destruction of one thing often the birth of another } And thus it will be found that evil maketh contribution unto the fullness of the world, and through its presence, saveth the universe from imperfection."

20. The true answer whereunto will be that evil (q?ia evil) causes no existence or birth, but only debases and corrupts, so far as its power extends, the substance of things that have being. And if any one says that it is productive, and that by the destruction of one thing it giveth birth to somewhat else, the true answer is that it doth not so qua destructive. Qua destructive and evil it only destroys and debases ; but it taketh upon it the form of birth and essence through the action of the Good. Thus evil will be found to be a destructive force in itself, but a productive force through the action of the Good. Qua evil it neither hath being nor confers it ; through the action of the Good, it hath being (yea, a good being) and confers being on good things. Or rather (since we cannot call the same thing both good and bad in the same relations, nor are the destruction and birth of the same thing the same function or faculty, whether pro- ductive or destructive, working in the same relations), Evil in itself hath neither being, goodness, productive- ness, nor power of creating things which have being

114 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

and goodness ; the Good, on the other hand, wherever It becomes perfectly present, creates perfect, universal and untainted manifestations of goodness ; while the things which have a lesser share therein are imperfect manifestations of goodness and mixed with other elements through lack of the Good. In fine, evil is not in any wise good, nor the maker of good ; but every thing must be good only in proportion as it approacheth more or less unto the Good, since the perfect Goodness penetrating all things reacheth not onl}' to the wholly good beings around It, but extendeth even unto the lowest things, being entirely present unto some, and in a lower measure to others, and unto others in lowest measure, according as each one is capable of participating therein.^ Some creatures participate wholly in the Good, others are lacking in It less or more, and others possess a still fainter participation therein, while to others the Good is present as but the faintest echo. F'or if the Good were not present only in a manner proportioned unto each, then the divinest and most honourable things would be no higher than the lowest ! And how, pray, could all things liave a uniform share in the Good, since not all are equally fit to share entirely therein ? But in truth the exceeding greatness of the power of the Good is shown by this — that It giveth power even to the things which lack It, yea even unto that very lack itself, inasmuch as even here is to be found some kind of participation in It.^ And, if we must needs

But in truth the exceeding greatness of the power of the Good is shown by this — that It giveth power even to the things which lack It, yea even unto that very lack itself, inasmuch as even here is to be found some kind of participation in It.^ And, if we must needs

^ D. is no pantheist. According to Pantheism God is equally present in all things. Thus Pantheism is a debased form of the hnmanence doctrine, as Calvinism is a debased form of the Tran- scendence doctrine. In the one case we get Immanence without Transcendence : in the other Transcendence without Immanence. D. holds a Transcendent Immanence (cf. Bradley, Appearance and Reality ^ rebutting cliarge of Pantheism).

2 e. g. The cruelty of Nature seems to show Intelligence ; and Intelligence per se is a good thing.

TIIK DIVINE NAMES 115

boldly spccik the truth, even the thini^s that fii^ht ay;ainst It possess throui^h Its power their beini; and their capability to flight. Or rather, U) speak shcjrtly, all creatures in so far as they have beini^ are good and come from the Good, and in so far as they are deprived of the Good, neither are good nor have they being.^ For in the case of other qualities, such as heat or cold, the things which have been warmed have their being even when they lose their warmth, and many of the creatures there are which have no life or mind ; and in like manner God transcendeth all being and so is Super-Essential ; ^ and generally, in all other cases, though the quality be gone or hath never been present, the creatures yet have being and can subsist ; but that which is utterly bereft of the Good never had, nor hath, nor ever shall have, no nor can have any sort of being whatever. For instance, the depraved sinner, though bereft of the Good by his brutish desire, is in this respect unreal and desires unrealities ; but still he hath a share in the Good in so far as there is in him a distorted reflection of true Love and Communion.^ And anger hath a share in the Good, in so far as it is a movement which seeks to remedy apparent evils, converting them to that which appears to be fair. And even he that desires the basest life, yet in so far as he feels desire at all and feels desire for life, and intends what he thinks the best kind of life, so far participates in the Good. And if you wholly destroy the Good, there v/ill be neither being, life, desire, nor motion, or any other thing. Hence the birth of fresh

^ All evil things contain the seed of their own decay, and so tend to non-existence. The arrogance and cruelty of the Germans has been their weakness, as discipline and self-sacrifice has been their strength.

* God exists without Essence, as an object can exist without this particular quality or that.

^ D. is thinkinsj; especially of carnal sin. Such sin is a depraved form of that which, in its true purity, is a mystery, symbolizing the Unitive Life.

ii6 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

* God exists without Essence, as an object can exist without this particular quality or that.

^ D. is thinkinsj; especially of carnal sin. Such sin is a depraved form of that which, in its true purity, is a mystery, symbolizing the Unitive Life.

ii6 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

life out of destruction is not the function of evil but is the presence of Good in a lesser form, even as disease is a disorder, yet not the destruction of all order, for if this happen the disease itself will not exist.^ But the disease remains and exists. Its essence is order reduced to a ininiuium ; and in this it consists. For that which is utterly without the Good hath neither being nor place amongst the things that are in being ; but that which is of mixed nature owes to the Good its place among things in being, and hath this place

' amongst them and hath being just so far as it partici- pates in the Good. Or rather all things in being will have their being more or less in proportion as they participate in the Good. For so far as mere Being is concerned, that which hath not being in any respect will not exist at all ; that which hath being in one respect but not in another doth not exist in so far as it hath fallen away from the everlasting Being ; while in so far as it hath a share of being, to that extent it exists ; and thus both an element of existence and an element of non-existence in it are kept and preserved. So too with evil. That which is utterly fallen from Good can have no place either in the things which are more good or in the things which are less so. That which is good in one respect but not in another is at war with some particular good but not with the whole of the Good. It also is preserved by the admixture of the Good, and thus the Good giveth existence to the lack of Itself through some element of Itself being present there. For if the Good be entirely removed, there will not remain aught at all, either good or mixed or absolutely bad. For if evil is imperfect Goodness, the perfect absence of the Good will

^ remove both the perfect and the imperfect Good, and evil will only exist and appear because, while it is evil in relation to one kind of good (being the contrary

^ A diseased body siill lives, Death ends the disease.

THE DIVINE NAME.^ 117

thereof), yet it depends for its existence on another kind of c^ood and, to that extent, is jrood itself. 1^'or things of the same kind cannot ^ be wholly contra- dictory to one another in the same respects. ^ Hence evil is Non-Existent.

