The Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato — trans. Thomas Taylor (1820)

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COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS

ON THE TIMAZUS OF PLATO, IN FIVE BOOKS 5

CONTAINING A TREASURY OF

| 5001 PYTHAGORIC AND PLATONIC PHYSIOLOGY. TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK, BY THOMAS TAYLOR. Epos wpos ptAogopous ἐστι φιλια" προς μεντοι σοζιστας, ἡ γραμματιστας, ἢ Υϑιονῆο yeros εἐτέρον ανθρωπὼων κακοδαιμονων, οντε νυν core φιλια, μητε νστερον wore γένοιτο. . Apollonius Ty aneus. TWO VOLUMES. se VOL. i. ες London:

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INTRODUCTION.

OF that golden chain of philosophers, who, having themselves happily pene- trated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Plato,

Proclus ts indisputably the largest and most refulgent link. Born with a genius

transcendently ereat, and accompanied throuch life with a fortune sincularl δ δ tad

good, he exhibited in his own person a union of the rarest kind, in which power concurred with will, the benetit resulting from genuine philosophy with the ability of imparting it, and in which Wisdom was inseparable from Prosperity. The eulo- gium therefore of Ammonius Hermeas, “ that Proclus possessed the power of un- folding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of things,in the highest perfection posstale tohumanity,”' will be immediately assented to by every one, who is an adept in the writings of this incomparable man.

I rejoice therefore, in the opportunity which is now afforded me of presenting to the English reader a translation of one of the greatest productions of this Cory- phean philosopher ; though unfortunately like most of his other works, it has been transmitted to us in a mutilated state. For these Commentaries scarcely explain a third part of the Timeus ; and from a passage in Olympiodorus On the Meteors of Anstotle,” there is every reason to believe that Proclus left nu part of the

* Fa δὲ τι και ἡμεῖς δυνηθειημεν εισένεγκειν περι τὴν τὸν βιβλίον σαφηνειαν, απονημονένσαντες των εζηγησεων row θειον ἡμων διδάσκαλον LpoxXov τον πλατωνίκον διαδοχον, Tov εἰς axpoy τῆς αγθρωπινηε φυσεωε τὴν τε εξηγητικὴν τῶν δοκουντῶν τοῖς παλαιοις δνναμιν, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστημονίκην rns φυσεως τῶν Ὄντων κρισιν ἀσκησαντος, πολλὴν av τῷ λογιῳ Dew χαριν ομολογησαιμεν- Ammon, de luterpret. p. 1.

For important particularsrespecting this extraordinary man, see my translation of his Commentary en the first book of Euclid. He was born about the year 412 of Christ.

* See this passage in the notes to my translation of the Meteors of Aristotle.

΄

ΠῚ INTRODUCTION.

p. 1.

For important particularsrespecting this extraordinary man, see my translation of his Commentary en the first book of Euclid. He was born about the year 412 of Christ.

* See this passage in the notes to my translation of the Meteors of Aristotle.

΄

ΠῚ INTRODUCTION.

Timzus without his masterly elucidations. This is likewise more than probable, from what Marinus says in his life of him, ‘that he was a man laborious to a miracle ;” for it cannot be supposed that such a man would leave the greater part of one of the most important dialogues of Plato unelucidated, and particu- Jarly as these Commentaries were written by him (as the same Marinus informs us) in the flower of his age, and that he preferred them beyond all his other works." Fortunately however, the most important part of this work is preserved ; or that part in which the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final causes of the universe are- unfolded ; the corporeal nature of it is represented as fabricated with forms and demiurgic sections, and distributed with divine numbers ; and soul is produced from the Demiurgus, and is filied with harmonic ratios, and divine and fabriea- tive symbols. The whole mandane animal too, is here shown to be connected, ac- cording to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligible world ; and the parts which it contains are so disposed as to harmonize with the wiole, both such as are corporeal, and such as are vital. For partial souls such as ours, are introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane Gods, and hecome mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected. The progression of the cloments likewise from their first incorporeal subsistence to their subterranean termination, and the mature of the heavens and heavenly bodies, are beautifully developed. And as the result of the most scientific rea- that the fixed stars have periodic revolutions on their axes, though the length of their duration is

2

soning, it is shown that every planet is surrounded with satellites,

tous unknown; and that the stars, which at times disappear and again: become visible, are the satellites of other fixed stars of amore primary dignity, behind the splendors of which they are occasionally concealed.’ These and many other Inost interesting particulars, are unfolded in’ these Commentaries, with an accu- racy and perspicuity which have seldom been equalled, and have never been ex- celled.

' The late Dr. Charles Burney, on being once asked by me, whether he had ever read these Com- mentaries, candidly replied, ‘that they were too much for hin; atthe same time eaclaiming, ‘‘ What a giant was Proclus compared to Longinus!” ‘This confession, as the Doctor had never studied the philo- sophy of Plato, displayed a degree of good serse, which is seldom to be met with in a grammarian and philologist, om such an occasion; aud his cundour is still more remarkable, when it is considered that he had been a Reviewer.

* See p. 270. Vol. 2. in which itis saia, “ that in each of the planetary spheres, a number analogous to the choir of the fixed stars, subsists with appropriate circulations.” Sce also p. 2650 and 281, of the same volume, in which this is more fully asserted.

3 See p. 299. Vol. 2.

INTRODUCTION. v

When T speak however, of the perspicuity with which these particulars are developed, Ido not mean that they are delivered in such a way, as to be obvious to every one, or that they may be apprehended as soon as read ς for this pertains only to the fungous and frivolous productions of the present day ; but my mean- ing is, that they are written with all the clearness, which they are naturally capa- ble of admitting, or Which a genuine student of the philosophy! of Plato can desire. And this leads me to make some remarks on the iniquitous opinion which, since the revival of letters, has been generally entertained of the writtigs of Proclus and other philosophers, who are distinguished by the appellation of the latter Plato- nists, and to show the cause from which it origmated,

The opinion to which T allude is this, that Plotinus and his followers, or in other words, all the Platonists that existed from his time to the fall of the Roman empire, and the destruction of the schools of the philosophers by Justinian, cor- rupted the philosophy of Plato, by filling it with jargon and revery, and by ascribing dogmas to him, which are not to be found in his writings, and which are perfectly absurd. It might naturally be supposed that the authors of this calumny were men deeply skilled in the philosophy, the corruptors of which they profess to have detected ; and that they had studied the writings of the men whom they so grossly defame. This however is very far from being the case. For since the philosophy of Plato, as 1 have elsewhere shown, is the offspring of the most consummate science, all the dogmas of it being deduced by a series of geometrical reasoning, some of them ranking as prior, and others as posterior, and the latter depending on the former, like the propositions in’ Eucla, certain preparatory disciplines are requisite to the perfect comprehension of these doc- trines. Hence a legitimate student of this philosophy must be skilled in mathe- matics, have been exercised in all the logical methods, and not be unacquainted with physics. [16 must also be an adept in the writings of Aristotle, as pre- paratory to the more sublime speculations of Plato. And in addition to all this, he must possess those qualifications enumerated by Plato in the 7th book of his Re- public; viz. he must have naturally a good memory, learn with facility, be magnifi- cent and orderly, and the friend and ally of justice, truth, fortitude, and temperance. Since the revival of letters however, this philosophy has not been studied by men, who have had the smallest conception that these requisites were indispensably

1 Itis well said by Petwin, alluding to this philosuphy, ‘that there are certain truths acquired by a long exercise of reason, both in particular, and likewise in those subjects that are most general, as much, perhaps, out of the reach of the greatest mathematician, as the speculations of Newton are above the capacity of some that are now called matbematicians.”

vi INTRODUCTION.

necessary, or who have attempted the acquisition of it, in this regular and scienti- fic method. Hence, they have presumed to decide on the excellence of works, with the true ments of which, as they were thus unqualified, they were wholly unacquainted, and to calumniate what they could not understand, They appear likewise to have been ignorant, that Plato, conformably to all the other great philosophers of antiquity, wrote in such a way as to conceal the sublimest of his doctrines from the vulgar, as well knowing, that they would only be profaned by them without being understood; the eye of the multitude, as he says, not being sufficiently strong to bear the Jight of truth. Hence, as Proclus well observes, ! “it is needless to mention, that it is unbecoming to speak of the most divine of dogmas before the multitude, Plato himself asserting that all these are ridiculous to the many, butin an admirable manner are esteemed by the wise. Thus also, the Pythagoreans said, that of discourses some are mystical, but others adapted to be delivered openly. With the Peripatetics likewise, some are esoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himself, wrete some things co.formable to truth, but others to opinion; and Zeno calls some assertions true, but others adapted to the necessary purposes of life.” The men therefore, who have defamed the latter Platonists, being thus unqualified, and thus ignorant of the mode of writing adupted by the great ancients, finding from a superficial perusal of the most genuine disciples of Plato many dogmas which were not immediately obvious in his writings, and which were to them incomprehensible, confidently asserted that these dogmas were spurious, that the authors of them were delirious, and that they had completely corrupted and polluted the philosophy of their master. It may also be added, as Olympiodorus justly observes, that the writings of Plato like those of Homer, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and in short, multifariously; and that he who does not thus consider them, will in vain attempt to unfold the latent meaning they contain. By the latter Platonists however, they have been explored in this way, and he who is capable of availing himself of the clucidations of these most benevolent and most sagacious men, will find the arduous sublimities of Plato accessible, his mystic narrations conformable to scientific deductions, and his apparent obscurity, the veil of conceptions, truly

* Ore de azxpern ra Oewrara των Soyparwy ἐστιν, εἰς ἀκοὰς φερομέναᾳ τῶν woAwY, οὐδὲν dec λεγειν, avrov WAarwios εἰπονῦτον, ws παντα ravra καταγέλαστα μεν ἐστι τοις πολλοῖς, θαυμαστως δὲ alia τοις

ovgus. ovrw be και οι luda yope (ut τῶν λυγων TOUS μεν εφασκον εἰναι μυστικους, TOUS δε νπαιθριονς, καὶ οἱ

ex τὸν Tlepexarov, τοὺς μεν ἐσωτερικονς, τους δε εξωτερικους, και avtos Παρμενίδης, τα per xpos αληθειαν : E

ovrw be και οι luda yope (ut τῶν λυγων TOUS μεν εφασκον εἰναι μυστικους, TOUS δε νπαιθριονς, καὶ οἱ

ex τὸν Tlepexarov, τοὺς μεν ἐσωτερικονς, τους δε εξωτερικους, και avtos Παρμενίδης, τα per xpos αληθειαν : E

eypaye, ta be xpos Solar, καὶ o Zyvwy ke rovs μεν adnfers exader των λόγων, τοὺς δε χρειωξεις.

Procl. MS. Comment. in Parmenid,

INTRODUCTION, vik

luminous and divine. And thus much as to the cause of the prevailing iniqui- tous opinion, respecting the writings of the latter Platonists; for the authors of jt, I have not been able to discover. But of this I am certain, and posterity will confirm the decision, that whoever they were, they were no less ignorant than arrogant, no less contemptible than obscure.

With respect to the following translation, 1 have only to observe, that [have endeavoured to the utmost of my ability to unite in it faithfulness with perspicuity, and to preserve the manner as well as the matter of the original, Independent of the difliculties snseparable from such an undertaking, and which arise from the abstruseness of the subjects that are discussed in this work, the original abounds with errors, not of a trifling, but of the most important nature; errors, which so materially affect the sense, that no one can read these Commentaries, unless he corrects them, and yet no one can correct the greater part of them, unless he is well acquainted with the philosophy of Plato. Of this the reader may be con- vinced by perusing the notes which accompany this translation, in which he will find upwards of eleven hundred necessary emendations. I call them necessary, because they are not the offspring of conjecture, but such as the sense indubitably demands, Of translations too, of this work, I could not avail myself; for ofthe whole of it there are none; and a Latin translation of a part of the 3d book. by Nicholwus Leonicus Thomeus," is the only aid that has been afforded me in this arduous undertaking, From this translation I have been able, as the learned reader will perceive, to give many important emendations of the printed original, and not unfrequently to add to it, not only particular words, but entire sentences that were wanting.

And now 1 shall conclude with observing, that though like most others who have laboured greatly for the good, not merely of their country, but of all man- kind, I have only met with ingratitude from the public for those labours ; and that though on this account Iam not much indebted, yet I sincerely wish well to my native Jand, and to every individual in it. That 1 have neither been influ- enced by the expectation of sordid emolument, nor of the honours of the multi- tude, in the prosecution of these labours, must be evident from the nature of them, to the most careiess observer. The most perfect conviction indeed, that a greater. good than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was never imparted by divinity

The most perfect conviction indeed, that a greater. good than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was never imparted by divinity

* This translation forms the last part of the Opuscula of Thomzus, printed at Venice in the year 1525 ; which work is so scarce, that Fabricius in his account of the Life and Writings of Proclus, (Biblioth. Grec. Tom, 8.) says, he never sav it.

* According to Plato in the 7th Book of his Republic, “that which springs up spontaneously, should not be forward to pay any one for its nurture.”

vill INTRODUCTION.

to man, and the consequent persuasion, that 1 could not confer a more real bene- ‘fiton the present age and posterity than by a dissemination of it in my native tongue, as they induced me to engage in such a difficult undertaking, have also been attended with the purest delight, froma conviction that 1 was acting rightly, and therefore ina way pleasing to divinity. Hence in accomplishing this Hercu- lean task, I have been satisfied with exploring myself, and imparting to others, the treasures of ancient wisdom ; and with endeavouring to deserve the favourable regard of that ineffable principle, whose approbation is not only the highest honour that either mortals or immortals can obtain, but the most durable and substan-

tial gain.

Ιχ

NAMES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS QUOTED BY PROCLUS IN THESE COMMENTARIES.

Aprastus APHRUDISIENSIS, one of the genuine Peripatetics, according to Simplicius On the Categories of Aristotle.

AGLAOPHEMUS, one who initiated Pythagoras in the mysteries of Orpheus.

Αὐδιν 5, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished about the time of Galen.

ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, ἃ Peripatetic philosopher, who flourished under the Empero™ Severus.

Ametivs, a Platonic philosopher, and a disciple of Plotinus.

AmMonius Saccas, the preceptor of Plotinus.

ANAXAGORAS, the Clazomenian, flourished about the 70th Olympiad.

ANTONINUS, a disciple of Ammonius Saccas.

ArIsToTLF, the disciple of Plato, was born in the first year of the 99th Olympiad.

Aristot1s, the Rhodian.

Atticus, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.

Curysiprus, a celebrated Stoic philosopher, died in the 145rd Olympiad.

Crantor SoOtensis, the first interpreter of Plato, also a fellow disciple with Nenocrates of Plato, and an auditor of Polemo.

Democritvs, the celebrated philosopher of Abdera, flourished about the 80th Olympiad.

Empenoc.es, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, was an auditor when a young man of Pythagoras.

Ericurvs, was born in the 109th Olympiad.

Evpemus, the Rhodian, a disciple of Aristotle, and to whom Aristotle inscribed his Eudemian Ethics.

EurymMacnves, the Epicurean,

Ga en, the physician, who was also a Platonist. Ele wrote 200 Volumes, most of which were burnt in the temple of Peace, and flourished under the Emperor Adr-an.

Ele wrote 200 Volumes, most of which were burnt in the temple of Peace, and flourished under the Emperor Adr-an.

HarpvocratTion, the Platonist, an Argive, and the familiar of Augustus Cesar.

Hrraciipes Ponticus, a disciple of Plato and Speusippus.

Heracuitvus Ernesivs, surnamed the obscure, flourished about the 70th. Olympiad.

Hermes TrismMeGistus.

Juan, the Theurgist, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.

IamBticnus, a Platonic philosopher, surnamed the ditine, flourished under the Emperor Con- stantine.

Tim. Plat. Vou. i. h

Χ

Heracuitvus Ernesivs, surnamed the obscure, flourished about the 70th. Olympiad.

Hermes TrismMeGistus.

Juan, the Theurgist, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.

IamBticnus, a Platonic philosopher, surnamed the ditine, flourished under the Emperor Con- stantine.

Tim. Plat. Vou. i. h

Χ

Nicomacnes, the Pythagorean, was, according to Fabricius, somewhat posterior to the age of Antoninus Pius. Numentus, a Pythagoric and Platonic philosopher, flourished prior to Plotinus. Oce ius Lucanvs, an auditor of Pythagoras, and one of his most eminent disciples, OriGen, (not a father of the Church,) a disciple of Plotinus. ParmeENtpES, the Elean, a Pythagoric philosopher, flourished about the 70th Olympiad. Puerecybes, the Syrian, the preceptor of Pythagoras. Puiroravs, of Tarentum, an eminent Pythagorean philosopher, and ai auditor of Pythagoras. Pato, was born in the 4th year of the 88th Olympiad, and died in the 108th Olympiad. Protinus, one of the most eminent of the Platonic philosophers, flourished under the [Emperors Gordian and Galieuus. Piurancn, of Charonea, in Baotia, the preceptor of Trajan, and the celebrated biographer. Porruyry, a disciple of Plotinus, aud distinguished by the appellation of the pAilosopher, Posivonivus, a Stoic philosopher, flourished under the reign of Julius Cxsar. PRAXIPHANES, adisciple of TPheophrastus. Procius MaLtores, is mentioned by our Proclus as one of the ancient philosophers, Pytnacoras, the father of philosophy, flourished about the Goth Olympiad, Severus, a Platonist, but the time in which be flourished is not known, Socrates, the celebrated preceptor of Plato, was born in the 4th year of the 77th Olympiad. Socrates, the Platonist, was posterior in time to Amelius. Soton, the Legislator, fluurished about the 46ch Olympiad. Srrato LaAMPSACENUS, an auditor and successor of ‘Mheophirastus. Synianus, the preceptor of Proclus, See the notes to this work, Tuaces, was bom in the firt year of the 35th Olympiad, and died in the 58th Olympiad. Tneoponus, Asin evs, a disciple of Plotinus, and surnamed the great. Turornrastus, the celebrated disciple and successor of Aristotle, Xexanenes, ἃ Peripatetic philosopher, and the frend of Augustus Cusar. Xenocrates, a disciple, and successor of Plato. Xexopnanes, the Colophonian, author of the Eleatic method of reasoning, flourshed in the Goth Olempiad. For an account of this method, see the additional notes on this work, Zeno ELeares was an auditor of Parmenides, and flourished about the 86th Olympiad. N. B. The Olympic games were restored by Iphicus, 442 years after their first institution, and about 777 years before Christ. From this last institution the Greeks began to reckon by Olyimpiads, cach vf which con- tained the space of a years. Aud this continued even to the reign of Constantine,

she eR PRE I ας στον

ain nite aaa Accs ts

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AN EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN TERMS USED BY PROCLUS IN THIS WORK.

From this last institution the Greeks began to reckon by Olyimpiads, cach vf which con- tained the space of a years. Aud this continued even to the reign of Constantine,

she eR PRE I ας στον

ain nite aaa Accs ts

. κι

AN EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN TERMS USED BY PROCLUS IN THIS WORK.

το ανχγωγιχον. Tur Anacocic. That which elevates the soul from sensibles to intelligibles.

αλλοιωσις:. ALLIATION. Change in quality.

axoxaractasi;. APOCATASTASIS. Lestitution to a pristine form, or condition of being.

τὸ γενεσιουργικον. Tne Grnesiurcic. ‘That which is effective of generation.

ο δαιμόνιος Δριστοτέλης. THe Damoniacat AristotLe. This philosophez was thus de- nominated by the ancients, from his transcendent physiological knowledge; nature being proximately governed by demons, or those powers that subsist between Gods and men.

γένεσις. GENERATION. A flowing condition of being, or a subsistence in becoming to be. Hence, ro yryverdas signifies am extension in subsistence, or a tendency to being.

δημιουργὸς τῶν ode. THe Desmiturcus or Wuores. The maker of the universe is thus denominated, because he produces the universe, so far as itis a whole, and likewise all the wholes it contains, by his uwn immediate energy, other subordinate powers co-operating with him in the production of parts. Llence be produces the universe totally and at once.

διανοια. Ditanosa. ‘Vhe discursive energy of reason; or it is that power which reasons scienti- ficall, deriving the principles of its reasoning from inteliect.

Sofa. Opinion. Is the last of the gnostic powers of the rational soul; and knows that a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or why it is. For the knowledge of the és, or why a thing 1s, belongs to διάνοια,

τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος τῆ; ψυχης. ‘Tue Epituymetic Part oF THE Sout, or that part of the soul which is the principle of all-various desires. But desire is well defined, by the Pythago- reans, to be a certain tendency, impulse, and appetite of the soul, in order to be filled with something, or to enjoy something present, or to be disposed according to some seusitive energy. They add, that there is also a desire of the contraries to these, and this 1s a desire of the evacua- tion and absence, and of having no sensible perception of certain things.

εἰκονιχως. IcCoNICALLY. Δ thing is said to subsist iconically, when it subsists after the manner. of an image.

εἰδολιχως. Ipouicauty. Adumbratively.

εἐνδιαστικω;. ENTHEASTICALLY. In adivinely-inspired manner.

ἐνιαιω;. Unicanry. In away conformable to the nature of (he one.

ro ἐτερηχιγήτον. THE ALTER-MOTIVR. ‘That which is moved by another thing, and not by. itself,

ὄυμος. ANGER. An appetite of the soul directed to the avengement of incidental molestations..

doy. Reasons. Productive principles or powers; aud they also signify forms.

itself,

ὄυμος. ANGER. An appetite of the soul directed to the avengement of incidental molestations..

doy. Reasons. Productive principles or powers; aud they also signify forms.

μορῷη. Morerne. Pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies..

ΧΗ πολυδυναμος. MULTIPOTENT. Possessing much power, vorpa επιβολη. INTELLECTUAL Prosecrion. The immediate energy of intellect is thus denominated, because it is an intujtive perception, or an immediate darting forth, as it were, to

its proper object, the intelligible. νους. Interteer. In the human soul is the summit of dianoia, and is that power by the hght

proceeding from which, we perceive the truth of axioms. But in divine natures itis a self--

subsistent, impartible, eternal essence, perceiving all things at once.

chorrs, Wuobrness. A whole which has a perpetual subsistence, and which comprehends in itself all the multitude of which it 15 the cause.

πλήρωμα. PLENITUDE, OR Compreteness. Is a whole which gives completion to the universe. :

τὸ vonroy, % wees, ᾿ ψυχικὸν αἀλατο;. THE [yTrLLIGIBLE, oR INTELLECTUAL, OR Psycuicar Breaptu; i.e. the extent of the progression of the istelligible, of intellect and of soul, and of each of these according to its own order, and not according to a progression into an in- ferior order.

τὸ cuvgercy. Tur Composite. L have used the word composite instead of compounded, because the latter rather denotes the mingling, than the contiguous union of one thing with another, which the former through its derivation from the Latin word compositus, solely denotes.

τελεστικη τέχνη. ΤῊΣ Trvestic Ant. Is the art pertaiming to mystic operations.

φιλυπολεμικός. Puitorotemic. An epithet of Minerva, signifying that she 1s a dover of war ; just as she is also called philosophic, as being a lover of wisdom,

νπαρξις- ΠΥΡΑΆΧΙΒ. The first principle, or :.undation, a3 it were, of the essence of a thing.

Hence also, it is the summit of essence.

] i | 1

PROCLUS

THE TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

The first principle, or :.undation, a3 it were, of the essence of a thing.

Hence also, it is the summit of essence.

] i | 1

PROCLUS

THE TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

THAT the desizn of the Platonic Timeus embraces the whole of physiology, and that it pertains to the theory of the universe, discussing this trom the be- ginning to the end, appears to me to be clearly evident to. those who are not entirely illiterate, For this very treatise of the Pythagoric Timawus Concerning Nature, is written after the Pythagoric manner; and Plato being thence impelled, applied himself to write the Timwus, according to Sillographus." On this account we have pretixed the treatise of Timaus to these Commentaries, in order that we may know what the Timeus of Plato says that is the same with what is asserted in the treatise of Tinzeus (the Loecrian], what it adds, and in what it dissents. And that we may investizate not in a careless manner the cause of this disagree- ment. All this dialogue, likewise, through the whole of itself, has physiology tor its scope, surveying the same things in images and in’ paradigms, in wholes and in parts. For it is filled with all the most beautifal boundaries * of physiology, assuming things simple for the sake of such as are composite, parts for the sake of wholes, and images for the sake of paradigms, leaving none of the principal causes of nature uninvestigated.

* Viz. Timon, who was so called from writing scurrilous comic poems. * J. ε. Final intentions.

Tim. Plat. Vou. 1. ' A

2 PROCLUS ON TITF [BOOK 1.

* Viz. Timon, who was so called from writing scurrilous comic poems. * J. ε. Final intentions.

Tim. Plat. Vou. 1. ' A

2 PROCLUS ON TITF [BOOK 1.

But that the dialogue deservedly embraces a design of this kind, and that Plato alone preserving the Pythagoric mode in the theory concerning nature, has pro- secuted with great subtilty the proposed doctrine,—ought to be considered by those who are more sagacious and acute. Por since, in short, physiology receives a threefold division, and one part of it is conversant with matter and material causes, but another part also adds the investigation of form, and evinces that this is the more principal cause; and again, since a third part demonstrates that these have not the relation of causes, but of concauses, and admits that there are other causes, Which are properly so called, of things generated by nature, viz. the eflec- tive, paradigmatic and final cause ;—this being the case, among the multitude of physiologists prior to Plato, that directed their attention to matter, there was ἃ diversity of Opinion respecting the subject of things, For Anaxagoras, who appears to have seen, while the rest were asleep, that intellect is the first cause of generated natures, made no use of intellect in his explaination of things, but rather employed certain airs and iethers as the causes of things that are generated, as Soerates says in the Phiedo. But of those posterior to) Plato, who were the patrons of a sect, not all, but such of them as were more accurate than the rest, thought fit to survey physical form in conjunction with matter, referring the prin- ciples of bodies to matter and form. Porif they any where mention the pro- ducing cause, as when they say that nature is a principle of motion, they rather take away its efficacious and properly effective power (than allow the existence of it] by not granting that it contains the reasons [or productive principles} of the things effected by it, but admitting that many things are generated casually. To which we may add, that they do not acnnowledge that there is a pre-existing producing cause of, in short, all physical things, but of those only that are borne along in generation. Por of eternal natures they clearly say, that there is no effective cause; im asserting whieh they are ignorant that they must either give subsistence to the whole of heaven from chance, or evince Chat whats casual is Itself productive of itsell.

Plato however alone, following the Pythagoreans, delivers indeed, as the cons causes of natural things, a tiiversal reeipient, and material form, which are sub- servient to causes properly so called, ino the generation of things. Bat prior to these, he investigates principal causes, viz. the producing cause, the paradigm, and the final cause. ‘Through these also, he places a demiurgic intellect over

Viz. Anstotle, and his followers,

ποοκ 1. TIMZEUS OF PLATO. 3

Bat prior to these, he investigates principal causes, viz. the producing cause, the paradigm, and the final cause. ‘Through these also, he places a demiurgic intellect over

Viz. Anstotle, and his followers,

ποοκ 1. TIMZEUS OF PLATO. 3

the universe, and an intelligible cause in which the universe primarily subsists, and the good, which is established prior to the producing cause, in the order of the desirable. Tor since that which is moved by another thing, is suspended from the power of that which moves, as it is evidently not adapted either to pro- duce, or perfect, or save itself, in all these it is in want of a producing cause, and ix conducted by it. Tt is 1+ therefore, that the concauses of natural things, should be suspended from true causes, from which they are produced, with a view to which they were fabricated by the father of all things, and for the sake of which they were generated. Justly, therefore, are all these delivered, and investigated with accuracy by Plato; and the remaining two, form and the subject-matter, suspended from these. For this world is not the same with the intellizible or intellectual worlds, which, according to some, subsist in pure forms ; but one thing in it has the relation of reason and form, and another, of a subject. But that Plato very properly delivers all these causes of the fabrication of the world, viz. the good, the intelligible paradigm, the maker, form, and the subject nature, is evident from the following considerations. Vor if he had spoken con- cerning the intelligible Gods, he would have evinced that the good alone is the cause of these ; for the intelligible number is from this cause. But if concerning the intellectual Gods, he would have shown that he good and the intellizible are the causes‘ of these. For the intellectual multitude proceeds from the intelligible unities, and the one fountain of beings. And if he had spoken concerning the supermundane Gods, he would have produced them from the intellectual and total fabrication, from the intelligible Gods, and from the cause of all things, For this cause gives subsistence to all things of which secondary natures are generative, but ina primary, ineflable, and inconceivable manner. But since he discusses mundaie affairs and the whole world, he gives to it matter and form, descending into it from the supermundane Gods, suspends it from the total * fabrication, assimilates it to intelligible animal, and demonstrates it to be a God by the participation of the good; and thus he renders the whole world an inte!- lectual, animated God, This, therefore, and such as this, is, as we have said, the scope of the Timienus,

This however being the case, the order of the universe is appropriately indi- cated in the beginning of the dialogue, through images; but in the middle of it,

* Tustead of ἀντι τουτων in this place, it is necessary to read αἰτίας rourwy.

> For wAns bere, it is necessary to read ολην.-

> For wAns bere, it is necessary to read ολην.-

4 PROCLUS ON THE [nook &

the whole fabrication of the world. is delivered ; and in the end, partial natures, and the extremities of fabrication, are woven together with wholes. For the resumption of the discourse about a polity, and the narration respecting the Atlantic island, unfold through images the theory of the world, For if we direct our attention to the union and multitude of mundane natures, we must say that the polity which Socrates summarily discusses, is an image of their union, esta- Hlishing as its end the communion which pervades through all things; but that the war ofthe Atlantics with the Athenians, whieh Critias narrates, is an image of the division of mundane natures, and especially of the opposition according to the two co-ordinations of thirgs. Bat if we divide the universe into the celestial and sublunary regions, we Ν᾽ say that the [Socratic] polity, ts assimilated to the celestial order ; for Socrates savs, that the paradigms of it is established in the heavens; but the warof the Athintics, to eeneration, which subsists through con- trariety and mutation. “Phese things therefore, for the reasons we lave mentioned, precede the whole of physiology.

Butatter this, the demiursie, paradigmatic and final causes of the universe are unfolded, in consequence of the pre existence of whieh, the universe is fabricated both according to the whole and the parts of it. Por the corporeal nature of it iN fashioned with forms, and divided by divine numbers; soul also ts produced from the Demiurgus, and is filled with harmonic reasons, and divine and demiurgic syinbols ; and the whole animal is woven together conformably to the united comprehension of it inthe intelfeible world. “Phe parts likewise of at, are ar- ranged ina becoming manner in the whole, both such as are corporeal and such as are vital For partial souls being introduced into. the world, are arranged about their leading Gods, and through their vehicles become mundane, toitating their presiding deities, Mortal animals likewise, are fabricated and vivitied by the eclestial Gods: where also mau is surveyed, and the mode of his subsistence, and throuh what causes he was constituted, Man indecd ts considered prior to other things, cither because the theory respecting him pertains to us who make him the subject of discussion, and are ourselves men; or because man is ἃ micro- cosin, and all sueh things subsist in him partially, its the world contains divinely and totally. For there isan intellect ino us which is in energy, and a rational

non! procoeding from the same® father, and Che sane Vivifie Goddess, as the soul

' Vor arribeaes here, itis obviously requisite to re ad αὐ τιῆε σέων,

Vor αὐτὴν rarpos here, 1 ᾿ν neeessary to read aurov marpos,

nook 1.) TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 5

procoeding from the same® father, and Che sane Vivifie Goddess, as the soul

' Vor arribeaes here, itis obviously requisite to re ad αὐ τιῆε σέων,

Vor αὐτὴν rarpos here, 1 ᾿ν neeessary to read aurov marpos,

nook 1.) TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 5

of the universe ; also an etherial vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terres- trial boay derived from the four elements, and with which likewise it- is co-ordt- nate. Tf therefore, it is necessary that the universe should) be surveved multifa- viously, in the intelligible, and in the sensible world, paradigmatically, iconically, totally and partially, it will be well, if the nature of man is perfectly discussed in the theory of the universe,

Tf therefore, it is necessary that the universe should) be surveved multifa- viously, in the intelligible, and in the sensible world, paradigmatically, iconically, totally and partially, it will be well, if the nature of man is perfectly discussed in the theory of the universe,

You may also say that conformably to the Pythazoric custom, it is necessary to connect the discussion of that which surveys with that which is surveyed. For since we are informed what the world is, it is requisite T think to add also, whiat that is which considers these things, and makes them the subject of rational anim- adversion. But that Plato directs his attention likewise to this, is evident froin what he says near the end of the dialogue, that it is necessary that the intellect of him who intends to obtain a happy life, should be assimilated to the object of his intelleetion. For the universe is always happy; and our soul will likewise be happy, When itis assimilated to the universes for thus it will be led) back to its cause, Foras the sensible man is to the universe, so is) the intelligible man_ to animal itself, But there secondary natures always adhere to such as are first, and parts subsist in unproceeding union with their wholes, and are established in them. Hence, when the sensible man is assimilated to the universe, he also imitates: his paradigm after an appropriate manner, becoming a world through similitude to the world, and happy through resemblance to that blessed) god [the universe. } The ends also of fabrication are subtilely elaborated by Plato, according to genus and species, and also what pertains to meteors, together with productions in the earth, and in animals. such things as are preternataral, and such as are accord- ing tonature; in which part of the Timawus, likewise, the principles of medicine are unfelded. For the physiologist ends αἱ these; since he is a surveyor of nature. Fora subsistence aceordiig to nature, exists together with nature; but the preternatural is a departure trom nature, It is the business, therefore, of the physiologist to understand in how many modes this aberration subsists, and how it becomes terminated in moderation and a natural condition. But itis the pro- vince of the medical art to unfold) such particulars as are consequent to these. Aud in these things especially, Plato has something in common with other physiologists, For they were conversant with the most material, and the ultimate works of nature, neglecting the whole heaven, aud the orders of the mundane Gods, in consequence of directing their attention to matter; but they bade farewell to forms and primary causes.

6 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 1,

6 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 1,

It also appears to me that the demoniacal Aristotle, emulating as much as possible the doctrine of Plato, thus arranges the whole of his discussion concern- ing nature, perceiving that the things which are common to every thing that has a natural subsistence are, form and a subject, that from whence the principle of motion is derived, motion, time, and place; al! which are delivered by Plato in this dialogue, viz. interval, and time which is the image of eternity, and is con- subsistent with the universe; the various species of motion; and the concauscs of things which have a natural subsistence. But with respect to the things peculiar to substances according to an essential division, of these Aristotle discusses in the first place such as pertain to the heavens, ina way conformably to Plato; 50 far as he calls the heaven unbegotten, and a fifth essence. Lor what diflerence is there between calling it a fifth clement, or a fifth world, and ἃ fifth figure, as Plato denominates it?) But in the seeond place, he discusses such things as are commoy to every thing that has a generated: subsistence, And) with respect to things of this hind, Plato deserves to be admired, for having surveyed with much accuracy the essence and powers of them, and for having rightly preserved their harmony and cgntrarieties. And of these, such indeed as pertain to meteors, Plato has delivered the principles, but Aristotle has extended the doctrine respecting them beyond what is fit. But such as pertain to the theory of aumals, are distinguished by Plato according te all final causes and concauses, but by Aristotle are scarcely, and bat in few Instances, surveyed according to form. For his discussion for the most part stops at matter; and making bis exposition of things that have ao natural subsistence from this, he shows to us that he deserts the doctrine of lis preceptor, gand thus much concerning these par- ticulars.

In the next place it is requisite to speak of the form and character of the dia- logue, and to show what they are. It is universally acknowledged, then, that Plato receiving the treatise of the Pythagoric Timiwus, which was composed by him after the Pythagoric manner, began to write his Timwus. Again, it is - also acknowledged by those who are in the smallest degree conversant with the writ- ings of Plato, that his manner is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonstrative. 10, therefore, he has any where mingled the Pythagoric and Socratic peculiarity, he appears to have done this in the present dialogue. For there are in it from the Pythayorie custom, elevation of conception, the intellectual, the divinely inspired, the suspending every thing from intetligibles, the bounding wholes in numbers, the indicating things mystically and symbolically, the anagogic, the transcending

nooK 1. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 7

TIMAUS OF PLATO. 7

partial conceptions, and the enunciative or unfolding into light. But from the Socratic philanthropy, the sociable, the mild, the demonstrative, the contemplat- ing beings through images, the ethical, and every thing of this kind. Hence it is a venerable dialogue ; forms its conceptions supernally from the first principles ; and mingles the demonstrative with the enunciative. It also prepares us to under- stand physies, not only physically, but likewise theologically. For Nature herself who is the leader of the universe, being suspended from, and inspired by the Gods, governs the corporeal-formed essence. And she neither ranks as a God- dess, nor is without a divine peculiarity, but is illuminated by the truly-existing Gods.

If, likewise, it be requisite that discourses should be assimilated to the things of which they are the interpreters, as Timeus himself says, it will be fit that this dialogue also should have the physical, and should also have the theological ς imitating nature, which is the object of its contemplation, Fartier still, acvording to the Pythagoric doctrine, things receive a threefold division into intelligibles, ἢ things physical, and such as are the media between these, and which are usually called mathematical, But all things may be appropriately surveyed in all. For/ such things as are media, and such as are last! presubsist in intelligibles after a primordial manner, and both these subsist in the mathematical cenera ; first natures indeed iconically, but such as rank as the third, peradigmatically, In physical entities, also, there are images of the essences prior to them. This, therefore, being the case, Timieus, when he constitute? the soul, very properly indicates its powers, its productive principles, and its elements through mathematical names. But Plato defines its peculiarities by geomc.tical figures, and leaves the causes of all these primordially pre-existing in the intelligible and demiurgic intellect. And thus much concerning these things ; since when we descend to particulars, we shall be able to know more perfectly the manner of the dialogue. But the hypo- thesis of it ix as follows :

Socrates having come to the Pirwus for the sake of the Bendidian festival and solemn procession, discoursed there concerning a polity with Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, Glanco and Adimantus, and likewise Thrasymachus the sophist. But on the day after this, he narrates the conference in the Pirwus, as it is laid down in the Republic, in the city, to Timaus, Hermocrates and Criteas, and to another fourth anonymous person. Having, however, made this narration, he calls upon the other associates, to feast him in return on the day after this, with the banquet of discourse. The auditors therefore and speakers assembled together

Ἷ

f

8 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook 1.

Having, however, made this narration, he calls upon the other associates, to feast him in return on the day after this, with the banquet of discourse. The auditors therefore and speakers assembled together

Ἷ

f

8 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook 1.

on this day, which was the third from the conference in the Pireus. For in the Republic it is said, “* T went down yesterday to the Pirwus 37 but in this dialogue, “ Of those who were received by me yesterday at a banquet of discourse, but who ought now in their turn to repay me with a similar repast.” Not all of them how- ever, Were present at this audition, but the fourth was wanting through indispost- tion, What, therefore, you will say, are these three auditors of a discussion about the whole world? Treply, that itis fit the father of the discussion should be con- sidered as analogous to [the Demiurgus, or] the father of works. For the fabrica- tion of the world in words, is the image of the fabrication of it according to intel- lect. Bat the triad of those that receive the discussion of Timieus, is analozous to the demiurgic triad which receives the one and total motion of the father; of which triad Socrates is the summit, through an alliance of life immediately con- Jolming himself to Tinieus, just as the first of the paradigmatic triad is united to the fatter, who is prior to the tuiad, These things, however, if the Gods please, we shall render more manifest through what follows. As we have therefore spoken concerning the scope and management of the dialogue, have shown low admirable the character of itis, and what is the whole of the hypothesis, and have indicated the adaptation of the persons to the present discussion, twill be proper that, betaking ourselves to the words of απ, we should investigate every par- Hieular to the utinost of our power,

Since, however, the word nature, being diflerently understood by different: per- sons, disturbs those who love to contemplate the conceptions of Plato, let us in the first place show what it appeared to him: to he, and what his opinion was of Its essence. For the hnowledge of what nature is, whence it proceeds, and how far itextends to productions, will be adapted) τὸ the dialogue, which bas for its object the physical theory. For of the ancients, some indeed, as Antipho, called iatter nature; but others form, as Aristotle, in many places. Others again called the whole of things nature, as some prior to Plato, of whom he speaks ino the Laws. Others’ denominated nature things which subsist by nature. But others gave the appellation of nature to physical powers, such as gravity and levity, rarity and density, as some of the Peripatetics, and still more ancient: pliysiolo- vists. Others called things which have a natural subsistence the art of God 5 others soul; and others something else of this kind. Plato, however, does not

think fit to give the appellation of nature primarily, either to matter, or material

Plato, however, does not

think fit to give the appellation of nature primarily, either to matter, or material

' For ore δὴ here, it is necessary to read οἱ dy,

ROOK 1] TIM-LEUS OF PLATO. 9

form, or body, or physical powers, but is averse to call it immediately soul. Placing, however, the essence of it in the middle of beth, I mean, between soul and corporeal powers, the latter being inferior to it, in consequence of being divided about bodies, and incapable of being converted to themselves, but nature surpass- ing things posterior to if, through containing the reasons or productive principles of all of them, and generating and vivifving all things, he has delivered to us the most accurate theory concerning it. For, according to common conceptions, nature is one thing, and that which subsists according to, and by nature, another, For that which is artificial, is something diflerent from art, and the intellectual soul is one thing, and nature another. For nature, indeed, verges to bodies, and is inseparable from them, But the intellectual soul is separate from bodics, is esta- blished in herself, and at one and the same time belongs to herselfand to another. She belongs to another, indeed, in consequence of being participated, but to herself, through not verging to the participant; just as the father of soul is of himself being imparticipable, and, if yon are willing, prior to him the intelligible paradigm itself of the whole world. For these follow each other, viz. itse/; of itself; of’ itself and of another ; of another ; another. And with respect to the last of these, it is evident that it is every thing sensible, in which there is interval and all-various division. But of the next to this, (viz. that which is of another,] it is nature which is inseparable from bodies, That which immediately precedes this [viz. that which is both of itself and of another,] is soul which subsists in herself, and imparts by illumination a secondary life to another thing. The next to this [or that which is of itself.) is the demiurgie intellect who abides Cas Plato says] in himself in his own accustomed manner. And the next to this Cor itself] is the intelligible cause of all things, which is the paradigm of the productions of the Demiurgus, and which Plato on this account thinks fit to call animal itself. Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal-formed and sensible essence. She is also the boundary of the extent of ineorporeal essences, and is full of reasons and powers through which she directs and governs mundane beings. And she is a Goddess indeed, in consequence of being deified, but she has not immediately the subsistence of a deity. For we call divine bodies Gods, as being tle statues of Gods. But she governs the whole world by her powers, containing the heavens indeed in the summit of herself, but ruling. over generation through the heavens; and every where weaving together partial natures with wholes. Being however such, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess [Rhea.} [For according to the Chaldwan oracle] “ Immense Nature is suspended from the Tim. Plat. Vou. I. Bb

over generation through the heavens; and every where weaving together partial natures with wholes. Being however such, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess [Rhea.} [For according to the Chaldwan oracle] “ Immense Nature is suspended from the Tim. Plat. Vou. I. Bb

10 PROCLUS ON TIE [Book 1.

back of the Goddess ;” from whom all life is derived, both that which is intellee- tual, and that which is inseparable from the subjects of its government. Hence, being suspended from thence, she pervades without impediment through, and inspires all things; so that through her, the most inanimate beings participate of a certain soul, and such things as are corraptible, remain perpetually in the world, being held together by the causes of forms which she contains. For again the Oracle says, “ Unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws downward, that Heaven may run an eternal course,” kc. So that if some one of those who assert that there are three demiurgi, is willing to refer them to these principles, viz. to the demiurgic intellect, to soul, and to total nature Lor to nature considered as a ἡ 016,7 he will speak rightly, through the causes which have been already enumerated. But he will speak erroneously, if he supposes that there are three other demiurgi of the universe, beyond soul. For the Demiurgus of wholes is one, but more partial powers, distribute his whole fabrication into parts. We must not therefore admit such an assertion, whether ibe Amelius or ‘Theodorus (Asinwus} who wishes to make this arrangement; but we must be careful to remain in Platonic and Orplic hypotheses.

Moreover, those who call nature demiurgic art, if indeed they mean the nature which abides in the Demiurgus, they do not speak rightly; but their assertion. is right, if they mean the nature which proceeds from him, Jor we must conceive that artis triple, one kind subsisting in the artist, in unproceeding union ; another, proceeding indeed, but being converted to him; and a third being that which has now proceeded from the artist, and subsists in another thing. The art therefore, which is in the Demiurgus, abides in him, and is himself, according to which the sensible world ' is denominated the work of the artificer, and the work of the artificer of the fiery world. But the intellectual soul is art indeed, yet art which at the same time both abides and proceeds. And nature is art which proceeds alone; on which account also it Is said to be the organ of the Gods, not destitute of life, nor alone alter-motive, but having in a certain respeet the selfmotive, through the ability of energizing from itself, Por the organs of the Gods are essentialized in eflicacious reasons, are vital, and concur with the energies of the Gods.

As we have therefore shown what nature is according to Plato, that it is an incorporeal essence, inseparable from bodies, containing the reasons or productive principles of them, and incapable of perceiving itself, and as it is evident from

* It appears to me, that the words roy αἰσθητὸν κόσμον, are wanting bere in the origival.

BOOK 1 TIMA:US OF PLATO. ii

these things that the dialogue is physical, which teaches us conceraing the whole mundane fabrication,—it remains that we should connect what is consequent with what has been said. For since the whole of philosophy is divided into the theory concerning intelligible and mundane natures, and this very properly, because there is also a twofold world, the intelligible and the sensible, as Plato himself says in the course of the dialogue,—this being the case, the Parmenides compre- hends the discussion of intellizgibles, but the Timaus that of mundane natures. For the former delivers to us all the divine orders, but the latter all the progres- sions of mundane essences. Bat neither does the former entirely omit the theory of the natures contained in the universe, nor the latter the theory of intelligibles ; because sensibles are in intelligibles paradigmatically, and intelligibles in sensibles iconically. But the one is exuberant about that which is physical, and the other about that which is theological, ina manner appropriate to the men from whom the dialogues are denominated: to Timeus, for he wrote a treatise of this kind about the universe; and to Parmenides, for he wrote about truly-existing beings. The divine Iamblichus, therefore, says rightly, that the whole theory of Plato is comprehended in these two dialogues, the Timieus and Parmenides. For every thing pertaining to mundane and supermundane natures, obtains its most excellent end in these, and no order of beings is left uninvestigated. To those also who do not carelessly inspect these dialogues, the similitude of discussion in the Timeus to that in the Parmenides, will be apparent. For as Timius refers the cause of every thing in the world to the first Demiurgus, so Parmenides suspends the pro- gression of all beings from the one. And this is effected by the former, so far as all things participate of the demiurgic providence; but by the latter, so far as beings participate of a uniform hyparxis, [or of an hyparxis which has the form of the one.) Farther still, as Timus, prior to physiology, extends through images the theory of mundane natures, so Parmenides excites the investigation of imma- terial forms, prior to theology. For it is requisite after having been exercised in discussions about the best polity, to be !ed to the knowledge of the universe; and after having contended with strenuous doubts about forms, to be sent to the mystic theory of the unities (of beings.) Tlaving however, said thus much, it is now time

to consider the words of Plato, and investigate their meaning to the utmost of our

ability. “TI see] One, two, three, but where, fricnd Timieus,’ is the fourth

* In all the editions of the Timzus, ἡμῖν follows after gure Τίμαιε, but is wanting in these Commen- taries of Proclus.

12 PROCLUS ON THE- {nook τ.

person of those who having been received by me yesterday at a banquet of discussion, ought now to repay me with a similar repast δ᾽

Plato here, together with the grace and beauty of the words, raises and exalts the whole period. Praxiphanes however, the disciple of Theophrastus, blames Plato, first because he makes an enumeration of one, two, three, ina thing which is Manifest to sense and known to Socrates. For what occasion had Socrates to numerate, in order that he might know the multitude of those that assembled to this conference? In the second place he blames him, because he makes a change in using the word foxrth, and in su doing, does not accord with what had been sald before. For the word four, is consequent to one, two, three; but to the

Jourth, the frst, second, and third are consequent. These, therefore, are the objec- tions of Praxiphanes. The philosopher Porphyry however directly replies to him, and in answer to his second objection observes, that this is the Grecian custom, for the purpose of producing beauty in the diction, Homer! therefore

has said many things of this kind:

Full of the brass descending from above, Through six bull hides the furious weapon drove, Till in the secenté it fix’d.

And in ἃ similar manner in many other places. Here also the mutation has a cause. For to numerate the persons that were present, was to point them out. For to say one, two, three, is indicative; but he signifies the person that was absent (since it Was Impossible to point him out) through the fourth. For we use the term the fourth, of one that is absent. But to the former objection Porphyry replies, thataif as imany had been present as was requisite, it would have been superfluous to nunerate them, but one of them being absent, of whos? name we are ignorant, the enumeration of those that are present contains a representation of the one that is wanting, as desiring that which rema‘nas, and as being in want of a part of the whole number, Plato therefore indicating this, represents Socrates “enumerating the persons that were present, and requiring him who was wanting, For it he had known him, and had been able to manifest him by name, he would perhaps have said, J see Critias, and Timeus, and Hlermocrates, but that man I do not see. Since however, he who was absent was a stranger, and unknown to

ε Vil. 247:

ποῦκ 1 TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 13

Since however, he who was absent was a stranger, and unknown to

ε Vil. 247:

ποῦκ 1 TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 13

him, he only knew through number that he was wanting, and manifests to us that so many were present. All these observations, therefore, are elegant, and such others of the like kind as may be devised by some in subserviency to the theory of the words before us. But it is necessary to remember that the dialogue is Pythagorean, and that it is requisite interpretations should be made in a way adapted to the philosophers of that sect.

Such ethical Pythagoric dogmas therefore, as the following, may be denved from the present text: Those men established friendship and a concordant life, as the scope of all their philosophy. Hence Socrates prior to every thing else adduces this, by giving Timeus the appellation of friend. In the second place, they thought that the compacts which they made with each other, should be stably preserved by them; and for the fulfillment of these, Socrates desires the presence of the fourth person. In the third place, they embraced communion in the invention of dogmas, and the writings of one, were common to all of them. This also Socrates establishes, calling on them to become both guests and hosts, those that fill, and those that are filled, those that teach, and those that learn, Others, therefore, have written arts concerning disciplines through which they think they shall improve the manners of those that are instructed by them; but Plato delineates the forms of appropriate manners, through the imitation of the most eveellent men, which have much greater efficacy than those which are de- posited in mere rules alone. For imitation disposes the lives of the auditors, conformably to its own peculiarity. Hence, through these things it is evident what that is about which the philosopher is especially abundant, that it is about the hearing of discussions, and what he conceived to be a true feast; that it is not such as the multitude fancy it to be; for this is of an animal and brutal nature ; but that which banquets in us the [true] man. Hence too, there is much in Plato about the feast of discourse. ‘These therefore, and such particulars as these, are ethical.

But the physical Pythagorie dogmas are as follow: They said that every phy- sical production was held together by numbers, and that all the fabrications of nature subsisted conformably to numbers. These numbers however are partici- pated, just as all mundane forms are participable. Very properly, therefore, does the dialogue at its commencement proceed through numbers, and use numbers as things numbered, and not those very things themselves of which they partici- pate. For the monad, duad, and triad are one thing, and one, two, three, another. For the former are simple, and each of these subsists itself by itself;

14 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ |.

For the monad, duad, and triad are one thing, and one, two, three, another. For the former are simple, and each of these subsists itself by itself;

14 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ |.

but the latter participate of the former. Aristotle therefore, is not right in assert- ing, that these men considered numbers as subsisting in sensibles, For how could this be admitted by those who celebrate number as the father of Gods and men, and the tetractys, as the fountain of ever-flowing nature? But since the dia- logue iy physical, it makes ity commencement from participated numbers, such as are ΑἸ γα {πὰ} αὐτὸ physical PBarther stl, these men venerated physical communion, both that whieh isin generation, wecording to whieh all Chines are rendered effable and commensurate with each other, and that whichis in celestial natures. For these impart to each other their proper powers, Rightly therefore, and in away acapted to the thing proposed, does Socrates think fit, that the same persons should become both hosts and guests.

From these things also, you may survey such theological conceptions as the following: These men generated all things through the first numbers, and which also rank as rulers and leaders; and from three Gods, gave subsistence to all mundane natures, Of these three, the monad, duad and triad, are indicative; so that it is requisite to begin from these, and that be why surveys nature inwardly should look to these, Farther still, the concauses of mataral Chings were also contemplated) by other philosophers, as by Anaxagoras and Zeno; bat the final, the paradigmatic, and the producing ' cause, were peculiarly investigated by Plato, These causes therefore are manifested through the above numbers, Phe final, indeed, through the monad ; for it presides over numbers in the order of the good. But the paradigmatic through the duad; for the difference of beings separates the primary causes of wholes. And besides this, the duad is the principle of the tetractys of intelligible paradigms. But the producing cause is signified through the triad. For intellect is adapted to the triad, since itis the third from being through life as the medium, or from the father through power, or from the intelli- gible through intelligence. Por as the monad is to the duad, so is being to life, father to power, and the intelligible to intelligence. Βα ἀν the duad is to the triad, so is life, and also power and intelligence, to intellect. Again, all divine natures are 'nall, and are united to each other, so that all of them are in one, and each is in all, and they are connected together through divine friendship, The sphere also which is there, comprehends the one union of Gods. Hence Socrates who looks to divinity, very properly begins from) communion and concord, and likewise calls the other persons of the dialogue to this. Moreover, the words

* Por warpoaow here, it is necessary to read ποιητίκον.

BOOK 1.] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 15

Hence Socrates who looks to divinity, very properly begins from) communion and concord, and likewise calls the other persons of the dialogue to this. Moreover, the words

* Por warpoaow here, it is necessary to read ποιητίκον.

BOOK 1.] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 15

Jeasting and banguet, are words adapted to the Gods, and especially to the mun- dane Gods. For they proceed together with the liberated Gods to the banquet and delicate food, as Socrates says in the Phadrus: and the feasting on the nati- - vity of Venus, was in conjunction with the great Jupiter. These things therefore, Socrates thinks should subsist analogously with them, in their mutual participa- tions of divine conceptions, And itis not at all wonderful that Timaus should feast others, and be feasted by them. Farther still, communications and partici- pations of powers are celebrated by theologists, divine natures filling and being filled by each other, For thus we hear from poets inspired by Phabus, that the Gods communicate with each other in intellectual or providential energies in the works which they effect in the universe.

In golden cups the Gods each other pledge, And while they drink their eyes are fix’d on Troy. *

They also know and intellectually perceive each other. For Gods are to each other not unknown. *

But the intelligible according to the Chaldzan oracle is nutriment to that which is intellective. From all which it is evident, that a reciprocation of banqueting, subsists primarily in the Gods. And of men, those that are more wise, imitating in this respect the Gods, impart to each other in unenvying abundance, their own proper intellectual conceptions.

“Tim. A certain infirmity has befallen him, Socrates: for he would not willingly be absent from such an association as the present.”

The philosopher Porphyry says, that what is apposite is delineated in these words: that this is the one cause with wise men of relinquishing such like associa- lions, viz, infirmity of body; and that it is requisite to think that every thing of

this kind depends on circumstances and is involuntary. Another thing also is delineated, that friends should make fit apologies for friends, when they appear to have done any thing rightly, which is contrary to common opinion. The present

᾿ liad Iv. 2 seq. " Οὐγ95. Υ, 79.

16 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

words therefore, comprehend both these, indicating the manners of Timiwus, and the necessity of one being absent; exhibiting the former as mild and friendly to truth, but the latter, as an impediment to the life of a lover of learning. But the

divine Tamblichus speaking lottily on. these words, says that those who are exer-

But the

divine Tamblichus speaking lottily on. these words, says that those who are exer-

cised in the survey of intelligibles, are unadapted to the discussion of sensibles ; as also Socrates himself says in the Republic, + that those who are nurtured in pure splendor, have their eyes darkened when they descend into the cavert through the obscurity which is there; Just as it likewise happens to those who ascend from the cavern, through their Inability to look directly τὸ the hieht.” Through this cause therefore, the fourth person is wanting, as being adapted to another contemplation, that of intelligibles. 1 is also necessary: that this his infirmity, should be a transcendeney of power, aecording to which he surpasses the present theory, Lor as the power of the wicked, is rather impoteney thane power, thus also imbecillity with respect to things of a sccondary mature, Is tran scendency of power. According to famblichus therefore, the person who is wanting, is absent in consequence of betng incommensurate to physical discus- sions; but he would have been willingly present, if intelligibles were to have been considered, And nearly with respect to every thing [in this dialogue} prior te physiology, one of these, i.e. Porphyry, interprets every thing in amore political inanner, referring what is said to the virtues, but the other, Tamblichus, ina more physical way. Por itis necessary, that every thing should accord with the pro- posed scope : but the dialowue is physical, and not ethical, Such therefore, are the conclusions of the philosophers about these particulars. Por TP omit to men- tion those who labour to evince, that this fourth person was "Thewtetus, because he was known to those who came out of the Eleatic* school, and because we are informed felsewhere} that be was all Pence he is said to have been now absent on necount of iiness, Por this Aristocles: infers, that the absent: person wits Theatetus, who a little before the death of Socrates, beewme hnown to Socrates, and to the Elean stranger, Bat admitting that he had been Leng before known to the latter, What is there in common between Timwus and hin? ‘Phe Platonic Prolomy however, thinks that the absent person was Clitophon: for in the dia- logue which bears hiv name, he is not thought deserving of an answer by Socrates, But Dereyilides is of opinion that it was Plato: for he was absent through illness, * See the beginning of the 7th book of the Republic. > Por eXeyaruov here, it eppears to me to be pecessary to read EXearjauv.

BOOK 1.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 17

> Por eXeyaruov here, it eppears to me to be pecessary to read EXearjauv.

BOOK 1.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 17

when Socrates died. These, therefore, as I have said, I omit; since it is well observed by those prior to us, that these men neither investigate what is worthy of investigation, nor assert any thing that can be depended on. All of them, like- wise, attempt a thing which is of a slippery nature, and which is nothing to the purpose, even if we should discover that which is the object of their search. For to say that it was either Theaxtetus or Plato, on account of illness, does not accord with the times. For of these, the former is said to have been ill when Socrates was judged, but the latter when Socrates was dead. But to say it was Clitophon is perfectly absurd. For he was not present on the preceding day, when Socrates narrates what Clitophon said the day before, during the conference in the Pirewus; except that thus much is rightly signified by Atticus, that the absent person appears to have been one of those strangers [or guests] that were with Timeus. Hence Socrates asks Timzus where that fourth person was; and Timezus apologizes for him, as a friend, and shows that his absence was neces- sary, and contrary to his will. And thus much for what is said by the more ancient interpreters,

What, however, our preceptor [Syrianus] has decided on this subject, must be narrated by us, since it is remarkably conformable to the mind of Plato. He says, therefo-e, that in proportion as the auditions are about things of a more venerable and elevated nature, in such proportion the multitude of hearers is diminished. But the discussion in the Timeus becomes, as it proceeds, more mystic and arcane. TLence in the former discussion of a polity during the conference in the Pirwus, the hearers were many, and those who had names were six. But in the second conference, which is narrated by Socrates, those who receive the nar ration are four in number, And in the present conference, the fourth person is wanting; but the auditors are three. And by how much the discussion is more pure, and more intellectual, by so much the more is the number of auditors con- tracted. For every where that which is discussed is a monad.—But at one time, it is accompanied with contention; on which account also, the auditors have the indefinite, and the definite is extended into multitude, in which the odd is com- plicated with the even. At another time, however, the discussion is narrative, yet is not liberated from opposition, and dialectic contests. Hence also, the auditors are four in number; the tetrad through its tetragonic nature, and alliance to the monad, possessing similitude and sameness ; but through the nature of the even, possessing difference and multitude. And at another time' the discussion

* It is necessary to supply in this place, the words owov δε. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. Cc

18 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1.

And at another time' the discussion

* It is necessary to supply in this place, the words owov δε. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. Cc

18 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1.

is exempt from all agonistic doctrine, the theory being unfolded enunciatively, and narrafively. Hence, the triad is adapted to the recipients of it, since this number is in every respect connascent with the monad, is the first odd number, and is perfect. For as of the virtues, some of them subsist in souls the parts of which are in a state of hostility to each other, and measure the hostility of these parts ; but others separate indeed from this hostility, yet are not perfectly liberated from it; and others are entirely separated from it;—thus also ‘of discussions, some indeed are agonistic, others are enunciative, and others are in a certain respect media between both. Some, indeed, being adapted to intellectual tran- quillity, and to the intellectual energy of the soul; but others to doxastic ener- gies; and others to the lives that subsist between these. Moreover, of auditors likewise, some are commensurate to more elevated auditions, but others to such as are of a more groveling nature. And the auditors indeed of grander subjects, are also capable of attending to such as are subordinate; but those who are naturally adapted to subjects of less importance, are unable to understand such as are more venerable. Thus also with respeet to the virtues, he who has the greater possesses likewise the less; but he who is adorned with the inferior, is not entirely a partaker also of the more perfect virtues,

Thus also with respeet to the virtues, he who has the greater possesses likewise the less; but he who is adorned with the inferior, is not entirely a partaker also of the more perfect virtues,

Why, therefore, is it any longer wonderful, if an auditor of discussions about a polity, should not be admitted to hear the discussion about the universe? Or rather, is it not necessary that in more profound disquisitions, the auditors should be fewer in number? Is it not likewise Pythagoric, to define different: measures of auditions? For of those who caine to the homacoion (or common auditory of the Pythagoreans] some were partakers of more profound, but others of more superticial dogmas. Does not this also accord with Plato, who assigns infirmity as the cause of the absence of this fourth person? For the imbecility of the soul with respect to more divine conceptions, separates us from more elevated con- ferences, in which case the involuntary also takes place. For every thing which benefits us in a less degree, is not conformable to our will. But the falling off from more perfect good is involuntary; or rather it is itself not voluntary. But the falling off which not only separates us from greater goods, but leads us to the infinity of vice, is involuntary. Hence also Timwus says, that this fourth person was absent not willingly from this conference. For he was not absent in such a way as to be perfectly abhorrent from the theory, but as unable to be initiated in evreater speculations. It is possible, therefore, for an auditor of disquisitions about the fabrication of the world, to be also an auditor of discussions about a

BOOK 1.) TIMEUS OF PLATO. 19

polity. But it is among the number of things impossible, that one who is adapted to receive political discourses, should through transcendency of power, omit to be present at auditions about the universe. This fourth person, therefore, was absent through indigence, and not as some say, through transcendency of power. And it must be said, that the imbecility was not the incommensuration of the others fo him, but the inferiority of him to the others. For let there be an imbe-

_cility both of those that descend from the intelligible, and of those that ascend

And it must be said, that the imbecility was not the incommensuration of the others fo him, but the inferiority of him to the others. For let there be an imbe-

_cility both of those that descend from the intelligible, and of those that ascend

from the speculation of sensibles, such as Socrates relates in the Republic; yet he who becomes an auditor of political discussions, cannot through a tran- scendency unknown to those that are present, be absent from the theory of physics. It likewise appears to me, that the words “ has befallen him,” sufficiently represent to us the diflerence between him and those that were present, with respect to discussions, and not with respect to transcendency. His being anony- mous also, scems to signify, not his being exempt from and circumscribed by those that were present, but the indefiniteness and inferiority of his habit. Plato, therefore, is accustomed to do this in many places. Thus in the Phado, he does not think him deserving of a name, who in that dialogue answered badly. He also mentions indetinitely,' the father of Critobulus, who was absent from the discussion of the subjects that were then considered ; and likewise very many others. An auditor therefore of this kind would in vain* have been present at these discussions; since of those that were present, Critias indeed himself says something; but Hermocrates is silently present, differing only from him who is absent in a greater aptitude to hear, but being inferior to all the rest, through his inability to speak.

“Soc. It is your business, therefore, O Timus, and that of the com- pany present, to fill up the part of this absent person.”

This also accords with what we have said. For in natures which are more causal and divine, quantity is always contracted, and multitude diminished, but power transcends. And this also is a dogma of the Pythagoreans, with whom the triad is more venerable than the tetrad, the tetrad than the decad, and all the numbers within, than those posterior to the decad: And in short, that which is

* For ἀρίστως here, it is necessary to read αοριστως. * Instead of o bn rotovros axpoarns, ov parny ay παρεγένετο ros Aoyous, it appears to me to be neces- sary to read ὁ δὴ rovovros ἀκροατὴς ovy, parny κ.λ.

20 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1.

* Instead of o bn rotovros axpoarns, ov parny ay παρεγένετο ros Aoyous, it appears to me to be neces- sary to read ὁ δὴ rovovros ἀκροατὴς ovy, parny κ.λ.

20 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1.

nearer to the principle, has a more primordial nature. But that which is more primordial is more powerful; since all power is antecedently comprehended in the principle, and from the principle is imparted to other things, If, therefore, the principle of things was multitude, it would be requisite that what is more multitudinous, should be more primordial and powerful than what is less so. Since, however, the principle is a monad, that which is more monadic, is more excellent and more powerful than things which are more separated from their cause. Hence Socrates very properly makes a diminution of number to bea symbol of superior perfection, which antecedently comprehends according to power all secondary natures, and fills up their deficiency. But since, as we have before observed, Socrates is the summit of this triad of auditors, and he conjoins himself to the monad that disposes the conference, conformably to the image of demiurgic Gods, it is worth while to observe, how he exempts Timwus from the rest, and how he is extended to him, as to the dispensator of the whole discussion. He conjoins, however, the other auditors to himself, as being inferior to him in desert. For these things may be referred to divine causes, in which the first of the [demiurgic] triad is united to the primary monad, and extends the other parts of the triad to it. Tt also calls forth, indeed, the productive energy of the monad, but excites the energies of the rest to fabrication. These things, therefore, are conformable to what has been before said. But according to Por- phyry, the ethical doctrine contained in these words is this, that friends ought to endure all things for each other, both in words and deeds, and to supply their wants, and cause them to be unindigent, by filling up their deficiency.’ For these are the peculiarities of pure and genuine friendship. Tamblichus, however, having supposed that the anonymous person was superior to those that were present, and was a lover of the contemplation of intelligibles, says, that Socrates indicates by these words, that though generated fall short of the nature of truly- existing beings, yet a certain sinulitude is divulsed from these beings. And conformably to this, the theory which is conversant with nature, participates ina certain respect of the science of intelligibles, and this the filling up the part of the

absent person manifests.

“Tim. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment

* For τὸ ἐκείνων here, it is necessary to read ro e\Aciwor.

BOOK 1.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 21

“Tim. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment

* For τὸ ἐκείνων here, it is necessary to read ro e\Aciwor.

BOOK 1.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 21

unaccomplished. For it would not be just, that we, who were yesterday entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received, should not return the hospitality with readiness and delight.”

The manners of Timeus are indicated by these words; for they are shown to be superb and modest, elevated and elegant, friendly and philanthropic. For the words “ Entirely so,” indicate his promptitude respecting the absent person, and the perfection of the science according to which he is readily dis- posed to fill up what is wanting in others; and they also indicate his genuine sincerity. But the words, “ We shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave nothing belonging to such an employment unaccomplished,” sufficiently present to our view, his firmness in the fulfilment of his promises, and his modesty in speaking of himself. Such, therefore, are the ethical indications that may be surveyed in these words. But the physical indications are these, that the remuneration of discussion, conveys an image of tiie communion and compensation of powers, through which all things are co-ordinated, and contribute to the one harmony of the universe. Likewise, that the energies of nature are changed according to time, different energies operating at different times on different subjects. For to these indications the words, “return the hospitality to you, by whom we were yesterday entertained in such a manner as guests ought to be received,” are similar. That which is theologically indicated is this, that the demiurgic cause proceeds through, and fills all things, aad cuts off every deficiency through his own power, and his pro- lific abundance, according to which he leaves nothing destitute of himself. For he is characterised by the super-plenary, the sufficient, and the all-perfect. More- over, the expression, return the hospitality, is derived from the banqueting in divine fables, according to which the Gods pledge each other:

In golden goblets they each other pledge. Iliad IV. v. 2.

being filled with nectar from the mighty Jupiter. Nor is it simply said, to feast, but fo return the hospitality (or to feast in return). For a reciprocation of feasting," comprehends the entire, and completely perfect plenitude of banqueting. But this also is scen in wholes. For the visible orders of things call forth invisible powers, through their own consummate aptitude; and the latter through tran- scendency of goodness perfect the former. All these likewise, are conjoined with each other, and the communication of perfection, becomes the retnbution of

* For αφεστιασις here, it is necessary to read αγταφεστιασιε.

22 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 1.

All these likewise, are conjoined with each other, and the communication of perfection, becomes the retnbution of

* For αφεστιασις here, it is necessary to read αγταφεστιασιε.

22 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 1.

calling forth. Farther still, to do all these things, accompanied with justice, conveys an image of the Justice which arranges all things in conjunction with Jupiter. But the becoming {or in such ἃ manner as guests ought to be received] is an image of the cause which illuminates wholes with demiurgic beauty. And the term guests, is an image of the variety which is defined according to divine pecu- liarities. For each of the divine natures possesses appropriate powers and energies. As therefore Socrates feasted Timeus with the discourses of his own philosophy, thus also each of the Gods, energizing conformably to his proper powers, contributes to the one and transcendent providential attention of the Demiurgus to the whole of things. And_ these particulars are exhibited as an exercise to the theory of things, which presents itself to the view! after the manner of an image, in the introduction to the dialogue,

From these things likewise, the times of the dialogues, the Republic, and the Timwus, are manifest; since the one Is supposed to have taken place during the Bendidian festival in the Pirwus, but the other on the following day of the fes- ἀνα]. For that the Bendidian festival was celebrated in the Pirwus on the 19th of April, is acknowledged by those who have written concerning festivals, so that the Timwus must be supposed to have taken place on the 20th of the same month, But if, as will be observed in what follows, this dialogue is supposed to have taken place during the Vanathenwan festival, it is evident that this was the less Panathenwa. For the greater were celebrated on the 28th of June, according to the narration of those whom we have just mentioned,

“Soc. Do you remember, therefore, the magnitude and quality of the things which I proposed to you to explain £”

In the first place, it is requisite to attend to the order of the heads of what is said, of which, that concerning the multitude of those that form the conference, is the leader. The next to this pertains to the filling up the part of him who ts absent. And the third is that which is now added, and respects the explication of the things proposed to be discussed. But these are in continuity with each other. And with reference to the order, it is requisite to understand the accuracy of the words. For the words “ Do you remember,” exhibit distributed knowledge in the participations of discourse, Lor in the Demiurgus the recollection of all

' For eugawopeva in this place, I read engancuerns.

BOOK 1. ΠΕ ΕΌΒ OF PLATO. 23

For the words “ Do you remember,” exhibit distributed knowledge in the participations of discourse, Lor in the Demiurgus the recollection of all

' For eugawopeva in this place, I read engancuerns.

BOOK 1. ΠΕ ΕΌΒ OF PLATO. 23

things, is a separate, exempt, and uniform knowledge, according to the Mnemo- syne which he contains, and which is the firm establishment of divine intelligence. And this in the secondary Gods, is a subordinate intellection; of both which the present persons are images. Through this memory likewise, which pre-exists in the universe, whole souls are established in intelligibles, and the demiurgic rea- sons, [or productive principles} possess an imrautable and an immoveable nature ; so that such" beings as are deprived of it, as is the case with partial souls, and the natures of things that are generated, fall off from their proper causes. But the terms “ such things,” and “about which,” are indicative of the quantity and quality of the productive principles, which proceed indeed from the total fabrication, and also proceed trom more partial Gods. And with respect to the words “which 2 proposed to you to caplain,” if they were addressed to Critias and Hermocrates, it is evident how they are to be referred to things, and to the principles of the fabri- cation of the world; but if also to Timeus, they are not a symbol of transcen- dency [in Socrates}, but of an evocation of the intellectual conceptions of Timzus. Besides these things, however, let us survey the answer of Timaus.

“Tim. Some things indeed, I recollect ; but such as I have forgotten, do you recall into my memory.”

That which is ethical in these words, you will find to be this, as Porphyry says, that they are amedium between irony and arrogance. For Timus does not say that he recollects every thing, nor that he recollects nothing; but that he recollects some things, and not others. That which is logical in them is, that they afford a pretext for the summary repetition of the problems: for to do this is the province of dialectic. The physical indication of the words is this, that phy- sical productive principles always remain, and are always refluxive, just as the present remembrance [of Timius] is partly preserved, and partly lost. For what is said by the man must be transferred to the whole of nature. And the theologi- cal indication is, that the one fabrication [which is that of the Demiurgus] pos- sesses indeed from itself, the immutable and undefiled in its generations ; but through secondary and third powers, is sustained as it proceeds, and is in itself separate ; these powers attending it as guards, and running as it were before it repress the tumult of generated natures. Or rather, that this fabrication is such,

* For oens here, it is necessary to read oea.

24 PROCLUS ON THE [Boom t.

Or rather, that this fabrication is such,

* For oens here, it is necessary to read oea.

24 PROCLUS ON THE [Boom t.

through placing secondary powers over the subjects ofits government. Farther still, the recalling into the memory, brings with it an image of the renovation of the productive principles in the universe. For that which is effluxive in them, is cir- cularly recalled to the same, and the similar. And the order of generation re- mains never-failing, through the circular motion of the heavens. But this motion subsists always after the same manner through intellect which connectedly con- tains and adorns all its circulation, by intellectual powers. It is very properly, therefore, Socrates that recalls into the memory the discussions, who is the nar- -rator of the polity, of which the celestial is the paradigm.

“ Orrather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a cursory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly establish-

ed in our memory.”

The polity [of Socrates] being triple, the first description of it was truly dith- cult on account of sophistical contests; the second was easier than that which preceded it; but the third was [perfectly] easy ; containing in itself contractedly every species of a polity. The recapitulation however of it pertains to physical things, through the regeneration which jis in them, and the circular return to the same form; from which also, forms permanently remain in the world, revolution recalling their efllux and their destruction, Through this cause likewise, the hea- vens are perpetually moved, and evolving many periods, return to the same life. What, however, is the reason that in the [first] narration of a polity, Socrates nel- ther makes mention of the persons, nor the promises, but here adds both these? It is because in wholes, paradigms indeed comprehend all the productive princi- ples of images, but the things which proceed from them, have not strength sufhi- cient to comprehend all the power of theircauses, As, therefore, in the second description of a polity, mention is made of the persons that were in the first con- ference in the Pirsus, thus also in the third, he commemorates those that were passed over in silence in the first. For effects may be surveyed more perfectly in their more superior causes. You may also say theologically, that Timeus, as being established analogous to the total fabrication, comprehends all the persons, the promises, and the discussions themselves. But Socrates in the Republic, heing arranged analogous to the summit' of the triple fabrication, fashions only

* For axAornri here, it is necessary to read ἀκροτητι.

ποοκ 1.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 25

But Socrates in the Republic, heing arranged analogous to the summit' of the triple fabrication, fashions only

* For axAornri here, it is necessary to read ἀκροτητι.

ποοκ 1.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 25

the form of a polity, tis form being celestial. Here, therefore, as in one all-per- fect animal, all things are comprehended, viz. things tirst, middle, and last, and all the evolution of wholes, But how, and through what cause is a polity nar- rated the third time? Is it because the life also ' of the soul is triple? The first indeed, being that which represses and adorns the irrational * part by justice, and governs it ina becoming manner. But the second being that which is con- verted to itself, and desires to perceive itself intellectually, in consequence of subsisting according to its own justice. And the third ascending to its causes, and establishing in them its proper energies. To which may be added, thai “to speak “in a cursory manner,” brings with it an image of a life conspiring to one intellect, which comprehends all things through an intelligible essence. The words also “ run over the whole” afford an admirable indication of an elevation to the highest end, of perfection, and if you are willing s0 to speak, of a more eternal intelligence. For this signifies to be more established, and to possess that which is more firm and more eternal about the same things.

“Soc. Let it be so. And to begin: the sum of what was said by me yesterday is this, What kind of polity appeared to me to be the best, and of what sort of men sucha polity ought to consist.”

Some, considering the resumption of a polity ina more ethical point of view, say thatit indicates to us, that those who apply themselves to the theory of wholes, ought to be adorned in their manners. But others think that it is placed before us as an image of the orderly distribution of the universe. And others, as an indi- cation' of the whole of theology. Zor id τοῖς usual with the Pythagoreans, prior to scientific doctrine, to render manifest the proposed objects of enquiry, through simili- tudes and images ; and after this, to introduce through symbols the arcane indication respecting them. For thus, after the excitation of the intellection of the soul, and the purification of its eye, it is requisite to introduce the whole science of the things which are the subjects of discussion. Here, therefore, the concise narra-

For ac rns ψνχη»ν, it is requisite to read καὶ τὴς Lunes.

> For τὸν Aoyor here, we must read τὸν adoyor.

2 Inthe original oc δὲ αζιουσιν ws εἰκονα τῆς Του παντὸς διακοσμήσεως προκέεισϑθαι THs συμπασης BeoXo- yias. But this, in the latter part, is evidently defective. Aficr προκεῖσθαι therefore, it appears to ine to be necessary to add the words, οἱ δὲ ws ἐγξειξιν, agreeably to the above translation.

Tim. Plat. VoL. I. D

25 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox ft.

But this, in the latter part, is evidently defective. Aficr προκεῖσθαι therefore, it appears to ine to be necessary to add the words, οἱ δὲ ws ἐγξειξιν, agreeably to the above translation.

Tim. Plat. VoL. I. D

25 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox ft.

tion of a polity, prior to physiology, iconically places us in the fabrication of the universe ; but the history of the Atlantics accomplishes this symbolically. For it is usual with fables to indicate many things through symbo!s. So that the phy- siologic character pervades through the whole of the dialogue ; but differently in different places, according to the different modes of the doctrine which is deli- vered. And thus much concerning the scope of the proposed words.

That in the present discussion, however, the summary repetition of a polity very properly takes place, may be multifariously inferred. For the political sei- ence subsists primarily in the Demiurgus of the universe, as we may learn in the Protagoras. And true virtue shines forth in this sensible world. Hence also ‘Ti- meus says, that the * world is known and js friendly to itself through virtue. Far- ther still, the polity of Socrates being triple, and the first being referred to the total fabrication, as we have elsewhere shown, the form of this is very properly deli- vered here contractedly, where it is proposed to survey the whole Demiurgus, gene- raung and adorning the universe. These things, therefore, are capable of being still farther discussed. Let us however return to the teat, and the words of So- crates. But in these, there is mach contention among the interpreters, who op- pose each other about a certain punctuation, and with reference to this differently explain the scope of the discussion. For some, making a stop at the word polity, define the scope of it to be conformable to the inscription, and adduce Plato as a witness that it is concerning a polity. Others again, making a stop at the words what was said, evince that the scope of itis about justice ; and that Soerates has given a certain summary of what was said about justice, which is concerning a polity. If, however, itis requisite not to trifle in asserting and contradicting, it must be said that both concur with each other, For the discourse concerning Justice, Is a disquisition of the polity whichis within the soul. Por it rightly dis- poses the communion of the powers that we contain. The discourse, likewise, about a polity, is a discussion of the justice which subsists in multitude. — Both, therefore, pertain to the same thing, And the same thing ts indeed justice in’ the soul, a polity na city, and gracefulness in the world. Nor is it fit to separate from each other, things which are conjoined by nature, And thas much for this par- ticular.

* By an unaccountable mistake the original has Σωκρατὴν instead of coopoy in this place, which lat-

tcr is evidently the teue reading.

noox 11] ΤΙΜ ΖΚ OF PLATO. .7

Nor is it fit to separate from each other, things which are conjoined by nature, And thas much for this par- ticular.

* By an unaccountable mistake the original has Σωκρατὴν instead of coopoy in this place, which lat-

tcr is evidently the teue reading.

noox 11] ΤΙΜ ΖΚ OF PLATO. .7

Longinus however and Origen contend with each other from another principle, about what kind of polity Socrates speaks, in these words; whether about the first, orthe middle polity. For in the latter, the polity is seen living physically, politi- cally, and intellectually. Longinus therefore thinks, that what is here said per- tains to the middle polity, because Socrates calls the assistants guardians, and says that the guardians are warriors. But Origen is of opinion that what is said respects the first polity. For in this Soerates delivers disciplines to the guar- dians. We however say in answer to such-like assertions, that it is not proper to divulse the one polity ; nor to separate the continuity of life from itself. For the polity is one, perfecting itself, and co-augmenting itself by more perfect additions. But the whole polity possesses the physical in the mercenaries, the warlike in the ausiliaries, and the intellectual in the guardians. So that the discussion is about the whole polity. And itis not proper to contend about these things, but rather to consider this, how the polity may very properly be said to be both subordinate to, and superior to physiology." For so faras it has for its matter human con- cerns, and is desirous of adorning these, it has an order secondary to, and more partial than physiology. But so far as it subsists in universal reasonings, and is arranged incorporeally, and immatenally, it is superior to, and more total than physiology. The world also is a certain polity, and a partial polity [with reference to the imelligible world], because every body is partial. In short, the polity pre- exists indeed in the intelligible, but exists in the heavens, and subsists in the Jast place in human lives. So that if it is superior to physical fabrication, it was very properly discussed prior to the Timieus; but ifit is inferior to it, because it is an ethical world, but the other is mundane and all-perfect, we are very properly re- quired to recur from things subordinate to such as are of a more venerable nature. Aud both are true, through the above-mentioned causes. Since, however, as we have said, the form of the polity is universal, and is impressed in a partial matter, hence also Socrates employs the words what kind for the sake of the form, but the words of what sort of men on account of the matter.

— ©Try. And what was said, Socrates, was in the opinion of all of us very conformable to intellect.”

A narration conformable to intellect, but neither conformable to pleasure, nor

* Here also the original has erroneously θεολογίας instead of φυσιολογιαι.

28 PROCLUS ON THE [ROOK 1.

— ©Try. And what was said, Socrates, was in the opinion of all of us very conformable to intellect.”

A narration conformable to intellect, but neither conformable to pleasure, nor

* Here also the original has erroneously θεολογίας instead of φυσιολογιαι.

28 PROCLUS ON THE [ROOK 1.

the decision of the vulgar, indicates the admirable perfection and intellectual na- ture of the discussion [contained in it), And prior to this, it obscurely signifies the concordant congress of all secondary causes about one intellect, and one united fabrication. The word very too, which is added, unfolds the transcendent union, through which all demiurgic causes converge as to one centre, and one

paternal cause of all things.

“Soc. Did we not then, in the first place, separate husbandmen and other artificers from the belligerent genus?”

The discourse about a polity, and the conglomerated and concise repetition, in asummary Way, of the genera contained in it, contributes to the whole narration of the mundane fabrication, For itis possible from these as images to recur to wholes. This very thing also was ina remarkable degree adopted by the Pytha- roreans, Who investigated the similitades of beings from analogies, and betook themsclves from images to paradigms ; which likewise is now in a prefatory man- ner eflected by Plato, who points out to us, and gives us to survey in human lives those things which take place in the universe. Por the polities of worthy men are assimilated to the celestial order. Ttis necessary, therefore, that we also should refer the images which are now mentioned (to their paradigms), and in the first place, what is said about the division of the genera. For this section of genera, imitates the demiurgic division in the world, according to which incorporeal nas tures are not able to pass into the nature of bodies, nor mortal bodies to leave their own essence, and migrate into an incorporeal hypostasis. According to which, also, mortal natures remain mortal; immortal natures eternally continue τὸ. be never-failing ; and the diferent orders of them have paradigmatic causes pre-sub- sisting in wholes. For if you are willing to arrange the whole city analogous to the whole world ; since itmust not be said that man is ἃ microcosin, and a city not; and to divide it into two parts, the upper city and the lower, and to assimilate the former to the heavens, and the latter to generation, vou will find that the ana- logy is perfectly appropriate. Likewise, according to a division of it into three parts, you may assume in the city, the mercenary, the military, and the guardian : butin the soul, the epithymetic part, which procures the necessities of the body ; the irascible part, whose office is to expel whatever is injurious to the animal, and is also ministrant to our ruling power; and the rational part, which os essentially philosophic and has a regal authority over the whole of our life. In every multi-

In every multi-

ὩΣ τοι Oe PRI πὰς Ὁ κ

SEER OE 9 Be τον

ἐών

pooK 1] TIMGEUS OF PLATO. 29

tude of souls, however, there are, that whieh performs the partof a mercenary about generation, that whoech is ministrant to the mundane providence of the Gods, and that which is elevated to the intelligible. But in all mundane natures,

‘ and the order of

there are, in short, the tribe of mortals, the tribe of damons, the celestial Gods ς for they are truly the guardians and saviours of the whole of

things. And again, damons precede as in asolemn procession the fabrication

of the celestial Gods, and suppress all the confusion and disorder in the world.

There ts likewise a certain physical providence of mortal natures, which gene- rates and comprehends them contormably to a divine intellect.

Farther sal, according to another division, the agricultural tribe of the city is analogous to the Moon, which comprehends the sacred laws of nature, the cause of generation. But the inspective guardian of the common marriages, is analo- sous to Venus, who is the cause of all harmony, and of the union of the male with the female, and of form with matter, That which providentially attends to clegant allotinents, is analocous to Termes, on account of the lots of which the God is the guardian, and also on account of the fraud which they contain, But that which is disciplinative and judicial in the city, is analogous to the Sun, with whom, according to theologists, the mundane Dice, the elevator and the seven-fold reside, And that whieh is belligerent, is analogous to the order proceeding from Mars,* which governs all the coutraricuics of the world, and the diversity of the mniverse. That which is royal, is analogous to Jupiter, who is the supplier of ruling prudence, and of the practical and adorning intellect. But that which is philosophic, is analogous to Saturn, so far as he is an intellectual God, and ascends as far as to the first cause. These things, therefore, may thus be

cassumed through analogies. Plato, however, appears to have divided the city

into two parts, and to have established as one genus, that which is agricultural and that which pertains to the arts, which is called demiurgic τ but that which is belligerent, as another; not that he now recapitulates the military polity, as Longinus says, but because through the word dedligerent, he comprehends the auxiliaries and the guardians. For of these, the former war with their hands, but the latter by their counsels. Just as also among the Greeks, Ajax indeed fights, as being the barrier of the Greeks, and Nestor likewise fights, who is the guardian of the Greeks ; the latter as a defender, repelling the enemy by his counsels ; but the former, by employing his hands. Unless it should be said, that Plato now

Just as also among the Greeks, Ajax indeed fights, as being the barrier of the Greeks, and Nestor likewise fights, who is the guardian of the Greeks ; the latter as a defender, repelling the enemy by his counsels ; but the former, by employing his hands. Unless it should be said, that Plato now

' For ro δαιμὸν φυλον in this place, it is necessary to read τὸ δαιμονὼν φυλον. * For yewpyuy, which occurs here by a strange mistake, it is obviously necessary to read ἀρηΐκῃ.

30 PROCLUS ON THE {nook t.

peculiarly makes mention of the military tribe, because he wishes to narrate the warlike actions of a polity of this kind.

“Soc. And when we had assigned to every one that which is accom- modated to his nature, and had prescribed one employment only to each of the arts,’ we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only.”

In the first place, there is a two-fold reading of these words. For it either is “And when we had prescribed one employment conformable to nature to each of the citizens, in order that each might perform his proper work,” or, “ When we had presenbed to each to pursue an employment conformable to nature, which: is adapted to each according to the present aptitude of his nature.” In the next place, it must be enquired through what cause Socrates makes such a division, or on what account he says, “that each employmentis rightly pursued by hin who ts naturally adapted to it, and who ina becoming manner engages init.” For neither is diligent attention, when deprived of aptitude, able to accomplish with rectitude any thing perfect, nor can dexterity without diligent attention proceed into energy. The end, therefore, is from both. Tf, however, this be the case, it is not possible for him who engages in many works, to be similarly adapted to all of them, or to pay attention similarly to all; in consequence of his ardor being divided about a multitude of things. Hence in this case, the pursuits of the citizens must necessarily appear to be of a viler nature. But if this is not right, one employment should be assigned to each of the citizens, to which he to whom it is distributed is adapted, and he should be ordered to extend all his care and attention to one thing. For he who is properly adapted to this particular life, and pursues it in a becoming manner conformably to nature, will, itis likely, perform in the best way his proper work. In human polities, therefore, it is easy to survey a division of this kind ; for our nature is partible. But how is this true with respect to the Gods?) For a divine nature ts all-powerful and all-perfect. Or may we not say that with the Gods all things are in all of them, but that each is all things according to the peculiarity of himself, and possesses the cause of all things, one after a Solar, but another after a Mercurial manner? For pecu- liarity originating from the divine unities, proceeds through intellectual essences,

For pecu- liarity originating from the divine unities, proceeds through intellectual essences,

through divine souls, and through the bodies of these souls. Hence of these,

a 5

* The words exaory τέχνῃ are omitted in the text of Proclus.

iti prpocmnte tienen

PE ASW ee ασα

Bee wane

PER A ARS EE aI

ROOK 1. TIMMUs OF PLATO. 31

some participate of demiurgic, others of prolific, others of connective, and others ofa dividing power. And after this manner they energize about generation, In divine natures themselves therefore peculiarity pre-exists, defining the unities according to the infinity which is there, and the divine duad. But in intellects, difference is pre-existent, which separates wholes) and parts, and = distributes intellectual powers, imparting a different peculiar order to a diflerent intellect, through which the purity of intellects is not confounded. In souls progression and division pre-subsist, according to a different life in different souls, some of them being allotted a divine, others an angelic, others a damoniacal, and others adiflerenthyparxis. But in bodies, interval pre-exists, producing diferent powers in different bodies, For in these, there are ultimate representations of intelligi- bles, according to which this particular body is effective of this thing, but another ofthat. And this body has a sympathy with this thing, but another sympathizes with something else. As, therefore, in this universe, each thing acts according to nature upon that which it was arranged by the fabrication of things to act upon; thus also in the city, the employments of the citizens are divided, and each is arranged to perform that for which he is naturally adapted. What, therefore, the works are of the military tribe, ‘Timaus clearly shows in what follows :

“Ἱ mean that they ought to be only guardians of the city, so as to pro- tect it from the hostile incursions both of external and internal enemies ; but yet in such a manner as to administer justice mildly to the subjects of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with war- like fierceness towards their enemies in battle.”

In these words Plato is willing that the euardians and auxiliaries should be judges of those that act ill within the city, but contenders against those that are out of it; in one way the auxiliaries, and in another the guardians, as we have before observed. To be only guardians, however, is not a diminution of power. For when we assert of the first cause that he is one alone, we do not by this diminish him, and entirely enclose him within narrow bounds; since neither is that which is only the most excellent, diminished by being so. But on the con- trary, every addition to a thing of this kind is a diminution ; so that by asserting not only of athing which was such from the beginning, you diminish its excellence. And thus much for such-like particulars.

But on the con- trary, every addition to a thing of this kind is a diminution ; so that by asserting not only of athing which was such from the beginning, you diminish its excellence. And thus much for such-like particulars.

Again, however, it is requisite to consider how we may survey what is now

/ bal 4 «. γ᾽

42 PROCLUs ON THE [nook 1.

said in wholes. For what is that which is external in the universe?) And how can it be said that the universe does not comprehend all things? May we not reply, that evil has a two-fold subsistence in the world, viz. in souls and i bodies? And it is necessary that those who exterminate confusion and ses from the universe, should extend justice and measure to souls, but should be antagonists to the unstable nature of matter. For some souls, indeed, are naturally adapted to the intelligible, on which account, also, they may be said to be internal, and to belong to the extent of the intelligible umverse ; but others, being material and remote from the Gods, are in a Certain: respect aliens, strangers, and external. Hence, those who are the accomplishers of justice, use the former mildly, as being naturally friends ; but are severe to those that are borne along in bodies in a confused and disorderly manner, as being incommen- surate towards them, and as entirely abolishing their privation of order, and amputating the inexhaustible avidity of matter, For some things, indeed, cannot sustain ornament of this kind, but immediately vanish into non-entitv. But

others whieh are moved confusedly and disorderly, are repressed by the justice

which prevails in the universe, and by the invincible’ strength of the order of

euardian powers. Ifence he now says, that they are severe to those who are hostile to the city. For they are such as cannot endure to behold them. [ἢ short, there are elevating and cathartic powers about souls, and also inspective euardians of judgment and justice. And itis evident, that some of these are analogous to guardians, but others to auailiaries. About bodies, tuo, some are connective, but others dissolving powers : and it is manifest that some of these are analogous to guardians, but others to those that are belligerent. Por these powers expand into the universe, things which are no longer able to remain in their proper series, in order that all things may have an arrangement, and that nothing may be indefinite or confused. If, likewise, you direct your attention to

the Demiurgus himself of wholes,.and to the mmmutable and invariable nature of

If, likewise, you direct your attention to

the Demiurgus himself of wholes,.and to the mmmutable and invariable nature of

the intellects, which divine poetry calls the guards of Jupiter, you will also have in the father (of the universe] the pre-existent cause of these two-fold) genera. For through the demiurgic being which he contains, he adorns all things ; but through the immutable guard which is established in himself, every eternal order remains, all disorder being entirely abolished. You may also see there Justice governing all things in conjunction with Jupiter. For Jastice follows him, being

* For ανταγωνίστεν here, it is necessary to read avavraywrtorov,

aha

noox 1.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 33

the avenger of the divine Jaw. At the same time too, you may perceive the armed order with which he arranges the universe, as those assert who have written the wars of the Titans and Giants. These things, however, we shall hereafter discuss,

The words, however, external and internal, may be understood as follows : The confused and disordered tlux of bodies, at one time arises from the impo- tence of the reasons, [or productive principles participated by bodies,] and at another, from the inexhaustible avidity of matter. Reasons, however, are fami- liar and allied to producing causes ; but matter, through the indefiniteness of itself, and the remoteness of its diminution, is a stranger to its adorning causes. Hence, the invincible strength of the Gods, and the immutable guard of fabrication, all-variously subverting its confusion, renovates the reasons of matter, and reme- dies their imbecility; but vanquishes the avarice of matter. Not that matter resists the Gods who produced it, but that because on account of its indefiniteness it flies from ornament, it is vanquished by forms through the demiurgie guard, against which nothing is able to prevail. But itis necessary that all things in the world should be obedient to it, in order that they may perpetually remain, and that the Demiurgus may be the father of eternal natures.

“Soc. For we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be of sucha nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philoso- phic in a remarkable degree; so that they might be mild to their friends, and severe to their enemies.”

“Soc. For we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should be of sucha nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philoso- phic in a remarkable degree; so that they might be mild to their friends, and severe to their enemies.”

The philosophic and the irascible comprehend both the genera, viz. the auxiliary, and that which is peculiarly called the guardian genus, just as the epithymetic accords with the third genus, which is called the mercenary. For because Socrates distinguishes the upper from the lower city, he manifests by these two-fold names the differences of the orders contained in the city ; just as if some one having divided the world into heaven and generation, should say that in the former there are dwmoniacal and divine orders, and should call both of them the guardians of generation and the universe. For the universe is suarded by the Gods, and it is also guarded by daemons. By the former indeed totally, unically, and exemptly ; but by the latter partially, multitudinously, and in a Manner more proximate to the natures that are guarded by them. For about every God a multitude of demons is arranged, which divides his one and total

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. Ὁ

54 PROCLUS ON THE ο΄ [RooK 1.

providence. The term philosophic, therefore, pertains to the Gods, so far as they are united to the intelligible, and so far as they are filled with being. But the irascible pertains to diemons, so far as they exterminate all confusion from the universe, and so far as they are the saviours of the divine laws, and of the sacred institutions of Adrastia. Through these causes, however, they are mild to their familiars, aptly applying a remedy to their imbecility, as being allied to them by nature, but severe to those that are external fi. e. to those that are strangers to them} as abolishing the indefiniteness of their nature, in an exempt manner, and

according to supreme transcendency.

“Soc. But what did we assert concerning their education ? Was it not that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and all other becoming disciplines?”

The assertions that have been already made, are certain common types, extending to all things, according to the denuurgic allotment, and. divine ditfer- ence, defining employments adapted to every one, and distributing powers appropriately τὸ the recipients. But in the present words, the lite of the citizens is unfolded, through education, employments, communion, and the procreation of children, proceeding in a becoming manner from the beginning to the end. What then is education, and how is it assimilated to the universe? For in’ the [Socratic] city, it is the discipline of the soul, rightly adorning the irrational part

through music and gymnastic, the former giving remission to the streneth of

What then is education, and how is it assimilated to the universe? For in’ the [Socratic] city, it is the discipline of the soul, rightly adorning the irrational part

through music and gymnastic, the former giving remission to the streneth of

anger, but the latter exciting desire, and rendering it) as it were elegant and commensurate with anger, in consequence of its being vehemently remiss, and through its descent to a material nature, filled from thence with a privation of life. But this discipline adorns reason through the mathematical sciences, which have something of an attractive mature, are capable of exciting ἢ αν the recol- lection of true being, and elevate our intellectial part) to that which is itself the most splendid of being. All which is evident to those who are not entirely forgetful of the arrangements in the Socratic republic.