THE DIVINE NAME.^ 117

21. Neither inhereth evil in existent creatures.^ For if all creatures are from the Good, and the Good is in them all and embraces them all, either evil can have no place amonij^st the creatures, or else it must have a place in the Good."* Now it cannot inhere in the Good, any more than cold can inhere in fire ; just so the quality of becoming evil cannot inhere in that which turns even evil into good. And if evil doth inhere in the Good, what will the mode of its inher- ence be? If you say: It comcth of the Good, I answer : That is absurd and impossible. For (as the infallible Scriptures say), a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor yet is the converse possible. But if it Cometh not of the Good, it is plainly from another origin and cause. Either evil must come from the Good, or the Good from evil, or else (if this is impossible) both the Good and evil must be from another origin or cause. For no duality can be an>/ origin: some unity must be the origin of all duality. And yet it is absurd to suppose that two entirely

^ Exuberant vitality is per se a good thing and the more exuberant the better, though, like all good things, it is dangerous, and unless properly directed is disastrous.

2 If good and evil are both existent, they are, to that extent, both of the same kind ; which is impossible.

3 So far D. has been showing that evil is not an ultimate principle, being neither (i) identical with the Good, nor (2)self-subsistent. Now he argues that it is not a necessary element in any created thing : neither in their existence as such, nor in any particular kind of creature.

* D. rambles characteristically, but the general argument is plain. All existence is from the Good. Hence, if evil is inherent in the nature of existence, evil is from the Good. Thus D. meets again and ]:)roceeds to lay the ghost of a theory which he has already elaborately slain in the previous section.

ii8 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

All existence is from the Good. Hence, if evil is inherent in the nature of existence, evil is from the Good. Thus D. meets again and ]:)roceeds to lay the ghost of a theory which he has already elaborately slain in the previous section.

ii8 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

opposite things can owe their birth and their being to the same thing. This would make the origin itself not a simple unity but divided, double, self-contra- dictory and discordant. Nor again is it possible that the world should have two contradictory origins, existing in each other and in the whole and mutually at strife. For,^ were this assumed, God ^ cannot be free from pain, nor without a feeling of ill, since there would be something causing Him trouble, yea, all things must in that case be in a state of disorder and perpetual strife ; whereas the Good imparts a principle of harmony to all things and is called by the Sacred Writers Peace and the Bestower of Peace. And hence it is that all good things display a mutual attraction and harmony, and are the offspring of one I.ife and are disposed in fellowship towards one Good, and are kindly, of like nature, and benignant to one another. And so evil is not in God,^ and is not divine. Nor Cometh it of God. For either He is not good, or else He worketh goodness and bringeth good things unto

^ Having just given a metaphysical argument for the non-existence of evil, D. now gives an argument drawn from the actual nature of the universe and of God's creative activity.

Tliis argument is not so satisfactory as the metaphysical one, for, under all the harmony of the world, there is perpetual strife, and the Cross of Christ reveals God as suffering pain. " Christ is in an agony and will be till the end of the world " [Pascal).

The metaphysical argument is sound because metaphysics deal with ultimate ideals, and evil is ultimately or ideally non-existent. The argument from actual facts is unsound because evil is actually existent. Much wrong thinking on the subject of evil is due to a confusion of ideal with actual non-existence. D. here seems to fall into this mistake.

* D. here uses the name " God " because he is thinking of the Absolute or the Good, not in Its ultimate Nature, but in Its emanating or creative activity, in which the Personal Differentiations of the 'I'rinity appear. See II. 7.

' i. e. Evil does not arise through the passage of the (jood from Suj)er-I']ssence into Essence. It is not in the Good through the Good submitting to the conditions of existence (O. has already shown that evil has no place in the ultimate Super-Essential Nature of the Good).

TTTE DIVINE NAMES 119

e. Evil does not arise through the passage of the (jood from Suj)er-I']ssence into Essence. It is not in the Good through the Good submitting to the conditions of existence (O. has already shown that evil has no place in the ultimate Super-Essential Nature of the Good).

TTTE DIVINE NAMES 119

existence. Nor acts lie thus only at some times and not at others, or only in the case of some thinj^s but not of all. For were He to act thus, He must suffer a chani^e and alteration, and that in respect of the divincst quality of all — causality. And if the Good is in God as His very substance, God must, in chani;- ing from the Good, sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. Doubtless if you feign that He hath the Good by mere participation therein, and derives It from another, in that case He will, forsooth, sometimes possess It and sometimes not possess It.^ Evil, there- fore, doth not come from God, nor is it in God either absolutely or temporally.^

22. Neither inhereth evil in the angels. ^ For if the good angel declares the Divine Goodness, he is in a secondary manner and by participation that which the Subject of his message is in a primary and causal manner."^ And thus the angel is an image of God, a manifestation of the invisible light, a burnished mirror, bright, untarnished, without spot or blemish, receiving (if it is reverent to say so) all the beauty of the Absolute Divine Goodness, and (so far as may be) kindling in itself, with unallowed radiance, the Goodness of the Secret Silence. Hence evil inhereth not in the angels ; they are evil only in so far as they must punish sinners. But in this respect even those who chastise wTong-doers are evil, and so are the priests who exclude the profane man from the Divine

^ This is a reductio ad absurdnm. D. considers it obvious that God possesses the Good as His Substance and not by participation. The Persons of the Trinity are not products of the Absolute but Emanations or Differentiations of It.

* The argument is as follows : No evil is from God. All existence is from God. Therefore no existence is evil.

•* Having shown that existence as such is not inherently evil, D. now takes various forms of existence and shows that none of them is, as such, inherently evil.

* Cf. Old Testament title, " Sons of God," and D. on Deification. Cf. also " I have said, Ve are Gods."

120 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

Mysteries. But, indeed, 'tis not the suffering of the punishment that is evil but the being worthy thereof; nor yet is a just exclusion from the sacrifices evil, but to be guilty and unholy and unfit for those pure mysteries is evil.

also " I have said, Ve are Gods."

120 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

23. Nor are the devils naturally evil. For, were they such, they would not have sprung from the Good, nor have a place amongst existent creatures, nor have fallen from Goodness (being by their very nature always evil). Moreover, are they evil with respect to themselves or to others.-* If the former^ they must also be self-destructive ; if the latter, how do they destroy, and what do they destroy P^ Do they destroy Essence, or Faculty, or Activity?^ If Essence, then, first, they cannot destroy it contrary to its own nature ; for they cannot destroy things which by their nature are indestructible, but only the things which are capable of destruction. And, secondly, destruction itself is not evil in every case and under all circumstances. Nor can any existent thing be destroyed so far as its being and nature act ; for its destruction is due to a failure of its natural order, whereby the principle of harmony and symmetry grows weak and so cannot remain unchanged.* But

^ i. e. If totally and essentially by very nature evil with respect to themselves. In so far as they continue to exist they are good with respect to themselves.

2 Evil is the contrary of the Good. Hence since the Good is by Its very nature productive, evil must be destructive. Hence the devils, if essentially evil, must be essentially destructive. Now they are not essentially self-destructive, for, were they such, they could not exist. Therefore, if essentially evil, they must under ail circumstances be destructive of other things.

* The essence of (^. ^^.) an apple-tree is self-identity ; its faculty is its latent power of producing leaves, apples, etc. ; its activity is the actual production of the leaves, apples, etc.

* ( I ) The devils do not destroy all things {c. g. they do not annihilate the human soul). Therefore they are not essentially evil. Evil passions are good things misdirected. (2) Often the destruction of a thing is beneficial {e.g. the falling of the faded leaf). In fact, nothing could be

TTTK DIVINE NAMES 12I

g. they do not annihilate the human soul). Therefore they are not essentially evil. Evil passions are good things misdirected. (2) Often the destruction of a thing is beneficial {e.g. the falling of the faded leaf). In fact, nothing could be

TTTK DIVINE NAMES 12I

the weakness is not complete ; for, were it complete, it would have annihilated both the process of destruc- tion and the object which suffers it : and such a destruction as this must be self-destructive. Hence such a qualit}' is not evil but imperfect good ; for that which is wholly destitute of the Good can have no place among things that have being.^ And the same is true of destruction when it works upon a I faculty or activity. Moreover, how can the devils be evil since they are sprung from God ? For the Good produceth and createth good things. But it may -be j^ said that they are called evil not in so far as they exist (for they are from the Good and had a good l, existence given them), but in so far as they do not '' exist, having been unable (as the Scripture saith) to ^ keep their original state. For in what, pray, do we consider the wickedness of the devils to consist except their ceasing from the quality and activity of divine virtues? Otherwise, if the devils are naturally evil, they must be always evil. But evil is unstable." Hence if they are always in the same condition, they are not evil ; for to remain always the same is a property of the Good. But if they are not always evil, then they are not evil by their natural constitu- tion, but only through a lack of angelic virtues.^ Hence they are not utterly without the Good, seeing that they exist and live and form intuitions and have

destroyed if it had not grown feeble and so become worthy to be destroyed. (D. here, in his zeal to explain evil away, countenances the ])ase doctrine that might is right. What is wrong with the whole system of the universe is that its underlying law is the survival of the fittest. The enlightened conscience of humanity rebels against this law. )

^ The weakness is an imperfect good, and therefore the process of destruction which co-operates with the weakness is an imperfect good.

- The (jood is permanent. Hence its contrary must be unstable.

^ Evil is essentially a negative and self-contradictory thing. Its very permanence would be opposed to its own nature and would be due to an element of the Good within it.

112 DlONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

- The (jood is permanent. Hence its contrary must be unstable.

^ Evil is essentially a negative and self-contradictory thing. Its very permanence would be opposed to its own nature and would be due to an element of the Good within it.

112 DlONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

within them any movement of desire at all ; but they are called evil because they fail in the exercise of their natural activity. The evil in them is therefore a warping, a declension from their right condition ; a failure, an imperfection, an impotence, and a weakness, loss and lapse of that power which would preserve their perfection in them. Moreover what is the evil in the devils ? Brutish wrath, blind desire, headstrong fancy. But these qualities, even though they exist in the devils, are not wholly, invariably, and essentially evil. For in other living creatures, not the possession of these qualities but their loss is destructive of the creature and hence is evil ; while their possession preserves the creature and enables the creature pos- sessing them to exist. Hence the devils are not evil in so far as they fulfil their nature, but in so far as they do not. Nor hath the Good bestowed complete upon them been changed ; rather have they fallen from the completeness of that gift. And we maintain that the angelic gifts bestowed upon them have never themselves suffered change, but are unblemished in their perfect brightness, even if the devils themselves do not perceive it through blinding their faculties of spiritual perception.^ Thus, so far as their existence is concerned, they possess it from the Good, and are naturally good, and desire the Beautiful and Good in desiring existence, life, and intuition, which are existent things. And they are called evil through the deprivation and the loss whereby they have lapsed from their proper virtues. And hence they are evil in so far as they do not exist ; and in desiring evil they desire that which is non-existent.

24. But perhaps some one will say that human

^ There is a timeless ground in all personalities, and this ground is good. Eckhart and Tauler say that even the souls in hell possess eternally the divjne root of their true being. Ruysbroeck says, this divine root does not of itself make us blessed, but merely makes us exist.

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souls are the seat of evil. Now if the reason alleged is that they have contact with evil temptations when they take forethoii ut (in a sense) it exists in the Persons of the Trinity and between them and the world, and hence from Them comes Absolute Wiscjpm^ though the Godhead transcends it.

TlIK DIVINE NAMES 147

Now if the reason alleged is that they have contact with evil temptations when they take forethoii ut (in a sense) it exists in the Persons of the Trinity and between them and the world, and hence from Them comes Absolute Wiscjpm^ though the Godhead transcends it.

TlIK DIVINE NAMES 147

been as a luminary both to us and to our teacher) when lie says : " The foolishness of God is wiser than men." ^ And these worJs are true not only because all human thoui^^ht is a kind of error when compared with the immovable permanence of the perfect thoui^^hts which belong to God, but also because it is customary for writers on Divinity to apply negative terms to God in a sense contrary to the usual one. For instance, the Scripture calls the Light that shines on all things '*Terrible,"and Him that hath many Titles and many Names "Ineffable" and "Nameless," and Him that is present to all things and to be discovered from them all "Incomprehensible" and "Unsearch- able." In the same manner, it is thought, the divine Apostle, on the present occasion, when he speaks of God's " foolishness," is using in a higher sense the ap- parent strangeness and absurdity implied in the word, so as to hint at the ineffable Truth which is before all Reason. But, as I have said elsewhere, we misinter- pret things above us by our own conceits and cling to the familiar notions of our senses, and, measuring Divine things by our human standards, we are led astray by the superficial meaning of the Divine and Ineffable Truth. Rather should we then consider that while the human Intellect hath a faculty of Intelligence, whereb}' it perceives intellectual truths, yet the act whereby the Intellect communes with the things that are beyond it transcends its intellectual nature. 2 This transcendent sense, therefore, must be given to our language about God, and not our human sense. We must be transported wholly out of our- selves and given unto God. For 'tis better to belong unto God and not unto ourselves, since thus will the

^ I Cor. i. 25.