It is now, however, our business to investigate, what education, eyminastic and music are in the universe, and what the disciplines are of the guardians of the universe. Perhaps, therefore, we shall speak rightly if we say, that education is the perfection which fills each thing with the good pertaining to it, and causes it to be sufficient to itself, according to intellectual perceptions and providential

i ans WOE. eit Rae σῶς δὶ

ποοκ 1. TIM.LUS OF PLATO. 30

Perhaps, therefore, we shall speak rightly if we say, that education is the perfection which fills each thing with the good pertaining to it, and causes it to be sufficient to itself, according to intellectual perceptions and providential

i ans WOE. eit Rae σῶς δὶ

ποοκ 1. TIM.LUS OF PLATO. 30

energies. But with respeet to music and gymnastic, that the former canses the lives in the universe to be harmonious, and the latter renders divine motion ryth- mical and elegant, so as always to preserve the same form, and the same immu- table habit of the divine vehicles. For through these things Plato elsewhere calls divine souls Sirens, and shows that the celestial motion is harmoniously elegant ; for gymnastic is indeed in them. But medicine is in things sublunary in’ conse- quence of their receiving that which is preternatural. If, therefore, we assert these things, we shall, as I have betore observed, perhaps speak rightly. For powers proceed supernally from intelligibles to all heaven, and impart to the celestial lives by illumination the most excellent harmony, and to their vehicles undecay- ing strengih. But the disciplines which are in the universe, are the intellectual perceptions of souls, and of celestial natures, according to which they run back to the intelligible, following the mighty Jupiter, and) surveying number charac- terized by unity, the truly-existing heaven, and intellectual figure. Hence you may say, that the most trae arithmetic, astronomy and geometry are in them. Por they behold swifthess itself) and slowness itself, which are the paradigms of the celestial periods. And, in short, they survey the primordial and intellectual circulation, divine number, and intellectual figures. You may likewise say, that prior to these, they contain dialectic, according to which they intellectually perceive the whole of an intelligible essence, and are united to the one cause of all the unities. And if it is necessary to speak by making a division, we may say, that through such like disciplines they energize about first natures; but through gymnastic, preside over things secondary with undefiled purity; and through music, harmonically contain the colligation of wholes. ἢ

“δος. We likewise established, that those who were so educated, should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a similar kind, as their own private property.”

Those things which are to be ordained in a city governed by the most equita- ble laws, have an evident cause, and were mentioned by Socrates in the Republic. Bat how ean we transfer them to the heavens?) Must it not be by. surveying through what cause men pursue the acquisition of gold and silver, and from what conceptions they are induced to cherish this infinite love? It is evident that it is because they wish to supply their wants, and desire to procure such things as may administer to their pleasures. For on this account, they are stupidly astonished

a

>

It is evident that it is because they wish to supply their wants, and desire to procure such things as may administer to their pleasures. For on this account, they are stupidly astonished

a

>

36 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 1.

about much-beloved wealth. They say, therefore, conformably to Cephalus, that the rich have many consolations. If, however, these things thus subsist, the perfection of the celestial Gods, since it is sufficient to itself, and is converted to the beautiful and the good, is not at all in want of this adventitious and apparent self-sufliciency, nor docs it look to convenience, or regard as its scope vulgar utility; but being established remote from all indigence and material necessity, and replete with good, it has a leading and ruling order in the universe, —More- over, it does not admit partible and divided good. But it pursues that which is common and impartible, and extends to wholes, and is especially characterized according to this. Hence it harmonizes with what is now said, “that those who are so educated should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a similar hind, as their own private properly.”

If you are willing also, it may be said, that gold and silver, and each of the metals, as likewise other things, grow in the earth, from the celestial Gods, and from an εἰ μα τον thence derived. Ut is said therefore that gold pertains to the Sun, silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn, and iron to Mars, Hence these are gene- rated from thence. But they subsist in the earth, and not in the celestial Gods who emit the effuxions. For they do not receive any thing from material natures, And all things there, are indecd from all, but at the same time a different pecu- liarity has dominion in’ a different divinity,—here, ina Saturnian, bat there, inva solar manner; to which those who love to contemplate these things directing their attention, refer one material substance to this, but another to a different

power. These things, therefore, are not the private, but the common property of

the Gods ; for they are the progeny of all of them, Nor do they subsist in them, For as they produced them, they are not in want of them; but the metals which are here, derive their concretion from the efflurions of the celestial Gods. Why, therefore, are these things earnestly pursued by men ina partible manner? [tis because they have a material life, and are extended to a partial nature, upostatiz- ing from the whole. For on this account there is much among them of mime and not mine. But they abandon the union and communion of lite.

“ But that rather, after the manner of auxiliaries, they should receive the wages of guardianship from those whom they defend and_ preserve ; and that their recompense should be as much as is sufficient for tempe- rate men. ‘hat besides this, they should spend their stipend in com-

Βοοκ 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 37

‘hat besides this, they should spend their stipend in com-

Βοοκ 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 37

mon, and live cohabiting with each other, and neglecting other pursuits should pay attention to virtue alone.”

It is not at all wonderful that in human lives there should be donation and re- tribution, and a reward of beneficence. For it is well said by Socrates in the Re- public, that the mark at which he aims is to render the whole city happy, but not one particular genus of it, such as the guardian. If, however, this be right, it will be requisite that some persons in the city should be the saviours of it by their providential care and prudence, but that others by ministrant aid and servi- tude, should supply the saviours of the polity with the necessaries of life; just as the nature which is in us, by fashioning and preserving the organ, prepares milk for the energies adapted to it. But in the world, what retribution can there be, or what recompense can be made by mortals to the celestial Gods? For may we not say that these are the peculiarities of human imbecility, in consequence of not possessing self-sufliciency, but that every God is suflicient to himself, and in con- Junction with the self suflicient is superfull?" Pence through the union of super- plenitude with selfsufliciency, he fills all secondary natures with good, but re-

-ceives nothing from them. Or it may be said, that though divinity receives ‘nothing, as being sutlicient and unindigent, yet at the same time he requires cer-

tain remunerations from us, retributions of beneticence, the acknowledgment of thanks, and equity, through which we are converted to him, and are filled) with greater good. For being good,’ he is desirous that all things should look to him,

-and should remember that all things are from him and on account of him. For

the preservation of the natures posterior to him, is for each of them to be suspend- ed froma divine cause. If, however, we interpret these things after this manner, referring remunerations to conversions, and the acknowledgment of thanks, how can it still further be inferred, that the Gods cohabit with us in common, and spend a remuneration of this hind? It is better, therefore, to understand remuneration ina more physical way. For since efluaions proceed from the heavens to the mortal place, but exhalations ascend thither, and through these the fabrication of the Gods about mortal natures receives its completion, hence Socrates calls such- like mutations and tronsitions of terrestrial natures, remunerations or wages from sublunary matter,’ which are perfected by the heavens, in order that generation

* It is necessary afler ry avrapver here to supply the word ureprAnpes. * For ayadwy yap or, it is obviously requisite to read ἀγαθὸν, «. A. 1 Instead of απο rns oAns in this place, I read ἀπὸ τὴν wAns τὴν νποσεληνῆν,

48 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1.

* For ayadwy yap or, it is obviously requisite to read ἀγαθὸν, «. A. 1 Instead of απο rns oAns in this place, I read ἀπὸ τὴν wAns τὴν νποσεληνῆν,

48 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1.

may never fail. But it must be said, that the cohabiting in common, is the one conspiration of divine fabrication, and the concordant providence of the celestial Gods, through which every thing that undergoes a mutation from the earth is consumed, and generation is variously changed through the harmonious dance of the celestial divinities ; to which also Timawus looking says, “ that the whole world is friendly and known to itself through virtue, and that its corruption ts the source of its nutriment, in consequence of effecting all things in, and suffering all things from itself”

What then is the end of this one and common life of the citizens? Socrates says virtue, viz. divine virtue. Por virtue subsists first with the Gods; afterwards from them, in the genera superior 10. man ; and a certain portion of it descends also to us. The guardians of the world, therefore, living contormably to. this, are also unoccupied by other pursuits. Por they do not look to convenience, nor to ex- ternals ; for all things are within’ themsclyes. They likewise are the saviours of all things, and fill them with whatis beautiful and wood, being ministrant to, and co-operating with the one father and Demiurgus of wholes. Since, however, they give measure to the mutations of the earth, notin so doing departing from, but being converted to themselves, and subsisting in themselves, on this account So- crates says, “ a@ recompense such as ty sufficient for temperate men. For beme tem- perate and pradent in what relates to themselves, they measure secondary nae tures, comprehending their all-various mutations in the simplicity ot their own life. Thus therefore what is said may be explained in this way. Butin another way we may say, that piety and a conversion to the Gods, especially coutain a measure, and are occupied by the good. This measure, however, is defined by the Gods themselves according to divine prudence, since the Gods are able

both to save themselves and others.

“ Soc. Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in such a manner that their natures might be aptly conformed so as to be similar to those of men; with whom they should perform im common both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business of life.”

Plato very properly thought that the virtues of men and women are common, since he evinces that both have one human form, but not the male one, and the female another. For things which have a different perfection according to form, are also different in species. But things which are the same in species, have like-

BOOK 1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 39

For things which have a different perfection according to form, are also different in species. But things which are the same in species, have like-

BOOK 1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 39

wise one and the same perfection. This, however, is denied by others, who as- sert that there is a diflercnce according to form between men and women, though Plato has shown that itis both possible and advantageous for women to have the same virtues as men. It is possible, indeed, because this, history contirms. For there have been found well-educated women, who have been far superior to men. But itis advantageous, because it is better to live double than half the number of those who exhibit virtue in their works. As therefore we form the male guar- dians from such a particular education, and from such particular disciplines, thus also we form the female guardians from the same: and in a similar manner, the female warriors from the same institutes as the male.

As therefore we form the male guar- dians from such a particular education, and from such particular disciplines, thus also we form the female guardians from the same: and in a similar manner, the female warriors from the same institutes as the male.

In order, however, that we may admire in a greater degree the conceptions of Plato, we must betake ourselves to wholes, and to the order of the universe, where we may survey a wonderful conspiration of the male and female nature. For in the Gods, indeed, these are so connascent with each other, that the same divinity is called both male and female, as is the case with the Sun and Mercury, and certain other Gods. Where also they are distinguished from each other, the works of the male and female that are of the same order, are common, so as that they primarily proceed from the male, but in an inferior degree from the female. Hence, likewise, in mortals, nature evinces that the female is more imbecile in all things than the male. Whatever, therefore, proceeds from the male, this the female also can produce ina diminished degree. Hence Juno proceeds together with Jupiter, generating all things in conjunction with the father. TTence, too, she is said to be equal in rank with Jupiter, as is likewise Rhea with Saturn. For this Goddess is the bosom of all the Saturnian power. Earth also is equal in dignity with Heaven. For Earth is the mother of all things, of which Heaven is the fa- ther. Δ prior to these clements, if we direct our attention to bound and infi- nity, Which rank in the order of principles, we shall find that all things whatever, which proceed into existence, are generated from both these. You have there- fore, in the intelhiible, in the intellectual, and in the supermundane Gods, the har- monious conjunction of the male with the female. You may also see the same in the heavens. For the whole of generation is governed by the Sun and Moon 3 in a greater and paternal degree by the former; but secondarily, by the latter. Hfence also, the Moon is denominated by some, a lesser Sun. And among the male divinities in the Sun, there are likewise lunar Gods, and analogous orders. But if you direct your attention to demons, you will every where see the providence of these two-fold genera conjoined. For divine female dwmons, unitedly effect all

40 . PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1.

And among the male divinities in the Sun, there are likewise lunar Gods, and analogous orders. But if you direct your attention to demons, you will every where see the providence of these two-fold genera conjoined. For divine female dwmons, unitedly effect all

40 . PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1.

things in a secondary degree, which are accomplished by divine male damons primarily, Female psychical likewise, and female corporeal demons, have to the. males the relation of mothers to fathers, and of duads to monads. For they ge- nerate all things with diminution, which the males produce paternally and united- ly. If therefore we before rightly assimilated the guardians to the celestial Gods, but the auxiliaries to dwmons their attendants, and who are ministrant to their providential energies, Plato very properly embraces in these genera, a similar conjunction of the mate with the female, and imparts to both common virtue, and common employments ; just as Nature binds these genera to, and causes them to procreate the same things in conjunction with each other, But she does not divide the one from the other, since whatever is generated from both is unprolitic, when either of them is separated ; though there is a greater difference in the phy- sical organs than in the lives of these; yet at the same time in these also, Nature makes the work of them to be common. Much more, therefore, does the commu- nion of them in their employments, and the whole of their life, deserve to be

honoured.

“Soc. But what did we establish concerning the procreation of chil- dren? Though perhaps you easily remember this on account of its novel-

ty. For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common; as we were particularly carcful that none might be able to distinguish their own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred. ‘That hence those of an equal age might regard themselves as brothers and sis- ters; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and grandfathers, and the elder might esteem the younger as their children and grandsons. “Tia. These things indeed, as you say, are easily remembered.”

Ifsome one should inquire why that which is unusual is easily remembered, it is not difficult to reply, that it excites our phantasy inse ereater degree as being unexpected ; and inserts in us a clearer impression of itself. Moreover, it is easy conformably to Plato, to show how what is here said of marriages and children being common, applies to: women. For he wished, according to the intention of

* In the text of Proclus, αληθείαν is erroneously printe 1 for anfecay.

Pn αν .......ὅ

BOOK 1.] TIMZUS OF PLATO. 4l

Moreover, it is easy conformably to Plato, to show how what is here said of marriages and children being common, applies to: women. For he wished, according to the intention of

* In the text of Proclus, αληθείαν is erroneously printe 1 for anfecay.

Pn αν .......ὅ

BOOK 1.] TIMZUS OF PLATO. 4l

the rulers, that their connexion with men should take place in definite times, accompanied with sacnifices and prayers; and that the woman that had con- nexion with a man, should not be the property of any one man, but should be separated after connexion, and dwell apart, and again at other times should be copulated with that man whom the guardians might approve. But. these things are thus indicated in what is said in the Republic.

But. these things are thus indicated in what is said in the Republic.

Referring, however, the theory of these particulars to nature, let us show how they pertain to the order of the universe. For these things by a much greater priority exist in the Gods, on account of the union of the divinities. For all things! are the progeny of all the Gods, though different things are characterized by a different peculiarity. All the Gods likewise are in all, and all are united to all, in conjunction with an unmingled purity adapted to all, to which Socrates di- recting his attention, embraces this communion, and this distribution of employ- ments, assigning one to each of the arts, conformably to nature. For not to know their own progeny as peculiarly their own, takes place with the Gods. On which account, indeed, their intellectual perceptions, and also. their productions are common. Each of them, however, benefits and preserves that which is generated, as being the common offspring of all of them. Moreover, to consider all those as brothers and sisters that are of an equal age, those that are elder as fathers and grandfathers, and the younger as children and grandsons, originates from. the Gods, and is transferred from thence to this polity. For similitude of essence, derived from the same cause, is that which is fraternal in them. But prolific cause, is in them that which is analogous to father and grandfather. And an efflux of essence proceeding into a second and third serics, exhibits the form of offspring. For that the same Goddess is conjoined with diflerent Gods, or the same Gud with many Goddesses, may be assumed from mystical treatises, and from what are called Sacred Marriages in the mysteries, which Plato as much as possible imitat- ing in what he ordains about politics and marriages, calls the marriages sacred. In physical productive powers also, we may sce that there is one and the same recipient of different powers ; and one productive power presenting itself to the view in a multitude of recipients, and pervading through many receptacles, But forms are analogous to males, and receptacles to females. Why therefore is this very thing beheld in the universe, but is paradoxical in human lives! 1 say it is because these lives are cut off from wholes, and every human soul is partible.

* For ravra here, it is necessary to read παντγα.

Tim. Plat. τ Vou. 1. ὰὼ

42 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 1.

Why therefore is this very thing beheld in the universe, but is paradoxical in human lives! 1 say it is because these lives are cut off from wholes, and every human soul is partible.

* For ravra here, it is necessary to read παντγα.

Tim. Plat. τ Vou. 1. ὰὼ

42 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 1.

Hence the dogmas which embrace this communion appear to it most difficult to be admitted. If, therefore, some one should take away the condition of lis pre- sent subsistence, and elevate himself to the whole of things, he would immediate- ly admit this communion, and despise the sympathy whichis divided by the mul- titude. So far, however, as each of us is extended, and minutely distributed about a part, and thus relinquishes the whole and one, so far also he leaps toa life of this kind, which is an unrestrained habitude, a disorderly arrangement, and

an indivisible division.

“Soc. But that they might from their birth acquire a natural disposi- tion as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed over the marriage rites should, through the means of certain lots, take care that in the nuptial league, the worthy were mingled with the worthy ; that no discord may arise in this connexion, when it does not prove prosperous in the end, but that all the blame may be referred to fortune,

and not to the guardians of such a conjunction.”

Plato particularly assumes in his Republic similitude, sameness, and geometri- cal, In conjunction with arithmetical equality, ino order that the similitude of it to the heavens, as in sensibles, or to the intelligible, as in supereclestial lives, may be perfectly preserved. For through this cause, in marriages also, he preserves the union of the best woman with the best man, and of the less excellent: woman with the less excellent man. For in the Gods likewise, primary natures are more connascent with those of the first rank, and secondary with those of the second rank ; and together with union there is unmingled purity. Tfence in the second genera after the Gods, a distribution of this kind conformably to the intention of the Gods, is effected according to desert. On this account, divine femate die- mons are co-arranged with divine male dimons, psychical female with psychical inale, and material female with material male dwmons. And every where, the analogous in order proceeds as far as to the last of things. Po which we may add that the rulers contriving that this connexion may take plaice litently, sufh- ciently adumbrates to us that the cause of such a conjunction of genera sub- sists unapparently with the Gods; being thence primarily derived, bat) seconda- rily from damons,' and from the order of each, which ¢he lot indicates; possess-

It is necessary here to insert the words, ἀπὸ τὼν δαιμόνων.

BOOK 1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 43

BOOK 1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 43

ing the power of colligation from similitude of life, according to which each is co-arranged with the similar, the divine with the divine, the material with the material, and that which has a middle subsistence, with the middle. On this account, likewise, all sedition and dissension is removed from divine natures, each loving that which is allied to itself, according to its own order, perceiving that this order is spontaneous, and not adventitious and devised; of all which, the citizens being conjoined in marriage by lot, and not looking to elegance and ornament in the connexion, is an image, For in natural things, also, receptacles are distributed to forms appropriately; and each form may ascribe the cause of its own co-ordination to material variety. At the same time, likewise, this is eflected according to causes ' which preside over the whole fabrication of things, and which are analogous to guardians. And thus much, therefore, has been said, tor the sake of the theory of wholes.

Longinus, however, doubts here, whether Plato was of opinion, that souls are emitted together with the seed: for in order that they may become most excellent, he conjoins similars with similars. And Porphyry replies indeed to the doubt, but not satisfactorily. Our preceptor, however, thinks that in’ the first place it should be observed, that Plato himself adds, “ In order that they might acquire a natural disposition as far as possible the best.” For children receice a physical stmilitude from their parents, and participate of a certain dignity and excellence from their begetters, according to the physical virtues. In the next place, it must be observed, that though it is not true that souls are emitted together with the seed, yet there is a distribution of the organs according to desert. For all souls are not introduced into casual organs, but each into that organ which is adapted to it.

ezira μὲν ἐσῆλος ebuve, χείρα Ce χείρονι δοσκεν,"

says Homer. Farther still, as an initiator into the mysteries, by placing certain sym- bols about statues, renders them more adapted to the participation of supcrior powers, thus also total nature fashioning bodies, by physical productive powers, the statues of souls, disseminates a different aptitude in different bodies for the reception of different

* For ra atriara here, it is requisite to read ra αἰτία.

* Iliad, χιν, vs, 382. i.e. ‘* He gave the good [i. e. the brave] man, good things, but the less ex- cellent character, things of a less excellent nature. In the text of Proclus it is erroneously eofAa μὲν εσθλα eduve, x. Xr.

44 PROCLUS ON THE : [Boox 1.

* Iliad, χιν, vs, 382. i.e. ‘* He gave the good [i. e. the brave] man, good things, but the less ex- cellent character, things of a less excellent nature. In the text of Proclus it is erroneously eofAa μὲν εσθλα eduve, x. Xr.

44 PROCLUS ON THE : [Boox 1.

souls, the better and the worse ; which the politician likewise rightly understand- ing, pays attention to the emission of seed in the city, and to all physical aptitude, in order that the most excellent souls may be generated for him in the most excel- lent natures. And thus much in answer to the doubt of Longinus. But why does Plato conceive it is better to think that Fortune is the cause of this distribu- tion to the citizens? Shall we say it is, because it is advantageous to us to know the cause of things which we think to be good, but better to conceive the presence of such as we apprehend to be evil, to be causcless, than to accuse the cause which distributes these [seeming evils] for a good purpose? For this excites to a contempt, or rather to a hatred of the giver; because every one avoids that which becomes to him productive of evil.

“Soc. Moreover, we ordered that the children of the good should be educated, but that those of the bad should be secretly sent to some other Cie:

These things also are established in the Republic, but by a much greater prior- ity take place in the universe. With respect, therefore, to the productions of Gods and Dwimons, some genera abide in them, pure and remote from generation, which on this account are called undefiled; but others descend into generation, not being able to remain in the heavens without a downward inclination. And some of these are the offspring of good, but others of less excellent powers. lor the term dad is indicative of less excellent. ‘The horses, therefore, and charioteers of the Gods, are all of them good; but those of partial souls are of a mixed nature.t Hence in these, there is preponderation, a verging downward, and a defluxion of wings, which the celestial Gods send into generation, and diemons who preside over the descent of souls, The celestial and undefiled genera of souls, therefore, are nourished following the Gods to the banquet and delicious food, as it is said in the Phedrus. And those that are subservient to generation, communicate with it, being latently sent into it from the heavens, as Socrates says, indicating by the word Jafent the invisible and occult cause in the Gods of the psychical descents, and that souls which thence descend, become subject [latently] to another providential inspection, and to other guardians who preside over generation.

' This is asserted inthe Phadrus. See this explained, in the notes at the end of this Translation.

δας A καράβι, ει, RN αὶ

Boox 1] 'TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 45

' This is asserted inthe Phadrus. See this explained, in the notes at the end of this Translation.

δας A καράβι, ει, RN αὶ

Boox 1] 'TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 45

* Yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile; while, on the con- trary, those who were retained from the first in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished.”

In the Republic, Socrates makes a transition not only from those that were distributed from the upper into the lower city, but also from those of the golden race that were born there. Here, however, the reference is made to those who are recalled from exile. Do these things, therefore, accord with each other? Per- haps, indeed, it is possible to reconcile what is here said, with what is there deter- mined, if we understand the word adult, as not only pertaining to those sent from the upper city, but likewise to all those that are educated in the lower city. For, in short, the natural disposition is to be considered of those adults who were born in the lower city, or of those who were sent from the upper into the lower city, and thus those that are worthy are to be recalled from exile. Butif some one is will- ing to understand the words according to our first explanation of them, it: must be said, that what Socrates now delivers is conformable to the things proposed to be considered. For descending [rational] souls again ascend, but not such souls as had their .ypostasis from the beginning in generation, and about matter, such as are the multitude of irrational souls. And thus much for the words themselves. See, however, how the same things take place in wholes, as. those Which Socrates ordains in his polity. For some things always have the same order in the heavens, remaining divine and immutable; but others are always conversant with generation ; and others are in a certain respect the media between both ; at one time, indeed, being suspended from divine natures themselves, but at another being mingled with those that embrace generation. It is not, therefore, the damoniacal genus which ascends or descends, nor is this to be asserted of multiform lives, nor are dwemons subject to death, but partial souls, which are at one time conversant with generation, and at another are transferred into a divine demoniacal allotment; which things being known by Socrates in the Republic, he legislatively ordains that which is analogous to them. — For the celestial Jupiter presides over the Gods in the heavens, over damons that elevate partial souls [to their paternal port}, and also over others that lead souls into generation, in order that the ascents and descents of souls may be never failing in the universe. “ For though you should see this particular soul restored to its pristine perfection, yet

46 PROCLUS ON THE - [Book 1.

“ For though you should see this particular soul restored to its pristine perfection, yet

46 PROCLUS ON THE - [Book 1.

the father sends another to be annumerated,” according to the divinely-inspired indication‘ about these things.

“Soc. Have we, therefore, again sufficiently resumed the epitome of the discussion of yesterday, or do we require any thing further, friend Timeus, which has been omitted ἢ

The resumption of the polity teaches us, through images, how the universe is filled with the most excellent productive powers. For generated natures in it are separated from each other, and each communicating with other things, energizes according to its own peculiarity. And primary, indeed, are exempt from: secon- dary natures, yet employ their energies, as necessary to: the completion of the universe. But secondary are adorned by primary natures. Phe most excellent, however, of mundane beings, are connascently conjoined with the most excellent, middle with middle, and last with such as are dast. Bat the same productive powers pervade through many subjects, and the same recipients participate of many productive powers. Lives, also, at different times have different allotments, according to their desert. All these particulars, therefore, sufficiently place be- fore our view the order of the universe. For in detinite heads, Socrates has, ina becoming manner, epitomized every form of the polity, recurring to intellectual Impartibility, in order that he might imitate the God who adorns the celestial polity intelligibly and paternally. But since every where measures and perfec- tion are detinitely imparted to secondary natures from [primary 7 eases, on this account also Socrates requests Tinieus to inform him, whether he has compre. hended fin his epitome} every ἤσαν οὐ the polity. Por every intellect being firmly fixed in the deity prior to itself, defines itself by looking to it. To which we may add, that to speak) summarily is a syvinbol of the first parts, and the head of the universe being adorned by the fabricator of the heavens; which the Demiurgus of the universe adorns ina more perfect manner, looking to the whole, and the one life of the world. And thus much respecting the analogy of partial natures to wholes.

The investigation, however, is not attended with any difficulty, whether the words inean, “ Slave we now epitomized the polity which we discussed yesterday ?” or “ Have we again epitomized to-day, the polity which we epitomized yesterday?” For

δ, ον, According to the Chaldean Oracles.

ποοκ 1. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 47

ποοκ 1. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 47

whether yesterday Socrates spoke more diffusely, but now summarily, or he spoke summarily in both, the divine Tamblichus approves of either of the read- ings, and we do not at all difler from him. | Perhaps, however, the latter con- struction is more consonant, For again to discuss the polity summarily, mani- fests thatit was summarily discussed yesterday. And it is not at all wonderful, that the summary discussion which took place in the Republic, should not be brought to light. For many other things which are asserted here, as being said on the former day, are not to be found in that dialogue. Unless it should be said that the word again, does not refer to the epitomizing, but to resuming the discus- sion. For he resumes, who narrates at great lencth what had been before said ; but he again resumes, who summarily contracts the narration. But whichever of the constructions is adopted, neither of them is attended with any difliculty.

“Soc. Hear now, then, how I am affected towards this polity which we have discussed.”

What Socrates says in the words that follow, comprehends, that I may speak summarily, these five particulars. First, what that is which in what has been said, he desires should take place, after the narration of the polity. Secondly, that he is not sufficient to effect this himself. Thirdly, that neither is any one of the poets sufficient. Fourthly, that it is not proper to commit a work of this kind to the sophists, Fitthly, that the anditors alone can accomplish that which is earnestly desired by Socrates, ina becoming manner. What, therefore, is this? Por it is necessary, ino the first: place, to speak concerning that: which Socrates desires to sec after this polity, viz. to see, as he says, a city of this kind In motion, engaging in contests and labors, and warlike actions, in order that after the peaceful lite which he had delivered, he might have to narrate the ener- gies of the city arising from circumstances of times and places. This, therefore, is What he wishes to see accomplished.

Some one, however, may doubt to what the desire of Socrates is directed, and on what account he wishes this to be accomplished. Porphyry therefore dis- solves the doubt by saving, that energies perfect habits, not only those energies that are prior to habits, but also those that proceed from them. For the pertee- tion in habit, is in conjunction with energy, since otherwise habit will be in a certain respect in capacity, and at rest through remission of energy. Socrates therefore, in order that he may survey the polity truly perfect, requires that in

48 PROCLUS ON THE [Book ι-

For the pertee- tion in habit, is in conjunction with energy, since otherwise habit will be in a certain respect in capacity, and at rest through remission of energy. Socrates therefore, in order that he may survey the polity truly perfect, requires that in

48 PROCLUS ON THE [Book ι-

words it may be beheld in motion, engaged in warlike actions, and contending with others, And it appears, says he, from hence, to be manifest that Plato does not admit that the habit of virtue by itself, but. when energizing, is sufficient to felicity. It may, however, be said, in answer to Porphyry, that if the end was military, it would be requisite to assert that war gives perfection to the polity. But ifthe end of it is peace, what occasion is there to solve Platonic doubts by introducing Peripatetic explanations? Or though the end is not military, νοὶ war exhibits the magnitude of virtue in a greater degree than peace, just as mighty waves and a tempest, show in a stronger light the skill of the pilots art. And in short, this is eflected by circumstances, as the Stoies also are accustomed to say, “ Give circumstances, and take the man.” For that which is not subdued by things which enslave others, manitests a life in every respect worthy, — Perhaps, however, it is absurd to refer the cause to these things alone, though they have a political reason, and not to look to the whole scope of Plato, according to which the God who adorns the polity in the heavens, Is ling also that generation should be governed by the celestial Gods, and that the war of forms in matter should always subsist ; in order that the cirele of generation may adambrate the celestial circulation. Aud this itis to see the eity excited to war, to see genera- tion co-arranged with the celestial regions, and the whole of it governed from thence. Ttappears likewise, that this 15 analogous to what is shortly after said by the Demiurgus of the universe, © That when the generating futher understood that ths wencrated resemblance [the workd| of the eternal Gods moved and lived, he was delizhtd with his work.” In asimilar manner, therefore, Socraies wished to see his city moving and energizing 5 just as the God who comprehends the celestial polity wished to behold: the natures whieh it contains energizing, and adorning the contrariety produced by generation, Such an analogy, thetefore, as this, takes phice in the present instince,

If, however, we arranged before, the lower city as analoyous lo ceneration, but now as analogous to war, you must not wonder, Por the same things may be safely arranged among diflerent things according to different analogies. Por generation also, according to the lives in it which are inseparable from matter, resembles the lower city; but according to its contrarieties and material tumult, it is similar to war, and warlike dissensions, That we may, however, co-adapt every thing to the theory of mundane wholes, prior to the consideration of every particular, let us direct our attention to the second thing said by Socrates, and see how it accords with this theory. For since Socrates is analogous to the first

BOOK t.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 49

of the three fathers who adorn the first of things, he says he is not sufficient to fashion what follows. For the divinity who gives subsistence to all things, is different from him who constitutes toings of a middle nature ; and this God again is different from him who is the cause of things that rank as the third. But the third particular is, that neither are the poets sufficient for this purpose. Nor, in the fourth place, the sophists. The former, indeed, because they imitate the things in which they have been nourished ; but the latter, because they are wanderers, and not at one and the same tine, philosophers and politicians.

Nor, in the fourth place, the sophists. The former, indeed, because they imitate the things in which they have been nourished ; but the latter, because they are wanderers, and not at one and the same tine, philosophers and politicians.

Again, therefore, let us see how these things are conformable to what has been before said. For it is necessary that the powers that are to preside over genera- tion should not be separable’ from material natures, but conversant with them, For these powers are analogous to poets who invent fables, and to imitators. For these are employed about images, alone praise material and partible natures which they only know, and are unable to ascend from matter. Nor is it fit that these powers should be inseparable,’ and very mutable, at diflerent times ascend- ing or descending to different orders, such as are partial souls, who are assimi- lated to sophists ; because they also possess all-beautifal productive powers, but at different times wander to different parts of the world. [lence it is necessary that the powers that connectedly contain generation, which is governed by the heavens, should at one and the same time be philosophical and political; in order that through the philosophic characteristic, they may be separate from the subjects of their government, but may energize providentially through the political peculiarity, performing the duties pertaining to their allotments according te intellect. For that which is physical, being productive, is inseparable from matter, but the form of partial souls: being sophistical, is abundantly wandering. Its necessary, however, prior to things which are moved, that there should be the invariable and perpetually-permanent providence of the Gods, and immutable prior to mutable allotments. In the Ἐπ place, therefore, Socrates delivers to us who those are, that are able to effect this. For these things are to be transferred from words to deeds ; because the Demiurgus of the universe, and the rest of the fathers, fabricate totally and exemptly ; the second of which fathers zives subsist- ence to middle, but the third to last natures. And to these Timeus, Critias, and

* For axwpiorous here, it is necessary to read ywporovs, and to supply adda, 50 as instead of cure axwpiorovs aurwy εἰναι dei, και εν avrais orpegoueras, to read oure ywprorovs avrwy εἰναι det, ἀλλα και κ΄ A.

* Hence for χωριστας in this place, it is necessary to read axwporas.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. ᾿ G

50 PROCLUS ON THE [nook 1.

Hermocrates, are analogous. But of these, the first is praised in an admirable manner, Socrates also adding, “in my opinion;” but the second, in a middle way, conformably to his order; and the third, in the last degree, te. according to the testimony of others. |

Hermocrates, are analogous. But of these, the first is praised in an admirable manner, Socrates also adding, “in my opinion;” but the second, in a middle way, conformably to his order; and the third, in the last degree, te. according to the testimony of others. |

“ For J will illustrate the affair by a similitude. Suppose then that some one, on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in ἃ picture or really alive, but in ἃ state of rest, should desire to behold them in motion, and engaging in some one of those contests which per-

8

tain to bodies.

Longinus says, that Plato here decorates and beautifies his diction, through similitudes and the gracefulness of the words. But Longinus says this in answer to certain Platonists, who contend, that this mode of expression is spontaneous, and not the result of art. For Plato, he observes, pays attention to the selection of words, and does not employ them casually. It may, however, be said, that Plato made choice of this form of words from a mode of diction which was at that time common and usual, and that he was very attentive to what was customary. For the atoms of Epicurns would more rapidly by their concurrence produce the world, than nouns and verbs would form a correct sentence by a casual compo- sition. Bat some blame Plato for employing metaphors in’ the use of words 5 though with respect to composition, all admire him, At the same time, however, it may be inferred, not from this cireumstance alone, but from such care and industry as are exhibited in the present words, that he paid great attention to diction. For Socrates does not simply say, that he desires to see this accoms plished by those that were with Pinwus; but he speaks like one decorating his words and alluring the hearer, when he says: ‘Lor 7 will dlustrate the affair by a δἰ μος. Suppose that some one on beholling beautiful animals, whether repres sented ina picture, or really alive,” &e. And thus much for Longinus.

Origen, however, grants indeed, that Plato is attentive to the grace of diction, not as regarding that which is pleasing, as the end of it, but that he employs this. image for the sake of exhibiting the manner in which he was himse!faflected.

' The text of Proclus haus, erroneously, καὶ rot των row σωμάσι δυκουντῶν ἀνήκειν Kara τὴν ἀγωνίαν

αθλενν Tw, instead of καὶ re γὼν τοῖς σωμασι δοκυνντων προσήκειν κατὰ Τὴν αγωγια) αθλονντα.

ROOK 1 TIMAEUS OF PLATO. δ]

' The text of Proclus haus, erroneously, καὶ rot των row σωμάσι δυκουντῶν ἀνήκειν Kara τὴν ἀγωνίαν

αθλενν Tw, instead of καὶ re γὼν τοῖς σωμασι δοκυνντων προσήκειν κατὰ Τὴν αγωγια) αθλονντα.

ROOK 1 TIMAEUS OF PLATO. δ]

And we say, that this similitnde was written for the sake of the imitation of divine natures; that the grace of the words presents to us an image of the grace im- parted by the Deminurgus to celestial natures; and that the artitice of the diction, Which is mingled with the spontaneous, adumbrates divine production, which has indeed a boundary from itself, and also a progression from being and essence. Tf, likewise, you direct your attention to the image itself, beautiful animals manifest those natures that are resplendent with [divine] beanty ; but those represented in a picture, or really alive, indicate corporal images, and true lives prior to these imitations, For the figures of the Gods are resemblances of the animals that are in them, But those that are ina state of rest exhibit to us the natures that are fall of intellectual arrangement, and of an equable and continued life; those that are in motion such as proceed into another order, and a second fabrication ; and those which engage in some one of the contests pertaining to bodies, are images of those that impart to more imperfect natures their own proper eflluxions and powers, and operate by their own powers on other things. And thus much respecting the image. But the words whcther represented in a picture or really alive, ave rightly asserted in both respects of divine bodies. For they are depicted by the dodecahedron, and they possess eflicacious and demiurgic lives. If, however, you consider the words separately, they will signify that the before- mentioned polity is indeed fashioned in words, and is assimilated to the heavens, but evists, tf not in human, yet in true or demoniacal lives. Farther still, ἐὸ desire ta see the city in motion, is analogous to the words {in another part of this dialogue] “as soon as the father saw the universe moving, he was delighted, and wished to assi- milate it ina still greater degree to its paradigm.” For thus also the adorner of the heavens wished to see them in motion, and through motion governing the war of generation, But the words “engaging in some one of the contests pertaining to bodies,” are employed, because of contests some belong to souls, but others to bodies ; and the latter are such as running, wrestling, and gymnastic.

Ta such a manner am I also affected towards the city which we have discussed. For I should gladly hear any one relating the contests of our city with other cities, when it engages in a becoming manner in war, and acts during such an engagement in a way worthy of its educa- tion and discipline, both with respect to practical. achievements, and verbal negociations.”

52 _PROCLUS ON THE [RooK 1.

achievements, and verbal negociations.”

52 _PROCLUS ON THE [RooK 1.

We have before shown through what cause, and with reference to what para- digm, Socrates wished to see his republic contending in war. Because cities, however, employ against their enemies both works and words; words indeed in embassies, in compacts, in exhortations to battle, and inevery thing of this kind ; but works in the pitching of camps, in spears, and the hurling of missive weapons; on this account Socrates wishes that a city of this kind should be celebrated according to both these. In words indeed, as prudent, cautions, magnanimous, and strenuous; but in deeds, as brave, vehement, and well exercised. For thus, according to both, it will imitate its paradigm, who, shining with physical and intellectual productions, adorns all the war of generation,

“ For, indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my own inability to praise such men and such a city according to their desert.”

This is the second of the proposed heads, of which we have before assigned the cause, and shall now again explore it according to another method. For now some of the more ancient [interpreters] have said, that the encomiastic form of writing is robust, superb, and magnificent; but the Socratic character of diction is slender, accurate, and dialectic. The latter, therefore, is contrary to the former. Hence (say they} Socrates avoids panegyric, as knowing the power he possessed, and the subjects to which it was naturally adapted. Those, however, who assert this, in addition to their being directly refuted by the Menexenus, appear to me not to have perceived the magnificence of the diction of Socrates in the Phiedrus. There are also those who say it is fit that the artificer of such-like encomiums, should be skilled in warlike affairs. Hence many historians err in their disposition of armies, through ignorance of tactics. But Socrates having fought at Delos and Potidiwa, was not unskilled in all such-like particulars. Others avain assert, that Socrates speaks ironically, Just as he said with respect to other things, that he was ignorant of them, so here he says, that he did not know how to praise this city according to its desert. The irony, however, of Socrates was employed against sophists and young men, and not against wise and scientific men. It is better, therefore, instead of these things to say, that he guards against becoming the third from the truth. For the works of a rightly instituted city, are the third from the paradigm of truth fi. e. of the true or intelligible polity}. Hence, wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he says, he is not able to bear the

book 1 TIMEUS OF PLATO. 53

For the works of a rightly instituted city, are the third from the paradigm of truth fi. e. of the true or intelligible polity}. Hence, wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he says, he is not able to bear the

book 1 TIMEUS OF PLATO. 53

descent to the third species of life. And an impotency of this kind is an abund- ance of power. For to be able to abide in paradigms, is eflected through power which ts transcendent. You may likewise see how this accords with what has been before said by us respecting the analogy of these things to wholes. For the second fabrication ts assimilated: to the first, and on this account is proximate to it. For the whole demiurgic series is one, possessing union together with separ- ation. Very properly, therefore, is Socrates precedaneously extended to Critias and Hermocrates, and he rightly thinks it fit that they should weave together the particulars that are next in order, For Timaus is about to deliver these things in a more universal and elevated manner, and not through images, in consequence of directly preserving his analogy to the Demiurgus of wholes, who paints the heavens with the dodecahedron, but generation with appropriate figures.

Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not wondertul, since the same inbecility seems to have attended poets, both of the pastand presentage. Not that [ despise the poetic genus; but it is pertectly evident, that the imitative tribe easily and in the best manner imitate things ino which they have been educated. But that which is foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds, and still more dithcult in words.”

This is the third of the before-mentioned heads of discussion, in which Socrates shows that none of the poets have been adequate to the praise of men and cities of this kind, which have casually been engaged in warlike actions. Longinus, however, and Origen, donbt, whether Plato comprehends Homer among the poets, when he says, that he has not only the same opinion of the poets then existing (for this is nothing novel), but likewise of those of former times, so that Porphyry informs us that Origen passed three whole days exclaiming, blushing and toiling, asserting that the hypothesis and the doubt were great, and being ambi- tious to show that the imitation in the poetry of Homer is sufficient for virtuous actions, For who speaks more magnificently than Llomer, who, representing the Gods as contending and fighting with each other, does not err in his imitation, but speaks loftily conformably to the nature of things? Porphyry, however, in reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable

54 PROCLUsS ON THE {BooK 1.

Porphyry, however, in reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable

54 PROCLUsS ON THE {BooK 1.

of delivering an impassivity which is intellectual, and which energizes according to a philosophic life. But YT should wonder if Homer is not sufficient for these things, but Critias is, or Hermocrates, and should be thought fit to speak about them. It appears, therefore, to me, that Plato divides poetry into the divinely- inspired, and the artificial, And having made this division, he refers the magni- ficent diction and sublimity derived from inspiration, to the Gods. For oracles in a remarkable degree possess grandeur, vehemence, and magnificence of language. But he evinces that the poetry proceeding from human art, is not adequate to the praise of the fortitude of this city, and of the great deeds of the men that are educated init. For if there is any artificial sublimity 1m some one of the poets, it has much of contrivance in it, and grandeur of diction, and makes great use of metaphors, as is the case with Antimachus. But Socrates requires a pane- gyrist, who exlubits in his pratse a spontaneous sublimity, and a magnificence of language, which 15 free from compulsion and pure; justas actions Cin bis Republic] have magnificence, not casually, bat adapted to the education and discipline of the men, That Socrates, however, does not reject’ the divinely-inspired poet, nor the whole of poetry, but that only which is artiticul, he manifests, PE think, when he says, “that he docs not despise the poetic genus.” The poctic genus, therefore, is divine, as he elsewhere says. But he despises the imitative species of poetry; nor yet Uns simply ; but that whieh ts nourished in depraved manners and laws. For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

The last part, however of the words of Socrates, being ina certain respect dif- ficult, may be rendered perspicuous as follows: But the words are, that which ts Sorcign to the education of any one, itis dificult to imitate well in deeds, and still more difficult in werds.” Por it scems to be easy to imitate words or deeds. Not a few, therefore, act suphistically, by exlibiting virtue as far as words, bat in deeds being entirely alienated from it. Willit not, therefore, be better to interpret these words thus, viz.: To suppose the most excellent education is implied in the words, that which ts foreign to the education of any one; but to assume, in decds and in words, as equivalent to, conformably to deeds, and conformably to words ; and to imi- fate well, as having the same meaning with fo be τε εὐ imitated 2. And thus we may collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated, itis difficult mdeed according to deeds, but it is still more dullicult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing

BOOK 1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 55

And thus we may collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated, itis difficult mdeed according to deeds, but it is still more dullicult for it to be well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing

BOOK 1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 55

proposed to be effected in poetry. And you may see how this accords with things themselves. For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men, composes a history. But he who narrates the speeches of these men, ifhe intends to preserve the manners of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar io the speaker. For words are seen to difler according to the inward dispositions. For thas we deride most of those, except Plato, who have written the Apology of Socrates, as not preserving the Socratic manner in their composition. Though the narration of this very thing, that Socrates was accused, made an apology, and was sentenced to die, would not be thought worthy of laughter, but the dissimili- tude of imitation in the composition, renders the imitators ridiculous. — Since, also» to say of Aclilles, that he came forth armed after such a manner, and that he performed such deeds, is not dificalt; but to narrate copiously what he said» when detained in the river, is not easy. But this is the province of one who is able to assume the manners of the hero, and to write conformably to what he would have said. This also is evident from Socrates in the Republic, very much Dblamine Homer respecting the imitation of words. But as to the Gods, it is said to be easy by language to uifa/e the words or the deeds of the Gods. For who can delineate their works according to their desert? Or it may be said that it is the same thing with respect to the Gods, to imitate their words or deeds. For since their words are intellections, and their intellections are productions, the imitator of their words is also the imitator of their productions, So that by how much he fails in the one, by so much also is he deficient in the imitation of the other. Longinus, however, has the following doubts with respect to the proposed words. For if poets are not worthy imitators of the works pertaining to such a city as this, because they are not educated in the manners of the city, neither will Critias and his associates be able to effect this. For neither did they live perform- ing the office of magistrates in it. But if it is because they have not science, but are imitators alone, why by receiving types from us, may they not be able to imi- tate, since they possess an imitative power? In answer to these doubts, it may be said, that the imitation of such a polity proceeds through a life concordant with its paradigms. For he who does not live according to virtue, is incapable of adducing words adapted to worthy men. It is not, therefore, sufficient merely to hear what form of life the polity possesses, in order to imitate it, as the doubt of Longinus says itis, Bat Porphyry adds, that as all things, such for instance as the diurnal light, are not imitated by painters, so neither is the life of the most excellent polity imitated by poets, in consequence of transcending their power.

56 — PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1.

“ But with respect to the tribe of sophists, though I consider them as skilled both in the art of speaking, and in many other beautiful arts, yet as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of cities, IT am afraid, lest with respect to the institutions of philoso- phers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the qua- lity and magnitude of those concerns, which wise and politic men are engaged in with individuals in warlike undertakings, both in deeds and

» words.

With respect to the sophists, some of them frequently pretended to be skilled in astronomy, others in geometry, others in politics, and others in the art of dividing. Hence they are now said to be skilled in many beautiful arts. Since, however, they did not possess a scientific knowledge of these, it is added, that they are skilled in them. For skil! manifests an irrational occupation in’ mere words, unaccompanied with the Knowledge of the why. Because, however, they not only lived at different times in different cities, but were full of deception, of false opinion, and unscientific wandering, they are justly called wanderers. But as they led a disorderly and inerudite life, energizing according to passion, they are very properly said not to have a settled abode ; since it is requisite that every one should arrange himself prior to other things. For all such particutars, as ave ina family and a city, are Likewise in manners, and these prior to externals ought to be titly governed. Who then are the proper imitators of the deeds and words of the best polity, if neither the poets nor the sophists are? Phey are such as are both politicians and philosophers. For the union of both these is necessary, in order that through the political character they may be able to perceive the works of the citizens ; but through the philosophic, their words, te consequence of inwardly pre-assuming their life. And through the former, indeed, they com- prehend their practical wisdom, but through the latter, the intellectual energy of the rulers. But from these images we should make a transition to demiurgic causes. For it is necessary that these also should) be total and Intellectual, mn order that the universe may be consummately perfect, and that generation may

possess ironically such things as the heavens primarily contain.

“ The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the same time participates of both these, by nature and by education.”

BOOK 1. TIMZUS OF PLATO. 57

“ The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the same time participates of both these, by nature and by education.”

BOOK 1. TIMZUS OF PLATO. 57

Longinus, not disdaining to survey these words, and those that precede them, — says, that in that part of them beginning with, “ But with respect to the tribe of sophists, Lam afraid, as they are wanderers,” &c. there is a difference of expression through the desire of dignity and gravity in the diction. That in the words that follow, “ Lest with respect to the institutions of philosophers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concerns,” &e. there is a distortion of phrase from what is natural. And that the third part, “ The genus therefore of your habit remains,” &c. is perfectly unusual. For it is not at all dissimilar to the strength of Hercules, to sey ig Τελεμαάχοιο, the sacred strength of Telemachus,” and other such like expressions. But Origen admits, that the form of expression in the proposed words, is conformable to the manner of historians. For such like periphrases are adapted to a narration of this kind, as well as to poetry. We, however, say, that Plato everywhere changes his mode of diction, so as to be adapted to his subjects; and in unusual things, stu- dies mutations of expression. But we do not admit that the proposed words are a periphrasis. For they do not manifest the same thing as the expression you, like the strength of Hercules ; from which there would only be an ability of giving that which is adapted to the imitation of the best polity. For those who are both philosophers and politicians, by energizing according to the habit which they possess, and which differs from the poetical and sophistical habit, will be able to effect that which Socrates desires. And thus much for the words themselves,

Looking, however, to the conceptions which they contain, we must say, that So- crates excites Critias and [lermocrates to what remains to be accomplished in the polity. But he likewise calls on Timieus to assist the undertaking. And this is the fifth head of the things proposed for elucidation. You may also see how magnificently Socrates celebrates the men from the very beginning, calling [the wisdom which they possess] a Aabit, in order that he may exempt them from so- phistical wandering. But he says that they are partakers of the political science, both by nature and education, in order that you may contradistinguish it from poetical imitation, which is nourished by less excellent laws. And he designates the perfect from nature and educaiion ; lest depriving nature of education, you should cause it to be lame ;* or you should think that education ought to be thrown into an

* Odyss. 11. 409. * For xoAny here, it is necessary to read χωλην,

Tim. Plat. το α, te

58 | PROCLUS ON THE > [BOOK 1.

11. 409. * For xoAny here, it is necessary to read χωλην,

Tim. Plat. το α, te

58 | PROCLUS ON THE > [BOOK 1.

unapt and incongruous recipient. And thus much has been said in common re- specting the men, But if you wish to speak, proceeding to paradigins, the demi- urgic genus, which is total and intellectual, remains to be arranged according to a providential attention to wholes. Let us, however, survey separately every parti- cular.

“ For Timzus here of Locris, an Italian city, governed by the best of laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in wealth and nobility, has obtained in his own city the greatest honours, and the highest posts of government; and, in my opinion, has arrived at the summit of all philosophy.”

What testimony, therefore, can be more admirable than this, or what praise can be greater? Does it not, in the first place, evince that Timiwus was a political character; in the second place, that he possessed intellectual knowledge {ina most eminent degree], by saying, that he had arrived at the summit of all phuilo- sophy; and adding, in my opinion, which places a colophon on all the panegyrics ? What other image also than this among men, is more carable of being assimilated to the one Demiurgus? For, in the first place, by the poutical and the philosophic, the image is Jovian. In the next place, by asserting that Timiwus belonged toa city governed by the best of laws, it imitates the god who was nurtured in the in- tellizible by Adrastia. And by Timwus excelling in nobility of birth, it adum- brates the total, intellectual, and unical nature of the god. For all these the De- miurgus possesses, by participating of the fathers prior to himself. By asserting also that Timwus had obtained the highest posts of government, it represents to us the royal power of the Demiurgus, and which has dominion over wholes ; his sceptre, according to theologists, consisting of four and twenty measures. But to add likewise that he had enjoyed the greatest honours, presents us with an image of that transcendency which is exempt from wholes, both in dignity and power. It is the Demiurgus, therefore, who also distributes honours to others. And it may be said, that the assertion that Timius had arrived at the summit of philoso- phy, assimilates him to the god, who at once perfectly contains all knowledge in himself. So that, from all that has been said, you may apprehend, as from ima- ses, who the Demiurgus of the universe is; that he is an intellect comprehensive of many intellects, and arranged among the intellectual Gods ; that he is full of

BOOK 1.J TIM.ZUS OF PLATO. 59

So that, from all that has been said, you may apprehend, as from ima- ses, who the Demiurgus of the universe is; that he is an intellect comprehensive of many intellects, and arranged among the intellectual Gods ; that he is full of

BOOK 1.J TIM.ZUS OF PLATO. 59

the first intelligibles ; and that he has a royal establishment, as surpassing in dig- nity the other demiurgic gods. If, however, Plato calls the city of Timaus Lo- cris, it not being usual with the Greeks thus to denominate it, but to call it Locri only, in order to distinguish it from the Locris opposite to Eubcea, we must not wonder. For Plato changes many things for the purpose of signifying in a clearer manner the thing proposed. But that the Locrians were governed by the best laws is evident ; for their legislator was Zaleucus.

“ Besides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of any of the parti- culars of which we are now speaking.”

Critias, indeed, was of a generous and grand nature. He likewise engaged in philosophic conferences, and was called, as history informs us, an ideot among philosophers, but a philosopher among ideots. He tyrannized also, being one of the thirty. Itis not, however, just to accuse Socrates on this account, because he now thinks him deserving of a certain praise. For, in the first place, we should attend to the manner in which he praises him. For he says, that “ he is not igno- rant of any of the particulars of which we are now speaking,” both on account of his natural disposition, and his association with philosophers. In the next place, we should observe, that the tyrannical character is an argument of an excellent na- ture, as we learn from the fable in the [10th book of the] Republic, which parti- cularly leads souls descending from the heavens to a tyrannical life. For being accustomed there to revolve with the Gods, and to govern the universe in conjunc- tion with them, in these terrestrial regions also, they pursue apparent power ; just as those who possess the remembrance of intelligible beauty, embrace visible beauty. That Critias, however, pertains, according to analogy, to the middle fabrication of things, may be learnt, in the first place, from his succeeding to the discourse of Socrates ; in the next place, from his narrating the Atlantic history, the Atlantics being the progeny of Neptune; and, in the third place, from his own proper life, Bor the ruling peculiarity, and that which extends to many things, are the characteristics of this life. Power, likewise pertains to media, and therefore he possesses the middle place in the encomiums. For to assert of him, that he was not one of the vulgar, but a partaker of the prerogatives of Timeus, shows his inferiority to the first person of the dialogue. But that he was not en- tirely removed from him, indicates his alliance to him,

60 PROCLUS ON THE (soox 1.

For to assert of him, that he was not one of the vulgar, but a partaker of the prerogatives of Timeus, shows his inferiority to the first person of the dialogue. But that he was not en- tirely removed from him, indicates his alliance to him,

60 PROCLUS ON THE (soox 1.

“ Nor is this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of cir- cumstances evince that he is, both by nature and education, adapted to 411 such concerns.”

Hermocrates was a Syracusan general, desirous of living conformably to law. Hence also he participates, in a certain respect, of the political science and philo- sophy. He must be * referred, therefore, according to analogy, to tle third fabri- cation * of things. For the command of an army is a power allied to the god, who arranges the last and most disorderly parts ΟΥ̓ mundane fabrication ; and fo be testified by a multitude of circumstances, indicates an analogy to the power that produces fabrication into all multitude, and an ultimate division. We therefore make this arrangement, in order that the men may have an analogy to the things. But others arrange Critias as inferior to Hermocrates ; though the absent person was neither adapted to speak nor to hear, and of those that are present Lat a conference], he who is an auditor, indeed, but is silent, is secondary to lim who is both an auditor and a speaker, and in this respect: imitates those that are about Socrates and Timwus. In the next place, this also must be considered, that So- crates gives the preference to Critias, in what he says, praising him immediately after Timewus. There are likewise those who attribute such an order as the fol- lowing to these persons, viz. they arrange Timanus according to the paradigmatic cause, Socrates aceording to the efficient, and Critias according to the formal cause; for he Jeads into energy those that have been rightly educated ; but: Her- mocrates according to the material cause. Hence also he is adapted indeed to hear, but not to speak. For matter receives productive powers externally, but is not naturally adapted to generate. And this arrangement indeed will be found to be very reasonable, if we abandon the former conceptions [relative to the ana- logy of the men].

* Instead of So καὶ πολιτικῆς πως pererxe, καὶ φιλοσοφιαι evexey οὖν «κ᾿ A., iL is Necessary to read διο και πολιτικὴς ἴων μετειχέ καὶ φιλυσυφιαι. ενεέγκεν οὖν K. A,

* Timeus is analogous to Jupiter, the Demiurgus of the universe; but Socrates, Critias, and Her- mocrates, are analogous to the three ruling fathers, or demiurgi, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, who form the summit of the supermundane order of Gods. For, according to the arcana of the Grecian theology, there is a twofold Jupiter; one being the Demiurgus, and existing at the extremity of the intellectual order; but the other being the first of the supermundane demiurgic triad. See the oth Book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

ORAS Os < AMO βε"

See the oth Book of my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

ORAS Os < AMO βε"

BOOK 1.] TIM.£US OF PLATO. ΟἹ

“Hence when you yesterday requested me to discuss what pertains to a polity, I readily complied with your request; being persuaded that the remainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained by any one than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its discussion. For when you have properly adapted the city for warlike purposes, there is no one in the present age but you from whom it can acquire every thing fit for it to receive. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above- mentioned particulars. Nor have you, indeed, refused this employment ; but have, with common consent, determined to repay my hospitality with the banquet of discourse. I now, therefore, stand prepared, in a deco- rous manner, to receive the promised feast.”

The summary repetition of the polity appears, indeed, as Socrates now says, to have been made for the sake of the discussion of the contests in war of a rightly constituted city. Both the concise comprehension, however, of the polity, and the Atlantie war, refer us to the one fabrication of the world. For, as we have before observed, it is better, prior to the whole fabrication, and all the form of the production of the world, to make a survey from parts and images. Socrates, there- fore, resuming the polity in certain forms, and, first, through this imitating the universe, very properly establishes himself, as it were, in essence; but excites others to the discussion, who celebrate the power of such a city, and imitate those who arrange the universe according to the middle demiurgic form, and uniformly comprehend the contrarieties and multiform motions which it contains. As, therefore, Jupiter, in Homer, being seated in his citadel on the summit of Olym- pus, and abiding in his own accustomed unity, sends the Gods who preside over the mundane contrariety to the Grecian war; thus also Socrates, being purely established in the intelligible form of a polity, prepares those after him that are able, to celebrate the motion and power of this polity, calling forth, indeed, the science of Timezus, to the survey of wholes totally, but preparing the others to the total and concise comprehension of partial natures. For as he had discussed the polity totally, after this manner also, he wishes that the power of it should be cele- brated by the rest. Since, however, all these discourses bring with them an image of demiurgic works, and the whole conference adumbrates the fabrication of the

02 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ 1.

world, Socrates very properly says, ‘ that he stands prepared, in a decorous manner; to receive the promised feast,” his words being invested with modesty, as a form adapted to virtue.

world, Socrates very properly says, ‘ that he stands prepared, in a decorous manner; to receive the promised feast,” his words being invested with modesty, as a form adapted to virtue.

“ FTerm. But we, O Socrates, as Timeus just now signified, shall cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire; for we cannot offer any excuse sufficient to justify neglect in this affair. Yor yesterday, when we departed from hence, and went to the lodging of Critias, where we are accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and in the way thither, we

discoursed on this very particular.”

It was requisite that Hermocrates should say something, and not be silently present, like the unemployed persons ina comedy. Hence also he ts represented speaking to Socrates. And this indeed is logographic for pertaining to the art of writing); but it is hkewise adapted to what has been before said. For it repre- sents to us, asin an image, that the last parts, of the fabrication of things, follow the one father of wholes, and, through similitude to him, converge to the one providence of the world. For Hermocrates, following Socrates, says, that no- thing shall be wanting, either of alacrity or power, to the accomplishment of the narrations investigated by Socrates. For these two things become especially im- pediments to us in our mutual energies, viz. our indolence, and any external im- pediment. Removing, therefore, both these, he says, that there cannot be any ex- cuse sufficient to justify their neglect, or prevent them from accomplishing the mandate of Socrates. Very properly, therefore, does he call upon Critias for the narration respecting the city of the ancient Athenians, in which the mandate of Socrates terminates ; just as Socrates calls on Timwus, and makes himself a par- taker of his discourse. For on the preceding day, Hermocrates says, they dis- coursed on this very particular together with Critias, just as the third Demiurgus in the universe communicates with the production of the second. For the whole of generation is entirely in want of returns from the subterranean world. If, how- ever, these things subsist after this manner, the Atlantic Iistory will appear to have had the third narration. But those numbers, the duad and the triad, are said to be adapted to the middle fabrication, the former through power, and the latter through its demiurgic providence, and which is also perfective of mundane natures. So that whether you assign to this history a double or a triple narration

MP 5 SNS ANE Sa SA I BE DLN OLE LILES ES

nas a

BOOK 1.] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 63

you will, from either of the numbers, be able to recur to the conception of the in- tervening medium.

“He therefore narrated to us the following particulars from ancient rumour, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his re- quest.

“He therefore narrated to us the following particulars from ancient rumour, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his re- quest.

“Cri. Itis requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timaus, the third as- sociate of our undertaking.

“Trim. I assent to your compliance.”

You will find in these words an admirable indication, as in images, of divine natures. For, as in them, such as are secondary call forth the prolific powers of such as are primary, and produce them to the providential inspection of the sub- jects of their government; thus also here Hermocrates calls on Critias to speak, and gives completion to what was promised to Socrates. And as, among divine natures, effects convert themselves to the reception of their causes, thus also here, Hermocrates is extended to Critias, but Critias looks to the mandate of Socrates. As likewise all demiurgic causes are suspended from the one father of the uni- verse, and govern all things conformably to his will; after the same manner here also all the persons tly to Timeus, and to his nod, or consent, or will, in order that, being impelled from that as from a root, they may dispose their narration agreeably to his desire. For thus what is going to be said will contribute to the discourse about the whole fabrication of the world. Moreover, the words “ from ancient rumour,” if the narration is historicel, signify ancient according to time. But if they are an indication of what takes place in the universe, they will ob- scurcly signify the reasons or productive powers which are from eternity inherent insouls. And if, likewise, they bring with them an image of divine causes, they show that these demiurgic causes, being supernally filled from more ancient Gods, impart also to secondary natures their own providential energies.

“Cri. Hear, then, O Socrates, a narration surprising indeed in the extreme, yet in every respect true, which was once delivered by Solon, the wisest of the seven wise men.”

64 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ !.

“Cri. Hear, then, O Socrates, a narration surprising indeed in the extreme, yet in every respect true, which was once delivered by Solon, the wisest of the seven wise men.”

64 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ !.

With respect τὸ the whole of this narration about the Atlantics, some say, that it is a mere history, which was the opinion of Crantor, the first interpreter of Plato, who says, that Plato was derided by those of his time, as not being the inventor of the Republic, but transcribing what the Exyptians had written on this subject; and that he so far regards what is said by these deriders as to refer to the Exyp- tians this history about the Athenians and Atlanties, and to believe that the Athe- nians once lived conformably to this polity. Crantor adds, that this is testified by the prophets of the Exyptians, who assert that these particulars (which are narrated by Plato} are written on pillars which are still preserved. Others again, say, that this narration Is a fable, and a fictitious account of things, which by no means had an existence, but which bring with them an indication of natures which are perpetual, or are cenerated in the world 5 not attending to Plato, who exclaims, “ that the narration is surprising in the extreme, yet ts in every respect true.” For that which is in every respect true, is not partly true, and partly not true, nor is it false according to the apparent, but true according to the inward meaning; since a thing of this kind would not be perfectly trac. Others do not deny that these transactions took place after this manner, but think that they are now assumed as images of the contrarictics that pre-cxist in’ the universe, lor war, say they, Is the father of all things, as Heraclitus also asserted. And of these, some refer the analysis to the fixed stars and planets τ so that they assume the Athenians as analogous to the fixed: stars, but the Athantics to the planets. They Ekewise say, that these stars fight on account of the opposition in their cir- culation, but that the fixed stars vanquish the planets on account of the one con- volution of the world. ΟΥ̓ this opinion, therefore, is the illustrious Ameliis, who vehemently contends that this must be the case, because it is clearly said in the Critias, that the Atlantic island was divided into seven circles. But I do not know of any other who is of the same cGpimion., Others, again, as Origen, refer the analysis to the opposit on of certain dwmons, some of them being more, but others less, excellent. And some of them being superior in mulutude, but others in power: some of them vanquishing, but others being vanquished. But others refer it to the discord of souls, the more excellent being the pupils of Minerva, but the inferior kind being subservient to generation; who also pertain to the God that presides over generation [i, e.to Neptune]. And this is the interpreta- tion of Numenius. Others, mingling, as they fancy, the opinions of Origen and Numenius together, say, that the narration refers to the opposition of souls to damons, the latter drawing down, but the former being drawn down. And

And this is the interpreta- tion of Numenius. Others, mingling, as they fancy, the opinions of Origen and Numenius together, say, that the narration refers to the opposition of souls to damons, the latter drawing down, but the former being drawn down. And

“......5....ὕ..ὄ

BOOK 1.} TIMAUS OF PLATO. 65

with these men, demon has a triple subsistence. For they say, that one kind is that of divine dwmons ; another, of diemons according to habitude, to which par- tial sonls give completion, when they obtain a damoniacal allotment; and another is that of depraved diemons, who are also noxious to sonls, Daemons, therefore, of this last kind, wage this war against souls, in their descent into generation, And that, say they, which ancient theologists refer to Osiris and Typhon, or to Bacchus and the Titans, this, Plato, from motives of piety, refers to the Athenians and Atlantics. Before, however, souls descend into solid bodies, those theologists and Plato, deliver the war of them with material daemons who are adapted to the west; since the west, as the Egyptians say, is the place of noxious demons.’ Of this opinion is the philosopher Porphyry, respecting whom, it would be wonderful, if he asserted any thing different from the doctrine of Numenius. These [philosophers] however, are in my opinion, very * excellently corrected by the most divine Tamblichus.

According to him, therefore, and also to our preceptor Syrianus, this con- trariety and opposition are not introduced for the purpose of rejecting the narra- tion, since on the contrary, this is to be admitted as an account of transactions that actnally happened; but, as we are accustomed to do, we must refer that which precedes the subject of the dialogue, to the scope itself of the dialogue. Hence, they are of opinion, that this contrariety which is derived from human affairs, should, according to a similar form, be extended through the whole world, and especially through the realms of generation, That in consequence of this, we should survey every where how things participate of contrariety, according to the variety of powers. For since all things are from the one, and from the duad after the one, are in a certain respect united to each other, and have an opposite nature; as in the genera of being, there is a certain: opposition of sameness to difference, and of motion to permanency, but all things participate of these ge- nera ;—this being the case, we must survey after what manner mundane natures possess the contrariety which pervades through all things.

Moreover, if we consider the polity of Plato as analogous in every respect to the world, it is necessary that we should survey this war as existing in every nature. For the polity is analogous to existence and essences, but war, to the powers of these essences, and as Plato says, to their motions, We must, like-

For the polity is analogous to existence and essences, but war, to the powers of these essences, and as Plato says, to their motions, We must, like-

' For exc καὶ ἡ dusts, here it is necessary to read ἐπεὶ καὶ Svors, and for caswricor, κακωτίκων, 3. Instead of κομηδει in this place, it is requisite to read κομεδῃ.

Tim. Plat. Vo a ]

66 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1,

wise, refer the polity, by making it common to all things, to the whole union of things ; but it must be said, that war is to be assimilated to the mundane division, and’ to the empire of victory, Whether, therefore, you give a twofold division tu the universe, by separating it into the Incorporeal and the corporeal; and again divide the incorporeal into the more intellectual and the more material natures, and the corporeal into heaven and generation ; and heaven, into contrary periods, but generation into opposite powers; or in whatever way you assume this opposite life, whether in the mundane Gods, or in daemons, in souls, or in bodies,—you may every where transter the analogies from men to things. For of the Gods themselves, the divine Homer makes oppositions 3 representing Apollo as hostilely opposed to Neptune, Mars to: Minerva, the river Nanthus to Vulcan, Hermes to Latona, and Juno to Diana, For it is requisite to survey generauion in incorporeal natures, in bodies, and in both. ΖἴἜΤ is likewise necessary to consider Neptune and Apollo as the fabricators of the whole of generation, the one totally, but the other partially, But Juno and Diana, as the suppliers of vivipication, the former rationally, but the latter physically. Minerva and Mars, as the causes of the contrariety which pervades through both evistence and life; the former, of that which ts defined accurding to intellect; but the latter, of that which is more ma- terial and passive. Hermes and Latona, as presiding over the twofold perfection of suuls; the former, indeed, over the perfection which is obtained through the gnostic powers,* and the evolution into light of productive principles ; but the latter, over the sn.ooth, spontancous, and voluntary elevation which is acquired through the vital powers, Vulcan and Nanthus, as the primary leaders of the whole of a corporcal con- Sttiution, and of the powers it contains , the former, of those that are more cficacious but the latter of those that are more passive, and as there more material. But he leaves Venus by herself, in order that she may tlluminate all things with union and harmony, and represents her as fighting on the worse side, because THE ONE. in those that belovy to us sule, ts less eaceltent than multitude. Vor all contraricty is sur- veyed ina becoming manner in conjunction with a unity, whieh is either prior to it, Or Connascent with, or isin a certain respect an adjunct posterior to it. And Plato, as well as theologists, rightly perceiving that this is the case, have delivered

Vor all contraricty is sur- veyed ina becoming manner in conjunction with a unity, whieh is either prior to it, Or Connascent with, or isin a certain respect an adjunct posterior to it. And Plato, as well as theologists, rightly perceiving that this is the case, have delivered

a multitudinous contrariety prior to the one fabrication of the world, and parts

* cae is omitted in the original, aud the omission of it, reuders the latter part of the sentence very ambiguous.

* For δυνάμεως here, it is requisite to read dur ἀμεων.

ne cacao EE

HOOK 4.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 67

prior to wholes, Finding, likewise, these things in images prior to paradigms, he

surveys this contrariety ino men, which also has an analogous subsistence in wholes, neither being in want of Titannic or Gizantic wars. For how could he narrate such wars to Socrates, who on the preceding day had blamed the poets for devising things of this kind?) Reeeiving, therefore, ransactions from history, in order that he might not assert of the Gods that they fight with each other, he ascribes these battles to men, but throneh a cautious and pious analogy, transfers them also to the Gods, For such like wars are delivered by divinely-inspired poets, prior to the one order of things. Their mode, however, of narrating them, is adapted to them, but the present mode to Plato; the latter, in conjunction with the political science, being more moderate, but the former, in conjunction with the telestic art, being more replete with divine inspiration, And thus much concerning the whole of the text.

In what is said by Critias, however, the word “hear” is proverbial, and is employed in those things to which we wish to call the attention of the hearer. The word hear, therefore, is equivalent to receive what is worthy of attention. But the word “ surprizing” (aroxov) manifests that which happens contrary to expec- tation, as in the Gorgias, “ [tis surprizing, O Socrates,” (arora ys w Σωκρατηςνὶ or that which is paradoxical, as in the Crito, What a surprising dream, So- crates ; (wg ατόπον ενυπνίὴν ὦ Σωκχρατης); or the wouderfal, as in the Theatetus, © And itis not at all surprising, but it would be much more wonderful, if it were not a thing of this kind.” (και οὐδὲν γε ατοπον, κλλὰ πολυ Savuarroresoy εἰ μη τοιουτῆς TY.) But here it is assumed as that which deserves admiration. This, however, is evi- dent irom what follows, in which it is said, “ that the decas of this city were great and admirable” Moreover, the word © narration” (Asyos), Manilests the truth of what is going to be related. For thus it is said in the Gorgias, that a fable differs from Asya; [because the latteris true, but the former is ποῖ. ΤΕ is also very properly said, that “ Solon was the wisest of the seven wise men ;~ as being asserted of one who was related to Plato; as being said to another Athenian, and in the Panathenaie 5 and as indicating that the ensuing narration extends to all wisdom. Nor is it requisite to wonder how Solon is said to be the wisest of all the seven wise men, nor to be anxious to know, how he can be said to be the wisest of other men, but one of the wise men, when all of them were most wise. For what ab- surdity is there, mecalling a man the wisest of those that are of the same order with himself? But his legislation, his pretended insanity at Salamis, his armed attack of Pisistratus the tyrant, who said he was more prudent than those that

68 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 5.

For what ab- surdity is there, mecalling a man the wisest of those that are of the same order with himself? But his legislation, his pretended insanity at Salamis, his armed attack of Pisistratus the tyrant, who said he was more prudent than those that

68 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 5.

were absent, and more brave than those that were present, his conference also with Croesus, and his answer to one who said, that he had established most beautiful laws; for he replied, that he had not established the most beautiful, but) powerful laws, and that he knew laws that were more excellent than these ;—all these par- ticulars bear testimony to his wisdom. There is, likewise, a story told of a tripod that was dragged up in’ a net by certain young men, though it is not related by all historians, and that the oracle (of Apollo} being consulted on the oceasion, the God answered, that it should be given: to the wisest: man, That im conse- quence of this, it) was offered to Thales, but he sent it to another of the seven wise men, this again to another, and so on, till at last it came to Solon, all of them yielding it to him, Solon, however, sent it to the God, saying, that he was the wisest of beings. Solon, also, is said to have found, that the lunar month does not consist of thirty days, and on this account he was the first that called it ἐν vey "ὦ new one, and ysag niew. And, in short, the discovery, that the numbers of the days revert frum the twenticth day, is ascribed) to him. Some, also, assert, that pricr to Anaxagoras, Solon showed that intellect presided over the whole of things. From all which it is evident, that he was a paruicipant of a certain

wisdom.

“ Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grand- father Dropides, as he himself frequently? relates in his poems. But he once declared to our grandfather Critias (as the old man himself informed us) that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city, which nevertheless were buried in oblivion through length of time, and the destruction of mankind.”

The history of the race of Solon, and of the alliance of Plato to him, is as fol- lows: The children of Execestides were, Solon and Dropides, and of Dropides Critias was the son, who is mentioned by Solon in his poems, where he sings,

Bid Critias with the yellow locks, Attention to his father pay,

* The same story is also told of Solon, by Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Thales. 2 In the original ἐνυν, which I conceive to be erroneously transcribed for ev veer. 3 πολλαχὸν is omitted in the text of Proclus.

BOOK 1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 69

2 In the original ἐνυν, which I conceive to be erroneously transcribed for ev veer. 3 πολλαχὸν is omitted in the text of Proclus.

BOOK 1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 69

Por by revering what he says, No faulty Jeader he'll obey. Bat Callescrus and Glauco were the sons of Critias: and again the Critias of the present dialogue was the son of Calliescrus. This, however, is evident from Cri- tias in the Charmides, calling the father of Charmides, his uncle. But Charmides and Perictione were the offspring of Glauco: and Perictione was the mother of Plato. So that Glauco was the uncle of Critias, but the father of Charmides. And Charmides was the uncle of Plato, but Solon was the brother of the great- grandfather of Critias. Such, therefore, is the truth (respecting the race of Solon.} The divine Tamblichus, however, gives a different account of the succession of his race. Vor he immediately makes Glauco to be the son of Dropides. But others, as the Platonic Theon, assert, that Critias and Glauco were the sons of Callwserus; though in the Charmides, Critias says, that “ Charmides ts the son of Glauco our uncle, but is my couzin” Uence Glauco is not the son of Dropides, nor the brother of the younger Critias. To a man, however, who pays attention to things, itis of no consequence in whatever manner these particulars may sub- sist. Passing on, therefore, to things, you may assume from these particulars as Images, that all the discord of the world, and the twofold co-ordinations that are Init, are suspended from: proximate demiurgie causes, and are referred to other more Intellectual and anetent causes; that the causes of this motion are conti- nuous and united, and suspended from one cause; that the superior causes: are More ancient in intellection ; and that secondary receive the production of primary natures, difler from and yet have a connascent communion with them, [ἢ addi- tion to these things also, you may assume, that a twofold oblivion ix produced in souls of the theory of great and admirable wholes, arising either frem having abandoned for along tinea life of that hind, or through having fallen immodcrately into gene- tion. Tor ths is for the real man to be truly corrupted. But souls that have been recently perfected, and retain the memory of things ino the intelligible world, in consequence of not falling into matter, easily acquire a reminiscence of the trath. And thus much for these particalars. We must not, however, wonder, if Critias calls Solon simply a λων αν. For we not only call those with whom we asso- ciate, but also our kindred, favulars. But by likewise adding, ‘ and an intimate Jricnd,” he indicates, that there was not merely a communion of race, but a same- ness and similitude of lite, in the ancestors of Plato. The prior Critias, also, is called an old man, which signilies his possession of prudence and intellect, and his being adapted to many disciplines.

70 PROCLUS ON THE (Boox 1.

The prior Critias, also, is called an old man, which signilies his possession of prudence and intellect, and his being adapted to many disciplines.

70 PROCLUS ON THE (Boox 1.

“Jn particular, he informed me of one undertaking surpassing in magnitude all the rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation I may offer my tribute of praise to the Goddess in the present solemnity, by cele- brating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, justly, and in a manner agreeable to truth.”

Longinus doubts what was the intention of Plato in the insertion of this narra- tion, For he does not introduce it either for the purpose of giving respite to the auditors, or as being in want of it. And he dissolves the doubt, as he thinks, by saying, that it is assumed by Plato prior to: physiolozy, in order to allure the reader, and soften the severity of that hind of writing, But Origen says, that the narration is indeed a tietion, and so far he agrees with Numenius and lus fol- lowers, but he does not admit: with Loneinus, that it was devised for the sake of pleasure. {0 does not, however, add the cause of the fiction, We, therefore, have frequently said, that it contributes to the whole theory of mature 5 and we likewise sav, that in these words, Plato calls the one and common productive principle of the twofold co-ordinations ino the world, and the one contrariety which pervades through wholes, the greatest and most admirable of works, as containing the other fabrication of things in infrangible bonds, this) fabrication consisting of participations of the contraries, bound and infinity, as Philolaus says, and as Plato also asserts in the Philebus. Por he there says, “ (hat there is much bound and much infinity inthe world, which are things most coutrary tocach other, and give completion to this universe.” Since, however, all things that contribute to the production of the world, are said to recompense the benefits bestowed by total causes, Critias says very properly, that it becomes him to repay fis obligations to Socrates, who excited both the second and third powers. These things, there- fore, may be immediately assumed (from the words betore us. |

But will vou not say, that the Minerval solemnity las an indication of demi- urgic works?) For the Goddess herself indeed, connectedly contains all the mun- dane fabrication, and possesses intellectual lives in herself} according to which she weaves together the universe, and unifying powers, according to which she governs all the mundane oppositions, “Phe Minerval solemnity, however, indi- cates the gift of the Goddess which pervades through all things, and fills all things with herself, and likewise the union which extends through all variety.

Book 1.] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 71

Book 1.] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 71

For in solemnities, we especially embrace a common and concordant life. If, however, we have asserted these things rightly, we may from these transfer our- selves to the various and one life of the world, and survey the diflerence between the Parmenides and this dialogue. | Por both have their hypothesis in the Pana- thenway but the former in the greater, and the latter in the lesser of these solem- nities. Por they were celebrated about the same time with the Bendidian festival ; and this very properly. For since the productions of Minerva are twofold, total and partial, sapermundane and mundane, intelligible and sensible ; the former of these solemnities, indeed, pertains to the exempt productions of the Goddess, unfolding into light the intelligible series of the Gods, but the latter to her sub- ordinate productions, interpreting the powers of the Gods about the world. And the Bendidian festival, indeed, appears to manifest the suppression of the con- trariety externally acceding to the universe from a = Barbarric tempest, by the Gods who are the inspective guardians of the festival. Hence it is said to have been celebrated in the Pirwus, as being most adapted to the extremities, and material parts of the universe. But the Panathenwan festival, exhibits the esta- blished order which proceeds into the world) from intellect, and the unconfused separation of mundane contrarietes, Por this Goddess is at one and the same time, a lover of wisdom, and a loverof war. Another veil, therefore, was referred to the Goddess fin the Bendidian festival.) representing the war in which the pupils of Minerva were victorious; just as the veil in the Panathenwan solemnity, represented the Gants vanquished by the Olympian Gods. The Goddess, how- ever, Is celebrated with hymns, justly and with truth; jast/y, indeed, because it is necessary that every thing which has proceeded, should be converted to its pro- per principle; but with (ruth, because the hymn is assumed through things and through beings, And because of hymns, some celebrate the essence, but others

the providence of the Gods, and others praise the works that proceed from them,'

cand a hymn of this hind is the last form of celebration 5 (for the praise of the

divine essence precedes all other panegyrics, as Socrates asserts in the Banquet) —this being the case, the words “ celebrating as it were,” are very properly added. For he wishes to celebrate the Goddess from the deeds performed by the Athenians, But that the Panathenwean followed the Bendidian fes- tivals, is asserted both by the commentators, and by Aristotle the Rhodian. For they say, that the Bendidia were celebrated in’ the Pireus on the

* For ax’ αὐτὸν here, it is necessary to read ax’ avurwr.

72 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook 1.

twentieth day of April; but that the festival sacred to Minerva followed these.

For they say, that the Bendidia were celebrated in’ the Pireus on the

* For ax’ αὐτὸν here, it is necessary to read ax’ avurwr.

72 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook 1.

twentieth day of April; but that the festival sacred to Minerva followed these.

“ Soc, You speak well. But what is this ancient achievement, which Critias once heard from Solon, and which is not narrated in history, but was once actually accomplished by this city.”

Socrates exciting Critias to narration, requests that he would relate the mighty undertaking which the ancient Critias said he had heard from Solon, and which though not much celebrated, yet was really performed, Τὰ which, this in the first place deserves to be considered, that wany things happen in the universe of which the multitude are ignorant. And inthis, worthy men differ from others, that they sce things of this hind, and understand the events that take place, sat it is worth while secondly to observe, that the more perfect causes, rejoice in sim plicity, and proceed from things of a composite nature, to such as are test, But subordinate beings on the contrary, descend from things simple to things compo- site. For thus also here Socrates recurs from that which is downward as far as to Solon, in an ascending progression; but Critias on the contrary, descends

from Solon to the mention of himself.

“Cri. 1 will acquaint you with that ancient history, which 1 did not indeed receive from a youth, but from aman very much advanced in years.”

Longinus here again observes, that Plato pays attention to elegance of diction, by narrating the same things differently. For he ealls the wudertaking ἀρχαιον, but the narration sara, and the man, nota youth; though as he sienifies the same thing through all these, he anight have denominated all of them: after the same manner. Longinus, therefore, as Plotinus said of him, was a philologist, but nota philosopher. Origen, however, docs not admit that Plato is studious of artificial delight and certain ornaments of diction, but that he pays attention to spontaneous and unadorned credibility, and accuracy in imitations. ‘This mode also ofexpression has spontaneity, as being adapted to erudition. For it was rightly said by Aristoxenus, the lyric poet, that the dispositions of philosophers extend as faras to sounds, and exhibit in all things the arrangement which they possess 3 just 7 think, as this mighty heaven, exhibits tn its transfigurations clear

BOOK 1.) TIM.LZUS OF PLATO. 73

For it was rightly said by Aristoxenus, the lyric poet, that the dispositions of philosophers extend as faras to sounds, and exhibit in all things the arrangement which they possess 3 just 7 think, as this mighty heaven, exhibits tn its transfigurations clear

BOOK 1.) TIM.LZUS OF PLATO. 73

images of the splendor of intellectual perceptions ; being moved in conjunction with the unapparent periods of intellectual natures."| The great Iamblichus, however, thinks that we should rather refer the variety of the words to things, and see how in nature contranies are vanquished by the one; how the one is varied, and how great a mutation the same productive principles exlibit; subsisting in one way in the intellect of the universe, in another, in soul, in another, in nature, and in the last place, subsisting in matter. And again, unfolding about matter a most abundant difference in conjunction with similitude. For these observations are worthy the conceptions of Plato, and not a solicitous attention to diction.

“ For at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety years old, and I was about ten.”

These three persons are assumed, as having preserved this history, or mytho- logy, Solon, the ancient Critias, and this junior Critias; because perfect causes precede the fabrication of the world, and perfective causes are antecedent to the subjects of their government. The elder Critias, however, heard this narration from Solon, one from one; from the elder Critias it was heard by the junior Cri- tias and Amynander; and from the junior Critias three persons received it. For the monad_ proceeds through the duad to the perfective providence of wholes. The numbers also of the ages, have much alliance to the things themselves. For the decad manifests the converston of all mundane natures to the one ; and nincty the restitution again to the monad, in conjunction with progression. But both numbers are symbolical of the world. You may say, therefore, that Solon is analogous to the cause of permanency; but the former Critias, to the cause which supplies progression ; and the present Critias to the cause which converts and conjoins things which have proceeded, to their causes. And the first of these, indeed, preserves the relation ofa ruling and leading cause ; the second, of the cause which comes into contact with mundane fabrication in a liberated manner; and the third, of that which now pays attention to the universe, and governs the mundane war.

“ When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us, which is known by the name of Cureotis Apaturiorum, nothing was omitted which

* Instead of ovyxwovpevas ταῖς εἰκονων agavess περιοδοις, it is necessary to read, σνγκινουμενας ras

ecewwwr, κι Δ.

Tim. Plat. Vou. J. K

74 PROCLUS ON THE {noox 1.

Tim. Plat. Vou. J. K

74 PROCLUS ON THE {noox 1.

boys during that festivity are accustomed to perform. For when our parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time

enurely new.”

The Apaturia was a festival sacred to Bacchus, on account of the duel between Melanthus and Xanthus the Bootian, and the victory of Melanthus through deception ; the Bavotians and Athenians waging war with each other for CEnoe. But this festival was celebrated for three days; of which the first day was called avazcuris, because many sacrifices were performed in tt ; and the victims were called avaccuuara, because they were drawn upward, and sacrificed. The second day was called dogma; for on this day there were splendid banquets and much feasting. But the third day was called κουρεώτις 3 fur on tis day boys, three or four years old, were enrolled in their tribes. On this day also, such boys as were more sagacious than the rest, sung certain poems, and those were victorious who retained the greater number of them in their memory, They sang, however, the poems of the ancients. Bat with respect to the tribes, it must be observed, that after Jon there were four families, but from Clisthenes ten, and that after these, each twelve of the families was divided into three: the tribes were arranged into the same family and company, as being allied to each other: the cnrolment of the boys was into these tribes; and this day, as we have before observed, was called Cureotis, from the boys that were enrolled. And such is the information derived from history.

Again, however, let us direct our attention to things, and behold these in the particulars that have been narrated, as in images. “The festival, therefore, of the Apaturia, which had for its preteat the victory of the Athenians, pertains to the hypothesis according to which the Athenians conquered [the Atlantics}, and all intellectual subdue material natures. Deception, likewise, is adapted to mundane forms, Which separate themselves from impartble and inumaterial principles, and become apparent, instead of truly-existing beings. But the enrolment of the boys, imitates the arrangements of partial souls into their proper allotments, and their descents into different) generations. The festival Is an imitation of the eternal hilarity in the world: for if it is filled with Gods, it celebrates a perpetual festival. But the contests of rhapsody, are analogous to the contests which souls sustain, weaving their own ΠΡ together with the universe. And the rhapsody

BOOK 1. ΤΙΝῸΣ PLATO. 75

But the contests of rhapsody, are analogous to the contests which souls sustain, weaving their own ΠΡ together with the universe. And the rhapsody

BOOK 1. ΤΙΝῸΣ PLATO. 75

uself, resembles the above-mentioned woven life of the universe. For this has an imitation of intellectual forms, in the same manner as the contests of rhapsody have of heroic actions and manners, possessing together with an harmonious conjunction, a connected series. The many poems of many poets, adumbrate the many natures, and many circum-mundane productive powers,’ and, in short, the division of physical imitations, But the new poems, are images of forms which are perpetually flourishing, always perfect and prolific, and able to operate efhiea- ciously on other things. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Mention, however, is made of the poems of Solon, not as of a poct in the popu- lar sense of the word, but as of one who mingled philosophy with poetry. For of mundane works likewise, and whole productions, a royal intellect is the leader. And the praise is related as being mentioned to another person, i.e. to Amynan- der, because, as we learn in the Phadrus, that which judges diflers from that which makes and generates. Referring, however, all that has been said, to the universe, we may infer as from images, that partial souls, partial natures, and partible forms, and of these, those especially that are always new and efficacious, contribute to the mundase war. But all these are connected together by the Gods, who are the inspective guardians of fabrication, and are co-arranged with one world, one harmony, and one kindred life.

ee

ut then one of our tribe, whether he was willing to gratify Critias, or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him to be most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry, the most ingenuous and free of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man (for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted ; and said, laughing —If Solon, O Amynander, had not engaged in poetry as a casual affair, but had made it as others do a serious employment ; and if through sedi- tions and other fluctuations of the state in which he found his country involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that cither [Hesiod or Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and renown.” ° /

Here again, the lovers of diction may indicate to their admirers, that Plato

* The word Aoyovs is, | conceive, omitted in the original in this place.

78 PROCLUS ON THE . [βΒοοκ 1.

78 PROCLUS ON THE . [βΒοοκ 1.

cautiously praises the poetry of Solon, since he represents the praise as bestowed by a private individual, and for the sake of others, and not as given by one who spoke conformably to intellect and reason. For Plato, if any one, was a most excellent judge of pocts, as Longinus also admits. Heraclides Ponticus there- fore says, that Cheerilus and Antimachus being at that time most renowned, Plato preferred the poems of the latter to those of the former, and that he per- suaded Heraclides at Colophon, to collect the poems of Antimachus. Tn vain, therefore, is it futilely observed by Callimachus and Duris, that Plato was nota sufficient judge of poets. Hence, what is here said manifests the judgment of the philosopher, and it may be considered in a more historical point of view. The investigator, however, of things, will think it requisite to show how all the causes of the orderly distribution of the universe, and also the causes that are connective of contrariety, are extended to one principle, and how the last adhere through media to the first of things. For thus those who receive the narration of the ancient Critias, are extended to him, but he looks to Solon. And he, indeed, admires the poctic power of Solon ; but they, through Critias as a medium, are referred to the poetry of Solon. For gratifying the former [1. e. Critias], they praise the poctry of the latter. But what is it that Critias says respecting Solon? That he was subordinate to divinely-inspired pocts, from these two causes; because he engaged in poetry as a casual affair; and because when he came from Egypt, he found the city of the Athenians in a state of sedi- tion, and that he was not able, his country being involved in difficulties, to com- plete the history, which he brought from thence hither. What the history there- fore was, he informs us as he proceeds.

From these things, however, as images, Plato manifests, that what is primanly demiurgic, and every thing effective, have other primary energies ; but that their secondary energy is the production of secondary things. Likewise, that the con- fused, disorderly, and unstable nature of matter, frequently does not receive ornament from more divine causes, but subsists without symmetry’ to the gift which proceeds from them. Hence, second and third powers are unfolded into light, which proximately adorn its formless nature. Solon, therefore, being most ingenuous, and imitating exempt causes, did not deliver through poetry the Atlantic war. But Critias, and those posterior to him, transmit the account of this war to others, imitating second and third causes, who produce the variety of

‘ For ἀλλα ovpperpws in this place, it is necessary to read, αλλ᾽ aovpperpes.

200K 1.) TIMEUS OF PLATO. 77

But Critias, and those posterior to him, transmit the account of this war to others, imitating second and third causes, who produce the variety of

‘ For ἀλλα ovpperpws in this place, it is necessary to read, αλλ᾽ aovpperpes.

200K 1.) TIMEUS OF PLATO. 77

effective principles, and the orderly distribution of things, which is harmonized from contraries into a visible subsistence. Moreover, the assertion that Solon was the wisest of the seven wise men, exhibits his analogy to the first principles. And his being most free, adumbrates the power which is exempt, and established in itself, and which fills all things in a hberated manner. A thing of this kind likewise concurs with the wise man, as being immaterial, without a master, and of itself. The ancient Critias, also, being said to be old, indicates a cause which is intellectual, and remote from generation. For “ wisdom,” says Plato, “ and true opinions are most desirable things to himwho has arrived at old age.” Again, the assertion of Critias, that he very well remembers, exhibits to our view the salvation of eternal productive powers, and the stable energy of secondary causes, about such as are first. But Solon engaging in poetry asa casual affair, represents to us that productions into secondary natures, have only a secondary rank among first causes. For their first energies are intellectual, according to which they are united to the beings prior to themselces.

If, however, some one omiiting the survey of things, should consider through what cause Plato introduced’ these particulars, according to their apparent’ meaning, he will very properly find that they contributed to the thing proposed. For the design of Plato was to narrate the Atlantic war. But it was requisite that the messenger of this history should neither deceive nor be deceived. Hence also, Solon is said to have been most wise, and intimately acquainted with those about Critias. For as a wise man, he was not déceived, and as being an intimate acquaintance, he would not deceive. It was likewise requisite, that the receiver of this history should neither have been aged, in order that the narra- tion may appear to be ancient, nor yet so young, as to be forgetful. Hence, Cri- tias is supposed to have been a youth, but sufficiently able to remember, and in consequence of this, to have contended with others in rhapsody, in which much memory is necessary.

Farther still, it was requisite, that the ancient Critias should not commit such- like narrations to very young men, lest they should appear to them to be con- temptible. Ience, it is very properly said, that some one of the tribes, by enquiry of Solon, heard the history. But it was requisite that he also should, in a certain respect, have been familiar with Solon, in order that the old man might oppor- tunely relate all the history to him. Hence, likewise, the praises of the poetry of

* For παρεισκεκληκεν read παρεισκνκλ yeer.

But it was requisite that he also should, in a certain respect, have been familiar with Solon, in order that the old man might oppor- tunely relate all the history to him. Hence, likewise, the praises of the poetry of

* For παρεισκεκληκεν read παρεισκνκλ yeer.

78 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 1.

Solon precede the history 5 the praise being given by Amynander in order to gra- tify Critias. And thus much concerning the disposition of what is said in the text.

That Solon, however, went to Egypt, not only for the purpose of obtaining the Atlantic history, but likewise that the Athenians, during his absence, obeyed his laws, which he had bound them by an oath not to violate, is evident. Por during this time, also, he associated with Crarsus, and sailed to Egypt; but on his return, he became master of the city, which was ina tumultuous condition through the Pisistratida. And thus much we have derived from history. Origen, how- ever, doubts how Plato calls Solon most free: for this is not an encomium adapt ed toa poet. And he dissolves the doubt by saying, that he is so called, either because he spent his money (ideral/y, or because he used the greatest freedom of speceh; and that on this account he was free, without any timidity in his poetical compositions. Or he was 50 denominated, as being in lis poetry remiss and un- compelled. But Tamblichus says, that no one of these solutions is true, but that through this appellation, the Uderated condition of the intellect of Solon, the τις servile nature of his virtue, and that which was venerable in his character, and which transcended all other things, are signified. The same interpreter also says, that the daughter of Critias manifests a generative progression from causes, perfect, and rejoicing inits progeny. But the remembering well, indicates the salvation of effective principles in the world. Why, therefore, was Solon anxious to deliver the Atlantic war in verse?) Because, says he, all natural works and the mundane contrariety subsist through imitation, Por this is analogous to its effective and primary Causes; just as Critias is analogous to proximate and secondary causes. But why was he prevented by sedition? Because material motions and material tumult become an impediment, as we have before observed, to the productive

powers of mundane Causes.

“Tn consequence of this, Amynander enquired of Critias what that history was. ‘To which he answered, that it was concerning an athair, which ought most justly to be the greatest and most renowned which this city ever accomplished ; though through length of time, and the destrac- tion of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has not reached the present age.”

Longinus says, that something is wanting here to render the sense complete

ROOK 1. TIMEUS OF PLATO. 79

TIMEUS OF PLATO. 79

For the word considered is wanting to the words most justly to he, because these are required in what follows, but not the word overs, being. Porphyry, however, says, that Longinus did not perceive, that, in consequence of the undertaking being the greatest, but not yet celebrated, Plato adds, “ ought most justly to be most renowned.” But we, directing our attention to things, say, that Plato calls it the greatest undertaking, as bringing with it an image of all contrariety, extending itself every where. And that he denominates it most renowned, as contributing to the visible fabrication of things. For thus, also, the works of nature are called by

Orpheus renowned.

Boundless eternity, and nature’s works Ἧ Renown'd, remain.

“Relate this affair, O Critias, says Amynander, from the beginning, and inform us what that transaction was, how it was accomplished, and from whom Solon having heard it, narrated it asa fact.’

Joe. Relate what this admirable deed was, how, or after what manner. it was performed, how it became Known to, and by whom being preserved, it reach- ed the hearing of Solon. Plato appears, through this, to investigate the whole forin of contraricty, how it was effected, or may be known, and from what causes, tous invisible, itis suspended, Before, therefore, he recurred through relatives to the narration of Solon; but now he investigates the superior histories of it, or, that ITmay speak clearer, the principles of the fabrication of this contrariety. And by directing your attention to this narration, you may survey, as in images, through certain symbols, all the principles of this fabrication, as far as to the first causes of it.

“ There is, then, says he, a certain region of M.gypt, called Delta, about the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, and i in which there is a province called Saitical.”