^ This is the Doctrine of Unknowing. Cf. "Through love, through hope, and faith's transcendent dower, We feel that we are mightier than we know."

148 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

Divine Bounties be bestowed, if we are united to God.^ Speaking, then, in a transcendent manner of this "Foolish Wisdom,"- which hath neither Reason nor Intelligence, let us say that It is the Cause of all Intelligence and Reason, and of all Wisdom and Understanding, and that all counsel belongs unto It, and from It comes all Knowledge and Understanding, and in It ''are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."^ For it naturally follows from what hath already been said that the All-wise (and more than Wise) Cause is the Fount of Very Wisdom and of created wisdom both" as a whole and in each individual instance.*

2. From It the intelligible and intelligent powers of the Angelic Minds derive their blessed simple percep- tions, not collecting their knowledge of God in partial fragments or from partial activities of Sensation or of discursive Reason, nor yet being circumscribed by aught that is akin to these,^ but rather, being free from all taint of matter and multiplicity, they perceive the spiritual truths of Divine things in a single immaterial and spiritual intuition. And their intui- tive faculty and activity shines in its unalloyed and undefiled purity and possesses its Divine intuitions all together in an indivisible and immaterial manner, being by that Godlike unification made similar (as far as may be) to the Supra-Sapient Mind and Reason of

^ The term "Go'l" is rightly used here because the viain/eslcd At)solute is meant.

2 I Cor. i. 25. ^ Col. ii. 3.

^ (l) Very Wisdom = Wisdom in the abstract.

(2) Wisdom as a whole = Wisdom embodied in the universe as a

whole.

(3) Wisdom in each individual instance = Wisdom as shown in

the structure of some particular plant or animal, or part of a plant or animal.

(i) Is an Emanation ; (2) and (3) are created. ^ /. e. 'I'bey are not limited by the material world, which, with its laws, is known through sensation and discursive reason.

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God through the working of the Divine Wisdom.^ And human souls possess Reason, whereby tliey turn with a discursive motion round about tlie Truth of things, and, through the partial and manifold activities of their complex nature, are inferior to the Unified Intelligences: yet they too, through the concentration of their many faculties, are vouchsafed (so far as their nature allows) intuitions like unto those of the Angels. Nay, even our sense-perceptions themselves may be rightly described as an echo of that Wisdom ; even diabolic intelligence, qua intelligence, belongs thereto, though in so far as it is a distraught intelli- gence, not knowing how to obtain its true desire, nor wishing to obtain it, we must call it rather a declen- sion from Wisdom. Now we have already said that the Divine Wisdom is the Beginning, the Cause, the Fount, the Perfecting Power, the Protector and the Goal of Very Wisdom and all created Wisdom, and of all Mind, Reason, and Sense-Perception. We must now ask in what sense God,^ Who is Supra-Sapient, can be spoken of as Wisdom, Mind, Reason, and Knowledge? How can He have an intellectual intui- tion of intelligible things when He possesses no intellectual activities? Or how can He know the things perceived by sense when His existence tran- scends all sense-perception ? And yet the Scripture says that He knoweth all things and that nothing escapes the Divine Knowledge. But, as I have often said, we must interpret Divine Things in a manner

Or how can He know the things perceived by sense when His existence tran- scends all sense-perception ? And yet the Scripture says that He knoweth all things and that nothing escapes the Divine Knowledge. But, as I have often said, we must interpret Divine Things in a manner

^ This speculation is, no doubt, based on experience. A concentra- tion of the spiritual faculties in the act of contemplation produces that iiitiiy of the soul of which all mystics often speak. The angels are conceived of as being always in such a state of contemplation.

^ God is the Manifested Absolute. Hence qua Absolute He is supra-sapient, qna Manifested He is wise (cf. ch. i, § l). The Persons of the Trinity possess one common Godhead ( = tlie Absolute) which is supra-sapient, and in that Godhead. They ai-e One. Yet they are known l)y us only in their differentiation wherein Supra-Sapience is revealed as Wisdom.

150 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

suitable to their nature. For the lack of Mind and Sensation must be predicated of God by excess and not by defect.^ And in the same way we attribute lack of Reason to Him that is above Reason, and Imperfectibility to Him that is above and before Per- fection ; and Intangible and Invisible Darkness we attribute to that Light which is Unapproachable because It so far exceeds the visible light. And thus the Mind of God embraces all things in an utterly transcendent knowledge and, in Its causal relation to all things, anticipates within Itself the knowledge of them all — knowing and creating angels before the angels were, and knowing all other things inwardly and (if I may so put it) from the very beginning, and thus bringing them into existence. And methinks this is taught by the Scripture when it saith " Who knoweth all things before their birth." ^ For the Mind of God gains not Its knowledge of things from those things; but of Itself and in Itself It possesses, and hath conceived beforehand in a causal manner, the cognizance and the knowledge and the being of them all. And It doth not perceive each class specifically,^ but in one embracing casuality It knows and main- tains all things — even as Light possesses beforehand in itself a causal knowledge of the darkness, not know- ing the darkness in any other way than from the Light. ^ Thus the Divine Wisdom in knowing Itself

^ Via Negativa. It is not mere negation.

^ Susannah 42.

^ "According to its idea," "according to the law of its species." We perceive that this is a rose and that is a horse because we liavc two separate notions in our minds — one the notion of a rose and the other that of a liorse. But in the Divine Knowledge there is only one Notion wherein such specific notions are elements, as the activities of several nerves are elements in one indivisible sensation of taste, or touch, or smell.

But in the Divine Knowledge there is only one Notion wherein such specific notions are elements, as the activities of several nerves are elements in one indivisible sensation of taste, or touch, or smell.

■* i. e. Suppose the light were conscious, and knew its own nature, it would know that if it withheld its brightness there would be darkness (for the very nature of light is that it dispels, or at least prevents,

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will know all thinc^s : will in that very Oneness know and i)r(xlucc material things immaterially, divisible things indivisibly, manifold things under the form of Unity. For if God, in the act of causation, im^parts Existence to all things, in the same single act of caus- ation He will support all these His creatures the which are derived from Him and have in Him their forebeing, and lie will not gain His knowledge of things from the things themselves, but He will bestow upon each kind the knowledge of itself and the know- ledge of the others. And hence God doth not possess a private knowledge of Himself and as distinct there- from a knowledge embracing all the creatures in common ; for the Universal Cause, in knowing Itself, can scarcely help kiiowing the things that proceed from it and whereof It is the Cause. With this know- ledge, then, God knoweth all things, not through a mere understanding of the things but through an understanding of Himself. For the angels, too, are said by the Scripture to know the things upon earth not through a sense-perception of them (though they are such as may be perceived this way), but through a faculty and nature inherent in a Godlike Intelligence. 3. Furthermore, we must ask how it is that we know God when He cannot be perceived by the mind or the senses and is not a particular Being. Perhaps 'tis true to say that we know not God by His Nature (for this is unknowable and beyond the reach of all Reason and Intuition), yet by means of that ordering of all things which (being as it were projected out of

darkness). On the other hand, the light could not directly know the darkness, because darkness cannot exist where there is light. The simile is capable of being applied to illustrate God's knowledge of the world, because the world is imperfect. It applies more fundamentally to God's knowledge of evil, and is so employed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who quotes this passage and says {Sutivna, xlv. lo) that, since evil is the lack of good, God knows evil things in the act by which lie knows good things, as we know darkness through knowing light.

152 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

Thomas Aquinas, who quotes this passage and says {Sutivna, xlv. lo) that, since evil is the lack of good, God knows evil things in the act by which lie knows good things, as we know darkness through knowing light.

152 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

Him) possesses certain images and semblances of His Divine Exemplars, we mount upwards (so far as our feet can tread that ordered path), advancing through the Negation and Transcendence of all things and through a conception of an Universal Cause, towards That Which is beyond all things.^ Hence God is known in all things and apart from all things ; and God is known through Knowledge and through Un- knowing, and on the one hand He is reached by Intuition, Reason, Understanding, Apprehension, Perception, Conjecture, Appearance, Name, etc.; and yet, on the other hand, He cannot be grasped by Intuition, Language, or Name, and He is not anything in the world nor is He known in anything. He is All Things in all things and Nothing in any," and is known from all things unto all men, and is not known from any unto any man. 'Tis meet that we employ such terms concerning God, and we get from all things (in proportion to their quality) notions of Him Who is their Creator. And yet on the other hand, the Divinest Knowledge of God, the which is received through Unknowing, is obtained in that communion which transcends the mind, when the mind, turning away from all things and then leaving even itself behind, is united to the Dazzling Rays, being from them and in them, illumined by the unsearchable depth of Wisdom.^ Nevertheless, as I said, we must

^ God, being the Manifested Absolute, exists on two planes at once : that of Undifferentiation and that of Differentiation. On this second jilane He moves out into creative activity. And thus He is both knowable and unknowable : knowable in so far as He passes outwards into such activity, unknowable in that His l^eing passes inwards into Undiffcnntiation. Thus He is known in His acts but not in His ultimate Nature.

2 He is the Sui:)cr-Esscnce of all things, wherein all things possess their true being outside of themselves [as our pcrcci)tions are outside of ourselves in the things we jierceive. ( Vide Bergson, Maticre et Mevwirc. )].

^ This is experience and not mere theory.

THE DIVINE NAMES 153

draw this knowledge of Wisdom from all things ; for ^ wisdom it is (as saith the Scripture) ^ that hath made all things and ever ordcreth them all, and is the Cause of the indissoluble harmony and order of all things, perpetually fitting the end of one part unto the beginning of the second, and thus producing the one fair agreement and concord of the whole.

4. And God is called " Word " or '' Reason " 2 by the Holy Scriptures, not only because He is the Bestower of Reason and Mind and Wisdom, but also because He contains beforehand in His own Unity the causes of all things, and because He penetrates all things, "reaching" (as the Scripture saith) "unto the end of all things," ^ and more especially because the Divine Reason is more simple than all simplicity, and, in the transcendence of Its Super-Essential Being, is inde- pendent of all things.^ This Reason is the simple and verily existent Truth : that pure and infallible Omniscience round which divinely inspired Faith revolves. It is the permanent Ground of the faith- ful, which builds them in the Truth and builds the Truth in them by an unwavering firmness, through which they possess a simple knowledge of the Truth of those things which they believe.^ For if Know- ledge unites the knower and the objects of knowledge,

^ Prov. viii.

^ The reference is, of course, to the opening verses of St, John's Gospel. The present passage shows that by the term "God" D. means not one Differentiation of the Godhead singly (?. e. not God the Father), but all Three Differentiations together ; the undivided (though differentiated) Trinity.

^ Wisdom viii. i.

* God is called Reason: (i) because He is the Giver of reason ; (2) because reason causes unity {e.,^. it unifies our thoughts, making them coherent), and God in His creative activity causes unity and in His ultimate Godhead z's Unity.

^ The Divine Omniscience is: (i) the Object of our faith because we trust in it ; (2) the Ground of our faith because the development of our faith comes from it. Faith is a faint image of Divine Know- ledge, and is gradually perfected by being changed into knowledge. L

154 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

and if ignorance is always a cause of change and of self-discrepancy in the ignorant, naught (as saith Holy Scripture) shall separate him that believeth in the Truth from the Foundation of true faith on which he shall possess the permanence of immovable and unchanging firmness. For surely knovveth he who is united to the Truth that it is well with him, even though the multitude reprove him as one out of his mind. Naturally they perceive not that he is but come out of an erring mind unto the Truth through right faith. But he verily knows that instead of being, as they say, distraught, he hath been relieved from the unstable ever-changing movements which tossed him hither and thither in the mazes of error, and hath been set at liberty through the simple immutable and unchanging Truth. Thus is it that the Teachers from whom we have learnt our know- ledge of Divine Wisdom die daily for the Truth, bearing their natural witness in every word and deed to the single Knowledge of the Truth which Chris- tians possess : yea, showing that It is more simple and divine than all other kinds of knowledge, or rather that it is the only true, one, simple Knowledge of God.