In the first place, itis worth while to observe how the narration always delivers

things comprehended, proceeding from such as are more comprehensive ; from

Egypt, indeed, the river, from this Delta, from this the Saitic province, and from this Sais, sacred to Minerva. In the next place, having observed this, it will be

80 PROCLUS ON THE {poo τ.

In the next place, having observed this, it will be

80 PROCLUS ON THE {poo τ.

proper to ascend through the analogy of these things, to the first and most com- prehensive causes of fabrication. For you may perceive this supernally compre- hended by more total causes, and proceeding as far as to the last of things ; com- prehending causes every where preceding such as are comprehended ; the more total, such as are more partial; and the impartible fabrication, that which is parti ble, and is denominated recent ; to which also the present words refer the father of the narration. And this fabrication, indeed, is filled from these causes, and particularly participates of the undefiled power of Minerva. For, in short, since we refer this war, for the sake of which the whole narration 15 excited, to the mundane contrariety, it will be well, preceeding in the same way, to assimilate all the knowledge of the Egyptian priests to the former [or impartible] fabrica- tion, which stably comprehends the productive powers contained in the universe 5 but the history of Solon, which is always recent, and placed in mutations, to the more novcl fabrication, and which administers the all-various circulations of mun- dane natures. We shall also be benefited by perceiving how, in images, the dif- ference between human and divine fabrications becomes apparent; and how, i these, Solon, indeed, calls on the priest to the developement of ancient transac- tions, but the priest knows both such events as are reckoned ancient by the Greeks, and prior to these, such as are truly ancient. For thus also, in’ divine fabrications, that which is recent or junior, is converted to that which Is more an- cient, and is perfected by it; but the latter antecedently Comprehends the causes of the former, and is established above it, by still greater and more perfect intel- Jectual perceptions and powers, And thus much concerning the whole of the text.

It is necessary, however, to discuss every particular. With respect to Egypt, therefore, some call it an image of matter; others of the whole earth, as being divided analogously to it; and others of the intelligible, and the intelligible es- sence. But we say, that in what is here asserted, it is assimilated τὸ the whole invisible order, which is the principle of visible natures. With respect to Delta also, itis produced from the Nile, being divided about the Saitic province, so as to make its egress from one right line to the right and left, and to the sea, the sea forming the hypothenuse of the triangle, which Plato calls the Saitic province 5 indicating, in what he here says, that it is that about which the stream of the Nile is divided. It is, however, analogous to the one vivific fountain of all divine life, and, in visible natures, to the celestial triangle which is connective of all generation, heing proximate to the ram, which the Egyptians particularly honor, on account

It is, however, analogous to the one vivific fountain of all divine life, and, in visible natures, to the celestial triangle which is connective of all generation, heing proximate to the ram, which the Egyptians particularly honor, on account

BOOK 1.} TIMLUS OF PLATO. 81

of Ammon having the face of a ram, and also because the ram is the principle of gencration, and is moved with the greatest celerity, as being among the constellations established about the equinoctial. The mention, therefore, of Delta is here very appropriate τ since the triangle, as we shall learn in what follows, is the principle of the hypostasis of the mundane elements. But the Nile is to be arranged ana- lozous to the zodiac, as being situated under it, having an inclination similar to it, and imitating, through its divisions, the obliquity of it, and its division about the equinoctial points, The Nile also ts a symbol of the life which is poured on the whole world. Moreover, the two sides of the Nile, which ran into the sea from the summit fof Delta], may be, ina certain respect, assimilated to the two co-ordina- tions, Which proceed from one root as far as to generation, and of which genera- tion is the recipient. So that a triangle is produced from them and their common receptacle, into which they conjointly flow. But the Saitic province, which forms agreat part of Delta, participates also of a great portion of the celestial regions. Sais, therefore, must be sacerdotally referred to the constellation called the Bear, not becanse it is situated under it, nor on account of its coldness, but as partici- pating of a certain peculiar ettlux of the God [who presides over that constellation]. Hence likewise Sais is not shaken by earthquakes, in consequence of receiving a firm establishment on account of the place about the pole.

“ Of this provinee, the greatest city is Sais, from which also king Ama- sis derived his origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is, in the Egyptian tongue, Neith, but in the Greek Athena, or Minerva. The inhabitants of this city were very friendly to the Athenians, to whom also they said they were after a certain manner allied.”

The word νομὸς, or province, derived its appellation from the distribution of land. For thus the Egyptians called divisions of the great parts of Egypt. But from the city the whole province was denominated Saitic, just as Sebennytic is denominated from Sebennetus, and Canobic from Canobus. Amasis, however, is now assumed analogous to Solon. For he paid attention to wisdom and justice beyond all the {other Egyptian) kings. He is therefore conjoined with Solon, and has the same relation to him, which the city has to Athens ; in order that we may survey the cities and the men adomed by the Goddess [Minerva] as from one monad, and secondary natures always perfected from such as are more per-

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. L

. 82 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1.

Plat. Vou. I. L

. 82 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1.

fect. Callisthenes, however, and Phanodemus relate, that the Athenians were the fathers of the Saite. But Theopompus, on the contrary, says, that they were acolony of them. The Platonic Atticus says, that Theopompus altered the his- _ tory through envy. For, according to him, some of the inhabitants of Sais came to renew their alliance with the Athenians. But Plato only says thus much con- cerning them, “that the Suite were very friendly to the Athenians, and after a cer- tain manner allied to them.” \t is possible, however, that he might say this on account of the tutelar Goddess of the city being the same with the Minerva of the Athenians.

With respect, however, to this Goddess the guardian of the two cities, itis requisite to know, that proceeding from intelligible and intellectual causes through the supercelestial orders, to certain parts of the celestial regions and) terrene dis- tributions, she is allotted places adapted to herself; not imparting an adventitious government of herself, but antecedently comprebending the essence and form of it, and thus possessing this allotment in a manner adapted to herself, “Phat the government, however, of this Goddess extends supernally as far as to the last of things, the Greeks manifest by asserting that she was venerated from the head of Jupiter, But the Egyptians relate, that in the adytum of the Goddess there Was this inscription, Zam the things that are, that will be, and that have been. No one has ever laid open the garment by which Tam concealed. The fruit which I brought forth was the sun. Che Goddess, therefore, being demiurgic, and at the same time apparent and unapparent, has an allotinent in the heavens, and tllu- minates generation with forms. Lor of the signs of the sudiac, the ram ts ascribed to the Goddess, and the equinoctial circle itself, where especially a power motive of the universe is established. She is very properly, therefore, called by Plato a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war, and he now denominates her the leader of these allotments in the earth. In the tirst place, Iykewise, he honours the Goddess in the language of his country. For the Athenians dcnominate the tutelar Goddess of the city cIrchevetes, or the leader, celebrating her surname, and her presiding power. Jn the next place, he indicates the uniform: pre- established comprehension in herself, of the allotments which are governed by her. And besides this he clearly represents to us, that it is possible for the same

* The former part of this inscription is to be found in Plutarch’s treatise on Isis and Osiris; but the latter part of it, viz. the fruit which 1 brough! forth was the sun, is only to be found in these

Commentaries of Proclus. The original of this part is, ov eyw καρπὸν erexoy ἡλίὸς Eyevero.

βοοκ 1.) ᾿ TIMGEUS OF PLATO. 83

the fruit which 1 brough! forth was the sun, is only to be found in these

Commentaries of Proclus. The original of this part is, ov eyw καρπὸν erexoy ἡλίὸς Eyevero.

βοοκ 1.) ᾿ TIMGEUS OF PLATO. 83

things to be signitied through many words, since words are images of the things signified by them. For many statues may be formed of one thing froin different materials; so that the Ezyptians preserve the analogous,” because they call the Goddess by a name which has the same signification with that of the Greeks. Nor is it at all wonderful that both should denominate her rightly, in consequence of establishing the name according to one science. If, therefore, there is one tutelar Goddess of the two cities Sais and Athens, the inhabitants of Sais are very properly said to be lovers of the Athenians, as being ina certain respect allied to them: for the aflinity is not wholly perfect. For some may participate more and others less of the same providence. And some may participate of one, but others of another power contained in the Goddess. Jur again, it ts likewise necessary to hnow this, that a variation is produced in different nations from the places which they severally inhabit, from the temperature of the air, from habitude to the heavens, and sll more partially from spermatic productive powers, But you may say, that they especially differ according to the gregal government of the Gods, and the diversities of the tutelar powers, from which you will find a difference in colour, figure, voice, and motion, in different places. So that those who migrate into other countries

Srequently chanse, by dielling in those countries, their colour and voice; just as

plants are changed together with the quality of the region, when they are trans- planted ina foreign land,

* Tn this country Solon, on his arrival thither, was, as he himself relates, very honourably received. And on his inquiring about ancient affairs of those priests who possessed a knowledge of such particulars superior to others, he perceived that neither himself, nor any one of the Grecks (as he himself declared), had any knowledge of things of this

kind.”

Solon, on account of his political wisdom, and on account of the dignity and worth of his city, justly appeared to be deserving of honor to the priests of Sais. But he found, with respect to memory and history, among the Greeks, that neither himself, nor any other Grecian, had any knowledge of very ancient transactions. The remembrance, however, of such transactions, contributes indeed to political virtue, and also contributes to the theory of the mundane

* For &weovew ἀπολογον in this place, I read σωδσυσιν avadoyor.

84 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

The remembrance, however, of such transactions, contributes indeed to political virtue, and also contributes to the theory of the mundane

* For &weovew ἀπολογον in this place, I read σωδσυσιν avadoyor.

84 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

periods, which Solon being desirous to know, and interrogating for this purpose the priests, found that he was perfectly deficient in knowledge of this kind. These things, likewise, are symbols of divine concerns. For a certain fabrication or workmanship, is called by theologists recent. But this 15. particularly honoured [as being suspended): from the father of wholes, and from the intelligi- ble Gods, with whom there are intellectual perceptions exempt from other things, and which have more eternal natures for their objects. But those intellectual perceptions are more partial and less excellent, which are in secondary natures. And farther still, there is such a difference in demiurgic principles, that some of them are comprehensive of more total, but others of more partial forms. And some of them precede in dignity and power, but others are recent as with refe- rence to them, and possess a subordinate power.

“* Hence, when he once desired to excite them to the relation of pris- tine transactions, he for this purpose began to discourse about those most ancient events which formerly happened among us. 1 mean the tradi- tions concerning the first Phoroneus and Niobe ; and after the deluge, of Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with their posterity ; at the same time paying a proper attention to the diffe- rent ages in which these events are said to have taken place.”

Ofsuch a nature as this are all divine causes : for they call forth more divine powers, and through this evocation, are filled from them with more divine and total intellections ; such as is now also effected by Solon. For extending to the Egyptian priests the most ancient transactions of the Greeks, he ina certain respect leads them to the narration of their antiyuities ; of which the Egyptians participate in a remarkable degree, as they survey without impediment the celestial bodies, through the purity of the air, and preserve ancient memorials, in consequcnce of not being destroyed ether by water or fire. But the Assyrians, says Iamblichus, have not only preserved the memorials of seven and twenty myriads of years, as LHipparchus says they have, but likexcise of the whole apocatastases and periods of the seven rulers of the world, So that this being admitted, there is stll less reason to compare with these memorials the much-celebrated archwology of the Greeks > from which

" The words ws εξηρτημενὴ appear to me to be wanting in this place in the original.

ἢ Ἷ I Ϊ

KOUK 4.) TIMAUS OF PLATO. 85

likewise it is evident, that the present narration does not look to that which is small, but to the whole and the universe. :

ἢ Ἷ I Ϊ

KOUK 4.) TIMAUS OF PLATO. 85

likewise it is evident, that the present narration does not look to that which is small, but to the whole and the universe. :

Farther still, the archwology of the Greeks is different with different [Grecian cities}. For with the Athenians it proceeds as far as to Erichthonius, who was a native of Athens: but with the Argives, as far as to Phoroneus and Niobe. For these two are with the Greeks the most ancient. For Argos descended from Niobe; but from him Tasos and Pelasgos, from whom Argos was denominated Pelasgic. The particulars, however, respecting Denecalion and Pyrrha, that a deluge taking place, they were preserved in Parnassus, and how migrating from thence, they restored the human race, are manifest, and also that antiquity with the Thessalians is as far as to these. But according to some, the Argolie race begins from Inachus, but that of the Athenians from Cecrops, each of whom was prior to Deucalion. Solon, therefore, relating these and such-like particulars, causes the Egyptian priests to narrate their antiquities. We shall however see, what one of the ancient priests said respecting the narration of Solon. And these things, indeed, will be evident through what follows. Solon, however, met at Sais with a priest called Pateneit ; but at Heliopolis, witha priest called Ochlapi ; and at Sebennytus, with one whose name was Ethimon, as we learn from the histories of the Egyptians. And perhaps it was the priest of Sais, who says as follows to Solon :

“ But upon this, one of those more ancient priests exclaimed, O Solon, Solon, you Grecks are always children, nor is there an aged Greck among you.”

The Egyptian priest is ancient, in order that while he reproves he may not be intolerable, and may have a probable reason for teaching about archeology. But he employs a repetition of the name of Solon, not only as striving beyond measure in what he is about to say, but also for the purpose of indicating the circulation of things from the same to the same, which the more total causes of things cene- rated in the universe, comprehend stably and intellectually, through indelible knowledge ; to which causes the priest is analogous. IIe accuses, however, the Greeks as being always children, because they have not acquired the all-various wisdom of the Egyptians, but bear servile hairs in their soul. Juvenility, there-

fore, indicates their want of wisdom. © Or this privation of wisdom arises from

the frequent destructions of them, so that before they become truly ancient, they

80 PROCLUS ON THE [ΒοοΚ 1,

Juvenility, there-

fore, indicates their want of wisdom. © Or this privation of wisdom arises from

the frequent destructions of them, so that before they become truly ancient, they

80 PROCLUS ON THE [ΒοοΚ 1,

become again juvenile through destruction. Or it is because ancient deeds are not preserved by them ; but their knowledge ts always confined to present events, and such as sense apprehends. But with the Egyptians, past transactions are always present through memory, as if they were recent. And the remembrance is through history. But the history is fiom pillars, in which things paradoxical and worthy of admiration, whether in actions or inventions, are inscribed. Why, however, it may be said, does this priest accuse the Greeks with such sey erity ? For what is there admirable in his narration, since, asthe noble Heraclitus says, avery learned knowledge of past transactions does not produce intellect? But if that which Eudoxus says is true, that the Egyptians calla month a year, the enumeration of many of these vears, will not be attended with any thing won- derful. Tt was idle, therefore, in the Egyptian priest to think highly of himself for the knowledge of transactions in these. Or, though, as Aristotle Says, it ts IMposst- ble that memory and sense should be effective of science, yet at the same time it must be admitted, that they contribute to the reminiscence of wholes. Por by relating in many things many similar ciretinstances, we produce one form of them, and finding frequently from history concordant apocatastases of many things, we recur to the one cause of them. Por thus the observations of the aflections of the air were framed by Calippus, and the Knowledge from astrology of the celestial motions. And thus much inanswer to the doubt.

Again, however, let us recur to the theory of wholes, and there survey the junior Sobrication, held together by Minerva, and titled fiom more ancient and primoge- nial causes. For from: thence this fabrication possessing stability. proceeds,’ on account of an exempt cause, and contributes to the mundane contrariety. Por every thing in the demiureie progression which is distributed inte parts and mal- tiphied, proceeds on account of that principle, As, therefore, there are causes in the world, some of which are eflective of the regencration of things, bat others are guardians of the coherence of productive powers, the priest, indeed, must be assumed as analogous to these latter causes, but: Solon to the former, Tlence, the one exhibits a transcendent remembrance of antiquity, but the other is said to have related various mutations, eencrations, and corruptions. It hKewise appears to me, that the arrangement of the elder prior to the younger person, is assumed ina way adapted to the orderly distribution of the universe. For in the fabrica- tion of Jupiter, they have this order with reference to each other ; Just as the

It hKewise appears to me, that the arrangement of the elder prior to the younger person, is assumed ina way adapted to the orderly distribution of the universe. For in the fabrica- tion of Jupiter, they have this order with reference to each other ; Just as the

‘ ; : Tustead of Wpus τὸ ἐφζφηρημένον here, I read, καὶ TPOKLAL διὰ ro «ςηρημέενον αἰΤιο}.

ὑσιωυττε Ble ee σνεατασος στ

BOOK 1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 87

Klean guest {in Plato] says, that those who live in the Saturnian period, proceed from being older to being younger; but those that live in the period of Jupiter, proceed ina contrary direction, And _ in this dialogue, Timieus says, respecting the soul, that the Demiurgus produced it more ancient than the body, and on this account constituted it of amore principal nature. Now, therefore, the priest, who is the guardian of divine institutions, excels through antiquity, though that which is Junior proceeds from a higher order; just as Solon comes from a city, which per- tains ina greater degree to Minerva. In mundane works, however, that which is more ancient possesses a great dignity.

“To whom the priest :-—Because all your souls are juvenile ; neither containing any ancient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any discipline hoary from its existence in former periods of time.”

Sucenility of soul, in what is here said, is analogous to renovation of life, and to more partial causes; but remote tradition, to stable intelligence, and to more an- cient principles. And hoary discipline is analogous to the comprehension, which is united and always the same, of the nature and composition of all that the world contains; through which, indeed, the first and most divine of mundane natures comprehend totally and exemptly the causes of all generated beings, and eternal- ly and antecedently contain in themselves temporal natures ; but comprehend things more proximate to the universe partially and subordinately, as falling short of the unical intelligence of wholes. Hence to some of the Gods hoariness is adapted, but to others juvenility. For hoariness is a symbol of intelligence and an undefiled life, and which is remote from generation; but juvenility of more partial knowledge, and which now comes into contact with generated natures.

** But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of the human race, which formerly have been, and. again will be: the great-

est of these, indeed, arising from fire and water ; but the lesser from ten thousand other contingencies.”

In what is here said, an inquiry is made, why the Greeks are always children, but there is no discipline with them hoary from its existence in former periods of time? Or, if you wish to survey the paradigms of these things, the enquiry is,

88 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 1.

Or, if you wish to survey the paradigms of these things, the enquiry is,

88 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 1.

through what cause the junior fabrication presides over variety, generated natures always rising into existence, and such as are ancient becoming renovated? Be- fore, however, he discovers the cause of such-like doubts, he first discusses the periods in the universe, and pots out the variety ef them; of which the first principles of the Gods, indeed, have an antecedent Knowledge, stably and uni- tedly ; but the second principles partially, and in such a way as to come into contact with the nature of the things which they govern; for this it is always to know what is present. But to retain in the memory things that are absent, is analogous to the perception of wholes separately and stably. Phere are, there- fore, certain various periods of things in the world ; but it must be admitted, that there is always generation and always corruption in the universe. For that which is sensible is rising into existence, and tending to corruption, but never (rudy is. This generation, however, and destruction, must he surveyed im one way in the heavens, and in another in material natures. Por, in the former, a mutation of fizures, and the motion of perpetually generated: bodies, pre-exist. But) genera- tion, being governed through the mutations of these bodies, evolves its own circle, In this cirele, however, different Clements have dominion at different times, And wholes, indecd, always preserve the same and a similar order according to na- ture; but the different parts of these wholes subsist at different times, either con. formably to nature, or preternaturally, ina becoming manner, Por ὁ either the wholes and the parts always subsist according to nature; or both, on a certain time, have a preternatural subsistence; or the one has a preternatural, but the other a natural subsistence, and this ina twofold respect. If, therefore, all things [perpetually] existed according to nature, the variecy of generation would be dis- sipated, perpetual natures would be the extremities of beings, and the first es- sences would be the last of all things. But if all things were disposed preternatu- rally, there would be nothing stable; from which an invariable sameness of sub- sistence might be present with mutable natures; nor would the circle of genera- tion be preserved. And it is impossible that wholes should have a preternatural, but parts a natural, subsistence ; for parts follow wholes, and wholes are compre- hensive of parts. Hence it is impossible that the former should, at a certain time, exist preternaturally, but the latter remain in a condition conformable to nature. For neither is it possible, when the whole of our animal nature is moved, and its order destroyed, that any one of its parts should still exist according to nature.

* Tap is omitted here in the original,

arene ESD ANEURIN κα σκάρος ον «μα:

satan esr

For neither is it possible, when the whole of our animal nature is moved, and its order destroyed, that any one of its parts should still exist according to nature.

* Tap is omitted here in the original,

arene ESD ANEURIN κα σκάρος ον «μα:

satan esr

BOOK 1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 89

It remains, therefore, that wholes being established in a natural subsistence, the parts at one time following the wholes, are disposed conformably to nature, but at another time have a preternatural tendency. But as of partial animals, each is indeed always generated and corrupted, on account of the efflux of them in the universe; but one is more generated, and another is more corrupted than another, and one is more adapted to existence, but another to corruption; thus also the several parts of the earth, receiving both a natural and preternatural subsistence, some of the parts are more able to subsist conformably to nature, but others are more adapted to sustain deviations into a preternatural condition of being ; this, indeed, on account of a different temperament, but afterwards on account of the position being different of diferent parts, and in the next place, on account of ha- bitude to the heavens. For different parts of the earth are adapted to different parts of the heavens, though they are preserved by other figures [or configurations} And in addition to all that has been said, on account of the power of the inspec- tive Gods, and of the divinities who preside over climates, and who are allotted different peculiarities ; some rejcicing more in motion, but others in permanency, seme in sameness, but others in difference; abundant corruptions likewise of par- tial natures being produced in different places; the forms or species of the uni- verse have a never-failing subsistence. For man is always, the earth is always, and each of the clements always is. For since corruption and generation pro- ceed from the celestial figures; but these are imitations of divine intellections, and the intellections are suspended from intellectual forms, but from these stabi- lity is derived ;—this being the case, continuity is produced in mundane forms, and the visible figures are preservative of species, but corruptive of parts, so as to cause things which are generated in time, to be also dissolved in time, according to a circular progression. For the universe does not envy salvation to such things as are able to exist in conjunction with it; but that which is incapable of being administered together with the universe, is not able to abide in it. The law of Jupiter, however, expels ' from essence every thing of this kind as disgraceful, For it is perfectly impossible that what is disgraceful should remain in the uni- verse. But that whichis deprived of order in the universe is disgraceful. We have shown therefore why * abundant and partial corruptions are produced in different places of the earth,

We have shown therefore why * abundant and partial corruptions are produced in different places of the earth,

* For εἐμβαλλει here, it is necessary to read εκβαλλει. * For tore in this place, read δια τι.

Tim. Plat. Vouk 0. M

90 PR@CLUS ON THE [βοοκ 1.

In the next place it must be shown why the greatest of destructions are through the predominance of fire and water, and not through that of the other elements. Fire, therefore, has an efficacious and productive order in the elements, is sufficiently able to proceed through all other things, and is naturally adapted to divide them. But water, is indeed moved with greater facility than earth, yet is more difficultly passive than air. Aud by its facility of motion, indeed, it is able to operate ; but through being passive with difficulty, it is not affected by violence, nor becomes imbecile when dissipated, like air; so that it reasonably follows, that violent, and the greatest destructions are effected by deluges and conflagrations. You may also say, that the remaining two elements are more adapted to us. For we are pedestrious, and allied to earth; and as we are on all sides compre- hended by air, in which we live, and which we respire, itis evident that our bodies are of a kindred nature with it. [fence these elements, as being more alhed to, are less destructive of us; but the others, which are contrary to these, bring. with them more violent destructions. © Farther sull, according to another mode of survey also, these clements earth and air, together with suflering themselves, and sufleting prior to us, appear to operate on us. For air when it becomes putrid, produces pestilence ; and earth when divulsed, abundant absorptions, But) pes- tilence is a passion of air, and chasms and earthquakes are passions of earth, Fire, however, and water are able to operate on us, without being previously af fected themselves ; the former by permeating, but the latter by external impulsion, Hence they are capable of producing more extended destructions, as being more vigorous and powerful than the other elements, in consequence of not corrupting through being themselves distempered, Deluges, therefore, and contlagrations are the greatest destructions. But famine and pestilence, earthquakes and wars, and other such-like partial calamities, may be produced from other causes. And of all these, the effective cause indeed is the order of the universe, and prior to this, the junior fabrication, which always makes new effects, and at different times produces the generation of different things. For this is asserted by the fables of the Greeks, and is indicated by the tradition of the Egyptians, which mystically says of the sun, that he assumes different forms in the signs of the zodiac. Itis not, therefore, atall wonderfal, ifthough there are many destructions, and inanany places, yet man and every form always exist, through the tmmutable progression of divine forms. For through these, the productive principles in’ the universe possess an invariable

Itis not, therefore, atall wonderfal, ifthough there are many destructions, and inanany places, yet man and every form always exist, through the tmmutable progression of divine forms. For through these, the productive principles in’ the universe possess an invariable

* See this explained further on, in one of the notes on the 4th book;

BOOK 1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 91

sameness of subsistence, because every thing which is generated from an immove- able cause, is always suspended from its cause.

“ For the relation subsisting among you, that Phaeton the offspring of the Sun, on a certain time attempting to drive the chariot of his father, and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up the natures belonging to the earth, and perished himself blasted by thunder, is indeed said to have. the form of a fable.”

That the first principles of beings comprehend! indeed things which are moved, stably, things multiplied, unitedly, partial natures, totally, and such as are divided according to time, eternally, is evident. And it is likewise well known, that theologists refer the causes of periods, and of the psychical ascents and descents, and of all multiplied and divided life, to the principles that are proximately established above the world. Hence it appears to me, that what is now said, refers the mythology about Phaeton to the Greeks, and the knowledge of Solon, For all such-like corruptions and generations derive their completion from the junior fabrication, [or the fabrication of the junior, or mundane Gods,]} from which also the circulation of forms, and the variety of corporeal and psychical periods, is perfected. As, however, in divine natures, things secondary remaining, perfection is imparted to them from such as are first; thus also, the Egyptian pre- . serving what is related by the Greeks, teaches Solon from this concerning things of which he had a knowledge prior to Solon. What therefore does this narration obscurely signify ? That psychical lives, and the nature of bodies, have still multiform mutations. And over these, indeed, the supermundane powers preside; but they are connectedly comprehended by the intelligible orders of the Gods. And of the former, indeed, the apparent meaning of the narration being historically deli- vered by the Greeks, is a symbol; but of the latter, the priest investigating the real meaning of the history, and unfolding it into light, to Solon. And thus much has been said by us for the sake of the whole theory, and in order to show that the narration is not discordant with the things proposed to be discussed.

The fable respecting Phaeton, however, requires a manifold discussion. For in the first place, it is necessary to consider it historically; in the second place, physically; and in the third place, philosophically. Llistory therefore says, that

* For παρέχουσι here, it is necessary to read περιέχουσι.

92 PROCLUS ON THE {noox 1.

For in the first place, it is necessary to consider it historically; in the second place, physically; and in the third place, philosophically. Llistory therefore says, that

* For παρέχουσι here, it is necessary to read περιέχουσι.

92 PROCLUS ON THE {noox 1.

Phaeton was the offspring of the Sun, and of Clymene the daughter of Ocean, and that driving the chariot of his father, he deviated from the proper track. That Jupiter also fearing for the safety of the universe, destroyed him by thnnder; but he being blasted by thunder, fell about Eridanus, The fire likewise proceeding from him burnt every thing that was nourished by the earth: and his sisters, the Heliades, lamented his fall, And such is the historical account of the fable. Tt is, however, necessary to adinit thata conflagration took place; for the whole nar- ration is introduced for the sake of this; and, also, that the cause of it is neither an impossibility, nor a certain thing which may easily happen. But at will be im- possible if some one fancies that the Sunat one time drives his own chariot, and at another time being changed ceases to drive it, and) commits his proper em- ployment to another. And ait will be among the number of things which may be easily accomplished, if itis supposed that this Phacton wasa comet, which being dissolved produced an intolerable dryness trom: vehement heat. Por this sup. position is generally adopted. Porphyry therefore says, that certain signs may be assumed from the motion of comets. For when this motion ts towards the southern parts, it ts indicative of tempests, towards the north, of dryness from excessive heat, towards the east, of pestilence, and towards the west, of fertility. The dis- appearance likewise of the comet, is said τὸ be the destruction by thunder. If, however, it be requisite to dissolve the fable ina more physical way, it is better to adopt the explanation of our associate: Dommninus, that sometimes so great a quantity of dry exhalation is collected together, as to be easily enkindled by the solar heat. But this being enkindled, itis not at all wonderful, that it should burn all that part of the earth which is situated under it, and produce such a conflagration as that of which the fable speaks. In consequence, therefore, of the inflammation being produced by the San, the authors of fables were induced to call Phaeton the offspring of the Sun; denominating this offspring amale, on account of the efheacy of the power of fire, and because likewise it is usual to call fire a male, in the same manner as earth a female; and to deno- minate the one matter, but the other form. But because this exhalation did not proceed ina path parallel to that of the San, Mythologists assert, that Phaeton did not drive the chariot conformably to the track of his father. Phe dissolution of the cloud about the earth, was called by them, the fall! of Phaeton ; and the extinction of this cloud, the thundering of Jupiter, But the abundance of rain after the extinction of the cloud, (for this takes place after great conflagras tions) is the lamentation of the sisters, or the wet exhalations, inasmuch as

of Phaeton ; and the extinction of this cloud, the thundering of Jupiter, But the abundance of rain after the extinction of the cloud, (for this takes place after great conflagras tions) is the lamentation of the sisters, or the wet exhalations, inasmuch as

ΠΡ manana

BOOK 1.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. : 93

those that weep, pour forth moisture. And the exhalations, both the dry and the wet, have one cause, the Sun. But to the latter the female pertains, and to the former the male, These explanations, therefore, are more physical.

It is however possible, that the fable may indicate something more sublime; that partial souls proceed indeed from the father of wholes, but are disseminated about the mundane Gods, in order that they may not only be intellectual, come into contact with intelligibies, and recede from bodies, but also that they may have a mundane hypostasis. As, therefore, divine and demoniacal souls are arranged under secondary leaders ; some indeed under the divinity of the Earth, others under the Moon, and others under the Sun; some, under the government of Jupiter, but others under that of Mars; that which is disseminated being of divine origin, every where receives something from the nature of that in which it is sown: just as things sown in the earth, receive something from the earth; but those sown in an animal, receive something from the nature of the animal: so that of offspring, some express the peculiarity of places, but others the similitude of the mother, Tlence also, sonls that are disseminated about their kindred stars, receive a certain peculiarity of life, from their leaders; so that each is not only soul, but a soul of a certain kind, such for instance as Martial, or Jovian, or Lunar. For whether the God is of an immutable characteristic, or is demiurgic, or vivific, a certain representation of the peculiarity of the allotted deity accedes to' the souls that are arranged under it. And why is this wonderful, since the peculiarity of presiding Gods extends as far as to herbs and stones? And there is a stone, and also a herb suspended from the solar power, whether you are willing to call them heliotropes, or by any other name. A similar reasoning likewise must be extended to the other Gods,

And there is a stone, and also a herb suspended from the solar power, whether you are willing to call them heliotropes, or by any other name. A similar reasoning likewise must be extended to the other Gods,

Of these souls therefore, those indeed that are undefiled, remain always suspended from the Gods to whom they are allied, and govern the universe in conjunction with them. But others descend, yet are not filled with genesiurgic vice [or the depravity which is offspring of the realms of generation]. And others receive a certain defilement from the subjects of their government. Vor this is the last form of life. The first of these souls, therefore, are truly sons of the Gods, as not proceeding out of their fathers, being, as it were, fashioned by and remain- ing within them, running before the Gods, and having the order of guards or attendants. The souls that have the middle rank, are indeed called sons of the

* For νπὸ rus vrorerayperas αὐτῳ Yuxas, it is requisite to read ewe ras vworeraypesas, κ᾿ Xr.

PY PROCLUS ON 'THE [noox »

Gods, but receive also a secondary life, and become the sons of Gods and men. And souls of the third rank, are also sons of the Gods, but are not called genuine sons, as not preserving the form of their proper God, but verge to matter, and become oblivious of their genuine fathers. Whether, therefore, the authors of fables call Tityus the son of Earth, or Phaeton the offspring of the San, or Musiweus the son of the Moon, they thus denominate them after this manner, and others difttrently conformably to the before-mentioned causes. With respeet) to other sons of the Gods, however, we shall elsewhere speak,

With respeet) to other sons of the Gods, however, we shall elsewhere speak,

But again, Phaeton is indeed the offspring of the Sun, as being of the solar series. Ifence also he has a solar name. Since however, abiding on high, he revolved and governed the universe in conjunction with his father, he is said to have driven the chariot of his father. For the velncle of Phacton belongs to the solar chariots; since that also is entirely solar form. Bat when he fell into gene- ration, for he did not rank among the first of souls, he is suid τὸ have been de- struyed by the thunder of Jupiter. Por thander fi. e. lizhtning} is a symbol of fabrication, proceeding through all things without contact,’ and vivifying all things; but is not the cause of the dissolution of the spirit: in which the soul is) carried, But there are: many transpositions of souls into different polites, and from one clement into anothers; some being transferred from earth to the sphere of fire; but others from the sphere of fire to earth ; and some inorder; but others heaped tovether, and accompanied with mach tumult and disorderly motion, such as Phacton is said to have suffered. Mor being borne alone on high collectively, and attracting empyrean vestients, he was moved throneh these ina disorderly manner, When he proceeded to earth, and produced in certain parts of ita contla- eration. For souls in descending become invested with many garments acrial or aquatic; and some have empyrean vestments, ΟἹ these also, some have the vigorous,’ but others the vehement and the percussive, from: fire. And some indeed, when they become situated in air, lay aside these garments, and assume others that are more gross, but others preserve them even as far as to the earth. I know, therefore, that the Chwronean Platareh relates, that in one of the islands of Britain, which appears to be sacred, and on this account is considered by the rulers of it as an asylum, the inhabitants frequently assert, when prodigtuus rains or thunder and lightning take place, that some one of the more excellent natures

* Por avagws here, itis necessary to read avagys.

2 frstead of ἀμυδρὸν in this place, read axpatore

ποοκ 1. . TiIMAUS OF PLATO. 95

2 frstead of ἀμυδρὸν in this place, read axpatore

ποοκ 1. . TiIMAUS OF PLATO. 95

fails, they being accustomed to passions of this kind. But they denominate souls that are transferred into bodies, and that relinquish a certain generation, more excellent natures." Tt ust not, however, be denied that such-like circumstances befall souls descending into bodies, and especially those that ave magnilicent, and are allotted a more diemoniacal essence, such as the fable obscurely sicnities the soulof Phacton to have been, But it is not at all wonderful, that descending souls should be in a greater degree co-passive with those elements which are analogous to their presiding Gods, and should attract and become invested with a greater number of such-like elementary garments; so that Saturnian souls should ina greater degree rejoice in humid and aqueous vestments, and solar souls in such as are empyrean, each being desirous of obtaining a material and ponderous body, instead of immaterial garments; the Gods also employing these as organs, in the same manner as they use material demons, int heir productions about the earth. Through these souls likewise the Gods produce conflagrations, or pestilence, or intlict certain other calamities on those who deserve to suffer them, and employing souls that are allied to them as ministrant to the causes of the eflects that take place in the heavens, they accomplish that which they effect. Por it is nothing wonderful, that there should be many causes of the same things, some producing in one, and others in another way. Phaeton therefore, being borne along about the earth, and after a certain dwmoniacal manner, burning those places to which he approached, through the stream of fire (for partial souls effect many things out of the body, being then the instruments of avenging or punfying demons); he was lamented by the Heliades, who were certain solar souls, whence also they were said to be the sisters of Phaeton. But they lamented him, not as alone commiserating him on account of his descent into generation, but providentially inspecting him, in order that they might in an undefiled manner pay attention to things which are generated and corrupted. For the river Eridanus, and the falling into it, indicate the lapse of the soul into the river of generation; in which being situated, she requires the providential care of the genera allied to herself, and the aid of souls that are in a permanent condition. Theologists also signify the exten- sion of the solar providence to mortal natures through tears.

The much-enduring race of men thy tears - Excite.

* Plutarch relates this, in his treatise On the Failure of the Oracles.

96 PROCLUS ON THE [noox 1.

Theologists also signify the exten- sion of the solar providence to mortal natures through tears.

The much-enduring race of men thy tears - Excite.

* Plutarch relates this, in his treatise On the Failure of the Oracles.

96 PROCLUS ON THE [noox 1.

So that the fable very properly manifests through tears, in a symbolical manner, the providential attention to Phacton of souls that are of the solar order. Again, therefore, this corollary may be assumed from the fable, that the descents of souls are effected through impotency. And that not only souls, but likewise their vehicles participate of the peculiarity of their leading Gods ; so that from these divinities, some of them are denominated Solar, others Martial, and others receive an appellation from some other God. It may also be inferred that destructions are effected by the providence of the Gods. For Jupiter was the cause of the conflagration, by hurling the thunder at Phaeton, And lkewise, that the descents of souls are suspended from the one fabrication of things. ° Ilence Timieus teaches us not only about the essence, but also about the ascents

and descents, the lives and all-various elections of souls.

“ But the truth is, that it indicates the mutation of the bodies τὸ volving in the heavens about the carth ; and signifies that through long periods of time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensucs from the devastations of fire.”

The Egyptian priest only unfolds thus much of the fable that contnbutes to the proposed discussion, that abundant destructions ΟΥ̓ terrestrial natures are produced through fire, in consequence of the mutation of the bodies that revolve in the heavens about the earth. But through mutation he signifies either the incommensuration of things in the earth to celestial natures: for all things while they subsist commensurately to the celestial efuxions, are able to remain, but when they are incommensurate to them, are corrupted. For things which are able to sustain the dividing power of Mars, are preserved; but such as are too imbecile to endure his effective energy, are easily dissolved; just as ΠῚ your eye not being able to endure the solar light, should be blinded by its effulgence, though some other eve may be capable of looking directly to it) without pain. And ἃ similar reasoning must be adopted with respect to the other Gods and their configurations, For the universe is one animal, and its parts sympathizing with each other, it preserves different things by different parts; nor is any thing which is generated in it preternatural to the whole. For the natures which are generated in it, are generated through it; and it is the world itself which operates, and operates on itself. Or it may be said that this mutation is just as if a good father, who is always benevolently disposed towards his son, should on a time

BOOK 1.) TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 97

Or it may be said that this mutation is just as if a good father, who is always benevolently disposed towards his son, should on a time

BOOK 1.) TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 97

chastise him for the sake of his good; for in so doing he will appear to have | changed his accustomed mode of treatment. Or this mutation may he the Various configuration of the celestial bodies. For these are the bodies that revolve in the heavens about the earth, and at different times exlubit different figures, through the various intellectual perceptions of their informing souls. For the conficurations are the letters of these souls, and certain efficacious impressions produced through them. Again, however, both these are true. For the mutation of these bodies, and the incommensuration of earthly natures, are the leading causes of such-like destructions. But if it is necessary to call the fall of Phaeton from the heavens to the earth, a certain mutation of some one of the bodies that revolve in the heavens, it is not atall wonderful. For the mutation of the celestial Gods is one thing, since this is an impassive transfiguration; but another, that of the souls that revolve together with them, this being a habitude to terrestrial natures, from a life without habitude: and that of places about the earth, is different from either of the former, since it is a certain corruptive mutation; according to which neither souls are changed, nor much less the Gods, the leaders of souls. Such-like cor- ruptions, therefore, of terrestrial natures are eflected through partial souls; but are also eflected through dwmons alone. And as through these, destructions adapted to their scries are produced, the like also takes place through souls. For the souls that when on high are delighted to illuminate immaterially, betake themselves to sublunary conflagrations.

Why, however, do copious destructions of the human race happen through long periods of time; is it because a concurrence of many things is necessary in order that such a destruction may take place? For it is requisite that there should be both the peculiar and common habit of the things that suffer, and a conspiration of the agents. For what if that which is corruptive of one thing, should be preservative of another? Itis also necessary that there should be an apti- tude of matter, and a preparation of instruments and times. For these also take place in partial destructions, but more rarely in such as are common; and this rea- sonably. ΕΓ is necessary that the progression from an incorruptible nature to one that is easily corruptible, should be through things which are corrupted with difficulty. If, therefore, wholes are always incorruptible, but more partial natures are easily corrupted, the media between these may be very properly arranged among things which are corrupted with difliculty, and which become destroyed in long periods of times For wholes which remain during the

Tim. Plat. Vou. I, N

Plat. Vou. I, N

98 PROCLUS ON THE {woox 1,

mundane period, are incorruptible and indestructible. For no configuration of the stars is destructive of them, since all things are evolved in the whole period of the universe. But partial natures and individuals receive an easy dissolution. Copious destructions, however, of partial natures are eflected through long periods of time; but such natures are nevertheless dissolved. For there is a life of a certain genus, as there is of one man, and of a city, and a nation. And as Aristotle says, there are periods of these, of some, more, but of others, less extended.

“ Hence those who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers or the sea.”

This is likely to happen in the visible destructions through fire: for those who dwell near water, are defended from the devastation of fire. The phi- Josopher Porphyry, however, transfers what is here said, from the phanomena to souls; and says, that in these the irascible part is at one time effervescent, and this inflammation is the destruction of the man within us. Thus Homer represents the eyes of Agamemnon when he was enraged with Achilles, as “ shining like fire.” But at another time, the epithymetic part, being deluged by genesiurgic moisture, is enervated, and merged in the streams of matter. For, as Heraclitus says, “ another death of intellectual souls ts occasioned by moisture.” But if these things are rightly asserted, those will be inexperienced in the pertur- bations arising from anger, who have the irascible part in a relaxed condition, and commensurate to a proper attention to secondary concerns. For this is signified ly hollow places, and such as are near to water, But those are inexperienced in the perturbations of desire, who have the epithymetic part in a more strenuous condi- tion, and excited from the somnolency of matter. For this ts indicated by lofty places. For in a certain respect, the irascible part is adapted to be easily moved, and to be etlicacious; but desire is languid and imbecile. A musician, therefore, will be requisite, in order to relax the strenuous nature of anger, and give inten- tion to the inertness of desire. The philosopher Jamblichus, however, thinks fit to survey these things physically, and not ethically. Ile says, therefore, that when a conflagration takes place, those perish more abundantly that dwell on lofty mountains, as being more remote from the exhalations arising from water ; for these exhalations are not much elevated on account of the weight of the moist substance.

est NATE TERA IASI IIIT

BOOK 1.]} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 99

Hence the air that surrounds them is not wet but dry, and becomes fuel to fire, which naturally tends upward. But the contrary takes place in deluges. For those that dwell in hollow situations, are more abundantly destroyed, since all heavy substances naturally tend downward.

99

Hence the air that surrounds them is not wet but dry, and becomes fuel to fire, which naturally tends upward. But the contrary takes place in deluges. For those that dwell in hollow situations, are more abundantly destroyed, since all heavy substances naturally tend downward.

“To us, indeed, the Nile is a saviour in other respects, and also be- cause it liberates us from this destruction.”

According to the apparent signification of what is here said, the Nile is the cause to the Egyptians of many and all-various goods, viz. of geometry, of the generation of fruits, and likewise of avoiding conflagrations. Its water also preserves their bodies, and the divinity that connectedly contains this body, clevates their souls. But from these things you may assume, that first causes, being full of life and prolitic power, connect themselves, and remain eternally, and also think fit to impart connexion from themselves to other things, which are in a flowing and dissipated condition; so thatthe name of saviour, adumbrates divine and exempt providence; from which also the light that is in the intelligible’ Gods, illuminates all the intellectual and demiurgic causes.

“ἢ But when the Gods, purifying the earth by water, deluge its surface, then the herdsmen and shepherds inhabiting the mountains are preserved, while those that dwell in your cities are hurried away to the sea, by the Hypetuous inundation of the rivers.”

In what is here said, the efficient cause is clearly ascribed to the Gods. And this also may be asserted of contlagrations. For purification is at one time effected through water, and at another through fire. But every where purification to secondary is from piimary natures. Hence likewise in Orpheus, Jupiter is ex- horted to bring purifications from Crete. For it is usual with theologists to ar- range Crete for the intelligible. But the material cause of purification is here ascribed to the incursion of water. For each of these {t. e. fire and water] produces without deliberation and involuntarily, being borne along according to its own natural tendency. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be a pre-existent cause which employs them to beneficial purposes, and operates for

* The words νοητοῖς φως are wanting in the original.

100 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ |.

the sake of good; which cause is beautifully ascribed to the Gods. But if there are certain purifications in wholes, there are also powers that preside over these purifications, operating as purifiers on wholes priorto partial natures. There are likewise divine mysteries, some powers initiating, and others being initiated ; nor will these ever desert the universe. The Egyptian priest likewise knowing this to be the case, calls the destructions through water and fire by a sacerdotal name, purifications, but not corruptions, as he would have done if he alone phy- siologized.

The Egyptian priest likewise knowing this to be the case, calls the destructions through water and fire by a sacerdotal name, purifications, but not corruptions, as he would have done if he alone phy- siologized.

“On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time, did the water descending from on high pour with desolation on the plains ; but, the whole of it is capable of returning from the bosom of the earth. And hence, and through these causes, the traditions which are preserved here, are said to be most ancient.”

Though rain may sometimes happen in Egypt, yet it does not happen in the whole of it, but usually takes place about the lower parts. This, however, says Aristotle, is evidently the work of the river. But the upper parts do not receive an afflux of this kind. Whence, therefore, does the Nile return?) Porphyry indeed says, it was an ancient opinion of the Egyptians, that the water issued upward from beneath, by the ascent of the Nile; on which account also they called the Nile, the waterer of the earth; and that it returned from beneath; manifesting by this, that what is dissolved in Egypt preserves the Nile. Not that the snow being dissolved produces the quantity of its water; but that it is loosened from its own fountains, and proceeds so as to become visible, being prior to this impeded and detained. We however understand the term dissolved, with reference to doubt : for speaking Attically, the Nile is dissolved, because it liberates us from doubt. For it is not true that from snow being dissolved the Nile is increased. for where in southern places, such as those through which the Nile flows, is there «1 collection of snow?) = Nor does this river emerze from rarefied earth. Tor the rarity of the earth, does not give to the water a motion upward, — But itis entirely necessary that there should be something else, which impels it from cavities to lofty places. And thus much with respect to the Exyptian opinion,

Others, however, say, that the Nile is increased from certain rains that are poured into it, as is clearly asserted by Eratosthenes. Hence to return does not now sig- nify tu spring from beneath, but for the water, being elsewhere increased, to

μοοκ 1. TIMEUS OF PLATO. 101

Hence to return does not now sig- nify tu spring from beneath, but for the water, being elsewhere increased, to

μοοκ 1. TIMEUS OF PLATO. 101

proceed above the earth ; streams of water being poured into the Nile from other places. But Tamblichus says, it is not requisite to investigate a thing of this kind, but to understand in a more simple way the return of the water from beneath, as equivalent to what is usually called the ascent of water; and he assigns a two-fold cause, through which the Egyptians avoid dryness, from excessive heat, and deluges. And this is manifest from what he says when examining the increase from rains. For he says, that the first cause of the salvation of the Ezyptians, is the will of their presiding Gods, and the boundary from the first of fabrication. But the second cause is the temperature of the air. For the seasons there are con- trary to those in the antarctic " regions, from which the Nile flows to these places ; and in them the generation of dryness from violent heat, and of great rains, reci- procates. If, however, some one should blame this explanation, because the rains being increased the increase is not regular, it must be said, that rain frequently happens when there is no descent for disappearance} of the Nile. At the same tine, the uninterrupted succession of rain, and the magnitude of the mountains in which the fountains of the Nile are contained, are the causes of the unceasing increase ofthe water. For these mountains, receiving in all their sides the rain impelled against them from the annual clouds, pour it incessantly into the foun- tains of the Nile. But these fountains becoming exuberant increase the river. For this, says Theophrastus, is one cause of rain, viz. the pressure of clouds against a mountain. Moreover, it ix not at all wonderful, if clouds are not seen about the cataracts. Lor the stream of the Nile is not first poured from these, but from the Lunar mountains, which are thus denominated from their altitude. And the clouds when present being collected about the mountains, impede the cataracts by their superior magnitude. And thus much against the Egyptian oration of Anistides,

Eratosthenes, however, says, it is no longer requisite to investigate the cause of the increase of the Nile, when we direct our attention to certain waters and rains that run into it, so as to corroborate what is said by Aristotle. These things, there- fore, we have concisely indicated on this subject. But from these particulars the Egyptians infer, that their land will never experience either a deluge or a confla- gration. That it should however fail from other causes, is not at all wonderful ; since, as Aristotle rightly observes, every part of the earth becomes sea in the infinity of time, and the same place is at one time continent, and at another, sea.

* For avricoss here, it is necessary to read avraperecoss. |

102 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1.

* For avricoss here, it is necessary to read avraperecoss. |

102 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1.

And looking to the infinity of time, it must not be denied that the water of the Nile may fail. For what if the annual winds, blowing less vehemently, should not impel the clouds against the mountains ? What also, if the mountains should fall, in which there is a collection of clouds; the wind from subterranean places burst- ing them, through which, likewise, the oracles say, that succeeding cittes shall be de- stroyed? And the clouds not being collected, the stream always becoming less and less, will be absorbed by the earth which is dry.

“ But the truth is, thatan all places, where neither intense cold nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous.”

The pricst has spoken concerning the mundane periods, aad the different mutations fin them], and has observed that the safety of the Egyptians is derived from the position of the region, and the providence of the Nile. Now, therefore, he infers in common respecting places of the earth, that every place which is tree from deluges and contlagrations, has always the race of wen remaining, more or less numerous. For the greatest destructions are through fire and water, as was before asserted. Some one, however, may say, that the race of men failina different way. For at present there are none who inhabit these very places of the Attic land [which were formerly so populous), though neither a deluge nor a conflegration has happened, but acertain dire impiety, which has entirely obliterated the race of men." Or it may be said that Plato now calls climates, places. He says, therefore, that every climate has men, though there should not have been a deluge or a contla- gration, atone time more, and at another less numerous. Some however will also be saved ina deluge, as Deucalion, who was preserved, when the climate of Greece was deluged. After this manner, therefore, some unfold the meaning of the passage.

But according to our associate (Domninus), Plito means, that every place his always a greater or less number of men, whichis not excessively cold, or immo- derately dry through heat. Por mathematicians say, Chat there are certain places Which are uninhabitable through excess of heat or cold, Every place, therefore, which is adapted to the habitation of men, and every climate, has a greater or Jess number of men, And this interpretation is reasonable, and conformable to

‘ oo. . . . . Tu my copy of the original of these Commentaries, a certain annotator observes in the margin, that * Proclus alludes, in what he here says, to the Christian religion,”

> ee NEN STI ΝῊ

nook 1 TIMEUS OF PLATO. 103

. . . . Tu my copy of the original of these Commentaries, a certain annotator observes in the margin, that * Proclus alludes, in what he here says, to the Christian religion,”

> ee NEN STI ΝῊ

nook 1 TIMEUS OF PLATO. 103

the words of the text. For the words, “where neither intense cold, nor immo- derate heat prevails,” appear to signify, where nether of the contrarics being exces- sive, impedes habitation, And, in short, since Plato had before observed, that the transactions of the Egyptians were said to be most ancient, he very properly adds, that in reality, every climate which is commensurate to the habitation of men, has always men more or less numerous. For not only mathematicians assert that not every climate of the earth has men, but Orpheus also, who says:

The Demiurgus for th’ abode of men, A seat apart from the immortals gave, Where turns the Sun's mid axis stretching wide ;

Between excessive cold and heat a mean.

And this likewise Plato now asserts, when he says, “where neither intense cold, nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men iy always preserved, though it is some- dimes more, and at other times less numerous.” With other nations, however, there is an oblivion of ancient transactions, not through the failure of men, but in con- sequence of frequent destructions taking place, certain illiterate and rustic persons alone remain. But with us [says the priest] many most ancient transactions are said to be preserved, in consequence of every thing being committed to writing in our temples.

* But Vhatever has been transacted either by us, or by you, or in any other place, beautiful or great, or containing any thing uncommon, of which we have heard the report,—every thing of this kind is to be found described in our temples, and preserved to the present day.”

As the situation of the country and its guardian Goddess impart safety to the Egyptians, thus also the preservation of past transactions is effected by their own eare and attention, through which they apply a remedy to the oblivion produced by time. But they are assisted in this by their temples, in which ali great and won- derful actions are recorded, both of their own people and of others, and also para- doxical events of things. For this is the meaning of the words, “or containing any thing uncommon.” The history, however, of these things contributes to their know- ledge of similar events; from which the reminiscence of wholes is produced, and also to the knowledge of futurity. For through observations of this kind, they dis- cover the effective powers of the ¢clestial configurations. For assuming that certain

104 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK τ.

For through observations of this kind, they dis- cover the effective powers of the ¢clestial configurations. For assuming that certain

104 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK τ.

things happen from certain things existing, they are able syllogistically to collect, from the same signs, the causes of future events. It appears also to me, that the doctrine of the Pythagoreans which prepares souls to remember their former lives, imitates such a history as this of the Egyptians. For as itis fit to assume different lives of one man, or rather of one soul, thus also different periods must be assumed of one nation. Hence, as in the one, the recollections of the transac- tions of a furmer life are perfective of souls, so in the other, the histories of former periods afford the greatest assistance to the acquisition of wisdom. Farther still, such observations are assimilated to the orderly distribution of the universe. Por they imitate the stable productive powers of nature, through which remaining lin- inoveable, order is ingenerated in things that are mutable. If, therefore, the world is a most sacred temple, in which the productive powers that connect the universe Ὁ eternally remain, the recording of ancient deeds in temples will be an Image οἵ the subsistence of these powers. And what is asserted by the Egyptians may δι σαν, that whatever in sensibles is stable, of a firtn consistence, and always sub- sisting after the same manner, proceeds from the intelligible Gods ; but that what- ever is moved, and at different times is generated and corrupted ina different mannez, is derived from the junior fabrication, For the sacerdotal genus by which mention is made of ancient transactions, conveys an image of the divine order, which is connective of wholes and of stability, and which guards all things by divine memory, and from which the junior fabrication being filled, imparts by illumination to things of a very mutable nature, sameness, Connexion, and per- manency.

“ While on the contrary, you and other nations, commit only recent transactions to writing, and to other contrivances which cities have em- ployed for transmitting information to posterity.”

Contrivance is a symbol of the cause which always fabricates new things, pro- duces things which are not yet in existence, and co-adapts all things to the one perfection of the world. For in our domestic concerns, we call the preparation . of every thing necessary, contrivance. And such also in cities, are literature and arts, forums and baths, and the like. But in the universe, coutrivances are such things as receive a temporal and partial composition. As, therefore, temples sig- nify the receptacles of perpetual productive powers, and also of such as are of a connective and guardian nature ; thus likewise cities manifest hypostases convist-

nook 1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 105

As, therefore, temples sig- nify the receptacles of perpetual productive powers, and also of such as are of a connective and guardian nature ; thus likewise cities manifest hypostases convist-

nook 1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 105

ing of many, dissimilar, and mortal powers. But recent transactions only being committed to writing, evinces that the existence of such writings and arts, is of a more recent nature, ᾿

“And so again in accustomed years,a celestial efluxion rushes on them like a disease.”

This also is evidentin men. For deluges destroy their race, being excited indeed from the celestial periods, but having water for their matter, Tlence the whole of this is called a celestial edlusxion, and, as it were, a disease, because it is corrup- tive of other things. ‘That, however, which is corruptive, is indeed to a partial nature evil, but to the whole of things good. But Plato says, “in accustomed ycars,” because such like destructions are accomplished conformably to certain circula- tions, Which also have themselves a certain consecutive order with reference to. the whole period of a divinely generated [or perpetually circulating] nature. This also seems to be manifested through these particulars, that such things as are alone generated from wholes are necessarily consummated according to mundane petiods, which are detined by the same number; but that such things as happen from certain partial causes, will not entirely happen to be the same, though the configurations of the period are the same. In the universe, however, you may survey the same thing, by understanding that all generated natures are corrupted, and yield to the mundane periods, and to the circulations of the whole life [of the world, and that the periods are conjoined to each other, and accomplish one continued lite.

Tenee those among you who survive, are illiterate and unacquainted with the Muses. And thus it happens that you become juvenile again, and ignorant of the transactions of ancient times, as well of those among us, as of those in the regions which you inhabit.”

- For from a deluge, Plato says, that herdsmen and shepherds are left, but that the inhabitants of cities are destroyed. Hence those that remain are illiterate and without the Muses, And on account of the former, indecd, they are unable through writing to transmit: memorials of the pre-existent period 5 but on account of the latter, they are not sufliciently capable of preserving in verse or melody the events that happened prior to the deluge, Lence they become oblivious of all

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. . O

106 PROCLUS ON ΗΒ. [Book τ.

Plat. Vou. I. . O

106 PROCLUS ON ΗΒ. [Book τ.

things. But through oblivion they return to the life of children, For an ignorant old man, says Aristotle, does not at all differ from a child in understanding. A thing of this kind, however, happens to souls that have recently descended into generation. For having exchanged for the former period, which was intellectual, " ἃ certain, secondary and genesiurgic condition of being, they become oblivious of intelligibles, through the deluge arising from matter, Such representations also of intelligibles, as they once had from the vision of them they lose in the progres- sions of time. Thus, therefore, every thing in the world returns to juvenility from juvenility through regeneration being borne along differently at diflerent: times, in consequence of the form of it naturally subsisting in motion. Moreover, the assertion that mutations taking place, those that remain, are illiterate and unac- quainted with the Muses, Indicates to those who consider it physically, that) the analysis of bodies takes place as far as to that which is formless and without morphe; and also that in this mutation, the destruction of the elements happens, wich is manifested through the word με αἰ, and the dissolution of harmony, which again the Gods who are the inspective guardians of renovation, easily

remedy, and restore co a condition according to nature,

“The transactions therefore, OG Solon, which you relate from your antiquities, ditier very little from puerile fables.”

The Egyptian priest compares the venerable and very ancient narrations of Solon to the fables of children, Por the fables of the wise are about things ofan cternal nature; but those of children about temporal things and which are of small consequence. And the former, indeed, contain intellectual concealed truth; but the latter, truth of a grovelling nature, end which indicates nothing elevated. To the latter fables therefore, the histories of Solon are analogous ; but to the former, the histories of the Eeyvptians. Por the one look to that which is small, but the other have a most extended survey, And the one are only histories, but the other coutribute to science. Prom these things, therefore, the paradigms also of them are to be surveyed. Phe effects, indeed, of the junior fabrication, are called the sports of the Gods, and resemble fables. | For they are the imaves of beings, and participate of forms in an ultimate degree. But the things which primarily derive their subsistence from intelligibles, are intellectual,

eternal, and stable, aad have the essence of themselves concealed,

* Por seapas here, it is necessary to read soepus.

ὄπα

BOOK 11] ΤΙΣ 5 OF PLATO. 107

“Tor, in the first place, you only mention one deluge of the earth, though in former times there have been many.”

ὄπα

BOOK 11] ΤΙΣ 5 OF PLATO. 107

“Tor, in the first place, you only mention one deluge of the earth, though in former times there have been many.”

Por the deluge of Deucalion is much celebrated by the Greeks, though as the Egyptian says, there were many others prior to it. Thus also in wholes, the junior fabrication gives completion to wholes partially, and multitudinously, and renders that which is present in a good condition through regeneration. But in intelligibles, the causes of the first subsistence and of the circulation of forms, are antecedently comprehended unically Cor according to the nature of the one].

“ And,in the next place, you are ignorant of a most beautiful and excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country ; from whence you and the whole of your city descended, though a small seed only of this adimirable people once remained. But your ignorance in this atfair is owing to the posterity of this people, who for many ages were destitute of literature, and became as it were dumb.”

The Egyptian wishes to conjoin the second to the former period, and to show that there is one connexion and life of the first Athenians, and of those that now exist, through a small seed, as he says, remaining. For thus also in’ the world the seeds of a former period conjoin that which succeeds it to its principles, throuch the essence of causes, the unceasing motion of the universe, and as some one says, its immutable inutation. We must not, however, wonder if the priest now indeed says, that Solon is the offspring of those excellent men. For we must again direct our attention to the cause of all mundane contrariety. For Solon, so far as he is an animal, possesses from them the genus; but 50 far as he is ἃ partial intellect, receiving the narration of a war, he is analogous to the divi- nity, who transports the productive principle of mundane contrariety, supernally from intelligibles to the sensible region. — Nor is it proper to be disturbed by such like objections, but to know the nature of analogies ; and that the same things through analogy, become first, middle, and last.

“ or prior to that greatest destruction by water, there was a most excellent city of Athenians, which surpassed all others in war, and was in every respect governed by the most equitable laws, and whose deeds and polities are said to have becn the most beautitul of all that we have receiv- ed the knowledge of by the hearing, under the heavens.”

108 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

Plato does not perhaps mean by the greatest destruction, the deluge of Deuca- lion, but some one of the deluges prior to it. But he calls the city of the Athenians most warlike, and governed by the most equitable laws, as being an imitation of its guardian Goddess, whom he afterwards says, is both philosophic and philopolemic. For the Athenians partake of the warlike from the philopolemic, and of equitable legislation from the philosophic. By the most beautiful deeds he means the victory over the Atlanties. But by the most beautiful polities he does not intend to signify that they changed many of them, but he thus speaks, because one polity may be called the number of many polities ; just as one world is connective of many worlds. Por if the lite ofeach maividual is a certain polity, but the common life is the communion of many partial lives, the one polity will consist of many polities, the beauty of it depending on its union, Tle also adds, the most beautiful of all that we lnovw under the heavens, Weeause itis the first inita- tion of the polity of the world; so that you may say, itis the best of those under the heavens; for the paradigm of it is inthe heavens. And thus much forpar- ticulars,

Again, however, we should remind ourselves respecting the whole deed of the Athenians, that it is neither called a fable, nor a mere history ; some indeed receiving What is narrated as a history, but others, as a fable. And some assert- ing, that, in the first place, the developement of these, and such dike narrations, appeared τὸ Plato himself tobe the province of a certain laborious and not very fortunate man;' and in the second place, that what is delivered by Plato is not a thing of such an enigmatical mature, as the doctrine of Phereeydes, but that he teaches with perspicuity concerning most of his dogmas, Neither, therefore, say they, should we force him to analyse, since the man proposes to instructus without ambiguity. Phey also add, in the third place, that neither is a developement in the present: instance necessary. Per the cause of the insertion of this narration is known to be the deleht and allurement of the reader. And in the fourth place, that fwe analyse all things, we shall safler the same as those who ina slippery mannerare conversant with) Tomer, Others again think that the developement of this history should be referred to physical harmony, from what Plato savs of the narration about Phaeton, thatat has mdeed the form of a fable, bat: that at} manifests a certain matural event; saice the

Ug yptians also, who, as Plato says, were the fathers of this relation, obscurely signified the arcana of nature through fable. So that the developement of this narration

* Plato says this in the Phwdrus of the man who does uot adapt the eapliations of fables to divine

concerns, but interprets them plysically,

nooKx 1} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 109

So that the developement of this narration

* Plato says this in the Phwdrus of the man who does uot adapt the eapliations of fables to divine

concerns, but interprets them plysically,

nooKx 1} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 109

will be adapted to him, who speaks in the person of the Egyptians. For as Timwus himself, contormably to the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, makes his discussion from numbers and figures, as interpreting nature throuch images ; thus, also, the Egyptian priest will teach the trath of things through symbols adapted to himself. Po which may be added, that Plato himself elsewhere accuses those who speak every thing from what is at hand, in order, says he, that they may render their wisdom manifest, even to shoemakers. So that he who delivers true assertions through enigmas, is not foreign from the mind of Plato. And such are the arguments of each.

We however, say, that all these particulars are a history, and also an indication of the mundane contrariety, and the whole order of things; the history, indeed, narrating the past transactions of men, but symbolically comprehending in itself those things which are comprehended in the universe, and the mundane contra- riety. For the progression according to opposition, commencing from the first intelligibles, divides the world by powers that are eppositely arranged. And if you are willing, we will divide the universe according to the divine orders, which are In uninterrupted succession, and survey, conformably to the Pythagoreans, the co-ordinations that it contains. From the two principles, therefore, it is divided into bound and infinity, or rather into things allied to bound and_ the infinite. Tor of things that are mixed, some pertain to the former, but others to the latter principle. But from that which is unfolded into light as the third after these principles, the universe is divided into the united and the multiplied." For there multitude first subsists unitedly. From the triad that is next to this, it is divided into things perpetual, and things corruptible.? For the measure of existence to all things is derived from thence, From the third triad it is divided into the male and female:! for in this each of these primarily subsists: But from the first triad of the next order, itis divided according to the even and the odd; for number characterized by unity — there.4 From the second triad, it is divided into the partial and the total.’ And from the third,’ into the straight and the cireular. Again, of the intellectual triads, it is divided, according to the first, into things that are

This third thing, after the two principles bound and infinity, is being ilself. > This triad constitutes intelligible life, or eternity itself,

ω

This triad forms intelligible intellect, or [avro2wor] animal itself. This tnad is the summit of the order which is called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual.

>

> This triad constitutes intelligible life, or eternity itself,

ω

This triad forms intelligible intellect, or [avro2wor] animal itself. This tnad is the summit of the order which is called intelligible, and at the same time intellectual.

>

> The second triad of the above order is denominated [Jeaven, by Plato in the Phadrus.

® Aud the third triad of this order, is called by Plato in the Phadrus, the eub-celestial arch.

110 PROCLUS ON THE [nook τ.

in themselves, and things that are in others. According to the second, into things animated and things inanimate, into things stable and things which are moved. But according to the third, into things that are the same and things

* indeed, it as divided into

that are diflerent.'” And from the order of Rulers, things which rejoice in similitude, and things allied to dissimilitude., But) from the liberated? order, it receives a division into the separate and the inseparable. These things, therefore, which have an arrangement elsewhere, have now also been as it were explored by us. For according to each division, the goodness of better natures, desiring to fill things subordinate, and to take away depravity, produces war, But the desire of less excellent matures, τὸ. divalse a certain portion of beings, of amore excellent condition, excites the apparent opposition of things; since in war, also, those that contend against each other, wish to reduce into their own power the property of their opponents, and entirely destroy them, These things, therefore, are evident,

We may, however, understand the opposition of powers in the universe, by making a division after the following manner, into the adorming and adorned, And, in the first place, indeed, into things super-essential amd essences. Por the venus of the Gods is super-essential, Tn the next place, by divide essences ito eternal lives, and those which energize according to time. Likewise, those which energize according to time, ito souls and bodies. And bodies, into such as are celestial, and such as subsistin generation, These, likewise, we must divide into wholes and parts. For the division extends as far as to these extremes, And, again, we must divide super-essential natures into the divine pecatiaritics, such as the male and the female, the odd and the even, that which unites, and that whieh separates, the stable and the motive. Bat eternal natures must be divided into total and) partial essences. And such as are total, into the divine and angelic. Souls are to be divided into the divine, and the attendants on the divine. And divine souls, into the celestial, and those that pay a providential attentton to weneration, Souls, likewise, that follow the Gods, must be divided into those that follow them perpetually, and those that are frequently separated from them. And the division of those that are separated from therm, is into those that preside over generation with undefiled purity, aud those that become detiled with vice. For

* The intellectual triad consists of Saturn, Rhea, aud Jupiter.

> The order of Rulers, is (he supermundane order of Gods.

> ‘The liberated which immediately follows the supermundane order, is itself immediately followed by the mundane order of Gods. See my translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato,

3 i SNP ORES

BOOK 1.] TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 1

the descent is far as to these. Moreover, the celestial bodies must be divided into. the inerratic and erratic. And these, into such as are moved with a simple, and such as are moved with a various motion. The latter, also, must be divided into the peculiarities of powers. And universally the division in all the above mentioned orders, is into that which adorns, and that which is adorned, that which fills, and that which is filled.

The latter, also, must be divided into the peculiarities of powers. And universally the division in all the above mentioned orders, is into that which adorns, and that which is adorned, that which fills, and that which is filled.

If, however, 1 be requisite, not to look to apart, but to adhere to the intellec- tual conception of wholes, it must be admitted that this opposition subsists every where. For it is in Gods, and in intellects, in souls, and in bodies. For in the first of these, there is bound and infinity 5 in intellects, sameness and difference ; in souls, the circle of the same, and the circle of the diflerent ; and in bodies, heaven and generation. But) secondary natures are always arranged with reference to' such as are more excellent. Tence, also, we say that this narration ix useful to the whole theory of nature, as indicating to us the mundane contra- riety from energies and = motions. For all the teachers of physiology begin from contraries, and make these to be principles; which Plato also knowing, delivers to us, through symbols and enigmas, what the contrariety is of the genera in the universe, and how less are subjugated to more excellent natures, through the intellectual energy of Minerva. Farther still, Plato very properly calls the polity the work of the Athenians, because it is requisite that such an analogy as this which the junior fabrication connects, should proceed through all things ; but that total powers should by a much greater priority eflect this, from which also the junior fabrication being filled, gives subsistence to mundane intellects, to souls andbodies, conformably to the pec ularity of itself.

* Solon, therefore, on hearing tais, said that he was astonished, and burning with the most ardent desire, entreated the priests to narrate every thing pertaining to his ancient fellow citizens.”

This, likewise, is the peculiarity of divine natures, viz. for such as are secon- dary, genuinely to adhere to such as are first, and to be established in their un- defiled intellectual perceptions ; but for such as are first, to impart by illumination their own plenitude to such as are secondary, through * unenvying exuberant

' For πρὸ τῶν ἀμεινόνων, it is necessary to read xpos τῶν ἀμεινονων.

> Instead of ra Se xpwra, ἕνναμεων αφθονων, cat ἀγαθότητι, rows Sevreps επιλαμπειν τὴν ag’ cavTw,

112 PROCLUS ON THE (Boo 5.

power and goodness. Wonder, therefore, precedes, because in us, also, this is the beginning of the knowledge of wholes. But in divine natures, it conjoins that which wonders with the object of wonder, Hence, likewise, those who are wise in divine concerns celebrate 7hawnas, (whose name is derived from = thawna, wonder,] as one of the greatest of the Gods, who through wonder inclines secon- dary to primary natures. But ardent request follows, rendering that which ought to partake of more perfect goods, adapted to the participation of them.

But ardent request follows, rendering that which ought to partake of more perfect goods, adapted to the participation of them.

«That afterwards, one of the priests said :—Nothing of envy, Ὁ Solon, prevents us from complying with your request. But tor your sake and that of your city, I will relate the whole; and especially on account of the Goddess.”

Solon being an Athenian, has a resemblance to the Tutelar Goddess Minerva, so faras he adheres to more perfect intellectual pereeptions. And the priest re- sembles one speaking, as 1 were, from a certain adytam, For he teaches what Was committed to writing in the temples 5 and) presents to us an Imitation of the middle orders of the junior fabrication, and of the whole paternal cause 5 which orders transmitting the gifts of a more elevated to a subordinate cause, fill from that as froma certain fountain the divine order. All things, likewise, are clegantly effected by the speaker. For Solon is perfected, the city is praised, and the Goddess is celebrated. Phe ascent also is from Solon to the Goddess through the city as a medium; imitating the convertive power of the Goddess, And. this, likewise, is indeed beneticent; viz. to energize for the sake of the

‘

perfection of secondary natures: for it imitates ‘ providence, and the super- plenary power of divine beings. But it is in a still greater degree beneficent, to energize for the sake of the city: for the energy is more ample, and embraces a greater power. Besides this, it is stl more divine to extend all the nar- ration to the Goddess, and to terminate the whole energy in her; all) which, the unenvying communication of the priest genuinely represents to us, not only indicating the privation of envy, but the divine and prompt generation of good.

Again, however, we must not be ignorantly disturbed, if now indeed the priest as being the dispensator of the narration, is said to adumbrate a greater and more divine cause; bat at another time, the Athenians being the ancestors of Solon,

πληρωσιν in this place, it is necessary to read ra de rpwra δια δυναμεων agOorwr, καὶ ayabornros, κ. ἃ.

* For ποίρίγαι here, it is necessary to read pupecrac,

nook 1. TIMEUS OF PLATO. 113

ἃ.

* For ποίρίγαι here, it is necessary to read pupecrac,

nook 1. TIMEUS OF PLATO. 113

are more ancient than the inhabitants of Sais; the Athenians being arranged ac- cording to the mundane causes of the whole contrariety of things. For so far as pertains to the narration, they have this order; but so far as pertains to physical progression, they bring with them an image of certain more elevated and divine orders, And if you are willing so to speak, since all fabrication, and the mun- dane contraricty, are antecedently comprehended in the father of wholes, together with adorning causes, and things which are adorned, you may there also assume according to analogy, the paradigmatic cause of the Athenians in intellectual lives, For again, the veil (of Minerva] is the last image of the whole contrariety of things. But in the universe, the true works of the Gods have a precedency, and likewise in the productive and primary causes of them; where also it is said, Minerva became apparent, invested with armour. Or rather, the veil is the last work of the weaving art, containing in itself an image of the mundane war, and of the demiurgic order proceeding from the Goddess into the universe; which veil she wove in conjunction with her father. A better image however of this, is that which in the narration of Plato, and in enigmas, represents to us the whole contrariety of things, and of the works of Minerva; which narration contributes to the whole (deseriptive) fabrication of the world, in the same manner as the veil to the splendid precession of the Goddess, and the whole of the solemnity. Fur the Panathenaa is aninage of the Minerval fabrication in the universe. The veil, however, is superior to both these, which is woven in the universe, in the intellec- tual dight of Minerva. For contrariety is spread under the one life of the world, and the war is apart of the fabrication of things, which the ruling art of Minerva arranges in a becoming manner. And prior to all these, is the veil, Which is pre-established in paradigmatic causes and the intelligible, and is com- prehended in the one intellectual perception of Minerva, — For,

In weaving, all th’ immortals she excels,

says Orpheus, Hence, the weaving art is there primarily, and the vetl of the essence of this Goddess, which essence is all things intellectually, that the uni-

_ Verse is according to a mundane eharacteristic. For in ruling over the war of the

universe, she does not look any where else than into herself.

That we may however recur to the thing proposed to be considered, ‘the Egyp- lian priest directly imitates the unenvying providence of the Demiurgus, about which Plato a litde farther on says, “ FHe was good, but envy never subsists in him who ts good, about any thing.” For the orders which exist proximately with him,

Tim. Plat. νοις 1, ᾿

114 PROCLUS ON THE [poox τ.

Plat. νοις 1, ᾿

114 PROCLUS ON THE [poox τ.

have from him, and on account of him, an unenvying participation of good. And through this privation of envy, the priest fills indeed the mind of Solon, but praises the city, and celebrates the tutelar Goddess ; conjoining partial and total’ natures, uniting things contained to the things that contain them, and sus- pending all things from the Goddess, according to one bond and one series.

“Who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by whom they have been nourished and educated.”

The Egyptian, after a certain admirable manner, converts all things to the God- dess, and produces them from, and again converts them to her. For recurring froma citizen through the city to the power who presides over it, he makes this con- version. But again proceeding from the Goddess to the natures that primarily, and also to those that secondarily participate of her, he imitates the progression of things from her divinity, Again also asserting that the participants are nourished and disciplined by the Goddess, he likewise converts these to her. How is it possible, therefore, that these particulars should notin an admirable manner imi- tate demiurgic powers, which are established in natures prior to themselves, and generate those posterior to, and convert them to the causes of themselves? And thus much concerning these particulars.

What, however, is the meaning of this allotment? And how are the Gods said to be distributed into the universe? Of allotments therefore, some are those of partial souls, and others, of the undefiled genera. Some are diemoniacal, others angelic, and others, of the Gods themselves. Porat the father of the universe was one alone, and there was only one providence and one law, there would be no need of allotments, nor of divine distribution. Since, however, after the one father there is a triad, after the uniform a multiform providence, and after one law a multitude of fatal laws, it is also necessary that there should be a division of the subjects of government, and another providence and order about other things. Through this cause therefore the universe is divided by demiurgic numbers, viz. by the duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, ebdomad, and dodecad. — For after the one fabrication, the section ofthe universe into two, heaven and generation, constitutes two-fold allot- ments, the celestialand genesinrgic. After this, the triad divides the universe, about which Neptune in [Lomer* says,

‘To me by lot belongs the hoary deep, ‘The spacious heaven to Jove, to Pluto, Hades dark.

* For v\usa here, it is necessary to read oda.

* iad av, vs. 190, δ,

NOOK 1. TIMMUS OF PLATO. 11

The tetradic distribution follows the tiple order; giving a four-fold) arranzement

to the elements in the universe, as the Pythagoreans say, celestially and ethereatiy,

above the earth, and under the earth. Next to this is the five-fold division. For

190, δ,

NOOK 1. TIMMUS OF PLATO. 11

The tetradic distribution follows the tiple order; giving a four-fold) arranzement

to the elements in the universe, as the Pythagoreans say, celestially and ethereatiy,

above the earth, and under the earth. Next to this is the five-fold division. For

the world is one, consists of five parts, and is appropriately divided by celes- ὁ tial, empyreal, aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial figures, and presiding Gods. After

this allotment, the division into seven parts follows. For the heptad beginning

supernally from the inerratic sphere, proceeds through all the elements. And

after all these, is the allotment of the universe defined in the dodecad. From the

divine allotments, however, the allotments of anzels and dimons are suspended

and have more various distributions. For one divine allotment is comprehensive

of many angelical, and of a still greater number of demoniacal allotments. For

every angel rules over a multitude of daemons, and every angelical allotment has

about itself many dawmoniacalallotments. For what a monad is in the Gods, that a

tribe is to each allotmentin daemons. Instead of atriad, therefore, we must assume

three companies, and instead of the tetrad or dodecad, four numbers and twelve

choirs, following their respective leaders. And thus we shall always preserve

the higher allotments. For as in essences, as in powers, as in energies, progres- sions generate multitude, thus also in allotments, those that rank as the first, have a precedency in power, but are diminished in quantity; as being more proxi- inate to the one father, and to the total and one providence. But those that are the second in rank, are allotted a diminished power, and an increased multitude. These things therefore are to be considered in common about allotments.

Since, however, we have divided allotments according to a section into two, into the celestial and sublunary, concerning the former indeed there can be no doubt respecting the nature of them, and whether they always remain invariably the same. But the sublunary allotments are deservedly subjects of admiration, whether they are said to be perpetual, or not. For if they are perpetual, how is this possible? For how, since every thing in generation is mutable and tlowing, ean the energies of the powers that providentially inspect it, be perpetual? For the things that are in generation, are not perpetual. And if these energies are nut perpetual, how ts it that divine inspection subsists diflerently at diflerent times? For an allotment is neither a certain separate energy of the Gods, in order {πα΄ things in generation being changed into another condition, Us energy may remain exempt and immutable; nor is it alone that which is governed, in order that no absurdity may follow from the allotment flowing, and sustaining all-varieus muta- lions; but itis an assigned state, providence, and unrestrained government of

divinity, about these sublunary concerns. And on account indeed of the subject

of government, the definition of perpetuity cannot be applied to it; but on account of its being [always] present, it is destitute of corruption, in order that we may not ascribe to the Gods the passion of partial souls, by assigning them different allot- ments at different times. [ence it remaing for us to show, how allotment is to be explained, so as to preserve the immutable in the Gods, and mutability to. things in weneration.

Perhaps therefore the discussion of this affair will be easy, by having recourse to that theory, which we have frequently elsewhere employed, viz. that every thing in generation, and generation itself, must not be considered as alone con- sisting of mutable and flowing things, but there is also in these something tmmu- table, and naturally adapted to remain always the same. For the interval, which receives all the parts of the world, comprehends them in itself, and is extended through all bodies, is immoveable, lest, if it belonged to things which are moved, it should also itself require another receptacle, and this should be the case ad infinitum. The ethereal vehicles likewise of divine souls, with which these souls are circularly invested, and which imitate the lives in the heavens, have a per- petual essence, and are eternally suspended from divine souls, being full of pro- lific power, and performing acircular motion,’ according to a certain secondary circle of the celestial orbs. And in the third place, the wholeness of the elements remains always the same, though the parts sustain anall-vartous corruption, For itis necessary that each form of the universe should be never-failing, im order that the universe may be perfect, and that being generated from an immoveable cause it may be immoveable according to essence, But ecery wholeness is a form, ov rather it is that which itis said to be, through the participation of oue entire form,

And here you may see, how the nature of bodies proceeds in’ fa becoming] order. For one thing fi. e. the interval of the universe) is immoveable according to every motion ; but another thing, fie. the velicles of divine souls) receives motion only according to place. For this is most remote from essential mutation. And another thing, [1. e. the wholeness of the elements] admits of other mutations in its parts, but the whole remains entirely immutable. And the celestial allot- inents Indeed, proximately dividing the interval, divide also together with it the heavens, But with respect to the sublunary allotinents, in the first) place indeed they are allotted portions in the interval of the universe, In the next place, they inake a distribution according to the definite vehicles of souls. And in the third?

* Ynstead oferta πλήρη, καὶ yoruiou δυνάμεως κινησιν eysvaloy mowupera, itis necessary to read cra

xXnpn yoripou ov pews, και κινησιν, KAY

* For «pecrroy, read rpiroy.

And in the third?

* Ynstead oferta πλήρη, καὶ yoruiou δυνάμεως κινησιν eysvaloy mowupera, itis necessary to read cra

xXnpn yoripou ov pews, και κινησιν, KAY

* For «pecrroy, read rpiroy.

BOOK 1. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 117

place, they remain always invariably the same, according to the whole parts of generation. The allotments of the Gods therefore do not change, nor subsist diflerently at diflerent times. For they have not proximately their bypostasis in that which is changed. Tlow, therefore, do the illumunations of the Gods take place in these? [low are the dissolutions of sacred rites elected?) And how is the same place, at diflerent times occupied by different spirits)’ May we not say, that the Gods possessing perpetual allotments, and dividing the earth according to divine numbers, similarly to the sections of the heavens, these divisions of the earth also are illuminated, so far as they possess aptitude? But the circulation of the celestial orbs produces indeed this aptitude, through certain configurations; divine illumination,' at the same time, imparting a power more excellent than the then existing nature. Total nature likewise (or nature considered as a whole} produces this aptitude, inserting divine impressions in each of the things illami- nated, through which these spontaneously participate of the Gods. For she inserts diferent images of the divinities in diflerent laminated parts, in consequence of these parts being suspended from the Gods. Times also effect: something, according to which the conditions of other things are governed. The good temperament of the air too co-operates. And, in short, every thing about us contributes: to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. When, therefore, according to a concurrence of these many causes, aptitude to the participation of the Gods is ingenerated in some one of the things naturally disposed to be changed, then divinity is unfolded into light, even in these mutable natures, he being before concealed through the inaptitude of the recipients; possessing indeed eternally his proper allotment, and always extending the participation of himself, but not being always received by these terrestrial places, on account of their maptitude. But in the same manner as of partial souls, which choose different lives at diferent times, some choose such as are adapted to their proper Gods, but others such as are foreign, through an oblivion of the divinities to whom they are allied; thus, also, of sacred places, some are adapted to the power that has there lis allotinent, but others are suspended from another order, And on this account,

says the Athenian guest, some are acenstomed to be more prosperous, but others

nore unfortunate. Whether, therefore, the telestic or legislative art dedicates this particular city to the divinity who, according to an eternal allotment from the beginning, received this portion [οὐ the earth), the life (of the inhabitants] is through this ina greater degree assimilated to the tutelar deity, and the works of him (who

* [tappears to me that the words θειας edAap ews are wanting in this place.

118 PROCLUS ON THE {BooK 1.

looks to this divinity in effecting them] are rendered more correctly great anc admirable than those of the man who is not impelled to action from ἃ. principle of this kind. And he who chooses a life conformable to that of the allotted deity, acts with greater rectitude than he does who transfers himself to another order. .

Conformably to this mode therefore, the Egyptian says, that Minerva ts allotted the city which is named after her, and also his own city Sais; inferring this per- haps from the great similitude of the life of the citizens to the Goddess; and per- haps also perceiving that there was an allotment of this kind, from the telestic art, and sacerdotal works. For as of the other Gods, so likewise of Minerva, there is an allotment proceeding supernally from intellectnal causes to the place of the earth. Her allotment therefore is tirst in her father; but in the ruling Gods accord- ing toa second order. In the twelve liberated Gods, it makes a third: progres- sion; but after this, it unfolds itselfinto lightin the heavens, with unrestrained authority. _In one way indeed, in the inerratic sphere. Por there a certain allot- ment of this Goddess is expanded, whether it be the place about the Ram, or that about the Virgin, or whether it be some one of the northern stars, as some say it is the Electra, which is there. But in another way, it ts unfolded into lightin the Sun. For there, according to theologists, an admirable power, and a Minerval order, govern wholes in conjunction with the Sun, And again, in another way inthe Moon: for Minerva is the monad of the triad’ whichis there, But in another way in the earth, according to the similitude of the allotments of the earth to the celestial distributions. And lastly, about the earth ditterently in different places, according to the peculiarities of providence. It is not therefore at all wonderful, if one divinity should be said) to be allotted both Athens and Sais. For the same thing must not be supposed to take place about the Gods, as about partial souls, which are not adapted to dwell in two bodies at the same time, because they exert a providential energy in conjunction with habitude; but there is indeed a participation of the same power tn diterent places; and in the one power there is also maltitude. Phis power likewise is differently participated by different places. And in some, sameness ts more abundantly participated; but in others, difference.

Phis power likewise is differently participated by different places. And in some, sameness ts more abundantly participated; but in others, difference.

These things therefore are truly asserted, and the allotuicuts of the Gods are perpetually established in the universe, ‘These likewise existing, there are different

. This triad consists of Minerva, Proserpine, and Diana,

"οὐκ 1.} TIMASUS OF PLATO. 110

temporal evolutions of them into light, according to diflerent places. Ancient theology also manifests the perpetual essence of the allotments; as when it is said in Homer,

‘To me in ocean's hoary deeps to dwell, Alzwoys, by lot belongs,’

For the word always is signiticant of perpetuity, And in short, since it is necessary that prior to things which sometimes, there should be natures which a&ecays, parti- cipate of the Gods, it is likewise necessary that perpetual allotments should exist prior to such as are temporal. For as diemons prior to partial souls follow the Gods, thus also there are perpetual allotments suspended from the Gods, prior to partial illuminations. And the mundane Gods comprehend these allotments; the terrestrial Gods, such as are terrestrial; the aquatic, such as are aquatic; and the aerial, suchas pertain to the air. These Gods likewise, prior to visible bodies, ride in ethereal vehicles, conformably to the Gods in the heavens. But whether it must be admitted, that there are other sublunary allotments, proceeding from on high in conjunction with divine light, must be elsewhere considered: for what has been said, is sufficient for the present.

“ Yours indeed, by a priority to ours of a thousand years, receiving the seed of your race from Vulean and the Earth.”

With respect to the fabrication of Vulcan, how may some one decide, so as not perfectly to fail im his conceptions of the power of the God? For the assertions of the multitude concerning him, belong to things which must be entirely rejected, But that which is said by those whose notions are more intellectual’ is indeed true, but requires no small degree of confirmation. We shall therefore introduce to our discussion from theologists, credibility concerning this divinity. That Vulcan then is of the demiurgic, but not of the vivific, or connective, or any other series, is manifested by theologists, when they represent him as fashioning things from brass, employing the bellows, and, in short, when they call him the artificer. But that he is the fabricator of sensible, and not of psychical, or intellectual works, is also manifested by them. For the formation of a mirror,

* Πα xv. vs. 190. Instead of o¢ vewrepor in this place, it appears to me to be uccessary to read o« roepwrepor.

120 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1,

But that he is the fabricator of sensible, and not of psychical, or intellectual works, is also manifested by them. For the formation of a mirror,

* Πα xv. vs. 190. Instead of o¢ vewrepor in this place, it appears to me to be uccessary to read o« roepwrepor.

120 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1,

the exercise of the brazier’s art, lameness, and every thing of this kind, are syinbols of his productive energy about a sensible nature. Moreover, that he is the maker of all sensibles, is evident from the same theologists, who say that he was hurled from Olympus as far as to the earth, and who make all the receptacles of the mundane Gods, to have been elaborated by Vulean. Vf, therefore, we admit that these things are true, this God will be the fabricator totally of every corporeal-formed substance; preparing for the Gods their visible seats, rendering all things subservient to the one harmony of the world; jilling all fabrications with corporeal life ; and adorning and connecting with forms the resisting and gross nature of matter. On this account also he is said by theologists to fashion things from brass, as being the artificer of resisting solids. And because the heavens are [said to be} brazen, as being an imitation of the intelligible, the maker of the heavens is likewise [fabled to be] a brazier. But he is lame in both his feet,{ as being the fabricator of things that are Jastin the progressions of being; for such are bodies ; and also as being no longer able to proceed into another order. Likewise, because he ts the maker of the universe, which, as “Pimieus says, is without legs. And he was hurled from on high to earth, as extending his fabrication through the whole of a sensible essence. Whether, therefore, there are said to be certain: physical productive principles in the universe, or whether there are spermatic principles, the cause of all these must be referred to this God. For that which mature cllects by verging to bodies, this God fashions divinely and exemptly, excitine nature, and using her as an instrument to her own fabrication, Por innate heat is Vuleanian, being generated by Vulean as subservient to corporeal production, The productive cause therefore of generated natures is referred, ino what) Plato says, to this God.

Since however matter is necessary to things that are generated; for the Gods in the heavens borrow parts from the universe, as things which will be again returned, for the generation of mortal animals; this also Plato delivers to us, ina very adimirable manner, through earth. Por in seed teelf, there are productive powers, and a subject. And the former are derived fourm the στ οὐ Valeans, but the Jatter from earth, Por by earth, we must now understand every nraterial

cause; not that the Athenians sprang from the carth; but because it is usual to

Por in seed teelf, there are productive powers, and a subject. And the former are derived fourm the στ οὐ Valeans, but the Jatter from earth, Por by earth, we must now understand every nraterial

cause; not that the Athenians sprang from the carth; but because it is usual to

' Ttamust be carefully observed, that defects when ascribed to divine natures adumbrate Gounseenden. cies: just as those whose eves are filled with the solar light, are said to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects; for this incapacity is nothing more than transcendency of vision, In like mauner,

the lameuess of Vulcan, symbolically indicates his exemption from any defective progression,

Ce a ea

BOOK 1.] TIMUS OF PLATO. me 0}

call all generation earth, and every thing material, earthly. Fire, therefore, is a Vulcanian instrument; but earth is matter, which is excited and vivified through fire, since itis of itself lifeless. Hence also, in consequence of this being filled, the material order is now assumed in conjunction with Vulcan. And on this account it is said that the seed of Vulcan, together with earth, gave subsistence to the generation of the Athenians. For according to the fable also, Vulcan being in love with Minerva, emitted his seed on the earth, and from thence the race of the Athenians blossomed forth. In short, therefore, Vulcan is always in love with Minerva, imitating her intellectual nature, in the fabrication' of sensibles. But Minerval souls, according to this energy of Vulcan, especially receive vehicles from him, and are introduced into bodies from the productive powers of Vulcan, and the hypostasis* of earth; the productive powers receiving Minerval impressions. For this God, prior to nature, is the perfecter of bodies, inserting in different bodies, different symbols of the divinities.

For this God, prior to nature, is the perfecter of bodies, inserting in different bodies, different symbols of the divinities.

What however are the thousand years, according to which the Athenians are prior to the inhabitants of Sais? This, therefore, may be said historically. But it seems also to signify the temporal priority of the life of the Athenians, and in short, that itis necessary their life should be more elevated than that of the Saitans, For as in the invisible orders of things, many genera are suspended from the same leader, some indeed more proximately, but others more subordinately ; after the same manner also, of Minerval souls descending into generation, some are assi- milated to Minerva, according to the hizhest degree of excellence; but others subsist proximately after these. A thousand years, therefore, signify this excellence. For they are the measure of a perfect genesiurgic period, on account of a thousand being a cubic number, Hence this number is very properly adapted to a life superior according to generation, and which is in a greater degree assimilated to _ the {tutelar Goddess. If also you wish to transfer these things to the universe, you may there behold all the visible fabrication which is Vulcanian, and adorning causes and adorned eflects ; some of which are more total, but others more partial. And some being analogous to the Athenians, but others to the Saitans. For

* Instead of ro γοερὸν aurns των αἰσθητων pipovperos in this place, which is evidently defective, I read τὸ νοερὸν aurns εν τῇ δημιουργιᾷ των αιἰσθητων μιμουμενος.

* For τὴς γῆς νποστασιν των λόγων, αθηναΐκα συγθηματα λαβοντων, it seems necessary to read rns γης: vrooracews, τῶν λόγων αθηναΐκα, «. A.

Tim. Plat, Vou. I. | Q

122 PROCLUS ON THE fBooK ft.

nothing hinders, but that the same things may be surveyed analogously, in demiurgic causes, 1n the universe, and in an historical narration,

A.

Tim. Plat, Vou. I. | Q

122 PROCLUS ON THE fBooK ft.

nothing hinders, but that the same things may be surveyed analogously, in demiurgic causes, 1n the universe, and in an historical narration,

The divine Iamblichus however doubts, how the gods are said to be allotted certain places, according to definite times ; as for instance, Minerva was. first allotted Athens, and) afterwards Sais. For if, their allotment commences from acertain time, it will also αἱ ἃ certain time cease. Por whatever is measured by time, is a thing of this kind. Farther still, with respect to the place which they are allotted at a certain time, was it without a ruler, w hen it fell to their lot, or was itunder the dominion of other Gods ? For if, indeed, it was without a ruler, how is it possible that any thing belonging to the universe can be perfectly destitute of divinity? How, in short, can any place remain without the guardian protection of more excellent natures? Or how, if itis sutlicient: to the preserva- tion of itself, can it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods? But if it is under the dominion of another leader, it will also fall to the allotment of another God, and thus an absurdity will ensue. For the second God does not divulse the prefecture and allotment of the former divinity. Nor do the Gods alternately receive the places of each other; nor do dawmons change their allot- ments. Tamblichus having thus doubted, dissolves the doubts by saying, that theallotwents of the Gods are perpetually established, but that the participants of them, atone time derive advantage from the guardianship of the rulers, and at another time reap no benefit from it. Ele adds, that these are the participations which are measured hy time, and which sacred institutions frequently call the birth- days of the Gods. Wt has however been observed by us, that this resembles that which happens about souls, ΓῸΓ every soul has entirely a tutelar God. And certain souls choose lives adapted to other Gods. Thus, therefore. every place ts the allotment ofa certain God, and there is atime when it becomes the allotment of some other divinity, who renders it adapted through a certain period, or through certain mystic rites established by men. For allotment is twofold, the one being essential, but the other subsisting according to habitude. Bat let us direct our

attention to what follows.

“ But an account of the transactions of this our city, during the space

of eight thousand years, is preserved in our sacred writings.”

The priest assigns to the Athenians the number nine thousand, receiving this

Boox 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 123

Bat let us direct our

attention to what follows.

“ But an account of the transactions of this our city, during the space

of eight thousand years, is preserved in our sacred writings.”

The priest assigns to the Athenians the number nine thousand, receiving this

Boox 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 123

also from history; but to the Saitans the number eight thousand ; measuring the lives of the citizens by the chiliad, conformably to the writings in the temples. for by this number, as the philosopher Porphyry says, damons also measure tine. Farther still, the priest makes this narration from the sacred writings ; which manifests, as Tamblichus would say, the stable guard of the mundane divine guardians. These numbers, however, happen to lives according to a probable reason. For eight thousand isa cube ona cube ;* but nine thousand isa tetragonic superficies on a cube." Hence the one’ gives depth to a superficies, and. this through the indefinite duad ; but the other preserves the superticies itself in itself, in similitade and perfection from the triad.4 But it is the symbol of a better lite, to remain in itself, and to adorn secondary natures. And it is an indication of a more imperfect life, to descend to secondary natures, to be assimilated to them, and to be filled with a certain indetiniteness. Since however even a secondary nature is not entirely deprived of similitude to divinity, the descent is through a cube, in which there is a tetradic similitude.’ But it is better to imitate more excellent nature through a more simple life, than through a life which is more compounded, And a square is more simple than a cube. [f however you should say, that the number nine thousand is adapted to those that have their hypostasis from Earth and Vulcan; for a thousand is terrestrial, as being a cube, but nine pertains to Vulcan,

With them IT many artificial forms

For nine years fashion'd

says Vulcan [in Homer, °} in thus speaking, you will not wander from the truth. But, in short, a cube is adapted to the terrestrial allotments of Minerva; since the decad is attributed to the heavens, and the last progression of the decad gives subsistence to the solid number one thousand. For the Gods make their progression from the celestial allotments to the terrestrial, as the last. This therefore must be said by us.

The philosopher Porphyry however, in interpreting . these things, supposes

‘For 1000 is acube, and 80 likewise is 8.

5 For 9is a square, and 1000 isa cube.

7 8000 gives — to the superficies 20. For 20x 20x 20=8000. and this is through the duad, because 20=2 x 10.

* For 9000 is the cube of 30.

Si. e. The descent is through 9000, in which there is a tetradic similitude, because as Prochus had before observed, it is a square superticies ov a cube.

6 jliad. |. 18. vs. 400,

124 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

and this is through the duad, because 20=2 x 10.