CHAPTER VHI

Concerning '"'' Power ^'' " Righteousness J\ ''''Salvation^'' "Redemption'' J aiid also concerning "Inequality."

I. Now since the Sacred Writers speak of the Divine Truthfulness and Supra-Sapient Wisdom as Tower, and as Righteousnes, and call It Salvation and Redemption, let us endeavour to unravel these Divine Names also. Now I do not think that any one nurtured in Holy Scripture can fail to know

Till': DIVINE NAMES 155

that the Godhead transcends and exceeds every mode of Eower however conceived. For often Scripture attributes the Dominion to the Godhead and thus distinguishes It even from the Celestial Powers.^ In what sense, then, do the Sacred Writers speak of It also as Tower when It transcends all Power? Or in what sense can we take the title Power when applied to the Godhead ?

2. We answer thus : God is Power because in His own Self He contains all power beforehand and exceeds it, and because He is the Cause of all power and produces all things by a power which may not be thwarted nor circumscribed, and because He is the Cause wherefrom Power exists whether in the whole system of the world or in any particular part.^ Yea, He is Infinitely Powerful not only in that all Power comes from Him, but also because He is above all power and is Very Power, and possesses that excess of Power which produces in infinite ways an infinite number of other existent powers; and because the infinitude of powers which is continually being multi- plied to infinity can never blunt that transcendently infinite^ activity of His Power whence all power comes ; and because of the unutterable, unknowable, inconceivable greatness of PI is all-transcendent Power which, through its excess of potency, gives strength to that which is weak and maintains and governs the lowest of its created copies, even as, in those things whose power strikes our senses, very brilliant

^ The highest power our minds can conceive is that of the angels. But God has the dominion over them, and hence His power is of a yet higher kind such as we cannot conceive.

^ Since the ultimate Godhead is undifferentiated God's power is conceived of as an undifferentiated or poiaitial ^ncxgy.

^ The inexhaustible multiplication of things in this world, though it should go on for ever, is a series made up of separate units. God's inexhaustible energy is beyond this series because it is one indivisible act. The Undifferentiated transcends infinite divisibility. Cf. IX. 2.

156 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

illuminations can reach to eyes that are dim and as loud sounds can enter ears dull of hearing. (Of course that which is titterly incapable of hearing is not an ear, and that which cannot see at all is not an eye.^)

Cf. IX. 2.

156 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

3. Thus this distribution of God's Infinite Power permeates all things, and there is nothing in the world utterly bereft of all power. Some power it must have, be it in the form of Intuition, Reason, Percep- tion, Life, or Being. And indeed, if one may so express it, the very fact that power exists ^ is derived from the Super-Essential Power.

. 4. From this Source come the Godlike Powers of \ the Angelic Orders ; from this Source they immutably possess their being and all the ceaseless and immortal motions of their spiritual life ; and their very stability and unfailing desire for the Good they have received from that infinitely good Power which Itself infuses into them this power and this existence, and makes them ceaselessly to desire existence, and gives them the very power to desire that ceaseless power which they possess.

5. The effects of this Inexhaustible Power enter into men and animals and plants and the entire Nature of the Universe, and fill all the unified organizations with a force attracting them to mutual harmony and concord, and drawing separate in- dividuals into being, according to the natural laws and qualities of each, without confusion or merging of their properties. And the laws by which this Universe is ordered It preserves to fulfil their proper functions, and keeps the immortal lives of the in- dividual angels inviolate ; and the luminous stars of

^ This is meant to meet the objection that if God's power is infinite tliere should be no decay or death. Things, says I)., are sometimes incapable of responding, as a blind eye cannot respond to the light.

^ i. e. Power in the aljstract.

THE DIVINE NAMES 157

Things, says I)., are sometimes incapable of responding, as a blind eye cannot respond to the light.

^ i. e. Power in the aljstract.

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heaven It keeps in all their ranis unchanged, and chives unto I^^ternity the power to be; and the temporal orbits It differentiates when they bei^in their circuits and brings together again when tliey return once more ; and It makes the power of fire unquenchable, and the liquid nature of water It makes perpetual ; and gives the atmosphere its fluidity, and founds the earth upon the Void and keeps its pregnant travail without ceasing. And It preserves the mutual harmony of the interpenetrating elements distinct and yet inseparable, and knits together the bond uniting soul and body, and stirs the powers by which the plants have nourishment and growth, and governs the faculties whereby each kind of creature maintains its being and makes firm the indissoluble permanence of the world, and bestows Deification ^ itself by giving a faculty for it unto those that are deified. And, in short, there is nothing in the world which is without the Almighty Power of God to support and to sur- round it. For that which hath no power at all hath no existence, no individuality, and no place whatever in the world.

6. But Elymas ^ the sorcerer raises this objection : "If God is Omnipotent" (quoth he) "what meaneth your Sacred Writer by saying that there are some things He cannot do ? " And so he blames Paul the Divine for saying that God cannot deny Himself.^ Now, having stated his objection, I greatly fear that I shall be laughed at for my folly, in going about to pull down tottering houses built upon the sand by idle children, and in striving to aim my arrow at an inaccessible tar:;et when I endeavour to deal with this

^ See Intr., p. 43.

^ The name is introduced to support the fiction of authorship, and an objection, current no doubt in the writer's day (as in every age), is put into the mouth of one who belonged to the same time as St. Paul's Athenian convert.

^ 2 Tim. ii. 13.

158 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

43.

^ 2 Tim. ii. 13.

158 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

question of Divinity.^ But thus I answer him ; The denial of the true Self is a declension from Truth. And Truth hath Being ; and therefore a declension from the Truth is a declension from Being. Now whereas Truth hath Being and denial of Truth is a declension from Being, God cannot fall from Being. We might say that He is not lacking in Being, that He cajinot lack Power, that He knows not how to lack Knowledge. The wise Elymas, forsooth, did not perceive this ; and so is like an unskilled athlete, who (as often happens), thinking his adversary to be weak, through judging by his own estimation, misses him each time and manfully strikes at his shadow, and bravely beating the air with vain blows, fancies he hath gotten him a victory and boasts of his prowess through ignorance of the other's power.^ But we striving to shoot our guard home to our teacher's mark celebrate the Supra-Potent God as Omnipotent, as Blessed and the only Potentate, as ruling by His might over Eternity, as indwelling every part of the universe, or rather as transcending and anticipating all things in His Super-Essential Power, as the One Who hath bestowed upon all things their capacity to exist, and their exist- ence through the rich outpouring of His transcendent and abundant Power.