* For 9000 is the cube of 30.

Si. e. The descent is through 9000, in which there is a tetradic similitude, because as Prochus had before observed, it is a square superticies ov a cube.

6 jliad. |. 18. vs. 400,

124 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

Vulean to be the intellect that presides over art, but earth to be the lunar sphere. Fur this ts called by the Egyptiansethereal earth, We says therefore that souls which derive their subsistence from divinity, but participate of the artificial for Vuleanic} intellect, are disseminated in the body of the moon; souls that give themselves to the arts, dwelling there; and that they have bodies which are etHuxtons of the ethereal bodies. That nine thousand years, also, are adapted to these souls, after the following manner. A inyriad of years is, says he, the period of the soub which ascends and descends through the five stars, in order that each may have two chiliads, yet not successive. Time indeed is successive according to concep- tion; for it is not without continuity. Hence all the stars have nine lives ; which is obscurely signified through nine thousand years. Ninths also are performed to the dead. And ina similar manner, some give names to those that are born, in the ninth year; employing as symbols the periods of generation and production, The priest, however, does not now assume a myriad of years, but the number of nine thousand, in order that those of whom he is speaking may still be terrene, but approvimating to the period of a myriad of years, All this interpretation, however, the divine Tamblichus rejects, and says thatthe discussion here is not about hives, but about the diflereat measures of Minerval participation, Its absurd, therefore, to make mention of the periods spoken of in the Phwedrus. But if it be requisite to narrate what follows from the conception of Porphyry, it must be said, that the soul lives indeed intellectually and Saturnally on high, bat descends first to the conception of a political life, whichis Jovian. Afterwards, she excites anger, and lives ainbitiously, But anger is Martial. Τὰ the next place, she proceeds in her descent to desire, and venereal lives; and at last, exerts physical reasons {or productive powers]. Butall reasons are Hermaic. And Hermes is the Inspective guardian of physical reasons. Through these, however, she is bound to body. And again, receiving a body, she first lives physically, being the supplier of nutriment and increase to the body. Afterwards, she lives epithymetically, exciting genesiurgic powers. In the next place, she lives under the intlucnce of anger, rising against her former habits, but entering into an ambitious life. After- wards, she lives politically, moderating the passions. And in the last place, she lives intellectually. If therefore she is restored to her pristine state, her life is mtellectual, and the myriad is terminated. But in generation, though she is conversant with it in the best manner, she lives according to a deficiency by the chiliad. And of this the number nine thousand is a symbol, being adapted to the Lest polity of the Athenians.

But in generation, though she is conversant with it in the best manner, she lives according to a deficiency by the chiliad. And of this the number nine thousand is a symbol, being adapted to the Lest polity of the Athenians.

BOOK 1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 125

“1 will therefore bricfly unfold to you the laws, and the most beautiful of the deeds of those citizens that existed nine thousand years ago. For when we are more at leisure, we shall accurately discuss every particular, receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves.”

If you wish to refer what is here said to the whole order of things, the number nine thousand will manifest the total progression as far as to a cube, and terrestrial works, and likewise the life which pervades through all things. But through the word briefly, the union of many productive powers, and the comprehension of them according to intellect, are indicated. For the synoptical is an image of intellectual impartbility ; but that which departs into multitude, of prolific power; multiplying, producing, and dividing forms into minute parts, through diversity. The laws are images of the divided fabrication, which is united accord- ing to intellect. But) the most beautiful work is an adumbration of the orderly distribution of things which is extended to one beantiful end. For beauty subsisting according to the united, proceeds from intelligibles to the visible fabri- cation. And _ the resumption of the sacred writings, Indicates the recurrence to the paradigms of them, from which also the priest being filled, delivers these things to Solon. The narration, therefore, will be concerning the divided and multiplied fabrication, which is connected by intellect, and extends as far as to terrestrial works, as may be inferred from all that has been said.

“Tn the first place then, consider the laws of these people, and compare them with ours. Tor you: will now find here many paradigms of things which then subsisted in your city.”

As Socrates summarily discussed his own polity, thus also the priest brietly discusses the laws ofthe ancient Athenians, in order that the latter may have dimi- nution with reference "τὸ the former, and also a similitude to it. And this very pro- perly. For the one is more universal, but the other more partial. And the one is the work of dianoia, but the other of the phantasy. This diminution indeed may be surveyed, so far as Socrates has described a polity, but the priest laws. A polity, how- ever, ts the union and comrion bond of the life of citizens ; but legislation is order pro- ceeding into multitude and division, And the former is more analogous to the providen- tial cause, but the latter to fate. But there is a similitude between Socrates and the

* Instead of vgeow exp ravra cat execva, it seems necessary to read vpeow ἐχὴ ravra καὶ xpos exewva-

But there is a similitude between Socrates and the

* Instead of vgeow exp ravra cat execva, it seems necessary to read vpeow ἐχὴ ravra καὶ xpos exewva-

126 PROCLUS ON THE (woo 1. priest, 80 far as’ both assert that they deliver the multitude of their words con- tractedly.

Again, therefore, these things embrace wholes and divine causes. For the middle is suspended from the first fabrication, and is assimilated to it. And each indeed pertains to the universe ; but) the latter according to union, and one sameness 3 and the former according to progression and the difference of the things fabricated. Just as the third ‘fabrication subsists according to conversion.* And the first fabrication connects the war in generation celestially ; but) the second subordinately and according to diminution ; just as the third? connects the extremities of the universe. Very properly therefore does Socrates summarily deliver the laws, and the whole life of the Athentans, in the samme manner as the priest. And these things may be assumed from what the priest now says. But he calls images paradigms, because the Saitans participate secondarily of those things, of which the Athenians participate primarily. For though archetypes rank among the first of beings, yetimages have the first: order with reference to our knowledge. As therefore things secondary by nature are said to be first, thus also they are said to be paradigms to the things that are elevated from them, and which know through them the natures prior to them. Hflere also, what pertains to the Athenians, indicates a more total, but what pertains to the Saitans, amore partial order. ‘These things likewise are analogous, both in partial natures and in wholes. So that the polity which is about to be delivered, pertains to the city of the Athenians, or rather to the whole orderly distribution of things ; and the laws extend to the whole world) from Minerva. Por every law is said to be the distribution of intellect, and is rightly said to be so. But the laws of the Athenians, being established conformably to the tutelar Goddess, exhibit the distribution of the Minervalintelleet. But of this kind are the laws in the universe which are defined conformably to one demturgic intellect, and the one providence of Minerva.

‘Por the race of the priests was separated from the rest of the inhabi- tants.”

That in a certain respect all this order of the polity of the priest is more partial and more divided than that of Socrates, imitating the middle fabrication, may be

‘ For xpwrn here, it is necessary to read τρίτη. * The nature of these three fabrications is uufolded farther on. Ὁ Here also for xpwrn, it is necessary to read τρίτη,

cove nia Dae

BOOK 17} TIM.LUS OF PLATO. 127

* The nature of these three fabrications is uufolded farther on. Ὁ Here also for xpwrn, it is necessary to read τρίτη,

cove nia Dae

BOOK 17} TIM.LUS OF PLATO. 127

learnt from the multitude and quality of the genera in the city. For in the polity of Socrates, there were three genera, the guardian, the auxiliary, and) the merce. nary. Por the triad is allied to the demiurgie monad. But here there are the double of these, the sacerdotal, and the military; the demiurgic, for pertaining to artificers; and = the pastoral; the venatic and the agricultural, For the middle fabrication has at one and the same time the duadic, and the triadie; and both these numbers are adapted to Minerva. But one of these indeed, viz. the triad, is immediately adapted to the Goddess; but the other according to generation, For the hexad is a triangle from the triad.’ By the trigonic therefore, and by the hexad from the triad, the diminution and at the same time alliance to the Goddess are manifested. For though every fabrication participates of Minerva, yet the first and supreme parts of the universe, and the first fabrication, and the first father, are filled from her in a more abundant degree. Thus therefore, if you alone select these genera, you will find) the number adapted to the Goddess, Buotif you add, the presiding over wisdom, you will entirely find the heptad, which is ofa Minerval characteristic. And this is one of the things that are of great notoriety. The feminine nature likewise of the heptad is celebrated, and that itis produced fromthe monad alone. The monad also, the triad, and the hep- tad, are said to be espectally imazes of Minerva; the first, indeed, as being intellectual ; the second, as converting the monad to itself ; and the third, as proceeding from the father alone. After this manner, therefore, you may infer from numbers,

It is necessary however, from the quality of the genera, to survey the diminution and transcendency of these. For the sacerdotal is subordinate to the guardian genus, Which ascends as far as to the first cause. * For Plato himselfin the Politi- cus arranges the priests under the politician, and does not impart to them political power. The military also is subordinate to the auxiliary genus. For the latter arranges ina becoming manner, and sufficiently disciplines the inhabitants of the city. Butthe former pursues war alone, and things pertaining to it, and partici- pates of this study alone. And the mercenary tribe is divided into the remaining genera. The polity of Socrates therefore surpasses that of the priest, as being more comprehensive, and after a manner co-adapted to the genera prior to it. So that both froin number and quality, it becomes evident to us that the polity

' For 6 is a triangular number, and is the double of 3.

* Plato asserts this of the guardians, in bis Republic,

128 PROCLUS ON THE [ΒβΒοοκ 1.

So that both froin number and quality, it becomes evident to us that the polity

' For 6 is a triangular number, and is the double of 3.

* Plato asserts this of the guardians, in bis Republic,

128 PROCLUS ON THE [ΒβΒοοκ 1.

second after it. We establish, however, the analogies of the polity of Socrates to the universe, to be as follows. The genus of guardians we arrange as analo- gous to the celestial Gods. The aunihary genus to those more excellent natures, the attendants on the celestial Gods, and the defenders of the universe. And the mercenary genus, to those powers that connect a material nature with partial souls. The first of these also, ts analogous to the fined stars, the second to the planets, and the third to material natures, We may likewise assume in the celes- tial Gods themselves, all these according to analocy,

Here, however, itis worth while to survey how, and after what manner, these cenera Lenumerated by the priest) are to be assumed in’ the universe, Vor the philosopher Porphyry arranges them as follows: That the priests are analogous to the archangels inthe heavens, who are converted to the Gods, of whom they are the messengers. But the soldiers are analogous to souls descend- ing into bodies. Again, the shepherds are analogous to the powers that are arranged over the herds of animals ; which in arcane narrations are said to be souls that are frustrated of the human intellect, but have a propensity towards animals. Vor there is also a certain curator of the herd of men. And there are likewise certain partial curators; some being the inspectors of nations; others of cities ; and others of individuals. But the hunters are analogous to those powers that hunt after souls, and inclose them in bodies. ‘There are likewise powers who delight in the hunting of animals, such as Diana is said to be, and another mul- titude together with her of venatic demons. And the husbandmen are analogous to those powers that preside over fruits. ΔἸ] this administration therefore of snblunary damons is said by Plato to receive many demiurgic distributions, in consequence of looking to the efleet which now is, or is becoming to be. The divine Tamblichus, however, reprehends these assertions, as neither Platonic nor true. For archangels are not any where mentioned by Plato, uor does the mi- litary genus pertain to souls verging to bodies. For it is not proper to oppose these to gods or diemons. For we should act absurdly, in arranging these in the middle genus, but Gods and demons among the last artificers. Nor must it be admitted, that those are shepherds, who are frustrated of human intellect, but have a certain sympathy to ammals. Por the existence of damons who zovern the mortal nature, is not derived from men; nor are those powers hunters, who inclose the soul in body, as ina nets since the soul is not thus conjoined to Which is now delivered, is subordinate to that of Socrates, and will rank as the

129

tothe body. Nor ts this mode of theory philosophic, but full of Barbarie arrogance." Nor are husbandmen to be referred to Ceres: for the Gods are exempt from the proximate causes of nature. Reprehending, therefore, these assertions, he consi- ders the priests as analogous through similitude to all such secondary essences and powers, as honour and worship the causes prior to themselves, But the shep- herds, as analogous to all those mundane powers, that are allotted the government of the life which verges to body, and of the most irrational powers, and who dis- tribute these in an orderly manner. The hunters he places as analogous to those universal powers who adorn secondary natures through the investigation of [real] being. But the husbandmen, as corresponding to the powers that yive efficacy to the seeds that descend from the heavens to the earth. And the soldiers, to the powers that subvert every thing atheistical, and corroborate that which is divine. After this manner, therefore, the divine Tamblichus [interprets what is said by the priest.) But it is common to both these philosophers, that they divide the fabricative genus into the pastoral, the venatic, and the agricultural ; but they do not produce the four genera from one. Forno one, who rightly considers the affair, can place either the pastoral or the venatic under the fabricative genus. Will it not therefore be better to interpret the passage conformably to our preceptor, by admitting that the sacerdotal and military tribes form one duad, but the fabricative and agricultural another, and the pastoral and venatic a third | duad; and assuming an order of this kind, to investigate the paradigms of them. For the sacerdotal genus subsists in the anagogic Gods, the military in’ the guardian, and the fabricative in the Gods who separate all the forms, and the pro- ductive principles of mundane natures, But the agricultural genus subsists in those Gods that supernally excite nature, and disseminate souls about generation. For Plato, likewise, denominates the lapse of the soul into generation, a dissemi- nation, But to sow is most adapted to husbandmen, as is, also, to collect pro- ductions of nature. The pastoral genus subsists in the Gods that govern distinctly all the forms of life that revolve in generation. For Plato, in the Politicus, delivers to us certain divine shepherda. And the venatic subsists in the divinities that give an orderly distribution to all: material spirits. For it is usual with theologists to call these Gods hunters. All these genera likewise pertain to the middle fabrication, viz. the convertive genus, the guardian, that which ad-

"It is somewhat singular, that Porphyry, who called the Christian religion Bapjapor τολμημα, @ barbarously bold wickedness, should have adopted this theory, Tim. Plat. Vou. I. R

130 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1,

the convertive genus, the guardian, that which ad-

"It is somewhat singular, that Porphyry, who called the Christian religion Bapjapor τολμημα, @ barbarously bold wickedness, should have adopted this theory, Tim. Plat. Vou. I. R

130 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1,

ministers the psychical allotments, that which governs the genesiurgic forms of life, every thing which fabricates and gives form to material natures, and that which arranges the last order of spirits. ‘That, however, which pays attention to wisdom, and that which is contemplative, must be considered as different from all these genera, and which the Egyptian also celebrates above all the rest, making mention in the first place, as being a priest, of the sacerdotal genus. All the wenera, therefore, are seven, and the monad is exempt from the hexad. And the monad, indeed, is analogous to the one intelleet which connects all the fabri- cation of generated natures ς but the hexad is analogous to the more partial orders ‘under this intellect, viz. to the anagegic, guardian, formalizing, and vivifying orders, and also to those that are the leaders of the herds ofa tame fife, and to those that rule over the brutal nature, which orders in the universe likewise are separated from the fined stars. Moreover, he says, that these orders may be scen among men, in the firstplace, among the Athenians, but ins the second: place, amon the Saitans, according to the division of genera, each accomplishing its proper work ina detinite manner. For he manifests this by saying, separate from others, in order that we may understand the unmingled purity of the genera,

proceeding supernally through dimimution, as far as to the last of things.

“The artificers, also, exercised their arts insuch a manner, that each was engaged in hisown employment without mingling with that of other artists. The same method was likewise adopted by shepherds, hunters,

and husbandmen.”

The whole of this tetractys has, indeed, the third order, according to a section of the genera into: three, but is now enumerated by Plato as the second; in order that through this, whats said may imitate the universe, inowhich the last is the middle, comprehended on all sides by more divine natures. Por that which is most material and gross, is enclosed by fabrication in the middle. Por thus alone’ can it be preserved, being adorned and guarded according to the whole of itself by all the comprehending natures [in the universe). But again, it is here added, that the fabricative art was not mingled with the other arts, mor ina simile lar manner any one of the others with the rest, but that each remained by itself, and inits own purity. Por this not only produces accuracy and rectitude in

* For podes here, itis necessary to read porws.

AE EERIE ESE OE

nook 1] TIM.TEUS OF PLATO. “ΠΡ

Por this not only produces accuracy and rectitude in

* For podes here, itis necessary to read porws.

AE EERIE ESE OE

nook 1] TIM.TEUS OF PLATO. “ΠΡ

appropriate works, but likewise efleets the sympathy of the citizens. For all will thus be in want of all, in consequence of cach not exercising many arts. For the builder will be in want of the husbandman, the husbandman_ of the shepherd, the shepherd of the hunter, and the lmnter of the builder; and thus each being in want of the rest, will not be unmingled with them; hence, there is sameness in conjunction with difference, and separation accompanied with union.

“The warlike genus too, you will find was separated from all the other genera, and was ordered by law to engage in nothing but what pertained

to war.”

Every where indeed, but especially in the warlike genus, the unmingled and the separate are appropriate. For they have an alliance to the highest order, which cuts offevery thing material, and obliterates that which is disorderly and confused, Very properly therefore does this genus pay attention to the concerns of war. For on account of this, the city remains free from external and injurious incursions ; and this invests it with a guard from itself, imitating the guardian order. For as a guardian. deity is present with the first, so likewise with the mid- dle of the demiurgi. This, therefore, may be assumed from theology. But by Jaw in the universe, we must understand the divine institutions proceeding from the one demiurgie intellection, For prior to mundane natures is the demiurgic law, whichis seated by Jupiter, and distributes together with him in an orderly manner all the providential inspection which exists in the universe.

“© A similar armour too, such as that of shields and darts was employed by each. These we first used in Asia ; the Goddess in those places, as likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use.”

The narration extends the energy of Minerva supernally from paradigms, as far as to the last genera. For there are things connascent with this energy, participating of undefiled powers, more total and more partial, and which arrange the mundane genera from the middle fabrication. Analogously also to this, they comprehend and are comprehended, are vanquished by the Minerval energies, and remain perpetually undefiled with invariable sameness through it, in the uni- yerse. It is requisite, therefore, to know these things in common about all these

192 PROCLUS ON THE [nook 1.

particulars. We must however show what the armour, the shields, and the spears, are, and how these are antecedently comprehended in the Goddess. Porphyry, indeed, calling the body the shield, assumes anger for the spear. But these pertain to souls falling into generation and to material things, and are not the instruments of immutable safety, but ofa venesiurgic life, corrupting

the purity of intellect, and destroying the life which subsists according to

But these pertain to souls falling into generation and to material things, and are not the instruments of immutable safety, but ofa venesiurgic life, corrupting

the purity of intellect, and destroying the life which subsists according to

reason. The divine Tamblichus, however, explains these in a divinely Inspired manner, For since itis requisite that every thing divine should operate and not suffer, in order that by operating it may not have the ineflicacious, which is assimilated to matter, and that by not suffering it may not have an eflicacious power resembling that of material natures, which actin conjunction with passion ;— in order that both these may be accomplished, he says, that sliclds are powers through which a divine nature remains impassive and undetiled, surrounding itself with an inftangible guard. But spears are the powers according to which it pro- ceeds through all things without contact,” and operates on all things, cutting off that which is material, and giving aid to every genesiurgic form, These powers, however, are first seen about Minerva. Hence in the statues of her she is) repre- sented with a spear and shicld. Por she vanquishes all things, and according to theologists, remains without declination, and with undetiled purity, in her father: But these have a secondary subsistence, in both the total and partial Minerval powers. For as the Jovian and demiurgic multitude, mitates Its monad, and as the prophetic and Apolloniacal multitude participates of the Apollomacal pecu- larity ; thus, also, the Minerval number, adtunbrates the undefiled and unmingled nature of Minerva. This, also, takes place in an ultimate degree in Minerval souls, For in these, likewise, the shield is the untamed and uninclining power of reason; but the spear is that power which amputates matter and liberates the soul from damoniacal or fatal passions ; of which powers the Athenians participate ina purer manner, bat the Sattans ina secondary degree, receiving these through the

measure of alliance to the Goddess.

“You may perceive, too, what great attention was paid immediately from the beginning by the laws to prudence and modesty, and besides these, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of health. And from these, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding

* For ἀνάψω, here, itis necessary to read avagns.

REI AOR OL EE RTE

ROOK 1. TIM US OF PLATO. 133

tothe invention of such as are merely human, procured all such other disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated.”

And from these, which are divine goods, the laws, proceeding

* For ἀνάψω, here, itis necessary to read avagns.

REI AOR OL EE RTE

ROOK 1. TIM US OF PLATO. 133

tothe invention of such as are merely human, procured all such other disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated.”

A little farther on, he calls the Goddess both a lover of wisdom and a lover of war, in order that the arrangement of the polity of the Athenians and Saitans might be produced conformably to her as a paradigm. And what indeed pertains to the exercise of war, is sufficiently indicated trom what has been said ; but that which pertains to wisdom, he exhibits to us in the present words ; in order that by the one, the philopolemie, and by the other, the philosophic nature of Minerva might be adumbrated. What then is this prudence?) The theory of wholes and of supermundane natures, from which, after the first of goods which are perfective of souls, a certain facility is obtained in the concerns of human life, proceeding in conjunction with divination and medicine. And in one way, indeed, this prudence is the source of disciplines in invisible causes, in another way, about the world, and in the last place, about human affairs. For since the Goddess her- selfis immaterial and separate wisdom, on this account, to the natures that are allied to her, she unfolds into light all the parts of divine and human prudence. Por with respect to divination, also, one kind must be admitted to exist in the intellectual, and another in the mundane Gods. And of the latter, one kind proceeds from the Gods, another from dawmons, and another from the discuar- sive energy of the human soul, existing rather as something artificial and con- jectural, Ina similar manner also with respect to medicine, one kind indeed exists in the Gods themselves, and this is ofa Psconian nature ; but another kind, in demons, being ministrant and subservient to the Gods, from whom likewise matter and instruments are procured for the advents of the Gods. For as there are many dwmons about Love, thus also about Esculapius, some are allotted the order of attendants, but others that of forerunners of the God, And ano- ther kind exists in human lives, being that which is noparted from theorems and experience, according to which some are adapted ina greater, and others in a less degree to divine medicine. But there is also a mixture of these two kinds of prudence, viz. the prophetic and the medicinal, with the Egyptians ; because the causes of these are antecedently comprehended in one divinity, and from one fountain many streams are distributed about the world. And thus much has been said in common about the prudence which is now menioneddl.

In order, however, to unfold each particular more fully, we must say, that daw, indeed, is the order proceeding from the one intellect of Minerva; but adlention,

134 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook τ.

And thus much has been said in common about the prudence which is now menioneddl.

In order, however, to unfold each particular more fully, we must say, that daw, indeed, is the order proceeding from the one intellect of Minerva; but adlention,

134 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook τ.

the providence pervading from wholes as far as to material natures 3 and immedi- ately from the deginning, the nataral aptitude of Minerval souls to prudence. For that which is neither adventitious nor foreign, appears to be signified by these words, But if some one should) refer what is said to the mundane order, because the distribution of things does not proceed from the imperfeet to the perfect, but is always arranged and accompanied in its progression with that which is excellent, it appears to me that this is manifested by the words unmedi- ately from the beginning. The words, however, must be referred to the order of the whole world, because there are invisible causes of the natures that are arranged in the world, whieh perfect pradence (i.e. wisdom) primarily contemplates, Por the form of prudence is not, as Porphyry says it ts, artificial, or adapted to the arts. For this, as Tamblichus observes, is the gift of Valean, but not of Minerva. But attention was also paid to divination and medicine, heeause itis fit, in the first place, to contemplate the other powers of the mundane Gods, and thus afterwards, their prophetic and) sanative production; since we are allotted the government of a generated body, and to us who are enclosed in body, futurity is immanitest. For a material life exhibits much of the contingent, end of an hyparsis diflerently moved at different times. But by such other disciplines as follow from these, he doubtless means geometry, astronomy, lowistic, arithmetic, and the sciences allied to these; all which the law having established, led the Athenians and Saitans to the possession of an admirable prudence. And thus much concerning these particulars,

Porphyry, however, says, that medicine very properly proceeds from Minerva, because Eseulapius is the lunar intelleet, inthe same manner as Apollo is the solar intellect. But the divine Tamblichus blames this assertion, as confounding the essences of the Gods, and as not always rightly distributing according to pre sent circumstances the intellects and souls of the mundane Gods, For it must be admitted that) Esculapins exists inthe sun, and that he proceeds from: that luminary about the generated place; in order that as the heavens, ΝῸ likewise veneration may be connected by this divinity, according to a second participation,

and may be tilled from it with symmetry, and good temperament.

“ According to all this orderly distribution therefore, and co-arranges ment, the Goddess first established and adorned your city.”

Vhe word αἱ manifests the united comprehension in the Goddess of all the natures that are adorned by her, and that neither is any thing pretermitted by

“ According to all this orderly distribution therefore, and co-arranges ment, the Goddess first established and adorned your city.”

Vhe word αἱ manifests the united comprehension in the Goddess of all the natures that are adorned by her, and that neither is any thing pretermitted by

nook 1] TIM:GUS OF PLATO. 135

her, nor the multitude in her suffered to exist in a divided state. But the word διακοσμησις, Indicates the orderly distribution of the Minerval providence. And the word co-arrangement signifies the union of these, and their alliance to one world. Farther still, the word διακόσμησις signifies the progression of wholes from the Goddess; but co-arrangement, the conversion of them to herself. Since, however, of the natures in the universe, some are total, but others are partial, and some are analogous to monads, but others to numbers, and both participate of the Minerval providence, but primarily such as are total and monadic,—on this ac- count what is at present said, attributes the more ancient and leading order to the Athenians, but that which is secondary and diminished to the Sattans,

Choosing for this purpose the placein which you were born ; as she foresaw, that from the excellent temperature of the seasons it would

produce the most sagacious men.”

Prior to this, the Goddess was said to have been a/lotfed the Attic region; but it is now said that she chose it. Both, however, concur, and neither is the being allot- ted contrary to her will, nor is her choice disorderly, as is the case with a partial soul Por divine nece sity concurs with divine wall, chotee with allotinent, and to choose with to. be allotted. What this place, however, is, has been betore shown by us, viz. that it is interval, and that which is truly place. For the divi- sions of divine allotments, are divisions of these, in order that they may be esta- blished with invariable sameness prior to things which subsist according to time. But it must now be added, that the soul of the universe possessing the productive principles of all divine {mundane} natures, and being suspended from the essences prior to herself, inserts in diferent: parts of the interval an allance to different powers, and certain symbols of the divine orders in the Gods. For this interval is proximately suspended from: her, and is an instrument Connascent with her, As she is, therefore, a rational and psychieal world, she also renders this [sensible] world endued with interval, and vital through divine impressions. ence the interval itself, though it is said to be continued and inimoveable, yet is not entirely without diflerence with reference to itself; since neither is the soul of the universe perfectly without difference in’ itself towards itself, but one part [as 1 were] of it, isthe circle of the same, and another, the circle of the different. And — why do [assert this of the soul? for neither is much celebrated intellect without diflerence in itself, though all things in it are, as it were, of the same colour. For

136 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 1.

all things do not possess an equal power in intellect, hut some are more total, and others more partial. Nor is this wonderfol. For the Demiurgus himself contains in himself, first, middle, and last orders. Whence, also, Pthink Orpheus, indicating the order of his powers, says, ‘ that his head is the refulgent heaven, but his eves are the sun, and the opposing moon.” Though, therefore, this interval should have one essence, unattended with difference, yet the power of soul, and the allot- ted orders of dawimons, and prior to these, the Gods, dividing it, according to the demiurgic order, and the allotments of justice, demonstrate that there is much diflerence in the parts of it. Tlence itmast be admitted, that the choice becomes Internal, and from the essence of the Gods, and that itis not such as we see in partial souls, Por the former is essential; buat the latter is atone detined aceord- ing to the present life. And the former is eternal, but the latter temporal.

Tlence itmast be admitted, that the choice becomes Internal, and from the essence of the Gods, and that itis not such as we see in partial souls, Por the former is essential; buat the latter is atone detined aceord- ing to the present life. And the former is eternal, but the latter temporal.

By place, therefore, We must not understand the earth or this air, but prior to these, the immoveable interval, which is always illumiuated after the same man- ner by the Gods, and divided by the allotments of justice. Por these material natures are atone time adapted, and at another unadapted, to the participation of the Gods, And itis necessary that prior to things which sometimes participate, there should be those which are always suspended: atter the same manner from the Gods. And thusimuch may sutlice respecting these particulars,

With respect, however, τὸ the excellent: temperature of the seasons, which is productive of sagacious men, Panwtius, and certain other Phatonists, understand the words according to their apparent Ineanine, viz. that the Atte region, on acccunt of the excellent temperature of the seasons of the year, is adapted to the production of sagacious men, But Longinas doubts the truth of their assertion, For the contrary is seen to be the case, since about this place, there is a great want of symmetry in dryness from excessive heat, and cold tempestuous weather. Nor if the place was of this kind, would they yet be able to preserve the immor- tality of souls, if sagacity was implanted in them through the excellent tempera- ture of the seasons, But he says, that this excellent temperature is not. to be referred to the condition of the air, but that it) isa certain nameless peculiarity of the region contributing to sagacity. For as certain waters are prophetic, and certain places are productive of disease, and are pestilential, thus, also, itis not at all wonderful that a certain peculiarity of country should contribute to prudence and sagacity. Origen, however, refers this excellent temperature to the cireua- tion of the heavens ; for from thence the fertility and sterility of souls are derived, as Socrates says, in the Republic. He, however, apprehends the truth in a more

SSeS TENS A MATT AIOE?

parses ce

BOOK 1.) TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 137

He, however, apprehends the truth in a more

SSeS TENS A MATT AIOE?

parses ce

BOOK 1.) TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 137

partial manner. But Longzinusis ignorant that he makes the peculiarity to be corpo- real, and that he is entangled in the doubts which Porphyry proposes to him. For how can one peculiarity of air render men adapted to different pursuits? Ans in the next place, a similar peculiarity stil! remaining, how comes it to pass that there is now no longer the same natural excellence in the genius of the inhabitants 7 Bat if the peculiarity is corruptible, it must be shown what it is that is corruptive of it. It is however better to say, that the Gods having divided the whole of space conformably to the demiurgic order, each portion of place receives souls adapted to it; that portion indeed which is Martial, receiving souls of a more animated and irascible nature ; that which is Apolloniacal, prophetic souls; that which is Esculapian, medical; and that which is Minerval, prudent and sagacious souls. But this is effected through a certain quality, or rather each portion of place possesses a power of this kind from its allotted divinity ; and Plato calls this adaptation, excellence of temperature; since there are many physical, psychical, deemoniacal, and angelical powers in each portion of place, but each unity of the allotted divinity unites and mingles all these in an unmingled manner. Since however the Seasons are allotted from the Father, the guardian- ship of these portions of place and allotments, to whose care, as Llomer ' says, “the mighty Heaven and Olympus are committed,” and according to which, the co-adaptations of souls similiar to places is effected ; hence Plato suspends this excellent temperature froin the Seasons, the whole of it deriving from thence its subsistence. :

The Goddess therefore perceiving that the [Attic] portion of interval which is always guarded by the Seasons, is adapted to the reception of sagacious souls, selected it for this purpose; not that this place was once deprived of Minerva, but at another time was under her allotted guardianship; for the text demonstrates the contrary ; but because there are also in the interval itself, different aptitudes to the reception of divine illuminations, according to different parts; which aptitudes were inserted by the whole Demiurgus, who uniformly comprehends the powers of all the Gods posterior to himself. ‘These powers, however, are corroborated and perfected by, or rather proceed from, the presiding Gods. As, therefore, with respect to the elections of lives, the soul that chooses its proper life, acts with rectitude ; after the same manner, also, the soul which is arranged in a

: © had. V. v. 750. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. : Ss

128 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

As, therefore, with respect to the elections of lives, the soul that chooses its proper life, acts with rectitude ; after the same manner, also, the soul which is arranged in a

: © had. V. v. 750. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. : Ss

128 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

place conformable to the choice of its life, energizes in a greater degree than the soul which is disseminated ina foreign place. But to this arrangement, the one circulation of the heavens contributes, which introduces a fertility and. sterility. of souls. In fertile periods, therefore, there is a greater, but in barren periods, a less nember of sagacious men. Elence, as when a husbandiman chooses good land for the etheacious growth of the seeds, Knowing that when the season is fertile, be shall reap greater benefit, but when itis barren less, on account: of the power of the earth; thas also the test says, that the Goddess chose this place, as pro- ductive of sagactous men, in order that when the period is fertile it may have more; and when the period is barren, may have less! of prudent and sagacious men, in consequence of falling off from a fife adapted to the place. We must not however wonder, if Plato praises the excellent: temperature of the visible Seasons. 9 For there is) one excellent temperature with reference to the health of bodies, and another contributing to the reception of sagacious souls, such as is that of the Attie region. Por though there is not always the same sagacity ins those that inhabit this region, yet there is always a certain greater abundance of it through the peculiarity of the place, and the aptitude of the Seasons. Such, therefore, is our opinion respecting these particulars,

The divine Tamblichus, however, does not understand by place, one corporeal- formed condition, but an incorporeal cause pervading through the earth, sus- taining bodies by hfe, and comprehending all interval, Por ina place of this kind, he says the Goddess fashions truly good men, and causes them to inhabit. But whether he accords with the words of Plato, may be surveyed from what has been said. Tf, however, it be requisite, desisting trom these things, to con- template wholes according to the analogous, it imust be said that this Goddess fabricating and weaving the universe in conjunction with her father, every where distributes to wholes, and to things of the better co-ordination, a more perfect allotipent. But these are more replete with wisdom than their upposites, and are more adapted to the Goddess. We shall show, therefore, from the following words of Plato, how that which excels in prudence is of a more Minerval

characteristic.

“The Goddess, therefore, being a lover both of war and wisdom, first ~clected this place for the habitation of en most similar to herself.”

* Justead yf καὶ agupias EON, Tw eXarroy ατυπιπτέιν THs KaTa TOY TOKUY exunsecas Zens, in this place,

it ds necessary to read, και UMOPIAS NTTOY, Tw ὠπυπιπτει», κα. ee

ee

ee

ee

poor 11] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 139

In what is here said, Plato delivers to us the most accurate conception respecting this greatest divinity, unfolding to those who are sufficiently able to perceive his meaning, the indications of theologists, Different interpreters however betake themselves to diflerent arrangements of the Goddess ; some indeed narrating their opinion more enigmatically, but others more clearly, yet not confirming what they assert. For Porphyry, placing Minerva in the Moon, says that souls descend from thence, which possess atone and the same time irascibility and mildness sand that on this account, the mystagogues in Eleusis are lovers of wisdom and lovers of wary; since it is said that the race of those who are kaders of the mysteries in Eleusis, is derived from Musaus, the offspring of the Moon; and also that. the Hermes there subsists about the Moon, from which also the race of the Cryers is derived. The divine Tamblichus, however, blames these assertions, as not well preserving the analogy. For he interprets iar as that which entirely subverts the whole of a disorderly, confused, and material nature ; but wisdom as immate- rial and separate intelligence. He also says, that this Goddess ‘ is the cause - of both these; which likewise the Athenians imitate through a prudent and warlike life, He adds, that the Athenian region is well adapted to the τὸς ception of such-like souls.

If, however, it be requisite that the conceptions of these men should become manifest, and prior to these, that what is delivered by Plato should be shown to accord in the highest degree with theologists, we must assert as follows : deriving what we say from a supernal ongin. In the Demiurgus and father of the whole world, many orders of Gods that have the form of the one, present themselves to the view. And these are of a guardian, or demiurgic, or eleva- ting, or connective, or perfective: characteristic. But the undefiled and un- tamed deity Minerva, is one of the first intellectual unities: subsisting in’ the Deniureus, according to whieh he himself remains firm and imiutable, and all things proceeding from him participate of inflesible power; and through which, he intellectually perceives every thing, and is separate in an exempt manner from all beings. All theologists, therefore, call this) divinity Minerva, as) being brought forth indeed from the summit of her father, and abiding in him; being adcmiurgic, separate, and immaterial intelligence.

Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as ¢heonoe (4eovoy] or deific intel- lection, But theologists, also, consider her as in conjunction with other divinities

' Instead of των θεων here, it is necessary to read την θεον.

140 PROCLUS ON ‘THE {Rook ".

Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as ¢heonoe (4eovoy] or deific intel- lection, But theologists, also, consider her as in conjunction with other divinities

' Instead of των θεων here, it is necessary to read την θεον.

140 PROCLUS ON ‘THE {Rook ".

sustaining all things in the one Demiurgus, and arranging wholes together with her father. Hence through the first of these, they denominate her philosophic, bat through the second philopolemic, For she, who according to the (τ of the one, connectedly contains all the paternal wisdom, is a pAilosopher, And she, who invariably rules over all contrariety, may be properly called a lover of war. Hence Orpheus speaking of her birth says, that Jupiter generated her from

hes head,

With armour shining like a brazen flower,

Since, however, it was necessary that she should proceed into second and third orders, she appears in the order to which Proserpine belongs, according to the undefiled heptad; but she generates every virtue from herself, ἀπ clevating powers; and illuminates secondary natures with intellect, and an undetiled life. Hence she is called Core Tritogencs. She likewise appears among the liberated Gods, umting the lunar order with intellectual and demuurgic light, causing the productions of those divinities to be undefiled, and demonstrating the one unity of them to be unmingled with their depending powers. She also appears in the heavens and the sublanary region; and according to the united gift of herself nnparts the cause both of the philosophic and the philopolemte power. For her inflexibility is intellectual, and her separate wisdom is pare and unmingled with secondary natures ; and the one characteristic peculiarity of Minerval providence, extends as far as to the last orders. Por since wherever there are partial souls that resemble her divinity, they exert an admirable prudence, and exlibit an unconquerable strength, what ought we to say of her attendant choirs "of damons, or divine, mundane, liberated, and ruling orders? For all these receive as from a fountain the twofold peculiarity of this Goddess. Hence also, the divine poct (Homer) indicating both these powers of Minerva, in conjunction

with fabulous devices says,

‘The radiant veil her sacred fingers wove Floats in nich waves, and spreads the court of Jove.

Her father’s warlike robe her limbs invest. * ‘

- ' For χορευτῶν in this place, it is necessary to τόδ χορὼν των. * Thad. vit.

1 | : ἃ

Book 1.) TIMAUS OF PLATO. Lal

Her father’s warlike robe her limbs invest. * ‘

- ' For χορευτῶν in this place, it is necessary to τόδ χορὼν των. * Thad. vit.

1 | : ἃ

Book 1.) TIMAUS OF PLATO. Lal

Tn which verses by the veil which she wove, and to which she gave subsistence by her intellections, her intellectual wisdom is signified. But by the warlike robe of Jupiter, we must understand her demiurgic providence, which immutably takes care of mundane natures, and prepares more divine beings always to have dominion in the world. Hence, also, Ε think Homer represents her as an asso- ciate in battle with the Greeks against the Barbarians; just as Plato here relates that she was an associate with the Greeks against the inhabitants of the Atlantic island; in order that every where more intellectual and divine natures may

“rule over such as are more irrational and vile. For Mars, also, is a friend to warand contrarieties, but with a separation and division more adapted to the things themseives, Minerva, however, connects contrariety, and illuminates the subjects of her government with union, Hence, likewise, she is said to be

plilopolemic, For, Strife, fighting, war, she always loves.

And she is a friend to war, indeed, because she is allotted the summit of se- paration; but she is a lover of contrarieties, because these are in a certain respect congregated through this goddess, in consequence of better natures having dominion. On this account, likewise, the ancients co-arranged Victory with Minerva.

If, therefore, these things are nghtly asserted, she is philosophic indeed, as being demiurgic intelligence, and as separate and immaterial wisdom. Hence, alsoy she is called Metis by the Gods. But) she is philopolemic, as con- necting the contrarietics in wholes, and as an untamed and inflexible deity, On this account, likewise, she preserves Bacchus undetiled, but vanquishes the giants in conjunction with her father. She too alone shakes the το σία, without waiting for the mandate of Jupiter. She also hurls the javelin ;—

Shook by her arm, the massy javelin bends ; Hluge, ponderous, strong! that when her fury burns,

Whole ranke of heroes tames and overturns. "

Again, she is Phosphoros, as every way extending intellectual light; the Sa- viour, as establishing every partial intellect in the total intellections of her father ;

* Tad. viii.

142 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 1.

Ergane, or the artificer, as presiding over demiurgic works. Hence the the- ologist Orpheus says, that the father produced her,

That she the queen might be of mighty works.

viii.

142 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 1.

Ergane, or the artificer, as presiding over demiurgic works. Hence the the- ologist Orpheus says, that the father produced her,

That she the queen might be of mighty works.

But she is Calliergos, or the beautiful fabricator, as connecting by beauty all the works of the father; a /reim, as exerting an undefiled and unmingled purity, und diviochos, or wgis-beaving, as moving the whole of fate, and betne the leader of its productions. We should, also, discuss the remaining appellations of the Goddess, if, what we have already said might not appear to be prolin through my sympathy with the discussion, Again, therefore, recurring to the thing proposed we must say, that Plato calls both these divinities, Love and) Minerva, philo- suphers, not for the same reason; but he thus denominates the former, as being the middle of wholes, and as leading to intelligible wisdom ; and the latter as the summit of wholes, and as the union of demiurgic wisdom, Por the Demiurgus is “ Metis the first generator and much-pleasing Love.” And as Metis, indeed, he brings forth Minerva; but as Love, he generates the amatory series.

“ The ancient Athenians, therefore, using these laws, and being formed by good institutions in a still greater degree than I have mentioned, inhabited this region ; surpassing all men in every virtue, as it becomes those to do, who are the progeny and pupils of the Gods.”

We learn from history that the affiirs of the Athenians are more ancient than those of the Saitans; that the establishment of their city is prior; and that their laws are more proximate to Minerva. But in the mundane paradigms, also, wholes are prior to parts 5 and there is an order in them which is more divine, a power which is greater, and a form of virtue which is truly Minerval. Por the genus of virtue is adapted to this greatest divinity, as being virtue herself, For abiding in the Demiurgus, she is wisdom and immutable intelligence, and in’ the ruling (or supermundane] Gods, she unfolds the power of virtue.

By virtue’s worthy uame she’s called,

says Orpheus. It is evident, however, that things which are more divine in the universe, may be called the progeny and pupils of the Gods, For they derive

Fl IN IIE ti Hn

ον οί

Seu sient

nook 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 143

By virtue’s worthy uame she’s called,

says Orpheus. It is evident, however, that things which are more divine in the universe, may be called the progeny and pupils of the Gods, For they derive

Fl IN IIE ti Hn

ον οί

Seu sient

nook 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 143

their subsistence and are perfected, or rather they are always perfect, through the fabrication of the Gods, and the undefiled production of Minerva. Every thing, therefore, which is suspended and originates from the Gods, and is converted to them, exhibits transcendent virtue. But this, also, is in wholes ; since it must be admitted that there is divine virtue in the universe. And it is likewise in human lives, according to a similitude to wholes. Henee what is now said is applied to the Athenians, But making the lite of the Athenians to be one and continued, it conjoins Solon to the ancient inhabitants of Athens. Vor it says, they “inhabited this region.” For the paradigm of them is one, and in continuity with itself; since the whole of the Minerval series being one, extends as far as to the last of things, and originates supernally from the supermundane orders.

“ Many,and mighty deeds, therefore, of your city are recorded in our temples, and are the subject of admiration; yet there is one which surpasses all of them in magnitude and virtue.”

The priest having promised summarily to relate the laws and deeds of the Athenians, he delivered, indeed, their laws according toa division of genera; and it, therefore, remained for him to celebrate their deeds, through which an encomiuin is passed on the city, and the tutelar Goddess is praised. Since, how- ever, of deeds there is a number, and there is also one unity comprehensive of them, according to which the whole form of the polity is exhibited, he announces that he shall narrate the greatest deed, and which surpasses all the rest in virtue ; this deed not being one of the many, but one prior to the many. For such a method of narration subsists appropriately with reference to the universe, in which wholes accomplsh, and connectedly contain one life, and collect many con- trarieties into one union with the Goddess. Hence, as there were many and great deeds of the city, the priest very properly relates one deed which was recorded in the temples. For there is, also, an intellectual paradigin of it, so far as it is surveyed in the world, and which transcends in’ magnitude and virtue; transcendency according to magnitude presenting to our view that which is fotal, but according to virtue that which is intelectual. For wholes and the more divine of mundane natures have. many energies of the great- est magnitude, and accomplish one life and polity, conformably to which

. fighting under Minerva, they vanquish all subordinate beings. After this

* For pepuas here, it is necessary to read μεγίστας.

144 PROCLUS ON THE [RooK 1.

many energies of the great- est magnitude, and accomplish one life and polity, conformably to which

. fighting under Minerva, they vanquish all subordinate beings. After this

* For pepuas here, it is necessary to read μεγίστας.

144 PROCLUS ON THE [RooK 1.

manner, therefore, we must explain what is said. Porphyry, however, by great and admirable deeds, understands such as are accomplished by souls against matter, and material modes. But he calls demons material modes. For, according to him, there are two species of dwmons, of which the one consists of suuls, but the other of modes: and these are material powers, which are noxious to the soul. For these dogmas, however, he is corrected by the interpreter that came after him.'

“ Por these writings relate, what a mighty power your city once tamed, which rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile fury overall Europe and Asia.”

Plato in what is here said, neither omits any thing of encomiastic «augment, if the war of the Athenians against the Atlanties is considered as a mere history 5 nor fails in theological accuracy in Conjunction with caution, ifany one is) willing to pass from partial natures to wholes, and to proceed from images to paradigms. As itis usual, therefore, in Panathenaic orations to celebrate most amply the Per- sian expedition, and the victories of the Athemians both by land and sea, with which more recent orators fill their orations 3 Plato in praising the Athenians, neither delivers the Persian invasion nor any other similar deed, but introducing the Atlantic war against the parts inhabited by us, and which rushed from. the ex<ternal sea with a force capable of entirely destroying these parts, he informs us | thatthe Athenians were victorious, and that they subdued this mighty power. Since, however, the Persian expedition came from the east against the Grecks, and particularly against the Athenians, Plato introduces the Atlantic war from the west, inorder that you may survey the city of the Athenians as from a centre, castgating a Barbaric multitade pouring against ton each side in’ a disorderly manner. “To which may be added, that in the institutes delivered by the ancestors of the Athenians, and also in the mysteries, the Gigantic war is celebrated, and the victory of Minerva over the Giants, because in conjunction with ber father she vanquished these and the Titans, Plato, however, does not think it safe im- mnediately to introduce war against the Gods; for this is the very thing which he Hlamesintheancient poets; and itwould beabsurd that Critias or’Timwus, who were

auditors of what Socrates said against the poets on the preceding day, should

ἐν ον By the divine Jamblichus.

ἥ

ERE φπδν FNRI S PO ES ih

ROOK 1.] TIMAUS OF PLATO. 145

ἥ

ERE φπδν FNRI S PO ES ih

ROOK 1.] TIMAUS OF PLATO. 145

again ascribe wars and seditions to the Gods. But through the analogy of human to divine concerns, he delivers this Atlantic war prior to the fabrication of the world, assuming the Athenians instead of Minerva and the Olympian Gods, and the Atlanties instead of the Titans and Giants. For it is possible to survey the same things in images as in wholes, And that I] may remind you of the analogy, through thename of the Athenians, he refers his readers to the Olympian co-ordina- tion which fought under the command of Minerva; but through that of the Atlan- tics, to the Titanic Gods. For the mighty Atlas was one of the Titans. Theo- logists also after the laceration of Bacchus, which manifests the divisible progression into the universe under Jupiter from the impartible fabrication, say that the other Titans had different allotments, but that-Atlas was established in the weslera parts, sustaining the heavens.

By strong necessity the wide-spread heay'n

In carth’s extremes, by Atlas was sustain’d,

Farther still, the victories of Minerva are eclebrated by the Athenians, and there is a festival sacred to the Goddess, in consequence of her having vanquished Nep- tune, and from the genesiurgic being subdued by the intellectual order, and those that inhabit this region betaking themselves to a life according to intellect, after the procurement of necessaries. Tor Neptune presules over generation ; but Minerva is the inspective guardian of an intellectual life. The things proposed therefore will contribute in the greatest degree to these analogies. For the Athe- nians bearing the name of the Goddess, are analogous to her; and the Atlantics through inhabiting an island, and through being called the progeny of Neptune, preserve an analogy to this God ; so that it is evident from these things that tle Atlantic war indicates the middle fabrication, according to which the second father (Neptune) being tilled by Minerva, and the other invisible causes, governs diviner natures ina more powerful manner, and subjects all such things as have a mulliplied, divisible, and more material hypostasis, to intellectual natures. For the Gods themselves, indeed, are eternally united; but the beings which are go- yerned by them, are filled with this kind of division. After this manner, therefore, these things must be separately understood, |

In order however that we may pre-assume certain definite forms' of the pro- posed analysis, it must be admitted, that the habitations within the pillars of Her-

* For rovrovs here, it is necessary to read rvrovs.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. T

146 PROCLUS ON THE faced.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. T

146 PROCLUS ON THE faced.

cules, are analogous to the whole of the more excellent, but those external to them, to the whole of the inferior co-ordination, and that of this, there is one continued, and variously proceeding lite. Whether, therefore, beginning from the Gods, you speak of the Olympian and Titanic divinities 5 or beginning from intellect, of per- manency and motion, or sameness and difference; or from souls, you speak of the rational and irrational; or from bodies, of heaven and generation ; or in whatever other way you may divide essences, according to all divisions, all the genus of those within the pillars of Hercules will be analogous to the better, but of those without to the less excellent: co-ordination of things. © For the true sea of dissimi- litude, and the whole of a material life which proceeds into interval and multitude from the one, are there. Hence, whether you are willing Orphically to arrange the Olympian and ‘Titanic genera in opposition to each other, and τὸ celebrate the former as subduing the latter; or Pythagorically, to perceive the two co-ordi- nations proceeding from on high, as far as to the last of things, and the better adorning the subordinate rank; or Platonically, to survey much of infinity and much of bound in the universe, as we learn im the Philebus, and the whole of infinity in conjunction with the measures of bound, producing generation, which extends through all mundane natures,—from all these, you may assume one thing, that the whole composition of the world is co-harmonized from this con- traricty. And if the illustrious Heraclitus looking to this said, that war ts the Sather of allthings, he did not speak absurdly.

Porphyry, therefore, here refers the theory to demons and souls, and makes mention of the fabulous Titanic war, adducing some things to what 1s proposed to be considered, with probability, but others, without it. Phe divine Iambli- chus however, against those who adopt a more partial assignation of the cause of the analysis, is of Opinion after a certain wonderful manner, that what is said is only to be understood according to the apparent meaning, though in’ the pre- face he himself delivers to us auxiliaries for the solution of such-like narrations. May that divine man however, who has instructed us in many other particulars, and also in these, be propitious to us. Betaking ourselves, therefore, to the inter- pretation of the words of Plato, we think it fit to remind ourselves, of the before- mentioned forms of analysis; and that we must arrange the Atlantics accord- ing to all the total natures of the inferior co-ordination. For in these, also, some things are wholes, but others parts. But we must arrange their ansoleny

“mpustice, according to progression, a division through diminution, and a proximity to matter, Por matter is truly infinity and baseness. Hence through nearness

δ PEE

ROOK 1. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 147

For in these, also, some things are wholes, but others parts. But we must arrange their ansoleny

“mpustice, according to progression, a division through diminution, and a proximity to matter, Por matter is truly infinity and baseness. Hence through nearness

δ PEE

ROOK 1. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 147

to, and being in a certain respect in it, they are said to have acted injuriously from iusolence. For the paradigm of them is manifested by the theologist, through these names, when he says of them, “that their mind is replete with evil counsels, and their heart is insolent.” And we must arrange the rushing from external parts according to a defection and separation remote from. the Gods, and things of a diviner nature in the universe. For the external does not indicate compre- hension of powers, but an hypostasis departing from every thing stable, im- material, pure, and united. But the Atlantic sea must be arranged according to matter itself, whether you call it the abyss, or the sea of dissimilitude, or in whatever other way you may be willing to denominate it. For matter receives the appella- tions of the inferior co-ordination, being called infinity and darkness, irrationality and immoderation, the principle of diversity and the duad; just as from. the Atlantic sea, the Atlantic island is denominated. For thus receiving the analogies in order, we shall understand that the whole of the inferior co-ordination, and the more total and partial genera in it, are characterised by progression and division, and a conversion to matter, and that thus it proceeds through all things, presenting itself to the view appropriately in each, and appearing analogously in each nature, viz. the divine and intellectual, the psychical and corporeal. Being however such, itis adorned and arranged by the better order, which you may properly say is Minerval, as being undefiled, and subduing through its power things of a subordinate nature. But the inferior co-ordination becoming adorned, ceases from its abundant division and infinity; the genus of the Titans being connected by the Olympian Gods; but difference being united by sameness, motion by permanency, irrational by rational souls, generation by the heavens, and in a similar manner in all things. It must not however be supposed from this, that two-fold divided principles of things are to be admitted. For we say that these two co-ordinations are of a kindred nature. But the one precedes all contrariety, as the Pythagoreans also say. Since, however, after the one cause of all, a duad of principles is unfolded into light, and in these.the monad is more cxcel- lent than the duad, or, if you wish to speak Orphically, ather than chaos, the divisions are accomplished after this manner in the Gods prior to the world, and also in the mundane Gods, as far as to the extremity of things. For among the supermundane Gods the demiurgic and connective orders are under the monad, lmut the vivific and the generative orders are under the duad. But among the mundane Gods the Olympian genus is under the monad, but the Titanic under the duad. And sameness, permanency, reason and form, are under the more

But among the mundane Gods the Olympian genus is under the monad, but the Titanic under the duad. And sameness, permanency, reason and form, are under the more

148 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1,

ancient, but difference, motion, irrationality, and matter, are under the other of these principles. For as far as to these the diminution of the two principles proceeds, Since however the one 1s beyond the first duad, things which appear to be contraries are collected together, and are co-arranged with a view to one orderly distribution of things. For in the universe there are these two-fold venera of Gods, the oppositely divided genera οἵ being, the various genera of souls, and the contrary wenera of bodies. But the subordinate are vanquished by the more divine, and the world is rendered one, being harmonised from contraries, since it subsists according to Philolaus from things that bound, and from things that are infinite. And according to the infinite, indeed, which it contains, it derives its subsistence from the indefinite duad, or the nature of the infinite ; but according to the things that bound, from the intelligible monad, or the nature of bound. And according to a subsistence from all these, it becomes one whole and all-perfect form from the one. Vor it is God, as Socrates says in the Plilebus,

who gives subsistence to that which is mixed,

“ Porat that time the Atlantic sea was navigable, and had an island before that mouth which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. But this island was greater than both Libya and Asia together, and afforded an casy passage to other neighbouring islands 5 as it was likewise casy to pass from those islands to all the opposite continent which surrounded that true sea.”

That such and so great an island once existed, is evident from what is said by certain historians respecting what pertains to the external sea, For according to them, there were seven islands in that sea, in their times, sacred to Proserpine, and also three others of an Immense extent, one of which was sacred to Pluto, another to Ammon, and the middle (or second] of these to Neptune, the magni- tude of which was a thousand stadia, They also add, that the inhabitants of it preserved the remembrance from their ancestors, of the Atlantic island which existed there, and was truly prodigiously great; which for many periods had dominion over all the islands in the Atlantic sea, and was itself likewise sacred to Neptune. These things, therefore, Marcellus writes in his Ethiopic Llistory. It however this be the ease, and such an island once existed, it Is possible to receive what is said about itas abistory, and also as an image ofa certain mature among

ee

nook 1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 149

These things, therefore, Marcellus writes in his Ethiopic Llistory. It however this be the ease, and such an island once existed, it Is possible to receive what is said about itas abistory, and also as an image ofa certain mature among

ee

nook 1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 149

wholes. Unfolding likewise the similitude of this, we may gradually accustom those who survey things of this kind, to the whole theory of mundane natures. Por it is possible to behold the same analogies ina more partial, and in a more comprehensive way. Butitis necessary that doctrine proceeding from universals to the subtle elaboration of particulars, should thus give respite to theory. You must not therefore wonder, if before we assumed this analogy more generally, but now aiter another manner, and that we explore the same thing with an accuracy adapted to the things themselves, For since, as we have. said, there is a two-fold co-ordination in: the universe, which originates from the Gods, and is terminated in matter and material form; and since each possesses things more total, and things more partial, [for this we have before said]; but other things are the middles of both these co-ordinations ; for the divine genera are comprehensive of all things, and the last elements are the vilest of all things; and the intellectual and psychical genera subsist between these ;—this being the case, we think fit in’ the lirst place to divide in a three-fold) manner the inferior co-ordination, and to assuine in it some things as most total genera, others as middle, and others as last genera. And to some things, we shall arrange the Atlantics as analogous, to others the other islands, and to others all the opposite continent. But we shall consider the deep, and the Atlantic sea, as analogous to matter. For all the inferior co-ordination is material, and proceeds into multitude and division. But it also has, with respect. to itself, transcendency and deticiency. Hence Plato says that the Atlantics spread themselves externally, as being more remote from the one and nearer to matter; but that they inbabited an island larger than both Libya and Asia, as proceeding into bulk and interval. For all things that are more remote from the one, are diminished according to power, but transcend according to quantity; just as such as are nearer to (he one, are contracted * in quantity, but possess an admirable power. Here, therefore, magnitude is sig- nificant of diminution, and of progression and extension to every thing. But the sea Was then navigable, since more total natures proceed as far as_ to the last of things, and adorn matter, but having arrived at the end of the order, they stop, and that which remains beyond it is infinite, For that which in no respect has a subsistence is successive to the boundaries of being. But the addition of those, has an indication that total causes proceed without impediment through matter, and adorn it, but that we do not always subdue it, but are merged in an infinite

But the addition of those, has an indication that total causes proceed without impediment through matter, and adorn it, but that we do not always subdue it, but are merged in an infinite

> For σννέσταμενα here, it is necessary to read σνυνεσταλμενα.

150 PROCLUS ΟΝ THE {Wook 1,

and indefinite nature. Since however the progression of things is continued, and no vacuum! any where intervenes, but a well-ordered dininution is surveved from more total to middJe natures, which comprehend and are comprehended 5 ane from middles to the last and vilestnatares;s—on this account he says, there wii a passage from the Atlantic island to the other islands, and from these τὸ the opposite continent. And that the Atlantic was one, but the other islands many, and the continent was the greatest. Por the monad is adapted to the first genun in every thing 5 but number and multitude to the second, Por multitude subsists tovether with the duad, And magnitade is adapted to the third genus, on account of the progression of inagnitude to the Gad. Since, however, the extremities of the worse co-ordivation are inmost material, he manifests through the term opposite, that they are at the greatest possible distance from more excellent matures, And he does not alone use the term eafernal, as he does of the Athanties, and which evinces that they belong to the other part, but he also adds the word opposite, that he may indicate the most extreme diminution, But he signifies by the words about that true sea, the hy postasis of them about matter, and the last of mundane natures. For the true sea is analogous to that Which is truly fidse, and truly matter, which in the Politicus he calls the sea of πε τὰν = More- over, because it’ is necessary that: these two-fold co-ordinations should be sepa- rated from each other without confasion, and guarded by demiurgic boundaries, on this account he says, that the Pillars of Hercules separated the internal from the external habitable part. For he denomimates flourishing demiurgic production, and the divine separation of genera in the wniverse, the latter of which always remains stably and strenuously the same, the Pillars ef Hercules. Vis Uereules theretore is Jovian ; but the one prior to thix, and who is divine, is allotted) the guardian order of the generative series. Hence from both the demiurgic division, which

cuards these two separate parts of the universe, mast be assumed.

“ Por the waters which are beheld within the mouth we have just now mentioned, have the form of a port with a narrow entrance ; but the mouth itself is a true sea. And the Jand which surrounds it may

be in every respect truly denominated the continent.”

The waters within the mouth indicate the genera of the better co-ordination,

' For μενον i this place, the sense requires we should read μενον.

οτος TNS ANT να

HOOK 4.] ᾿ TIMALUS OF PLALO. 15]

And the Jand which surrounds it may

be in every respect truly denominated the continent.”

The waters within the mouth indicate the genera of the better co-ordination,

' For μενον i this place, the sense requires we should read μενον.

οτος TNS ANT να

HOOK 4.] ᾿ TIMALUS OF PLALO. 15]

as being converted to themselves, and rejoicing ina stable and) uniting power, For the mouth symbolically manttests the cause which defines and separates the two portions of mundane natures, But the port with a narrow entrance, signifies the convolved, sclGeouverging, arranged, and ΜΔ ΤΟΥ ΑΙ hyparais of these mundane portions. Por through ¢he narrow entrance {ΠΝ signified that interval and extension proceed froma the worse co-ordination. But through the port an hyparxis is indicated, exempt from the confused and disorderly motion of material natures. For such are ports affording a protection from the tamults in the sea. If, however, some one should say, that an elevation to the more intel- lectual and divine natures in the universe becomes a port to souls, he will not be far from the truth.

“Tn this Atlantic island there was a combination of kings, who with great and admirable power subdued the whole island, together with many other islands and parts of the continent; and = besides this sube

jected to their dominion all Libya as far as to Migypt, and Lurope as

far as to the ‘T'vrrhene sea.”

lu what is here said it is requisite to recolleet the Platonic hypotheses about the earth, that Plato does not measure the magnitude of it conformably to ma- thematicians ; but apprehends the interval of it to be greater than they admit it to be, as Socrates says in the Phaedo; and that he supposes there are many habitable parts similar to the part which we inhabit. Tlence he relates that there isanisland and a continent of so great a magnitude in the external sea. For in short, if the earth is naturally spherical, 10 is necessary that it should be so according to the greater part of it. That portion of it, however, which is inha- bited by us, exhibits great inequality by its cavities and prominencies. Hence there is elsewhere an expanded plane of the earth, and an interval extended on high. For, according to Heraclitus, he who passes through a region very difficult of aceess, will arrive at the Atlantic mountain, the magnitude of which is said to be so great by the Ethiopic historians, thatit reaches to the wther, and sends forth a shadow as far as to five thousand stadia. For the sun is concealed by it from the ninth hour of the day ull it entirely sets. Nor is this at all) wonderful. For. Athos, a Macedonian mountain, emits a shadow as far as to Lemnos, which is distant from it seven hundred stadia. And Marcellus, who wrote the Ethiopic history, not only relates that the Atlantic mountain was of such a great height,

159 PROCLUS ON THE [Roon 4,

For. Athos, a Macedonian mountain, emits a shadow as far as to Lemnos, which is distant from it seven hundred stadia. And Marcellus, who wrote the Ethiopic history, not only relates that the Atlantic mountain was of such a great height,

159 PROCLUS ON THE [Roon 4,

hut Ptolemy also says that the Lunar mountains are immensely high, and Aristo- tle informs us that Caucasus is illuminated by the sular rays during the third part of the night after the setting, and also forthe third part before the rising, of the sun. And he who looks to the whole magnitude of the earth, bounded by its elevated parts, will infer that it ix truly immense, according to the assertion of Plato. So that we are not now in want of certain mathematical methods to the development of what is said about the earth, nor do we attempt to recur to them. For these methods measure the carth according to the surface which ts ithabited by us ; but Plato says that we dwellin a cavity, and that the whole earth is elevated, which also the sacred rumor of the Eguplians asserts, Aud thus much concerning what is related of the magnitude of the Athintic istund, in order to show that it is not proper to disbelieve what is said by Plato, though it should be received as a mere history. But with respect to the power of this island, that there were ten kines in it who begat five male twins, and thatit ruled over the other islands, certain parts of the continent, and some parts within” the Pillars of Herceules,—all these par- ticalars are clearly related in the Critias.

But with respect to the power of this island, that there were ten kines in it who begat five male twins, and thatit ruled over the other islands, certain parts of the continent, and some parts within” the Pillars of Herceules,—all these par- ticalars are clearly related in the Critias.

Now however, for it is proposed to make an analysis of the particulars, the power is said to be great and admirable, according to a reference to the universe, hecause it’ procecds to every thing, and comprehends totally the whole of the second co-ordination, For it is held) together by ten hinges, because the decad comprehends the rulers of the two co-ordinations ; since the Pythagoreans also say, that all opposites are comprehended in’ the deead. But they were twins, so that there are five duads, twins being five times begotten from Neptune and Clites; because according to the measures of justice, there ts Jikewtse an orderly distribution of this co-ordination, of which the pentad isan image. ‘Phe pro- eression of it however is through the duad, just as that of the better co-ordination is through the monad. Moreover, all of them are the descendants of Neptune, because all the connexion of contraries, and the mundane war, belong to the middle fabrication, For as this God presides over the contraricty which every where exists, he Jikewise rules over generation and corruption, and all-various notion. But these kings subdued the Atantic island: as comprehending all the first and most total genera of the worse co-ordination, And they subdued the other islands, as likewise comprehending middles through the wholeness of them. But they also vanquished parts of the continent, as adorning as much as possible the last of things. And they had dominion over certain parts) of the internal habitable region, because the last parts of the better are subservicnt lo the first parts

ἐυσοωκαν eae Ste

BooK 1.] TIMUsS OF PLATO. 153

And they had dominion over certain parts) of the internal habitable region, because the last parts of the better are subservicnt lo the first parts

ἐυσοωκαν eae Ste

BooK 1.] TIMUsS OF PLATO. 153

of the worse co-ordination. Nor is this at all wonderful ; since certain demons are in subjection to certain heroes, and partial souls which belong to the intelii- gible portion of things are frequently slaves to fate. Such also is the Titanic order with the Gods to which Atlas belongs. And the first of these ten kings was called Atlas, and as it is said in the Atlanticus gave the name to the island. The summits, therefore, of the second co-ordination, are adorned indeed by the Olympian Gods, of whom Minerva is the leader; but they subdue the whole of the essence which is subordinate to the Gods, but ter- minates in the worse co-ordination; such as the essence of irrational souls, of material masses, and of matter itself. Plato also appears to have called the power of the Atlantics great and admirable, because Thaumas and Bias are said by ancient theologists to have belonged to this order. Per- haps too, he so denominated it, because the whole of the second co-or- dination is the progeny of infinity, which we say is the first [power'], just as the better co-ordination is the offspring of bound. On this account he celebrates the power of the Atlantics, just as he does the virtue of the Athenians, which belongs to * bound : for it is the measure of those that possess it, After this manner therefore, I think we may be able to make the analysis according to the Pythagorean principles.

The words of Plato likewise, have a great augment, in order to exhibit the work of the victors in a greater and more splendid point of view. For he says δύναμιν τε, through the union of the particle re augmenting δύναμιν power. And he also adds, great, and admirable. But each of these is different from the other. For power may be great though it is nothing else, but it is said to be admirable from othér things. And by how much the more admirable that is which is van- quished, by so much’ greater is the victor demonstrated to be. Besides this also, indicating through divisions the multitude subdued by this power, he evinces that it is multitudinous and transcendent.

** But then all this power being collected into one, endeavoured to enslave our region and yours, and likewise every place situated within the mouth of the Atlantic sca.”

* Avray is omitted in the original.’ * Instead of προ τον πέρατος in this place, it is necessary to read wpos του weparos. ? For ro rovrp here, read τοσσυτῳ.

Tim. Plat. in '(.) an 6 U

154 PROCLUS ON ΤῊΝ {noox 1,

? For ro rovrp here, read τοσσυτῳ.

Tim. Plat. in '(.) an 6 U

154 PROCLUS ON ΤῊΝ {noox 1,

Plato docs not say that there was once sedition among divine natures, or that subordinate subducd more excellent beings. But let these things indeed be true in homan affairs : the present narration however, Indicates, that the most total of the genera in the second co-ordination of things in the universe procced through all things. For there are both in the heavens and every where, a sepa- rating and uniting power, and nothing is destitute of these. In more excellent natures however, these powers do not subsist with division, nor multitudinously, but collected into one, and with one impulse; but this is, umitedly, and ac- cording to one and a continued life, For as in the worse co-ordination the one is multiplied, thus also in the better, multitude is united. Llence mul- titude is every where, and is vanquished through union, Of these things the Atlantics wishing to subdue every place within the mouth of the Atlan- tic sea, all their powers being collected into one, but at the same time being vanguished by the Athenians, are an Image, Por multitude and) separation, though they may be surveyed in the better co-ordination, yet they will be seen to subsist’ there unitedly; multitude not being there victorious, but sameness, and in short, the better genera.

“Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous to all men for its virtue and strength.”

Plato opposes to the power of the Atlantics, the power of the Athenians ; preferring this appellation, as heing adapted to the middle fabrication. And he celebrates the more excellent power for its virtue and strength 3 in order that through virtue, he may indicate its alliance τὸ the philosophic nature of

Minerva; (for another theology, ‘and not the Orphic only, calls her virtue,) but through strength its alliance to her plulopolemic nature. But he ealls the power conspicuous, because it is mundane, and contributes to the fabri- cation of sensibles: and to the Atlanties indeed, he alone attributes power, and this continually, beeause they are arranged under infinity, But he says that the Athenians vanquished this power, through virtue, Por as they belong to the co-ordination of bound; they are characterized by virtue,

which measures the passions, and uses powers in a becoming manner.

* i.e, The Chaldean theology.

net

TAR ες“ “νυ RS

nooK τι] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 155

* i.e, The Chaldean theology.

net

TAR ες“ “νυ RS

nooK τι] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 155

“For as its armies surpassed all others, both ia magnanimity and military arts, so with respect to its contests, whether it) was assisted by the rest of the Grecks, over whom it sometimes presided in wathke affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the cnemics, and thus was in extreme danger, yet still” it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those who were not yet enslaved, it liberated from danger; and procured the most ample liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of ITler- cules.”

As we have triply divided the inferior co-ordination, into first, middle, and last boundaries, thus also we must divide the superior, into the most total, and the most partial genera, and those that subsist between these. And having made this division, we shall arrange the Athenians as analogous to the first genera; but the other Grecks who were not yet enslaved, to the middle; and those who were now slaves, to the last genera. For according to this arrangement, those that belong to the Minerval series, vanquish those that belong to the series of Neptune; those that rank as first, subduing those that rank as second,’ the monadic, the dyadic, and in short, the better vanquishing the worse. But the middle genera eternally preserve their own order, and are not vanquished by the worse co-ordination, on account of the union of them- selves, and the stable genus of power. They likewise liberate from slavery those that are enslaved, recalling them to union and permanency. Tor some things indeed, are always in matter, others are always separated from it, and others, sometimes become situated under the material genera, and sometimes have an arrangement in a separate life. Just as in the drama pertaining to us; at one time we are arranged under the Titanic, and at another, under the Olympian order; and at one time our course terminates in gencration, but at another, in the heavens. This however happens to partial souls, through the invariably perma- nent providence of the Gods, which leads back souls to their pristine felicity. For as in consequence of there being genesiurgic Gods, souls descend, in sub- serviency to their will, thus also, through the prior subsistence of anagogic causes, the ascent of our souls from the realms of generation is elected. And thus much

* For xpwrwy here, it scems necessary to read Sevrepwr,

156 PROCLUS ON THE {(pooxt.

concerning the whole meaning of the words before us. Let us however, concisely discuss each particular,

And thus much

* For xpwrwy here, it scems necessary to read Sevrepwr,

156 PROCLUS ON THE {(pooxt.

concerning the whole meaning of the words before us. Let us however, concisely discuss each particular,

The words therefore, surpassed all others, manifest the total comprehension of the first genera of the more divine part. But the words im magnantnity, and military arts, have the same meaning as Minervatlly. Por through mag nanimily, they imitate the philosophic characteristic of the Goddess, but through warlike arts, her philopolemic characteristic. And the words, whether it was assisted by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided tn warlike affairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, signify that first and total causes, produce some things in conjunction with second and middle causes, but others by themselves, beyond the production of these, and being alone in their energy. For the genus of the Gods, and that which is posterior to the Gods, do not produce equally, but the eflective power of the Gods proceeds to a greater extent; since every where more divine causes energize prior to, together with, and posterior to their effects. Credibility therefore of this may be multifariously produced. But the extreme danger manifests the last production of the: first genera. And the ¢rophics signify that the second co-ordination is perfected under the first, being adorned by it; that it is in a certain respect converted by the power of it; and that there are in the last of things invariably permanent indications of the conversion of less excellent natures, proceeding from the first of things. For whatever is arranged in the worse co-ordination, and invested with form, material causes receding, affords a suflicient indication of the inspective care' of the better order, which is especially the peculiarity of trophies. But the most ample liberty, is an indication of the divine and iiberated order, proceeding from on high to all things; which liberty the Athenians imparted to the Greeks, by vanquishing the Atlantics; or rather the Olympic, by subduing the ‘Titanic genera, For thus the demiurgic will is accomplished, and the worse is vanquish- ed by the better co-ordination; in partial natures indeed the Atlantics by the Athenians, but in wholes, the Titans by the Olympian Gods,“ Though they are robust, and oppose the better order, through pernicious pride, and insolent impro- hity,” says the theologist; whom Plato emulating, asserts that the Atlantics inso- lently proceeded against the Athenians.

“ But in succeeding times prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking

* For extorparcas here, it is necessary to read exoraoias.

πο ses er στον

ROOK 1.} ἘΠΕ OF PLATO. 157

“ But in succeeding times prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking

* For extorparcas here, it is necessary to read exoraoias.

πο ses er στον

ROOK 1.} ἘΠΕ OF PLATO. 157

place, and bringing with them desolation, in the space of one dreadful day and night, all that warhke race of Athenians was at once merged under the earth ; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea, entirely disappeared. And hence that sea is at present innavigable, from the impeding mud which the subsiding island produced.” *

That what is here said has a physical deduction, is evident to those who are not entirely ignorent of the physical theory. For it is not wonderful that there should have been an earthquake so great, as to have destroyed sucha large island ; since an earthquake that happened a little before our time, shook both Egypt and Bithynia, and it is not at all paradoxical, that a deluge should follow an earth- quake, For this usually happens in great earthquakes, as Aristotle relates, who at the same time adds the cause. For where a deluge takes place together with earthquakes, the waves are the vause of this passion. For when the spirit which produces the earthquake, does not yet flow towards the earth, and is not able to drive backward the sea which is impelled by a certain contrary spirit, urging it in acontrary direction, through the wind which propels it, but nevertheless stops the sea by hindering its progression, it is the eause of much sea which js impelled by the spirit contrary to this, becoming collected together. Then however, the sea thus collected flowing most abundantly, the spirit impelling it ina contrary direction, enters under the earth and produces an earthquake. But the sea deluges the place, For after this manner also about Achaia, there was an earthquake accom- panied with an ingress of the waves of the sea, which deluged the maritime cities, Bouras and Helice ;; so that neither will any physiologist reject this narration, who considers the affair rightly. Moreover, that the same place may become pervious and impervious, continent and sea, is among the things admitted by physiologists, according to Aristotle, and which history demonstrates. Aristotle also relates, {in his Meteors,] that there was mud in the external sea, after the mouth of it, and that the place there was marshy ; so that if ro πηλοῦ xapra Bpayeng signifies marshy, it is not wonderful. For even now rocks concealed under the sea, and having water on their surface, are called breakers. Why therefore should any one con tending for the truth of these things be disturbed?

That these particulars however, have reference to the admirable and orderly distribution of the universe, we shall be convinced by recollecting what is said by

" The text of Plato in this place is in the Commentaries of Proclus very erroneous, as the Jearned reader will immediately perceive by comparing it with any of the editions of the Timzus.

158 PROCLUS ON THE leven. Orpheus about the hurling into Tartarus, near the end of the fabrication of things,— For he delivering the demiurgic opposition between the Olympian and. ‘Titanic Gods," terminates the whole ordorly distribution in the extremities of the universe, and imparts to these also the undefiled providence of the Gods, — Plato, therefore, knowing this, and delivering to us wholes in images, extends and leads into the

invisible, these twofold genera, and through this disappearing, imitates the Orphic

precipitation into Tartaras, Por in order that the last of things may be adorned, and participate of divine providence, it is requisite that both the superior and infe- rior co-ordination, should extend their production from on high as far as fo the mundane extremity. Each however, effects this in a manner adapted τὸ itself; the one being shaken, and entering under the earth, which is the same as proceed- ing stably and solidly ; but the other disappearing, whieh is the same as becom- ing material, disorderly, and formless 3 raider the earth, being a symbol of the firm and the stable; but ἐλ the sea, of that which is very mutable, disorderly and flowing. Forin the last of things, permanency and generation are from the better 5 but corruption, mutation, and disorderly motion are from the worse co-ordina- tion. Since however these things are adorned, both the invisible and visible fabri- cation receiving their completion, on this account Plato says, they happened in one dreadful day and night, aight indicating the invisible causes, but day the visi- ble, and the dreadfulness, signifying opposing power, the inflexible, and that which proceeds through all things. But because all these are accomplished according to demiurgic powers, earthquakes and deluges took place, Which are adapted to the middle fabrication. Por if he wished to signity Jovian powers or energies, he would have said, thunders and lightnings happened. But since he delivers Nep- tunian demiurgic energies, he asstmilates them to earthquakes or delauges. Por it is usual to call this God earth-shaker, and the source of marine walter (κυανοχετὴν). And because time signifies a progression in order, and a well-arranged diminu- tion, he says that all these events took place in succeeding time. Its not there- fore proper to say, that he who destroys an argument, takes away also the sub- jects, as Homer says of the Phieaceans, and of the wall which the Greeks raised ; since the things which are now asserted are not fictitious, but true. Por many parts of the earth are deluged by the sea; and what he says happened is not at all impossible. Nor again, does he relate it'as a mere history ; but he mtroduces it for the purpose of indicating the providence which proceeds through all things,

and extends even to the last of things.

* Instead of τὴν των Ολυμπίων θεων, καὶ την Tiraviny παραουν δημιουργικὴν artreou in this place,

Nor again, does he relate it'as a mere history ; but he mtroduces it for the purpose of indicating the providence which proceeds through all things,

and extends even to the last of things.

* Instead of τὴν των Ολυμπίων θεων, καὶ την Tiraviny παραουν δημιουργικὴν artreou in this place,

Tread σὴν των Ολυμπίων θεω», καὶ τὴν τῶν Τιταγίκων, κι δ.

BaP

BOOK 1.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 159

In short, it is necessary to assert, since the whole orderly distribution of things receives its completion from the visible and invisible fabrication, that for the purpose of giving perfection to the demiurgie productions of the second father, the gifts both of the better and the worse co-ordination, proceed as far as to the last of beings; the former vanquishing the subjects [of its powec] through the warlike genus, and illuminating a stable! power, through entering under the carth, li. 6. through proceeding firmly and solidly 2] but the latter producing ultimate division, and connecting the most material and indefinite motion of Tartarus. But these things being adorned, it reasonably follows that what remains is an impervious * and uninvestizable place of the sea. For there is no other passage and progression of the adorning genera of the universe, but this is that which is truly mud; and whichis mentioned by Socrates in the Phado, when he is teaching us concerning the subterranean places. For the place under the earth obscurely retains the forms of corporeity, which it possesses through the inferior co-ordina- tion subsiding, and proceeding to the end of the orderly distribution of things. For the Titanic order being driven by Jupiter as far as to Tartarus, fills what is there contained with deiform guards.

“ And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated from the narration of Solon. But when yesterday you were speaking about a polity and its citizens, I was surprised on recollecting the present history. For I pereeived how divinely from a certain fortune, and not wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the narration of Solon.” .

That the war of the Atlantics and Athenians contributes to [the theory of] the whole fabrication of the world, and that the mundane contrariety is connected by the middle fabrication proceeding from on high, from the first to the last of things, the Minerval series adorning all things stably, and in a ruling and victorious manner, expanding indeed the natures which are detained in matter, but pre- serving those undetiled that are separated? from matter ;.and also, that the other fabrication imparts appropriately, * motion, division, and diflerence, to the things fabricated, and proceeds supernally to the end ;—all this has been sufficiently

* For γονεμον here, it is necessary to read μονέμον, * For axeqos here, itis necessary to read ἀποροῖ.

ἢ Instead of καὶ χωυρέσμενα read κεχωρισμένα.

4 For προσφωνων, read προσῴορωε.

—S

100 PROCLUS ON: THE [Boox 1,

ἢ Instead of καὶ χωυρέσμενα read κεχωρισμένα.

4 For προσφωνων, read προσῴορωε.

—S

100 PROCLUS ON: THE [Boox 1,

shown and recalled to the memory by us, in what we have before said. Since however, he by whom this narration is made, ts analogous to the God who connects this contrariety, he, in a certain respect imitates him. And through a recurrence to the fathers of the narration, through what was heard by Critias and Solon, he ascends to the Egyptians; conformably to what pre-exists in the paradigm, which is filled from first causes, and fills things posterior to itself, with demiurgic power, Farther still, since he brings with him an image of the second, which proceeds from another fabrication, hence he says, that he recollected the history through the discourse of Socrates. For the recollection itself, is nota transition from images to paradigms, but from universal conceptions to more partial actions. Hence, also it is adapted to the progression of the whole fabrication of things. For since all things are in intelligibles, every demiurgic cause distributes total productions according to its: proper order,

Again, if you consider what is said after another manner, you will find that the Athenians are praised in an admirable manner, and that the polity of Socrates is fitly celebrated. For that it ts possible for this polity to exist, is demonstrated through the life of the (ancient) Athenians, and also that tt ts productive of the great- est good to those who belong to itt; which also Socrates thinks fit to demonstrate in his Republic. But he is likewise of opinion that those who live according to the best form of a polity, should be shown to deserve the greatest admiration, — For those who are fashioned according to the first paradigm are truly admirable ; since of mundane natures also, the more divine which transcendently receive the whole form of their paradigms, are said to be, and are monadic; but material natures Which have the same form in many subjects, possess the last order. This therefore, which in’ the fabrication of things, belongs to the Gods, viz. to partake transcendentiy of their proper paradigm, the city of the Athenians also exhibits, by applying itself in the most excellent manner to the best measure of life,

Moreover, the circle of benefits, imitates the mundane ἡ circle. For the Egyp- tians are benetited by the Athenians, through warlike works; and the Athe- nians are benefited by the Exyptians through sacerdotal narrations. For the communication of an unwritten action, was a return of favour. But in addition to this, the doctrinal narration of the deeds of their ancestors, exhibits a multi- plied retribution. The mention also of fortune and divinity, and the excitation of our reasoning powers, are worthy of the theory of Plato. For fortune and her

' For ro ἐγκωμιον here, it is necessary to read τὸν ἐγκοσμιίον.

nooK 1] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 161

The mention also of fortune and divinity, and the excitation of our reasoning powers, are worthy of the theory of Plato. For fortune and her

' For ro ἐγκωμιον here, it is necessary to read τὸν ἐγκοσμιίον.

nooK 1] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 161

gifts are not without a scope, or indefinite ; but sheis a power collective of many dis- persed causes, adorning things that are without arrangement, and giving completion to what is allotted to each individual from the universe. Why then did Socrates collect many things which agree with the narration of Solon? I answer, an account of the cause which collects many dispersed causes, and on account of the one divinity ἡ who connects the common intellect of Socrates and Solon. For, being of a Minerval characteristic, they are excited as it were from one fountain, their tutelar Goddess, to similar conceptions.

“Yet Iwas unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as, from the great interval of time since I first received them, my remem- brance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition. ] consider it therefore necessary, that [ should first diligently revolve the whole in my mind.”

These things may also be surveyed in the universe; viz. that the demiurgic cause of beings which are generated according to time, gives subsistence to his own progeny prior to that of partial natures." And that the hypostatic cause of things generated, first? intellectually perceiving himself, and seeing in himself the causes of his productions, thus gives also to other things a progression from himself; in order that he, being sufficient and perfect, may impart his own power to secondary natures. Conception therefore and resumption, and every thing of this kind, manifest the comprehension of demiurgic productive principles in one.

“And on this account, I yesterday immediately complied with your demands; for I perceived that we should not want the ability of pre- senting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Her- mocrates has informed you, as soon as we departed from hence, by com- municating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose

' For jay dewy in this place, read μιὰν Ocov.

* The erroneousness of the punctuation here, perverts the meaning of Procius. For the original is,

ravra καὶ ew τῷ wavre Oearcoy, πρὸ των μερικων. TO δημιουργικον αἰτιον τῶν γιγνομένων κατὰ yporoy νφιστησι τα eavrov γεννήματα. But the punctuation ought to be as follows: ravra καὶ ἐν ry παντι

θεατεον. πρὸ τῶν μερικων, ro δημιονργικον αἰτιον, κ᾿ ἃ, ? Instead οἵ προ των io this place, it is necessary to read πρωτον.

Tim. Plat, Vou. I. X

162 PROCLUS ON THE [moox 1,

of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of" the affair.”

Instead οἵ προ των io this place, it is necessary to read πρωτον.

Tim. Plat, Vou. I. X

162 PROCLUS ON THE [moox 1,

of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of" the affair.”

Why did Critias nearly remember? For he promised to accomplish what was enjoined him. Because he did not accurately remember. But he first revolved the affair in his mind, conceiving that in mandates of this kind, such as that in which Socrates wished to sce his polity in motion, the greatest undertaking is to find an hypothesis from which it is possible to give what is adapted to the man- dates. And this Critias accomplishes, by receiving from history the war of the Atlantics and Athenians, as a thing capable of exhibiting a life productive of the best polity. He also revolved this narration by might, in order that he might impart it to his associates without error,

Again therefore, from these things, let us betake ourselves to wholes. For there the demiurgic cause being filled from an invisible cause (since all intellectual causes are there primarily, to which he is united ἡ according to the highest trans- cendency), produces the power of himself into the visible world, conformably to their will and judgment. Farther still, not to give the narration immediately, but afterwards, isa symbol of the preparatory apparatus of nature, from which perfection is produced in physical effects. You may also consider the caution of Critias ethically. For it is not proper to attempt things of sucha magnitude rashly, without first revolving the whole undertaking by ourselves, in order that we may bring them forth as froma treasury through speech, which is truly the messenger of internal reasons. Moreover, the repeating the narration to himself, imitates the conversion of demiurgic reasons to themselves, according to which {the soul] surveys in herself (by participation] the productive principles of beings, And to present a discourse accommodated to the wishes of those who enjuined it, in- dicates in the fabrication of things the suspension of visible effects from their

causes.

“ And, indeed, according to the proverb, what we Jearn in childhood, abides in the memory with a wonderful stability. For with respect to inyself, for instance, Lam not certain that I could recollect the whole of yesterday’s discourse ; yet I should be very much astonished if any thing should escape my remembrance, which 1 had heard in some past time very

* For wenrac here, it is necessary to read exwrac.

BOOK 1. TIMZUS OF PLATO. 163

BOOK 1. TIMZUS OF PLATO. 163

distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight ; who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently gratified me with a repetition of it. And hence, as the marks of letters deeply burnt in, remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly established in my memory.”

That children remember better than men is seen in works, and has many probable causes. One indeed, as Porphyry says, because the souls of children hare not anexperience of human evils. Hence, as they are neither distracted nor disturbed by extemals, their imagination js void of impressions ; but their reasoning power is more sluggish. For experience renders this power more acute. But another cause is this, that the rational life in children is in a greater degree min- gled with the phantasy. As therefore, in consequence of the soul being co-passive, and co-mingled with the body, the body becomes stronger and more vital ; after the same manner also, the phantasy is strengthened through the habitude of reason. And being strengthened, it has more stable impressions, from receiving through its own power reason in a greater degree; just as the body is more powerful, in consequence of being more vital, through a more abundant commu- nion with the soul. A third cause in addition to these is, that the same things appear to be greater to the imaginations of children. TIence they are in a greater degree admired by them, so that they are more co-passive with them, and on this account especially remember them. For we deposit in the memory things which vehemently pain, or vehemently delight us. They therefore operate on us ina greater degree. Tlence ἀν that which suffers in a greater degree from fire, preserves fora longer time the heat imparted to it; after the same manner, that which suffers more from the external object of the phantasy, retains the impression ina greater degree, Moreover the imagination of children suffers more, on ac- count of the same things appearing to us to be greater during our childhood, Hence children in a greater degree retain the impression, as suflering in a greater degree from the same things. And it appears to me that Critias indicates this when he says, that he heard this history from the old man with great delight, and that on this account it became firmly established in his memory, like the marks of letters deeply burnt in. But as Socrates in the recapitulation of his polity asserts, that the cause of memory to us is the unusualness ' of the things which

* For αληθειαν here, it is necessary to read αηθειαν.

164 PROCLUS ON THE [poox τ.

But as Socrates in the recapitulation of his polity asserts, that the cause of memory to us is the unusualness ' of the things which

* For αληθειαν here, it is necessary to read αηθειαν.

164 PROCLUS ON THE [poox τ.

we hear, thus Critias, in what is here said, ascribes this cause to the age of children. For every thing that occurs to children at first, appears to be unusual. And perhaps this brings with it an indication, that the prolific fabrication of Gods of the second rank is suspended from the stable sameness of those of the first order ; just as the memory of a boy is the cause of memory to the associates of Critias. If some one however, in addition to these solutions, should adhere to the whole theory of things, let him hear Janublichus asserting, that the memory of children indicates the ever new, flourishing, and stable production of reasons; the indelibility of the letters, the perpetually-tlowing and never-failing fabrication ; and the alacrity of the teacher, the unenvying and abundant supply afforded by more ancient canses to secondary natures. Por these things also have ἃ place in con-

junction with the before-mentionced solutions,

“ In consequence of this, as soon as it was day, I repeated the narra- tion to my friends, that together with myself they might be better pre- pared for the purposes of the present association, But now with respect to that for which this narration was undertaken, IT am prepared, O Socra- tes, to speak not only summarily, but so as to descend to the particulars of every thing which 1 heard. We shall transfer, however, to reality the citizens and city which you fashioned yesterday as ina fable ; consider- ing that city which you established as no other than’ this Athenian city, and the citizens which you conceived, as no other than those ances- tors of ours described by the Egyptian priest. And indeed the aair will harmonize in every respect ; nor will it be forergn from the purpose to assert, that your citizens are those very people who existed at that time. Ilfence, distributing the affair in) common among us, we will en- deavour, to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish ina becoming man- ner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite there- fore to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse 15 reasonable, or whe- ther we should lay it aside, and seck after another.”

Before, Critias made his associates partakers of his narration ; but now, he calls on them to accomplish in conjunction with him, the employment assigned them. Because in the paradigms all things indeed are united on high, and fill each other with intellectual powers; but in the demturgie world for in’ the world

in the intelleet of the Demiurgas,} they subsist with each other, according to

a certain divine and total conspiration ; conformably to which, and through

partes πον 5 ν

BOOK ν.} ΤΙΝ Ό5 OF PLATO. 162

162

which, all things are every where appropriately in each. Hence ἴῃ the heavens the paradigms of generated natures pre-exist, and in generation there are images of celestial natures. Since, however, wholeness every where pre- cedes parts, this also may be seen in the second fabrication. On this account Critias first summarily discusses the war; but afterwards he endeavours to explain more copiously every particular, narrating all the polity of the At- lantics, and the principle of their generation; how they turned to injustice, how the Athenians proceeded to war; from what apparatus, from what le- gations, through what ways, with whom they were co-arranged, and such things as are consequent to these. The genuine polity, therefore, (of Socrates] is an imitation of the first fabrication. Hence indicating the mystic nature of it, and its pre-existence in pure reason, he says, that it was fashioned as it were ina fable. But the hypothesis of the Athenians has an indication, as in images,’ of the second fabrication; in which that) which is more partial presents itself to the view; and what remains consists of contrariety and motion, and that which is circumscribed in’ place. Since, however, the second is suspended from the first fabrication, and is in continuity with it, hence he says, “ that the affair will harmonize in cwery respect, and that it will not be foreign to the purpose to assert, that the citizens in the Re- public of Socrates are the very people who existed at that time.”

“Socrates. But what other, O Critias, should we reccive in _ prefers ence to this? Por your discourse, through a certain affinity, is particularly adapted to the present sacrifice to the Goddess. And besides this, we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, ¢hat your rela- fion is not a mere fable, but a true history of transcendent magnitude. It is impossible, therefore, to say how and from whence, neglecting your narration, we should find another more convenient.”

Socrates approves the narration of Critias, in the first place as adapted to the festival of the Athenians; for the [Atlantic] war is an image of mundane

wars; and as a hymn accommodated to the sacrifice to Minerva. For if

speech is of any advantage to men, it should be employed in hymns. And besides this, since the Goddess is the cause of both theory and action; through

* For ws exeiswy ostwy in this place, it is necessary to read ws εἰκογων orrwr.

166 PROCLUS ON THE {[poox ἣν

For if

speech is of any advantage to men, it should be employed in hymns. And besides this, since the Goddess is the cause of both theory and action; through

* For ws exeiswy ostwy in this place, it is necessary to read ws εἰκογων orrwr.

166 PROCLUS ON THE {[poox ἣν

sacrifice, indeed, we imitate her practical energy, but through the hymn her theoretic energy. But, in the second place, Socrates approves the narration as bearing witness to the possibility of his polity. For this, in his discourse about it, he thought worthy of demonstration. For it was sufficient for him that this scheme of a polity existed in the heavens, and in one man; since all things that have an external, have an internal subsistence, and that) which is truly law, begins from the internal life itself. If also he shows, that this polity once prevailed among the Athenians, he certainly demonstrates the possibility of it. This, therefore, has such-like causes as these, Again how- ever it may be assumed from these things, that the narration about the At- lantics is not a fiction, as some have supposed it to be; but a history indeed, yet having an affinity to the whole fabrication of the world. So that such things as Plato discusses about the magnitude of the Atlantic island, 1uust not be rejected as fabulous and _ fictitious on account of those who en- close the earth in a very narrow space.

“ Hence it is requisite that you should speak with good Fortune, but that I on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest from speaking, and be attentive to what you have to say.”

Plato does not, like the Stoics, assert, that the worthy man has no need of Fortune; but he is of opinion that our dianoetic energies, since they are com- plicated with corporeal energies, according to external progression, should be inspired by good Fortune, in order that they may proceed fortunately, and that their effect upon others may be friendly to divinity. And as Nemesis is the inspector of light words, thus also good Fortune directs the words both of those that receive and of him that utters them, to a good purpose, in order that the former may receive benevolently and sympathetically, but the latter may impart ina divinely inspired manner, that which is adapted to every one. Thus, therefore, in partial natures. But in wholes, good Fortune signities a divine allotment, according to which each thing 15 allotted an order adapted to it, from the one father, and the whole fabrication. Moreover, for So- crates to rest from speaking, and to be attentive to what may be said, has indeed an appropriate retribution. For the other persous of the dialogue did this, when he narrated his polity. But this shows from analogy, how all demiurgic causes being united to each other, have at the same time separate

rasa

ΒΟΟΚ 1. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 167

For the other persous of the dialogue did this, when he narrated his polity. But this shows from analogy, how all demiurgic causes being united to each other, have at the same time separate

rasa

ΒΟΟΚ 1. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 167

productions. Jor to hear is indicative of receiving through each other. And for the others to rest, when one speaks, signifies the unmingled purity ac- cording to which each demiurgic cause produces and generates secondary natures from its own peculiarity.

“ Crit. But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual banquet of discussion. Tor it seems proper to us that ‘Timeus, who is the most astronomical of us all, and is eminently knowing in the nature of the universe, should speak the first; commencing his discourse from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to you according to the narration and law of Solon, as to proper judges, should render them members of this city; as being in reality no other than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us, in the report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse concerning them, as about citizens and Athenians,”

The intention of this arrangement is to make Timaus a summit, and at the same time a middle. Forhespeaks after Socrates and Critias, and prior to Critias and Her- mocrates. And thus,indeed, heis amiddle; but in another respect,he is a summit, according to science, and because he generates the men, whom Socrates indeed edu- cates, but Critias arms. This, however, is also a manifest symbol of total fabrication, which is at one and the same time a summit and a middle. For it is exempt from all mundane natures, and is equally present to all. The summits likewise, and the middle of the universe, belong to the Demiurgus, according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. For the tower of Jupiter is, as they say, situated there. But Critias, who spoke as the middle after Socrates, now again summarily speaks prior to Hermocrates. For the duadic pertains to the middle fabrication, and also the whole in conjunction with parts ; just as the whole [prior to parts] belongs to the first, but parts to the last fabrication, Wence Socrates summarily delivered his polity, and Hermocrates contributed to the parts of the history which was about to be narrated by Critias. And thus much concerning the whole arrangement.

Some one, however, may doubt, what will be left for Ilermocrates to accomplish after Timeus has delivered the generation of the men, Socrates their education,

108 PROCLUS ΟΝ THE [Boox 1.

And thus much concerning the whole arrangement.

Some one, however, may doubt, what will be left for Ilermocrates to accomplish after Timeus has delivered the generation of the men, Socrates their education,

108 PROCLUS ΟΝ THE [Boox 1.

and Critias their actions. For to these things there is nothing successive. May it not be said that Hermocrates is the adjutor of Critias in his narration ; for the relation of the history was a mixture of deeds and words. And Critias himself promised to make a discussion of the actions, but calls on Hermocrates to assist him in the words. For the imitation of these is difficult, as was before observed. Hence in the Atlanticus, Critias having assembled the Gods, as consulting about the punishment of the Atanties, he says ‘ Jupiler thus addressed them.” And he thus terminates the dialuzue, as delivering to Hermocrates the imitation of the words. But there is no absurdity in his not discussing (in the Athanticus] the remainder of the deeds. For, in short, having assembled the Gods, for the purpose of chastising the insolence of the Atlanties, he has every thing consequent to this comprehended in the Gods being thus collected, viz. the preparation of the Athenians, their egress, and their victory. Timwus, therefore, generates the men, Socrates educates them, Critias leads them forth to actions, and Hermocrates to words ; the first of these, imitating the paternal cause; the second, the suppher of stable intelligence; the third, the supplier of motion and progression to secondary natures; and the fourth, imitating the cause which converts the last of things to their principles through the imitation of reasons (i. e. of productive powers]. Thus, therefore, these particulars may be symbolically understood, and, perhaps, in no very supertluous manner,

e. of productive powers]. Thus, therefore, these particulars may be symbolically understood, and, perhaps, in no very supertluous manner,

Some one, also, may doubt why the Timzus had not an arrangeinent prior to the Republic, since in the former dialogue the generation of the world, and also of the human race, is delivered. For it is necessary, as Timwus says, that men should be generated; and also, that they should be educated, which Socrates effects in the Republic ; and that they should energize in ἃ manner worthy of their education, which in a certain respect the Atlanticus exhibits. And if, indeed, Plato beginning from the end proceeded to the ‘Timeus, which is first by nature, it will be asserting, what is usual to say, that for the sake of doctrine, things that are first to us, though posterior by nature, are first’ delivered ; but that now he appears to have arranged the middle as the first, and the first as the middle. And if, indeed, this arrangement had been adopted by those who are studious of ornament, it would have been less wonderful; but now Plato himselfappears to have acted in this manner, Προ, therefore, there is a recapitulation of the polity, as having been already summarily narrated in the shortest: manner, In answer tu this doubt it must be said, that if all hypotheses were assumed from the nature of things now in existence, or which were formerly, it would be necessary that the.

Book 1} TIMEUS OF PLATO. 169

Book 1} TIMEUS OF PLATO. 169

doubt should be valid, and that the Timeus is not rightly ranked in the second place. If also, all the narrations were devised from hypothesis, it thus would be requisite that such things as are first according to nature, should be first assumed. Bat since the hypothesis of Socrates subsists in words alone, and surveying the universal, applies itself to the nurture and education of men, but the hypothesis consequent to this discusses beings and things in generation, these are very properly conjoined to each other; while the hypothesis of Socrates, as only subsisting in words, and being on this account accurate, has an arrangement prior to the rest. Perhaps, likewise, Plato wished to indicate this to us, that such things as divine (human) souls, and which are ascending to the intelligible, produce, these are some time or other effected on the earth, according to certain prosperous vicissitudes of circulations, As Critias therefore asserts this, bearing testimony to Socrates, we must say that those true ancestors of ours of which the priest spoke, perfectly accord with those citizens which Socrates mentally conceived, and our opinion is not to be rejected that they were those who existed at that time. Ifhowever the Republic is inferior to the Timzus, because it is conversant with that which is partial, and to discuss mortal affairs is to dwell on an image, ἢ yet the universal prevails init. For the same form of life exhibits indeed in the soul Justice, but ina city a polity, and in the world, fabrication,

Farther still, the deliberate choice of virtue is free, but the energy which is di- rected to externals, requires the mundane order, and hence the Atlanticus is pos- terior to the Timaus. But the habit of the citizens shows that virtue is without a master. Plato also manifests through these things, (hat the soul when she is of herself [and does not depend on another] is superior to every physical hypostasis, and runs above Fate ; but when she verges to actions, is vanquished by physical laws, and is in subjection to Fate. In addition also to what has been said, it is requisite to know this, that from the order of human life delivered in the Republic, the con- nexion of these dialogues, may be obtained. For in that dialogue the men are first educated and instructed through disciplines. Afterwards, they ascend to the contemplation of [true] beings ; and in the third place, descend from thence to a providential attention to the city. Conformably to this congruity, the Re- public has an arrangement prior to the Timeus; and the Timaus to the Atlanti- cus. For the men being instructed by the Republic, and elevated according to theory by the Timaus, will, living happily, wisely’ perform such actions, as the

' For exporws bere, 1 read ἐμφρονωε. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. -

170 PROCLUS ON THE ioe.

For the men being instructed by the Republic, and elevated according to theory by the Timaus, will, living happily, wisely’ perform such actions, as the

' For exporws bere, 1 read ἐμφρονωε. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. -

170 PROCLUS ON THE ioe.

Atlanticus narrates. After this manner therefore, we dissolve the doubt. The philosopher Porphyry however, not directly for the sake of this doubt, but dis- cussing something else, affords us the following aid in its solution ; that those who wish' to apprehend the whole theory genuinely, ought first to be instructed in the form of it, in order that being similar to the object of intellection, they may be in a becoming manner co-adapted to the knowledge of the truth. This therefore, the order itself of the dialogues demonstrates. For the auditors of the Timaus ought first to have been benefited by the Republic, and having been adorned through it, to attend afterwards to the dogmas concerning the world, evincing themselves to be most similar through erudition to the excellent order of the uni- verse. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

Each particular however of the text must be considered, ‘Timiwus therefore, is now said to be most astronomical, not as directing his attention to the rapidity of the celestial motions, nor as collecting the measures of the courses of the sun,* nor as being conversant with the works of Fate, but as astronomizing above the heavens, conformably to the coryphwus in the Phewtetus, and contemplating the invisible causes which are properly stars. TLenee Socrates does not exhibit the visible man, but the man that is purely essentialized ino reason; and he does this as imitating the whole demiurgus, in) whom the heavens and all the stars subsist, as the theologist says, intellectually, “Timieus begins however, from the generation of the world, and ends in man; because man is a mi- crocosm, possessing all things partially, which the universe does totally, as Socrates demonstrates in’ the Philebus. But there are certain persons educated by Socrates in the most excellent manner, who also educates the whole city, and these are the guardians and auxiliaries. Forin the universe, that) which transcendently participates of intellect is heaven, which also imitates intellect through its motion. The men however, are introduced by Critias, conformably to the law and conceptions of Solon, because Solon narrates, that the Athenians were once thus governed, and established laws how children ought to be intro-

duced into the polity, and into the tribes, and how they ought τὸ be registered 5

* For pevovras inthis place, it appears to me to be necessary to read ἐθέλων ταν,

* Proclus here alludes to the following Chaldaan oracle: ‘ Direct not your attention to the immense measures of the earth; for the plant of truth is not in the earth. Nor measure the dimensions of the sun by means of collected rules; for it revolves by the eternal willof the father, and not for your sake. Dismiss the sounding course of the moon; for it perpetually runs through the exertions of necessity. The advancing procession of the [fixed] stars, was not generated for yoursahe,” Ac. See my collection of these Oracles, in No. XAVII, of the Classical Journal.

ete AEN SRAM δος σον, TL ον

BOOK 1.] TIM EUS OF PLATO. 171

and likewise, by what kind of judges, they should be tried, in one place from the tribes, but in another, from other appropriate persons, As Critias therefore admits» that the-men educated by Socrates were Athenians, he follows the conceptions and the law of Solon, conformably to which certain persons are introduced into the polity.

Soc. “ I seem to behold a perfect and splendid banquet of discussion set before me. It belongs therefore, now to you, O ‘Timaus, to begin the discourse; having first of all, as is fit, invoked the Gods according to law.”

Soc. “ I seem to behold a perfect and splendid banquet of discussion set before me. It belongs therefore, now to you, O ‘Timaus, to begin the discourse; having first of all, as is fit, invoked the Gods according to law.”

The perfection and the splendor of the narration indicate the supernatural pro- duction of things on account of their paradigms, and which takes place universally. And to these the words of Socrates refer. The banquet of discussion indicates the perfect plenitude of demiurgic forms ; but the calling on Timaus, the conversion of partial causes to the whole, and an evocation of the goods thence derived ; and the invocation of the Gods, the fabrication: supernally suspended from intel- ligibles. For the expression according to law, is not such as many of the Ttalic or Attic interpreters suppose it to be, butait has the same meaning as the words usually employed by the Pythagereans, “ [loner in the first place, the immortal Gods, as they are disposed by law.” For law manifests the divine order, accord- ing to which secondary are always suspended from prior causes, and are filled from them. But law thus beginning from intelligibles, extends τὸ the demiurgic cause, and from this proceeds, and is divided about the universe, At the same time, however, Socrates indicates through these things, that the Pythagoric doc- trine requires that physiology should commence from a divine cause, and that it should not be such as that which he reprobates in the Phado, which blinds: the eye of the soul, by assigning airs and wthers as causes, conformably to Anaxa- goras. Por itis necessary that true physiology should be suspended from theo- logy, in the same manner as nature is suspended from the Gods, and is divided according to the total orders of them; so that words may be imitators of the things of which they are significant. For mythologists also narrate that Vulean who presides over nature was in love with Minerva, who weaves the order of intellec- tual forms, and is the supplier of intelligence to all mundane essences. As far as to this therefore, the preface of the Timiwus receives its completion; of which Severus, indeed, did not think fit to give any interpretation; but Longinus does not say that the whole is supertluous, but only such particulars as are introduced

7 ΞΖ

172 PROCLUS ON THE TIM.EUS OF PLATO. [Book τ.

[Book τ.

about the Atlantics, and the narration of the Egyptian; so that he is accustomed to conjoin with the request of Socrates, the promise of Critias. I mean, he con- nects with the words, ‘ J now therefore stand prepared to receive the promised feast,” the words, “ But now consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual ban- quet of discussion.” But Porphyry and Jamblichus show that this preface accords with the whole design of the dialogue, the one indeed more partially, but the other with more profound intuition ; so that we also shall here finish the book in conformity to Plato, having adopted their order.

173

BOOK, ἢ.

Tut preface of the Timieus consists of two heads sa recapitulation of the polity of Socrates, and a concise narration of the war of the Athenians against the Atlantics, and the victory which they obtained over them. Each of these, how- ever, contributes in the greatest degree to the consummation of the whole theory of the world. For the form of the [Socratic] polity, considered by itself, is primarily adapted to the orderly distribution of the heavens. But the narration of the war and the victory, becomes a symbol to us of the mundane contrariety. And the former describes in images the first fabrication, but the latter the second. Or, if you are willing, the former describes the formal, but the latter the material cause. For all physiologists make principles to be contraries, and constitute the world from the harmonious conjunction of contraries. And harmony indeed, and order are derived trom form, which in the recapitulation is shown to proceed from

the polity in common, and to extend in an orderly progression to every multitude.

For it is one thing to deliver the polity whichis in the soul, another, that which is inmen, and another, that which is mundane. But the recapitulation of Socrates, describing the form itself of every polity separately, exhibits to us primarily the polity in the universe, to which also it entirely hastens to refer (the polities that rank as] parts,

Farther still, if also you are willing to consider the aflair after another manner, the polity may be arranged as analogous to the heavens, but the war to genera- tion. For the polity extends as far as to the last of things; since all things are arranged conformably to the series which proceeds from the demiurgus as far as to mundane natures. Contrariety also pre-exists after a manner in the heavens;

174 PROCLUS ON TUF. [BooK ιν.

For the polity extends as far as to the last of things; since all things are arranged conformably to the series which proceeds from the demiurgus as far as to mundane natures. Contrariety also pre-exists after a manner in the heavens;

174 PROCLUS ON TUF. [BooK ιν.

either according to the two-fold circulations of the celestial bodies, viz. to the right hand, and to the left; or according to the two-fold. circles of souls, the circle of sameness, and the circle of difference; or according to the genera of being, permanency ἡ and motion; or according to the divine peculiarities, the male and the female; or according to any other such-like division, “The polity there- fore, is more allied to the heavens, but the war to veneration, Lenee the former is Jovian, but the latter pertains to the allotment of Neptune, After however the theory of parts, it is necessary through images to he extended to the Know- ledge of the whole. And after the survey of images themselves, it 1s requisite to adhere to their paradigms, from small being initiated ino greater [objects of con- templation). Por the former have the relation of things preparatory to initiation, and of small mysteries, exciting the eye of the soul to the comprehension of the whole and the universe, and τὸ the contemplation of the one cause, and the one progression of all inundane natures, For every thing is from: the one, and the universe with having in different: parts of it, more partial presiding powers, proceeds vice versa to the one cause of its subsistence.

Timawus however, prior to entering on the whole discussion, converts himself to the invocations of, and prayers to the Gods, imitating in this the maker of the universe, who prior to the whole fabrication of things, Is said) to have approached to the oracle of night, to have been there filled with divine intellectual concep- tions, to have received: the principles of fabrication, and there to dissolve, if it be lawful so to speak, all his doubts, To night also, who calls on the father, (Jupiter] to enzage in the fabrication of the universe, Jupiter is represented by the theola-

gist as ΒΆΝ ΤΠ,

Maia, supreme of all the powers divine, Immortal Night! how with unconquer'd timd

Must | the source of the immortals fix ?

And he receives this answer from her,

All things receive inclos’d on ev'ry side, In wther’s wide ineffable embrace ;

Then in the midst of ather place the heav'n, *

* For σνστασιν here, itis necessary to read στασιν:

* For ovpary here, it is necessary to read ουρανον.

noon tJ TIMALUS OF PLATO. 175

And he is instructed by her in all the consequent fabrication of the world. But again to Saturn, after the bonds, Jupiter al but praying says,

Damon, most fam'd, our progeny direct.

noon tJ TIMALUS OF PLATO. 175

And he is instructed by her in all the consequent fabrication of the world. But again to Saturn, after the bonds, Jupiter al but praying says,

Damon, most fam'd, our progeny direct.

And in all that follows, he calls forth the benevolence of his father. For how could he otherwise fill all things with Gods and assimilate the sensible world to animal itself, (or the intelligible paradigm) than by extending himself to the invisible

causes of wholes, from which being himself filled,

Ile from his (sacred) heart may godlike works

Again produce.

It is necessary therefore, prior to all other tings, that we should know some- thing manifest concerning prayer, what its essence is, and what. its perfection, and whenee itis imparted to souls, For the philosopher Porphyry indeed, de- scribing those among the ancients that admitted prayer, and those that did not, leads us from one opinion to another, and says in short, that neither those who are diseased according to the first kind ofimpiety, derive any benetit from prayer, since they do not admit that there are Gods, nor those who labour under the second kind, and entirely subvert providence, granting indeed that there are Gods, but denying their providential energies. Nor are they benefited by it, who admit indeed the providence of the Gods, but assert that all things are produced by them from necessity. For there is no longer any advantage to be derived from prayer, if things of a contingent nature have not! any existence, But such as assert that the Gods providentially attend to all things, and that many things that are generated are contingent and may subsist otherwise, these very properly admit the necessity of prayers, and acknowledge that they correct our life. Porphyry also adds, that prayer especially pertains to worthy men, because it isa contact with divinity. But the similar loves to be conjoined to the similar: and the worthy man is most similar to the Gods. - Because likewise those who embrace virtue are in custody, and are inclosed in the body as in a prison, they ought to request the Gods that they may migrate from hence. Besides, since we are as children torn from our parents, it is fit we should pray

* For add\ws γινέσθαι ovrwy here, it is necessary to read, adAws γιγεσθαι μὴ οντων.

176 PROCLUS ON THE {Boox 13,

Besides, since we are as children torn from our parents, it is fit we should pray

* For add\ws γινέσθαι ovrwy here, it is necessary to read, adAws γιγεσθαι μὴ οντων.

176 PROCLUS ON THE {Boox 13,

that we may return to our true parents the Gods. Those also resemble such as are deprived of their fathers and mothers, who do not think it requisite to pray and be converted to the Gods, ΔἸ nations likewise, that have excelled) in wisdom, have diligently apphed themselves to prayer; among the Indians the Brachmans, among the Persians the Magi, and of the Greeks the taost theolo- gical, who instituted initiatory rites and mysteries, But) the Chaldeans venerate every other divinity, and likewise the virtue itself of the Gods, which they deno- minate a Goddess χ᾽ so far are they from despising sacred) worship, on account of the possession of virtue. And in addition to all this, as we are parts of the Universe itis fit that we should be in want of the universe. ΕῸΓ a conversion to the whole imparts salvation to every thing, Tf therefore you possess virtue, you should invoke that which antecedently comprehends all virtue, For that which is all-good, will also be the cause to you of appropriate good. Or τ you explore a certain corporeal good, there is a power in the world which compre- hends all body. It is necessary therefore that perfection should) from thence be derived to the parts. And this is the sum of whatis said by Porphyry on this subject.

The divine Tamblichus however, does not think that a history of this kind pertains to whatis here proposed to be considered, For Placo is not now speaking about atheistical men, but about such as are wise, and able to converse with the Gods. Nor does he speak of such as are dubious about the works of piety 3 dué fo such as wish to be saved by those who are the saviours of wholes, he delivers the power of prayer, and tts aumirable and supernatural perfection which transcends all ca pectation.

It is fit however, that transferring what he says to what is more usual and more known to the reader, we should render his meaning clear, and assign arguments concerning prayer which accord with the doctrme of Plato. From hence there- fore we must begin: All beings aie the progeny of the Gods, by whom they are produced without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the progression of things which perpetually subsist, and cohere from permanent causes, is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, bat immediately subsists from the Gods, from whence all things are generated, however distant they may be from the divinities. And this is no tess true, even though asserted of matter itself.

Fora divine nature is not absent from any thing, but is equally present to all

' Yor θέων in this place, it is requisite to read Beov.

BOOK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 177

And this is no tess true, even though asserted of matter itself.

Fora divine nature is not absent from any thing, but is equally present to all

' Yor θέων in this place, it is requisite to read Beov.

BOOK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 177

things. Hence though. you should assume the last of beings, in these also you will find divinity. Por the one is every where; and in consequence of its absolute dominion, every thing receives its nature and coherence from the Gods. — As all things however proceed, so likewise, they are not separated from the Gods, but radically abide in them, as the causes and sustainers of their existence. For where can they recede, since the Gods primarily comprehend all things in their embrace ? For whatever is placed as separate from the Gods has not any kind of sub- sistence. But all beings are contained by the Gods and reside in their natures, after the mannerofa circular comprehension. Hence, bya wonderful mode of subsistence, all things proceed, and yet are not, nor indeed can be separated from the Gods; because all oflsypring when torn from their parents, immediately recur to the immense vastness of non-entity. But in a certain respect they are established in them; and in short, proceed in themselves, but abide in the Gods. Since how- ever, haying proceeded, it is requisite that they should be converted and return, imitating the evolution into light, and conversion of the Gods to their cause, in order that these being arranged conformably to the perfective triad, may again be contained by the Gods and_ the first unities,—-hence they receive from them a certain secondary perfection, by which they may be able to convert themselves to . the goodness of the divinities, in order that being at first rooted in, they may again through conversion be established in them, forming a certain circle, which originates from and terminates inthe Gods.

All things therefore, both abide in, and convert themselves to the Gods, receiv- ing this power from the divinities, together with two-fold impressions according to essence; the one, that they may abide there, but the other that, having proceeded, they may convert themselves [to their causes). And these things we may survey not only in souls, but also in inanimate natures. Lor what else ingenerates in these a sympathy with other powers, but the symbols which they are allotted by nature, some of which are allied to éhis, but others to that series of Gods? For nature being supernally suspended from the Gods, and distributed from their orders, inserts also in bodies impressions of their alliance to the divinities. In some indeed, inserting solar, but in others lunar impressions, and in others again, the symbol] of some other God. And these indeed, convert them- selves to the Gods; some, as to the Gods simply, but others as to particular Gods ; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of

* For παρ᾽ core here, read xapeore.

And these indeed, convert them- selves to the Gods; some, as to the Gods simply, but others as to particular Gods ; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of

* For παρ᾽ core here, read xapeore.

Tim. Plat. ; Vou. ἢ Z

178 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK IF

the divinities. The Demiurgus of the universe therefore, by a much greater priority, impressed these symbols in souls, by which they might be able to abide in themselves, and again convert themselves to the sources of their being. And through the symbol of unity indeed he conferred on them stability ; but through intellect, he imparted to them the power of conversion,

But to this conversion prayer is of the greatest utility. For it attracts to itself the bencticence of the Gods, through those incflable symbols which the father of souls has disseminated in them. ΠῚ likewise unites those who pray with those to whom prayer is addressed ; conjoins the intellect of the Gods with the words of those who pray ; excites the will of those who perfectly comprehend good to the abundant communication of its is the fabricator of divine persuasion; and esta- blishes in the Gods all that we possess.

Toa perfect and trae prayer however, there is required in the first place, a knowledee of all the divine orders to which he who prays approaches. For no one will accede τὸ the Gods ina proper manner, unless he has a knowledge of their peculiarities. Hence also the oracle admonishes, that a fire-heated conception has the prst order in sacred worship. But in the second place, there is required a conformation of our life with that which is divine ; and this accompanied with all purity, chastity, discipline, and order, through which our concerns being intro- duced to the Gods, we shall attract their beneficence, and our souls will become subject to them. (In the third place, contact is necessary, according to which we touch the divine essence with the sumimitof our soul, and verge to a union with it.) Bat there is vet farther required, an approximating adhesion Σ for thus the oracle calls it, whenit says, he mortal approvimating to fire τὶ il possess alight from the Gods. For this imparts to us a greater communion with, and a more muanti- fest. participation of the light of the Gods. In the last place, union succeeds establishing the one of the soul in the one of the Gods, and causing our energy to hecome one with divine energy ; according to which we are no longer ourselves, but are absorbed as it were ia the Gods, abiding in’ divine ieht, and cireukarly comprehended by it. And this is the best end of true prayer, in order that the conversion of the soul may be"conjoined with its permanency, and that every thing which proceeds from dhe one of the Gods, may aga.n be established in ¢he one, and the light which is inus may be comprehended in the light of the Gods.

And this is the best end of true prayer, in order that the conversion of the soul may be"conjoined with its permanency, and that every thing which proceeds from dhe one of the Gods, may aga.n be established in ¢he one, and the light which is inus may be comprehended in the light of the Gods.

Prayer therefore, is no small part of the whole ascent of souls. / Nor is he who possesses virtue superior to the want of the ood which proceeds from prayer 5 but on the contrary the ascent of the soul is effected through it, and together with this, piety to the Gods, which is the summit of virtue, ΔῸΣ δὲ short, ought any

BOOK 11. TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 179

other to pray than he who is transcendently good, as the Athenian guest {in Plato} says. For to such aone, converse with the Gods becomes most efficacious lo the attain- ment ofa happy life. But the contrary is naturally adapted to befal the vicious. For it isnot lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure. Hence, it is neces- sary that he who generously enters on the exercise of prayer, should render the Gods propitions to him, and should excite in himself conceptions full of intellec- tual light. For the faver and benignity of more exalted beings, is the most eflec- tual incentive to their communication with ournatures, And it is requisite to continue without mtermission in the worship of divinity. For [according to the oracle} the rapid ' Gods perfect the mortal constantly employed ino prayer. It is also necessary to. observe a stable order in the performance of divine works ;

to exert those virtues which purify and elevate the soul from generation, together, 7.0)"

with faith, truth, and love ; to preserve this triad and hope of good, this immutable : reception of divine light, and segregation from every other pursuit, that thus be- coming alone, we may associate with solitary deity, and not * endeavour to conjoin ourselves with multitude to (he one. For he who attempts this, efleets the very contrary, and separates himself from the Gods. For as it is not lawful in con- junction with non-entity to associate with being ; so neither is it possible with multi- tude to be conjoined with theone. Such therefore are the particulars which ought lirst to be known concerning prayer; viz. that the essence of it congregates and binds souls to the Gods, or rather, that it unites all secondary to primary natures. - For as the great Theodorus says, all things pray except the first.

Such therefore are the particulars which ought lirst to be known concerning prayer; viz. that the essence of it congregates and binds souls to the Gods, or rather, that it unites all secondary to primary natures. - For as the great Theodorus says, all things pray except the first.

The perfection however of prayer, beginning from more common ἡ goods, ends in divine union, and gradually accustoms the soul to divine light. But its eflica- cious energy both replenishes us with good, and) causes our concerns to be com- mon with those of the Gods. With respect to the causes of prayer too, we may infer, that so faras they are efectice, they are the efficacious powers of the Gods, converting and calling upwards the soul to the Gods themselves, But that so far as they are final or pertective, they are the immaculate goods of the soul, which they derive as the fruits of being established in the Gods. That so far also as they are paradigmatical, they are the primordial causes of beings, which proceed from the good, and are united to it, according to one ineffable union. πὶ that so far as they are formal, they assimilate souls to the Gods, and ‘give perfection to the whole of their life. And that so far as they are material, they are the imprese

Tie. The intelligible Gods. * Forcar pera πληθους here, it is necessary to read καὶ μὴ μέτα πληθουν. * For κοιλογερων in this place, itis requisite to read κοεγοτέμων.

μὰ

150 PROCLUS ΟΝ ‘THE [MOOK Ut

sions or symbols inserted by the Demiurgus in the essences of souls, in order that they may be excited to a reminiscence of the Gods who produced them, and whatever else exists.

* For κοιλογερων in this place, itis requisite to read κοεγοτέμων.

μὰ

150 PROCLUS ΟΝ ‘THE [MOOK Ut

sions or symbols inserted by the Demiurgus in the essences of souls, in order that they may be excited to a reminiscence of the Gods who produced them, and whatever else exists.

Moreover, we may likewise define the modes of prayer which are va- rious, according to the genera and species of the Gods. Por prayer is cither demiurgic, or cathartic, or vivitie, And the demiurgic is suchas that which is offered for the sake of showers and winds. For the demturgi are the causes of the generation of these. And the prayers of the Athenians for winds procuring serenity of weather are addressed to these Gods. But the cathartic prayer is that which is offered forthe purpose of averting diseases originating from) pestilence, and other contagious distempers ; such as we have written ino our temples. And the vieyie prayer is that with whieh we worship the Gods, who are the causes of vivifieation, on vecount of the origin and maturity of fruits, Henee prayers are of a perfective nature, because they clevate us to these orders of the Gods. And he who considers such prayers in a different manner, fails ino properly apprehending: the nature and eflicacy of prayer. Bat again, with reference to the things for which we pray; those prayers, which regard the salvation of the soul, obtain the first place: those whieh pertain to the rood temperament of the body, the second 5 and those rank in the third) place, which are offered for the sake of ex- ternal concerns. And lastly, with respect to the division: of the times in which we offer up prayers, it is either according to the seasons of the year, or the centers of the solar revolution; or we establish niultiforim prayers ac- cording to other such-like conceptions.

Tra. “ But, O Socrates, all such as participate but in the least degree of temperance, Oi. e. wisdom] in the impulse to every un- dertaking, whether small or great, always invoke divinity.”

Do you see what kind ofan hypothesis Plato refers to the Timwus; what kind of an auditor of it he introduces, viz. Socrates ;and what a beginning of the discus- sion he has described? For the hy pothesis indeed, refers to the whole fabrication of things ; but the auditor is prepared to be led to it contormably to the one intellect ‘and onetheory of wholes. Hence also heexcites ‘Pimiwus to prayer, But the bezin- ning of the discussion, beingimpelled from the invocation of the Gods, thus imitates the progressionofbeings, which first abiding in the Gods, arethus allotted a generation fromthem. Since however, it is said, that “alliho in the least degree participate of

ROOK 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 181

Since however, it is said, that “alliho in the least degree participate of

ROOK 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 181

temperance always invoke divinity in the impulse to every undertaking, whether if be small or great, let us see from what kind of conception they make this invocation of the Gods in every thing in which they engage. For it is not pro- bable that these who are temperate will not make real bemg the scope to which they tend. And those who establish a pure intellect as the leader of their theory; who deposit the beautiful and the good in the prerogatives of the soul, and not in human afiairs, nor in external fortunes; and who perceive ἡ the power of providence extending through all beings, and = harmonizing all things to the universe, so that both the whole and the parts may subsist most) beautifully, and that nothing may be destitute of the providence which proceeds from deity to all things ; these will genuinely apprehend the science concerning the Gods. But again, perceiving this to be the case, they will very properiy in each action, aud according to each energy, call on divinity as the co-adjutor of their im- pulse, introducing their productions to the universe in conjunction with wholes, and establishing themselves in the goodness of the Gods. For things which appear to be small, enjoy the providence of the Gods, and are great so far as they are sus- pended from them ; just again, as things which are great in their own nature, when they separate themselves from divinity, areseento be perfectly small, and of no worth.

These things therefore, temperance imparts to souls, not being a certain human habit, nor approaching to what is called continence, but a divinely inspired energy of the soul, converting herself to herself and to divinity, perceiving the causes of all things in the Gods, and from thence surveying both other things, and such as proceed [into a visible subsistence], through which as auniliaries, * we also may be able to reenr to the Gods, by means of the gifts which they insert inus, The soul also, when thus converted to herself, finds symbols of the Gods in each even of the smallest things, and through these renders every thing familiar and allied to the Gods. Since however, the Gods produced the | whole of our essence and gave us a selfmotive nature in order to the choice | of good, their producing power is particularly manifested in our external ener- | cies; though when we consult, we require their providential attention ; (which the Athemans manifest by honoring Jupiter the Counsellor) and when we choose, we are in want of their assistance; in’ order that by consulting, we may discover what is advantageous; and that in choosing, we may not through passion verge to that which is worse; butrather, that both when acting, and when

' For καθαρ τε here, read καθόρωσι. * For agoopew tv this place, it is necessary to read agoppwr.

189 PROCLUS ON THE ~ [ROOK 4.

* For agoopew tv this place, it is necessary to read agoppwr.

189 PROCLUS ON THE ~ [ROOK 4.

impelled, we may perceive that the sclfmotive nature possesses the smallest power, and that the whole of it is suspended from the providence of the Gods. Hence Timieus also says, that those who are temperate always invoke the Gods, in the nnpulse to every undertaking. Por in our elections indeed, we are more able to separate providence from that which is in ear power, Hut Weare ted pable of doing this in our imprilses | heeatise in these we have tess of the self motive enerey. Por that which is in our power iy not se extended us the pro- vidence of the Gods; but as we have frequently said, superior energize prior to secondary matures, and together with and posterior to them, and on all sides comprehend the energies of subordinate beimes. But, says the Epicurean Eur- imachus, how can we avoid proceeding to infinity, * if in the impulse to every small thing, we require prayer: for though we should) pray, we shall be in want of another prayer, and we shall no where stop? And) Porphyry dissolves the doubt as follows: that it) is mot said it is necessary to pray on account: of every thing, but in the impulse to every thing, We are impelled: therefore: to things, but we are notimpelled to impulses, so that there is not a progression to infinity. Or does not the doubt still remain? Por we are impelled to prayer, so that in this we shall again require prayer, and an impulse to this again to imfinity, Hence it is better to say, that he who prays respecting any thing, prior to this, acknowledges to the Gods, that he is allotted a power from them of conversion to them, and that to other things indeed good is imparted through prayer, but to prayer through itself, Tt does not therefore require another prayer, since it com-

prehends good in itself, and procures communion with a divine mature,

“Tt is necessary therefore, that we should do this, who are about to speak in a certain respect: concerning the universe, whether it was gene- rated, or is without generation, unless we are perfectly unwise.”

Timzus evinces how very admirable the hypothesis is, but elegantly preserves himself in the order of a pradent man, pursuing the medium between irony and arrozance. For having before said, that those who in the smallest degree partici pate of temperance, invoke divinity in the impulse to every great or small under-

: Instead of διακριναι yup επι μεν Των aipediws’, THY προνοιαν aro Tov ey ἡμιν αδυγάτουμεν, επι δε Των ὅρμων, μαλλὸν δυνάμεθα in this place, it is necessary to read, ccaxporae yap ἐπὶ μὲν των ἀμεέσιων, τὴν προνοιαν aro tov ey’ ἡμιν μαλλον δυνάμεθα, ἐπι δε των ὁρμων, αδυνατουμεν.

* For axopuy here, read ἀπειρον.

wooK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 183

* For axopuy here, read ἀπειρον.

wooK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 183

taking, he very much exalts his proposed subject of discussion, by opposing a discourse about the wnaiverse to a small thing. But he cautiously says, not that he has himself arrived αὐ the summit of temperance (i. ον of wisdom]; for this is the contrary, to the participation of temperance in the smallest decree; but that he is net perfectly unwise. And this he says from the hypothesis, in order that he may have to show, that the power and science which he possesses, are from the work itself, but not from his own discussions. His theory therefore, will be concerning the universe, so far as it is: produced by the Gods. For the world may be multifariously surveyed ; etiher according to its corporeal-formed nature, orso far as it is full of partial and total souls," or so far as it participates of intellect. “Fimiwus however, considers the nature of the universe, not according to these modes only, but particularly according to its progression from: the Demi- urgus ; where also physiology appears to be acertain’ theology ; because things Which have a natural subsistence, have ina certain respeet a divine hyparxis, so far as they are generated from the Gods. And thus this must be determined,

It is usual however to doubt, why Plato here adds ina certain respect: for he says, “© Those who are about to speak ina certam respect concerning the universe.” And the more superficial indeed of the interpreters say, that the universe is δὲ a certain respect unbegotten, and in a certain respect generated. TTence the discussion of it is very properly in a certain respect, as of that which is unbegotten, and in a certain respect as of that which is generated. Though Plato does not co- arrange ἡ τὸ πὴ ina certain respect, with the words unbegotten and gencrated, but with the words about to speak. But the divine Tamblichus says that the discussion is ina certain respect about the universe, and ina certain respect not; for matter, as being indefinite in the world, may be variously considered. To this interpretation however, it mat be said, that ry, is co-arranged with something else, and not with the universe. Will it not therefore, be better to say with our preceptor, that words are multifariousty enunciated, For the demiurgic words proceeding from intellect are of one kind, such as the Demiurgus utters to the junior. Gods: for Plato says, “ that the soul speaks, being moved to itself.” Those words which are surveyed in science, are of another kind, And those are of another kind which are allotted the third hypostasis from intellect, and which proceed externally for the sake of discipline and communication with others. Hence Timaus knowing that those

' Instead of καθ᾿ οσον πληρες ἐστι ψνχίκὼν re καὶ ολιζων in this place, itis necessary to read, caf evo

Hence Timaus knowing that those

' Instead of καθ᾿ οσον πληρες ἐστι ψνχίκὼν re καὶ ολιζων in this place, itis necessary to read, caf evo

πληρεν ἐστι ψυχων μερικων re καὶ ολικων, : > For καὶ τε γε ο [lAarwy ev τῳ ἀγένει here, it is requisite to read και τοι γε o Πλατων μη ev, «. 2d.

184 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK τι.

are demiurgic words which the Demiurgus employs, but that those are scientific which he is now about to generate, but which he pre-assumes in himself, and that he makes use of external words for the sake of Socrates alone, on this account he says that he shall employ words in a certain respect about the universe. For it is one thing to use them intellectually, another scientifically, and another, for the sake of discipline; and xy indicates these differences of words,

Again therefore, with respect to the words, “whether it was generated, or is with- out generation,” those interpreters read the former with an aspirate, but) the latter

with a soft breathing, who say that) Plato speaks about the universe, so far as it

mR? Was generated from a cause, or is unbegotten, inorder that survecing it as gene- rated, we may perceive the nature which it contains. And the Platonic Albinus thinks, that according to: Plato the world being perpetual, δ has a beginning of generation, by which also it is more redundant than being; sinee this indeed always is, but the world in addition to existing always, has a beginning of gene- ration, in order that it may exist always, and be generated. Not that it is generated after such a manner as to be so according to time; for im this case it would not always exist; butin short, it has the relation of generation, on account of its composition from things many and dissimilar, And it is necessary to refer its hypostasis to another cause more ancient than itself, through which always existing primarily, the world is ia certain respect, and always is, and is not only generated, but is also unbegotten. [This therefore is asserted by Albinus], thenueh Plato no where in what follows says, that the universe is ina certain respect generated, and ina certain respect unbegotten. Others again, read both the parts with an aspirate, in order that Timawus may say, de rs about to speak con- cerning the universe so far as itis generated, and so far asit is unbegotten serving in the same way as those prior to them; unless indeed they assert that the universe was generated according to forin, but unbegotten according to Is nurse (matter). For thus also Timiwus says, hat its nurse is unbegotten, but that the world was generated, as receiving form from divinity. But Porphyry and Tamblichus read both the parts with a soft breathing, in order that what is said may be whether the universe was generated or is unikcgotten. For this is to be considered, prior to all other things; since it contributes in the highest degree to the consummation of the whole of physiology, rightly to admit that the world was generated or is un- begotten, Por from this hypothesis we shall be able to see what the nature is of

* For ayeryroy here, Lead αἰδιον.

BOOK 11.) TIM-£EUS OF PLATO. 185

its essence and powers, as will be manifest to us shortly after, The discussion | therefore, concerning the universe, will be for the sake of discipline, and will pro- ὦ ceed from this principle, whether the world was generated, or is without genera- tion; and from this, other things must be woven together in a consequent order.

“ΤῸ is necessary, therefore, that invoking all the Gods and Goddesses, we should pray that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves.”

“ΤῸ is necessary, therefore, that invoking all the Gods and Goddesses, we should pray that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves.”

The division of male and female comprchends in itself all the plenitudes of the divine orders. For the cause of stable power and sameness, the supplier of being. and that which ts the first principle of conversion to all things, are comprehended in the male. But that which emits from itself all-various progressions and sepa- rations, measures of life and prolific powers, is contained in the female. Hence, Timirus, elevating himself to all the Gods, very properly comprehends the whole orders of them, in a division into these genera. Such a division, likewise, 1s most adapted to the proposed theory. For this universe is full of these twofold divine genera. For heaven has to earth (that we may assume the extremes) the order of the male to the female; becanse the motion of heaven imparts productive princi- ples and powers to every thing [sublunary]; and earth receiving the effluxions thence proceeding, is parturient with and generates all-various animals and plants. Of the Gods also in the heavens, some are distinguished according to the male, but others according to the female. And of those powers that govern generation in an unbegotten manner, some are of the former, but others of the latter co-or- dination. In short, the demiurgic choir is abundant in the universe, and there are many rivers of life, some of which exhibit the form of the male, but others of the female characteristic. And what occasion is there to say much on this sub- ject? For from the liberated unities," both masculine and feminine, various orders proceed into the universe. Hence, he who is entering on the discussion of the universe, very properly invokes the Gods and Goddesses, from both which the universe receives its completion, and beseeches them that what he asserts may be consistent, and particularly that it may be agreeable to their divinities. For this is the sublimest end of theory, to run upward to a divine intellect ; and as all

* For efadwy here, it is necessary to read πα

᾿ς ‘Tim. Plat. Vou. 1. 2A

136 PROCLUsS ON THE [Βοοκ 11.

things are unifurmly comprehended in it, to arrange the discussion of things agree- ably to this causal comprehension. Βαϊ that whichis the second end, and is con- sequent to this is, for the whole theory to receive its completion conformably to human intellect and the light of science. For the whole, the perfect, and the uniform, pre-exist ina divine ‘ntelleet; but that which is partial and falls short of divine simplicity, subsists about a mortal intellect.

For the whole, the perfect, and the uniform, pre-exist ina divine ‘ntelleet; but that which is partial and falls short of divine simplicity, subsists about a mortal intellect.

Why however, does Timwus say, that itis necessary to pray, and magnifi- cently proclaim that the Gods and Goddesses should be invoked, yet does not pray, though an opportunity for so doing presents itself, but immediately converts himself to the proposed discussion? We reply, itis because some things have theirend comprehended inthe very will itself; bat others, distuibute! another enerzy after the will, and through action accomplish that which was the object ofthe will. And a life indecd, conformable to philosophy, depends on our wall, and a deficiency init, is contrary to the will [But the consequences resulting from a life conversant with external actions, are not dependent ou our will;] for the end of thems not placed in us. We may tustly, therefore, rank prayer among the number of things which have all their perfection in the will Dor the wish to pray, isa desire of conversion to the Gods. And Us desire itself conducts: the desiring soul, and conjoins it to divinity, which as the first: work of prayer." Hence it is not proper first to wish, and afterwards to pray, but he that wishes to pray, will at the same time have prayer as the measure of his wish, one person indeed in a greater, but another ina less degree. Parther still, this also is: the work of a true prayer, for those things for which we pray to be common to the Gods, both according to powers and energies, and for us to eflect them im con-

junction with the Gods.—-Thus if some one should pray to the powers that ampu-

tate matter, and obliterate the stains arising from generation, but should himself

particularly endeavour to effect this, through the cathartic virtues; such a one in conjunction with the Gods, would entirely accomplish a dissolution of his mate- rial bonds. ‘This therefore Timaus here effects. For those things which he prays to the Gods to accomplish, he himsclf completes, disposing the whole discourse according to human intellect, but so as to be in conformity to the intellect of the

Gods.

And such is my prayer to the Gods with reference to mysclf; but as

' Por axovecec in this place, we must read ἀπονέμει,

> For ψνχὴν bere, itis obviously necessary to τὰ ad euyyp.

BUOK 11.} TIM. EUS OF PLATO. 187

to what respects you, it is requisite to pray that you may easily learn, and that I may be able to exhibit what I scientifically conceive, in the clearest manner about the proposed subjects of discussion. [According to my opinion therefore, the following division must first be made. ]""’

187

to what respects you, it is requisite to pray that you may easily learn, and that I may be able to exhibit what I scientifically conceive, in the clearest manner about the proposed subjects of discussion. [According to my opinion therefore, the following division must first be made. ]""’

The exhortation of the auditors, is a thing consequent to the prayers* {of Timrus]. For it is necessary that the replenishing source being suspended from its proper causes, should previously excite its recipients, and convert them to itself, prior’ to the plenitude which it confers; in order that becoming more adapted, they may happily receive the intellectual conceptions which it imparts. For thus the participation will become more perfect to them,’ and the gift will be rendered more easy to the giver. Moreover, this very circumstance of facility, is adapted to those that imitate the whole fabrication ; from which abiding and rejoicing in itself, all things proceed to the effects which it excites. Farther still, to produce one series, through the contact of secondary with prior natures, adum- brates the demiurgic series, which proceeds as far as to the last of things. For if the anditors receive what is said conformably to the intellect of Timaus, but Timeus disposes the whole discussion conformably to the intellect of the Gods, it will happen that the whole conference will in reality be referred to one intellect, and one intellectual conception. Besides this also, the self-motive nature of souls is sufficiently indicated, that being moved by the Gods, they also move themselves, and produce from themselves sciences. For the words, “ what [screntifical'y con- ceive,” exhibit the energy which is impelled from a life whose power is free.

According to my opinion therefore, these things are first to be considered ; that Timeus being a Pythagorean, and preserving the form of Pythagorie dis- cussions, is immediately exhibited to us as such, from the very beginning. For Socrates does not enunciatively declare his opinions to -others, but having dialectically purified their conceptions, unfolds trath into light; who also said to them, that he knew nothing except to make an assertion for give a reason] aud receive one. But Timaus, as also addressing his discourse to men, says that he shall enunciate his own dogmas, not at all busying himself with foreign opi-

* The original of the words within the brackets belongs to the text, but is not to be found in the commentaries of Proclus, though as the reader may see, he comments on these words.

* For yvyxars here also, it is necessary to read evyass.

2. Instead of xpos τῆς πληρώτεωε in this place, we must read πρὸ rns πληρωσεωε.

4 For ro yap avrow, read rows yap avruss.

188 PROCLUS ON THE τς [poox πὶ

* For yvyxars here also, it is necessary to read evyass.

2. Instead of xpos τῆς πληρώτεωε in this place, we must read πρὸ rns πληρωσεωε.

4 For ro yap avrow, read rows yap avruss.

188 PROCLUS ON THE τς [poox πὶ

nions, but pursuing one path of science. Moreover, the word ἐδοξα,' i.e. Lam of opinion, is assumed here very aptly, and appropriately to what has been before suid. For of the whole rational soul, one part ts intellect, another ts dianoia, and a third is opinion. And the first of these indeed, ts conjoined to the Gods, the second produces the sciences, and the third imparts them toothers. This man therefore, knowing these things, through prayer adapts his own intellect to the intellect of the Gods. For this is manifested by the words, “ that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with ourselves.” But through exhortations, he excites the dianoetic part of the souls of his auditors, For the words, what I scientifically concerve, have an indication of this kind. The doxastic part therefore remains, which receiving a scientific division from dianoia, delivers the streams of it to others. This however is not ambiguous, nur divided about sensibles, nor does the formal distinction of it consist in hypolepsis * alone ; but itis filled from intellect and dianoia, surveys the demiurgic reason, and distinguishes the nature of things. These particulars also, are sufliciently assimi- lated to the paradigm?’ of the speaker. For there, a royal intellect precedes, according to which the paradigm is united to intelligibles; a dianota, containing in itself the plenitudes of forms ; and the first and uniform cause of opimon. Hence, the paradigm contains intelligibles in intellect, but mtroduces sense to the worlds, as the Oracle says; or as Plato, “ such ideas therefore, as intellect perceived to be inherent in animal itself, so many he diancetically saw this universe ought to possess.” Moreover, the distinction between beings and things generated, Is consentaneous to what has been before said. For after the Gods and Goddesses, and the ineffable peculiarity which is in them, the separation of thesetwo genera, 1. δὲ of being and generation, takes place. Por being is allied to the more excellent order of divine natures, Which is always established in invariable sameness, and is intelligible. But veneration is alhed to the inferior order, from which, infinite progression, and all-various mutation, derive their subsistence. What then is this division, and after what manner was it produced? Was it nade as if it were the section of a certain whole inty parts, or as genus is divided into species, or as the division of one word into many significations, or as that of essence Into accidents, Or vice versa,

What then is this division, and after what manner was it produced? Was it nade as if it were the section of a certain whole inty parts, or as genus is divided into species, or as the division of one word into many significations, or as that of essence Into accidents, Or vice versa,

'-This word is not to be found in any edition of the ‘Timus of Plato; but from this comment of Proclus, it appears that it originally belonged to it.

> viz. Inu the apprehension of each of the terms of which a syllogism Consists.

+ i. εἰ To Jupiter the Demiurgus of the world.

BOOK 11. ἘΙΜΞΟΒΟΟΣ PLATO. 189

> viz. Inu the apprehension of each of the terms of which a syllogism Consists.

+ i. εἰ To Jupiter the Demiurgus of the world.

BOOK 11. ἘΙΜΞΟΒΟΟΣ PLATO. 189

that of accident into essences; for these are the species of division which some persons are accustomed to applaud. It is ridiculous therefore, to divide being and generation, cither as accident into essences, or as essence into accidents. For accident by no means pertains to perpetual being. Nor again must they be divided as a word into its significations. For what word is there which Plato assuming as common, divides into perpetual being, and that which is generated ; unless some one should say that τι, 1. e. α certain thing, is thus divided by him? This division however, is not Platonic, but is derived from the Stoic custom. Is the division therefore, as that of a whole into parts?) But what is that whole which consists of perpetual being, and that which is generated? Or how can paradigm and image give completion to one composition! How likewise can perpetual being be a part of a certain thing, since it is impartible, united, and simple? For the impartible is not a part of any thing which does not consist of all impartibles. But that which is generated is not impartible. lence there is not a common genus of perpetual being, and that which is generated. For perpetual being precedes according to cause that whichis generated ; and the former is when the latter is not. But perpetual being not existing, which it is not lawful to suppose, ceneration also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of the first, and the last of things? For the division of genera into species, takes place in the middle psychical reasons {i. e. productive powers}. But things prior to soul, subsist in more excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence in co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that which is generated, be arranged under one genus? What also will this genus be? For it is not being, lest that which is generated, and which never [truly] is, should be arranged in being. Nor will being itself be the oxe. Because every genus is divided by its proper diflerences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in capacity, or in energy. But it is not lawful that she ove should have differences either in capa- city, lest it should be more imperfect than secondary natures 3 or in energy, lest it should have multitude, But as it is in short demonstrated to be superior both to power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever have diflerences ; so that neither will there in short, be a division of the one.

What then shall we say?) Must it not be this, that Plato does not now make any division whatever, but that he proposes to detine separately what cach of these two, perpetual being, and that which is generated, is? For it appears to me that the word é:aszereov has the same signification with διακρινητεον. For since he discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he

190 PROCLUS ON THE (BOOK 11,

For it appears to me that the word é:aszereov has the same signification with διακρινητεον. For since he discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he

190 PROCLUS ON THE (BOOK 11,

wishes separately to define perpetual being, and separately that which is generated, in order that through the given definitions we may know where the world, where the Demiurgus, and where the paradigm are to be arranged 3 and that we may not confound the orders of things, but may separate them from each other, so far as they are severally adapted to be separated. He likewise docs the very same thing in the Philebus. For inquiring concerning intellect, pleasure and the mixed life, which is the best of these, he assumes the genera of them, viz, bound, infinity, and that which is mingled from bound and the infinite. For thus the order of each will become apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarity of them trom their genera, There however, hound and infinity beginning from the Gods, proceed throuzh all beings of whatever Kind they may be. Mor these also were in intelligibles according to the stable and generative cause of intelligibles. They were lkewise in the intellectual order according to the paternal and material principle of the intellectual Gods. And they were in the supermundane order, according to the demiurgic monad and vivifie duad, and in the last place, according to effective and prolific powers, Here however, being and that which is generated, do not bevin from the Gods; for the unities of the Gods are superior to being, and prior tu these the one itself is exempt from all beings, because the first God is one,” but the other Gods are wniticy. Nor are being and that which is generated) things which are participated by the Gods, in the same manner as the unities which are posterior to the Gods, are said tobe and are participated by being. Nor do they extend as faras to the last ofthings, For neither is it possible to say that matter is perpetual being, since we are accustomed to call it non-being ; nor that which is generated, which is not able even to sufler being, lest perishing by so doing, it should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again be asserted by us. It is how- ever, [evident]* that the division is not of one certain thing, and that the proposed theory has necessarily, prior to other things, the definition of these two-fold genera, in order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical hypotheses to the investigation of things consequent, may Giscover the nature of the universe, and the paternal and paradigmatic Catse ofit. For if the universe was generated, it was generated by a cause. ‘There is therefore a denuargic cause of the universe, [fthere isa Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to

which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And thus in a consequent

’ For ov here, itis obviously necessary to read er,

‘There is therefore a denuargic cause of the universe, [fthere isa Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to

which he who constituted the universe fabricated. And thus in a consequent

’ For ov here, itis obviously necessary to read er,

* φανερὸν is omitted in the original.

BOOK 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 191

order the discussion about these things is introduced, and the physical theory beautifully terminates for us in theology.

* What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists in becoming to be]

but is never [real] being.”

According to some, all beings whatever, whether they subsist paradigmatically or iconically, are comprehended in this distinction ; but not all beings according to others, And the interpreters contradict each other respecting this, not a little. We however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt, unless we examine each of them by itself, Let us then consider from the beginning, what power each of the words fof Plato] possesses in itself.

In the first place, therefore, τὸ τι, or the what is definitive. For we are accus- tomed to give rs an antecedent arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus, as the Platonic Severus thought it was, who says that ro τί is the genus of being and that which is generated; and that the all is signified by it. For thus that which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will be all. It was also doubted by some that preceded us, why Plato did not demonstrate ἐλ αν there is such a thing as perpetual being, prior to the inquiry what it is. For whence is the subsistence of perpetual being evident? And it is the law in demonstrative dis- cussions, to consider if a thing is previous to the investigation, what itis. In answer to this doubt it may be said, that perhaps Timeus did not think this was requisite to his purpose; as the day before, it was shown by Socrates in what he said about the soul, that the soul is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that it philosephises through its alliance to real beings, with which it comes into contact.

And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly being, and tmily the object of science, is one thing; that what is partly being, and partly non- being, is another, and on this account is of a doxastic nature; and that what in no respect is being, and is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted to Timwus by Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible, the dianoetic, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise speaking about the good he says, that it reigns in the intelligible place, in the same manner as the sun in the visible region." And farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which always is. For if

* See the latter end of the 6th book of the Republic, where all this is asserted,

For if

* See the latter end of the 6th book of the Republic, where all this is asserted,

192 PROCLUS ON THE [s0ox It.

“

there are Gods, it is necessary that there should be truly existing being: for this is united to the Gods; but not that which is generated and which perishes, but is never ¢ruly being. Or rather prior to these things it may be said, that the exis- tence of something which always is, is deposited in our common conceptions. For whence was that which is generated produced except from perpetual being? For if this also was generated, it must have been venerated from some other being. And this must either be perpetual being, or must likewise have been itself generat- ed. So that we must either proceed to infinity, or generation 1s In acircle, or perpetual being has a subsistence. But it isnot lawful to proceed to infinity. For from one principle which is te one, all things originate. Nor is generation in a circle, lest the same things should be both better and worse, causes and eiects. Hence it remains that (true) being always is. Why then, it may be said, is not generation from the one? Because, we reply, itis absurd that multitude should be entirely produced without being. Itis necessary therefore, that there should be truly existing being, which primarily proceeds from ¢he one, in order that the first principle may not be alone the cause of the last of things, but prior to these may be the cause of being, from which also generation proceeds. After all that has been said, however, the most true solution of the doubt 15, that Plato now assuming as an hypothesis that there is perpetual being, defines it. But after the discussion about the fabrication of the world, resuming this very thing, he demonstrates that perpetual being has a subsistence. Preserving however, what pertains to phy- siology, he proceeds from this hypothesis, and demonstrates such things as are consequent to it. For science itself also is from hypothesis, and requires that hy- potheses should be assumed prior to its demonstrations. In what he says there- fore about matter, he demonstrates not only that matter is, but also that being 15. But a little after, from one of the hypotheses, i. e. from the third, demonstrating that there is a Demiurgus of the world, he obtains also from this that perpetual being subsists prior to that which is generated. And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, be demonstrates that perpetual being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this par- ticular.

And again from the fourth hypothesis he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the universe, looking to an eternal paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, be demonstrates that perpetual being is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this par- ticular.

With respect however, to. perpetual being itself, whether does it signify the whole intelligible world, or the Demiurgus, or the paradigm of the universe? for it is diflurently assumed by different interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole intelligible world, whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it

μονρ γα ρα τον

BUOK 11.} TIMAUS OF PLATO. 193

for it is diflurently assumed by different interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole intelligible world, whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it

μονρ γα ρα τον

BUOK 11.} TIMAUS OF PLATO. 193

proceed? But if it is the paradigm, how comes it to pass that the Deminrgus 1. not perpetual being, if the paradigm is one thing, and the Demiurgus another? And if it is the Demiurgus, whence is it that the paradigm ts not a thing of this kind? That the paradigmatic cause, therefore, is ta be arranged in perpetual being, is clearly evident from Plato when he says, “ According to which of the paradigms did the artificer fabricate the world? Was it according to that which subsists with tnvariahle sameness, or according to that which was gencrated 2?” And he immediately decides by saying, “ Jfthe world indeed is beautiful, and the Demiurgus ws good, tt is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm. But if the world is not beautiful, and the Demiurgus is not good, which ibis not lawfullo assert, then he looked to a generated paradigm.” If therefore itis not lawful to assert this, the paradigm of the universe is perpetual being. But that this is also true of the Demiurgus, is evi- dent from this; that Plato calls the soul, which the Demiurgus constitutes, the first of generated natures, and delivers the generation of it. The Demiurgus, how- ever, Is prior to soul, so that he belongs to eternal beings. Hence also Plato says concerning him, “ Afler this manner therefore was there truly an eternal reasoning of the God.” And how is it possible that being a divine intellect he should not rank among eternal beings? Is therefore every intelligible world perpetual being ? The divine Tamblichus, however, strenuously contends on this subject, evineing that eternal being is superior both to the genera and the species of being; and establishes itat the summit of the intelligible essence, as that which primarily part: cipates of the one, But whatis written in the Parmenides concerning the one being Cor being characterized by ¢he one}, and also in the Sophista, bears testimony to these things. For there Plato arranges the one being prior to whole, and prior to the intelligible all; though the whole and the all are intelligible. Here, however, Plato clearly ealls the paradigm’ perpetual being, and a whole, and all-perfect. For he denominates it all-pertect animal ; and a whole, when he says, ‘ of which other animals are parts according to one, and according to genera.” So that if the paradigm isa whole and all-perfect, but that which is primarily being is above whole and all, the paradizm and that being will not be the same.

Will it not, therefore, be better to say, that there is indeed such an order of being, as that divine man (lamblichus] has delivered, and such as Plato else- where surveys; but that now Plato thus denominates every cternal world? Nor is this at all wonderful. For, at one time, the intelligible is asserted of every Pr. petual and invisible nature, as when itis said that the soul also is intelligible, as by Socrates in the Phxdo. But at another time it is asserted of the natures that

Tim, Plat. Vou. I. 25

194 PROCLUS ON THE [BooKx 41,

are more excellent than every psychical essence, as the division in the Repub- lic manifests. And at another time, it is asserted of the first triads of being, as is evident from what ‘Timweus a little after says of them. After the same manner, therefore, being in the Sophista, indeed, manifests the order of the one being; but here it signifies the whole eternal world, — For it is evident that being which is primarily being, is the summit of the intelligible breadth, and the monad of all beings, Forevery where, that whieh is primarily betng in’ tts own series, has the highest order; since if it ranked as the second, it would not have the same form; for it would no longer be primarily that which itis. As therefore, virtue itself possesses the bighest phice in the series of the virtues, as the equal itself in equals, and animal itself in animals, thus also beiy itself which is primarily being, ix the summit of all beings, and frome at all beings procecd.! But every intelligible and intellectual being, ἀπ whatever ap- pears to exist, has * the appellation of being, yet being and perpetual being are not the same. For the one being is beyond eternity, Por eternity par- ticipates of being. Henee all such things as participate of eternity, have also a certain portion of being, but not all such things as participate of being, par- ticipate Likewise of eternity. The natures therefore that exist in time, participate also of being, so that what is primarily being is beyond the order of eternity. But perpetual berg is eternal, Tlenee the reasoning demonstrates: the very contrary, that every thing is rather to be assumed trom perpetual bene, than the one being. For this latter ty better than ἐπ creer, as subsisting between dhe one and eternity, and prior Co eternity being denominated one ΠΟΙ

For this latter ty better than ἐπ creer, as subsisting between dhe one and eternity, and prior Co eternity being denominated one ΠΟΙ

Vf, therefore, it be requisite that I should say what appears to me to he the truth, Plato now precedancously asstanes every thing which is clernally being ; beginning, indeed, from the nature of animal itself, Pur dus ts pronwarily elcrnal ; but ending in partial intellects, But the one being, he perhaps omits, in con- sequence of its existing as the? monad of these, and as being ineffable, and conjoined to the one. Hence Plato will now speak in reality of every intelligible, that intelligible is mot assumed which is oceult, is) the highest, and does not depart from the one. He says, therefore, shortly after this, that animal itself is the inost beautiful of intelligibles, in consequence of the natures prior to this, bein:

"An the orizinal curw δηπον καὶ τὸ aurcor, © πρωτωφεἐστιον, ὁ κυρνψη Των ΟΙΤῸΝ COTE GRA) των, καὶ ἀπ᾿ dure ᾿ ΠΡ πρυεισιν, After az’ αὐτὸν therefore, the words πάντα ra ovra muot be suy pled, * eyecis Wanting here in the original. Χχ = δ

4 30} μονα here, read μονα».

nook 11.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. | 195

through excess of union, superior to a subsistence as objects of intellect. Unless he says that animal itselfis the most beautiful ofall the objects of intellect, both animal itself and the one being existing as objects of intellect also, the latter as being causally ever, eternity as being so according to Ayparvis, and animalitself or the eternal, as existing always, according to participation. Hence, if these things are admitted, in that which always exists, eternity, animal itself, and the Demiur- gus will be comprehended, and likewise the one being itself, which possesses the ocenltcause of eternity. So that it is evident from this, that perpetual being comprehends every nature prior to souls, whether it be intelligible, or intellec- | tual; beginning indeed trom being itself, but ending in a partial intellect, and that it does not alone comprehend, as Tamblichus says it does, the summit of all beings, such as the being is which is characterized by the one, or the one being, through which all beings are said to be beings, and to which the one itself alone, and the principles of being [bound and infinity] are superior. Zhe one, therefore, is better than that which is self-subsistent. For it is necessary that it should be exempt from all multitude. Perpetual being, however, 15. self-subsistent indeed, but possesses the power of being so through the one. But that which is posterior to it, such as is our nature, ts self-subsistent, and at the same time derives its subsistence from another producing cause. And the last of things proceed ' indeed into existence from amore excellent cause, but are not. self-subsistent. It is not however yet time for these observations.

And the last of things proceed ' indeed into existence from amore excellent cause, but are not. self-subsistent. It is not however yet time for these observations.

But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed, that it is partly being, and partly non-being ; for if it were, it would be a composite, and consist- ing of things of this kind, it would be dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one time being, and at another non-being ; for itis said to be advays being. But it is simply and eternally being, and is unmingled with every thing whatever it may be, thatis of a contrary nature, For it appears to me that the addition of the words, “ but not having generation,” indicates the unmingled and undefiled purity of perpetual being, according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is borne along in the images of being, and is changed by time. Not as some assert, that perpetual being is said, for the sake of perspicuity, to be without generation ; nor according to others, that Plato was willing to speak of it both affirmatively and negatively ; but that it is necessary perpetual being should be intellectually perceived subsisting by itself, remote from al! temporal mutation. For soul

* For wapeco: in this place, it is requisite to read xpoecm.

198 PROCLUS ON THE [RmooK 11.

temporal mutation. For soul

* For wapeco: in this place, it is requisite to read xpoecm.

198 PROCLUS ON THE [RmooK 11.

participates of time, and the heavens are allotted a life which is evolved accod- ing to time; but the intelligible nature alone is, according to the whole of itself, eternal. Hence, some of the ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing being; the psychical truly evisting and at the same time not truly evisting being ;* the sensible not truly existing being ; and matter, truly non-being. After what manner, however, they made this arrangement, we shall elsewhere inves- tigate. But that the addition of “ sot having veneration,’ is for the sake of indi- cating the separate essence of perpetual being, is 1 think evident from what has been said. > Inthe next place, with respect to that which is generated, whether does 1 sig- nify the whole world, or a material and perfectly mutable composition? For some of the ancients explain this in one way, and others in another. But we un- derstand by it every corporeal formed nature, and not the soul of the universe 5 so faras this nature is of itself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe ts, in acertain respect, perpetual being. Much less is intelleet that which is generated: for this ts im- mediately perpetaal being. But body alone is that which is generated, and is truly never real being. For body is always in) want of the world-producing cause, and is always deriving from it the representation of existence. Why then it may be said, did not Plato add, always, and that which is generated, in the same manner as dei, or at a certain time, in order that he might have whatts generated entirely opposed to perpetual being? May we not say that Plato devised this mode of expression, Jooking to the various nature of that which is) generated, and taking away from eternal being the existence ata certain time, and the perpetuity ofa generated nature? Lor the wholes of such a nature are generated always, but the parts ata certain time, Aud atter another man- ner of considermg the ΠῚ with respect to forms, seine are inseparable from matter, and are always generated from that whichis truly always ybut others are in time, and depart from matter. Lor corporicty, indecd, is aleays generated and its always about matter ; but the form of pure, or of air, enters tntoand departs from matter, becom- mg separated from it and perishing, through the domination of a contrary nature, Vout ifthe perpetuity which detams matter is always generated, it never therefore is ; and if the existence ata certain time is generated, it ts never being, νοῦν thing

* After ovrws pew ον καλευσιν τὸ γεητυν πλατοι, instead Of Cua οὐτῶν δε cy τὸ ἐυχίκον, it ts neces:

sary to read ores καὶ μὰ cvs orrws or.

SSE EA a

ROOK II.) TIMZEUS OF PLATO. 197

SSE EA a

ROOK II.) TIMZEUS OF PLATO. 197

however, which is generated, is either always generated, or at a certain time. Hence, every thing which is generated, is never {real} being.

These things, therefore, having been said, let us, recurring to the discussion from the beginning, show whether perpetual being in this place is asserted of all. beings, or not ofall. For if, indeed, we admit that perpetual being indicates an eternal nature alone, having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not asserted of all bings. For neither the being prior to eternity, nor the order of eternity, nor again, such things as have indeed an eternal essence, but produce energies according to time, ean be arranged under this being. But if we assume every thing whatever that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole | of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures, and also that / Which contains in itselfthe causes ofall things, unically, as itis said, and univer- sally. For the ease is as follows: one thing (i.e. being itself] is super-eternal ; (another thing is eternity 3") another is simply eternal, and another is in a certain respect eternal, With respect, however, to each of these perpetual beings, the first is as the power and fountain of the ever ; the second, as that which is prima- rily always being, and the ever tse/f, and not according to participation ; but the third is always, as participating of the ecer, and as primarily wholly eternal; and the fourth, is as that which in a certain respect participates of a peculiarity of this hind, For each thing subsists triply, either according to cause, or according to hyparnis, or according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is being alone according to hyparxis, but is perpetual being according to cause. Eternity is per- petual being according to hyparxis, but: δοίη, according to participation. And the eternal is perpetual beng according to participation, but according to hy- parxis isa certain other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual fonly). And if the last of these, it is either total or partial; and if this, it is either supermundane or mundane, and if this, itis ether divine, or is posterior to the Gods, and is each of these either according to existence alone, or according to power and energy, and as far as to the perpetual being of things which are in a certain respect eternal,

Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we assume the uni- versal, we must assume generation all-variously changed τ but ifevery thing gene- rated, in whatever way it may be, we shall find that the heavens also are gene. rated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, and that soul is the first of generated natures, so far as it ives in time, and time is connascent with its ener-

" The words ro δε aw», are wanting in the original, but must necessaiily be supplied.

rated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, and that soul is the first of generated natures, so far as it ives in time, and time is connascent with its ener-

" The words ro δε aw», are wanting in the original, but must necessaiily be supplied.

198 PROCLUS ON THE (Book τι.

gies. And thus ascending froin beneath, we shall end in soul as the first of things that are generated ; and descending from above, we shall again terminate our pro- gression in soul, as the last of eternal natures. For though a certain person’ rightly says that the heavens always exist, yet their being is always generated by something else; but soul possesses its own essence from itself. Hence also, Socrates in the Phwdrus says, that it is unbegotten, and at the same time self moved, as being indeed the principle of all generation, but generating and vivify- ing itself. If therefore we say, that itis both unbegotten aud generated, eternal and not eternal, we shall speak rightly. Hence too the Athenian guest® thinks fitto call the soul indestructible, but not eternal, because it is in a certain respect oniy eternal, and not according to the whole of itself, in the same manner as truly existing being. Por it is one thing to de always, and another to be generated always. And the heavens, indeed, are generated always ; for they do not possess being from themselves. Butsoul is always ; for it possesses being from itself. And every thing prior to soul is not venerated from a cause, butiy froma cause, Por generation Is alone in things which derive their subsistence from others. Through these things therefore it will be manifest after what manner there Is a comprehen- sion of all beings in the before-tmmentioned portions of division, and after what manner all beings are not comprehended in thei. There is not a comprehension ofall beings, because that which is eternal only, and that which is generated only, are assumed ; one of which is prior to, but the other is posterior to soul, And there is a comprehension of all beings, because the extremes being assumed, It is possible from these to find the middle, which is at one and the same time both being and that'which is generated. «

«

That these distinctions, however, of that which always is, and of that which is generated, ,are necessarily made prior to all other axioms, it is easy to learn; by observing that this is the first of the problems which it is requisite to consider about the universe in the beginning, i.e. whether it always was, having no bexinning of generation, or whether it was generated, For if this is the first of the things to he investigated, then what that is which is generated, and what that is which is eternal, have very properly the first order in’ the axioms, Por the other axioms follow these, just as the remaining problems follow the problem respecting the geueration of the world. And if it be requisite that resuming the discussion about the hypotheses, 1 should more fully explain what appears to me on the pulyect,

* i.e. Aristotle. > In the 10th book of the Laws.

ποοκ 11.} TIMEUS OF PLATO. 199

Plato in the same manner as georetricians, employs definitions and hypotheses prior to demonstrations, through which he frames his demonstrations, and ante- cedently assumes the principles of the whole of physiology. For as the principles of music are different from the principles of medicine, and ina similar manner there are diferent principles of arithmetic and mechanics ; thus also there are certain principles of the whole of physiology, which Plato now delivers to us; [and these are as follow :] Zrulu existing being ts that which may be comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which is gencrated is to be apprehended by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. Every thing generated, is generated by a cause. That which does not derive its subststence from a cause, is not generated. That of which the paradigm is eternal being, ts necessarily beautiful. That, of which the paradigm is generated, is not beautiful. Let the universe be called heaven or the

world. Vor from these principles he produces all that follows. And it appears

to me, that on this account he shows what perpetual being ts, and also whae that is which is generated, but does not show us that each of them is. For the geo-

ees we

metrician informs us wat a point is, and what a line is, prior to his demonstra-‘

And it appears

to me, that on this account he shows what perpetual being ts, and also whae that is which is generated, but does not show us that each of them is. For the geo-

ees we

metrician informs us wat a point is, and what a line is, prior to his demonstra-‘

tions, but he by no means teaches us ¢hat each of these is. For how can he bea geometrician, if he discusses his own principles? After the same manner also, the physiologist says what perpetual being is, for the sake of the demonstrations he is about to make, but he by ne means shows (fat it is; for in so doing, he would go beyond physiology. But since, as we have before observed, Timeus does not resemble other physiologists, being a Pythagorean physiologist, and Plato exhibits in this dialogne the highest science, hence he afterwards very divinely proves ¢hat truly existing being is. For his present purpose, however, it is sufficient for him to admit (hat itis, preserving the boundaries of physiology. He appears also to investigate the definition of perpetual being and of that which is generated, in order that he may discover the causes which give completion to the universe, viz. form and matter: for that which is generated is in want of these. He assumes, however, the third hypothesis, in order that he may discover the producing cause; butthe fourth, that he may be able to infer that the universe was generated according to a paradigmatic’ cause; and the fifth, which is concerning the name of the universe, in order that he may investigate the participation of the good and the ineffable by the world, as will be shown in what follows.

It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his Physics, imitating Plato, assumes one

* For παραξειγμα airioy here, read παραξειγματικον αἰτιον.

200 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ τι. -

It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his Physics, imitating Plato, assumes one

* For παραξειγμα airioy here, read παραξειγματικον αἰτιον.

200 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ τι. -

hypothesis, when he says, it is supposed by us with respect to things which have a natural subsistence, that either all or some of them are moved. For it is entirely necessary that there should be motion, if the discussion of the physical theory ts to proceed with success ; since nature is a principle of motion. But in his trea- tise On the Heavens, prior to every thing else, he assumes those hypotheses con- cerning which Plotinus says, that Aristotle will tind no ditiiculty in his discussion if his hypotheses about the fifth body are admitted, meaning these five 3 that the motion is simple of a simple body ; that a simple body has a certain simple motion accord- ing to nature ; that there are two simple motions ; that one motion is contrary to one ; and that the thing which has not a contrary, has not that which can corrupt it. From which hypotheses, he frames bis demonstrations concerning the fifth body. Aristotle, however, shows that the universe is unbegotten, from the hypotheses ς but Plato that it is generated. Whether therefore, they are discordant or not, will shortly atter be manitest to us. And this, indeed, will again be considered, Why, however, does Plato, who is accustomed to employ, when speaking of intelligibles, the terms αὐτὸ ἐπεί, and ὁπερ that which, now assume neither of these, but rather prefers the term ass aleays, as connascent with being. Vor this also is attended with a doubt, through what cause he employs the third of these terms, 1. e. always, ax better adapted to signify the nature of truly existing being. In answer to this it may be said, that the term itself manifests the simplicity of mitellisibles, a subsistence according to hyparais, and an evistence which is pronary, which is asserted conformably to the peculiarity, according to which imtellizibles are primarily that which they are, and jill secondary natures with the participation of themselves. But the term that which ws, indicates purity, the unmingled, and the not being filled with a contrary nature. And the ever manifests the eternal, the immutable, and the invariable, according to hypostasis. Thus for instance, when we say the beaatiful ‘vse/f, and the just σεν, we survey beauty which is not so by the participation of the beautiful, and justice which is not so by the par- ticipation of the just; but that which is primarily beautiful, and that which is primarily just. But when we say that which is beautiful we mean that whieh is not mingled with deformity, nor contaminated by its contrary, such as is material beauty, which is situated in deformity, and is itself replete with its subject nature, And when we use the term cver or a/ways)we indicate beauty which is not at one _tme beautiful, and at another not, but which is eternally beautiful. So that the “first of these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, and the sepplyimg all other things from themselves. For such is the beantifal ἠδ by which

So that the “first of these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligibles, and the sepplyimg all other things from themselves. For such is the beantifal ἠδ by which

BOOK 11.j TIM.£2ZUs OF PLATO. 201

all beautiful things are beautiful, and the equal itse//, by which alLequal things are equal, and in asimilar manner in other things ofthis kind. But the Second of these terms, indicates onlyness and purity, the unmingled and the undefiled. For the that which is this, i, e. itis something which is not various, and which does not at- tract to itself any thing of a foreign nature. And the erer manifests immutability, for the ever is this. Yet it does not simply indicate immutability, but a perma- nency in eternity. Fora ¢emporal ever is one thing, and an efernal ever, another ; the latter being every thing collectively and at once; but the former being co-ex- tended with the whole continuity of time, and being infinite. And the latter subsisting in the now, but the former, in interval, the interval being unceasing, and always in generation, or becoming tobe. The term therefore itself, is derived to > beings from the paradigm. For that is the cause of simplicity to beings, and ot! imparting to other things that which it primarily possesses. But the term that)” which is, is derived from the one being. For that is primarily exempt from non- being, and privation ; because it is primarily being, and all things subsists in it occultly and indivisibly. And the term ever, is derived from eternity. For as the one being is the supplier of existence,‘ so eternity imparts perpetuity to intelligibles. Tleuce, if Plato had been speaking about participants and things participated, and: for this purpose had required being, he would have inquired what being thself is. And αὐ he had been discussing things unmingled, and things that are mingled, he would have used the term that which is. But since he dis- courses about) generation and the unbezotten, and for this purpose requires these definitions, he very properly inquires what that ts which is always being. For this! distinguishes the eternal from that which is temporal, in the same manner as the > unbegotten distinguishes eternity. Hence also the nature of animal itself, which. is comprehensive ofall intelligible animals, is eternal; but time was generated together with heaven, as Plato says in the course of the dialogue.

Moreover, though perpetual being is said to proceed from a cause, yet it must - \ Se

Hence also the nature of animal itself, which. is comprehensive ofall intelligible animals, is eternal; but time was generated together with heaven, as Plato says in the course of the dialogue.

Moreover, though perpetual being is said to proceed from a cause, yet it must - \ Se

not beasserted that it is generated according toall causes, but that it is according to } them. For itis δὲ ο, that onaccount of which, and προς 0, that with relation to which, and υφ᾽ ov, that by which. For perpetual being is self-subsistent, and is not gene- rated by itself, lest not existing at a certain time, it should be geuerated. For that which is generated, when it is becoming to be is not. Nor is it gene- rated with relation to itself, lest it should be a composite. Nor on ac-

‘ Instead of ws yap πον εἰναι ro ev ov, it is necessary toread ws yap rov εἰναι κ. A.

Tim. Plat. Voi. τὺ

209 PROCLUS ON THE [ποοκ i-

count of itself, \est it should be imperfect. But that which is generated is sus- pended from another thing, and has its progression from other causes ; and such is every corporeal-formed nature. After what manner however, js that which is generated never being, concerning which Plato speaks clearly in the Sophista? Not that it is non-being,’ but that it is never ¢ru/y being. Now, however, it is said to be never at any time being, because being has a prior arrangement In an eter- nal nature; but that which is generated, is never that which always ts. Mf, therefore, existence, so far as it is being, is unreceptive of non-existence, itis evident: that what is generated, since it has the being which is init, of Whatever kind it may be, mingled with non-being, is never at any time being, soas to be genuinely being 5 and being which subsists by itself, since this pertains to real existence alone, which has notin a certain respect non-existence in conjunction with existence, at one

and the same time being and not being.

“ The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in cone junction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness, But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.”

“ The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in cone junction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness, But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.”

“#9? To theseit happens, that they err in tiany otherrespects, and that they coim- prehend in the definitions the things defined. Por what perpetual being is, which the first definition assumes is explained, and is said to be that which always sub- sists with Invariable sameness; and this the second definition assumes, saying it is that which is generated and corrupted, but never truly is. This, however, ix to accuse both themselves and Plato of unskilfulness in) dialectic. But others dividing the sentence, show that imeach of the colons there are definition, and the thing defined. For in’ the former colon, the words, “ ¢hat which is (0))}}- prehended by intelligence in conjunction wth reason, are ἃ deimition ; but) the words, “ since it always subsists with invartable sameness,’ are the thine defined. And in the second colon, the words ‘is perceived by opanion in conjunction with irrational sense,” are given as adetinition; but the remaiming part ofthe sentence, is the thing defined. To these men it will be found our preceptor vas well replied. For by a little transposition of the words, the whole will be immediately apparent as follows: That which aleays subsists with. invariable sanieness, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason: but that which is generated and cor-

Me Porcuy ore τὸ μὲν ον ἐστιν, i this place, itis requisite to read οὐχ ore τὸ μὴ ov ἐστιν.

The beginning of this commentary, ts unfortunately wanting.

Book 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 203

The beginning of this commentary, ts unfortunately wanting.

Book 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 203

rupted, and never truly is, is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense. For these things are consequent to what was before said, “what is that which ts always being but is without generation,” and “ what is that which is generated, but is never [real] being 3” that which always subsists with invariable SAMENCSS, signifying the same thing as, that which is without generation ; and that which is gencrated, but is never (reall, being, having the same signification as, that which never truly is, though they are more obscurely announced. And through the addition of ¢ru/y Plato indieates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not; but that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is not generated. For in the definitions, he renders the things defined more clear through the additions. Thus, one of the definitions says, “which is aleays being,” in order that by the term akeays we may not understand temporal perpetuity, but the elernal. For this is all at once, and subsists with invariable sameness. But temporal per- petuity, is co-extended with the infinity of time. Thus, too, the other definition has, “ that which is generated,” and together with it also says, “and is corrupted,” in order that we may not understand by generations simp/y progressions, which are also aseribed to the Gods who are beyond being, but progressions which are co-ordinate with destruction. The assigned definitions, therefore, are such as. follow: Perpetual being, is that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, That which is gencrated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense.

Por these detinitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in the first place, indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules of definitions require. In the next place, that he does not manifest what the nature is of the things defined, but It is necessary, however, prior to this

distinguishes them by our knowledge. But [in defence of Plato]

habitude, to consider things themselves by themselves. we shall demonstrate the very contrary, viz. that those who are accustomed thus to doubt perfectly err. For what kind of genus has a place in being, which comprehends every intelligible essence? For if essence has no genus prior to itself, nor definition, since it is most generic, what can you say respecting being which is comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energics? Neither, a fore, is being the genus of eternal being: for if it was, it would not be simply | being, but a certain being. Nor is non-being the genus of eternal being lest we / should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species. Hence, there is not a gents of being. Besides, is not a definition

derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed definitions? For if,

Nor is non-being the genus of eternal being lest we / should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera are predicated of species. Hence, there is not a gents of being. Besides, is not a definition

derived from knowledge adapted to theory, and to the proposed definitions? For if,

204 PROCLUS ON THE. [ΒΟΟΧ 11.

as we said before, Plato wished to use these axioms and hypotheses in the demon- strations which he intended to make, it was necessary that they should be known and manifest to us. If, indeed, he had exhorted us to mvestigate the nature of things, itselfin itself, he would have ignorantly filled the whole of his doctrine de- finitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known through definitions being and that which is gencrated, he produced the demonstri ions through things that are known, and clearly represents to us the peculiarity of them, in order that being excited and perfected, we may more manife stly survey what each of them is. Forsince every thing gnostte, is either the thing known itself, or perceives, or possesses the thing known ; for intellect, indeed, is the intelligible, but sense perceives

what is sensible, and dianoia possesses in itself the dianoetic object ; aud as we are not naturally adapted to become the intelligible, but know itthrough the power im us which is conjoined with it; this being the case, we require this power, and through this the nature of being ts macs ntous. After this manner, therefore, we answer the doubts. ᾿

After this manner, therefore, we answer the doubts. ᾿

Itis requisite, however, to observe how Plato proposing to himself the problems, renders each of them manifest, both affirmatively and negatively. But viving an answer to each, in perpetual being, indeed, he assumes the affirmative alone, but in that which is generated, the negative, adding to italso, * ad which is destroyed.” He, also, explains the words, * but which is never being,” through the assumption of, “ never truly is.” For since being is characterized by existence alone, but that which is generated by non-existence, he assumes the one, alone defining it, and says, subsisting invariably the same; but he assumes the other together with hegation, yet not with negation alone, because definitions respect affirmations, and signify that which in each thing is inherent. Itis not, however, wonderful, if he not only says * which is generated,” ut also, “ and corrupted.” Vor as he adds to beimg, the words, “ subsisting with meariable sameness,” and not only says, if is akeays ; 50. likewise to that which ty venerated he adds, “ and corrupt- ed.” For this so faras it is generated, is different from perpetual bemg; but so far as it is corrupted, it differs from that which is invariably the same, Por that which is generated, so far as it is generated and corrupted, is incapable of con- necting itself; since if it were, it would also be able to produce itself. Assuming therefore each by itself, i.e. being and that which is generated, he assumes the former as that which is above generation, but the latter, ἀπ. that which is not indestructible. So that when the representation of being accedes to that which is generated, it is able after a certain manner to abide in a condition of always becoming to be.

voox tt] TIMAUS OF PLATO. 205

that which is not indestructible. So that when the representation of being accedes to that which is generated, it is able after a certain manner to abide in a condition of always becoming to be.

voox tt] TIMAUS OF PLATO. 205

Let us however, consider each of the words by itself, through which he ccm- poses the propositions ; and in the first place, let us see in how many ways intelli- gence subsists, and collect by a reasoning process the other progressions of it. The first intelligence therefore, is the intelligible, which passes into the same with the intelligible, and is not any thing different from it. This also is essential intelligence, and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists after this manner, viz. essentially and intelligibly. The second intelligence is that which®onjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing a peculiarity which is con- nective and collective of the extremes, and existing as life and power, filling indeed intellect from the intelligible, but establishing it in the intelligible. The third is the®eonjoined intelligence in a divine intellect" itself, being the energy of intellect, through which it comprehends the intelligible it contains, and accord- ing to which it intellectually perceives, and is what itis. Por this intelligence is energy, and intelligence itself, but is not intelligible intelligence. Nor does it exist as power, but (as we have said), as energy, and intellectual intelligence. The Yntellige ‘nce of partial intellects has the fourth order. For each of these

possesses this *

and entirely contains in itself a certain conjoined intelligible and intelligence. Or rather each has all these partially, viz. intellect, intelligence, and the intelhetble, through which also it is conjoined to total intellects, intellec- tually perceives each of these, and likewise the whole intellizible world. The fitth : intelligence is that of the rational soul. For as the rational soul is called intellect, thus also the knowledge of it is intelligence, and transitive intelligence, and has time connascent with ᾿ self. But the sixth intelligence, if you are willing also to con- numerate this, isphantastic knowledze, or the knowledge of the imagination, which by some is denominated intelligence; and the phantasy is called by them passive intellect, δ because it knows such things as it does know, inwardly, and accompa- med with resemblances and figures. For itis common to all intelligence lo have the chjects of tts knowledge inward. For in this also intelligence diflers from. sense. In one order however, intelligence is the thing known itself. In another it ranks asx the second, but sees that which is first totally. In another it is partially the thing Known, but sees wholes also through that which is partial. In another it sces indeed wholes, but at the same time partially and not at once, And in

In another it ranks asx the second, but sees that which is first totally. In another it is partially the thing Known, but sees wholes also through that which is partial. In another it sces indeed wholes, but at the same time partially and not at once, And in

* Ta the original, τρίτη δε ἢ ev avty Geup συξυγος vonoes, But it is necessary alter θείῳ to supply oy. * For τοῦτον here, it is requisite to read ravrny. ὁ The phantasy is thus called by Aristotle.

206 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1}.

another, the vision is accompanied with passion. So many therefore, are the differences of intelligence.

* For τοῦτον here, it is requisite to read ravrny. ὁ The phantasy is thus called by Aristotle.

206 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 1}.

another, the vision is accompanied with passion. So many therefore, are the differences of intelligence.

Now, however, phantastic intelligence must not be assumed ; since this is not naturally adapted to know truly existing being. For it is indefinite, because it knows the object of its perception accompanied with figure and morphe. But perpetual being is unfigured. And in short, no irrational knowledge is able to survey being itself, since neither is adapted to perceive that which is universal. Nor must the intelligence in the rational soul be assumed. For it does not possess the at-once-collected, and that which is co-ordinate with eternal natares ; but it proceeds according to time. Nor must we assume total intellections ; for these are exempt from our Knowledge. But Timwus co-arranges intelligence with reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect, must now be assumed. Por it is in conjunction with this, that we some tine or other perceive real being. Por as sense is in the second duad betow the rationel soul, so intelli- gence is inthe duad above i. Por @ partial inteliect ts proximate’y established above our essence, elevaling and perfecting it, townich we are converted when purifed through philosophy, and when we conjoin our own mitellectual power with the intellt- gence of this intellect. But what this partial tntellees ts, and that it ty not as one to one rational soul, but is participated through souls which akeays energize according to tt, through which also partial sows sometimes partuctpate of intelectual light, we have elsewhere aistinctly and coptousyy discussed. Now, however, Uius nuch must be assumed, thatit is participated indeed by ad other proammate damontacal souls, but tllumimates ours, when we convert ourselves tott, and render the reason whichis inus intellectual, And as tn the Phadrus Plato calls thts the governor of the soul, and says that tt alone intel. lectually perceives real being, but that the soul percetves tt together with thas mtellect, when she is nourished by intellect and science ; thus also it must be satd that this mtel- ligence 1s prior to soul, and is truly that intelligence (mentioned by Plato) but that itis participated by soul when reason energizes intellectually, Hence Plato says in the following part of this dialogue, that intellect ts indeed in the Gods, but that a certain small genus [ο΄ πιο] participates of tt. And it seems that in what he says unfolding the Anowledge of perpetual being, he first calls it intelligence ; but that we may not apprehend it to be that alone, he adds to intelligence reason, distinguishing by a transitive energy the latter from the former, So that when reason intellectually perceives perpetual beans, as reason tndeed, tt energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually, with simplicity ; undcrstand- ing cach thing as simple at once, yet not all things at once, but passing from some to

nUOK 11 TIMAELS OF PLATO. | 207

others. It transitively however perceives intellectually cvery thing which it perceives ay one thing, and avy simple.

After the definition of intelligence however, let us see what reason is, and how itis connascent with intelligence, In the Theatetus therefore, rsyos, reason, 18 said to havea three-fold subsistence ; for itis either enuneiative, ora discursive procession through the elements (of speech]; or that which exhibits the differences of each thing with respect to ethers. All these signitications however, are conver- sant with compositions and divisions, and are unadapted to the comprehension of eternal being. For the similar is naturally adapted to be apprehended by the sinilar, But eternal being is simple and indivisible, and is exempt from every thing which is contrary to these. Again, after another manner, one kind of reason is said to be doxastic, another scientific, and another intellectual, For since there are in us opinion, dianoia, and intellect; but 4 call intellect here, the summit of dianoia ; and since the whole of our essence is reason, in each of these reason must be diflvrently surveyed. Opinion however, is not naturally adapted to be united to the intelligence of intellect in energy + for on the contrary it is conjoined to irrational kKnowledze. Noris dianoia, so far as it proceeds into multitude and division, able to recur to intellect; but on the contrary through the Variciy of its discursive energies, it is separated from intellectual impartbility. It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that in it which has most the form of ¢he one, is established in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being threweh alliance united to it. Hence this is the reason which intellectually per- ceives the intelligibles co-ordinate to our nature, and the energy of which’ Soera- tes in the Republic says is intelligence 3 just as dianoia ts the knowledge of Uungs which subsist between intellizibles and the objects of opinion. It, however, intelh-~ gence is the energy of this reason, it will be a certain intellect. Plato in the fol- lowing Mart of this dialogue says, that ¢his reason in the same manner as science, ts mgencrated in the soul, when it is moved about the intelligible. But that science has amore various energy, apprehending some things through others, and intellect a more simple energy, intuitively surveying beings themselves. This highest there- fore, and most impartthle portion of our nature, Piato now deneminales reason, as unfolding to us intelicct, and an intelligthb’e nature. For when the soul abandons phantasy and opinion, and various and indefinite knowledge, but recurs to its own impartibility, according to whieh it is rooted ina partial intellect, and having run back to this, conjoins the energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then

For when the soul abandons phantasy and opinion, and various and indefinite knowledge, but recurs to its own impartibility, according to whieh it is rooted ina partial intellect, and having run back to this, conjoins the energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then

* Instead of καὶ ov ὁ εν coreg Σωκράτης, γοησιν εἰπε τὴν ἐνέργειαν iv this place, itis uecessary to

ἃ ᾿ ecad καὶ οὗ o ἐν πολιτείᾳ Lwaparns vonow εἰχε τὴν Evepyetay,

208 PROCLUS ON THE | [Book τ".

it intellectually perceives eternal being together with it, its energy being both one, and twofold, and both sameness and separation being inherent in its intellections, For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal things, in order that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and that the reason which is in us may like a less light, energize in conjunction with one that is greater. For our reason in conjunction with intelligence, sees the intelligible ; but the intelhgence of intellect always sees it, and always is; and \conjoins reason to if, When reason acquires the form of intellect.

After what manner however, 15 truly existing being comprehended by a partial intellect, or by reason? For this is still more admirable. May we not say, that though the intelligible itself cannot be comprehended by intellect and reason, because itis superior to all comprehension, and comprehends all things exemptly, yet intellect possessing its own intelligible, 15 also on this aceourt said to compre-

“hend the whole fof an intelligible nature}. But reason through the intellect which is co-ordinate to itself, receiving the conceptions of real beings, is thus through these said to comprehend being. Perhaps also it signifies, that reason running round the intelligible, and energizing and being moved as about a centre, thus surveys it; intelligence indeed knowing it intransitively and impartibly, but

vreason dancing as it were round the essence of it in a circle, and evolving the united hypostasis init of all things,

In the next place, letus direct our attention to opinion, and consider what it is. That itis therefore the boundary of the whole rational life, and that it is conjoined to the summit of the irrational life, is frequently acknowledged. But we shall now unfold such things as are the peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine; and which are as follow: That the doxastic part comprehends the reasons ' [or pro- ductive principles] of sensibles; thatit this is also which knows the essences of them; and that it knows the ors, or that a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it. For since dianoia knows at one and the same time both the essences and the causes of sensibles, but sense knows neither of these; for itis clearly shown in the Thewtetus that sense does not know the essence of a thing, and that it is perfectly ignorant of the cause of the objects of its knowledge 5 it is necessary

that opinion being arranged between sense and diangia, should know the essences fon) > ’

* These reasons in a divine soul, subsist both gnostically and fabricatively, and inthe human soul also, taey thus subsist, when it revolves on high in conjunction with the Gods; but during tue union of the

soul with this outward body, they subsist in it gnostically onls.

ΠΟΟΚ 11.} TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 209

of sensibles, through the reasons which it contains, but should be ignorant of the causes of them. For thus right opinion will differ from science in this, that it alone knows that a thing is, science being able to survey likewise the cause of it. But sense adheres to opinion, being also itself a medium between the instrument of sense and opinion. For the instrument of sense apprehends sensibles accom- panied with passion, TTence also it is corrupted through the excess of sensibles. But opinion possesses knowledge undefiled with passion, Sense however partici- pates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is established in the doxastic part, is laminated by it, and) partakes of the form of reason, since it isin itself irrational. In this, therefore, the series of gnostic powers is terminated, of which indecd intelligence is the leader, which is above reason, and is without transition. But reason has the second order which is the intelli- gence of our soul, transitively coming into contact with real beings. Opinion has the third order, being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And sense has the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For dianoia, being a medium between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle forms, which require a more obscure apprehension than that of intelligence, but a clearer pereeption than that of opinion; as Socrates said on the preceding day, when he defined the ditferent kinds of knowledge by the objects of knowledge.

It must be said, therefore, that opinion is according to reason, because it possesses gnostic reasons of the essences of things, but that it is otherwise irrational, as being ignorant of causes. For Socrates in the Banquet, speaking of it says, “since it is an irrational thing, how can it be science?” But it must be admitted that sense is entirely irrational. For in short, since each of the senses knows the passion produced about the animal by the object of sense, hence intelligence is an intransitive, but dianoia and reason a transitive knowledge ; opinion a know- ledge in conjunction with reason but without the assignation of cause; sense an irrational Knowledge of passions; and the instrument of sense passion enly. Thus, for instance, when an apple is presented to us, the sight indeed knows that it is red from the passion about the eye, the smell that it is fragrant from the pas- sion about the nostrils, the taste that it is sweet, and the touch that it is smooth. What then is it which says that the thing presented to us is an apple? For it is

not any one of the partial senses; since each of these knows one certain thing

only about the apple, and not the whole of it; nor does even the common sense

know this. For this alone distinguishes the differences of the passions; but it

does not know that the thing which possesses an essence of such a kind is the Tim. Piat, Vou. I. 2D

210 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11-

whole thing. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain power superior to the senses, which knowing the whole prior to the things which are as it were parts, and surveying the form of it, is impartibly connective of these many powers. This power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and on this account, he denominates that which is sensible doxastic. ‘

This power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and on this account, he denominates that which is sensible doxastic. ‘

Farther still, since the senses frequently announce various passions, and not such as things of this kind are in themselves, what is it in us which judges and says, that the sight is deceived when it asserts that the sun is but a foot in diameter, and that the taste which pronounces honey to be bitter, is the taste of those that are diseased?) For it is entirely evident that in these, and all such-lke particulars, the senses announce indeed their own passions, and are not perfectly deceived. For they say what the passion is ubout the instruments of sense, and itis athing of such a kind as they assert it to be; but that which says what the cause is of the passion, and forms a judgment of it, is something different from sense, Hence, there is acertain power of the soul superior to sense, which no longer knows sensibles through an instrument but through itself, and corrects the wrossness of sensible information, And this) power indeed which is reason as with reference to sense, is irrational as with reference to the knowledge of trily existing beings. But sense is simply irrational, On this account, Plato in’ the Republic calling this power opinion, shows that it is a medium between hnowledge and ignorance: for it is indeed a rational knowledge, but it is mingled with irrationality, knowing sensibles in’ conjunction with sense, But sense is alone irrational, as ‘Timwus also denominates it; i the first place, because it is also inherent in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every irrational life; for by these things, what is said in the Theatetus distinguishes it from science. In the second place, because in contradistinction to all the parts of the irrational soul, it is disobedient to reason. For the irascible and epithy- metic parts, are obedient to reason and its mandates, and receive from it erudi- tion. But sense though it should hear reason ten thousand times asserting that the sun is greater than the earth, yet would) still see it to be a foot in diameter, and would not otherwise announce itto us. In the third place, because neither does it [accurately] know that which it knows. For it is not naturally adapted to see the essence of it. For it does not know what a white thing is, butit knows through passion that it is white. It likewise is not separated from the instrument of sense,’ and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgias,

* Instead of διακέκριται δε ro acaOnrnpior in this place, it is necessary to read ov &caxexpiraa δὲ τὸν αισθητηριον.

ROOK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 211

It likewise is not separated from the instrument of sense,’ and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgias,

* Instead of διακέκριται δε ro acaOnrnpior in this place, it is necessary to read ov &caxexpiraa δὲ τὸν αισθητηριον.

ROOK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 211

irrational knowledge is defined to be not scientific, but conjectural. [n the fourth place, sense is alone irrational, because it is the boundary ofthe whole series of knowledge, possesses an essence most remote from reason and intellect, pertains to externals, and eflects its apprehension of things through body. For all these particulars demonstrate its irrationality.