7. Again, God is called " Righteousness " because He gives to all things what is right, defining Pro- portion, Beauty, Order, Arrangement, and all Dis- positions of Place and Rank for each, in accordance with that place which is most truly right ; and because He causeth each to possess its independent activity. For the Divine Righteousness ordains all things, and sets their bounds and keeps all things

^ He seems to mean two disiinct things: (i) The objection is cliildish and needs no answering ; (2) The whole question is beyond the reach of our understanding.

2 This unskilled athlete is not vrry convincing. I'resumably D. could not box !

THE DIVINE NAMES 159

uiiconfusccl and distinct from one another, and . i6i, n. 3.

THE DIVINE NAMES 169

reason, sensation, essence, nature, or will) is trans- cendently contained beforehand as an Unity in Ilim through that l^ower, exceeding all things, which brings all Equality into existence.

CHAPTER X

Concet'nitJg '"'' Omnipotent^'' '"' Aiicic7it of Days'' ; and also coficcrm?ii^ " Eternity " and *' Ti'mr."

CHAPTER X

Concet'nitJg '"'' Omnipotent^'' '"' Aiicic7it of Days'' ; and also coficcrm?ii^ " Eternity " and *' Ti'mr."

1. Now 'tis time that our Discourse should celebrate God (Whose Names are many) as " Omni- potent " and " Ancient of Days." The former title is given Him because He is that All-Powerful Founda- tion of all things which maintains and embraces the Universe, founding and establishing and compacting it; knitting the whole together in Himself without a rift, producing the Universe out of Himself as out of an all-powerful Root, and attracting all things back into Himself as unto an all-powerful Receptacle, holding them all together as their Omnipotent Foundation, and securing them all in this condition with an all-transcendent bond suffering them not to fall away from Himself, nor (by being removed from out of that perfect Resting Place) to come utterly to destruction. Moreover, the Supreme Godhead is called " Omnipotent " because It is potent over all things, and rules with unalloyed sovranty over the world It governs ; and because It is the Object of desire and yearning for all, and casts on all Its voluntary yoke and sweet travail of Divine all- powerful and indestructible Desire for Its Goodness.

2. And " Ancient of Daj's '' is a title given to God because He is the Eternity^ of all things and their

^ In the Super-Essence each thing has its ultimate and timeless being.

170 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

Time,^ and is anterior ^ to Days and anterior to Eternity and Time. And the titles " Time," " Day," " Season," and " Eternity " must be applied to Him in a Divine sense, to mean One Who is utterly in- capable of all change and movement and, in His eternal motion, remains at rest ; ^ and Who is the Cause whence Eternity, Time, and Days are derived. Wherefore in the Sacred Theophanies revealed in mystic Visions He is described as Ancient and yet as Young : the former title signifying that He is the Primal Being, existent from the beginning, and the latter that He grows not old. Or both titles together teach that He goes forth from the Beginning through the entire process of the world unto the End. Or, as the Divine Initiator^ tells us, either term implies the Primal Being of God : the term "Ancient" signifying that He is First in point of Time, and the term " Young" that He possesses the Primacy in point of Number, since Unity and the properties of Unity have a primacy over the more advanced numbers.^

3. Need is there, methinks, that we understand the sense in which Scripture speaketh of Time and lUernity. For where Scripture speaks of things as *' eternal " it doth not always mean things that are absolutely Uncreated or verily Everlasting, Incor-

^ In the Super-E'^sence each thin_[T has the limits of its (hirati )n predetermined. Or else D. means that in the Super-Essence the move- ment of Time has the impulse which generates it.

Or else D. means that in the Super-Essence the move- ment of Time has the impulse which generates it.

^ Temporal precedence is metaphorically used to express meta- j'jhysical precedence. God cannot in the literal sense of the words, temporally precede time.

^ He transcends both Rest and Motion.

* Presumably Hierotheus.

'' lie is the Source of all extension both in Time and in Space, Unitv underlies all counting (for 2, 3, 4, etc. =twice r, three times i, four limes i, etc). Ilcncc it is the Origin, as it were, of all number. And, being at the beginning of the arithmetical series (as youth is at the beginning of life) it is symboli/.ed (according to D.) by youthfulness.

THE DIVINE NAMES 171

ruptiblc, Immortal, Invariable, and Immutable (^r.j;. "Be yc lift up, ye eternal doors," ^ and such- like passages). Often it i^ives the name of " Eternal " to anything; very ancient ; and sometimes, again, it applies the term " Eternity " to the whole course of earthly Time, inasmuch as it is the property of Eternity to be ancient and invariable and to measure the whole of Being. The name " Time " it gives to that changing process which is shown in birth, death, and variation. And hence we who are here circumscribed by Time are, saith the Scripture, destined to share in Eternity when we reach that incorruptible Eternity which changes not. And sometimes the Scripture declares the glories of a Temporal Eternity and an Eternal Time, although we understand that in stricter exactness it describes and reveals Eternity as the home of things that are in Being, and Time as the home of things that are in Birth.- We must not, therefore, think of the things which are called Eternal as being simply co-ordinate with the Everlasting God Who exists before Eternity ;^

^ Ps. xxiv. 7.

^ We cannot help thinking of Eternity as an Endless Time, as we think of infinite number as an endless numerical process. But this is wrong. Eternity is timeless as infinite number is superior to all numerical process. According to Plato, Time is "incomplete life" and Eternity is " complete life." Thus Eternity fulfils Time and yet contradicts it, as infinite number fulfils and contradicts the properties of finite numbers. If Time be thought of as an infinite series of finite numbers Eternity is the sum of that series and not its process. But the name may be applied loosely to the process, though this is generally to be avoided. According to St. Thomas, Eternity measures Rest, and Time measures Motion : Eternity is a totiun simul and Time is sticccs- sivinn. The difference between them is not, he says, that Time has a beginning and an end whereas Eternity has neither, though he admits that each of the particular objects existing in Time began and will end. {Suinma, Pars L Q. x. Art. iv.) But this is, he says, not essential to the nature of time : it is ox\\y per accidcns {ibid. Art. v.). Cf. Aristotle's distinction between " unlimited Time" and limited Time.

{Suinma, Pars L Q. x. Art. iv.) But this is, he says, not essential to the nature of time : it is ox\\y per accidcns {ibid. Art. v.). Cf. Aristotle's distinction between " unlimited Time" and limited Time.