Every thing generated therefore is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense; the latter announcing passions, but the former producing from itself the rea- sons of them, and knowing the essences of sensibles. And as reason when in con- tact with intelligence sees theintelligible, thus also opinion co-arranged with sense, knows that which is generated. For since the soul is of a middle essence it gives completion to a subsistence between intellect and irrationality. For by its sum- mit it is present with intellect, but by its ultimate partit verges to sense. Hence also Tiinwus in the former conjunction, arranges intelligence prior to. reason, as being more excellent; but in the second he places opinion before sense. For there indeed, reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a less intellect; but) here opinion is prior to sense, as being rational sense. Opinion however, and reason circumscribe the whole breadth of the rational essence. But intellect is our king, and sense our messenger, says the great Plotinus. Reason indeed, togetuer with intellect, sees the intelligible; bat by itselfit: surveys reasons or forms that have a middle subsistence, And opinion in conjunction with sense, sees that which is generated ; but by itself it contemplates all the forms it contains, con- cerning which we have elsewhere spoken, have shown how these forms subsist, how the place of them is the doxastic part of the soul, and that the intelligible ix apprehended by reason, but by opinion, the intelligible is seen as a doxastic object. For the object of its knowledge is external to, and not withinit, as the intelligible is within reason. Hence the object is not comprehended by it, but is called epinable aud not sensible; because opinion knows indeed the essences of things, but sense does not. [lence too, it receives the appellation of a clearer knowledge, which knows wha¢ a thing is, but not alone ¢hat it is, which latter we say is the employment of sense; and in’ consequence of this Timieus very pro-- perly calls that which is generated the object of opinion. For this is Pythagoric ; since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, ἡ as a discussion according to opinion; sensibles being in their own nature perceptible by this

For this is Pythagoric ; since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, ἡ as a discussion according to opinion; sensibles being in their own nature perceptible by this

' Instead of exec και o ev Llappercder, την περι των αἰσθητων xpayparcwy in this place, it is necessary to read eres caco Παρμενίδης, την πέρι των αἰσθητων πραγματειαν.

412 PROCLUS ON TITE [βοοκ 11.

power of the saul. Hence it is not proper to call that which is generated sensi- hie alone, because sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion, without the addition of sense.

412 PROCLUS ON TITE [βοοκ 11.

power of the saul. Hence it is not proper to call that which is generated sensi- hie alone, because sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion, without the addition of sense.

Ifere however, Aristotle particularly blames the second assertion of Timzus. For where is it [universally] true that what is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense is generated and corrupted?) — For heaven is uabegotten and indes- tructible, though itis perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense. And Timiwus inthe course of this dialogue, inquires whether the whole heaven was venerated. At present, therefore, it must be said by us, that generation and cor- ruption subsist according to analogy in the heavens, not only according to the motions and mutations of figures, but also because a celestial body is not pre- duced by itself, but alone subsists from another cause. [ence it is generated as having the cause of its subsistence suspended from another thing (different from itself. Since, however, it not only subsists from, but is connected by another, not being able to connect itself, and is corrupted according to its own proper reason, on this account it assumes generation co-ordinately with corruption. — Por truly existing and) eternal beings generate themselves, and are connected by themselves, whence also they are said to be in their own nature unbegotten and indestructible. Tf, however, truly existing being is unbegotten, and therefore sub- sists from itself, that which does not subsist from itself will not) be truly unbe- eotten. And if that which is truly indestructible is naturally adapted to connect itself, that which is not naturally adapted to connect itself will not be truly indestructible. Heaven, however, but I mean by heaven the corporeal-formed nature of it alone, is neither adapted to produce nor to connect itself, ΕῸΓ every thing of this kind which produces and connects itself, is impartible, Hence it is neither truly unbegotten ' nor truly indestructible, but so far as pertains to its corporeal nature, It is generated and made. Farther still, as Aristotle himself says, and clearly and generously demonstrates, no finite body possesses an infi- nite power. But the eclestial body is finite, and therefore does not possess an infinite power. The indestructible, however, so far as indestructible, possesses an infinite power. Hence body, so far as body, is not indestructible. So that from the reasoning of Aristotle 11 is demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. But after what manner the heaven is unbegotten and perpetual, will be manifest to us

* Instead of ove apa οντων γενητὸς ἐστιν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read ove apa orrws

ayernros ἐστιν.

BOOK 11. TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 213

But after what manner the heaven is unbegotten and perpetual, will be manifest to us

* Instead of ove apa οντων γενητὸς ἐστιν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read ove apa orrws

ayernros ἐστιν.

BOOK 11. TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 213

shortly after. Now, however, this alone is evident from what has been sald, that every thing corporeal, is of itself, or in its own nature generated and corrupted, but never truly is, as Plato also says in the Politicus. For he there observes “ that to subsist always invariably the same, alone pertains tothe most divine of all things. But the nature of body ts not of this order. That, however, which we de- nominate heaven or the world, possesses indeed many and blessed prerogatives from its generator ; but, as it partakes of body, it is impossible that it should be entirely free from mutation.” We have shown, therefore, how the heaven falls under the above-mentioned distinctions,

Ifhowever, the damoniacal Aristotle, should again doubt respecting what is said of eternal being, not enduring to say that every thing which always is, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason; since the most divine of visible objects always * exist; we think it fit, that he should not confound the eternal, and that which subsists through the whole of time. For he also distin. cuishes eternity from time ; and attributes the former indeed to intellect, but the latter to heaven, and the motion of heaven. That always-existing being, there- fore, the eternal, is a thing of such a kind as Timiwus defines it to be. The most divine, however, of visible objects, are afier another manner perpetual, and not according to an eternal permanency. But they are produced in the whole of time from their causes, and the whole of their existence is in becoming to be. This also is said by Aristotle, that eternity is connascent with intelligibles, pos- sessing and comprehending in itself infinite time ; and therefore the eternal is truly intelligible.” Jf, however, that which akcays is, signifies the eternal, why is it ne- cessary to refer the nature of heaven to this perpetual being, and why should we not say that it is always generated, or becoming to be, as being co-extended with the perpetuity of time? So that we shall thus dissolve the objections from his ar- guments, which he urges against these definitions. Since, however, we have replied to this inquiry, we shall dismiss it; for it will be spoken of hereafter.

But, in short, the opinion of Plato concerning criteria, may from these things be assumed. Vor diflerent persons admitting a different criterion, some asserting that it is sense, as the Protagoreans, others opinion, as he who said,

Opinion is in all things fram'd; * Itis necessary here, to supply the word ae.

* Instead of ro awytov vonroy ovros ἐστιν in this place, it appears to me that we should read cae

TO αἰωγίον apa vonToy οὕτως €or.

214 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11.

* Instead of ro awytov vonroy ovros ἐστιν in this place, it appears to me that we should read cae

TO αἰωγίον apa vonToy οὕτως €or.

214 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11.

others that it,is reason, and others that it is intellect; Plato divides the essence of the criteria conformably to things themselves, attributing intellect to intelligibles, dianoia to dianoetic objects, opinion to doxastic objects, and sense to sen- cibles. You must not however fancy that the criteria are on this account di- vulsed according to him from each other. — For the soul is both one and amul- titude. If, therefore, the soul which judgesis both one ἡ anda multitude, the judicial power will also be both uniform and multiform. Some one therefore may say, what is this one power? We reply, reason. For this, when it proceeds to the survey of intelligibles, uses both itself and intelligence ; not that intelhgence in- deed is the instrument, and reason that which uses it, as the Platonic Severus thought, considering intelligence as inferior to reason, but that intelligence is the licht of reason, perfecting and elecating it, and Uluminating its gnostic power.

But when it forms a judgment of middle reasons, it alone uses dianoia and itself, and through this is converted to itself. When also it decides on objects of opinion, it moves opinion ; but in judging of objects of imagination, it excites the phantasy, and in judging of sensibles, sense. For when it considers the sensible essence of forms, such as is every sensible object, it uses opinion as the co-adjutor of its speculation, Vor in this the reasons of sensibles subsist. But when it directs its attention to the position or figure of a certain thing, as for in- stance, to the manner in which the earth 15 posited, which has in its summit a habitude to the heavens, it then excites the phantasy, in order that it may survey the object of its inquiry accompanied with interval and morphe, as it Is. And when it considers an eclipse, it employs sense as an adjutor in its obser- vations. At one time also, it admits the judgments of the second powers ; but at another, it blames the errors which they frequently happen to commit on ac- count of the instruments. Concerning the criteria therefore, thus much may sutlice for the present; for we have discussed these things more copiously in our Commentaries on the Thewtetus. From what has been said, however, the great accuracy of the before-mentioned definitions is evident.

But if you are willing, we will also survey the same thing according to another method. I say, therefore, that the mature which is primarily perpetual being, is that which is eternal according to all things, viz. according to essence, power, and energy. And that the nature which is simply generated, 1s that which re- ceives }} " its essence, power and energy in time, For itis necessary that the

‘ It is requisite here to supply the word ἐν.

> For ragwy here, read πάσαν.

according to essence, power, and energy. And that the nature which is simply generated, 1s that which re- ceives }} " its essence, power and energy in time, For itis necessary that the

‘ It is requisite here to supply the word ἐν.

> For ragwy here, read πάσαν.

ROOK τι TIM.EUS OF PLATO, 215

former should) be wholly eternal, but the latter wholly temporal. And that the former should be at once every thing in a self-subsistent manner, but that the latter should have its hypostasis suspended elsewhere than from itself, and con- sisting Inan extension’ of existence. Since these, however, are the extremes, the media are, things which in a certain respect participate of a portion of being, and ina certain respect communicate with generation. But again, there are two natures which participate of neither of these, one in consequence of being su- perior, but the other through being inferior to them. For matter is neither being, nor that which is generated. For it is neither comprehended by intelligence, nor is sensible. And this also is true of the one, as Parmenides demonstrates of both these, of the latter in the first, and of the former in the fifth hypothesis, Perpetual being, therefore, is the whole of the intelligible, and the whole of the intellectual genus, every supermundane intellect, every intellect participated hy divine souls, and every intellect which is called partial, and is participated by an- gels, and diemons ; and by partial souls, through angels and daemons as media. And as far as to this, perpetual being extends. For every intellect enerzizes eternally, and is measured in the whole of itself by eternity. But that which is generated, is every thing which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and which in conception is surveyed prior to the production of the world ; likewise every thing which is) properly generated and corrupted, heaven, and all these sensible and visible natures. “Timius also detines that which is simply generated, and that which is simply perpetual being, to be these. But the intermediate natures are those which communicate with both these; and on each side of them are the natures which participate of neither of these. Hence Timeus proposes hoth of them affirmatively and negatively, as for instance, perpetual being, and without generation, and again, that which is generated, and is necer real being, in order that through the affirmations he may separate them from things which are the recipients of neither, but that through the negations they may be distin- guished from things which ina certain respect participate of both.

As these, therefore, are the extremes, viz. every intelligible and intellectual essence, and every sensible essence, let us direct our attention to the intermediate nature. For Timeus calls both time and the soul generated. And it is evident that these, as not being sensible, are in a certain respect beings, and in a certain respect generated, but perfectly neither of these. Porphyry, therefore, rightly observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, viz. that which is primarily being,

* For xapagrace here, read παρατασει.

216 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ as

Porphyry, therefore, rightly observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, viz. that which is primarily being,

* For xapagrace here, read παρατασει.

216 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ as

and that which is alone generated, and that he omits the media; such for instance as, that which is at one and the same time deing and a generated nature, or that which is both generated and being ; of which being and gencrated are adapted to the nature of souls, but vice versa that which is generated and being, are allied to the summit of generated natures. Such as this, however, is the nature of the universe which vivifies the universe. For this nature so far as itis divisible about bodies, ts venerated, but so far as itis entirely incorporeal, is unbegotten, But it is absurd to say that matter is both generated and being. For thus it: would be superior to generated sensible natures, since these are eenerated alone, but matter would also participate of being. Andif you are willing separately to assume that whichis alone perpetual being, and that which is alone venerated, by taking away from one of the definitions intellect, and from the other sense; you will produce the definition of the medium. For this is known by reason and opinion, For reason knows both itself and opinion, and opinion knows itself an reason 3 the former indeed both in conjunction with cause; but the latter both, without cause. Vor in this reason and opinion differ from each other. Opinion also is known by reason, and reason by opinion, And the whole [rational] soul subsists through both these which are media. Thus too, by assuming the worse of the two upward terms, viz. reason, and making it to be spurious reason, and of the two downward terms sense, and making it to be insensible sense, you will then have the manner in which Plato thought matter may be known, viz. by spurious reason, and insensible sense. Assuming likewise analogously in each, that which is the better of the two, and mahing it to be spurious according to that which is more excellent, you will Lave the manner in which ¢he one is known, viz. by a spurious intellect, and spurious opinion. Henee it is not properly simple, and is not known from cause. It is known therefore by a spurious knowledge, because it is known in a superior manner according to each. For opinion does not know from cause, and the one is not known from cause, but from not having a cause. And intellect knows that which is simple; but a spurious intellect: knows the one, because it is superior to intellectual perception. The superior therefore, here, is spurious as with reference to intellect, as de one’ also is more excellent than that which is simple, such as that is which is intelligible to truly existing intelleet, and to which intelleet ts allied and is not spurious. It perceives therefore, the one, by that in itself which is not intellect. But this is the ove in it, according to which also it is a God.

It perceives therefore, the one, by that in itself which is not intellect. But this is the ove in it, according to which also it is a God.

ee Ste F : For ἐκεῖνος liere, it is necessary to read eseau. For Proclus is speaking of the τὸ Ἂν».

BOOK 11.} TIMAUs OF PLATO. 217

“ Ievery thing however, which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. [or it is pertectly impossible that it should have generation without a cause.”

For Proclus is speaking of the τὸ Ἂν».

BOOK 11.} TIMAUs OF PLATO. 217

“ Ievery thing however, which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. [or it is pertectly impossible that it should have generation without a cause.”

Timeus, in a manner truly conformable to the geometric method, after the definitions assumes these axioms. For having said what being and what that which ts gencrated are, he adds these other common conceptions ; that the thing which is gencrated, is entirely generated by a cause; but that the thing which is not generated by a cause, cannot have generation. From these axioms also it is evident that ro διαιρετον, does not signify the dividing method, but that the hypotheses are to be defined. For the assertion that every thing which is generat- ed, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, and that it is impossible for it to have generation without a cause, and also the following axiom, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is rendered beautiful, all these being axioms, are to be considered as belonging to the term διοριστέον, and not to be parts of division. Since however one of the present axioms is more clear, but the other is less known and clear, hence Timieus places the one as the middle term, but the other as the conclusion. For the axiom, every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, is the conclusion. But the axiom, it is entirely impossible that it should have generation without a cause, is the iniddle, in order that the syllogism may be categoric, and may be in the first figure, as follows: It is impossible for that which is generated to be generated without a cause. But this is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every thing therefore which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause. For it is better to collect: what is said after this manner, as the divine Jamblichus also thinks we ought, than to make, as some other persons do, the syWogism to be hypothetical. But how is the middle more known than the conclusion? For it is evident that a thing must necessarily be, which it is impossible should not be, and that itis impossible a thing should not be, which necessarily is. Or ina certain respect each of these is the same. But frequently it is not known that a thing necessarily is, but that it is impossible for it not to be, is known. Thus for instance, the physician says [to his patient] it is necessary you should be nourished, and he will in a less degree persuade the sick man. But if he says, it is impossible to live without being nourished, this will now compel the paticnt [to take nutriment}. And again, death is necessary through a certain cause: for it is impossible not to die [i 6. to avoid death}, And, it is necessary to give money

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2£

218 : PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

And again, death is necessary through a certain cause: for it is impossible not to die [i 6. to avoid death}, And, it is necessary to give money

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2£

218 : PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

that is owing to a tyrant: for itis impossible not to give it, And in a great variety of other instances, you may in asimilar manner see, that one of these is more ubscure, but the other more known, though both may appear to signify the saine thing.

How, therefore, in the words before us, is the one clearer than the other? For what if in some things this should be true, but in others not? May we not say, that here also it is easy to learn how that which is generated, when it is separated from its cause, is powerless and imbecile? For not being able tu preserve itself, neither is it connected by itself. But as it derives from its cause alone its preser- yation and connexion, if it is separated from its cause, itis evident that it becomes of itself powerless, and being dissipated, departs into non-entity, which also demonstrates that what is generated, catnot be venerated without a cause. lor if it is generated, it is generated by a certoin maker. Hence it is rightly said in the Philebus, that whatis generated ts made, but that which makes is the cause to /that which is made! (of its being made]. If, however, this be the case, itis either generated by itself, or by another. Butat’ ly itself, it passes into the same with perpetual being ; and thus that which is generated, and that which always is, will be the same, and a generated nature will rank among things that have an eternal subsistence. But if it is not generated by itself, it is entirely generated by another, For it is necessary that what is generated, should be generated by something, if it is that which is generated, and not [real] being. Por not connecting itself, nor making itself in energy, it will suffer this from something else. And being itself by itself imbecile, it will derive power from another, Farther still, though the same thing should both act and suffer, so far indeed as it is that which suflers, it suflers from another, and so faras itis ctlective it operates on another, That also which is generated, so far as itis generated: sutlers, Bat if it sutlers, it suffers from something else: for itis not naturally adapted to generate itself. For it would be before itis generated, and would bein energy prior to subsisting in capacity. For itis necessary that what operates should operate in energy on that which is in capacity. Plato, therefore, conjoining that which is generated to cause, which he does in the conclusion, very properly uses the term from necessity. Kor firmness and stability accompanied by persuasion accede to that which is venerated, from its cause: just as he says inthe Politicus, that arenovated tmmor-

ality is imparted to the world from its father. But separating that which is

Kor firmness and stability accompanied by persuasion accede to that which is venerated, from its cause: just as he says inthe Politicus, that arenovated tmmor-

ality is imparted to the world from its father. But separating that which is

Por τῷ yeyropery here, it is requisite to read ry ποιουμένῳ.

anok wd TIMEUS OF PLATO. 219

renerated from its cause, which he does in the middle, he uses the term impossible. For that which is generated, surveyed by itself, is inefhicacious and imperfect.

Moreover, in employing the word cause, he indicates the uniform power of {πθ΄ demiurgic principle; calling the demiurgic cause, not simply that which gives subsistence to another thing ; for Socrates says that the good is the cause of intelli- cibles, but it is not the demiurgic cause of them. For the demiurgic is attributed to veneration as Plato says in the Philebus, “ that the demiurgic refers to that which ts gencrated.” Hence, prior to the world, there are different causes of different things, but there are not demiurgic causes of generated natures. If therefore, there are many demiurgic causes, there is also one such cause [prior to the many]. For in short, if that which is generated is one, union must accede to it from its cause, and therefore itis much more necessary that its cause should be uniform and connective of multitude, in order that what is generated may become one conformably to the union pre-existing in its cause. And thus much con- cerning these particulars,

And thus much con- cerning these particulars,

It is here, however, usual to enumerate all the causes, and the differences of causes according to Aristotle ; nor is this done immethodically. For it is requi- site to say that every cause is either essential or accidental, fand this proximately or remotely,] and that these subsist in a two-fold respect, either simple or complex. All these, likewise, have a two-fold subsistence ; as they are either in capacity, or in energy. For thus the multitude of them may be surveyed. For on account of the essential and accidental, there are two modes of the explication of causes. But on account of these being attributed in a two-fold respect, either proximately or remotely, there are four modes, And again, on account of all these subsisting ina two-fold respect, either as simple or complicated with each other, there are eight modes, Through these also being two-fold, either in energy, or in capacity, there are sixteen modes, But on account of causes being predicated in a four-fold respect according to Aristotle, but according to Plato, causes subsisting in a three- fold,’ and con-causes also, though in a different way, in a three-fold respect,—hence according to the former, there will be sixty-four modes of causes ; [but according to the latter there will be forty-eight modes of causes,] and the same number of con-causes. For thus the assumption will become perfectly methodical ; though that of Plato is usually omitted by the interpreters, who having enumerated causes

* These causes are, the producing, the paradigmatic, and the final ; and the con-causes are, maller, matcrial causes, and form.

220 PROCLUS ON ΤῊ [ποοκ 4t.

according to Aristotle, enquire how it is said that every thing which is generated, is generated by acertain cause. We, however, omitting all this superfluous discus- sion, say that Timeus is here speaking about the eflective cause. Hence he uses the words, by a certain cause. For the term by which, is adapted to that which is effective. But he adds a@ certain cause. For the intellect of the universe, soul and nature, are said to be producing causes, and prior to these, other causes have this dignity, yet as many things are generated, and there are many causes, thoueh not of each particular, the word certain is very properly added. | For each par- ticular is generated by a certain cause, and not by all causes. These things therefore are manifest.

| For each par- ticular is generated by a certain cause, and not by all causes. These things therefore are manifest.

This axiom, however, is entirely derided by the Epicureans, who make the whole world, and the most divine of visible natures to be the work of chance. Bat by the Aristotelians, for the name alone itis thought worthy of reverence, For they say indeed, that what is generated, is) entirely generated by a certain cause, but they undesignedly make the cause to be causeless, when they enumerate chance with causes. Por chance is this very thing, (he causeless. But Plato alone, following the Pythagoreans, rightly says that every thing which ts generated, ix generated by a cause, and places over generated natures, Fate and God. For though generated natures are many, and separated from cach other, and which also on this account are generated from many causes, producing in ἃ different manner, yet there is one cause collective and connective of the makers, in order that there may be nothing in vain, or adventitious in the universe. Jor it is not proper that beings should be governed badly. Let there, however, be one ruler, one cause ofall things, one providence, and one chain of beings ; let there be also together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many Kings, various causes, a multiform providence, and a different order; yet every where multitude has a co-arrangement about the monad, things various about that which is simple, things multiform about that which js uniform, and things different about that which is common, in order that a traly golden chain may have dominion over all things, and that all things may be constituted ina becoming manner, For if, as Aristotle says, all things are co-arranged with a view to form, itis necessary that there should be a cause of the co-ordination, and that nothing which is in vain should have a place in the universe, but that what appears to be in’ vain to a part, should be advantageous to che whole, These observations, however, have been

made elsewhere.

* These are the words of Anstotle, in the 12th book of his Metaphysics.

HOOK ti] TIM.UEUS OF PLATO. ba |

* These are the words of Anstotle, in the 12th book of his Metaphysics.

HOOK ti] TIM.UEUS OF PLATO. ba |

But what is said in the Philecbus appears to be more universal than this axiom, viz. that every thing which is mixed, subsists froma certain cause of the mixture. ‘For if things which are mingled, are not to be mingled casually, it is necessary there should be one cause collective of the separated natures, and imparting union to the mingled form. . This cause, however, is in one mixture God, in another intel- lect, in another soul, in another nature, and in another a certain art, imitating nature, Indeed, every thing which is generated, is mingled, but not every thing which is mingled is generated. For the first of beings, bound and infinity, subsist mingled with each other. From these, therefore, Plato says other things, and also bodies derive their subsistence, All that is said here therefore, is analogous to all that is said in the Philebus, viz. the Demiurgus to the one, form to bound, matter / to the infinite, and that which is generated to that which is mixed. But the latter: are more universal than the former; because the latter [viz. the one, bound, the infinite, and that whichis mixed,] are beheld in all things, but the former (viz. the Demiurgus, form, matter, and that which is generated} are seen in mundane natures only, For intellect is mixed, as being knowledge, and as possessing infinite power, and also soul, as being at one and the same time impartible and partible. Hlenee, a certain cause, is the cause of that which is generated, just as that which is generated is a cer¢ain mixture, and not every mixture; by which also it is evi- dent that the Demiurgus is subordinate to the one, since he produces indeed a mixture, but a mixture which is generated. For since the causes of the world are these, the final, the paradigmatic, the effective, the organic,’ the formal, and the material, Timzus indeed points out to us afterwards, from reason and demon- stration, the final cause, but delivers the organic, the formal, and the material eause, from the former before-mentioned axioms. For if the universe is not [real] being, but that which is generated, itis a form participated by matter, and by | the orzanie, formal, and material causes is proximately moved, But Timeus unfolds to us the effective cause from what is now said. For if the universe is ~ generated, there is an effective cause of it. And he unfolds the paradigmatic cause in what will be said afterwards. For if the world is beautiful it was generated according to an eternal paradigm. So that through these axioms investigating for us the causes of the universe, he delivers all things in order. And the hypo- theses afford him this utility,

“When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an inva- riable sameness of subsistence, and always employing’ a certain paradigm

And the hypo- theses afford him this utility,

“When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an inva- riable sameness of subsistence, and always employing’ a certain paradigm

* There is an omission here, in the original, of ro οργανίκον. * For xporxoperos in this place, it isnecessary to read xporxpwperos.

222 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11.

of this kind, expresses in his work the idea and power of it, then it is necessary that the whole should be a beautiful effect; but when he looks

to that which is generated, employing a generated paradigm, then his work will not be beautiful.”

This also is in continuity with what has been said. For the paradigmatic is investigated after the effective cause; except that the before-mentioned axioms contribute to our discovering that there is a demiurgic cause of the universe, but the present axioms do not contribute to the discovery that there is a paradigma- tic cause of the world, but to the knowledge of what kind of a paradigm it is, whether eternal or generated. For from there being an effective cause, it follows that there is also a paradigm, either pre-existing in the maker himself, or external to him, and either superior, or inferior to, or of the same rank with him, For universally, that which makes, being extended to a certain form, makes that which it wishes to insert in the thing made. This therefore follows. It is neces- sary however to find that which is next in order, viz. whether the mundane para- diem is eternal, or generated. But to this the proposed axioms contribute: and the whole of what is said, will be truly consentaneous to itself. If the universe is generated, there is a Demiurgus of it; if thereis a Demiurgus of the universe, there is alsoa paradigm. And ifindeed that which is generated is beautiful, it was gene- rated on account of aneternal paradigm. But if it was not, that whichis generated is not beautiful. So that acontinued syllogism such as the following ts produced, The world was generated. Every thing generated, has a demiurgic cause. Every thing having a demiurgic, has also a paradigmatic cause. The world, therefore, has both a demiurgic and paradigmatic cause. And as in the first axioms there were two hypotheses, what perpetual being is, and what that is which is generated, and two other in the second axioms, viz. every thing which Is generated has a cause, that which has not a cause, is not generated ; thus also in these, there are two common conceptions, that which is generated on account of an ‘atelligible para- digm is beautiful, that which is generated on account of a generated paradigm is not beautiful.

Each also of these is perfectly true. For he who makes on account of the intel- ligible, either similarly, or dissimilarly, imitates it. And if indeed similarly, he makes the imitation beautiful: for there, that which is primarily beautiful, sub- sists. Butifdissimilarly, he does not make on account of the intelligible: for on the contrary, he falls off from the similitude. And he who makes any thing on account

nook 1] TIMAUS OF PLATO. pa as |

of that which is generated, if he truly directs his attention to it, evidently does not make that which is beautiful. For this very thing is full of dissimilitude, and is not that which is primarily beautiful; whence that which is generated on account of it, is much more separated from beauty. Hence Phidias also, who made the [eclebrated] statue of Jupiter, would not have arrived at the conception of the Jupiter in ILomer, if he had looked at a generated resemblance of the God. And if he had been able to extend himself to the intellectual Jupiter, it is evident that he would have rendered his work still more beautiful. For from the para- digm indeed, beauty or the want of beauty accedes to the image; but from the maker, similitude or dissimilitude to the archetype is derived. With reference to both however, the image is said to be the image of the paradigm, but the work an eflect of the maker. On this account also Timeus, when he speaks of the paradigm, conjoins with itits image: for he says, “ Thus therefore we must speak concerning the paradigm and its image.” But when he speaks of the Demiurgus, he conjoins with hin his work : for he then says, “ Of whom [am the Demiurgus and father of works.”

Since however paradizms are triple; for there is either an eternal paradigm of an cternal thing, or an eternal paradigm of a generated thing, or a generated pa- γα ταν Of a generated thing ;—hence when there is an eternal paradigm of an eternal thing, that which is entirely eternal is the paradigm of that which is so in a certain respect, as intellect of soul. But when there is an eternal paradigm of a generated nature, this paradigm also is in a certain respect eternal, i.e. according to infinite time. And when there is an entirely generated paradigm of a generated nature, this falls off from eternity. For it is not possible that what is essentially generated, should be productive of eternal natares. ‘The former, therefore, par- ticipate froin their paradigms of beauty and order, as being imitations of a stable nature ; but the latter, as deriving their subsistence from things mutable and in motion, are not beautiful, and vet are not entirely deformed, but are alone mani- fested through the negation of beauty. Such things, therefore, as are the beautiful progeny of art, are not beautiful when compared with the beauty which ac- cedes from an eternal paradigm to sensible paradigms." And perhaps on this account also, ‘Timwus does not say that what derives its subsistence according to a generated paradigm, is entirely deformed, but only that it is not beautiful. For that which is constituted according to artificial reason, does not subsist confonn-

* For ονύμασι here, it scems necessary to read, παραδειγμασι.

a4 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 11. |

ably to an eternal form, since there are not in intellect paradigms of things artificial. Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed, because in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that pro- ductive principle which ts in the mind, of the artist.) That these axioms there- fure are true, we may through these observations be reminded.

Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed, because in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that pro- ductive principle which ts in the mind, of the artist.) That these axioms there- fure are true, we may through these observations be reminded.

Some however doubt, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged, that there is a Demiurgus of the universe who looks to a paradigm: for there is not a De miurgus of it say they who directs his attention to that which is invariably the same. And many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion ; among whom are the Epicureans, who entirely deny the existence of that which is per- fectly eternal. The Stoics admit that there is a Demiurgus, but assert that he is inseparable from matter. And the Peripateties grant indeed, that there is some- thing which is separate from matter, yet do not allow that it is a producing, but that itis a final cause. Hence they also take away paradigms, and place over the whole of things an intellect void of multtude. Plato however and the Pythagoreans celebrate a separate and exempt Demiurgus of the universe, a pro- ducing cause of all things, and a providence that is attentive to the welfare of wholes; and this with the greatest propriety; for if the world, as Aristotle says, aspires after intellect, and is moved towards it, whence does it derive this desire ? For since the world is not the first of things, it is necessary that it should possess this tendeney, from a cause which excites it to desire. For he also says that the appetible is motive of that which is appetitive. But if this is true, and the world by its very being and according to nature is appetitive of intellect, it is evident that the whole of its existence is from thence, whence also its being appetitive is derived. Whence likewise is the world, since it is finite, moved ad infinitum? For every body possesses, as he says, a finite power. Whence therefore does the universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says it is? In short, if intellect is the cause of a motion which ts infinite, uninterrupted, and one, there is something which is productive of the eternal. But if this be the case, what should hinder the world from being perp πα}, and deriving: its subsistence from a paternal cause; for as it receives an infinite: power of being moved, from the appetible, through which it is moved ad intinitum, thus also it will entirely receive from thence an infinitive power of existing, through the pro- position which says, that in a finite body there is not at any time an infinite power. Ether therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and

HOOK τι} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 225

Ether therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and

HOOK τι} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 225

how is this possible? For every thing partible, has something impartible which connects it, as Aristotle himself somewhere says, and the universe also is an animal. He therefore says that God is an eternal animal, but every animal is connected by the life which is init. Or the universe has, indeed, a power which connects it, but this power is finite, This, however, is impossible: for if it is finite, it will fail. Or it possesses an infinite power. And again, it will not have this from itself, Something else, therefore, imparts to it the power of existing, and imparts not the whole at once. For it is not receptive of the whole at one time. Hlence it imparts this power by influx, and the influx is perpetual, and always as much as the world is able to receive. So that the world is always becoming to be, and never ts.

But if intellect is the Demiurgus of the world, whether does it make that which it makes, by a reasoning process, or by its very being? If indeed by consulting, an absurdity follows. For there will be a mutation about it, and the passions of a partial soul. It will not therefore consult. And if it should consult, it must entirely antecedently assume in itself the work about which it consults ; Just as every one does who consults before he energizes, But if it makes by its very being, it makes that which is similar to itself And if it does this, it will contain the paradigms of the things that are generated. And again, we must investizate, whether these paradigms subsist: primarily init, or not, and whence it derives this paradigmatic cause of wholes. Farther still, after what manner do we see artificers that are here produce? Ts it not by possessing the reasons cr productive principles of their effects? This, therefore, the damoniacal Aristotle will also grant. But if art imitates nature, it is necessary that natnre, much prior to art, should contain the reasons of the things which she generates. And if nature does this, we must inquire whence she is moved, and whence she is perfected? For she is irrational ; and thus ascending, we must say that the causes of all things are in intellect. In opposition to Aristotle, indeed, much has been said by many ; but our business, at present, is to explore what Plato says.

In the first place, therefore, let us investigate from what cause he introduces to cenerated natures the beautiful and the not beautiful, from the paradigm, and not from the producing cause. It might then have been said, that there are two-fold demiurgic causes, viz. the generated and the intelligible, the latter being effective of beautiful things, but the former of things that are not beautiful. But Plato does: not speak after this manner, but says that intelligible paradigms are the paradigms of beautifal eflects, hut generated paradigms, of such as are pot beau-

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2F

But Plato does: not speak after this manner, but says that intelligible paradigms are the paradigms of beautifal eflects, hut generated paradigms, of such as are pot beau-

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2F

226 PROCLUS ON THE [poo 11.

tiful. It may however be said, that what is here asserted contributes to erudition, exhorting us not to reject beautiful actions. Por if he had said that what is gene- rated, is not effective of beauty, perhaps he might have rendered us more sluggish with respect to beautiful actions. But it will be better and more physical, it we say that it is possible for the same eflective cause to look to two-fold paradigms, and to make a certain thing beautiful, and acertain thing not beautiful, Por soul looking to intellect, generates truth and science, but looking to generation, she procreates imaginations, and passive appetites, But itis tipossible for the same paradigm to be the cause of beautiful and not beautifal effects. Very properly therefore is it asserted, that from this cause beauty and deformity accede to genes rated natures. As the paradigm however of this universe is beautiful, itis evident that it is intelheible, and always subsists invariably the same; to Which also the Demiurgus looking, adorns the universe, If, theretore, itas the supplier of beauty, it has the highest order among eternal beings, and belongs to the first intelligibles, Hence the cause eflective of beauty is there, through which all things are beautiful, intellect, soul, and the nature of body. Again, therefore, the Demiurgus, indeed, ts the cause of form, but the paradigni of beauty, and the “οὐ of union, And the last of these. supplies all things at once, but the paradigm is the suppher of beauty and form, and the demiurgic cause, so far as it is Intellectual, of torm: and essence. Moreover, the demiurgie cause looking to the intelligible ts multiform. For the whole Demiurgus fabricates in one way ἡ looking toil. He, therefore, is united to it according to supreme transcendency. But the demiurgic triad fabricates in another way. And of this triad indeed, the first (i. οὐ Jupiter) fibricates uniformly 3 the second fi. e. Neptune} generatively, and the last (i.e. Pluto} convertively.

And in one way in the ruling, in another in the liberated and in another, in the

mundane order. But after this triad, we must survey fabrication proceeding after |

οὐ Jupiter) fibricates uniformly 3 the second fi. e. Neptune} generatively, and the last (i.e. Pluto} convertively.

And in one way in the ruling, in another in the liberated and in another, in the

mundane order. But after this triad, we must survey fabrication proceeding after |

a different manner to the many demiursie Gods, who from these receive and are allotted paternal powers. After these, also, it proceeds In one way to demiurgie angels, but in another to demiurzic damons, the attendants of this order. farther still, we must likewise survey the undefiled forms of life, which contribute to the demiurgic series, and the genera of partial souls, which follow. the demi- urgic choir, For the peculiarity and the mode of production, and of looking to the intelligible, extend diflerently to diflcrent natures, as far as to these, Itis also necessary to admire this in Plato, that he does not sity that what is generated on

' Por a\\q@ here, itis necessary to read adiwo.

Book 11.} ΤΊΜΕῸΝΟΕΡΙΑΤΟ. v7

account of! an eternal paradigm is Jwautiful, but that what is generated by the Demiurgus who looks to it. is most beautiful; since that which is confused and disordered is generated, for it is visible and sensible. But every thing of this kind is and was generated, as he says further on, receiving from the intelligible certain vestiges of forms prior to fabrication, and is not most beautiful, though it is ina certain respect beautiful, as with reference to the formless nature of matter. Hence that which is generated on account of an eternal paradigm, such for instance as that disorderly and confused nature, is not simply beautifal, but that which was generated by the Demiurgus looking to it. For from that confused nature the Demiurgus was absent; but the intelligible prior to the Demiurgus, uminated that disorderly essence. So far, however, as it was generated by the Demiurgus, it was also generated by the eternal paradigm, energizing on it through the Demiurgus as a medinm. And so far indeed as it was generated by the paradigm, it was invested with form, but so far as by the Demiurgus, it was arranged, For the Demiurgus is the cause of order ; but the paradigm is simply the cause of form to its participants.

And so far indeed as it was generated by the paradigm, it was invested with form, but so far as by the Demiurgus, it was arranged, For the Demiurgus is the cause of order ; but the paradigm is simply the cause of form to its participants.

Farther still, from the paradigm itself the difference of demiurgic powers may be assumed. For some of these powers, indecd, looking to the whole of intelli- gibles, produce according to the whole of them ; but others produce partially. And some, indeed, survey the whole of intelligibles through union 3. but others through intelligence. Some, again, do not produce according to the whole of the intelli- gible; but some are divided according to the four primary causes ; others proceed into a greater number; and others make the last forms the paradigms of their productions, Hence through these, there is one shepherd of men, but another of horses, as Plato says in the Politicus, and in a similar manner in’ other forms. As the demiurgie series therefore is various, and there are different paradizins of diferent things, some of which are more total, but others more partial, Timwus very properly does not say, that he who uses this intelligible paradigm, makes that which is generated to be beautiful, bnt he who uses a paradigm of this kind. In the intelligible paradigms therefore, the part is in a certain respect the whole, on account of the union of intelligibles; and the multitude is most similar to the monad, through the domination of sameness. Since also the whole Demiurgus looks indeed to the intelligible and all-perfect animal, but employs the paradigm which is in himself, possessing intellectually the intelligible ; which paradigm also

' For προαιωνίον in this place, we must read προς awwrior.

298 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 15,

-

Since also the whole Demiurgus looks indeed to the intelligible and all-perfect animal, but employs the paradigm which is in himself, possessing intellectually the intelligible ; which paradigm also

' For προαιωνίον in this place, we must read προς awwrior.

298 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 15,

-

is such as the intelligible through similitude to it, but is of a more partial nature ; hence Timwus adds the words a certain to a thing of this kind. Yor these intel- ligibles participate of the eternal paradigm, and are more partial than all-perfect animal.. Hence, too, he calls idea, τὸ, a certain thing, assimilating that which is vencrated to the paradigm. But fabrication imparts essences and powers to the things that are generated. Why, however, of eternal being does he say “ employing a paradigm of this kind,” but of that whichis generated, he no longer adds the ex- pression ‘ of this kind,” but instead of this, adduces the term venerated? Is it not because the intelligible has something similar to itself, as having the highest rank, but that which is generated being the last of things, has nothing else similar to itself? For that which is produced on account of it, is generated, and to this the dissimilar is appropriate ; but to the intelligible, the similar, the same, and every thing of this kind, is athed. And = thus much concerning these parti- eilars, But) the term αὐδάν must be conjoined: to aw subsistence according to mameness, In order that there may be that whieh looks to a nature always possess- Ing a sameness of subsistence, For thus the plulosopher Porphyry properly decides. Por Tinwus does not say that the Deniurgus in fabricating all things, always beholds, as Atticus thought, but that the intelligible always subsists after the same manner. Untess it should be said, that on this account he assumes the beholding always, lest by seeing at one time, but at another not, he should latently introduce into his production, that which is not beautiful. The Demi- urgus, therefore, looks to that whichis eternal, in order that he may produce that

which is similar to it, and beautiful.

“Let therefore this universe be denominated by us, all heaven, or the world, or whatever other appellation it may be especially adapted to receive.”

This is the last of the axioms, giving a name to the subject [of discussion) con- formably to geometricians, When they speak about the gnomon in parallelograms, for they say any one thing consisting of two complements ts to” be called a gno- mon, For since Plato intends to call the same thing both heaven and the world, in order that you may not think he disturbs the doctrine, by employing at different times different names, he previously determines something about the

' Vor ews yap hese, read eres yup.

ὍΟΟΚ 11.) TIM-ZUS OF PLATO. 299

ὍΟΟΚ 11.) TIM-ZUS OF PLATO. 299

names. For it must be observed that these names had great ambiguity with the ancients; some of them calling the sublunary region alone the world, but the region above it, heaven ; but others denominating heaven a part of the world. And some defined it to extend as far as to the moon; but others called the sum- mits of generation heaven :

The wide-spread heav'n in wther and the clouds Fell to the lot of Jove."

Hence Plato very properly determines concerning these names, prior to the whole theory, calling the universe heaven and the world, and saying all heaven, that you may not fancy he says, ὦ divine body alone is denominated by us the world, or by whatever other name it may rejoice to be called. And it seems, indeed, that he calls the universe Aeaven, conformably to the opinion of all men, but the world, according to his own opinion. Tor he says, let it be called by us heaven and the world. For the name of world is adapted to it as a certain fabrication ; though itis also possible to call it both heaven and the world : Acaven, indeed, as behold- ing the things above,* as surveying the intelligible, and as_ participating of an intellectual essence ς but dhe world, as being always tilled and adorned by truly existing beings. It may also be called /eaven, as being converted [to its prin- ple], but he world as proceeding from it. For it is generated by, and is convert- ed to real being. But as of statues established by the telestic art, some things pertaining to them are manifest,’ but others are inwardly concealed, being symbolical 4 of the presence of the Gods, and which are only known to the mystic artists themselves ; after the same manner, the world being a statue of the intelligi- ble, and perfected by the father, has indeed some things which are visible indi- cations of its divinity ; but others, which are the invisible impressions of the par- ticipation of being § received by it from the father who gave it perfection, in order that ° through these it may be eternally rooted in real being. Heaven, indced,

"Thad. xv. vs. 102.

* This is asserted in the Cratylus.

} For apavn here, it is necessary to read ἐμφανη.

* Instead of cuppoduns των θεων παρουσίας in this place, it is necessary to read, σνμβολικα της των θεων rapovacas. -

> Instead of της τὸν οντως μετοχῆς in this place, it is necessary to read rns τὸν ovros peroyns.

5 In the words wn μὴ δὲ ἀντων ἐρριϑωμενον ῃ διαιωνίω: ev τῷ οντι, it is obvious that μη ought to be

expunged,

240 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ i.

and the world, are names significant of the powers in the universe; the latter so far as it proceeds from the intelligible, but the former so far as it is converted to it.

and the world, are names significant of the powers in the universe; the latter so far as it proceeds from the intelligible, but the former so far as it is converted to it.

It is however necessary to know that the divine name of its abiding power, and which ia a symbol of the impression of the Demiurgus, according to which it does not proceed out of being, is ineffable and arcane, and known only to the Gods themselves. For there are names adapted to every order of things ; those indeed that are adapted to divine natures being divine, to the objects: of diangia, being dianoetic, and to the objects of opinion, doxastic. This also Plato says in the Cratylus, where he embraces what ig asserted by Homer on this subject, who ad- wits that names of the same things with the Gods, are different from those that

subsist in the opinions of men,

Xanthus by Gods, by men Scamander σα} ὦ,"

And, Which the Gods Chalcis, men Cymindis call. *

And in asimilar manner in many other names. For as the knowledge of the Gods is different from that of partial souls, thus also the names of the one are

different from those of the other; since divine names unfold the whole essence of

the things named, but those of men only partially come into contact with them. Plato therefore knowing that this pre-eaists in the world, omits the divine and ineffable name itself, which is diflerent from the apparent name, and with the greatest caution introduces it as a symLol of the divine impression which the world contains. For the words, “ or whatever other appellation,” and “it may receive,” are alatent hymn of the mundane name, as ineffable, and allotted a divine es- sence ; in order that it may be co-ordinate to what is signified by it. Hence, also, divine mundane names are delivered by Theurgists ; some of which are called by them ineffable, but others effible ; aud some being significant of the invisible powers in the world, but others of the visible elements from which it derives its completion. Through these things, therefore, as hypotheses, the mundane form, the demiurgie cause and paradigm, and the apparent and unapparent name of the world, are delivered. And the former name indeed is duadic, but the latter monadic. For the words “ whatever other” are significant of oneness. You may also consider the ineffable name of the universe, [as significant’) of its abiding in

‘liad xax.vs. 74 * Nliad xiv. vs, 291.

> In the original in this place, σημαντικον is omitted.

nook Oh] ἍΜ ΟΝ OF PLATO, 931

the father; but the name world, as indicative of its progression ; and heaven, of its conversion, But through the three, you have the final cause, on account of which itis full of good; abiding ineflably, proceeding perfectly, and converting itself to the good as the antecedent object of desire. It is fit, however, to engage in the discussion of the rest of the theory, terminating what follows by the principles,

It is fit, however, to engage in the discussion of the rest of the theory, terminating what follows by the principles,

“ Tn the first place, therefore, that as an hypothesis, must be considered respecting it, which oughtin the beginning to be surveyed about every

᾽ν

thing.

After the prayer, the exhortation to the auditors, and the delivery of the hypotheses, nothing else remains than to dispose the whole discussion conforma- ly to the hypotheses themselves. Of this, however, that head is the leader, whe- ther the world was generated, or is unbegotten, having no beginning of generation. Por in what was asserted prior to the hypotheses, Timiavus said, “7? is necessary thatwe who are about to speak concerning the universe, whether it was generated or ἐκ μη οποίον, should invoke the Gods and Goddesses,” as from hence commencing the theory. And in the hypotheses, “ [hat that is which is akecays being, but is without gencration, and what that is which is generated, but is never [real] being,” were the things which were first assumed. This therefore must first be considered, as it was the first thing supposed in the principles. It is necessary, however, as Socra- tes savs in the Phiedrus, respecting every thing, to consider in the first place what itis. But this is the form of the object of investigation, And the generated and the unbegotten give distinction to the mundane form, So that this is very pro- perly thought to be the first thing that deserves an appropriate consideration, to which also Timieus immediately after this directs his attention. But since most of the Platonists understand by the words περὶ πάντοὸς, that Plato means about erery thing, conformably to what is said inthe Phiedrus, but Porphyry understands the words as signifying about the universe, it being fit to speak first concerning the universe, and to show whether itis naturally unbegotten or generated,—it is requisite to Know that the former interpretation has in a greater degree the spon- tancous. For to assume τὸ παντὸς for τὸ πῆι tov πάντος, is a forced assumption.

That, however, these things are simply to be investigated concerning every thing, we may previously assuine from common conceptions, and the first hypotheses. The addition also of whether the universe aleays was, having no beginning of generation, or whether it was generated,” shows that what is said is asserted more generally of ihe universe. For with reference to the world, it is demonstrated that it has a

228 PROCLUS ON ΤῊΣ (BOOK 1|.

The addition also of whether the universe aleays was, having no beginning of generation, or whether it was generated,” shows that what is said is asserted more generally of ihe universe. For with reference to the world, it is demonstrated that it has a

228 PROCLUS ON ΤῊΣ (BOOK 1|.

beginning of generation, and that it is visible and tangible, but not with reference to the universe. This, therefore, is manifest. But since it is also necessary to discover in the first place the mundane form, whether itis to be arranged among eternal, or among generated natures, let us see what arguments the philosopher employs, and follow him in his demonstrations whether it always was, having no beginning of generation, or was generated from a certain principle ; for we shall find that he uses all the dialectic! methods in the hypotheses, "Thus he divides being from that which 1s generated, and definitively and also analytically assigns what each of them is. For he recurs from generated natures 10. the demiurgic and paradigmatic causes of them, Moreover, having indicated to us the truth concerning ineffable and effable names, in perfect conformity to the doctrine of Pythagoras, who said that number was the wisest of things, but that he was the next in wisdom who gave names to things,—he afterw ards converts himself to the demonstrations of the problems concerning the world. And in the first: place, he endeavours to find the form of it, and whether it: must be admitted to bea portion of perpetual being, or ofa venerated nature. And on this account he Inquires whether it has a certain principle of generation, or has none, not asking whether it belongs to eternal beings, or to generated natures 5 for he might have said that it was a mediom between both these, in the same manner as soul. But he asks whether it always was, having no principle whatever of generation, or whether it was in some way or other generated, in order that he might apprehend the medium between both these to be that which has a certain principle of generation, and yet always is. Afterwards having shown that the world is alone generated according to its body, he grants it according to a certain other thing to be unbegotten, according to which also itis ἃ God, as will be evident as we proceed,

Such therefore being the inquiry, Plutarch, Atticus, and many other of the Platonists, conceiving the generation here mentioned to be temporal, say that the inquiry is, whether the world is unbegotten or cenerated according to time, Por they assert that prior to the fabneation of the world, there was a disorderly motion, But time entirely subsists together with motion ; so that there was time

prior to the universe, Time, however, was also generated together with the

* As the dialectic of Plato is perfectly scientific, as we have shown in the notes on the Parmenides, and employs the dividing, defining, analysing, and demonstrative methods, it is evident that instead of διαλογιίκαις μεθοδοιν in this place, we should read διαλεκτίκαις μεθυδοι». This is also evident from what follows,

BOOK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 233

universe, being the number of the motion of the universe; so that the former time was prior to the fabrication of the world, being the number of a disorderly motion. But the interpreters of Plato that follow Crantor, say that the world is said to be generated, as being produced by another cause, and not being self-begotten, nor self-subsistent. And Plotinus, and the philosophers afler Plotinus, viz. Porphyry and Tamblichus, say that the composite nature is here called that which is cenerated, and that with this,’ generation from another cause is con-subsistent. We however say, that all these assertions are most true; and that the world is gencrated, both as a composite, and as being indigent of other causes to its existence. For every thing which has interval is a thing of this kind, and that which is sensible, is allotted such a nature as this. We think it fit however, that these philosophers should look to other generated natures, I mean time and soul, survey what is common in them, and extend it to these significations, and say, that [real] being indeed is that, which eternally possesses a stable essence, power

~and energy. But that which is simply, or absolutely generated, is that which

receives all these according to time. And that which is in a certain respect generated, possesses its energy In motion and extension. For it has been before observed by us, that Plato defined the extremes to be, that which 15. simply perpetual being, and that which is simply generated. But in what is here said, he comprehends the media. Hence, that which does not possess at once, the whole of its essence, or energy established in unity, is denominated gencrated. A thing of this kind also, entirely subsists through generation, and its existence is generated, or becoming to be, but is not [real] being. This sensible world likewise, time among things that are moved, and the transitive intelligence of souls, are things of this kind. But it is manifest that all motion subsists according to a part, and that the whole of it is not at once.

If, however, the essence of the world has generation, and the perpetuity of it subsists according to temporal infinity, some one by considering this may syllo- gize as follows: First, that it is necessary between things that are eternally per petual, and things which are generated in a part of time, the medium should be an hypostasis which is generated infinitely. And that this should be two-fold, either having the whole perpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts

And that this should be two-fold, either having the whole perpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts

‘of time, as is the case with these elements, or having both the whole and the parts

co-extended with the perpetuity of the whole of time, as is the case with the celestial

' For revro here, it is necessary to read rovry.

Tim. Plat. Vai, 7... 2G

|

234 ' PROCLUS ON THE [Rook 11.

bodies. For there is not the same perpetuity according to eternity and the whole of time; since neither is there the same infinity of time and eternity, because eter- nity and time are not the same. In the second place, that what is measured by eternity, and exists in eternity, 1s necessarily impartible. For how can that which is partible be fixed, and haye its essence established in the impartible? In the third place, that soul energizes according to time, and that body subsists entirely in time. For the energy of soul is nearer to eternal natures, than the essence of body. What is it then, by which we may infer that the essence of the celestial bodies is thus perpetual according to time? Itis this, that it cannot be separated from the cause that adorns it. For this makes it evident that it is allotted a renovated per- petuity, and is always generated from a source external to itself. For if it received the whole of its proper essence from itself, it would be sufficient to itself, sepa- jrate from that which makes it, and imparts to it essence.. The intention indeed lof Plato is to show, that the world is simply generated, as having its essence, power, and energy, and also its perpetuity co-extended with the whole of time. But he inquires from the first, whether it is eternal being, or belongs to things which are perfected by time. For the expression always was, signifies with Plato the intelligible, as we have before observed. If, however, he says further on, that

| the term was is not adapted to eternal natures, but the term ἐσ, we must not be

disturbed. For prior to a distinct evolution, he follows the accustomed mode of speaking. Hence also, when celebrating the Demurgus he says, “he was good,” though the Demiurgus ranks among eternal natures. And speaking of the paradigm, he collects both these together at once: for he says, “Zhe nature of animal itself therefore was being eternal ;” together with αἰώνιος, ovra being eternal, assuming τὸ eruyyave was. And in addition to all that has been said, because the power of every finite body is not infinite, as Aristotle has demonstrated, but eter- nity is an infinite power, hence every finite body is incapable of receiving eternity. It is necessary therefore that it should not always Je, but should always be gene- rated, or becoming to be, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.

It is necessary therefore that it should not always Je, but should always be gene- rated, or becoming to be, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.

Being, therefore, as 1 have said, and perpetual being, manifest the eternal. But “ that which was generated,” signifies the being allotted an hypostasis, mea- sured by time, such as is a sensible nature, which also 1s apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense. It has however been already said by us, that the intel- ligible is sclf-subsistent and eternal; but that the sensible nature is produced by something different from itself, and is con-subsistent with time. For the eternal in number is one thing, and the temporal another. And the former is in number,

BOOK 11. TIM.TUS OF PLATO. 935

but the latter iy generated in number. For to the former eternity is conjoined, but to the latter time. That which is generated likewise, thouch it is said to be per- petual, has an hypostasis co-extended with ali time, and which is always gene- rated, and always adorned by its producing cause. If therefore, perpetual being manifests the eternal, but that which has a principle of generation signifies that which is produced by another cause ; for such is that which is always generated ; but Plato always inquires, whether the world always was, or has the principle of acertain generation ;—this being the case, an inquiry of this kind will be the same asx an investigation. whether the world belongs to eternal natures, or to things which are generated according to the whole of time; and whether it belongs to self-subsistent natures, or to things which are adorned by another cause,

whether the world belongs to eternal natures, or to things which are generated according to the whole of time; and whether it belongs to self-subsistent natures, or to things which are adorned by another cause,

Farther still, that which is generated belongs to things which are multifariously predicated, For this very thing which has a temporal beginning, and is so much spoken of, is called generated, whether it arrives at being through generation, or without generation, as Aristotle says. Every thing likewise which proceeds from _ a cause, is called generated, that also which is essentially a composite, and that which has a generable nature (or which is naturally capable of being generated] though itshould not have been generated 3 such asis that which has a visible nature, thoughit should not be seen. That which is generated therefore, being predicated multifariously, that which is generated according to time, has all the generations. For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and has a generable nature. Tt does not, however, entircly follow that what is generated after another manner, has all the generations. [If therefore Plato had inquired whether the universe has all the gencrations,} or not all," we should say that he investigated whether itis generated according to time, or has not a temporal principle of generation. Since, however, this is not the case, but he asks whether it has no principle whatever of generation, or has a certain principle of it, he renders it manifest to those who have the smal- lest degree of intelligence, that he does not doubt about its temporal beginning, but whether the universe, since there are many generations, has a certain princi- ple of generation. For if it has no principle whatever of generation, it belongs to eternal and self-subsistent natures, in which there is not generation, because neither is there time. For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the

+ It seems that the following words are wanting in this place in the original: εἰ τοινυν ecnre 9

πλατων ποήέρον Τὸ παν πασαξέχει PAS γενεσειξ.

236 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the

+ It seems that the following words are wanting in this place in the original: εἰ τοινυν ecnre 9

πλατων ποήέρον Τὸ παν πασαξέχει PAS γενεσειξ.

236 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

Gods, yet we say this indicating their ineffable progression, and the difference of secondary natures with reference to the causes of them. Theologists, however, previously subverting all such doubts, in order that the generations of the Gods may be rationally devised by them, call the first principle of things Time, because it is ft that where there is generation, time should precede, according to which and on account of which generation subsists. With these, therefore, cause and time are the same; since also with them progression is the same as generation. That however which is truly generated, is that which does not generate itself, but is generated by another, becomes the image of another thing, 15 composed of many dissimilar things, and always receives a renovated hypostasis; with which also time is conjoined. It Vkewise has a never-failing generation, co-extended with the infinity of time, and is always becoming to be one and the same in num- ber, but is not one according to an eternal subsistence. But that which is. thus generated you may say proceeds from non-being. For that which is self-subsis- tent, being generated by itself, does not proceed from non-being. For though youmay divide it by conception into cause and effect, yet it proceeds from being. For the maker and that which is made are one, so that it proceeds from the being of itself, Hence also it: is eternal, never at any time deserting itself, But that which is alone from another thing, subsists from non-being, because it no longer is when separated from its cause; and the cause 15 different from the effect. Thus, therefore, the physical axiom δ may be adapted according to analoy to this generated nature : and that which is always generated and illuminated by being, to that which is always in time, But this is evident; forif you take away the maker, the universe is immediately imperfect ; which is likewise the case with every thing that is 51}}} generated. At one and the same time, however, the universe is generated and perfect, and is always venerated. H{ence also its pey- -petuity and its perfection, are according to the whole of time. For time was generated together with the heaven (or the universe], not a part of time, but all time: so that the heaven is generated in an infinite time, and is never-failing both with respect to beginning and end, in the same manner as time. Thus, there- fore, it is also said to have a principle of generation, and to originate from a cer- tain other principle. And in the first place, indeed, it originates as he says from the most proper principle, the final. For from this, the generating cause com- mences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the

And in the first place, indeed, it originates as he says from the most proper principle, the final. For from this, the generating cause com- mences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the

i.e. That the cause is different from the effect.

BOOK 11.] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 237

world subsists with reference to the final principle, and as the world is always becoming to be, it is beginning to be generated, and possesses the end of it, through generation in the whole of time. For with respect to the world, if was generated, is not one thing, and iis generated another; as neither is the begin- ning of it one thing, and the end another. That, therefore, which is generated in a part of time, begins at one time, and is perfected at another; but that which ts gencrated in the whole of time is always beginning, and is always perfect: And it has indeed, a certain principle of generation, which is perfected by some- thing different from itself, but it has not a certain principle, as not having the be- ginning ofa certain partial time. For since generation is multifarious, the prin- ciple also of it is multifarious. So that the generation which subsists through the whole of time ἢ is a certain generation, and this principle is the principle of a certain, and not of all generation. What therefore is this generation? That which has both the beginning * and the end contracted together [so as to be si- multaneous]. Because therefore the world is a body, it is generated, and has a principle or beginning of generation. But because intellect is the maker of it, it was generated, and has an end of generation. Through both, however, it is rising into existence, and is perfect according to generation, was generated, is always becoming to be, and is gencrated. For these do not” subsist at one and the same time, in things which are generated in a part of time. Thus for instance the motion of the heavens, not being generated in a part of time, is always, as Aristotle says, in the end ; but this is not the case with motions on the earth.

“It was generated. Tor it is visibie and tangible, and has ἃ body. But all such things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by Opinion in conjunction with sense, and appear to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated.”

As the Demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding in his own accustomed manner, produces the whole world, totally and at once collectively, and with eternally invariable sameness ; for he does not make at one time, and

at another not, lest he should depart from eternity ; after the same manner also 4

* xpovoy is omitted in the original. * apxn also is omitted in this place in the original. ? It is necessary to supply ovy here.

248 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ τι.

* apxn also is omitted in this place in the original. ? It is necessary to supply ovy here.

248 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ τι.

Timeus, being converted to himself, delivers the whole theory, recurring to in- tellect from dianoia, and proceeding into a reasoning process from intellect; doubting, therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the self- motive nature of soul; but in answering he imitates the projecting energy of in- tellect.. For he first comprehends the dogma in one word γέγονε, it was generated, and proclaims the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the manner of those who energize enthusiastically. For these see the whole collec- tively, and contract in intellect the end prior to the egress, perceiving all things at once. But syllogizing, he descends from intellect to logical progressions, and the investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world. Hence, in a manner perfectly divine, he shows from the hypotheses the whole form of the universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a body, but that which is visible and tangible, and has a body, ts sensible, and that which is sen- sible is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and is generated, the world therefore is generated. fence he shows this demonstratively from the de- finition, according to a conversion’ of the definition ; since geometricians also use demonstrations of this kind.* And thus much concerning the form of the words. ΐ Since, however, as we have said, he asks whether the universe is eternal, or has a certain principle of generation, he answers, if was generated From this, therefore, itis evident that he gives a certain generation to the world: for this was the other part of the before-mentioned opposition, — If, however, this be the case, he establishes the universe remote from temporal generation ; for if the world has a certain, and not every principle of generation, but that which is generated in time has the principle of every generation, the world was not generated in tume. Farther still, let us also consider the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus, who says that what was moved in ἃ confused and disorderly manner is unbegotten, but that the world was generated in’ time, and let us speak concerning this assertion, “7 was generated.” | Since, therefore, Atticus admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what the nature of this cause is according to him; for the world is visible and tangible. Whether, therefore, was every thing sensible generated in time, or not every thing? If indeed every thing, then that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner will be generated in time: for he says that this alsg

* For exirpoxny here, it is necessary to read exwrpogny. > See this explained farther on. 1 Γέγονε is omitted here in the original,

ROOK 11. ὙΠ OF PLATO. 239

> See this explained farther on. 1 Γέγονε is omitted here in the original,

ROOK 11. ὙΠ OF PLATO. 239

was visible. But if not every thing, then the reasoning of Atticus is unsyllo- gistic and conclusive of nothing. Unless he should say, indeed, that the world 15 visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disorderly man- ner, is not now visible, but was so prior to the fabrication of the world; since Plato also speaks in this manner when he says, “ every such thing as was visible, and was moved in a confused and disorderly manner.” But in the words before us he says, “ for it is visible and tangible, and has a body.” He shows therefore that every thing which is visible and tangible, was generated, but not that which was visible and tangible. Though, therefore, these things should be asserted hy Atticus; for the man is skilful in defending what he advances ; it must be said in answer to him, that there is nothing of this kind in the definition of that which is generated, but it is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. So thatif there is any thing which is entirely sensible, such thing will be generated. But every thing visible is sensible; and therefore that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is generated. In addition to which we may also say ‘that Plato calls this very disorderly thing itself generated, For he says that prior to the generation of the world, there were \ three things, being, place and generation, subsisting in the vestiges of forms. Hence that disorderly nature was generated, as well as that which is visible. It is not proper therefore to say that it was unbegotten according to time, and that the universe was generated ; but either both were generated according to Plato, or both were unbegotten. For both are similarly said by him to be visible and | 4 generated. If however both were generated, the world prior to being gene- rated such as it now is was changed into the confused: for to a contrary, the generation is entirely from a contrary. And if he who made the world is good, how is it possible he should not adapt it in a beautiful manner, or that having beautifully adapted it, he should corrupt it? But if he is not good, how not being good, did he make it to be arranged and adorned? For it is the province of a good being to adorn and arrange other things. If, however, 7 being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not neces- sary immediately to make the universe to be generated in time, because it is visible and generated. And thus much against Atticus.

But let us recur to our principles, and discuss the affair as follows: Whether is the world perpetual being, in the same maaner as the eternal, or is it not

tf

* For gws here, it is necessary to read payer,

440 PROCLUS ON THE [poox i.

And thus much against Atticus.

But let us recur to our principles, and discuss the affair as follows: Whether is the world perpetual being, in the same maaner as the eternal, or is it not

tf

* For gws here, it is necessary to read payer,

440 PROCLUS ON THE [poox i.

eternal, but consubsistent with time? And whether is it self-subsistent, or produced ἡ by another? Such then is the inquiry. But the answer is, that it is produced by another, and is consubsistent with time. A thing of this kind however, is generated. For if it has a composite form, it has a ceneration according to the composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause, it is generated, as not being itself productive of itself. If likewise it is not * eternal, it has the whole of its hypostasis according to time. For it is fabricated on account of another, and is generated as a flowing image of being. Hence, as that which is composite is to that which is simple, and as time is to eternity, so is generation to essence, Tf, therefore, a simple and uniform essence is eternal, the essence which is composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation, For it is divinely said by Plato, that the world originated from a certain principle, For thet which is generated ina portion of time began from a temporal, from a producing, from a final, from a material, and from a formal cause. Lor since principle is multifariously predicated that which was once generated has a begin- ning of generation according to all these causes. The world however originated from a certain, and not from every principle, What therefore is this principle ? You must not say it is a temporal principle. Por that which originates from this is also allotted the principle of generation from all the rest, But it onyinated froin that principle, In which he afterwards instructs us, IT mean the most proper, or the final principle. For it was generated on account of the good ; and this is the principle from which its generation originated, He says therefore that this is the most proper principle, so that this may be called the principle of the genera- tion of the world. lence in the first place he shows that the world is generated from its composition; forit is visible and tangible. Phese, therefore, are the extremes of the universe. For heaven is visible, but earth is tangible, And visibility is in earth so far as it participates of light; and tangibility in heaven, so far as a terres: trial nature is antecedently comprehended in it according to cause, But the world is simply {visible and tangible], ! and has a body in order that you may also assume the middle plenitudes which it contains, And this again is asserted by Plato conformably to the oracle, which says: /é ts an tnitation of intellect, but that which is fabricated has somethings of body. So far, therefore, as the universe

and has a body in order that you may also assume the middle plenitudes which it contains, And this again is asserted by Plato conformably to the oracle, which says: /é ts an tnitation of intellect, but that which is fabricated has somethings of body. So far, therefore, as the universe

* For rayoperoy here, read rapayoperoy. * For μὲν here, itis requisite to read μη. > The words oparoy καὶ axroy appear to me to be omitted ia this place,

BOOK 11. ΤΙ EUS OV PLATO. ΒΥ

has something corporeal, it is generated ; for according to this it is visible and tanzible, But every thing visible and tangible, is sensible 5 for sense is touching and secing. That however which is sensible is the object of opinion, as being mingled from sensibles, and not able to preserve the purity of intelligible forms. But every thing of this kind ts generated, as having a composite essence. ;

Plato, therefore, does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some who follow the Aristotelian hypotheses faney he does. And that this is true we may easily learn from hence. | He says that time was generated together with the heaven oY universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual.

πε if the universe had a temporal beginning, then time also had a temporal beginning, which is of all things the most impossible." They say, however, that time is twofold, the one disorderly, but the other proceeding according to number, For motion is twofold, the one kind disorderly and confused, but the other orderly and elegant. But there is a time * co-ordinate to each of these motions. That a body, however, may be moved equably or anomalously is possible 5 but it is impossible to conceive an equable and anomalous time. For thus the essence of time will be a composite. And why do 1 say this? For when the motion is anomalous, time is equable. There are now, therefore, many motions 3 and some are switter, but others slower, and one is more equable than another ; but there is one continued time -of all these, and which proceeds according to number. Ehence itis not τι τ, thus to make a twofold time. If, however, time is one and continued; ifindeed itis unbegotten, the universe also is unhegotten, Which is consubsistent with time. But if it was generated, an absurdity will follow 3 since time, in order that it may be generated, will be in want of time, and this, though it does not yet exist. For when time was gencrated, time was not yet.

Farther still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe immediately on its being generated, with body, and does not give to it life prior to the corporeal-formed nature, but as soon as itis constituted incloses it in body. Moreover, he “says ‘ that soul ranks among beings that always exist. If, therefore, he makes body and soul to be consubsistent, but soul always exists, according to him body also is perpetual. Vor that which is at once consubsistent with the perpetual, is unbe-

Moreover, he “says ‘ that soul ranks among beings that always exist. If, therefore, he makes body and soul to be consubsistent, but soul always exists, according to him body also is perpetual. Vor that which is at once consubsistent with the perpetual, is unbe-

' Instead of σι δε APXNY EXEL χρονικὴν, καὶ ο οὐρανὸς σρχην εξει XPorANY, in this place it seems to be necessary toread, εἰ δε ovparos ἀρχὴν EXEL χρονικὴν, Καὶ ὁ ypovos ἀρχὴν eee χρονικην. * For xpory here, it is requisite tu read ypovos.

Tim. Plat. Vou -: ae ἢ

242 PROUCLUS ON TIE {[Buok 11,

gotten. Again, Timwus here says, that the soul was generated ; but Socrates in the Phadrus says, it is unbegotten, Hence, he after another manner calls that eenerated, which is clearly unbesotten according to time, Farther still, he saye that the world is incorruptible, which is also granted by those who oppose him, But in the Republic he clearly asserts, or rather the Muses, that every thing we- nerated is necessarily corrupted, assuming in this place generation according to time. From these things, therefore, you may understand what Tsay: for the world is thus demonstrated to be unbegotten, Por if the world is incorruptible, hut nothing which is generated according to time is incerrupuble, the world ts not generated aceording to time, What occasion 15 there, however, for these syllogisms ? Por Plato in the Laws clearly says, Ghat tre ds infinite aecording to the past, and thatin this infinity there have been myriads on ΔῊΝ εἰν of barren and fertile periods of men. Por investigating the begin of a polity, from which cites change into virtue and vice, he adds se! But you wall say, frou whence 2 7 indeed think from the length and infinity of time, and the mutations whiel take place wna thing of this kind” Ov rather that we may argue from what ts tin our hands, a little prior to this, we may hear him saying, that “where there is neither catreme heat or cold, there the race of men aleays evivts more or icss numerous.” Bacit the race of men always enists, the universe also is necessarily perpetual,

Again, therefore, if the Deuiuurgus ranks among eternal betigzs, he does not at one time fabricate, and at another not. Por if he did, he would not have an in-

variable sameness of subsistence, and immutability. Βα εὐ he always fabricates,

that which is fabricated by him always exists. For why, being willinaly at rest

Por if he did, he would not have an in-

variable sameness of subsistence, and immutability. Βα εὐ he always fabricates,

that which is fabricated by him always exists. For why, being willinaly at rest

for an Infinite time, did he at leneth convert: himself to fabrication? Was it because he apprehended it to be better? But was he, prior to this, tznorant that itwas betteror not? Por itis absurd, betae intellect, that he should be ignorant; since there will be about him both tooraice and hoowledge. Bat ithe ον this, why did he not before begin to generate and produce the world? Numa it it was better, why did he not persevere in this enerey, iit be lawful so to speak ! For it is not holy to conceive that, being intellect and al God, he would) pursue that which os fess instead of that whieh is more beautiful Dt is necessary, how- ever, to admit these things, Wf the world is generated according to ime, and is net consubsistent with the infinity of time. Those also appear to me to sin against

V Instead of ἀλλὰ ry ἀπειρίᾳ tou κυσμον συνηλεστων ait this place, it is necessary to read «ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ απειρίᾷτου KPUdUU GUM OTWS.

nook χε] ΓΜ ΠΝ OF PLATO, 243

the Deminrgus of the world, in another way, who say that the world once was not. For if it once was not, there was a time in which the Demiurgus did not make it. For that which is made, and that which makes, subsist together. But if there was atime in which he did not make, he was then a maker in capacity. And if he was in eapacity, he was imperfect, and afterwards perfect when he made. Tf, however, there is prior and posterior about him, itis evident that he docs not belong to natures which energize eternally ; but that he passes from not making aceording to tine, to making. Moreover, he produces time. How therefore having an energy which is in want of tine, does he produce it through this energy?) For he once produced tine, of which he is indigent, in’ order that by his eflective energy he may produce time. This, therefore, cannot be otherwise.

Moreover, he produces time. How therefore having an energy which is in want of tine, does he produce it through this energy?) For he once produced tine, of which he is indigent, in’ order that by his eflective energy he may produce time. This, therefore, cannot be otherwise.

After this opinion, however, let us direct our attention to Severus, who says that the world stmply considered is indeed perpetual, but that this which now exists, and is thus moved, was eenerated. For there are twofold circulations, as the Elean euest has shown; one of whichis that which the universe now cir- cumvolves, but the other the contrary to it. The world therefore is cenerated, and originated from ἃ eertain principle, which is) the eause of this cireulation. Bat supply considered itis net generated. This interpretation, however, we shall oppose, by observing, that itis net proper to transfer fabulous enigmas to phy- Siology. For how is it possible that the soul which moves the universe, should be weary, and change the ancient circulation? [Tow also is the universe pertect, and suflictent to itsclf fit desires mutation? Pow ean there be an alternate change of circulations, when both that whichis moved, and that which moves, preserve their proper hab? And bow does Timiens say, that the circulation of the nature which is characterized by sameness, is moved to the right hand, according to the demiurgie will, but that which is characterized by ditlerence, to the left hand ? Por ifit is neces- sary that the works of the Deminrgns should remain invariably the same, and be perpetnal, iis likewise necessary that the circulations should be always the same ; and that the period characterized by sameness should be moved to the right hand, bat that which is characterized by diderence, to the left.” For they proceeded at one and the same time from the Demiurgus, and were allotted this circulation. Barther sull, is id not necessary, that inequability must thus be mtroduced to the

' The words την de θάτερον ex’ apecrepa, are omitted ia the original, but evidently ought to be inserted

in this place,

244 PROCLUsS ON ΤῊΣ

[took 1,

Barther sull, is id not necessary, that inequability must thus be mtroduced to the

' The words την de θάτερον ex’ apecrepa, are omitted ia the original, but evidently ought to be inserted

in this place,

244 PROCLUsS ON ΤῊΣ

[took 1,

motion of the universe’ For every thing which is about to cease from its former motion, and to pass on to another, hastens to the contrary, Le. to rest, and causes the precedaneous motion to waste away. For if it continued tived in the same energy, What Is the cause of the second circulation?" By no means, therefore, are these interpretations which are not physical to be admitted. Nor again, must such explanations be adopted, though they are more rational, as those which asenibe generation to the world, mm conception only, Por thus we may also infer according to conception, aud not according to truth, that there isa Demiurgus of the universe. Por from admitting that the world was generated, it is demonstrated that there is a producing and demiurgic eause of it. Orit may be said, that the universe is admitted to be generated * for the sake of perspicuity, and the doctrinal method, in order that we may Jearn what the numerous goods are, of which it participates, from the demiurgic providence. Por this is mdeed ina certain respect true, yet is not sufficient to the theory of Plato. Por the perspreaous, says Tamblichus, is venerable, when itis adapted to scienee. Por admittines also that the universe is perpetual, it is possible to point out the goods imparted to it by the Gods. And thus much tn opposition to these interpretitrons,

Again, however, let us show from the beginning, after what manner the universe is said to be generated. Por itis neither so according to ὅπ τὸ, through the before mentioned arguments, nor simply because it proceeds froma eause ; since itis not sufficient to say this, Por intellect also ts from: the first eause, and all things after (he one are froma cause, ΜΟῚ 41} things are not generated, Por where does the eternal subsist, fall: things are generated? Por the one is prior to eternity, After what manner therefore, ttmay be said, is the universe generated) As that which now is always becoming to be, and at the same tine always was becoming to be, or rising into existence. For itis not that whieh ts partial Body there. fore, (i. e. partial body) is not only generated, but there is also a time when it was generated. But the whole world alone subsists in becoming to be, and is not at the same time that which was generated. Ttis also according to Aristotle always in the end, the always being temporal, according to temporal infinity, Por as the solar-form light: proceeds from its) proper fountain, thus also the world is always venerated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the

Ttis also according to Aristotle always in the end, the always being temporal, according to temporal infinity, Por as the solar-form light: proceeds from its) proper fountain, thus also the world is always venerated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the

Pap is omitted in this ploee; aod the sentence ought to be interrogative, Hence instead of τι τὴν QUTNS COTWS ε!εέργείιν, TEs HITE Τὴν δέντεμαν avususrrdews, We ust read ἐπὶ γαρ TYS αὐτὴν ἐστων

crepyeas «XN. with ἃ note of interrogation at theeud.,

* After uredero re saz here, the word σεν τον must be supplied.

rook αι] TIMZUS OF PLATO. 245

same time always was so, Asa composite likewise itis generated. For all | Composition is ceaeration. But if is always composed, it Was always becoming ᾿ to be, with which to be generated conears. And it appears τὸ me that Plate Knowing this, says ἐδ weas generated instead of it is generated, just as of [real] being, hesavs it was, instead of itis: for his words are“ whether it aleays was.” Sor as in the intelligible, the was and is are the same ; for all things are there accord. / Ing to sameness, since all things are in dhe now, which is more mpartible than the now which is according to time; thas also iis generated and it was generated proceed to the same thing inevery sensible nature. For it was generated, as that Which always was becoming to be,and as generated, itis. But that a thing generated, when it is assumed aceording to a certain time, does not indicate that which is simply a composite, is evident: from its opposite. For to. this Plato opposes perpetual being. Tf therefore, perpetual being manifests that which is simple, we must say that what is alone a composite is generated. Bat if eternal heme siguified that which is always according to time, that which is originating trom ἃ certam thing, would be said to be becoming to be. For that which is cenerated is not opposed to the eternal, so far as itis cenerated, but) so far as it participates of time; on which account also it iss generated. That perpetual being, however, [er that which alw avs is,} manifests the eternal, is evident ; since the Deminrgus also who produces time, is called perpetual being, and the para- digm likewise is thus denominated. Hence, it: sicnifies an eternal hypostasis, and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity.

Hence, it: sicnifies an eternal hypostasis, and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity.

Some one, however, who acnnowledges this ay nevertheless doubt, why we have before καὶ that the world is generated, from having a body? For as there are in ita body, which is alone generated, a divine soul, which always is, and a divine intellect prior to this, why do we say that it is generated on account of its body, and not denominate it unbegotten, on account of its soul, or its intellect? tis said, therefore, that the whole world is every where characterized from form, and not from the subject nature. For do we not call Socrates mortal, though he has an immortal soul, because the animal which is in him is mortal? If, however, you say that we now consider the corporeal-formed nature of the universe, not yet co-arranged with sont, you will speak richtly. Bat when vou see it animated and endued with intellect, vou may eall ita God. Por thus Plato in the Repub- lie calls it a divine generated thing, But inthis dialogue, he thinks fit to denomi- nate the world, a blessed God. In the very words also before us, he ina sreater degree celebrates the universe. For as he is about to call that which is

Ϊ H Ϊ Ϊ 5

\

\ 7 \

ri

if

246 PROCLUS ON THE (Book It.

unbegotten [viz. soul] generated, though he attributes an unbegotten subsistence to eternal natures, thus also he calls the world generated. For it is not when denominated generated, diminished by a juataposition with the eternal, He likewise conjoins the becoming to be of it, with if was generated ; in order that as all or the universe, he may evince that it is perfect and being, but as having its essence in time, that it is generated. Te likewise assigns to it the principle ofa certainand not of all generation. And according to its corporeal-formed nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the divine powers in it, through which it is happy, and ts called a God.

Te likewise assigns to it the principle ofa certainand not of all generation. And according to its corporeal-formed nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the divine powers in it, through which it is happy, and ts called a God.

Moreover, the demonstration is worthy of admiration, viz. how. scientifically it proceeds from the definition. Llence also, he mverts the order. For inthe hypotheses indeed, he defined that which is generated to be the objcet of opinion butte the demonstration of that which is generated, he assures the converse, in order that he may make the definition to be the middle term, as in demonstra- tions is perfectly requisite. Por this will cause what ts said to be traly a demon- stration, For opinion through ' possessing the reasons of generated natures, introduces the order of eauses with reference to them. Elence itappears to me that Plato is not satistied with the term sensible ma order to demonstrate that the world is generated, but adds also that what is sensible is the object of opinion 5 since sense indeed knows the energy of sensibles, in consequence of suffering by them, but opinion knows also. their essences. Por itantecedently compre- hends the reasons of them. In order, therefore, that he might evince the esscnce of sensibles to be generated, he forms lis demonstration from that which ts the object ofopinton, Farther stu, lis not adding that which ts destructible to that which is venerated, shows his reverential Conceptions of the world; though it ds in a certain respect trae that the world is destructible, as we dave before said. At the sume time, this exhibits tous the caution and reverence of Plato: for having that which is consequent [τὸ the being generated], vet he does not add it; which he ought to admire who thinks that the world was generated according to Plato in time. Por this generated natare which he calls the object of opinion, isat the same time destructible ; but the world is not cestructible at) the same time that itis generated. Hence the world is both destructible and ticerraptuble, yet the philosopher does not call it both these according to the same; for this would be ridiculous ; but he calls it incorruptible, in the same manner as unbe-

gotten, according to time, For if that which ts gencrated according to time,

"Instead of ἡ yap Sofa ra τοὺς Auzous execw τῶν yeryrwy in this place, itis necessary to read y yap

toga τῷ rovs Noyors KA.

Look wd TIMAUS OF PLATO. 247

Look wd TIMAUS OF PLATO. 247

is corraptible, as atts said to be in the Republie, that which is incorruptible is unbezetten, But ie work! is destructiile, as net bein abl to connect its fo For ws that whieh ts corporeal so faras pertains τὸ itselfis alteramotive, or maved hy another, thus also so faras pertains to itself itis destructible, in consequence of hong connected by something else. Por no body is either generative or connec. live of itself; since every thing which generates, makes; but every thing which mahes is ineorporeal. For though it should be a body, yet it makes by incorporeal powers. Every thing, therefore, which generates is incorporeal ; and every. thing which connects, is efective of a certain thing, viz. it is efleetive of union, and the undissipated. Bat every thing which is effective is impartible. Every thing there- fore connective is impartible. Henee itis impossible for that which connects itself to bea body. Poritis not the province of body to connects; since so. far as itis body, tis partible, as itis said in the Sophista against those who assert that all things are bodies, Bat that which connects is inpartible, Tf however, that whieh is connected is body, but that which couneets is imeerporeal, body is not itself connective of itself Hence that whieh is connected by itse:f is neces- sarily impartble. As therefore body has in its own nature a tinite power, so likewise iis inits own nature destructible, not as being adapted to corruption, but as not naturally capable of preserving itself, nor as corruptible in’ capacity, that vou may also investigate the corruptible in energy, but as incapable of im- partiig Incorruptibility to itself.

Whence, therefore, has it the perpetual, and whenee does it receive intinite power? We reply, from its producing cause. For as it is moved from thence, so likewise it is generated from thence, and is always generated, Por every thing which is generated fren an immoveable cause, is allotted a never-failing nature, as also the damontacal Aristotle says 5 so that according to this reasoning likewise, the world will have the perpetual proceeding from the immoveable (i. e. from the intellectual) fabrication, Since, however, according to its own proper nature it is senerated, it is always generated from the father, But since the world being all anda whele, is not imperfect, in addition to being generated, or beconune to be, it always Was generaied, since, likewise, the motion of itis always in the end, as Aristotle says. Much more, therefore, is the essential gener. Gon of italways in the end, imitating the perfection of its maker. So Mat it is always generated, and always was generated ; not receiving’ at once the whole infinity of the generative

ΛῊ is pecessary here to supply μη δέχομένοι.

248 PROCLUS ON TIE [Book i.

Gon of italways in the end, imitating the perfection of its maker. So Mat it is always generated, and always was generated ; not receiving’ at once the whole infinity of the generative

ΛῊ is pecessary here to supply μη δέχομένοι.

248 PROCLUS ON TIE [Book i.

power of its Maker, but always according to the now possessing the ability of existing from this power, and receiving something from it, according to the instantaneous participation of infinity. And it receives the same infinity, indeed, on account of that which is imparted, but on its own account is not able to receive the same at ence. After this manner, therefore, the perpetuity of the world remains, and the weneration of it takes place ; and in this respect the before mentioned men {i. ὁ. Plato and Aristotle} are not at variance. At the same tine, however, they differ, because Plato says, that the essence of the universe is co-extended with all time, but Aristotle supposes that it simply always exists, infers this to be necessary through many arguments, and ascribes to it temporal infinity, asserting at the same time that eternity is stable infinite power. He likewise demonstrates that no infinite power whatever can be present with a finite body, Hence it follows, that the world being corporeal always receives infinite power, but never tras the whole of it, because it is finite, [tis therefore alone trae to say, that from intimnite power itis generated, but ay not, infinitely, But if itis eenerated, It receives infinity on account of infinite time. ΕῸΓ fo be infinite pertains alone to that which is eternal; but a gene raced infinite belongs to that w hichis temporal; for generation is conjoined with time. Hence Aristotle himself is compelled to acknowledge that the world is in a certain respect generated,

Both likewise assert that itis the same in number, but) Plato conformably to principles, says that it is venerated. Por he established: prior to the universe a producing cause, from which he gives subsistence to the universe. But Aristotle does not admit that any eternal nature is an effective cause. And the former, indeed, generates time together with the essence of the universe, but the latter together with motion: for time according to him is that which is numbered. Aristotle, however, is accustomed to do this in his other Preatises. Lor such things as Plato asserts of the ove, Aristotle ascribes to intellect,’ viz. the non- possession of multitude, the desirable, the having no intellectual perception of secondary natures. But such things as Plato attributes to the demiurgic intellect, Aristotle ascribes to the heavens, and the celestial Gods: for according to hin, falrication and providence are from these. Such things also as Plato ascribes to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motiun; departing indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is fit on physical

Such things also as Plato ascribes to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motiun; departing indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is fit on physical

* Aristotle in his metaphysical discussions ascends no higher than intelligible intellect, which is with

him the first cause. And perhaps this was in consequence of knowing that all beyond this intellect is

truly ineffable.

BOOK 11,} TIMAUS OF PLATO. 249

productive powers.’ Since, however, the demoniacal Aristotle is very copious in discussing the reciprocations of the generated with reference to the corruptible, and of the unbegotten with reference to the incorruptible, he must be reminded, that Plato much prior to him assents to these axioms; in the Republic indeed asserting that corruption follows every thing which is generated; but in the Phadrus, that the unbegotten is also incorruptible. How is it possible, therefore, since Plato gives generation to the universe, that he should not also introduce corruption to it; or that corrupting that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he should not give generation to it prior to corruption? The generation of the universe, therefore, was devised by him after a manner different [from its apparent

meaning].

* But we say that whatever is generated, is necessarily generated bv a eS ᾽ ~ 5 -

certain cause.”

The discussion accords with the hypotheses, or rather with the order of the things from which the hypotheses are assumed. Tor as every where form is suspended from the effective cause, so likewise, the first hypotheses are in conti- nuity with the second, and afford a principle to the demonstrations which are consequent to them. For since it was demonstrated according to the first hypo- thesis, that the world was generated, through the object of opinion as a medium, afterwards that which is consequent to this is demonstrated according to the second hypothesis, viz. that it was generated by a cause. For it the world is a thing generated, or becoming to be, but every thing generated is generated by a certain cause, hence the world was necessarily generated by a certain cause. What therefore is the producing cause of the universe? That from which the being generated is present to the world, For it is necessary to investigate this immediately after the present demonstration. And we shall see as we proceed, what kind of arguments Plato uses on this subject.

Now, however, let us briefly recall to our memory, [the reasoning by which it is shown] that every thing which is generated, is necessarily generated by a cer- (ain cause. Every thing gencrated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any other imperfect thing. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that

Every thing gencrated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any other imperfect thing. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that

* This is because he discussed metaphysics physically, justas Plato discussed physics metaphysically. Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 21

250 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 1).

which is in energy. Bat that which is in energy is perfect; so that every thing which perfects another ἐμ always when it perfeetein energy! according to that form to which it gives perfection). ‘Phat however, Which ix generated, so far us it is venerated, is imperfect. Hence that which is generated, so far as it is generated is not naturally adapted to perfect another thing, But if it cannot perfect another thing, much more is it incapable of perfecting itself Phe latter, therefore, is ἃ vreater undertaking than the former, Por that which perfects itself, is also) per- fective of another thing.’ Butifitis not perfected by itself, it is evident that itis perfected by another. For how will it be generated, unless it is perfected ?

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated, But every thing

For how will it be generated, unless it is perfected ?

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated, But every thing

which is generated being imperfeet, is either perfected: by another thing, or by itself. Hence every thing which is generated, is either perfected by another, or hy itself. But it is not perfected by itsell. It is therefore perfected by another, so that it is generated by a certain cause. Farther still, the world 15. a composite, and has its hypostasis from dissimilars. But if itis a composite, itis either com- posed by itself, or by another, For it is, necessary that composition should be from a eause, unless we intend to make it an accidental thing, and froin chance, If therefore it is composed by itself, again it will perfect itself, and give subsis- tence to itself, and we shall ignorantly transfer it to an incorporeal essence. Vor how will it compose itself? Will it be from the parts arranging themselves? But thus we shall make bodies to be self-motive. Or will it be from impelling each other? And what in this case is that which primarily moves them, And how is itholy to commit the whole world to such like impulsions and contrivances ? How likewise will there be order from things deprived of order, and ornament from things unadorned? For every where that which makes is better than its effect, and that which generates, than the thing generated. And if indeed the parts are the material causes of the composition of the world, what ' αἰ which made them? For this is what we investigate. Buatif they are the eflicient causes, how is it possible that thingsunadorned ean be eflective of things that are adorned, and disorderly natures, of such as have order and arrangement? Tf however the world is not composed by itself, it is evident that it has this composition: from another. Hence if the world is a composite,’ but that which isa COMposile is

. ν * Tustead of ἀεὶ ον ἐστι ἴῃ this place, we should doubtless read ἀεὶ εὐ ἐργεια ἐστι. τ Instead of τὸ yap εαυτίν τελειωτίκον cor, which is evidently defective, it seems requisite to read ro yap ἐαντὸ τελειοῦν, saca\Xov re λειωζίκον ἐστι».

"δ υθετον is omitted inthe original,

noox τι TIMEUS OF PLATO. 251

composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause. Hence too, trom these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause.

"δ υθετον is omitted inthe original,

noox τι TIMEUS OF PLATO. 251

composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause. Hence too, trom these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated by a certain cause.

It is not however wonderful, if Plato calls the cause of every thing generated, _ acertain cause. For the cause of all things, is stmply cause, and not ἃ certain cause ; concerning which he also says, that it is the cause of all beautiful things. For itis simply God. Butevery divinity posterior to it is @ certain God, as for instance, demiurgic or vivific. The cause therefore of generated natures is a cer- tain cause, as differing from the cause ofall. Hence, he says, that what is gene- rated, 15 generated by a certain cause. It is also well that Plato says one’ cause precedes the whole of generation, For multitude is co-arranged about one prin- ciple, and the many unities about the one. But with respect to other physiologists, some rank cause with con-causes; others recur to physical powers; others to dispersed infinite principles; others to‘ nature ; and others to soul. Plato, how ever, dismisses indeed these causes, but supposes that there is one cause which is the first of all causes. For with this cause, the psychical order indeed co-ope- rates, but nature is ministrant to it, and all con-causes are subservient to it, and are moved conformably to its will, Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad pre- cedes multitude, he denominates this monad a cause: for this is significant of unity. Because, however, it has not the first order among causes, nor is impar- ticipable,” he adds the word certain. So that the words “ by a certain cause,” have the same signification as, by one cause indced, yet not the first cause. Hence, neither is it reasonable immediately to produce that which is generated, but that which is eternal, from éhe one ; in order that from the one, which is prior to eternity, every eternal nature may proceed ; but from an eternal nature, that which is gene- rated and temporal. And that selfsubsistent natures likewise may proceed from that which is superior to beings that produce themselves; but from these, those that are generated by others, Vor the series and order of things which proceed from the one, is continued; and things nearer to the principle, give subsistence to such as are more remote from it.

“Tt is difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this uni- verse, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.” * For we here, itis requisite to read εἰς

* The demiurgic monad, (i.e. Jupiter or the Demiurgus,) is not imparticipable because it immedi- ately illuminates, or is con-subsistent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Translation

of Proclus on the theology of Plato.

252 PROCLUS ON THE [pook νυ".

Jupiter or the Demiurgus,) is not imparticipable because it immedi- ately illuminates, or is con-subsistent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Translation

of Proclus on the theology of Plato.

252 PROCLUS ON THE [pook νυ".

It has been rightly observed by some prior to us, that Plato having shown that the world was generated by a cause, immediately after ascends to the God who is the Demiurgus of it, in a manner worthy of his intellectual conceptions, Vor it seems that the artificial nature of the progeny, introduces a rational and divine cause, and not accident or chance, which are neither causes, nor have an hypo- static power, nor in short, sustain the well-ordered progression of beings. [1 is requisite, however, that we should first examine the words themselves, and after- wards thus recur to the whole theory.

Father and maker therefore, differ from) each other, so far as the former is the cause of matter,: but the latter of the world and order, and in short, of the formal cause; and so far indeed as the former is the supplier of bem and union, but the latter of powers and a multiforn essence 5 anid so far ax the one stably contains all things in himself, but the other is the eause of progression and veneration ; and so far as the former signifies ineffable and divine providence, but the Tatter an abundant communication of productive principles. Porphyry however says, that father is he who generates the universe from himself, but maker he who receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo indeed, is said to be the father of Plato, but the builder of a house is the maker or fabricator of it, as not him- self generating the matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there was no occasion to call the Demiurgus father, because, according to Timwus, he does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore, rather the maker as producing form? For we call all those makers who produce any thing from a non-existent state into existence, But so far as the Demiurgus produces that which he produces, in conjunction with life, he is father. Tor fathers are the causes of animals, and of certain living beings, and impart seed together with life. And thus much concerning this particular.

But “ this universe” signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and the whole spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each. It also signifies the vital and intellectual powers, which ride as it were in the corporeal masses. It also comprehends all the mundane causes * and the whole divinity of the world, about which the number of the mundane Gods proceeds ; likewise, the one di- vinity, the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the divine,

' For o\ns here, it is necessary to read vAys, because matter according to Plato proceeds from the father Phanes, or animal itself, and not from the Demiurgus.

* For avrovs, it is vecessary to read αἰτίας.

* For avrovs, it is vecessary to read αἰτίας.

ποοκ 11.]} TIMA:US OF PLATO. 253

intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is conjoined with the world, For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate to itself. All these there- fore must be assumed for the wuiverse ; since it signifies all these. Perhaps like- wise the addition of the pronoun ¢his, is significant of the universe being ina certain respect sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not ¢his, be- cause it is comprehensive of all intellectual forms. But the term this is adapted to the visible universe which is allotted a sensible and material nature. It is ditticult therefore, as Plato says, to discover the Demiurgus of this universe. For since with respect to discovery one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are first,’ but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, according to reminiscence ; the discovery from such things as are first may be said to be dificult, because the invention of the intermediate powers, pertains to the high- est theory. But the discovery from such things as are secondary, is nearly more ditficult than the former. For if we intend from these to survey the essence of the Demiurgus, and his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld all the nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the world, and the nnapparent natural powers which it contains, according to which the sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. Prior to these also, we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, and natures themselves, both the more total and the more partial,* and again, the immaterial and material, the divine and diaemoniacal, and the natures of mortal animals. And farther still, the genera which are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefiled and the material, such as are wholes, and sach as are parts, the rational and the irra- tional, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, through which every thing between the Gods and the mortal nature are bound together. We must likewise have beheld the all-various souls, the diflerent numbers of Gods according to the diflerent parts of the universe, and the ineffable and effable impressions of the world through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without having seen these is impelled to the survey of the Demiurgus, is more imperfect than is requisite to the intellectual perception of the father. But it is not lawful for any thing imperfect to be conjoined with that which is all-perfect.

Moreover, it is necessary,’ that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and being assimilated as much as possible to the whole intelligible world, should in-

* viz. From axioms and definitions. * Meptcwrepas is omitted in the original. Ὁ For δη here, it is requisite to read bec.

254 PROCLUS ON THE (Boon 11.

From axioms and definitions. * Meptcwrepas is omitted in the original. Ὁ For δη here, it is requisite to read bec.

254 PROCLUS ON THE (Boon 11.

trofuce herself to the maker of the universe ; and from this introduction, should in a certain respect become familiar with him through a continued intellectual energy. For uninterrupted energy about any thing, calls forth and resuscitates our (dormant) ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to him. For dis- covery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, to associate alone with the alone, and to see him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from every other energy to him. For being present with her father, she then considers scientific discussions to be but words,’ banquets together with him on the truth of real be- ing, and in pure splendor is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such therefore is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic ; for this is du- bious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Neither ts it scientific ; for this is syllogistic and composite, and does not come into contact with the intel- lectual essence of the intellectual Demiurgus. But it is that which subsists according to intellectual vision itself, acontact with the intelligible, and a union with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated difficult, either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution of life; or as the true labour of souls. For after the wandering about generation, after pu- rification, and the light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect which is in us shine forth, placing the sonl in the father as ina port, purely establishing her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining hight with light, not such as that of science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the nature of the onethan this. For this is the paternal port," and the discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

* This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus beiug so much superior to scientific per- ception.

For this is the paternal port," and the discovery of the father, viz. an undefiled union with him.

* This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus beiug so much superior to scientific per- ception.

* Proclus here alludes to the fabulous wanderings of Ulysses in the Odyssey. Por Homer by these oecultly indicates the life of a man who passes ina regular manner from a sensible to ao intellectual life, and who being throughly purified by the excrcise of the cathartic virtues, is at length able to energize according to the intuitive perception of intellect, and thus after becoming re-united to Penelope or Philosophy, meets with and embraces his father. This appears also to have been the opinion af tbe Pythagorean Numenius, as we are informed by Porphyry in his treatise De Antro Nympharuin, “ΤῸ he thought that the persou of Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to us a man who passes in a regular maoner over the dark and stormy sea of generation; and thus at Jength arrives at that region (ἡ. ἐν the intellectual region) where temmpests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation

“Who ne'er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.’”

See more onthis subject in my Restoration of the Platonic Theology, p. 294.

Rook 11.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 255

ἐν the intellectual region) where temmpests and seas are unknown, and finds a nation

“Who ne'er knew salt, or heard the billows roar.’”

See more onthis subject in my Restoration of the Platonic Theology, p. 294.

Rook 11.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 255

But to say “ thatwhen found it ts impossible to speak of him to all men,”* perhaps indicates the custom of the Pythagoreans, who had arcane assertions about divine natures, and did not divulge them to all men. For as the Elean guest says, the eyes of the multitude are not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this may be said which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to certain persons such ashe has seen him. For the discovery was not made by the soul speaking, bat closing her eyes, and being converted,” to the divine light. Nor was it made by her being moved with her own proper motion, but through being silent with a silence which leads the way (to union}. For since the essence of other things is not naturally adapted tobe spoken of, either through a name, or through definition, orthrough science, butis seen through intellection alone, as Plato saysin his Epistles, inwhat other way can itbe possible to discover the essence of the Demiurgus, than by intellectual energy? And how when having thus found it, is it possible to tell whatis seen, and explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolu- tion which is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple nature, What then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about the Demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of the one ilself? To this we reply, we speak indeed about them, but we do not speak of cach of them itself. And we are able indeed to speak scientifically of them, but not intellectually. For this, as we have before observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a silence of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient to lead that which is discovered into light. ᾿

After these things, therefore, let us, following the light of science, survey who the Demiurgus is, and to what order of beings he belongs. For different philosophers among the ancients were led to different opinions on this subject. For Numenius, indeed, celebrating three Gods, calls the first father, but the second maker, and the third that which is made, For the world according to him is the third God. So that with him the Demiurgus is two-fold, viz. the first and the second Goud, and that which is fabricated is the third God. For itis better to say this, than’ to say as he does speaking tragically, grandfather, ofispring, nephew. He how-

* For μηδε evpovra δυνατα δυνατον εἰναι λέγειν it is necessary to read, μηδε evporra εἰς axarras δυνατον, κι ἃ. ;

* For axcorpayperns, it is requisite to read extorpapiperns.

Ὁ It is necessary here to supply i.

256 PROCLUS ON THE (Boox 1,

He how-

* For μηδε evpovra δυνατα δυνατον εἰναι λέγειν it is necessary to read, μηδε evporra εἰς axarras δυνατον, κι ἃ. ;

* For axcorpayperns, it is requisite to read extorpapiperns.

Ὁ It is necessary here to supply i.

256 PROCLUS ON THE (Boox 1,

ever, who asserts these things, in the first place does not nghtly con-numerate the good with these other causes. For it is not naturally adapted to be conjoined with certain things, nor has it an order secondary to another. But father with Plato {in the text] is arranged as the second to maker, Farther still, Numenius co-arranges that which is exempt, ' from all habitude, with the natures that are under and posterior to it. It is necessary, however, to refer these indeed to the first, but to take away from it all habitude. Neither therefore, is the paternal nature of the maker* adapted to the first. For these things’ are apparent in the orders of Gods posterior to it. In the third place; it is not right to divide father and maker, since Plato celebrates one and the same God by both these names. For one divine fabrication, and one maker and father, are every where delivered by Plato. And by following names, to divulse the one cause fof the world,] is just as if some one, because Plato calls the universe both heaven and the world, should say there are two fabrications, the one heaven, and the other the world; just as here, Numenius says there is a two-fold demiurgic God, the one father, but the other maker.

With respect to Harpocration, it would be wonderful, if he were consistent with himself, in determining things of this kind about the Demiurgus, For this man is inconsistent in what he says according to the doctrine of three Gods and so far as he makes the Demiurgus to be two-fold. For he calls the first God, Heaven and Saturn, the second, Dia and Zena, and the third, Heaven and the World. But again changing the order he calls the first God Dia, and the king of the intelligible; but he denominates the second God, the ruler, and the same divinity, is with him Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first God therefore, 1s all these; from whom Parmenides takes away all things, every name, all lan- guage, and all habitude. And we, indeed, cannot endure to call the first God even father; but he denominates him father, and offspring, and the offspring of an offspring.

But Atticus, the preceptor of Harpocration, immediately makes the Demiurgus to be the same with the good, though the Demiurgus is called good by Plato, but not the good. He is also denominated by him intellect, but he says that the good

* For efnprnyevoy in this place, itis requisite to read εξηρημενον.

* Instead of παντος here, the sense evideotly requires that we should read ποιητὸν.

* Father and maker are first apparent in the intelligible and intellectual, and afterwards iu the other orders of Gods.

Book 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 257 —

* Instead of παντος here, the sense evideotly requires that we should read ποιητὸν.

* Father and maker are first apparent in the intelligible and intellectual, and afterwards iu the other orders of Gods.

Book 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 257 —

is the cause of all essence, and is beyond being, as we may learn in the Republic. What then will Atticus say concerning the paradigm? For it is either prior to the Demiurgus, and in this case, there will be something more ancient and honorable than the good; or itis in the Demiurgus, and the first God will be many things ; or it is posterior to the Demiurgus, and thus the good, which it is not lawful to assert, will be converted to things posterior to itself, and = will intellectually perceive them.

After these men, Plotinus the philosopher, asserts that there is a twofold Demiurgus, one in the intelligible world, but the other the leader and ruler of the universe. And he says rightly. For the mundane intellect is in a certain respect the Demiurgus of the universe. And Aristotle shows that this is the first God, denominates it Fate, and calls it by the name of Jupiter. But again, there is an exempt father and maker, which Plotinus places in the intelligible, calling every thing between ἐδ one and the world, the intelligible. For there, accord- ing to him, the true heaven, the king of Saturn, and the Jovian intellect subsist. Just as if some one should say, that the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, are in the heavens. For the whole intelligible is one many, and is one intellect comprehensive of many intelligibles. Plotinus therefore philosophizing asserts these things,

Just as if some one should say, that the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, are in the heavens. For the whole intelligible is one many, and is one intellect comprehensive of many intelligibles. Plotinus therefore philosophizing asserts these things,

Amelius, however, makes a threefold Demiurgus, three intellects, and three kings, one being him that exists, another him that possesses, and the third him that sees. But these differ, because the first intellect, indeed, is tru/y that which itis. The second, is the intelligible which is in it, but has the intelligible prior to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second intellect. But the third, is also the intelligible which it contains ; for every intellect is the same with its conjoined intelligible; but it possesses the intelligible which is in the second, and sees the first intellect. For by how inuch greater the interval is, by so much the more obscure is that which is possessed. He supposes, there- fore, that there are these three intellects and Demiurgi, and says that with Plato there are three kings, and with Orpheus also three, Phanes, Heaven, and Saturn. And he who, according to him, is especially the Demiurgus, is Phanes. It is worth while, therefore, to observe to him, that every where Plato is accustomed to recur from multitude to the unities, from which the order in the many proceeds, Or rather, prior to Plato, unity always precedes multitude according to the arrangement itself of things. And every divine order originates from a monad. . For it is necessary, indeed, that divine number should proceed from the triad ;

Tim. Plat. Vou... I. 2K

458 PROCLUS ON THE [soon 11,

but the monad is prior to the triad. Where, therefore, is the demiurgic monad, in order that the triad may procced from it? How likewise is the world one, unless it was fabricated by one cause? For it is by a much greater priority necessary that the cause itselfshould be united, and be monadic, in order that the world may become only begotten. Let there then be three Demiurgi; but who is the one Demiurgus prior to the three? For no one of the divine orders originates from multitude. Farther still, if the paradigm is one, and the world is one, how is it possible that there should not also be one Demiurgus prior to the many, who looks indeed to the one paradigm, but makes the world to be only begotten ? Hence, it is not proper that the demiurgic number should originate from a triad, but from a monad.

Hence, it is not proper that the demiurgic number should originate from a triad, but from a monad.

After Amelius, Porphyry thinking to accord with Plotinus, calls the super- mundane soul the Demiurgus, but the intellect of it to which it ix, converted, animal itself, so as to be according to him the paradigm ofthe Demiurgus; whom itis worth while to ask, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the Demiurgus. How, likewise, is this conformable to Plato, who continually deno- minates the Demiurgus a God and intellect, but never calls him soul? ILow also does he call the world a God? How does the Demiurgus proceed through all mundane natures? For all things do not participate of soul, but all things partake of the demiurgic providence, And divine production, indeed, Is able to generate intellect and Gods, but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing above the psychical order. 1 omit to say that this very thing itself requires much confirmation, whether Plato knew that there is a certain imparticipable® soul.

In the next place, therefore, the divine Jamblichus has written much against the opinion of Porphyry, and has subverted it as being Plotinian; but delivering his own theology, he calls the whole intelligible world the Demiurgus; so that from what has been said, it is evident that he asserts the same thing as Plotinus,— He says, therefore, in his Commentaries, ** Thus we call that which is truly cause, and the principle of generated natures, and the intelligible paradigms of the world, the intelligible world. Such causes, likewise, as we admit to have an existence prior to all things in nature, these, the demiurgic God, whom we now investigate, comprehending in one, possesses inhimself.” If, therefore, in what is here said, he intends to signify that in the Demiurgus all things subsist demiur-

+ i.e. A soul which is not consubsisteut with body.

BOOK 11. TIM.ZUS OF PLATO. 259

gically, and being itself, and the intelligible world, he speaks conformably both to himself, and to Orpheus who says:

For in Jove’s ample dwelling all things lie, And in Jove’s belly they together flow.

A soul which is not consubsisteut with body.

BOOK 11. TIM.ZUS OF PLATO. 259

gically, and being itself, and the intelligible world, he speaks conformably both to himself, and to Orpheus who says:

For in Jove’s ample dwelling all things lie, And in Jove’s belly they together flow.

And all such like assertions. Nor is it at all wonderful, that each of the Gods should be the universe, but after a different manner, one demiurgically, another connectively, another immutably, another convertively,' and another in some other way according to a divine peculiarity. But if he says that the whole extent between the world and the one, is the Demiurgus, this deserves to become the subject of doubt; and we may urge against this assertion the arguments which we derive from him. For where are the kings that are prior to Jupiter, and are the fathers of Jupiter?) Where are the kings, according to Plato, whom he thinks fit to arrange above the world next to the onc? How likewise can we say that perpetual being itself is the first being, if we also say that the Demi- urgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself perpetual being, as is likewise animal itself? For shall we not thus be compelled to say, that the Demiurgus is notan eternal being? Unless the Demiurgus likewise is comprehended together with other eternal beings. That Iamblichus himself, however, though he here celebrates the demiurgic order in a more confused manner, yet speaks of it more accurately elsewhere, may be from thence assumed, Tor writing concerning the fabrication of Jupiter in the Timanus, after the intelligible triads, and the three tricds of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual’ Gods, he attributes the third order in the intellectual hebdomad to the Demiurgus. Tor he says that these three Gods are celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who assert that the first of them is an intellect comprehending in itself whole monads, the simple, the indivisible, the boniform, that which abides and is united in itself, and who deliver such like indications of its transcendency. But they say that the second is collective of the perfection of things of this kind, and that the inost beautiful indications of it are divine fecundity, that which is collective of the three Gods, that which gives

completion to energy, that which is generative of divine life, that which proceeds

* Instead of των δε rpexrws, it is necessary to read τὸν δε excorperrixws.

* It is here necessary to supply καὶ voepwy. For the three triads of the intelligible and at ‘hes same time intellectual Gods, immediately follow the intelligible triads, and the intellectual hebdomad follows as the third in order.

260 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ τῷ)

* It is here necessary to supply καὶ voepwy. For the three triads of the intelligible and at ‘hes same time intellectual Gods, immediately follow the intelligible triads, and the intellectual hebdomad follows as the third in order.

260 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ τῷ)

every where, and that which is beneficent. And they teach us that of the third who fabricates wholes, the most beautiful signatures are, prolific progressions, the productions and connections of total causes, together with total causes defined by forms, all proceeding fabrications, and other things similar to these. It is worth while, therefore, to form a judgment of the Tamblichean theology from these things, and to determine what the nature of it is respecting the Demiurgus of wholes. For how can the Demiurgus be the whole’ of perpetual being, if indeed perpetual being has been already defined by Plato; but he now says that it Is difficult to find the Demiurgus, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all men? And how can these things be verified of that which is definitively delivered, and unfolded into light to all those that were present ?

After Lamblichus, therefore, Theodorus, following Atnelius, says that there are three Demiurgi. He arranges them, however, not immediately after the one, but at the extremity > of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. He also calls the first an essential intellect, the second, an intellectual essence, and the third, the fountain of souls. He likewise says, that the first is indivisible, but the second, divided into wholes, and the third receives a division into particulars. Again, therefore, the same things must be said to himas were said to the illustrious Amelius ; viz. that we indeed acknowledge that there are three Gods, or Gods analogous to these, yet we do not admit that there are three Deminrgi, but that the first is the intelligible of the Demiurgus, the second, his generative power, and that the third is truly the demiurgic intellect. It is likewise requisite to con- sider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third: for power pertains to the middle, as he somewhere says; and thus it must be denominated partially, and not called the universal fountain of life. For the fountain of souls, is one of the fountains contamed in this middle [or generative power of the De- miurgus.} For life is not in souls only, norin animated 1tures alone, but there is also a divine, and an intellectual, prior to the psychical life, which is said to proceed diversely from thence, from divided rivers. And such, in short, are the dogmas ? of the ancicnt interpreters concerning the Demiurgus.

Let ux, however, concisely relate the opinion of our preceptor (Syrianus] on this subject, as we think that it especially accords with the conceptions of Plato.

And such, in short, are the dogmas ? of the ancicnt interpreters concerning the Demiurgus.

Let ux, however, concisely relate the opinion of our preceptor (Syrianus] on this subject, as we think that it especially accords with the conceptions of Plato.

* For o\ew here, itis necessary to read odor. 1 ΓῚ Instead οἵ exe τὰ δε των νοητων τέ καὶ νυέρων θεων, I read ex’ ἐσχατον τῶν γοήτων κ. λ.

2. For δυγματων here, it is becessary to read δυγματα.

BOOK 11.} ΤΙΝ 5. OF PLATO. 261

The one Demiurgus, therefore, according to him," subsists at the extremity of the intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life. But he emits from himself the total fabrication, and presides over the more partial fathers of wholes, Being, however, himself immoveable, he is eternally established on the summit of Olym- pus,* and rules over the twofold worlds, the supercelestial and the celestial, com- prebending also the beginning, middles, and ends of wholes. For of the? whole demiurgic order, one part is a distribution of wholes totally, another of wholes partially, another of parts totallys, and another of parts partially. Fabrication, therefore, being fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds to itself the total providence of wholes; but a demiurgic triad, is suspended from it, which rules over parts totally, and over the divided power of the monad’ Just again, as in the other, or the partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad, which orderly distri- butes wholes partially, and parts partially. But all the multitude of the triad dances [as it were] round the monad, and being divided about it, distributes its productions, and is filled from it. Of the many Demiurgi, therefore, there is one Demiurgus (who is the monad of the rest], in order that all things may be - consequent to each other, viz. the one, the paradigm in intelligibles, the one intelli- gible Demiurgus, the one only-begotten world. If, however, these things are rightly asserted, the Demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of intellectuals, established indeed in the intelligible, but being full of power, according to which he produces wholes, and converting all things to himself. On this account also Timaus calls him intellect, and the best of causes, and says that he looks to the intelligible paradigm ; in order that by this he may separate him from the first intelligible Gods. But by calling him intellect, he distinguishes him from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods. And by denominating him the best of causes, he establishes him above all the other supermundane Demiurgi. For he denominates the causes demiurgic, as also he had before said, “ Every thing ge- nerated is generated by a cause,” and adds, “ /Vhen therefore an artificer, &c.” Hence the Demiurgus is an intellectual God, exempt from all the Demiurgi. If,

For he denominates the causes demiurgic, as also he had before said, “ Every thing ge- nerated is generated by a cause,” and adds, “ /Vhen therefore an artificer, &c.” Hence the Demiurgus is an intellectual God, exempt from all the Demiurgi. If,

* For avrny in this place, it is obviously requisite to read avroy. * i.e. He dwells eternally in the highest intellectual splendor. * Instead of πως yap δημιουργικης κι Δ.» here, it is requisite to read rns yap «. A.

Afier ro δὲ των ὁλων pepixws, it is necessary to supply the words, ro δε των μέρων oducws, in order to render the division complete.

* For rpcados here, we must read μοναδοε.

4

262 PROCLUS ON THE (Βοοκ 11.

however, he was the first among the intellectual Gods, he would alone abide in his own accustomed manner: for this is the illustrious property of the first. If he was the second, he would be particularly the cause of life. But now, when he generates soul, he energizes with the Crater [i.e. with Juno}, but when he gene- rates intellect, he energizes by himself. Hence he is no other than the third of the intellectual fathers. For his illustrious and principal work is to produce in- tellect, and not to fabricate body. For he produces body not alone, but together with necessity ; but he produces intellect through himselt. Nor does his prin- cipal work consist in producing soul: for he generates soul together with the Crater. But he alune by himself gives subsistence to intellect, and causes it to preside over the universe.

Nor does his prin- cipal work consist in producing soul: for he generates soul together with the Crater. But he alune by himself gives subsistence to intellect, and causes it to preside over the universe.

Existing, therefore, as the producer of intellect, he very properly has an intellec- tual order. Hence also he is said by Plato to be both maker and father, and neither father alone, nor maker alone, nor again father and maker. For the extremes indeed, are father and maker; the former possessing the summit of intelligibles, and being prior to the royal series [1. ὁ. to Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus]; but the latter possessing the end of the [intcllec- tual]order. And the former being the monad of paternal deity; but the latter being allotted a producing power in the universe. Between both these, however, are father and at the same time maker, and maker and at the same time father. For each of these is not the same; but in one order the paternal, and in another the eflective has dominion. The paternal, however, is more excellent than the (fective. Hence in the media, though both are in each, yet the former’ is more father than maker. For it is the boundary of the paternal depth, * and the foun- tain of intellectuals. But the second is more maker than father. ΠῸΓ it is the monad, of total fabrication. Hence I think the former is called JZetis, but the latter Afetietes. And the former indeed is seen, but the latter sees, ‘The former also is absorbed, but the latter is replete with the power of the former. And what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectuals. For the former is the boundary of the intelligible, but the latter of the intellectual Gods. Con- cerning the former likewise, Orpheus says,

In a dark cavern these the father made. * Viz. father and at the same time maker. This God also is Phanes or animal itself, and subsists

at the extremity of the intelligible order. * For βοῖτον in this place, we must read βνθου.

BOOK 11.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 263

But concerning the latter Plato says, “ Of whom I am the Demiurgus and father of works.” In the Politicus likewise, he makes mention of the doctrine of the Demiurgus and father; because with the former [i. e- with Phanes] the paternal is more predominant, but with the latter [i. 6. with Jupiter] the demiurgic. Each ot the Gods however is denominated from his peculiarity, though each is compre- hensive of all things. And he indeed who is alone maker, ' is the cause of mun- dane natures. Ife who is maker and father, is the cause of supermundane and mundane natures. Ile who is father and maker, is the cause of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures. But he who is alone father, is the cause of intelligibles, of intellectuals, of supermundane and mundane natures.

Ife who is maker and father, is the cause of supermundane and mundane natures. Ile who is father and maker, is the cause of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane natures. But he who is alone father, is the cause of intelligibles, of intellectuals, of supermundane and mundane natures.

Plato, therefore, admitting a Demiurgus of this kind, suffers him to be ineffable and without a name, as having an arrangement prior to wholes in the portion of the good.” Yor in every order of the Gods, there is that which is analogous to the one. Such therefore is the monad in each world. But Orpheus gives a name to the Demiurgus, in consequence of being moved [i. e. inspired] from thence ; whom Plato himself likewise elsewhere follows. For the Jupiter with him, who is prior to the three sons of Saturn, is the Demiurgus of wholes. After the absorption therefore of Phanes, the ideas of all things shone forth in him, as the theologist says :

Hence with the universe great Jove contains, Extended wther, heav'n’s exalted plains;

The barren restless deep, and earth renown’d, Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound ; Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main, With all that nature’s ample reaims contain ὁ And Gods and Goddesses of each degree ; All that is past, and all that e’er shall be, Occultly, and in fair connection lies,

In Jove’s wide belly,? ruler of the skies.*

‘i.e. Vulcan.

* viz, The Demiurgus has an arrangement analogous to the good. For as the good is the exempt monad of the intelligible order, so the Demiurgus is the exempt monad of the supermundane order.

? Celestial and sublunary causes and effects, are very properly said by Orpheus to subsist in the belly of Jupiter, because these have a middle subsistence between supermundane and Tartarean natures, just as the belly is in the middle of the body. : ᾿

* These verses are very defective in the original; but the learned reader will find them in a correct state in the Orpheus of Herman.

264 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11.

Jupiter however, being full of ideas, through these comprehends in himself wholes: which the theologist also indicating adds:

Jove is the first, and last, high-thundering king, Middle and head, from Jove all beings spring. Jove the foundation of the earth contains,

And the deep splendor of the starry plains. Jove is a hing by no restraint confin’d,

And all things flow from Jove’s prolific mind. One mighty principle which never fails,

One power, one damon, over all prevails,

For in Jove’s royal body all things he,

Fire, night and day, earth, water, and the sky.

Jupiter therefore, comprehending in himselt wholes, produces in conjunction with Night all things monadically and intellectually, according to her oracles, and likewise all mundane natures, Gods,* and the parts of the universe. | Night therefore says to him asking, how all things will be a certain one, and yet each be separate and apart from the rest:

| Night therefore says to him asking, how all things will be a certain one, and yet each be separate and apart from the rest:

All things receive inclosed on ev'ry side,

In wther’s wide inctlable embrace :

Then in the midst of wther place the heav’n ; Tn which let earth of infinite extent,

The sea, and stars, the crown of heav’n, be fixt. But after she has laid down rules respecting all other productions, she adds: And when your power around the whole has spread

A strong coercive bond, a golden chain

Suspend from wther. This bond which is derived from nature, soul and intellect, being perfectly strong and indissoluble. For Plato also says, that animals were generated, bound

with animated bonds. Orpheus, likewise, Homerically calls the divine orders

* For θεὼν here, it is necessary to read θέον.

a

ROOK 41.} TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 205

which are above the world,' a golden chain; which Plato emulating says, “ That the Demiurgus placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, fabricated the universe 5” and that he gave subsistence to the junior Geds, through whom also he adorns the parts of the universe. If therefore, itis Jupiter who possesses the one power, who absorbs Phanes, in whom the intellizible causes of wholes first subsist, who produces all things, according to the counsels of Night, and who gives authority both to the other Gods, and to the three sons of Saturn,—he is the one and whole Demiureus of all the world, and has the fitth order among'the kings, [1. e. among the Gods of the royal series,] as it is divinely demonstrated by our preceptor in his Orphic Conferences. Jupiter likewise,.is co-ordinate with Heaven and Phanes, and on this account he is both maker and father, and each of these totally.

e. among the Gods of the royal series,] as it is divinely demonstrated by our preceptor in his Orphic Conferences. Jupiter likewise,.is co-ordinate with Heaven and Phanes, and on this account he is both maker and father, and each of these totally.

That Plato, however, had these conceptions respecting the mighty Jupiter, is manifested by him in the Cratylus from names: for he there shows that he is the cause and supplier of life to all things. For he says, “ Zhat we denominate him Dia and Zena, through whom life ts present to all things.” But in the Gorgias he co-arranges, and at the same time exempts him from the sons of Saturn, in order that he may be prior to the three, and participated by them. He also makes Law to be his assessor, in the same manner as Orpheus. For with him also Law is placed by the side of Jupiter, according to the counsels of Night. Farther still, Plato in the Laws represents total Justice to be the attendant of Jupiter, in the same manner as the theologist. But in the Philebus he shows, that a royal soul and a royal intellect pre-exist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause. And conformably to this he now represents him as giving subsistence to intellect and soul, unfolding the laws of Fate, and producing all the orders of the mundane Gods, and constituting all animals as far as to the last of things; some things being generated by him alone, but others through the celestial Gods as media. To which we may also add, thatin the Politicus he calls Jupiter the Demiurgus and father of the universe, just as in the present dialogue he says concerning him, “Ofwhom Lam the Demiurgus, and father of works.” He likewise says inthe Poli- ticus, that the present order of the world is Jovian, aud that the world is moved wcording to Fate. The world therefore living a Jovian life, has Jupiter for the Demiurgus and father of its life. If, likewise, he represents the Demiurgus deli- vering a speech,’ this too is in reality Jovian. For in the Meno, he on this

* Instead of των θείων πραξεων vo των exoopiwy in this place, it is necessary to read των θείων rulrwy νπερ Tey ἐγκοσμιων. * For δημιουργουντα here, it is necessary to read énunyopourra.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. aL

268 PROCLUS ON THE [Βουκ 11.

account calls him a sophist, as filling the Gods posterior to him with all- various reasons. This also the divine poet [Homer] manifests, who repre- sents him thus speaking' from the summit of Olympus.

Hear, all ye Gods and Goddesses, my words.

Plat. Vou. I. aL

268 PROCLUS ON THE [Βουκ 11.

account calls him a sophist, as filling the Gods posterior to him with all- various reasons. This also the divine poet [Homer] manifests, who repre- sents him thus speaking' from the summit of Olympus.

Hear, all ye Gods and Goddesses, my words.

And converting the two-fold co-ordinations to himself. Through the whole of his poetry, likewise, he praises him as the supreme of rulers, and the father of men and Gods, and celebrates him with all demiurgic conceptions. As, therefore, we have shown that all the Grecian theology attributes the total fabrication of things to Jupiter, what ought we to conceive of these words of Plato? Is it not, that the same God king Jupiter, is with him maker and father, and is neither father alone, nor father and maker. For father is the monad, as the Pythagoreans say, but the decad is the demiurgic® order of divine natures, “to which divine number arrives from the secret recesses of the monad, which decad is the venerable uni- versal recipient, surrounding all things with bound, is immutable and unwearied, and is called the sacred decad.” Hence, after the paternal monad, and the paternal and at the same time effective tetrad, the demiurgic decad proceeds. And it is indeed immutable, because an immutable deity subsists together with it. But it surrounds all things with bound, as supplying with order things that are disorderly, and with ornament things that are unadorned. It likewtse illuminates souls with intellect, as being intellect totally, and body with soul, as possessing and comprehending the cause of soul, and generates things which are truly gene- rated, both such as are middles, and such as are last, in consequence of compre- hending in itself demiurgic being. From what is written also in’ the Protagoras, we may collect what the demiurgic order is. For Jupiter there becomes the cause of the whole political science, and of the reasons essentially disseminated in souls. This, however, is to bind the whole fabrication of things, and to connect all things by his own immutable powers. For as the theolovist establishes about him. the Curetic order, thus also Plato says, that he is surrounded with terrible guards. And as the former establishes him on the summit of Olympus, so the latter assigns to him a tower, in which being eternally seated, he adoins all things through the middle orders. Who the Demiurgus therefore is, and that he is a divine intellect, the cause of total fabrication, is evident from what has been said; and likewise that Jupiter himselfis celebrated as the Demiurgus both by Orpheus and Plato.

* Here also it is requisite to make the same emendation as above, * Δημιονργικὴ is omitted in the original,

BOOK 11.) TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 267

* Here also it is requisite to make the same emendation as above, * Δημιονργικὴ is omitted in the original,

BOOK 11.) TIMAEUS OF PLATO. 267

Whether, however, we must say that he is a fontal or a ruling God, or belongs to some other order of the demiurgic series, deserves not to be passed over in silence. It appears, therefore, that such things as the theurgist [Julian] ascribes to the third divinity of the rulers, these Plato assigns to the Demiurgus ;* such as to fabricate the heavens, iaclosing them in a convex figure; to establish the nu- merous multitude of inerratic stars; to give subsistence to the heptad of planetary animals; and to place earth in the middle, but water in the hosoms of the earth, and air above these. If, however, we accurately consider the affair, we shall find that the third of the mundane rulers divides the universe into parts; that the second divides it into wholes, and is celebrated as the demiurgic cause of motion ; and that the first by his will alone disposes all things, and constitutes the whole world according to union. But the God who is said by Timzus to be the De- miurgus, produces all things by his will, imparts to the universe a division into wholes, and also into parts, which give completion to all the wholenesses [rag ολοτητας πασας]. For he not only makes the universe to be a whole of wholes, but he also produces the multitude of each wholeness. On all these accounts therefore, we think it proper to assert that the Demiurgus is beyond the triad of ruling fathers ; that he is one fontal cause, and that the Oracles represent him eradicating the multitude of ideas in the fontal soul, and constituting the world from intellect, soul and body, and producing our souls, and sending them into generation. The Oracles likewise assert the same things of him as Timzus. For they say, “ The father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul in sluggish body.” But this is the admirable thing celebrated by the Greeks, con- cerning him who is according to them? the Demiurgus. If however these things are asserted conformably * both to Timaus and the Oracles, those who are incited by the divinely delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] will say that this Demiurgus is fontal; that he fabricates the whole world conformably to ideas, considered as

ἡ Itappears to be necessary here to read ry δημιουργῳ instead of ry κοσμῳ. * The Greek in this place is very faulty. For it is κατέθετο yap νον μὲν ev ψνχῃ ἐνιματι de ἡμεαι cysareOnce πατὴρ ανδρων re θεων re. Instead of which it ought to be,

careflero yap Novy μεν ere ψυχῃ, Yuxny δ᾽ ενε σώματι apyy Ἡμεων εγκατεθηκε xarnp ανδρων τε θεων τε.

3 For παρ᾽ avrne here, it isnecessary to read παρ᾽ ἀντοιε. * For ομωφνλως in this place read opoperws.

268 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ "1.

one, and as many, and as divided both into wholes and parts, and that he is cele- rated as the maker and father of the universe, and as the father of Gods and men

* For ομωφνλως in this place read opoperws.

268 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ "1.

one, and as many, and as divided both into wholes and parts, and that he is cele- rated as the maker and father of the universe, and as the father of Gods and men

hy Plato, Orpheus, and the Oracles ; generating indeed, the multitude of Gods, but ~ending souls to the generations of men, as Timeus himself also says. For if he is the best of causes, as he says, by what contrivance can he be arranged in the second orders of Demiurg:? Por the most excellent among the Demiurgi is significant of the highest transcendency in the demiurzic series. But the highest summit of every serivs is fontal, so that this Demiurgus is necessarily fontal, and not ruling; the rulers being every where secondary to their proper fountam, Henee also he renders the mundane Gods Demiurgi, or fabricators, as being a certain demiurgic fountain, Since, however, thereare many fontal Demiurgt, in what place this Demiurgus is to be arranged, requires greater Consideration. But from what has been said, it is evident in what order of Gods it’ is necessary to investigate him; from which hhewise, it is manifest after what manner it 18 dificult to find him, and when found to speak of him to all men. Its also evident how he is father and maker, and what his eNective power Is 5 and that he is not as sume say, the maler of inanimate natures, but the father of such as are animated. For he is both the maker! and father ofall things. Por he ts called the father of works, as he himself says in his speech (to the junior Gods). But heis maker and father, as the cause of union, essence, and hypostasis, and the

supplier of providential inspection in all things.

Again, however, this must be considered respecting him, viz. according to Pry of the paradigms the artificer fabricated the world, whether according to that which subsists with invariable sameness, or that which

was venerated.”

Timaus having shown what the form is of the mundane system, that it Is ge- nerated, and the manner in which it is generated, viz. as sensible ; for he makes no mention whatever of time, because he has not yet constituted time 5 and having also shown what the demiurgic cause Is, viz. that it is effective and at the same time paternal, but this is intellectual, imparticipable and total :—he now passes to the third object of inquiry, what the nature is of the paradigm of the universe, whether generated, or etern: il?) For he perceived that every artificer

1 Plouprys is omitted here im the origiual,

ROOK 11.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO, 269

either assumes the paradigm of the things which he fabricates, externally, or himself produces them from the paradigm in himself. Just as of human artificers, some ave able to imitate other things accurately ; but others possess themselves a power capable of fashioning admirable and useful works. Thus he who first made a ship formed in his imagination the paradigm of if. Farther still, this also must be observed, that every thing which makes in an orderly manner, has the scope and ineasure of that which is made. For if it has not, it will err in making, and will not know whether it has arrived at the end when it has. For whence will it know that this is the end, since something may be deficient or redundant, and it may be necessary to take something away, orto add something? For on. this account bodies make irrationally and stupidly, because they have no measure, hor cause of the thing that is made. For it is necessary that the medicine should be heated to a certain degree ; but if art and the medical intellect are not present, defining the’ measure of energy to the fire, it will operate too abundantly and destroy the whole, though it was intended to contribute to the production of the remedy. For it has not the form of the thing produced. Every thing, therefore, which makes ought to have the reason of the thing that is made, if it intends to make in an orderly manner, Hence Plato perceiving this, at the same time that he admuts the eflective cause, introduces the paradigm of the universe ; just as Aristotle also by subverting the paradigm, co-subverts likewise the maker. — Plato therefore, taking it for granted that there is a paradigm, investigates through these things what the nature ofitis, and employing the before-mentioned defini- tions, discovers the object of his inquiry, through the three former hypotheses. But in what manner he makes the discovery, and through what kind of demon- “stration, we shall shortly after survey,

In the first place, however, this very thing must be shown by us, that the world was generated according toa certain paradigm. And in the next place, we must mvestigate what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings it subsists. — If indeed the fabrication of wholes is indefinite and without design, there is nota paradigmatic cause of the universe ; but if itis not lawful to conceive this to be the case, and the Demiurgus knows what he produces, and knowing thus produces the fabrication of the world, the causes of the things generated are contained in him, and it is necessary either that he should primarily possess these causes, or that they should be imparted to him by more ancient principles. But whichever of these we admit, there is a paradigmatic cause prior to the world. Farther still, since the Demiurgus is intellect, if he produces by his very being,

470 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1}.

But whichever of these we admit, there is a paradigmatic cause prior to the world. Farther still, since the Demiurgus is intellect, if he produces by his very being,

470 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 1}.

he produces that which is most similar to himself. But this is to produce an image of himself. If, however, he produces from deliberation, this is entirely and in every respect unworthy of the demiurgic cause. And if some one should admit this to be the case, yet it will follow that the form of the demiurgic work pre-exists in him. For every one who deliberates and consults, antecedently assumes in himself the paradigm of that about which he deliberates. “This there- fore, may be demonstrated through many other arguments, that it is necessary the paradigm of the world should have an existence prior to the w orld, and especially when the demiurgic cause is pre-supposed. For it is necessary that the Demi- urgus being intellectual, should either be ignorant of the order of what is fabricated, or that he should know it. But if he isignorant of this, how can he providentially attend to it?) And how can he give arrangement to the universe? If, therefore, he knows it, how is it possible he should not comprehend that which is generated by the intellection of it, according to one cause?

In the next place, it must be considered what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings itranks. For there is a difference of opinion respecting this among the more ancient interpreters. Thus according to the divine lamblichus, that which is being itself, and which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, is the paradigm of the universe. For he admits that ¢he one is beyond the paradigm, but shows that what is being itself concurs with it, and denominates each that which is comprehended by intelligence. But the philosopher Porphyry supposes, as we have before observed, that imparticipable soul is the Demiurgus, but that intellect is the paradigm, thus beholding in subordinate, natures which exist in more ancient and venerable orders. For Plato having said that the Demiurgus is intellect, denominates the paradigm intelligible. But this inter- preter assuming soul for the Demiurgus, calls the paradigm intellect. In the third place, the admirable Theodorus dividing the demiurgic triad, and perceiving that in each monad of it there 1s a first, middle and last, calls the last’ in each animal itself, and thus says that intellect looks to animal itself; for according to him, intellect is proximately suspended from essential animal. Hence, either the essential Demiurgus does not fabricate looking to animal itself, or the paradigmatic causes are not many, or not every Demuurgus effects his proper production according to a certain paradigm, lest the maker should make looking to things posterior to himself, and thus should ignorantly sustain the passion of a partial soul,

* For ἕκαστον here, it is necessary to read ἐσχατον.

BOOK 11.} TIM/EUS OF PLATO, 271

Our preceptor, however, according to his divine intellectual conceptions, has thought fit to give this subject an appropriate examination. For of the ancients, some have made the Demiurgus himsclf to possess the paradigms of wholes, as Plotinus ; others, not the Demiurgus, but have asserted that the paradigm is prior to him, as Porphyry ; and others, as Longinus, that it is posterior to him, whom our preceptor asks, whether the Demiurgus is immediately posterior to the one, or there are also other intelligible orders, between the Demiurgus and the one. For if the Demiurgus subsists immediately after the one, it is absurd that all the multitude of intelligibles should be immediately posterior to that which is without multitude. For through numbers proximate to the one, the progression is to the whole of number, and the whole of multitude. But if there are other orders between the one and the Demiurgus, it must be investigated whether the paradigm of the universe is in the Demiurgus primarily, or posterior to, or prior to him. For if itis primarily in him, we must admit that he contains every intelligible multitude. Lor the paradigm is the most beautiful of intelligibles, so that again he will be intelligible, and not what we a little before demonstrated him to be, intellectual, though the paradigm has four ideas alone, but the Demiurgus has those which are more partial than these, viz. the ideas of the sun and moon, and each of the natures that have a perpetual subsistence. But if the paradigm is posterior to him, he will be converted to that which is less excellent, and less honorable, which it is not lawful to admit of any divine nature. So that the paradigm is prior to the Demiurgus. If, however, it is prior to the Demiurgus, whether is it seen by him, or not seen by him? To say, therefore, that it is not seen by him, does not accord with Plato and the nature of things. For it is absurd that our soul should see it, and speak about it, but that it should not be seen by intellect, and by a total intellect. But if the Demiurgus sees the intelligible, whether being converted tv himself does he see it, or does he alone perceive it external to himself? If, however, he alone sees it external to himself, he sees the image of being, and possesses sense instead of intelligence. But if converted to himself, the object of his intellectual perception will be in himself. So that the paradigm is prior to, and in the Demiurgus; intelligibly indeed prior to him, but intellectually in him,

The words of Plato also appear at one time to make the paradigm different from, and at another the same with the Demiurgus. For when he says, “ Such and so many ideas therefore, as intellect saw in that which is animal itself, so many he conceived by a dianoetic energy this universe also should possess,” he asserts that

272 PROCLUS ON THE [poox a.

For when he says, “ Such and so many ideas therefore, as intellect saw in that which is animal itself, so many he conceived by a dianoetic energy this universe also should possess,” he asserts that

272 PROCLUS ON THE [poox a.

the Demiurgus, as being different from the paradigm, is extended to animal itself. And again, when he says, ‘ Let us consider after the similitude of what animal the composing artificer constituted the world. Indeed, we must by no means think that he fushtoned it similar to such animals as subsist in the form of a part ; but we must admit that ut is the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals, both considered individually, and according to their genera, are nothing more than parts 7°—in these words also he separates him who constituted the universe from the paradigm. But when again he clearly says, "776 was good ; but in that which is good, envy can never be inherent about any thing whatever: being therefore void of this, he was willing that all things should be as much as possible similar to himself ;” here, the sameness of the Demiargus with the paradigm, appears to be manifest. So that in some places Plato says that the Demnurgus is the same, and in others, that he is differentfrom the paradigm, and very properly makes each of these asser- tions. For the ideas, or four monads of ideas, prior to the fabrication of things subsist intelligibly ; but the order of forms proceeds into the Demiurgus; aud the whole number of ideas ts one of the monads which he contains. Orpheus also indicating these things says, that the intelligible God [Phanes] was absorbed by the Demi- urgus of wholes. And Plato asserts that the Demiurgus looks to the paradigm, indicating through sight intellectual perception. According to the theolovist, however, the Demiurgus leaps as it were to the intelligible God, and as the fable says, absorbs him. For if it be requisite clearly to unfold the doctrine of our preceptor, the God who ts called Protogonus by Orpheus, and who is established at the end of intelligibles, is animal itself,’ with Plato. Hence it is eternal, and the most beautiful of intelligibles, and is in intelligibles that which Jupiter is in intellectuals. Each however is the boundary of these orders.*| And the former indeed, is the first of paradigmatic causes; but the latter is the most monadic of demiurgic causes. Hence Jupiter is united to the paradigm through Night as the medium, and being filled from thence, becomes an intelligible world, as in intellectuals.

Then of Protogonus the mighty strength Was seen; for in his belly he contain’d

* For τῳ αὐτοθωψ here, read τὸ avrozwoy.

* 1. @, Protogonus is the boundary of the intelligible, and Jupiter of the intellectual order,

BOOK 11. TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 273

The whole ἡ of things, and mingled where ’twas fit, The force and powerful vigour of the God. Hence, with the universe great Jove contains, &c.

* 1. @, Protogonus is the boundary of the intelligible, and Jupiter of the intellectual order,

BOOK 11. TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 273

The whole ἡ of things, and mingled where ’twas fit, The force and powerful vigour of the God. Hence, with the universe great Jove contains, &c.

Very properly, therefore, does Plato now say that the Demiurgus looked to the paradigm, in order that becoming all things through the intellectual perception of it, he may give subsistence to the sensible world. For the paradigm was the universe intelligibly, but the Demiurgus intellectually, and the world sensibly. Ilence also the theologist says:

For in his sacred heart he these conceal’d, And into joyful light again reveal'’d.

That the world therefore, was generated according to a paradigm, what this pa- radigm is, after what manner it is above, and how it is in, the demiurgic intel- lect, is manifest thronch what has been said.

Some however doubt why Plato inquires whether the world was fabricated according to that which is generated, or according to that which is intelligible ; for there is not any other generated nature in order that the universe might be fa- bricated with relation to it. If therefore the inquiry had been concerning So- crates, or any other partial nature, the question, say they, would have been rea- sonable. But as the inquiry is concerning the universe, is it not impossible it should have been constituted with relation to that which is generated? For what other generated nature is there besides the universe?) We may dissolve this doubt however, by recollecting what has been frequently said, that Plato calls soul generated, so far as it participates of time. But the inquiry here is, what is the paradizm of the universe, whether itis soul, or intellect, or the intelligible? For these are the only things that are eternal. And on this account he asks, whether the world was generated with relation to a generated or to an eternal nature. After this manner, as it has appeared to some, the doubt may be solved. May it not, however be possible to solve it, by another more perfect method, through which it will also be evident that the confused and disorderly nature prior to the

* In the original τῶν xarrwr Se Sepas, the word Seas or body obviously signifying whole. Tn this sense also, the word σώμα, which ts likewise body, is used by Aristotle in Lib. 2, Cap. 2. of his Meteors. For he there says, that the sea is the principle and body of all water, ἀρχὴν εἰναι καὶ σωμα του παντὸς vdaros ηδ᾽ ἐστι. This principle tov, he afterwards calls nOpocoperos oyxos, a collected bulk or mass. So that ὅεμας with Orpheus, and wa with Aristotle, have in these places the same meaning as odorms οὐ wholeness with the Platonists.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. . 2M

474 PROCLUS ON THE fecon τὸ

This principle tov, he afterwards calls nOpocoperos oyxos, a collected bulk or mass. So that ὅεμας with Orpheus, and wa with Aristotle, have in these places the same meaning as odorms οὐ wholeness with the Platonists.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. . 2M

474 PROCLUS ON THE fecon τὸ

world, must not be said, as Atticus and Plutarch thought it must, to be unbe- gotten? For if nothing was generated prior to the universe, it was ridiculous to inquire whether the world was generated with relation to perpetual being, or to that which is generated. This however, is now investigated. Prior to the world therefore, there was a certain generated nature. And since it was neither per- petual being, nor place ; for three things (as Plato says] were prior to the gene- ration of the universe, viz. being, place, and generation; it is evident that the so-much celebrated confused and disorderly nature was a thing of this kind, Hence not the universe only, but that which was moved ina confused and dis- orderly manner, Was generated, as we have said, and had a prior subsistence. The world therefore, possessing this confused nature as matter, but the intelligible pre-existing as more excellent, whether was the universe assimilated to the ma- terial nature which it contains, or to that which is essentially more divine? For being a medium between the two, it 15 necessarily assimilated to one of the extremes. For it is supposed that the Demiurgus assumed that disorderly nature, and perceives animal itself; so that Plato very properly inquires to which of these the Demiurgus assimilates the universe, whether to that which he assumes, orto that which he sees. To these things therefore, that which follows Is con- formable ; viz. that the world being beautiful, it was assimilated to the intelligible, and not to that which was moved ina confused and disorderly manner. For that which is assimilated to this is deformed.

To these things therefore, that which follows Is con- formable ; viz. that the world being beautiful, it was assimilated to the intelligible, and not to that which was moved ina confused and disorderly manner. For that which is assimilated to this is deformed.

Some of the interpreters however say, that Plato does not inquire concerning the Demiurgus, according to which of the paradigms he made the world, but that he asks as with reference to us who know that there are twofold paradigms, with relation to which of these the universe was generated. And this assertion 15 after a certain manner reasonable. For we are those who look to both these pa- radigins, and not the Demiurgus. For it is not lawful for him to look to that which is less excellent; bat) we perceiving the natures Which are prior, and also those which are posterior to him, interrogate ourselves, in which of them it is. tit to place the paradigm. But others say that Plato adduces that which is gene- rated, forthe sake of a perfect division, in order that he may not appear to prevent the object of investigation, whether the mundane paradigm js eternal. For supposing the paradigm to be venerated, he shows that a certain absurdity will fullow. Others again say, that since of sensibles, some are preternatural, but others according to nature ; and of these, some have the images of certain venerated natures, but others are the similitudes of them ;—hence Plato wishing

nook 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 275

to demonstrate that the world was generated with relation to an eternal paradigm, makes a subversion of the others, on account of the universe being most beautiful. For that which is most beautiful, is neither preternatural, nor is derived from a generated paradigmatic essence 3 since that which is derived from this is not most beautiful. But because, in short, the universe is beautiful, it is not preternatural. Such therefore, is the solution of the doubt.

It is worth while however concisely to survey the accuracy of the words. For the words “ again,” and “ must be considered,” indicate the order of the problem ; viz. that it is in continuity with the things which precede it, and that this imme- diately follows those speculations. But the words, “ respecting him,” collect all the investizations, and refer them to the one theory about the world. For what is said about the Demiurgus and the paradigm, is assumed for the sake of the theory of the universe, The words, “ according to which of the paradigms,” sepa- rate as extremes, and as different from each other, the intelligible, and that which is generated ; the former existing among the first, but the latter among the last of beings. But the word artificer exhibits the production of form by its cause, and demiurgic art proceeding into the world. For as the theologist says, the first manual artificers gave to Jupiter the demiurgic powers of all the mundane production. And,

But the word artificer exhibits the production of form by its cause, and demiurgic art proceeding into the world. For as the theologist says, the first manual artificers gave to Jupiter the demiurgic powers of all the mundane production. And,

Who thunder, and the lightning formed for Jove. Vulcan and Pallas the first artists, taught

Jove all the dadal arts, the world contains.

Plato therefore following what the theologist here asserts, continually uses the words τέχτὴνάμενος and erexryvara, Which signify fabricative energy, when speak- ing of the demiurgic production, But the words, “ according to that which sub sists with invartable sameness,” indicate the eternal paradigm of the universe, which is the first of eternal natures, and is established at the end of the first intelligibles. And again, “ that which was generated” signities, that which was moved in a con- fused and disorderly manner. For this is a composite, is much mingled, and alter-motive, or moved by another; all which are the clements of a generated nature. Tle does not therefore say that this disorderly nature is unbegotten and incorruptible, and that the world is generated and corruptible; but that the former of these was generated, as being alter-motive and co-mingled. For Plato clearly says, that prior to the generation of the universe there were these three

276 PROCLUS ON THE ᾿ [BOOK 1.

things, place, generation, and being. And it is evident that by generation he means the confused and disorderly nature. Generation therefore is this; and the world is unbegotten according to temporal generation. Hence these things are more concordant with Plato, and with our unperverted cpinions about the universe.

Indeed, if this world is beautiful, and the Demiurgus of it 1s good, it is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigin; but if he is not good,

which it is not lawful for any one to assert, he looked to that which was

generated.”

In the first place, it is requisite that we should understand the logical method of Plato, in order that we may see how demonstratively it proceeds. For from the hypotheses he had these twofold axioms, that what is generated according to an eternal paradigm is beautiful; but that what is generated according to a gene- rated paradigin ts not beautiful. The converse however to these are, that what is

beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, but what is not beautiful

was not generated according to an eternal paradigm. Por τὸ the opposite of

The converse however to these are, that what is

beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, but what is not beautiful

was not generated according to an eternal paradigm. Por τὸ the opposite of

that which precedes, the opposite of that which is consequent follows, then these reciprocate with cach other, and that which was proposed from the beginning is demonstrated, through a deduction to an impossibility. Por if that whieh is beautiful was generated according to a generated paradigin, but that which is so generated is not beautiful, through one of the axioms, then it will follow that what is not beautiful is beautiful, Why therefore, did not Plato immediately in the hypotheses assume these axioms, viz. that what is beautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, what is not beautiful was not so generated ; but those to which these are the converse, though he intended to use the former, and not the latter in his demonstration? In answer to this, it must be said, that the latter which commence from causes, are more adapted to hypotheses, but the former which are derived from things caused, are more allied τὸ things posterior to hypotheses. For when he says, “ That which was generated according toaneternal paradigm ts beautiful,” he begins froin causes, but ends in that which is caused. But when vice versa, le says, Zhat is beautiful which was generated according toan eternal paradigm,” he makes the beautiful to be precedancous, but the cause consequent. He employs therefore, the former of these, in order that

ΣΝ με. «ὦ δ. κ᾿.

ROOK 41} TIMEUS OF PLATO. 277 he may assume things adapted to principles and causes in the hypotheses, but he employs the latter, which is the converse of the former, in the demonstrations, selecting that whieh is appropriate to: the things demonstrated. Hence laying down these four axioms, he very properly enquires concerning the universe, Whether itis beautiful, or is not beautiful. Brat if indeed the world is beautiful, it was generated according to an eternal paradigin; bat if it is not beautiful, according to a generated paradigm. That the world however is beautiful, is evident from sense, ΠῚ was therefore generated according to an eternal paradigm.

Brat if indeed the world is beautiful, it was generated according to an eternal paradigin; bat if it is not beautiful, according to a generated paradigm. That the world however is beautiful, is evident from sense, ΠῚ was therefore generated according to an eternal paradigm.

Since however beanty is imparted to the world from_ the paradigm, through the demiurgie cause as a medium, in the proposition which precedes, for the purpose of showing that the world is beautiful, he assumes that the Demiurgus is good. For every artificer, who is a good artist, has dominion over his proper matter, and superinduces the form which he wishes, on the subjects of his art. And this is accomplished in a much greater degree by the whole Demiurgus, who also gives subsistence to nature, the (universal) subject of things, as other assertions evince; and who produced i, thatit might co-operate‘ with him, in receiving the world and fabrication from him. Since however, he had added this in the second proposition, he passes over the opposite in silence. ΕῸΓ the defamation of the world is atrocious. since it is most beautiful, and a blessed God, but the defamation of the Demiurgus is still more so. Hence Plato employs Themis* as a guard to what he says, who collects the Gods themselves to the Demiurzus, and does not sufler them to be divulsed from the goodness of the father. And he does this, in order that through Themis, he may not ascribe any

thing disorderly or defamatory to the Demiurgus. The propositions therefore, being such, and receiving their beginning from the dividing art, let us see what

Plato afterwards adds.

“It is however, manifest to every one, that he looked to an eternal paradigm; for the world indeed is the most beautitul of generated natures, and the Demiurgus is the best of causes. But being thus gene- ‘rated, it is fabricated according to that which may be apprehended by reason and intelligence, and which subsists invariably the same.”

* Instead of aepyos here, it is requisite to read ovrepyos. ? For Plato uses the word Oeyss, or ἐσμ μέ, in this place.

278 PROCLUS ON THE [noo τι.

? For Plato uses the word Oeyss, or ἐσμ μέ, in this place.

278 PROCLUS ON THE [noo τι.

Through what is here said, in the first place, he antecedently assumes the con- clusion, as he is accustomed to do, deriving the principles of his demonstrations from intellect. Inthe next place, he introduces the recollection of the assump- tion, and afterwards adds the rest... For the words, “ lt is however manifest to every one, that he looked to an eternal paradigm,” are the conclusion. But the words, “ For the world indeed is the most beautiful of generated natures, and the Demiurgus is the best of causes,” are a narration of the assumption, as the causal conjunction μὲν indeed manifests. And the rest is the conclusion of all that is said. Such therefore is the logical arrangement of the words. But again, be- taking ourselves to the theory of the tings, let us in the first place see through what cause he transfers the word dcautiful to the word most beautiful, and good to the best. In the next place, let us survey how these things are true, and what kind of order they have with reference to each other.

That a beautiful fabrication therefore, was fabricated according to an eternal paradigm 15 evident, and was before asserted. For whence could it obtain the beautiful, except from the imitation of this paradigm? If however, this is most beautiful, the fabrication was not simply made according to an eternal paradigm, but if it be requisite to say so, it was assimilated to the most eternal of eternal natures. For every image which more clearly participates of form, is the Image of a purer paradigm, And as of the statues produced by the telestic art, some par- taking of the presence of a divine nature more obscurely, enjoy the second and third powers of the divinity, but others participating of it more clearly, partake also of the first and highest powers of the God ;—after the same manner likewise, the God who gives perfection to the world, has rendered it most beautiful, as an image of the first of eternal natures. For that which is most beautifal is derived to the world from thence, and is extended to a similitude towards it, through its own beauty. Again therefore, if the demiursic cause is good, he looked to that which is eternal, and not to that which is generated ; lest by looking to whatis less excctlent, which it is not lawful to assert, he should fall off from goodness. [f, however, this be the case, not only a good cause, but thre best among causes, looked to the most eternal of paradigms. For by how much the perceiver is more divine, hy so much the more elevated is the object: of perception. For the same thing will not be surveyed by the better and the less excellent nature, Plato therefore, indica- ting these things, and through these latently assisting the position that the para-

* Instead of ro Anyor here, it is necessary to read ro λοιπὸν.

a

Book It] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 279

For the same thing will not be surveyed by the better and the less excellent nature, Plato therefore, indica- ting these things, and through these latently assisting the position that the para-

* Instead of ro Anyor here, it is necessary to read ro λοιπὸν.

a

Book It] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 279

digm of the universe does not rank among the multitude of eternal natures, but is the most eternal of all of them, and primarily eternal, calls the world indeed most beautiful, but the Demiurzus most excellent. For that which is most beau- tiful was generated according to the most divine paradigm, and that which is most excellent necessanly looks to that which is supreme. For if that which is most beautiful was not derived trom the first paradigm, this first paradigm will either be the paradigm of nothing, or of something less excellent. But it is not lawful for superior natures to make that which is less excellent in secondary natures, And unless that which is best looked to that which is first [either it will not make that which is most beautiful'] or not looking to that which is first it will make it. How likewise, will that which is the first paradigm, rank as a paradigm, unless* that which is best intellectually perceives it?) And how can that which 15 intelligible to a less excellent nature, be incoinprehensible through transcendency by that which is more excellent? Hence it is necessary that what is most beautiful shculd have been generated according to that whichis most divine, and that what is most excel- lent should look to that which is most eternal. Farther still, it isnecessary that what is most beautiful should be fabricated by that which is best. For of what is that which is best the cause, unless of that whichis the most beautiful of generated natures? For if it is not the cause of the most beautiful effect, it is the cause of something less excellent. If, therefore, that which is best is the cause of that which is less excellent, that which is not best will be entirely the cause of that which is most beautiful, and thus the order of things will be radically subverted. It must be admitted therefore, that these three things are, as it is said, demonstrated by geometrical necessities ; and through these we are reminded after what manner names are assumed by Plato. Porphyry however adds, that if the Demiurgus is most excellent, it follows that he looks to an eternal nature, or? that he will not fabricate what is beautiful. And in the next place,* it is necessary that he who fabricates What is [truly] beautiful, should look to that.which is eternal, or’ he will not make what is beautiful as the best of fabricators, but he will make it casually. Hence also, Plato asserts that the fabricators of mortal natures are damons. And ifindeed, they are simply most excellent, nothing will prevent the artificers and framers of mortal natures from being likewise most excellent, and on this

Hence also, Plato asserts that the fabricators of mortal natures are damons. And ifindeed, they are simply most excellent, nothing will prevent the artificers and framers of mortal natures from being likewise most excellent, and on this

* The words ἢ ov ποίει ro καλλιστον, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted. Ὁ Instead of ἡ in this place, it is requisite to read εἰ yn.

3 Instead of ec here, read ἡ. 2. For ecre read era,

5" The same emendation is also requisite here as above.

280 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK tr.

account the fabricators of beautiful images. Such therefore are the observations. of Porphyry.

We may easily however learn, that it is rightly said the world is most beautiful, and the Demiurgus the best of causes. In the first place, indeed, the beauty of the heavens, the order of the periods, the measures of the seasons, the harmony of the elements, and the analogy which pervades through all things, demonstrate to those who are not entirely blind, that the universe is most beautiful. [ἢ the next place, does not the order of the invisible powers it contains, according to which the parts of the world are connected, and the gift of the intellectual essence, evince that it is the most beautiful of generated natures? For there are in it the harmonious choir of souls, the participation of intellect, the supply ofa divine life, the progression ἡ of ineffable deity, and the number of henads or uni- ties, from which the whole becomes full of beauty. Since also, the fpartial] soul which is assimilated to the universe, becoming elegantly adorned, exhibits mn her- self an admirable beauty, how is it possible that the universe should) not possess beauty in a still greater degree? hence theolosists conjoining Venus with Vulcan, say that he thus fabricated the universe, And again, from VWulean and Agata, they generate Eucleia and Eusthenia, Eupheme and Philophrosune, who render the corporeal-formed nature decorated with beauty. Neither therefore, do those who revile the Demiurgus, dare to say that the world Is not most beautiful, but on the contrary they say that through the beauty of it souls are allured and ensnared.

Neither therefore, do those who revile the Demiurgus, dare to say that the world Is not most beautiful, but on the contrary they say that through the beauty of it souls are allured and ensnared.

But how are we to adnit that the Demiurgus is the best of eternal natures? For some think that we must understand by this word dest, the best of the causes of generated natures, in order that he may not be absolutely the best of causes. For this would be false, but that he may be the best of the causes of things that are generated ; since the natures that are above him are not the causes of these. I however, should be ashamed of myself, if L were in want of such an artifice as this, forgetting what was a little before said, in which the Demiurgus now delivered to us by Plato, was shown to be the fountain and monad of every demiurzic order. On account of this therefore, he is the best of causes, because he is allotted the first order among the demiurgi of the universe ; Plato here, directly emulating Homer, who calls the Demiurgus the father of wholes, and the supreme of rulers; and he thus denomiaates him though he mentions the Geds

* Itappears to me that the word xpocéus must be supplied in this place.

BOOK 11. TIMALUS OF PLATO. 281

prior to him, as far as to the Goddess Night. Because therefore Jupiter is the most ancient and venerable of demiurgi, he is celebrated by Tomer as the supreme of rulers, but by Plato as the best’ of causes. Others however by no means dare to aceuse the Demiurgus, but blame this universe, and pervert. thie assertions of the ancients, who eall ita eavern and aden. And others, as Hera-° clitus, say, Chat the Demiargus sported in fabricating the world,

Others however by no means dare to aceuse the Demiurgus, but blame this universe, and pervert. thie assertions of the ancients, who eall ita eavern and aden. And others, as Hera-° clitus, say, Chat the Demiargus sported in fabricating the world,

To these objections however it is easy to reply. Por though the world is, as Plato says, most beautiful, and a blessed God, yet when compared with the intelligible, and the place which is there, it is deservedly called a cavern and a den. And it is especially so to partial souls who verge to bodies and matter. But with respect to the Demiurgus, though he is the best of causes, yet the whole of his providential energies about the recent fabrications, may be called sport, when compared with the energies which are exempt from sensibles. For these reasons therefore, the Demiurgus is thus celebrated in the present: words by Plato. Tt is requisite also to understand how the co-ordination of the most beautiful with the most excellent, is suspended from the first principles. For as in them beauty is suspended from (he good, and the beautifying cause, from the fountain of all cood, thus also here, the world is said to be most beautiful, but the Demiurgus most execient, and the most beautiful is suspended from that which is best. Inthe next place i is requisite to understand how what is said about the fabrication itself (of things] imitates this fabrication. For as the world itself was led from confusion to order, and a similitade to the intelligible, by fabrica- tion, thas also the discussion of it first employed abhorrent: appellations, calling it generated and destructible, but now the most venerable names, denominating it the best of generated natures, the offspring of the most excellent father, and the image of the most divine paradigm. And shortly after, he reminds us of it hy the most sacred of names.

“ But again, these things [thus] subsisting, there is every necessity that the world should be the image of a certain thing.”

To those who are more simple, what is here said may appear to be the same with what was before asserted. For some one who does not survey things accu- rately may ask what difference there is between saying, thatthe world was fabricat-

* For αἴτιος here, itis necessary to read aproros.

Tim. Plat. Vor. i. 2N

289 PROCLUS ON THE [ποὺκ 11.

For some one who does not survey things accu- rately may ask what difference there is between saying, thatthe world was fabricat-

* For αἴτιος here, itis necessary to read aproros.

Tim. Plat. Vor. i. 2N

289 PROCLUS ON THE [ποὺκ 11.

ed according toa paradigm, and that it is the image of a certain thing. In reality however, each of these is separated from the other. For since itis possible for an artificer to make conformably to a paradigin, but the thing fabricated may not become the image of the paradigm in consequence of not being vanquished by the fabricating cause; in order that vou may not fancy that this is alse the ease with the world, Plato has shown that the Demiargus indeed looked to a para- digm, and that being most excellent he looked to the most divine paradigm, trom what he said respeeting the universe being fabricated conformably to the itellt-

ἐπ αἷς its

gible, But that the universe also is vanquished by form, and traly paradigm, he manifests from what is now said. Por if the world is an image, the universe is assimilated to the intelligible, For that which is not dissimilar but similar and consentancous, is an image. You have therefore, the sensible universe, the most beautiful of images, the intellectual universe, the best of causes, and the intelligible universe, the most divine of paradigms, Each of these also is every where. Por the sensible universe participates of intellect and being; the intellectual universe possesses sensibles uniformly, but itelligibles “secondarily 5 and the intelligible universe antecedently comprehends, primordially and umited- ly, intellectuals and sensibles. Phe universe however, subsists appropriately in each order. And the sensible universe indeed, is placed before us as a fabrica- tion; but the eternal is two-fold, the one beme as demiurgic, but the other as paradigmatic 3 though the paradigmatic is also in the demiurgic. Por the Demiurgus makes looking to himself; since every Intellect sees itself) and is the same with the intelligible it contains. And again the demiurgic is in the paradig- matic; since it makes that which is generated, Por it is not a paradigm like a form impressed in wax, nor as the Image of Socrates is the image of another Image; but the paradigmatic cause by its very being makes secondary natures similar to itself At the same time however, to fabricate paradigmatically, and τὸ be a paradigm demiurgically (16. fabricatively] differ, For the former is to energize essentially ; but the latter is to impart essence energetically, And the former is to perceive intellectually, intelligibly ; bat) the Latter is to be intelli- wible intellectually. For (he peculiarity of he paradigm ww to make by is very being ; but of the Demiurgus, to make by cnergismg. Vor itis wot the same thing tumake by existing, and to hnow and energize through knowledges siice soul also produces life by evisting, but makes artificially through knowledge. And it

For (he peculiarity of he paradigm ww to make by is very being ; but of the Demiurgus, to make by cnergismg. Vor itis wot the same thing tumake by existing, and to hnow and energize through knowledges siice soul also produces life by evisting, but makes artificially through knowledge. And it

* For ovros here, read ovrws.

* For ra αἰσθητὰ here, it is necessary to read ra sonra,

nook 11} TIMAUS OF PLATO. 283

possesses indeed, the former essentially, but the latter according to energy. And Why is it requisite to lengthen these observations philosophically ? For the theolo- gist lone before, celebrates the demiurgic cause in Phanes. 10)" there, ds he SAYS, the gre.t Bromius, or ali-sceing Jupiter, was, and antecedently existed y in order that he micht have as it were the fountains of the twofold fabrication of things. He also celebrates the paradigmatic eause in Jupiter, For again, he likewise is, as hosayvs, Metis the first ccnerator, and much-pleasing Love. He is also continual- ly denominaied by him, Dionysius, aud Phanes, and Ericapwus. All the causes thereiore participate ofeach other, and are in each other; so that he who Says as the εν το Tamblehus, that the Deminrgus comprehends in himself the paradigm, and he who evinces, as the dlustrious Amehus, that the paradicm is the Demiur- gus, a eertain respeet speak rightly, For the latter saw the demiurgic peculiarity pre-existing Inthe paradigm; for there the first Jupiter exists, and on this account he makes Phanes to be the Demiurgus ; but the former saw the paradigm in the Demiturcns, For Metis also was in the Demiurgus, being absorbed by him, And on this account he considered the paradigmatic to be the same with the deminraic eause. And thus much concerning these particulars,

We ought not however, to wonder if Plato calls the world an image. For though itis most beautiful, vet itis the image of intelligible beauty. Through this similitude also, aoexhibits such things as adorn! and beautify. generation, and receives as a whole the form of the paradigm. ‘Thus the philosopher calls the world the image of the intelligible, as being assimilated to its paradigm. The addition likewise of vecessity, shows that the similitade of the former to the latter is admirable and metlable. Afterwards also, le testifies this by a demonstration indubitable and firm. For it proceeds trom the hypotheses themselves,

But in every thing, to begin from a principle according to nature, is

the greatest of undertakings.”

Some read what is here said by stopping at the word ravros, every thing, ac- cording to whom the words indicate, that it is the greatest of all things, to make that bezinning. of the discussion which is according to nature. But others, stop- ping at the word μέγιστον, ereaiest, conjoin the word rayrog with what follows; so that with them the colon signifies that it is the greatest undertaking, to begin

* For exirpowevorra here, I rcad eximpexovra,

of the discussion which is according to nature. But others, stop- ping at the word μέγιστον, ereaiest, conjoin the word rayrog with what follows; so that with them the colon signifies that it is the greatest undertaking, to begin

* For exirpowevorra here, I rcad eximpexovra,

504 PROCLUS ON THE [nook τι.

the discussion of tho universe, from a principle which is according to nature, Others again say that these words are introduced for the sake of the things pre- viously assumed, these being rightly concluded through) the hypotheses which were necessary. But according to others, they are introduced for the sake of what is directly after asserted, it being requisite, if we intend to make a proper beginning, to define previously what hind of discourses ought to be adopted concerning sensibles, And others say, they are introduced for the sake of what will afterwards be delivered concerning the tinal cause, Por this is the greatest principle, and according to nature, which it is requisite especially to survey, and from which commencing it is fit to discuss what follows. But that previous to the disquisition of this, he informs us what the mode will be gf physical dis- cussions.

To me however, this axiom appears to be rightly asserted of all things. Vor it is universal, and is adapted to what has been before said, to what immediately follows, and to what will be again said. Or rather, it is not adapted to these alone, but to all fabrication. Por beginning from a principle according to nature as from a root, Plato delivers afterwards explanations of cause homologous to this principle. And science itself, from) proper hypotheses, collects appropriate conclusions. Science therefore follows the order of things ; but doctrinal dis- quisition follows science. And this is the greatest undertaking. Ino the first place, because it imitates wholes, and the progression of beings. In the next place, because if the smallest particular Is overlooked in’ the principle, it becomes multiplied as we proceed. And in the third place, the principle or beginning, Is said to be the half of the whole. If however, this be the case, it possesses the createst power, ΠῚ, too, as some say, the principle is something more than’ the whole, it is in an admirable manner said to be the greatest thing. The truth ag this is also. testified by poets who say, ‘that every thine which reecives a good beginning usually ends well.” And moreover, on this account the Athenian euest calls the principle a God, if it obtains that which is fit. For he says, * Principle being established in men as a God, produces all things rightly of it obtains acongruous portion{or the part which ts adapted to "1

For he says, * Principle being established in men as a God, produces all things rightly of it obtains acongruous portion{or the part which ts adapted to "1

But what is the meaning of the words “ according to nature? Is it the re- ceiving every thing which ought to be received, or is it that which first proceeds from things which subsist essentially? Por that which ts last is a principle as with reference to us, but not with reference to nature. The principle therefore

BOOK "1 TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 285

4d

according to nature, of the universe indeed, is the final cause, but of demonstra- tions the hypotheses, and of discussions the definition respecting the form of the doctrine, whether itis to be received as firm, immutable and accurate, or as that which is merely probable, and is not indeed truth, but credible, and assimi- Jated to truth.

“After this manner therefore, we must decide about the image, and

the paradigm of it.”

These three particulars are connascently consequent to each other, the things, the conceptions, and the words, According to the things and the conceptions therefore, Plato assumes the first hypothesis; but according to the words he makes this definition, Por when he separates that which is generated from being, he adheres to the theory of the things. But when he defines our knowledge according to the objects of it, he adheres to the theory of the conceptions.” And now distributing the words according to the diversity in the knowledge of them, he demonstrates to us their definite nature. Tlence, these are consentaneous to each other; viz. twofold things, being and that which is generated ; twofold knowledges, intelligence and opinion; and twofold words, the stable and the probable, For whence are knowledges derived, except from the objects of know- ledge? And whence ts the difference of words derived, except from knowledges ? Some therefore say, that it is the logographic art to define previously what. the mode is of the diction, and what kind of person the auditor of it ought to be; and that Aristotle emulated this, and also many others more recent.

L however should say that the disenssion imitates the fabrication itself of things, [ν᾽ αὐ thatunfolds into lightthe invisible lives of the world, but gives subsistence to that which is apparent, and imparts a boundary to it prior to the whole world, thus also Timwus adheres indeed to the theory of the things ; bat also makes the form of the words to be adapted to the things; and antecedently assumes, and previously defines the mode of the whole theory ofthe discussion, in order that he may dispose the whole ofthe doctrine conformably to this definition, Why therefore does he do this now and not before? Because, after the demonstra-

' In the original, ore ες ras nperepas γνώσεις διοριθει, exe ros πραγμασιν τοιε τῶν νοημάτων, Which is evi- dently defective, but may be restored to its genuine meaning by reading, ore δε ras ἡμετέρας γνωσεις

Because, after the demonstra-

' In the original, ore ες ras nperepas γνώσεις διοριθει, exe ros πραγμασιν τοιε τῶν νοημάτων, Which is evi- dently defective, but may be restored to its genuine meaning by reading, ore δε ras ἡμετέρας γνωσεις

Sopi2et ene rows πράγμασιν, rns ἀντείχετο Ocwpias των νοηματων.

28. PROCLUS ON THE ἐν ἐς

tion, that it is requisite the world should be generated, he necessarily detines what the nature of the discussion about: sensible things ought tg be, but not prior to this, the nature of the universe being unknown, But when he calls the world an image, an image of sucha kind is not ἡ to be assumed, as we conceive that of inanimate * natures to) be, as neither is the paradigm unprolitic and ineflicact- ous, but an assimilation must be given to this world to the intelligible. Inthe first place indeed, according to the prolific power ot the paradizin 5 for by its very being it produces the image trom itself. In the second place, according to the demiurgic cause, Which renders the universe most similar to the intelligible, by the energies extended to it. And in the third place, according to. the con- version of the world itself to the forming power and participation of intelligibles. Por “itassimilates itself, as the Oracle says, hastening to be invested with the im-

pression of the images which the intelligible Gods extend to it.”

“ As words therefore are allied to the things themsclves of whica they

are the interpreters.’

As the progression of beings is from the one which is prior’ to the many, and

mundane natures proceed from a monad to their proper number, thus also. the.

discourse of Timieus, beme assimilated, as he says, to beings, commences from one axiom, and the universal, and thus afterwards introduces division to his words. What therefore is the one common axiom, in the words before us?) That itis necessary language should be allied to the things, of which itis the interpreter. And it seems that the Platonists Albinus and Gaius, and their followers, took occasion from hence to define in how many ways Plato dogmatizes ; and that he does this in a twofold respect, either scientifically, ov from probability, and not according to one mode, nor as if all discussions had one accuracy, whether they are concerning beings, or things which subsist through generation ; but such as is the nature of things, such also is that of the words which are divided) in con- Janction with things. Hence they subsist in such a way with respect to accuracy and clearness about the things which are their subjects, that some words assert

the accuracy of the dogmas, but others their probability. For it is necessary that

1 Ou is omitted in the original, >For ῴνχὼν here, itis necessary to read αψυχων,

2 ΤΙρο is omitted in the original.

DIR Te ee

ΤΙΝ OF PLATO. 237

BOOK 11.}

For it is necessary that

1 Ou is omitted in the original, >For ῴνχὼν here, itis necessary to read αψυχων,

2 ΤΙρο is omitted in the original.

DIR Te ee

ΤΙΝ OF PLATO. 237

BOOK 11.}

language should be similar to things ; since it could not otherwise interpret their nature, than by being allied to them, Por it is requisite that what the thing is contractedly, that language should be evolvedly ; in order that it may unfold the thing into Jight, and may be subordinate to the nature of it. Hence, the divine causes of language unfold after this manner the essences of the natures prior to them, and are connascent with them. J the Gods therefore, the angel or messenger of Jupiter (i.e. Hermes), who has the relation of logos to the intellect of his father, announces the will of Jupiter to secondary natures. But in essences, soul which is the logos of intelligibles, unfolds the united cause of wholes which ts in them, she receiving from them her hypostasis."| And in the genera superior to us, the angelic order has the relation of logos to the Gods. Very properly therefore, is it here said, that language is allied to the things of which it is the interpreter. This therefore, must be said to be the one* common axiom, prior to the divided particulars. And Timwus in what follows, distributes different modes of words in conjunction with

the quality of the things.

- “ TIence, respecting that which is permanent and stable, and intellec- tually apparent, it is requisite that the words should be as much as possible permanent, without lapse, irreprehensible and immutable. But

in this [stability] the paradigm is in no respect deficient.”

Prior to this, Timeus called the paradigm perpetual being, subsisting invariably the same, and apprehended by intelligence ; but now he calls it permanent and stable; the former indeed, instead of perpetual being, and which is apparent in conjunction with intellect, but the latter, instead of that which is apprehended by intelligence. Tle also denominates: the words respecting it permanent, indeed, in order that through the sameness of the name, he may indicate the similitude of them to things; but wethout lapse, in order that they might adumbrate the firm- ness of the thing. And irreprehensible, in order that they may imitate that which is comprehended by intelligence, and may scientifically accede. For it 15 necessary that words, in order that they may be adapted to intelligibles, should have accuracy and firmness, as being employed about things of this kind. For as the knowledge of eternal natures is without lapse, so likewise is the discourse

* For τὴν υποθεσιν here, it is necessary to read τὴν νποστασιν-. > Ἐν is omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

288 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11.

For as the knowledge of eternal natures is without lapse, so likewise is the discourse

* For τὴν υποθεσιν here, it is necessary to read τὴν νποστασιν-. > Ἐν is omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

288 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11.

about them. For it is an evolved knowledge. Since, however, it proceeds into multitude, and is allotted a composite nature, and on this account falls short of the union and impartibility of the thing, he densminates the thing itself in’ the singular number permanent and stable, cad intellectually apparent; but the discourse about it in the plural number, calling it stable words, which are without a lapse, and are irreprehensible. And since in language there is a certain: simi- litude to the paradigm, but there is also a certain dissimilitude, and this abundant, he assumes one word in common ¢he permanent, but the others different. Since also a scientific discourse is irreprehensible, as with reference to our knowledge 3 for there is not any thing ἴῃ ἂς better than science; but is confated by the thing. itself, as not being able to comprehend the nature of it, such as it really is, and. as falling off! from its impartibility,—on this account he adds, δ as much as possible” For science itself, as subsisting in souls, is indeed irreprehepsible, but is reprehended by intellect, for evolving that which is iinpartble, and apprehend- ing that which is simple ina composite manner, For the phantasy also repre- hends sense, because its knowledge is in conjunction with passion, according to a commixture, from which the phantasy is purified. But opinion reprehends the phantasy because its knowledge is attended with type and morphe, from Which opinion is. free. Science reprehends opinion, because its Knowledge Is without the explanation of cause, by which science is especially bound. And intellect. as we have said, reprehends science, because it transitively divides the object of knowledge, but intellect’ Knows at once the whole in conjunction with essence. Hence intellect is alone unconquerable, but science, and scientific

discourse, are vanquished by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.

“It is necessary however, that words respecting that which 1S assiMl- lated tothe permanent and stable, but which is the image of being should possess probability [alone).”

That the discussion of generated * natures, is a discussion about an image, and" that on this account it is to be called probable, is evident. Perhaps however, some one may inquire what words remain to be assigned to things which are not assimilated to the intelligible, but yet at the same time exist in the universe, such

* For axopevos here, 1 read axoornoapevos.

> For πρὸ των γενήτων in this place, it is obviously necessary to read πέρι τῶν YORT wr.

BOOK 11} ΤΙΜΊΕῦΘ OF PLATO, 249

> For πρὸ των γενήτων in this place, it is obviously necessary to read πέρι τῶν YORT wr.

BOOK 11} ΤΙΜΊΕῦΘ OF PLATO, 249

as we assert conjectural and artificial things tobe, May we not say, that words of a conjectural nature are adapted to these, which words are different from those that are assimilative? For to conjecture is one thing; since this is more obscure than sense; and to assimilate another. For assimilation pertains to the interpreters of the images of being. Artificial, therefore, and conjectural things, are unfolded through conjectural words. Unless other such like words are adapted to things which are truly conjectural; but with respect to artificial things, assimilative or probable words, are adapted to those that are the first from forms, but to those which have a secondary hypostasis, and are the third from truth, such words are adapted as pertain to things conjectural by nature. For conjectural things are the images of sensibles, in the same manner as sensibles are the images of intelligibles. Thus the painted bed is the image of that which is made by the carpenter.

Farther still, this also must be considered, that Plato is now speaking about physical images, and that on this account he gives a twofold division to words. Por things which are assimilated to the intelligible, subsist by nature or naturally ; but this is not the case with things artificial, For the artist does not make that Which he makes, according to certain ideas, though Socrates appears to say this in the Republic. There, however, what is said, is asserted for the sake of the paradigm, and is not concerning ideas themselves. For he says that God is the maker and Demiurgus of things artificial,’ but he is not the Demiurgus of ideas. But in the Protagoras, it is clealy shown by Plato that we do not contain the reasons or productive principles of the arts,* and much less of things artificial,

For he says that God is the maker and Demiurgus of things artificial,’ but he is not the Demiurgus of ideas. But in the Protagoras, it is clealy shown by Plato that we do not contain the reasons or productive principles of the arts,* and much less of things artificial,

' See the 10th book of the Republic, where he speaks of the ideas of a bed and a table. Plato, however, did not intend to signify in what he there says, that there is an idea of each of these in the intellect of the Demiurgus of the universe; or, in short, that there are ideas of things artificial; but he calls by the name of idea, the reason or productive and forming principle which subsists in the dianoctic power of the artificer, This reason also he says, is the offspring of deity, because he conceived, that this very artificial principle itsclf, is imparted to souls from divinity, Proclus, in the Parmenides, well observes, that an argument. of the truth of this may be derived from Β΄ πο, that Piato calls a poet the third from, or with respect to, the truth, placing him analogous to a painter, who does not make a bed, but the image of it. The form of bed, therefore, in the dianoctic part of the artificer, ranks as first with respect to truth; the bed which he makes as second; and that which is printed asthe third. But if there was an idea of bed in the intellect of divinity, the painter would be the fourth, and not the third from truth.

* i.e. The soul dues not essentially contain the reasons of those arts which are solely ministrant to the purposes of the moral life.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 20

290 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ 11,

and that neither are the paradigms of them established in the Gods. These therefore were not generated according to the intelligible. Plato, however, now divides words into those which pertain to the discussion of the intelligible, and those which are concerning the image of the intelligible. Hence indicating this he says, that words respecting that which ty assimilated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of being, should possess probability [alone]. But the works of nature are assimilated to the intelligible, and not the works of art; so. that neither have particulars this assimilation detinitely, but the universals which are in then. We have, however, spoken concerning these things elsewhere.

“The latter words having the same relation to the former [as that of an image to its paradigm]. For what essence is to generation, that

truth is to faith.”

We have, however, spoken concerning these things elsewhere.

“The latter words having the same relation to the former [as that of an image to its paradigm]. For what essence is to generation, that

truth is to faith.”

Prior to this, Timaus made two things antecedent, the intelligible and the generated, or the paradigm and the image, and assumed two things as analogous to these, science and probability, or truth and faith: so that as truth is to the intelligible paradigm, so is faith to the generated image. But now alternately he says, as truth is to faith, so is the intelligible to that which Is generated. And this perfectly well, For he makes the intelligible and truth to be antecedent, but at the same time begins from that which is generated and faith, that he may mingle that which bas a reference to us with the order which is according to nature, and that he may preserve the proper worth of the things, and may argue from what is μόν ἢ to us. Plato, therefore, clearly divides language and know- ledge conformably to the objects of knowledge 3 and Parmenides though obscure on account of his writings being poetical, yet at the same time indicating these things, he says, “that truth ts full of splendor and immutable, but that the opinions of mortals have no real credibility.” And again, “ that there are two paths, one of which has a real existence, so that itis not: possible for it ποῖ to exist. But this is the path of Persuasion, and 15 attended by Trath, The other, necessarily has no true caistence. The former of these paths, however, Clough replete with the most perfect persuasion, is unpleasant.” And again, * Neither can you have any knowledge of non-being; for it is not attainable; nor can you make it the subject of discourse." The philosopher therefore says, that there are ἔν ον

* Owing to the obscurity of the original, | have only given the substance of the verses of Parmenides

ROOK tJ TIM:ALUS OF PLATO. 204

fold knowledges, of twofold things 5 truth which he calls [full of splendor, as shining with intellectual heht; and faith, from which he takes away stable knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now mentions appears to be diflerent from that spoken of him in the Republic, in the section of a line, For there the faith is an irrational knowledge ; whence also itis divided from eonjec- ture, but is arranged according to sense, The faith however of which he now speaks is rational, but is mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense and conjecture. Hence itis filled with much of the unstable. For receiving from sense or conjecture the ors, or (hata thing is, it thus explains causes. But these kinds of knowledge, have much of the confused and unstable. Hence Sucrates in the Phado reprehends sense in many respects, because we neither hear nor see any thing accurately.

For receiving from sense or conjecture the ors, or (hata thing is, it thus explains causes. But these kinds of knowledge, have much of the confused and unstable. Hence Sucrates in the Phado reprehends sense in many respects, because we neither hear nor see any thing accurately.

How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates from sense possess the ac- curate and the irreprehensible? | For the powers which use science alone, compre- hend the whole of the thing known with accuracy ; but those that energize with sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy, on account of sense, and because the object of knowledge is unstable. For with respect to that which is material, what can any one say of it, since it is always changing and flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide fora moment, But that which is celestial, in conse- quence of being remote from us, is not casily known, nor to be apprehended by science, but we must be satistied in the theory of it, with an approximation to the truth, and with probability [instead of certainty}. For every thing which is in place, requires the being situated there, in order to a perfect knowledge of its nature. The intelligible, however, is nota thing of this kind; since it is not apprehended by us in place. For wherever any one establishes his dianoetic energy, there, truth being every where present, he comes into contact with it. But if it is possible to assert any thing firm and stable about that which is celestial, this also is possible so faras it participates of being, and so far as it can be apprehended by intelligence. For if any thing necessary ean be collected concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations which are universal. But so far as it is sensible, it is difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to. be surveyed. And thus much concerning there particulars. .

Some one, however, may doubt, how it can be any longer said to be difficult to discover the Demiurgus, and impossible when found to speak of him to all men, since we are able to employ stable, immutable, and irreprehensible language about the paradigm? Or is not that which.is said about the Demiurgus, in a much

292 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11.

Or is not that which.is said about the Demiurgus, in a much

292 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11.

greater degree adapted to the paradigm itself? For it is much more difficult to discover the latter than the former, and when found to speak of it to all men. Neither, however, does Plato deny that scientific language may be employed about the Demiurgus, nor about any other of the natures that subsist always invariably the same. For in what does Plato differ from other physiologists, except in ex- hibiting the science pertaining to divine natures? But if he particularly reminds us of this in the Demiurgic cause, that itis difficult to find it, we ought not to wonder. For he knew, as it appears to me, that other physiologists tronsfer the effective cause to physical powers. Hence that we may not be affected in’ the same way as they were, he shows that the Demiurgic principle is difficult to be found, and difficult tobe known. And this much in answer to the doubt.

Plato however in many places admits the truth of beings, conformably to theologists. For aniform truth (or truth characterized by unity] is of one kind, and is the light proceeding from the good, which, as he says in the Philebus, imparts purity, and as he says in che Republic, union to intelligibles. The truth proceeding from intelligibles, is of another kind, and illuminates the intellectual orders, which the essence that is without figure, without colour, and without contact primarily receives, where, also, as itis written in the Phadrus, the plan of truth is situated. Another kind of truth is that whichis connarcent with souls, which comes into contact with being through intelligence, and is) conjoined through science with the objects of science. For the psychical hight, may be said to be as in the extension of breadth the third from = the intelligible; the intellectual breadth being filled from the intelligible, but the psychical from the intellectual. This truth, therefore, which is in souls, is that, which must now be assumed, since we likewise assume this faith, and not that which is irrational, and separated from all rational animadversion, The one also must be conjoined to intelligibles, but the other to sensibles.

“ You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, if asserting many things about many concerning the Gods, and the generation of the universe, I should not be able to employ language in every respect accurate and consistent with itself.”

Timeus first exhibits the hypotheses of the whole of physiology, and collects

the lemmas pertaining to the theory of it; the latter being three, but the former five. In the second place, he defines the mode of the discussion. And in the

ΠΟΟΚ 41.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 293 -

third place, he prepares the auditor to receive in a proper manner the discourse

which he is about to make. For it is necessary that he should not expect to

In the second place, he defines the mode of the discussion. And in the

ΠΟΟΚ 41.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 293 -

third place, he prepares the auditor to receive in a proper manner the discourse

which he is about to make. For it is necessary that he should not expect to

hear perfectly accurate arguments in’ physical discussions, nor sach as are truly scientific, but such as are assimilated to them. 11 is besides this requisite he should know, that as the world is mingled from physical powers and an intel- lectual and divine essence; for “ physical works, as the Oracle says, co-subsist with the intellectual light of the father = thus also the disenssion of it, makes a commixture of faith and trath, Por things which are assumed) from sense par- ticipate largely of conjectural discussion; but things which commence from intel- ligibles possess that which ds irreprehensible, avd cannot be confuted. For when we say of the Demiurgus himself, that he consults, that he energizes diano- etically, and that he makes these things prior to those, we relingtish the trath ofthings. So thatif when speaking of eternal beings, and showing how they provide for the universe, we are compelled to divide that which is impartible, and to inake that which is eternal temporal, much more will the assertions res specting sensibles themselves be deficient in accuracy [and truth]. What then, someone may say, do we not speak accurately concerning the heavens when we say, thatthe circles inthe bisect each other? Butdo we notfall off from accuracy, when we are satisfied, not with the accurate, but with an approximation to it, in con- sequence of our tmbecility, and not on account of the nature of the thing? Or, also, when we receive indeed, principles from sense, yet is it not from universal reasons? ‘The assertions therefore, respecting the heavens, as in intelligibles, ex- hibit the irreprehensible; bat as in objects of belief, they also are reprehended through immaterial forms. Consider then this very thing which is now asserted, that the greatest circles in the Heavens bisect each other. [sy it not necessary that the section should be according to points? But a point isimpartible. What, therefore, is there of this kind ina partible nature? What is there without inter yal in a nature distended with interval?) For every thing which subsists in a phy- sical body, is co-divided with its subject. What, then, is there not likewise a physical point? This however relinquishes that which is truly impartible, and is a point indeed, in physical substances, but is not simply a point. So that what is said of a point, is not accurately adapted to a thing of this kind. In short, as the assertions concerning intelligibles, are not adapted to dianoetic objects, so neither is what is said of scientific objects adapted to sensibles. For intelligibles are the paradigms of dianoetic natures, and dianoetic natures of sensibles. For

204 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ “τ.

In short, as the assertions concerning intelligibles, are not adapted to dianoetic objects, so neither is what is said of scientific objects adapted to sensibles. For intelligibles are the paradigms of dianoetic natures, and dianoetic natures of sensibles. For

204 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ “τ.

it is soul which adorns the mighty heaven, and adorns it in conjunction with the father. So that when we speak of circles in the heavens, of contacts, bisections, and equalities, we speak accurately, as not speaking about sensibles. Since therefore things of this kind may be asserted of all material natures, the objection is trifling.

If, however, some one should.ask us, is not that which is truly equal impartible, and that which is truly a circle, without interval? Por each is a universal; but universal is an impartible reason and form. But the natures in’ the heavens are partible, and not indivisible, and are inasubject, Here again, we do not say that either circles, or equalities, or any thing else of this kind are in sensibles ; and thus we are consistent with ourselves. We summarily, say, therefore, that Plato at one time defines science, by an explanation of causes alone ; at another time, by the subjects of tt, possessing anessence perfectly stable, tovether with an caplanation of cause ; and at another, by the principles not being hypotheses. And according to this last form, indeed, he asserts that there is one science (i.e. dialectic] which ascends as far as to the principle of being. Por this science pre-establishes the principle which is truly principle, to be unhypothetical, Ttalse has for its subject truly exisiting being, and produces its reasonings from cause, But according tothe second form, he also calls dianoetic knowledge science. And according to the first alone, he allows the appellation of science to be given to phystology. Now therefore looking to the first’ form he thinks fit to call it conjectural know- ledye. And thus much in answer to the doubt, the whole of what is here said being attended with difficulty on account of the construction of the words, which may thus be corrected with a small addition. “JA O Socrates, asserting many things about many,” afterwards showing what these many things are, he adds, “ concerning the Gods, and the gencration of the universe. And these are the many he alludes τον. Uf therefore, he says, many things being asscrted about many, concerning the generation of the universe, and the Gods tt contains, cach of these being many, we should not be able to employ accurate language, you must not ΟΝ He says this, however, because itis not w onderful, to be oceupicd in things of a necessary nature, But it is necessary that a discussion should not be accurate in a twofold respect, viz. on account of the thing known, not being stable and clear,

and on aecount of our nature being human. So great therefore is the caution

on account of the thing known, not being stable and clear,

and on aecount of our nature being human. So great therefore is the caution

' Itis evidently necessary instead of Seurepor ertus iv this plece, to read πρωτὸν etSos. Vor diunve-

tc hnowledge is by nu means conjectural.

ΠΟΟΚ 11. TIMTUs OF PLATO. 295

which Plato employs in what he says. This however is not the case with others. But Heraclitus, by asserting of himself that he knew all things, makes all other mento be destitute of science. And Empedocles announces that he imparts truth herself, and that, in what he writes.

‘To Wisdom’s summit rapidly he leaps.

For these assertions are not conformable to philosophic caution. But the Stoics say that there is the same virtue of Gods and men, being very far from emulating the piety of Plato, and the modesty of Socrates.

“ Tf therefore we shall afford arguments no less probable than others, it is proper to be satisfied, calling to mind that I who speak, and that: you who are my judges, have the human nature [in common]. 80. that if you reccive a probable narration concerning these things, it is fit to seek for nothing farther than this.”

Timeus reminds us ina twofold respect of the privation of stability and aceu- racy in physical discussions ; first, from the essence of the things. For from im- material natures becoming material, from impartble partible, from separate hatures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming indi- vidual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific and irreprehensible, which is adapted to: immaterial and imparuble forms. But in the second respect, from the imbecility of that by which physical objects are surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any thing concerning them, it is also requisite to embrace a knowledge co-ordinate to them. But this is sense. And if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived ; but here dwelling in the last part of the universe, and being most remote from them, we employ sense in a gross and erroncous manner. For we are allotted the human nature. But the human nature brings with ita life which is material and dark- ened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge. The Gods, however, know' that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote from generation, that which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent, necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they

* The word yeywosover is wanting in the original.

906 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK It,

For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they

* The word yeywosover is wanting in the original.

906 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK It,

intellectually perceive them after the above- mentioned manner. For we must not fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known, or that what is not stable is also not stable with the Gods, as the pInlosopher Porphyry says; for this is asserted by lim which it would have been better not to have said ; but we must admit that the mode of knowledge varies with the diversities of gnos- tic natures. For the same thing is known by divinity indeed unitedly, by intel- lect totally, by reason universally, by the phantasy morphotically," and by sense passively. Nor does it follow, that because the thing known is one, the knowledge also is one. Farther still, if knowledges are essential in the Gods, and their intel- lizence is not adventitious, such as they are, such also is their Knowledge. But they are immaterial, eternal, united, and undefiled; and, therefore, they know immaterially, eternally, unitedly, and with uncontaminated purity, Hence they antecedently comprehend that w hich ismaterial, immeatertally 5 dispersed multitude, uniformly ; that which is changed according to time, stably and eternally 5 and every thing preternatural, dark and impure, ina manner ftranscendently lumi- nous and] pure, Would it not therefore be superfluous to add any further contir- mation of this truth?

Again however this? may be assumed from what has been said, that the want of accuracy in the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility Por to the knowledge of them we require phantasy, sense, and many other organs. But the Gods contractedly comprehend these in their unity, and divine intellection, For in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending that which for the most part takes place, on account of the instability of their subject matter, But again, in celestial natures, we are filled with much of the conjectoral, through employing sense, and material instruments, On this account, we must he satisticd wath proximity in the apprehension of them, since we dwell remotely, at the bottom, as itis said, of the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant with them, who collect the same things respecting them from diferent hypotheses 5 some things, indeed, through eccentrics, others through epicyeles, and others through evolvents, (in all these} preserving the phenomena, What then, some one may say, are we to be satisfied with Plato im physiologizing, and in affording us arguments no less probable than others? May we not reply, that it especially becomes prudent men thus to speak about things of this kind, and to pursue the

May we not reply, that it especially becomes prudent men thus to speak about things of this kind, and to pursue the

' The word morphe, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies. Hence, the phantasy perceives morphotically, because its sight 1s a figured perception. ? Yor roec here, it secins necessary to read rovro.

1

Book 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 297

medium between dissimulation and arrogance ; for the latter is to say more, but the former less, than all others, and the medium is to say What is in no respect less. In the next place, the words no less, may not only be said of men in former times, and speculators of nature, but also of the conjectural things themselves. As if he had said, “ Jf therefore, we shall afford arguments no less probable than the things thenselces, and shall not desert the nature of the objects of knowledge, we must be satisfied.” The Gods indeed know these things in a more excellent manner, but we mist be satistied with an approximating knowledze of them. For we are men, are placed in body, and exert a partial form of life, and are filled with much! ofa conjectural nature, Hence, our discourses may be very properly said to resemble fables. For our language, which the word pugog a fable (used here by Plato] indicates, is replete with crassitude and irrationality, and it is necessary to pardon human nature,

* You speak most excellently, O Timawus, and we shall receive what you say, in every respect as you advise. Your preface indeed we won- derfully approve. Proceed therefore, and bring to a conclusion the sub- sequent melody.”

In the Republic, where Socrates disposes the discourse, Timwus was. silently present, not exhibiting bis own judgment about what was said. But) here Socrates, after a certain admirable manner, receives what Timanus says. Por in the things also, of which the persons are images, while secondary natures energize, those that are first are established in themselves, and do not depart from themselves, nor ,verge to inferior natures. But when more divine beings energize, then more subordinate natures are elevated to the participa- tion of them, through the love of all-various wonder. Hence Socrates, in’ what is here said, very properly surrounds Timeus with all possible praise. For through wonder itself, he is in a greater degree united to him. Moreover, the word most excellent” indicates indeed, the perfect, intellectual, and scientific

“nature of the doctrine of Timaus. And it also indicates his analogy to the Demi-

urgus, For as he is the best of causes in works, thes also Timieus is the best in discourses. ‘The words likewise, “ we shall receive what you say in every respect

' For πηλὸν here, it is necessary to read πολν. * In the teat of Proclus, Aoyor is erroneously printed for sepor. rae > or . o> pp Zim, Plat. Vou. I. 21

298 PROCLUS ON THE [ϑοοκ 11.

‘The words likewise, “ we shall receive what you say in every respect

' For πηλὸν here, it is necessary to read πολν. * In the teat of Proclus, Aoyor is erroneously printed for sepor. rae > or . o> pp Zim, Plat. Vou. I. 21

298 PROCLUS ON THE [ϑοοκ 11.

us you advise,” indicate what kind of person he ought to he, who rightly receives discussions concerning divine natures. That he ought assiduously to adhere to the teacher; to perform with all his might that which is ordered by him; and to persuade himself, that it is right to be persuaded by what the teacher says.

Farther still the word “ preface” indicates: the comprehension of total concep- tions in the hypotheses, All things therefore, are in the preface itself" Por in this preface, it is shown what the form* is of the object of inquiry, on what hypotheses,’ and things previously demonstrated from them it depends, and also what the nature is of the discussion, and what are the requisite qualifications of the auditor. But the word νόμος melody, is assumed from modulations adapted to the harp. These therefore, are certain melodies, some of whieh are Minerval, out others Martial. And some indecd, are entheastic, but others are defamatory ofmanners, Prior, however, to these melodies, itis usaal to arrange the preludes, which also on this account are called precontrectations, From thence therefore, they are assumed, But the word melody contributes to: the thing proposed τὸ be considered, because all the visible partible* order of things, being harmonious, eternally remains, on account of the goodness of its producing causes. And because likewise, It proceeds from, and subsists according to intelleet, and pos- sesses total powers separated from cach other, and arranged in a manner adapted toeach. For melodies are called νομοὺς dacs, because they remain iinmutable, and hecause such things as are fit are distributed from cach,

«“ Tet us narrate then on account of what certain cause, the composing artificer constituted generation, and this universe.”