^ lie alludes to Angels and the perfected souls of men and to their celestial abode.

172 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

but, strictly following the venerable Scriptures, we had better interpret the words " Eternal " and " Temporal " in their proper senses, and regard those things which to some extent participate in Eternity and to some extent in Time as standing midway between things in Being and things in Birth. ^ And God we must celebrate as both Eternity and Time,^ as the Cause of all Time and Eternity and as the Ancient of Days ; as before Time and above Time and producing all the variety of times and seasons ; and again, as existing before Eternal Ages, in that

^ St. Thomas speaks of aeviwi as standing between Eternity and Time and participating in both. Time, he says, consists in succession, Aevuvi does not but is capable of it. Eternity does not and is incapable of it {Snnivia, Pars I. Q. x. Art, v.). Thus the heavenly bodies, he says, are changeless in essence, but capable of motion from place to place ; and the angels are changeless in nature, but capable of choice and so of spiritual movement. Maximus's note on the present passage explains this to be D.'s meaning.

There is in each one of us a timeless self. It is spoken of by all the Christian Mystics as the root of our being, or as the spark, or the Synteresisy etc. Our perfection consists in this ultimate reality, which is each man's self, shining through his whole being and transforming it. Hence man is at last lifted on to the eternal plane from that of time. The movements of his spirit will then be so intense that they will attain a totuni siviiil. We get a foretaste of this when, in the experience of deep spiritual joy, the successive parts of Time so coalesce (as it were) that an hour seems like a moment. Eternity is Rest and Time is Motion. Accelerate the motion in the individual soul, through the intensification of that soul's bliss to infinity. There is now in the soul an infinite motion. But Infinite Motion is above succession, and therefore is itself a form of repose. Thus Motion has been changed into Rest, Time into Eternity. Mechanical Time, or dead Time (of which Aristotle si)eaks as mere movement or succession) is the Time measured by the clock ; developing or /ivini^ Time (which is Plato's "incomplete life") is real Time, and this is Arjuni, which partakes both of mechanical Time and of I^'.lemity. The iiest treatment of the subject is probably to be found in Bergson's theory of (-////w. (Cf. Von llxxgeVs Ete?-nal /.i/e.)

The iiest treatment of the subject is probably to be found in Bergson's theory of (-////w. (Cf. Von llxxgeVs Ete?-nal /.i/e.)

The words "eternal," " everlasting," etc., being loosely employed, may refer to three different things : (i) endless ttiechanical Time, /. c. mere endless succession ; (2) Aevitni, or developing and finally per- fected living Time ; (3) True Timeless Eternity.

2 Vide pp. 169 n. i, 170 n. i.

THE DIVINE NAMES I73

He is before^ ICtcrnity and above Eternity and His Kingdom is the Kingdom of all the Eternal Ages. Amen.

CHAPTER XI

Concerning'''' Peace'''' and what is meant by " Ve>y Being^' Itself^ " Very LiJ'e,^' "Fivj Poiuer,^^ a7id similar phrases.

I. Now let us praise with reverent hymns of peace the Divine Peace which is the Source of all mutual attraction. For this Quality it is that unites all things together and begets and produces the har- monies and agreements of all things. And hence it is that all things long for It, and that It draws their manifold separate parts into the unity of the whole and unites the battling elements of the world into concordant fellowship. So it is that, through partici- pation in the Divine Peace, the higher of the mutually Attractive Powers 2 are united in themselves and to each other and to the one Supreme Peace of the whole world ; and so the ranks beneath them are by them united both in themselves and to one another and unto that one perfect Principle and Cause of Universal Peace,^ which broods in undivided Unity upon the world, and (as it were with bolts which fasten the sundered parts together) giveth to all things their laws, their limits, and their cohesion ; nor

^ Vide p. 170, 11. 2.

2 i. e. The beraphim.

^ The Divine Energy and Light streams through the medium of the higher orders to the lower. This is worked out in the Celestial Hierarchy of the same writer. We get the same thought in Dante's Paradiso, where the Pri/num Mobile, deriving its motion from an immediate contact with the Empyrean, passes them on to the next sphere and so to all the rest in turn, the movement being received and conveyed by the succeeding angelic orders presiding severally, in descending scale of dignity, over the concentric spheres. — See Cottvito, II. 6.

174 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

— See Cottvito, II. 6.

174 DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE

suffers them to be torn apart and dispersed into the boundless chaos without order or foundation, so as to lose God's Presence and depart from their own unity, and to mingle together in a universal confusion. Now as to that quality of the Divine Peace and Silence, to which the holy Justus ^ gives the name of "Dumbness" and "Immobility" (sc. so far as concerns all emanation which our knowledge can • grasp),^ and as to the manner in which It is still and silent and keeps in Itself and within Itself and is wholly and entirely one transcendent Unity in Itself, and while entering into Itself and multiplying Itself,^ doth not leave Its own Unity, but, even in the act of \ going forth to all things, remains entirely within ! Itself through the excess of that all-transcendent ■ Unity : concerning these things 'tis neither right nor •» possible for any creature to frame any language or conception. Let us, then, describe that Peace (inas- much as It transcends all things) as " Unutterable," yea and " Unknowable" ; and, so far as 'tis possible for men and for ourselves who are inferior to many

^ Vide Acts i. 23 ; xviii. 7 ; or Col. iv. 11.

^ Victorinus calls God the Father Cessatio, Silentinni, or Quies, and also Mollis, as distinguished from Motio (the name he gives God the Son), the former kind of movement being the quiescent generator of the latter, since Victorinus was an older contemporary of St. Augustine (see Conf. viii. 2-5) his speculations may have been known to I). The peace of God attracts by its mysterious influence. Tin's influence is, in a sense, an emanation or outgoing activity (or it could not affect us), but it is a thing felt and not understood.

^ It multiplies Itself by entering into the creatures and seeking to be reproduced in each of them. This whole passage throws light on the problem of Personality. If our personalities are ultimately contained in the Absolute, the Absolute is not a Person but a Society of Persons. I), would reply that the Absolute is Supra- Personal, and that in It our personalities have their ultimate existence, outside of them- selves, as an undifferentiated Unity, though that ultimate plane needs also and implies the existence of the relative plane on which our personalities exist as differentiated individuals. The Holy Spirit enters into the various individuals, but still possesses One Supra-Personal Godhead, i'lolinus says the Godhead is indivisibly divided.

THE DIVINE NAMES 175

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