All that has been before said delivers to us preparatives for the whole of physio- logy. And of these, some through images and symbols, exhibit the theory of the world. A preface also of the whole discussion is prefixed, and of the demonstra- tion through images or symbols; one part of which unfolds the union, but another the separation of mundane natures. Of the prefatory parts also, some are hypotheses, but others are as it were lemmas demonstrated through the hypo-

* For cara re re here, it seems requisite to read κατὰ rovro. * Instead of re τὸν ecdous in this place, it is necessary to read re ro ecdos. 5 For cat ποιων υποῦεσεων read καὶ ex nowy νπυθεσεων.

* The word pepiorn is omitted in the original,

nook uJ TIMLUS OF PLATO. 299

* Instead of re τὸν ecdous in this place, it is necessary to read re ro ecdos. 5 For cat ποιων υποῦεσεων read καὶ ex nowy νπυθεσεων.

* The word pepiorn is omitted in the original,

nook uJ TIMLUS OF PLATO. 299

theses. For the particulars respecting the mode of discussion, may be placed among the things demonstrated. For to the demonstration that the world is generated, the assertion that the discussion of it is eikotology [or speaking trom probability], is consequent. But again, these things having received an appro- priate end. “Timwus commencing the fabrication of the universe, begins from the good, conceiving that the discovery of the final cause will be to him the imost beautiful incitation. For as the good is the cause of all beings, so likewise it is fit that the generation of the world should proceed from this as the first prin- ciple. For all things are from ¢he good. And of such things indeed, as the demi- urgic intellect is not’ the cause, as for instance of matter, of these the good is the cause. And of such things as the paradigm is not hypostatic, these also derive their subsistence from the good. For all things are for the sake of it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things, as it is said in the Epistles. Hence Timieus refers the other causes to this one cause. For having found the form of the world through the hypotheses, and also the paradigmatic, and eflective cause, he now Wishes to assign the most principal, most venerable, and most ancient of causes, the final, which he particularly desires in the fabrication of things. For since the man who lives according to intellect performs every thing for the sake of good, will not intellect itself, and a divine intellect, in a much greater degree fabricate all things for the sake of the final cause? For though the worthy man frequently appears to perform something for the sake of the body, yet this is not the end to him of the thing, nor does he principally regard the good of the subordinate nature ; but he does this also for the sake of a similitude to divinity, and makes that to be his most intentional end. How much more therefore, must the Demi- urgus of the universe fabricate for the sake of good, and the final cause? For he does not energize without design, nor indetinitely. Hence also, as it appears to me, Plato does not investigate inthe beginning, if there is a final cause of the composition of the world, but as if this was acknowledged by all men, he inquires what the final cause is. For the Demiurgus is supposed to be intellect and a God, and not chance, as some say, But if intellect is the maker, there is certainly that for the sake of which in the fabrication of things. For as the soul when it is in an upright condition, performs all things according to intellect, so intellect in fabricating, gives subsister ce to all things conformably to divinity. But this is

the same as conformably to the good.

For as the soul when it is in an upright condition, performs all things according to intellect, so intellect in fabricating, gives subsister ce to all things conformably to divinity. But this is

the same as conformably to the good.

* For oowy μεν ἐστιν aurios here, it is necessary tu read ogwy μη ἐστιν acres,

300 PROCLUS ON THE [noox 1,

Whether therefore, it be requisite to follow the Aristotelian problems, after what the universe is, and what kind of a thing itis, 1015 necessary to investigate on what account itis. For it has been said that itis generated indeed, but is the image of being. And itis also requisite besides this to cousider, for the sake of what it was generated. Oraf it be necessary to adoptthe Platonic causes, itis fit after the demiurgic cause and the paradigin, to discover the final cause of the fabrication of the world. Por again, all other causes are suspended from this, ἀπ likewise the divinity of the paradigm, the goodness of the maker, and the perfection of that which is generated. And as far as to this is: the ascent to those who love to conteniplate truth, Tt is ustal however, to call the final cause δέον ot account of which ; the paradigmatic cause ποτ ον wth relation to which, the demiurgic cause vg ov, by which ; Whe instremental cause av ov, (rough which ; form x25 ὁ, accord: mg lo which ; and matter 22 ov, or evan, from which, ov in which, These causes also received the same appellations from Plato limsclt, Por now investigating the final cause he says, on account of what cause. Inquiring conecruing the paradig- atic Catse, he says, with relation tow hich of the paradigms. Bat concerning the demiurgic cause, he says, that which is generated, Is from necessity gene- rated by a certain cause, And as we proceed, we shall point out the rest from the words themselves of Plato; except: that at present also it must be said, that these appellations are adapted to the discriminating setenee of the philosopher,

What however is generation, and) what is the universe? Some indeed by generation understanding the sublunary phice, call the universe the whole world, Bat these entirely wander from the meaning of Plato. Por the Detturgus ts hot represented as separately fashioning materkdl natures, aud separately the whole world. And in the next place, generation itself is a part of the aniverse. Iv however, it should be said that Plato calls the heaven the universe, because it Is the greatest part of the world, for the rest is stall ee because itis the most divine and principal part, and as it were the summit of the universe; for the head also is called the whole, as,

Peucer, dear Lead ;' and Plato also says, that the world was surrounded with the remaining bulk of body for the sake of this;—yet at the same time, the philosopher is accustomed to call this likewise generation. Others again call matter generation, but that

ν iliad, viii. 281.

BOOK Ih] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 504

Others again call matter generation, but that

ν iliad, viii. 281.

BOOK Ih] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 504

Which is adorned trom matter fas the subject], they denominate the universe, by Whom many things written by Plato, must necessarily be rejected. For he says. that every thing generated, and all generation, is sensible, or tancible, and visible, Farther sal, he gives a division to generation Opposite to that of matter, as when he says, there were these things subsisting separately, being, place, and generation, from which the universe was constituted,

Our preceptor however says, that the fabrication of the world is to be under- stood ina twofold respeet. For one part of it Consists in the formation of bodies, but the other, in adapting bodies to. the completion of one world, For it is one ‘thing to fashion bodies themselves, through figures, bat another to harmonize them When fashioned, to the universe. Generation therefore, must be said to be the forma: tion of bodies, being a motion [or tendency) by the wholeness and perfection of the τσοὶ, Lor that which is composed from parts has a pre-concetved production of the parts, Ilence the formation,’ which takes place between matter, the whole orderly distribution of things, and the one completion of the universe, must be called generation, τὴ order that it mity bed path to the whole inwhich the parts are comprehended. For this is the universe, being constituted perfect from perfect: parts, according to the one harmony of wholes. Since however, this whole is sensible, and not the in- telligible all, or universe: for this was the paradigm 3 nor the intellectual all; for this was demiurgie s on this account. Plato adds the particle dhis, inanifesting by it that which is sensible and partial. For every thing corporeal, though it should be a whole, is partial. But the most principal whole is that which is immaterial and withont interval, and that is traly all whether it) be intellectual or intelli- gible. And thas much concerning this particular,

But what shail we say is meant by composition? Perhaps it indicates that the world is composed from: many things, and that the generation of it is from dissimilars, Perhaps also, it signifies thatunion and stability accede to it from the total fabrication. For the collocation of ow, with, fin the word σωνιττας IS Significant of union, and of the conspiration of all things to one. But στατις, permanency, Wanitests the firmness and stability of the fabrication of the world. Farther stl, with respeet to the words συνιστὰς and συνεστητάτο [1 ον. he who comjosed and he constituted) employed here by Plato, the former copulates the present and past times, and the Jatter indicates: the perfection cand the perpe- tuity of the fabrication. For the former of these words manifests continual pro- "

ἡ For πάσαν here, it is necessary to read πλασι».

302 PROCLUS ON THE [soon ‘i.

For the former of these words manifests continual pro- "

ἡ For πάσαν here, it is necessary to read πλασι».

302 PROCLUS ON THE [soon ‘i.

duction, and which is always consummately effected with invariable sameness ; but the latter a wholeness which is allotted an existence in fulness. The signi- fying likewise, both the past and the present time through the same names, In- dicates that the divine fabrication proceeds through sameness and similitude. For such as is the nature of that which is efleetive, such also is the energy which it possesses. And as it is, so it fabricates ; because it produces by its very being, and from! its own proper essence.

“fle was good, but in him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing.”

Those who call the Demiurgus the good, are entirely ridiculous. For the good apd one who is good are not the same. For the former is imparticipable itself by itself, andis exempt from all things; but the latter is good through participa- tion ofthe former. And the one rules over all intelligibles ; but the other, if indeed itis the same with the paradigm, is intelligibles themselves, but is not the sovereign ruler of intelligibles ; and if itis subordinate to the paradigm is in amuch greater degree inferior to the king of all intelligibles. And in’ short, every certain God ts a certain good, one being a demiurgic, another a vivific, and another a perfective good. But the good is nota certain good, but is sinply good, And ifyou say that itis demiurgic, you diminish its subsistence as sinply wood,

These distinctions therefore being made, let us neat consider the beginning of whatis here said. In the first place, therefore, as Plato when Investigating the mundane form, and inquiring whether the world was generated, or is unbegotten, adds prior to the whole demonstration, “ if was generated ;” and as when explor- ing the paradigmatic cause, he previously adds, “if ts manifest to every one, that “ἀρὰς generated with relation to an eternal paradigm,” adducing the conclusion prior to the whole of the reasoning ;—thus also proposing to discover the final cause after all the others, he adds, “ he was good,” imitating intellect through this enunciation, and the at once collected comprehension of. the assertion, For in this colon, the whole of what is Investigated Is comprehended, because goodness is the final cause, whether itis simply so and one, or whether? it is the demiurgic goodness. For as the paradigm is two-fold, the one being intelligible, but the other intellectual ; and as the one is prior to the Demiurgus,

" For avro here, read azo,

* Lcre is omitted in the original.

SONS TAT ee RE OF TNT τοῦ

ROOK 11. TIMLEUS OF PLATO. 303

it is the demiurgic goodness. For as the paradigm is two-fold, the one being intelligible, but the other intellectual ; and as the one is prior to the Demiurgus,

" For avro here, read azo,

* Lcre is omitted in the original.

SONS TAT ee RE OF TNT τοῦ

ROOK 11. TIMLEUS OF PLATO. 303

being primarily eternal and united, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals, but the other which is in the Demiurgus of wholes, unically comprehends the demiurgic number of forms ;—thus also with respect to goodness, one kind is simply so, but another ts in the demiurgic intellect. And the former indeed, is the fountain of all intelligible, intellectual, and supermundane good ; but the latter being a certain goodness, is the cause and fountain of some things, but is allotted an order subordinate to others. For if we wish to explore what it is which makes a God, whether he be intelligible or intellectual, supermundane or mundane, we shall find that it is nothing else than goodness. For what is it that makes each of the bodies that are animated to be so, except the resemblance of soul? What is it which makes intellectual souls to be such, except the intellect that is in them, and which is an illumination of total intellect?) What therefore can deify intellect, and an intelligible essence, except the participation of the first God, and the forerunning illumination that proceeds from him? What therefore is the first? If indeed, he were intelligible "beauty we should say that intellect was a God through beauty. But since the first God is the good, intellect also through partici- pating of goodness is a God. Hence this is the hyparxis of the Gods; and the very essence of the Gods, if it be lawful so to speak, is goodness. According to this likewise, every God exists as a God. And on account of this he has a providential, or a demiurgic, or a vivific, or a connective characteristic. For

‘intellect indeed, so far as intellect, is naturally adapted to have an intellectual

perception and knowledge of beings; but to energize providentially is divine. So that the demiurgic intellect likewise, possesses its subsistence as demiurgic, on account of the goodness which it contains. For on account of this, the intellect which is in the Demiurgus, is the maker, and is not only gnostic of being. The being also which is in him, is an efficacious paradigm, and produces by its very existence, and is not alone perfective of intellect. And intellect indeed in making is corroborated by both these; by the paradigm, because it produces with relation to it; and by goodness, because it produces on account of it. But the paradigm is corroborated by unity.

You have therefore, these successive, viz. goodness, the paradigm, intellect. And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is the one,

* For nrrey in this place, it is necessary ¢o read γοητον.

goodness, the paradigm, intellect. And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is the one,

* For nrrey in this place, it is necessary ¢o read γοητον.

304 -PROCLUS ON THE [wook 11:

which is beyond even intelligibles themselves: for it 1s imparticipable " goodness. But the paradigm is that intelligible which unitedly comprehends all the number of forms. And the maker is the intellectual intellect which gives subsistence to wholes. So that if Amelius said that there are three demiurgi after this manner, perceiving this triad in the one Demiurgus, he said rightly. For one of them, says he, makes [as it were] by contrectation, another by mandate, and another by his will alone. And the first indeed, is arranged analogously to the manual artiticer; the second pre-exists conformably to the architect; but the third is established prior to both, analogously to a king, So far therefore, as the Denitur- gus is intellect, he produces all things by the intellectual perceptions of himself ; but so Jur asheis intelligible, he makes by his vory being ; and so far as he ix a God, by his willalone. Whowever Amelias divalses the three Deunurgt from the one Demiur- ous, we must not admit it, while we follow Plato, Por the same Demiurgus Ip cood, so far as he is a God, and on account of goodness he produces all things by his will, and is intellizible ‘intellectually 3 for such is the demiurgic being. Lle is also intellect, the artificer of the world, The words therefore, “ he was good,” have an explanation of this hind: in the term was, the super-plenary, the consummately perfect, and the super-eternal nature of his divine hyparats, being indicated. Lor the term ts, is significant of eternal things ; the term Was, of the super-eternal unities ; and the term WILL BE, Of things which subsist in time. For of the term ws pertains to eternal natures, the term was will be adapted to the natures prior to these, and the term WILL BE, fo the natures posterior to these. But such are the beings which are indi- geut of time,

Since however the Demiurgus is good, envy Is never ingenerated in him about any thing. But some one may say, what is there {remarkable} ino intellect: not being envious? For this? does not happen even to men that are moderately good. The term therefore never, is significant of eternal perfection; since souls are at one time passively effected, but at another, recur to impassivity. Bat the term about any thing, is significant of self-suflicieney 5 since we indecd, for the sake of other things, are frequently purified fromenvy, but in those things in which we have less

jthan we think we ought to have in these we are filled with envy. What however, ts

* For aperafexros here, reac ase Oearos. * Vor vonrws ἐστε γοέρως, tis necessary to read in this place γόητος ἐστι voepws,

What however, ts

* For aperafexros here, reac ase Oearos. * Vor vonrws ἐστε γοέρως, tis necessary to read in this place γόητος ἐστι voepws,

2 For rov yap here, it is requisite to read rovro yap. yo ’ 1 yor

ΒΟΟΚΊΙΙ.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 305

the meaning of the term ovjeg, none.” Is it because there are many kinds of envy that he adds none? Or is it said through transcendency, in consequence of making a pertect negation of envy?) But what kind of transcendency is it possible to find in assertions concerning the Gods? For all the appellations and words which are employed about them, are beneath their dignity. Is not envy therefore, a pain arising from the goods belonging to others, this passion if us being mingled from pleasure and pain, as Socrates has shown in the Philebus?) Envy likewise, is for a man to be able to benefit, and yet not benetiting, but keeping the good contined tu himself. And envy ts also the want itself of good ; which the philosopher appears to me especially to assume at present, exterminating it from a divine essence. For it is naturally adapted to be periectly exempt from this alone, since it is essen- tialized in goodness itself. For to be pained from the goods pertaining to others, is inherent in all good which subsists according to participation, and which is not primarily good. Tor adventitious good is one thing, good according to habit another, and primary good another. For the first is mingled with its contrary, in the same manner as adventitious beauty is mingled with deformity. But the second is wholly boniform, yet is such by participation. And the third, which is primarily good, ts good itself. For as intellect itself is the first intellect, and as the beautiful itself is primarily beautiful, so good itself is primarily good. What therefore is this? It is the deity of each thing, according to which every truly- existing being is a God. For it differs in no respect from goodness. But if any one ofsecondary natures should be said to be a God, or good, itis among the num- her of things deified, and rendered good, and is a God through participation, and not on account of its own proper essence, nor from itself,

This participation therefore, Plato is accustomed to call indigence ;* just as in the Banquet, he calls Love the want of things beautiful and good. Hence, a di- vine nature, so far as it is divine, is primarily good, and not according to parti- cipation ; so that neither is it indigent of good. Hence too, it is superior to all envy. Foras to the sun, which is generative of light, it is impossible for dark- ness to approach, but it is excluded from itat a great distance, about the cavities of the earth; after the same manner, it is impossible for envy to approach toa divine nature. For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent abundance? What imbecility is there in almighty deity?) What participation in the

For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent abundance? What imbecility is there in almighty deity?) What participation in the

"i.e. Ovders φθόνοι, no envy. > Evéesay is omitted in the original.

lim. Plat, Tot. ki 2Q

408 PROCLUS ON THE [5οοκ 1).

fountain of good? The Demiurgus therefore, being good by his very being, tran- scends al! indigence, and all participation which ‘acecdes from another thing, For he is united to the one itself, and does not proceed out of it. Por intellectual union is of one kind, but the union prior to intellect of another, according to which the generative deity of the Demiurgus, and the goodness which connects allthings, ave united to the one itself. Vor this goodness is not a certain power, as some say, but the measure of all power, Nor is it will, but will proceeds from it. Nor is it a habit; for habit pertains to another! thing different from habit ; but goodness is itself of itself [1 ¢. pertains to itself alone}. Nor, in short, is it an essential hypostasis ; but itis that which unites essence, and is ineffable, connects powers, and is prolific of demiurgic energies. As therefore, every intellect 15 essentialized in existing as intellect, but that which is above intellect is partici- pated by it; and as every soul is essentialized in existing as soul, but intellect 1s participated by it; thus also every God Is essentialized ino being a God, or rather is superessentialized, but there is not any ung Which is participated by him 15 because the Gods are the most ancient and venerable of all things. | Phe demiur- vic intellect therefore, so far as it is a God, in-existing as a God iN primarily se, and not according to participation, This however ts the same with good. As therefore, if some one should say that envy is the want of intellect, and a partial intellect is superior to envy, but soul is not superior to it, for itis indigent of in- tellect, because it is adapted to become intellectual by the participation of intel- lect;—thus also in goodness, envy > is the indigence of good ; but every thing indigent is not primarily good, Soul indeed and intellect are indigent of good, because they are not primarily good. But a God, so far as a God, being good, is exempt from all envy, and transcends all indigence of whatever kind it may be, whether it subsists according to diminution, or according to deviation. Vor indigence is twofold, one kind as we have said being evil, but the other not.

“ Being therefore entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself.”

This is consequent to the before-mentioned axioms. For the first colon [or

" Por ἀλλο here, itis necessary to read ἀλλον,

Male. Every God, so faras he isa God, is a participant of uothing superior to himself, For the procession of the Gods frum the principle of all things, ix nota participation, but an ἀρρήτοις exparou, an ineflable unfolding into light.

Every God, so faras he isa God, is a participant of uothing superior to himself, For the procession of the Gods frum the principle of all things, ix nota participation, but an ἀρρήτοις exparou, an ineflable unfolding into light.

> Yor agOosos here, read g6ores,

nook 11. TIMAUs OF PLATO. 307

part of the sentence] manifested the order, and the hyparxis of the Demiurgus, that he is ἃ αὐ. And since with respect to deity, one God is imparticipable, but another participable, ' he manifests that the Demiurgus is participable. For he does not say that he was goodness, but that he was good. But he who is cood participates of goodness. And goodness itself indeed, is primarily good. But intellect and being are good by participation. Again, the second colon shows that the Demi- urgus does not rank among deitied natures. For one thing is entirely imparticipable, such, for instance, as the good ; but another is good by* the participation of some other nature, as every thing which is deified.! But that which is primarily good, isgood itself, And that which is participated, and is the medium of both the before-mentioned natures is of such akind as all the intelligible and intellectual orders of the Gods are suid to be. But this third colon comprehends the demiurgie pecuharity. For not only to be good, but on account of the super-plenary, and the extended, to proceed to all things, is indicative of the demiurgic and eflective cause, desiring to fill all things with itself, and to benefit all things; in order that all things may become as much as possible similar to itself, by participating of a certain divine nature, and of arcane and ineflable impressions, which accede to them from the whole fabrication of things. If therefore, the maker of the universe is superior to all indigence, he is exempt from all imbecility, and this eternally. For being signifies the eternal; and because he especially benefits all things, he imparts to all things by illumination, the measure of good, a greater thing than which each of the participants is by no means adapted to receive. And this indicates the extension of providence. If likewise, he wished to supply all things with the participation of good, there is nothing in the universe solely evil, so that neither

ois there any thing disorderly, nor without the inspection of providence, nor

indefinite; but all things participate of beauty and order, so far as they are naturally adapted to receive them. Tlence he made all things similar to himself, so far as he is a God, benefiting generated natures ; buthe caused them to become other things besides this, according to other paradigmatic reasons. For as Atticus says, as the carpenter makes all that he makes to be artificial, but differ-

' The Demiurgus is a participable deity, because his intellect participates of his goodness, which constitutes his hyparxis.

> Instead of ro μετασχεῖν in this place, it is necessary to read ry μέτασχειν-

> Instead of ro μετασχεῖν in this place, it is necessary to read ry μέτασχειν-

* Thus soul is deified by the participation of intellect as a medium; because deity accedcs to soul through the intervention of intellect; and body 1» deificd by the participation of soul as a medium.

408 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11.

ent things according to a different reason [or productive principle], causing one thing to be aladder, but another a bed; thus also the Demiurgus, so far as he is wood, assimilates all things to himself, rendering them good; but according to forms which distribute their essences, he makes them with relation to paradig- matic causes. Porphyry however, admitting these things, thinks fit to ask what itis by the reception of which genera are good, And he says it is by the reception of harmony, symmetry, and order. For these are beautiful. But every thing [truly] be autiful is good. Plato therefore manifests that good is in these, when he says, “ Zhat God led that which was disorderly into order, through his wish to communicate good.”

From all that has been said, therefore, it is easy to infer, that the Demiurgus produces eternally; that the world is perpe tual, according to a perpetuity which is extended through the whole of time; that it is always generated with arrangement ; and that it rs not always incorruptible, but is always ; generated or becoming to be so, im Consequence of always receiving good. But it is not imme- diately good like its eenerating father. For in him all things are contained unitedly, {but in the world distributedly],! and not with perfect τὸ ‘ality, as in eternal natures. For if the universe was generated in time, was it from the Demiurgus that it did not e vist before, or from its subject nature being without order? For if from the Demiurgus, was it because he also did not subsist eternally?) Oris it not unlawful to assert this, and in other respects in vain? Por concerning him, there is the same mode of interrogation, and whether shall we make all things generated, or will there be something primarily unbegotten, and the Demiurgus still more so? Let it therefore be admitted, that it was in consequence of the Demiurgus not energizing. Whether then, did he not fabri- cate, because he was not willing, or because he was not able? If indeed we say it) was because he was not willing, we forget that we thus deprive him of goodness. But if he was not able, itis absurd that he should at one time have power, and at another imbecility. Por we shall take away the eternal. But if it was from its subject nature that the universe did ποῖ exist before, whether was it from this nature being unadapted or adapted? If therefore it was adapted, it was not this nature which prevented the universe from existing. But if it was unadapted, how being unadapted for an infinite time, came it to Le now changed [into an adapted condition]? Whether did it move itself? But it is not

If therefore it was adapted, it was not this nature which prevented the universe from existing. But if it was unadapted, how being unadapted for an infinite time, came it to Le now changed [into an adapted condition]? Whether did it move itself? But it is not

© The words ev δὲ τῳ κοσμῳ Senpnperws, are omitted in the original. y κοσμῳ διηρὴμ g

BOOK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 309

self-motive. Was it therefore moved by the Demiurgus? And why was it not moved by him before, if he also was then good, and was willing that afl things should become similar to himself?) The extension therefore of providence is suspended from the goodness of the father; but from this the eternal production of the Demiurgus ; and from this, the perpetuity of the universe, which subsists for an infinite time in becoming to be, and is not a stable perpetuity. And the same assertion subverts the perpetuity of the world, and the goodness of him who made it. For if the Demiurgus was good, he always wished to impart good to all things. For as the sun, as long as it exists, illuminates! all things, and fire heats as long as itis fire; for the one is essentially illuminative, bat the other calefactive; thus likewise, that which is always good, always wishes to impart good, lest being willing indeed, but unable, it should sustain the passion of the vilest natures, For neither does the worthy man wish to effect other things than such as he is able to effect. But if the Demiurgus was always able to impart good, he always imparts it in energy, lest he should have an imperfect power. If how- ever, he always imparts good in energy, he always makes that which is good, But if he always makes it, the world is always generated. Hence the world is perpetual ; for the Demiurgus is always good. The world therefore is perpetual, not being but becoming to be perpetually. lence, as we have said, the perpetuity of the universe is suspended from the goodness of its maker. For the orderly distribution of the universe sufficiently manifests the demiurgic power. — For matter, On account of its privation of form and morphe, has appeared to some to be without God, and the confused and disorderly nature, to be remote from divine providence. Since the universe however, is well-ordered and decorated with beauty, it clearly demonstrates divine production, The visible order of

‘things therefore, being the progeny of the demiurgic cause, is consubsistent: with

the goodness of the father,

* He therefore, who especially receives this most principal or proper and powerful principle from prudent men, will receive it with the greatest rectitude.”

Timeus assigns the final cause which extends itself to the goodness of the Demiurgus, according to which uniting himself to the first, and imitating him,

Ὁ For καταλέμπαγει, it is necessary to read καγαλαμπει.

310 PROCLUS ON THE baka

310 PROCLUS ON THE baka

he generates all things. For the first principle is that which primarily produces all things, and this ‘Timzus denominates the most proper and powerful principle, because it is motive of causes themselves. For the demiurgic principle moves indeed that which is generated, but is moved from thence [i. 6. from the first principle]. And the paradigmatic principle moves the total fabrication, but is moved by goodness ; because the good indeed, ts prior to intelligibles, but the paradigm is intelligible, and the Demiurgus intellectual, About the good also, all intelligible and intellectual natures subsist: but about the intelligible, the order of intellectuals © subsists. The effective cause therefore, is a principal cause, but the paradigmatic is more principal, and the final is most principal. Por it is that for the sake of which all things subsist, from which other things are suspended, and which is truly the end of fabrication, Hence the world is perfected indeed, on be- coming animated and inspired with life; but it is most perfect, so far as 10 partici- pates of good, and of the union which extends through wholes. Foras the good is the leader of all things, so the goodness which is in each thing has the first dignity in each, On these accounts therefore, he calls the tinal cause the most principal, or the most proper and powerful principle. For the name of principle comprehends also concauses. But by the addition of mos¢ principal, he indicates that which is truly * cause. For the most principal principles are the causes of generated natures τ but concauses are subservient to other things, and are in the effects themselves. It must be said however, that generation and tne world, ἐδ τὸς have before observed, are the path between matter and the whole arrangement of things, and the perfection itself of the universe. Since also in dogmas concerning the highest causes it is necessary that the speaker should have the intellectual habit, and the auditor a prudent judgment, this is especially requisite in’ discus- sions concerning the good. For intellect subsists on account of the good, and the intellect which is in us, on account of the good which is in-us. Ilence Plato thinks it is necessary, that those who assert something concerning the most proper and powerful principle, should be prudent men, and that their auditors should receive what they say with the greatest) rectitude. What then, may not any casual person say something concerning God and the — final cause? And do we not every day hear the multitude assertmmg that God is good? But God spoken of without true virtue is but a name, as Plotinus says ; and

® Lustead of πέρι δὲ τὸ γοερον, ἢ τῶν γοήτων διακοσμησις in this place, itis necessary to road πέρι δε ro vonror, ἢ των voepwr διακοσμησις. For the intelligible is superior to the intellectual order.

> Lor τῆν ovros αἰτίαν here, itis requisite to read τῆν οὕτως αἰτίαν.

—— -—-—

For the intelligible is superior to the intellectual order.

> Lor τῆν ovros αἰτίαν here, itis requisite to read τῆν οὕτως αἰτίαν.

—— -—-—

TIMAZUS OF PLATO. 31)

BOOK 11.)

he ts spoken of by the multitude, not according to wisdom, but according to chance. Do not dwmons also know the goodness of the father, who dance [as it were | round him; and demiurgie angels, who precede as ina solemn procession the paternal production of things; and Gods who receive demiurgic powers from the one fabricative cause? Gods however, possess this knowledge uniformly, anzels intellectualiy, damons with undetiled purity, eternally, and ina way allied to the natures prior to thei, but we must be satisfied with having this knowledge pru- dently and wisely, since we are in a certain respect media between more divine natures and the multitude, between intellectual beings, and those that are deprived of intellect. Vor such is human prudence, proceeding indeed from intellect and intelligence, but ruling over a life destitute of intellect. Hence, when we speak con- cerning the most proper principle, what we assert must be received as uttered by prudent men, Jor prudence isa medium between intellect and opinion ; sothat aright judgment will be concordant with it. Hence too, Plato adds, “ he who especially.” For the assertion concerning this principle must be especially received from prudent

men. But from the natures above man, something better than this assertion must

be sought ; and from the multitude, a casual assertion,

“Por the divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that

as much as possible nothing should be evil.”

The divine fabrication, and intellectual production proceeds from impartibles to partibles, from things united to such as are multiplied, and from things with- out interval, to every way extended masses. This also the discourse concerning it adumbrating, in the first place, celebrates the tinal cause apoplithegmatically ; inthe next place, discursively ; and in the third place, it delivers in’ an evolved manner, the whole orderly distribution and progression from it. For the asser- tion, “he was good,” uniformly comprehends every final and the most divine of causes, But the words, “ Jn him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated about any thing ; and being entirely void of this, he was willing that all things should become as much as possible similar to himself,” comprehend this cause discursively ;' because, after the one will of intellect, he adds the divided theory of it. And what he now says represents to us intelligence procecding into all multitude, and interval, and evolving all the demiurgic providence, and all the parts of fabrication. The third

* The word διεξοδίκως is omitted in the original,

419 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

And what he now says represents to us intelligence procecding into all multitude, and interval, and evolving all the demiurgic providence, and all the parts of fabrication. The third

* The word διεξοδίκως is omitted in the original,

419 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

assertion, likewise, is in continuity with the second, and the second with the first. For since the first division was, “ he was good,” onthis account the second begins from good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the father. And the third beginning from his twil/, delivers the whole of his providential energy. For if he was good, he wished to make all things good, But if he wished, he made them to be so, and the universe obtained an elegant arrangement. For providence indeed, is suspended from will, but will from goodness. And thus much con- cerning the order and connexion of the assertions.

Let us however survey what will is, in order that we may understand how it is conjoined with goodness. The super-essential union itse ‘lf, therefore, which 1s oft itself exempt from beings, is one, ineffable, and uncircumse ribed, from ¢he one

tself possessing its undetined and incomprehensible nature. Hence, if it be requi- site tu survey in this, from what has been said, the triad which is characterized by unity, or which has the form of the one,

Hence, if it be requi- site tu survey in this, from what has been said, the triad which is characterized by unity, or which has the form of the one,

coodness indeed pre cedes, but the sec “ond is will, and the third is providence 3 goodness producing the perfect, the sufficient, and the desirable ; δια τοῦ! exhibiting the super- -plenary, the evtended, and the genera- uve; and providence imparting the efficacious, the perfective of works, and the unide- filed. According however, to this ineffable and united hyparais of the triad, the intelligible also is triply divided, into essence, power, and energy 3 essence indeed, being firmly established in this triad, and existing selfpe rfect; but power pos- sessing anever-failing and infinite progression; and enerzy be inzallotted perfection and essential production, And again, intellect analogously receives a triple dia- sion, into being, life, and the intellectual. Por the first of these 15. the supplier ofexistence, the second of vitality, and the third) of knowledee. After these, soul likewise is divided) into the object of science, into: science, and’ the scien- tific. For the first of these indeed, is that which is known, the second is know- ledge, and the third is that which receives its completion from both. These triads therefore, being four in number, as goodness is to will, so Is essence to power, being to life, and the object of science to sc ience. And as will is to providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and science to that) which is scientific. For essence, being, and the object of science, have an order analogous to goodness. For the eonnective, the stable, the umform, and the perfective, pertain τὸ. goodness. But power, life, and science, are analogous to will, Por the selfbegotten, and that which comprehends and measures all things, belong to will, And energy, intellect, and that which is

scientific, pertain to providence, For the efficacious, and that which proceeds

"οὐκ 41.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 313

313

through and antecedently comprchends all things, are the resemblances of divine providence, Since therefore, the Demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable intellect, so faras he is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and provi- Jence ; but as intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy; and as intellect, ne is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will. Consequent to this, it remains to inquire how the Demiurgus wished all things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods and undefiled essences. If, however, he not only fabricated these, but also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that better natures should alone exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. If he had been willing, therefore, that all things should be good, he would have stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply, however, that if the progression of things was only as far as to the Gods, all things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last order, the good would be destroyed; since being able and willing to generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of an arrangement as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our opponents therefore say, if all tnings are good, the progression is as far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine nature is unprolific how is it good? But it will be unprolific, if it is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing, that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be the Gods, therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the Gods, let there be a progression’ as far as to matter itself; and let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last of beings, nor any vacuum, For what vacuum can there be when things characterized by itself? have the first subsistence; those that rank as the second proceed from these ; those of the third order proceed from these and

* TIpoogow is omitted in the original. “5 viz. Self-subsistent super-essential natures ; for to these the αὐτο, or tlse//, primarily belongs. The neat to these are intellects, Those in the third rank, are souls, ‘Those in the fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies, And those in the fifth and last rank are bodies.

Jim. Plat, ἘΠ fe α ᾿ 22k

314 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11,

The neat to these are intellects, Those in the third rank, are souls, ‘Those in the fourth, the natures that are divided about bodies, And those in the fifth and last rank are bodies.

Jim. Plat, ἘΠ fe α ᾿ 22k

314 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 11,

others; those in the fourth rank are generated from things characterized by the term another ; and those in the fifth rank being others only ; and on each side of these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar!’ Such, therefore, being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable natures being first established, selfmotive natures having the second, and alter-motive natures, the third rank, all of which are the last of things. Por all beings derive their com- pletion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the well-ordered progression of all beings from (he one.

Let, therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation of beings be extended as faras to nothing ; bat whether is there nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain respect, and that there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in souls?) For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely 3 but others have been induced to deny a providence, im consequence of believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are “σους, Lor if, indeed, divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he be good? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to benetit every thing, Just as itis of that which is essentially hot, to give heat. Butit is not lawful for (he good to effect any thing else than what is good. And if divinity was not willing there should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the doubt.

We must say, however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato, according to our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respeet to things subsists ina different manner from that of ours. And again that the habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their habitude with reference to us. Por wholes have a relation to parts different from that of parts to cach other. To divinity therefore nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. Por he uses these also toa good purpose. But again, to partial natures there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe and to wholes is not evil but good. Forso far as itis a being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, itis good. Por this thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute ofall good, you will

"viz. The one, and matter.

~My 1» wanting iw the original,

Forso far as itis a being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, itis good. Por this thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute ofall good, you will

"viz. The one, and matter.

~My 1» wanting iw the original,

HOOK I] TIM.-EUS OF PLATO. 315

make it to be beyond even that which in no respect whatever is. For as the good itself is prior to being, so evil itself is posterior to the nothingness of non- entity. Por that which is most distant from the good 15. evil, and not that which has no kind of subsistence.' If, therefore, that which in’ no respect whatever is, has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself.

If, however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil is complicated with good, you give ita place among beings, and you make it good to other things, And, indeed, how is it possible it should not, if it ranks among beings ? For that which participates of being, participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity, participates likewise of good. Hence evil, if it is, partici- pates of good ; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not entirely deprived of order, and indetinite. Who therefore made it to be such? Who imparted to it measure, and order, and bound? It is evident that it is the Demiur- gus who rendered all things similar to himself. For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For power is twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that is so abundantly seen ;* but the other being that of recipients, which participate of the goodness of the Demiurgus according to the measure of their order [in the scale of beings}. In consequence therefore of the Demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away the fabrication of the worid, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and confound the nature of things first and last,

‘That we assert these things, however, conformably to the opinion of Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the Politicus, he clearly says, “ that the world obtained from? its maker all beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice, and evil, as are produced within the heavens.” For because there is generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a subsistence.

" The good itself is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not that which is most distant from the good; for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from thr good is evil itself. Hence eril itself is posterior to nonentity.

" The good itself is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not that which is most distant from the good; for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from thr good is evil itself. Hence eril itself is posterior to nonentity.

τ * For wodvaparoy, it is necessary to read πολυόρατον,

? For rept here, it is requisite to read παρα,

316 PROCLUS ON THE (Book 11.

And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance of subsistence. Atthe same time, however, all these particulars become beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the universe. But inthe Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated 5 through which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from divinity, For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil, And he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted, and such as are indefinite, For itis not in evils as im things that are wood, viz. that the one and what is primarily good, precede multl- tude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil The words others, therefore, and certain, evince that the Causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But in the Thewtetus he says, thatit is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for them to be in the Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal nature, and this place of our abode.” If, therefore, evil revolyes necessarily in the mortal place, it will not be according to Plato, that which in no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all beings. So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the boniform providence of the Demiurgus, because there Is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in a certain: respect: accomplished contormably to justice and divinity.

So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the boniform providence of the Demiurgus, because there Is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in a certain: respect: accomplished contormably to justice and divinity.

For we may make the following division; OF all that the world contains, some things are wholes, but others parts. And of parts, some eternally preserve their own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial dwmons, but others are not always able to preserve their proper good. And of these, some are alter-notive, but others selfmotive. And. of selfmetive natures, some have evil established in their choice; but in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes, therefore, they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts with good. Such things, however, as are parts, and yet preserve their own good, possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are parts, and alter-motive, deriving their subsistence from other things, are suspended from the providence ofthem, and are transmuted in ἃ becoming manner, as is the case with such bodies as are generated and corrupted, For if it is necessary that there should he generation, itis also necessary that there should be corruption, — For genera-

ton subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation, But if there is

βοοκ 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 317

TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 317

corruption, itis necessary that the preternatural should be secretly introduced, Ags, therefore, that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted with reference to itself, but is not destroyed with reference to the universe; for it is either air or water, or something else into which it is changed; thus also that which is preter- natural, is indeed with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the universe has an orderly arrangement. For if though it should be destroyed and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of the universe, how is it possible that when having a preternatural subsistence which is of itself nothing when deprived of all order, it can destroy the whole arrange- ment of things? But again, partial natures which are self-motive indeed, and whose energy is directed to externals, cause that which is effected by their energy to be evil to themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is good, and conformable to divinity. Vor since impulses and actions are from choice, actions follow elections, according to justice, when he who chooses not only deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that also which follows from his conduct. And simply, indeed, the action is not good, but to him who chooses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain way, it is introduced according to justice; and is good to this individual and this particular life. For of goods, some are good to all things, others to such as differ accord- ing to species, and others to individuals, so far as they are individuals. For hellebore is not good to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies, but it is good to one who isdiseased in a particular manner, and is salutary from acertain principle. Whether, therefore, the action is intemperate or unjust, to those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is conformable to justice, but simply it is not good, nor to those by whom it ts done, but is to them the greatest evil. And so far as it proceeds from them and is directed to them, it is evil; but so far as it proceeds from the universe to them, itis not evil. And so far as their energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming actually de- praved ; but so far as they suffer from the universe, they undergo the punishment of their choice (just as it is said, that those who deliberate about betraying a suppliant, subvert divinity); or they suffer the punishment of their will.

Let us, however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such partial na- tures as energize self-motively, and who stop their depravity as far as to their choice. For they suffer the punishment of their cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly, and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise

418 PROCLUS ON THE [soox 11.

For they suffer the punishment of their cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly, and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise

418 PROCLUS ON THE [soox 11.

they punish the contrary. But it may be said, how can choice itself have that which is conformable to justice and divinity? May we not reply, because it is necessary there should be an essence of this kind and a power of an ambiguous nature, and which verges to different lives? If therefore that which has dominion over Choice is from divinity, choice also is from divinity, and if this be the case, it is good. Por the cleeting soul alone is) transferred to another and another order. For all choice either elevates the soul, or draws it downward (to an inferior condition of being}. And if indeed the choice is froma depraved * soul, itisevils but ifit transfers that which chooses to its proper order, itis according to justice and good. For the choice itself introduces punishment to the electing soul. Or rather, the choice becomes punishment in him who chooses, causing the soul tu apostatize from good. For as a beneticent choice becomes truly the re- ward of itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is the peculiarity of selfmotive powers. Hence there is no evil, which is not also ina certain respect good ; but all things participate of providence.

If, however, certain persons should ask on what account an evil-producing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these itmust be said, thatthe progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum is left among them. Whether, therefore, Is itnecessary that there should not be every self-motive hfe? But we shall thus take away many natures that are divine. Or shall we say it: is necessary there should be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should) be selfmotive parts? But how is it possible they should be wholes, if deprived of their proper parts Ἦ And how will the continuity of beings be preserved, if wholes ond selfmotive natures have a prior existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely destroy the intermediate natures, viz. such as are selfmotive indeed, but at the same time partial? And which through the partial form become connected with habitude, but through the selfmotive power, are ata certain time liberated fron habitude, [tis necessary therefore, that there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary? to each other. Evil, however, is noton this account natural to the soul ; since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an

essential tendency to disease ; for it is essentially corruptible ; and yet disease

to each other. Evil, however, is noton this account natural to the soul ; since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an

essential tendency to disease ; for it is essentially corruptible ; and yet disease

* MoyAnpas is omitted in the original, * For the proper parts of d self-motive whole, are also self-motive,

> For aw’ αἰτίαν here, itis necessary to read amerarriws,

WOOK 11.} ΤΙΝ OF PLATO. 419

is not according to nature. Hence, disease is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this particular body, but is ood to. the wholeness of bodies, Por it is necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed into another thing. As, therefore, to. the nature which isin us, it is good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation of the animal; thus alse to every nature it is good for a part to be corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always prior to parts. For if parts were generated irom wholes, and the things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed, in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For acontinued ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must necessarily fail, But wholes not existing, either generation will be stopped, or Mutation to partial natures will be derived from other things. Tlence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.

Tlence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.

Farther still, therefore, resuming the inquiry after another manner frém the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he was willing, indeed, consi- dered as imparting being to all things. Forevery thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from the demiurgic cause, But he was not "willing, considered as producing all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good, And if you are willing to argue physically, evil is produced cssenti- ally indeed (roma partial soul, but accidentally from divinity, so far as it is evil, ifit is admitted that divinity gave subsistence to the soul. Evil also, so far as it is essentially good, originates from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. Por so far as it subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him Who sullers it, and rescmbles the opening of ulcers. And he who is incapable Ὁ of being healed without a certain action, is incited to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and repenting of her own evils, may begin to be puri- fied. Por base and unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, till those that perform them with repentance. And when, indecd, they are the subjects of medi- tation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased ; but when they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, but liberate the soul from the

* For ro μεν vrapevow in this place, itis uecersary to read, ro μὴ Suvapevor.

410 “PROCLUS ON UTIL [wooK 11.

most disgraceful parturition, And some, indeed, exlubit this punisliment accord. ing to the whole of their life; but others according to purtial energies, For he who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in his imagination,

ing to the whole of their life; but others according to purtial energies, For he who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in his imagination,

In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures ; for the whole intellectual genus is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole bodies; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and always subsisting according to nature, It remains, therefore, that it must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither js it in the essences of these; for all their essences are derived from divi- nity ; nor in their powers ; for these subsist according to nature. Hence it re- mains, thatit must be in their energies. But with respect to souls, itis neither in such as are rational; for all these aspire after good ; nor in such as are irra- tional; for these energize according to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry ' of these with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in forin; for it wishes to rule over matter; norin matter, for it aspires after the supervening ornaments of form. Butit consists in the privation of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident, that every thing evil exists according to a parypostasis, or resemblance of subsistence, and that at the same time it is coloured by good ; so that all things are good through the will of divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have a shadowy subsis- tence, since It is necessary to the perfection of the whole of things. And from what has been said, itis evident, that the will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to him, and there is not any being which ts not vanquished by a portion of good. Nor are the words, “ as much as possible, written superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an abundance of good.

“Thus receiving every thing that was visible, and which was not in a state of rest, but moved ina confused and disorderly manner, be led it from disorder into order, conceiving that the latter was in every respect better than the former.”

‘ For ovpperpig here, it is uccessary to read, ασυμμετρίῳ. μμετριᾳ 7 ?

———- -—-—

BOOK 11.] TIMAUS OF PLATO, 321

Plutarch of Cherona and his followers, and also Atticus, understand what is

μμετριᾳ 7 ?

———- -—-—

BOOK 11.] TIMAUS OF PLATO, 321

Plutarch of Cherona and his followers, and also Atticus, understand what is

here said literally, as testifying for them the generation of the world froma certain time. They also say that unadorned matter existed prior to the generation of the universe, and likewise a malevolent soul, which moved this matter. For, [they add,] whence was the motion except from soul; and if the motion was disorderly it was froma disorderly soul? It is said therefore, in the Laws, that a benefi- cent soul instructs in an upright and prudent manner, but that a malevolent soul is moved disorderly, and that what is governed by it is conducted confusedly and inelegantly. They farther add, that when the fabrication of the world by the Demiurgus commenced, matter was brought into a state adapted to the com- position of the world, and that the malevolent soul participating of intellect, was rendered prudent, and produced an orderly motion. For the participation of form, and the presence of intellect, brought it into order. Porphyry however, and Tamblichus, and their followers, reprobate this opinion, as admitting in wholes, that which is without, prior to that which has arrangement, the imperfect prior to the perfect, and that which is without intelligence, prior to that which is intellectual. And [they add], that Plutarch and Atticus are not only guilty of > impiety towards the Demiurgus, but likewise, either entirely subvert his benefi- cent will, or his prolific power. For both these concurring, it is also necessary that the world should be perpetually fabricated by him. They likewise say, that Plato wishing to indicate the providence proceeding from the Demiurgus into the universe, and also the supply of intellect, and the presence of soul, and the nume- rous and mighty goods of which they are the causes to the world, previously sur- veys how the whole corporeal-formed composition is when considered itself by itself, disorderly and confused. And that he does this, in order that by perceiving by itself the arrangement derived from soul, and the demiurgic orderly distribu- tion of things, we may be able to determine what the nature is of the corporeal- formed essence by itself, and what order it is allotted from fabrication ; the world indeed, always existing, but language dividing that which is generated from its maker, and producing according to time things which are con-subsistent at once, because every thing which is generated is a composite.

We may also observe, in addition to what is here rightly asserted, that since the demiurgic production is twofold, the one being corporeal,’ but the other decora-

Ϊ } Ϊ

tive, Plato beginning from the latter, supposes with the greatest propriety, that //

* For Lwxparcns here, it is necessary to read cwparins.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2s

ὙΠ τ ὐπαντανα.. ἢ

322 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK It.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 2s

ὙΠ τ ὐπαντανα.. ἢ

322 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK It.

every thing corporeal is moved in a way perfectly confused and disorderly. For its motion is such, so far as pertains to itself, when it is surveyed as not yet partici- pating of intellect, and animated by an intellectual soul. For when the universe becomes a thing of this kind, then it participates of supernatural powers. But if itis moved, as he says, neither by intellect, nor by a prudent soul, from which order is derived, its motion will be disorderly. A little after this however, Plato delivers to us the demiurgic providence about the fabrication of bodies. For then the Demiurgus is represented as fashioning the whule of a corporeal nature, which Plato now says he assumed 5 the Demiurgus being the maker, the adorner, the artist, and the manual artificer. If therefore, he produces the first bodies, it is evident that the generation of body is a part of his fabrication, the visible nature receiving certain vestiges of forms, which are the forerunners of their distinct sub- sistence ; each thing when this distinction takes place, being perfectly adorned, and obtaining an appropriate position and order in the universe, And there is no occasion indeed, to say much about that which is moved in a confused and = dis- orderly manner. For Plato clearly says, that the Demiurgus fashioned the whole of the corporeal nature within soul. With respect to soul however, itis evident that one thing pertaining to it was not a subject funproduced by the Demiurgus), and that he alone produced its orderly distribution, For he first: constitutes its essence, and the same and the different; of which as elements it consists. Hence, if he produced the elements of soul, and the mixture of these, he produced the whole of it. So that he did not assume one part of it as already existing, and add another. And of soul indeed, which is incorporeal, this is trae. But with re- spect to body, we have shown how divinity is the cause of the first forms. Concerning matter itself, however, some one may enquire whether it is unbe- gotten, not being generated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus say, or whether it was generated, and if so from what cause. Vor Aristotle indeed, in another way demonstrates that it ts unbegotten, as not being a composite, nor consisting of another matter, nor again, being analyzed into another. The present discussion however, says that it is perpetual, but investigates whether itis unbegotten and not generated by a cause, and whether according to Plato, two principles of wholes are to be admitted, matter and God, neither God producing matter, nor matter God ; in order that the one may be entirely perpetual, and without God, but the other entirely immaterial and simple. This thing therefore, is among the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered by us elsewhere. Now, however, it is requisite to exhibit to these men, what the

This thing therefore, is among the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered by us elsewhere. Now, however, it is requisite to exhibit to these men, what the

-- ----

BOOK 11.} TIMAMUS OF PLATO. 323

conception of Plato is on this subject. For that the Demiurgus is mot the first’

who gave subsistence to matter, is evident from what Plato says further on, viz. that these three things preceded the generation of the world, being, place, and genera- tion; and that eeneration is an ofispring, but place a mother. He appears there-

\ Ὶ | |

fore through these things to divide matter oppositely as it were to the Demiurgus, ἡ

according to the maternal and paternal peculiarity, but to produce generation from the Demiurgus and matter. Does he not therefore give subsistence to mat- ter from another order, which has an arrangement prior to the Demiurgus? Iu the Philebus therefore, he clearly writes, “11 say that God" exhibited the bound, and also the infinity of beings, from which bodies andall beings derive their composition.” Hence, if bodies are from bound and infinity, what is the bound in them, and what the infinity? It is evident indeed, that we Say matter is infinity, but form

bound. If therefore, as we have said, God gives subsistence to all infinity, he \\ likewise gives subsistence to matter, which is the last infinity. And this indeed, /)

is the first and ineffable cause of matter. But since every where sensibles are ana- logous to intelligible causes, and Plato constitutes the former from the latter ; as for instance, the equal which is here, from the equal itself, the similar, from simi- litude itself, and after the same manner all sublunary animals and plants,—it is evident, that he hkewise produces the infinity which is here, from the first infinity, Just as he produces the bound which is here from the bound which is there. It has however, been demonstrated by us elsewhere, that he establishes the first infinity which is prior to things that are mingled in thesummitof intelligibles, and from thence

extends its illumination as far as tothe last of things ; so that according to him, mat- \ ter proceeds from the one and being, or if you are willing, from the one being also, [or ) | being characterized by theone|so far as it is being in power. Hence likewise, it is in 1}

Hence likewise, it is in 1}

a certain respect good and infinite, and the most obscure and formless being. On / this account also these are prior to forms, and the evolution of them into light. Orpheus likewise delivers the very same things. For as Plato produces two- fold causes from the one, viz. bound and infinity, thus too the theologist gives subsistence to ether and chaos from time ; ether being the cause of bound every where, but chaos of infinity. And from these two principles he generates both the divine and the visible orders of things; from the more excellent principle indeed, producing every thing stable, effective of sameness, and the source of measure and connexion ; but from the less excellent, every thing motive, effective

‘viz. The highest God, or the one.

/

324 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 11.

of difference, never failing progression, the nature which is defined, and connected by other things, and the last infinity by which matter also is comprehended. Hence also matter is dissimilarly assimilated to the firstinfinity.’ And it is indeed a separation (ywpiopa), as being the receptacle (ywza) and place of forms ; but there is neither bound, nor a bottom, nor a seat about it, as being infinite, unstable, and inde- finite. But again, the last infinity may be denominated a perpetual darkness, as being cllotted a formless nature. ence conformably to this assertion, Orpheus produces matter from the first hypostasis of intelligibles, Jur there perpetual darkness* and the infinite subsist. And these indeed, subsist there in a way more excellent than the successive orders of being. In matter however, the umluminated, and the infi- nite are inherent, through indigence, and not according to a transcendency, but a deficiency of power. Moreover, the tradition of the Egyptians asserts the same things concerning it. For the divine Tamblichus relates that according to Hermes materiality (υλοότη τα) is produced from essentiality? (ex τὴς οὐσιοτητος). It is pro- hable therefore, that Plato derived from Hermes an opinion of this kind concerning matter. And matter indeed primarily subsists from these principles [bound and infinity]. But Plato also produces it according to second and third principles, viz. intelligible and intellectual, super-celestial and mundane causes. And why do 1 say this of the Gods themselves? For the nature of the universe likewise, produces matter so far as she is [ἃ Goddess]* and according to the hyparxis of herself. For according to this she participates of the first cause. The Demiurgus therefore, according to the unity which he contains, according to which likewise ~ he is a God, is’ also the cause of the last matter; but according to his demi- urgic being, he is not the cause of matter, but of bodies so far as they are bodies,

* For xpos eavrny here, it is necessary to read pos avrny, [1, €. πρὸς avrny απειριαν.}

πρὸς avrny απειριαν.}

* The first hypostasis of intelligibles is being itself, which is mingled from bound and infinity. Per petual darkness therefore, may be said to reside here, because this hypostasis through proximity to the ineffable cause of all becomes Carkened. “ον being very pear, as Damarcius admirably observes, to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it ἀν εν as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence.” This darkness, however, is not any deficiency, but a transcendency of all that is luminous. Yor as there is one kind of ignorance which is below knowledge as being the defect of it, and another which is above knowledge, being that in which our ascent to the ineffable terminates ; thus also, there are two kinds of darkness, the one being below, and the other above light.

3 See lamblic. De Mysterns, p. 159.

* The word θέον is omitted in the original, but ought evidently to be inserted, because Proclus in the Introduction to this work observes that Nature is a Goddess through being deified.

" For crc bere, it is requisite to read ἐστι,

BOOK 11.} TIM.ZUS OF PLATO. 225

and of corporeal qualities. Lfence generation is the offspring of being. According to the life which he contains, he is the cause of the animation which pervades through all things; but according to his intellect, he is the cause of the intellectual supply imparted to the universe. And all such things indeed, as he produces according to his secondary powers, he produces in conjunction with those that are primary. For every thing which participates of intellect, participates also of life, of being, and of union, That also which lives is, and is one; and being is connected through its own proper unity. The converse, however, is not. true. For such things as he produces according to the one,’ so many he does not produce according to being. Nor does he give subsistence to as many things according to the fountain of life, as he does according tobeing. Noras many things according to a royal intellect, as he does according to life; but he gives the greatest extent to his providence from his more elevated powers. These things, however, we have elsewhere more fully discussed.*

Let us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey the meaning of each. The word thus then, suspends the whole orderly distribution of things from the goodness of the Demiurgus, viz. from his divinity. But the words, “ every ¢hing that was visible,” in the first place, leave’ nothing solitary; and in the next place, they show that this visible nature is corporeal. For it would not be visible if it was incorporeal and without quality. So that they neither signify matter, nor the \ second subject (i. e. body void of quality]. But the visible nature is that which, τ εν Ἵ

Oe δ,

ton

For it would not be visible if it was incorporeal and without quality. So that they neither signify matter, nor the \ second subject (i. e. body void of quality]. But the visible nature is that which, τ εν Ἵ

Oe δ,

ton

now participates of forms, and possesses certain vestiges, and representations, | being moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For the idolie and indistinct /), : presence of forms produces different motions in it, as Timeus says farther on. |/ , These, however, all the orders of Gods prior to the Demiurgus illuminate; but the paradigm transcendently illuminates them by his very being, and prior to fabri- cation. For superior energize prior to secondary causes, and the Demiurgus makes in conjunction with the paradigm, but the paradigm, prior to the Demi- urgus, and permeates to those things to which the energy of demiurgic providence

does not extend. Iftherefore, you wish to disjoin primordial causes, and the things which proceed from them,* you will find that the good which is the cause of 0, all things, is also the cause of matter. On this account it is likewise the cause of |

!

er

" Instead of cura ro ny here, it is uecessary to read cara ro εν.

* For εξησταται here, it is necessary to read εξετασται.

> Instead of ἀφιστησιν in this place, it is requisite to read ἀφίησιν. 4 For ra aw avrov bere, read ra ax’ avrwy.

“20 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ "1.

er

" Instead of cura ro ny here, it is uecessary to read cara ro εν.

* For εξησταται here, it is necessary to read εξετασται.

> Instead of ἀφιστησιν in this place, it is requisite to read ἀφίησιν. 4 For ra aw avrov bere, read ra ax’ avrwy.

“20 PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ "1.

its being invested with forms; for every form is a measure ; and of its participation of order. For order is the reason of things that are arranged, ‘Lhe paradigm, /however, is not the cause of matter, but ofthe production of form, and of the order vin forms. But the Demiurgus is the cause of order, Hence also Plato says, that ‘the Demiurgus received matter now advancing to the participation of forms. — Since all causes therefore, subsist always and at once, but of their effects, some "proceeding as far as to things that are last [1. e. to bodies], but others as far as to things which are beyond both, through the extension of superior causes ;—this being the case, the paradigm indeed, receives matter from ¢he good, and invests it with form; for forms, so far as they are forms, are the progeny of the paradigm ; but the Demiurgus receiving forms from the paradigm adorns them with numbers, and inserts in themorder. After this manner therefore, you must conceive, if you disjoincauses. Ifalso you say, that the Demiurgus 15 the one cause of all things, [ he produces indeed in one way according to his goodness [or the good which he | derives from the ineffable], but in another way according to his own paradigmatic, “andas we may say, artificial peculiarity. Ashe produces likewise collectively, atonce, and eternally,diflerent things proceed from a different peculiarity contained in him, | For according to the good, he produces matter, form and order; but according to the ‘paradigm in him, form; and according to his artificial peculiarity, order. Hence this thing which is invested with form prior to order, has these representations of forms from the paradigm which is in its own nature intelligible | From this order hke- wise, the Oracles produce abundantly-various matter. For they say, “ From thence entirely leaps forth the generation of abundantly-various matter.” For the first matter does not possess a great variety ; nor ts there a generation of this, but of that matter which has vestiges the forerunners of forms ; from which it is evident that the paradigm and the Demiurgus differ from each other, since matter indeed partici- pates of the former prior to the fabrication of the world, when according to the hypothesis, the Demiurgus was absent; but it especially receives something from the latter when it is arranged and adorned, and then the Demiurgus is present with it. The word therefore recetving, may be said to indicate the para- digmatic cause which is exempt from the demiurgic providence, from which the Demiurgus receives the subject of things, now variegated with certain vestiges of forms. It may also be said, that a different work participates of a diflerent power, ) though we may survey all powers in the Demiurgus. For he will be the same divinity who receives and who delivers, essentializing, or adorning things by different powers.

For he will be the same divinity who receives and who delivers, essentializing, or adorning things by different powers.

BOOK 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 327

But the words, ‘“cehich was not in a state of rest but moved,” show that the 7 hypothesis alone imparts to the subject a nature from which motion is derived. For the nature of it being irrational and not governed by divinity, what kind of) order can it be able to preserve? This however is evident, from the Politicus,! where, separating the Demiurgus from the world, Plato says, that it was moved by a certain fate, and an essentially connascent desire. Hence supposing here in conjunction with fabrication, what he there supposed after it, he introduces the privation of order to the motion of the visible nature, this motion being produced without intellect. And thus much for this particular. Again, the words, “ he led it’ from disorder into order,” signify the participation of intellect, and an intel- lectual life. But the word conceiving indicates the demiurgic intelligence, which is analogous to his will and power. Previously assuming therefore, will in the ἡ expression “ being willing,” and power in the expression “ as much as possible,” in the third place, he adds intellectual knowledge in the term, “ conceiving.” For in the Laws, he characterizes divine providence by these three things, vis. by goodness, power, and knowledge. And goodness indeed is paternal, and pertains to the first natures; but power is maternal, and ranks in the second place; and intellect, which is gnostic, is the third. Goodness therefore is the first, but power is with him, viz. with the first of the triad, and intellect, which is from him, is the third. Again, the words, “ that was in every respect better than this,” signify that order is better than disorder. For it was thus said, viz. “ that he led ' it from disorder into order.” "The word this also has an indication of the disorder then present which the Demiurgus received ; buat the word that represents to us the order pre-existent in the Demiurgus, according to which also he is about to arrange disorderly natures. Aristotle therefore, did not know the order which is in the Demiurgus, but that which is in effects. Tle places however, the excellent in both; in order that according to him, intellect may abide in itself, but may in no respect be effective of secondary natures. But Plato following Orpheus, says, that order is firstin the Demiurgus, and the whole prior to parts. For the Demiurgus being ali things intellectually, made all things to exist sensibly. For if he produces by his very being or existence; and it is necessary that he should, in order that we may not ascribe to him deliberate choice, which is an ambiguous tendency ; he either produces by a separation of parts from himself, and by a diminution of his own powers, in the same manner as fire, or abiding such as he is [without any

" For nxev here, itis requisite to read ηγεν.

328 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 11,

alteration], he produces successive natures by his very being. It is however, alwurd to say, that he produces by a separation of parts from himself: for neither js nature diminished in producing the hair or teeth, or any other of the parts of the body. Much more therefore, is it fit to preserve an exempt essence, and which gives subsistence to itself, undiminished. But if remaining that which he is, he produces by his very being, through this indeed, he produces that which is similar to himself; but through a separation of parts, he does not ' make that which he produces wholly similar to himself. For that which is diminished, does not make according to the whole of itself. All things therefore, subsist in him primanly. But external natures are the images of his allness, (ravroryros) and order exists in one way in effects, and in another in paradigms. Tor the former is complicated with disorderly natures, but the latter is order itself, subsisting in, and being of itself; that it may be able to arrange things disorderly, and may be exempt from them, and prescrye its Own essence in undefiled purity. And thus much concerning the meaning of the words.

It deserves however not to be omitted, that Plato here imitates the theologists, in supposing the existence of a confused and disorderly nature prior to. the fabrication of the world. For as they introduce the wars and seditions of the Titans against the Olympian Gods. So likewise Plato presupposes these two things, the unadorned and that which is effective of ornament, that the former of these may be adorned, and participate of order, They however speak theologi- cally. For they arrange in opposition to the Olympian Gods, the patrons of bodies. But Plato philosophically transfers order from the Gods to the subjects of their government.

In the next place, therefore, let us concisely narrate the sacred conceptions which the philosopher Porphyry here delivers. In the first place, then, he opposes Atticus and his followers, who admit that there are many principles, conjoining to each other the Demiurgus and ideas. These also say, that matter is moved by an unbegotten, but irrational and malevolent: soul, and is borne along in a con- fused and disorderly manner. That according to time likewise, matter exists prior to that which is sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order, ‘Let there however be, as they say, matter and God, both being without genera-

tion from acause. Hence, the unbegotten is common to them. At the same time, they differ from each other. They differ therefore, by something eise, and

not by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other, will

| * Instead of καθολον here, it is necessary to read ov καθ᾽ ολον. { wt ervgeut 2

a AWA A,

͵ -

t } ! " vberwnct

BOOK 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 329

They differ therefore, by something eise, and

not by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other, will

| * Instead of καθολον here, it is necessary to read ov καθ᾽ ολον. { wt ervgeut 2

a AWA A,

͵ -

t } ! " vberwnct

BOOK 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 329

not be unbegotten. It will therefore be generated. It is impossible, however, that things without generation, should differ by the generated. In the next place, what is the cause to them of their difference, and which makes the one to be pre- servative, but the other corruptive? For it is absurd to say, that it is the unbe- gotten; (for either every thing unbegotten is preservative, or every thing unbegotten is corruptive;) if the unbegotten nature of God makes God to be preservative, or the unbegotten nature of matter makes matter to be corruptive. But ifsomething else is the cause of their difference, whether is that something else unbegotten or generated? For if it is generated, it is absurd that it snould be the cause of things unbegotten; or if unbegotten,' that it should be the cause of unbegotten natures. So that again, we must investigate something else prior to these, as the cause of their difference, and the ascent will be ad infinitum. For if there will be no cause of difference to things that differ, so as to render the one preservative, but the other corruptive, the casual will have dominion over the principles ; for cause being subverted, the concurrence of such-like principles will be irrational, and without a cause. :

Farther still, it is absurd to make evil eternal, in the same manner as the good. Por that which is without God, is not similarly honorable with that which is divine; nor is it equally unbegotten, nor, in short, is it to be contrarily divided. Vor why is the one more suflicient to itself, or more immutable, or indestructible, than the other, if each of them is from eternity, and neither is in want of the other? Again, if one of them is adapted to be adorned, but the other to adorn, whence is their aptitude derived? For it is necessary there should be something which connects both, and makes them commensurate to each other. For these princi- ples being divulsed from, and subsisting contrary to.each other, cannot render themselves adapted to coalition. Unless they say, that this also arises from chance. Nor in thus speaking do they attend to the Athenian guest, who says, that this is the fountain of stupid opinion, to assert that the irrational is prior to reason, and that chance has dominion prior to intellectual art. Nor to Socrates in the Republic, who says, that it is not proper to remain in multitude, but to recur from the many to their common monads. . Farther still, it is necessary to characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another principle ; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity * [but that it is the prin-

. Farther still, it is necessary to characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another principle ; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity * [but that it is the prin-

! It is necessary here to supply ἀγένητον των; and therefore instead of reading, as in the original, aire αγενητων ὑντων, We Must read, cire ayernroy των ayeyntwY OVTwY.

* For αταξιαν here, it is necessary to read αξιαν.

Tim. Plat. Voi. L ; oy

330 ΤΠ PROCLUS ON THE [noo τι.

ciple of all principles). But if this be the case, there will not be more [indepen- dent) principles than one. For if there were, God will not be the cause of all things, but only of certain things. But if he also rules over matter, there is one principle, and not many principles. Farther still, if the existence of principle consists in this, that it is the principle of certain things, and that it adorns that which is disorderly, it will be simultaneous with the things that proceed from it, and the principle will be no less subverted from things posterior to it not existing,

}

than things posterior tu it when the principle is subverted... But this will be the

Α μ᾽ Ἵ

+ ‘ease, since they frequently say, that the principle has its existence in fabricating.

“If however this be true, itis not possible for the principle to exist, the world not”

‘lexisting, | But again, asserting differently from what they did before, they say, — that God exists without fabricating. ‘They assert this however, not* knowing

‘that true powers energize by their very being, and that the augmentative and nu-

| tritive powers, by their very being, increase and nourish the body. Thus also the soul by its very existence animates, vivifies, and moves its instrament [the body], For the body does not perceive or palpitate in consequence of our pre-deliberation 5 “but the presence of soul alone accomplishes these energies. ) Again, every thing which is always naturally adapted to a certain thing, essentially possesses the power of effecting it; but that which is changed differently at different times, Is adscititious, ΠΟ therefore God always fabricates, he will have a connascent demiurgic power ; but if he does not, lis power will be adscititious. Hlow there- fore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not being artificial, an artificer?

Hlow there- fore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not being artificial, an artificer?

The second head therefore after this, is that which shows that Plato refers all things to one principle. And this is evident from the Republic, where he asserts that the sun is the cause of visible, but the good of intelligible natures. Again also, he calls the sun the offspring of the good. ‘This is hkewise evident from his Epistles, in which he says that all things are about the king of all, and that all things are for his sake. For if all things are converted to him, and subsist about him, he is the principle of all, and not only of certain things ; since what- ever you may assume will be derived from thence. “This too is manifest from the Philebus, in which dialogue he ciearly says, that all things are from bound and

“ Instead of καὶ order μαλλὸν arnpnpern τῆς ἀρχὴν, ἐκ πκοδων ra per αὐτήν, ἐκ τοντων μὴ οντω), αναιρειται ἡ ἀρχῇ, Ll read, καὶ ονδεν μαλλον ανὴηρημενὴς τὴς ἀρχὴν, €« ποδων τα μετ᾽ αὐτὴν ἡ εκ τύντων, κ. Me

Ὁ Οὐχ is omitted here in the original.

ΟΟΚ it.J ΤΌΘ OF PLATO. 331

infinity, but that of these principles themselves there is one pre-existent cause, which is God. Hence, there is one principle and many principles ; but these are per- fected by the one principle. Prom what is said also in the Philebus this is evi- dent, in which dialogue he confutes those who assert that beings are [alone] many, and likewise those who admit the principle to be being itself. For he de- Monstrates, that itis neither proper to begin from the multitude of beings, nor from the one being, but from the one itself, :

For he de- Monstrates, that itis neither proper to begin from the multitude of beings, nor from the one being, but from the one itself, :

In the third place, therefore, neither do the principles which they assume_per- tainany thing to Plato. For ideas are not separated from intellect, subsisting | by themselves apart from it; but intellect being converted to itself, sees all forms. | Hence the Athenian guest assimilates the energy of intellect to the circulation of an accurately-fashioned sphere. But they introduce ideas as things ineflicacious, resembling in themsclves forms impressed in wax, and situated external to intel- lect. Nor is the Demiurgus the first God. For the first God is: superior to’ every intellectual essence. Nor does ἃ. certain irrational soul move that— which is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. Mor every | soul is the offspring of the Gods. Nor, in short, did the universe, from being | without order, become arranged. For if God was willing to bring 41} things | into order, how was he willing?) Was he always willing, or ata certain time? For if he was willing αἵ acertain time, this was either from himself, or from matter. Bat if from himself, an absurdity follows. For he is always good. Every thing good, however, which always exists, is always effective.’ And if this arose from the resistance of matter, how came it to be now adorned ? Because, say they, it became adapted to receive the demiurgie productive power, For God observed this, viz. the aptitude of tt. Tt is necessary therefore, that it should have been brought into order, not being itself disorderly. For af it had) been disorderly, it would not have been adapted ; since the disorderly motion of it is inaptitude. IIence matter is not the cause of the privation of order and ornament. Moreover, neither is the will of God the cause of this. For he is always good, and therefore the world is always adorned; and the Demiurgus always arranges the contused/ and disorderly nature. On what account, therefore, did Plato hypothetically in- troduce this privation of order? It was that we might survey how the generation of bodies is one thing, and the order of them when generated, another; bodies indeed existing, but being moved in a disorderly manner. For they are inca-

‘ Instead of ro δε ayaboy war, act ov ποιητικον,, it scems necessary to read ro δε ἀγαθὸν παν ae ον, ace ποιητικοῦ.

332 . PROCLUS ON 'THTE {[woox ir pable of arranging themselves. Hence Plato, wishing to indicate the order which accedes to bodies from something different from themselves, shows that disorder is con- subsistent with their motions, without a divine cause. Aristotle, however, blames him who asserts that disorder is assumed prior to order, merely according to hypothe-

sis, and says that those things will not follow for which the hypotheses are assumed, as is the case in geometry. For the hypotheses of geometry are of

Aristotle, however, blames him who asserts that disorder is assumed prior to order, merely according to hypothe-

sis, and says that those things will not follow for which the hypotheses are assumed, as is the case in geometry. For the hypotheses of geometry are of

_themselves able to effect geometrical conclusions. To this we reply, that itis

not said after this manner according to hypothesis, that the unadorned ought to be admitted prior to the adorned, but that Plato saw that which 1s formless prior

- τὸ forms, though it is never separate from them, Thus too, that which is invested

with form, though yet without distinction, is assumed prior to order, though it never was prior to it, but is consubsistent with order,

The fourth head, in addition to those that have been already considered, is that in which Plato demonstrates the mode of fabrication ; a divine intellect εἰς fecting this by its very being, which he infers through many arguments. For artists are in Want of instruments to their energy, because they have not dominion over every kind of matter, But this is evident from the instruments which they use, in order to. render matter pliant, boring, or polishing, or elaborating it with a wheel; all which operations do nut insert form, but take away the inaptitude of the recipient of form. Zhe reason itself however, or form, becomes present with the subject from artinstantancously, all the vapediments being removed. Wence if there was no impediment, form would immediately accede to matter, and would not in short be in want of any instruments. Morcover, the phantasy produces many passions about the body by its very energy alone. For a man blushes through the imagination of what is base, and becomes red ; and through the conception of something dreadful is terrified, and his body is rendered pale. And these, indeed, are the passions about the body. But the cause of these isa phantasm, which does not employ impulsions and mechanical contr- vances, but energizes by being present alone. Farther still, theologists axsert that there are certain powers superior to us, who employ efficacious imaginations, and which by their very existence are effective of what they wish to accomplish, and who are also able to produce illuminations, and to exhibit certain divine forms by their motions, to such ag are able to behold the visions which they externally pre- sent to the view. If therefore human arts, the imaginations of partial souls, and the energies of diemons, effect things of this kind, why is it wonderful that the Demiurgus, by the intellectual intuition of the universe, should give subsistence to the sensible nature; generating, indeed, that which is material immaterially, that

BOOK 11. ΤΙΝΒΟΒ OF PLATO. 333

ΤΙΝΒΟΒ OF PLATO. 333

which is tangible, without contact ; and extending impartibly that which possesses interval? And, indeed, it ought not to be considered as an admirable circum. stance, if something which is incorporeal, and without interval, is the fabricator of this universe. For human seed produces man, who is so much larger than the seed, and in each part of it contains all the diflerences of the solids; as for instance of the bones, those that are compact, and those that are hollow; of the soft parts, such as the lungs and the liver; of the dry parts, such as the nails and the hair; of themoist parts, such as the blood and phlegm; of the adipous parts, as the marrow and fat; of the bitter parts, as the bile; of the parts with. out quality, as the saliva; of the thick-set parts, as the nerves; and of the ex- panded parts, as the membranes. For all these, the substances of similar parts, and those that in a certain respect are composed of them, derive their subsistence from a small bulk; or rather from that which is without bulk. For reasons [or productive powers} generate these, and they are every where void of bulk. For whatever part you may take of the seed, you will find in it all things. Much more, therefore, is the demiurgic reason able to produce all things, being not at all in want of matter to their existence. But the fabricator of all things is eter- nally established in himself, and abiding in himself produces the universe.

* But it neither was, nor is lawful, for that which is best, to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.”

Themis’ is very properly assumed in the beginning of the fabrication of the universe. For she is the cause of the demiurgic sacred laws, and from her the order of the universe is indissolubly connected. Hence also she remains a virgin prior to the progression of the Demiurgus, according to the Oracles of Night. But she produces, in conjunction with Jupiter, the triad of the Seasons, to whom

Olympus and great Heav'n are giv’n in charge, And a dense cloud to open, or to close.

She is therefore the monad of all the mundane order; on which account alsa Socrates in the Repablic calls her Necessity, as is demonstrated in that dialogue. He likewise convolves the world on her knees, she preserving the order of it perpetually immutable and unshaken. Conformably therefore to this divine cause of order, the Demiurgus also, leading that which is disordered into order, imparts beauty to all things, and renders the world similar .to, and connects it

! This word which is used here by Plato, signifies both the Goddess of justice, and lawful,

334 PROCLUS ON THE (woe τι.

This word which is used here by Plato, signifies both the Goddess of justice, and lawful,

334 PROCLUS ON THE (woe τι.

with himself. For being himself most excellent, he very properly causes the world to be most beautiful ; because the first and intelligible beauty itself is sus- pended from, and is in goodness. Hence the world likewise, being most beauti- ful, is suspended from the Demiurgus, who is the best [of fabricative causes]. And because the good is the cause of beauty, on this account also the best of fathers gives subsistence to the most beautiful offSpring. Farther still, as ‘Themis is the guardian of the divine laws, but they make the generations of secondary from first natures to proceed in an orderly series, and preserve the connexion of divine beings, and the similitudes of things second to such as are first ;—on this account also, the Demiurgus, energizing with Themis, renders the universe most beautiful, being himself most excellent. For if Socrates, being a man, says that itis not lawful for him to concede any thing that is false, or to obliterate the truth, how is it possible we should say that the demiurgic intellect effects any thing else than what is beautiful, and that he does not exterminate deformity, being united to Themis, who is likewise always present with bim? And thus much concerning this particular.

But the words, “it neither was nor is,” are very appropriately assumed with that which ts best: for before this, he had called the Demiurgus good, and then also the term zas, was added. For Timeus says; he was good. For the sim- plicity which is above intellect, and the peculiarity itself of deity, are more adapted to the term twas, as being super-eternal, and better than all intellectual perception, Now! however he calls him the most excellent, as being a deified intellect. For that which participates [of deity] is most excellent. The terms also was and is, are adapted to the Demiurgus ; as to a God indeed, the term was ; but as to an intellect, the term ἐς, in order that at one and the same time his divine union and eternal hypostasis may be rendered manifest.

“ By a reasoning process, therefore, he found that among the things which are naturally visible, no whole work destitute of intellect: would ever be more beautiful than a whole work which possesses intellect.”

Amelius in a wonderful manner endeavours to prove that Plato knew the different demiurgic causes, and continually passes in a silent way from one of

these causes to another; exhibiting, on account of their connexion, no one of the

* Novy 1s erroneously printed here for νυν.

δοὺκ 11. TIM.E@S OF PLATO. 335

δοὺκ 11. TIM.E@S OF PLATO. 335

divine causes themselves, but discoursing about them as if they were one and the same, through the union of the demiurgi with each other. For all of them are one, and oneis all. Since now also he who wills is one Deimiureus, he who reasons is another, and he who assumes or receives is another. And the first, indeed, makes by his wilt alone, the second by intelligence and intellectual perception, but the third by [as it were] manual operation, For they placed intellect in soul, but soul in body, and thus together fabricated ' the universe. The divine lambli- chus however reprobates all such interpretations, as very superfluously devised. But he defines Ἀογίσμος, OF a reasoning process, to be that which causally precedes beings, Which is fabricative of essence itself, and which is according to energy invariably the same; from which all reasonings are connected, and have their existence.

We indeed have already observed, that Timieus discourses about one and the same Demiurgus, and shall now remind the reader that this must be admitted. Por if there isa multitude in the demiurgi, (i.e. if there are many demiurgi,] it is necessary to arrange aimonad prior to the multitude. Moreorer, we think it fit that the divine Lambiichus should consider, whether the one and whole Demiur- gus, being an intellectual world, is not multipotent, and does not by different powers fabricate diferent things, in addition to his being the father of all things ? Por let the same Demiurgus, so far as he is good, and so far as he is a God, be the producing cause of all things; yet since he comprehends in himself the cause of all fabrications, and produces in one way the whole, but in another the parts ; the former indeed collectively and totally, but the latter in’ a distributed manner, ceiving subsistence to each thing, according to its proper cause; hence by one intellectual perception, he adorns the whole, and generates it, collectively 5 accord- inz to which also, the world is one animal. But by a reasoning process, he pro- duces the parts in the world, and these as wholes; because he is the Demiurgus of total naturcs, fabricating total intellect, and total soul, and all the bulk of body. Hence, as composing parts, he is said to make them by a reasoning process. For λογισμὸς isa distributed or divided evolution of parts, and a distinctive cause of things. For it does not pertain to one who doubts; since neither does art, nor science doubt; but artists and scientific men then doubt when they are indigent of the habits by which the former become artists, and the latter men of science. If however these do not doubt, ng reason can be assigned why intellect should

' For ovvecrecverac in this place, it is necessary to read ovvrecraiveras,

336 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11.

If however these do not doubt, ng reason can be assigned why intellect should

' For ovvecrecverac in this place, it is necessary to read ovvrecraiveras,

336 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11.

doubt. Hence this λογισμὸς is not through the want of that which is fit taking place. But the Demiurgus produces the whole world by intelligence. For intelligence is collective of multitude into one; just as λογισμὸς is distributive of the one into multitude. Such therefore is the meaning of “ by a reasoning process.”

With respect however to the things which are naturally visible, to say that they are sensibles is perfectly absurd. For these are not yet arranged in the discourse of Timeus, and it is among the number of things impossible, that the Demiurgus should be converted to them. For how can he verge to that which 15 less excellent, or what kind of representation can he receive of material things, to which it is not fortunate even for a partial soul to incline? Itis better therefore, as the divine Tamblichus interprets the words, to think that things of this kind are intelligibles. For that these are visible is evident from the things which ‘Timwus shortly after says the Demiurgus perceives. For his words are, “ As many therefore, and such tdeas, as intellect perceived to be inherent in that which ts animal, &c.” That they are also naturally visible, will be evident if we consider, that some things are visible with relation to us, but others according to nature. And the things indeed which are visible with relation to us, are in their own nature dark and immanifest; but those which are naturally visible are truly known, and are resplendent with divine light. But intelligibles are things of this kind. Perhaps too, as he had ealled that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner visible, and which subsists preternaturally as with reference to fabrication, he now calls the intelligible paradigms of the Demiurgus, naturally visible. Hence, in the introduction he inquires, whether an eternal or a generated paradigm of the universe must be admitted; these two things existing prior to the generation of the universe, being and generation. And where else can the Demiurgus find the causes of generated natures, than in intelligibles? Por in- vention with him is not a fortuitous thing, nor a syllogistic process 3 since this pertains to partial souls; but a union with the intelligible causes of the parts of the universe, and a survey and plenitude from thence derived. For all things exist paradigmatically in the natures prior to him, both such as are the objects of intellection, and suchas are deprived of intelligence ;' since truly existing being comprehends uniformly the cause of intellectual natures, and of those that do not participate of intellect. And the intellectual beings which are there, are

Yor vonrwy here, it is necessary to read asonruy.

BOOK 11.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 337

And the intellectual beings which are there, are

Yor vonrwy here, it is necessary to read asonruy.

BOOK 11.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 337

of a superior’ but the rest, ofan inferior order. For though all things there are objects of intellectual perception, and intellects, yet in some of them, the cause posecsses the intellectual nature of the things caused, but in others, the privation of intellect and the irrational; the causes themselves being intellectual, but the things which proceed from them, deprived of intellect. Hence the Demiurgus looking thither, very properly admits that what possesses intellect is more venera- ble than that which is without it, the genus of the one, than the genus of the other, and the individuals of the one, than the individuals of the other. For manis better than horse, and a certain man than all horses, according to the possession itself of intellect. If however, you assume a certain part of man and a certain part of horse, it does not entirely follow that the one is better than the other. Norif youassume man fashioned by nature, and the man made by the art of the statuary, is the former in every respect more venerable according to figure than the latter. For art is in many respects more accurate [in this instance than nature]. One whole therefore, is every where better than another, when the one possesses intellect, but the other is deprived of it. For through what other thing can body be able to participate of intelligible beauty [than intellect]! Let no one therefore fancy that Plato makes the division of forms to be into those that possess and those that are deprived of intellect. For all things there (i. e. in the intelligible world] are, as we have said, intellects, where also Plato calls all things in every respect Gods. But extending himself to the natures which are there, he likewise perceived the separation which is here between the beings which possess, and those that are deprived of intellect. Hence he thus says, that nothing destitute of intellect, will be better than that which possesses it, the difference of these existing as in works, but there pre-existing according to cause.

Again however, let us survey how Plato says, that secondary energize on account of more principal causes, the latter being more perfect than the former, bul the former being suspended from the latter. Because indeed, the Dewmiurgus is good, on this account, he made the world to be most beautiful. For goodness is the cause of beauty. But because he made the universe to be most beautifal, he rendered it endued with intellect. And beauty fills the first intellect with its own power. Because also he made the universe to be endued with intellect, he imparted to it soul. For soul proceeds from intellect. Because likewise he rendered the world animated, he inserted life in that which was before moved in

' For uxeprepoy read νπερτεέρων.

Tim. Plat. | Vou. I. 2U

338 PROCLUS ON THE [ΒΟΟΚ 11-

For soul proceeds from intellect. Because likewise he rendered the world animated, he inserted life in that which was before moved in

' For uxeprepoy read νπερτεέρων.

Tim. Plat. | Vou. I. 2U

338 PROCLUS ON THE [ΒΟΟΚ 11-

a confused and disorderly manner. For this being well arranged, is able to participate of soul, soul of intellect, and intellect of beauty. The whole world however, becomes most beautiful trom the good, and after this manner may be said to be a blessed God. The Demiurgus likewise, seems, in what is here said, to behold all the paradigms, which Plato calls naturally visible, not those only Which are in animal itself, but also such as are more partial than the four ideas which are there. Or how does he see some things which are the paradigms of intellective, but others which are the paradigms of unintellective natures, which are hot separated in animal itself? But he mentions the forms of this animal itself, When be causes the universe to be an animal. For so far as it is an animal, iis the image of anunal itself, and so far also as it consists of four parts [i. e. of the four elements}. So far however, as it is now divided into intellectual, and non-intellectual beings, so far it entuely derives its subsistence from other paradigms more partial than those which exist according to the four ideas in animal itself, So that animal itself indeed, is a paradigm,\but every " paradigm

isnot *animalitself, Taving discussed these particulars however, let us proceed

to what follows.

* It as impossible however, for intellect to accede without soul.”

The intellectual essence indeed, is impartible, uniform and eternal, but the essence of bodies is partible and multiplied, and is consubsistent with temporal representation, These therefore, exist contrarily with reference to each other, and are in Want of a medium which may be able to collect them together; a medium, which is at one and the same time partible and impartible, composite and simple, eternal and generated. But according to Plato, the psychical order isa thing of this kind, intelligible, and atthe same time the first of generated natures, eternal and temporal, impartible and partible. If therefore, it is neces- sary that the universe should be endued with intellect, it is also necessary that itshould have a soul. For soul is the receptacle of intellect, and through it mitelicet: exhibits itself to the masses of the universe. Not that intellect is in wantol soul: for thus it would be less honorable? than soul; but that bodies

* Tustead of τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα in this place, it seems necessary to read ray δὲ παραδειγμα, > Por os τὸ avrezwow here, it isnecessary to read vv τὸ avrozwor.

* Por cyryswreoos here, it ts necessary to read ariyuwrevos.

pooK 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 339

than soul; but that bodies

* Tustead of τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα in this place, it seems necessary to read ray δὲ παραδειγμα, > Por os τὸ avrezwow here, it isnecessary to read vv τὸ avrozwor.

* Por cyryswreoos here, it ts necessary to read ariyuwrevos.

pooK 11} TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 339

require soul, in order to their participation of intellect. For the last, and not the first of things, are in want of secondary ' natures, For the first of things are every Where present without a medium.’ Hence it is necessary to understand, thatthe soul which connects intellect witha sensible nature, ought to be intellee- tual, and not deprived of intellect. For how can that which is destitute οὔ intellect be suspended from intellect?) But to these another medium will be requisite. The medium however, being a thing of this kind, will wisely and orderly govern every corporeal-formed nature. But it will imitate intellect, dancing as it were round it. If therefore, wholes are better than parts, things eternal, than such as subsist in time, and efficients than effects, it is necessary that the whole universe should be more divine than all the parts it contains. If therefore, certain animals in the world, which are partial, material and mortal, are naturally adapted to participate of intellect, what ought we to say of the whole world? Is it not, that the whole of it exhibits through the whole, the presence of intellect? For its figure, its order, and the measure of its powers, may be said to afford clear indications of intellectual inspection. If however, intel- lect presides over wholes, and governs the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellectual soul in the middle of it, adorning and ruling over bodies, and at the same time separate from the subjects of its government, and filling all things with life, in order that the world may through it, be firmly established in intellect, and that intellect may illuminate the world. .

If you are willing, we will also recall to your recollection ’ what is written in the Philebus, where Socrates shows that the world possesses intellect and is ani- mated, because that which is terrestrial in us is from the universe, and the fire which is in us is from the mundane fire, and in a similar manner the air and the water which we contain; and that it would be absurd that things less excellent in us should pre-exist in the whole, but that things more divine should not analo- gously pre-subsist in it, and that total intellect and total soul should not be contained in the universe. For either it must be said that no animal possesses intellect, or ifthere is a certain animal of this kind, it is absurd that it should

* Instead of σωμάτων in this place, it is requisite to read δεντέρων. * viz. They are notin want of a medium inorder to be present every where: but the last of things require secondary natures as media, by which alone they can receive the illuminations of the first

* viz. They are notin want of a medium inorder to be present every where: but the last of things require secondary natures as media, by which alone they can receive the illuminations of the first

of things. 3 For ἀναμισθωμεν here, it is necessary to read avaprnobwyer.

340 PROCLUS ON THE [Book τι.

participate of intellect prior to the universe." For the universe is always arranged, and through the sameness of its subsistence, is nearer to an intellectual essence. But much of the disorderly and confused is inherent in partial animals. Much more therefore, must it be said, that soul is in the universe.” Hence Plato very di- vinely admits that there is a twofold intellect, the one being imparticipable and de- miurgic, but the other participable, and inseparable ? [from its subject]. For from things which are in themselves, those which are in others, and are co-arranged with inferior natures, are derived. He also gives to the universe a twofold life, the one connascent, but the other separate; in order that the world may be an animal through the life which is in it, animated through an intellectual soul, and endued with intellect through much-honored intellect jisclf, But Aristotle only admits the half (of this doctrine of Plato}, since he takes away * imparticipable intellect from his philosophy.’ For the first: intellect with Jum, 15 the intellect of the inerratic sphere; but he cuts off the intellectual soul, which is the medium between intellect and the animated body of the universe 5 and immediately con- joins intellect with the living body. In addition to these things also he appears to me toerr in another particular, Por having placed intellect over the spheres, he does not establish the whole world in any intellect; but this is the most absurd ofall things; for how is the world one, unless one intellect hasdominion init?) What co-arrangement likewise is there of intellectual mulutade, unless it 1s suspended from a proper monad? Aud how are all things co-ordinated to an excellent condition of being, unless there isa certain common intellect of all mundane natures? For the intellect) of the inerratic sphere is the intelleet of that sphere

falone}; and this is also the case with the intellect of the solar, and of the lunar sphere, and in a similar manner of the Other spheres. Against Aristotle however, we have written a peculiar treatise about these particulars.

With respect to Plato however, Is not his method admirable? For receiving the world, dividing it into parts, and surveying by itself that which js moved in

" Tu the original ἢ ec ἐστι re wow τοιουτῶν, ατόπον. ἀλλ᾽ ore πρὸ τὸν παντὸς vou μέτεχειν. But it ts necessary to eapuage ad\, and by altering the punctuation, to read as follows: ἢ ecegrert ἔωον rowvror, arroy ore πρὸ τὸν παντος, KX.

* The words ev τῷ marre εὐλ αι, are omitted inthe original,

§ Vor aywpnrus here, it 1» necessary to read aywperrer.

4 Forvoede here, read ἀφεῖλε.

But it ts necessary to eapuage ad\, and by altering the punctuation, to read as follows: ἢ ecegrert ἔωον rowvror, arroy ore πρὸ τὸν παντος, KX.

* The words ev τῷ marre εὐλ αι, are omitted inthe original,

§ Vor aywpnrus here, it 1» necessary to read aywperrer.

4 Forvoede here, read ἀφεῖλε.

§ Por an explanation of the intellect: to which Aristotle asceuded, also why he says nothing about that which is beyvnd intellect, and why he appears to dissent in many things from Plato, but does not

in reality, see my Diasertation On the Philosophy of Aristotle.

nook 11} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 311

a confused and disorderly manner, he stops it in his discussion, Just as in the Laws, wishing to show that the self-motive nature is the cause of all motion, he stops the whole heaven, and having stopped it, introduces soul into the universe, in order that by pouring forth an abundance of life, she may animate the world. He likewise introduces intellect to soul, which governs the world, being con- verted to itself; through which the universe is moved in a circle, the whole is arranged, and the whole world is immovable. Since however, all these parti- culars give completion to one animal, and one nature, it is requisite that a collective and uniting cause of them should have a prior existence, and that this should be intellectual. For to comprehend wholes collectively and at once, and to bring them together, to the completion of one thing, is the work of an intellectual cause. Hence, Plato establishing imparticipable prior to participable intellect, and placing the causes of all things in it, he produces from thence, intellects, souls and bodies, from which he gives completion to the sensible world. ‘That it is necessary therefore, that the universe should participate of an intellectual soul, if it participates of intellect, is evident from what has been said. For this soul is the bond of the extremes which are contrary to each other.

‘That it is necessary therefore, that the universe should participate of an intellectual soul, if it participates of intellect, is evident from what has been said. For this soul is the bond of the extremes which are contrary to each other.

But it must also be demonstrated that the converse is true; viz. that an intellectual soul existing in the universe, it is necessary that there should be an intellect of the universe. For since it is said that this soul is intellectual, it is likewise necessary that it should participate of intellect. Whether therefore, does it alone participate of the whole of intellect, or does it participate of it through a certain thing in itself derived fromit? But if indeed, that which is corporeal immediately participates of the fountain of souls, and not through that which is in itself, it will be also requisite to admit, that the same thing takes place in the whole soul (of the universe]. If however, there is in the Demiurgus the fountain of souls, and there is also the fountain of the soul of the universe, and the universe participates through the latter of the former, it is likewise necessary that the soul itself of the universe, should be entirely suspended from imparticipable intellect through participable intellects. dor as the body of the universe is to its soul, so is the soul or it to intellect. And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intel- lectual,' it would be necessary that every soul should be the same [i. e. should be

* Instead of και et μεν abe voepa, ψνχη ywera, in this place, it is necessary to read, και εἰ μεν cabo ψνχη, voepa γινεται.

342 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 1.

And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intel- lectual,' it would be necessary that every soul should be the same [i. e. should be

* Instead of και et μεν abe voepa, ψνχη ywera, in this place, it is necessary to read, και εἰ μεν cabo ψνχη, voepa γινεται.

342 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 1.

intellectual]. But if it becomes intellectual through the participation of intellect, it is necessary that it should participate of an intellect commensurate to it. A thing of this kind however, is not intellect itself, but that which is a medium between intellect itself and soul, which has intellectual perception adscititious. This intellect also is a certain intellect, and is essentially intellect, and not becoming to be so, like soul; for it is better than soul. But by being! a certain intelleet, itis co-ordinate with soul. For intellect itself is intellect by eristing, and not by becoming to be, and intellect which is simply so by its very being, is superior to a co-ordination with soul. Ifalso you consider, that every monad constitutes a multitude similar to itself, a divine monad, a divine multitude, a psychical monad, a psychical multitude, just as an intellectual monad produces an intellectual multitude, and that secondary orders always participate of the natures prior to themsclyves, it is necessary these things being admitted, that there should be a certain intellect of the whole world. For it is necessary that an intellectual soul should participate of intellect. But if some one should say, it’ participates of the intellect which ranks as a whole, it is absurd. For this intellect will not be the Demiurgus of all things And if it) par- Ucipates of a certain other intellect, this is the intelleet of the universe, and that which is properly participated, as giving completion to the universe in conjunction with soul. But the intellect which ranks as a whole, is so participated by, as illuminating the soul of the universe. Mf therefore intellect presides over Wholes, the universe is animated ; but if the universe is animated, it is also

endued with intellect.

“Through this reasoning process therefore, placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, he fabricated the universe.”

In the first place, it is requisite to sce what this intellect is, and whether it is essential, established above soul, or a certain intellectual habit of soul. From analogy however, it may be inferred that it is essential. For as intellect is to soul, so is soul to body, But soul does not so subsist with reference to body, as tobe ahabit ofits and therefore neither is intellect a habit of κοι], This like-

' For ro δε ris είναι, read τῳ δε res εἰναι. , * viz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic is an imparticipable intellect, or in other words, is not consubsistent with soul,

BOOK "1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 343

, * viz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic is an imparticipable intellect, or in other words, is not consubsistent with soul,

BOOK "1. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 343

wise, may be inferred from the final cause. For Plato says that soul was constituted on account of intellect.". But the converse is not true. If however. soul is for the sake of intellect, but intellect is that for the sake of which soul subsists, intellect is not a habit; for no where*® does essence subsist on account of habit. And inthe third place, the Demiurgus constitutes this intellect; but the soul as Plato says, gives subsistence to the intellect which is according to habit, throneh the motion of the circle of sameness about the intelligible. For fas he adds] through this motion, imtelleet and scicnce are necessarily produced, Liow therefore does the Demiurgus constitute prior to soul, that to which soul herself gives subsistence? To which we may add, that it is right to assume, that in the Demiurgus there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, as Socrates says in the Philebus, subsisting according to the reason of cause [or causally]; and that according to these fountains of these two-fold genera, the Demiurgus now places intellect in soul, and soul in body, not because better are in less excellent natures, nor that intellect is in want of a certain seat, or that the soul of the universe is in a certain thing, For these things are unworthy of wholes and divine essences; through which the world is called by Plato, a blessed God. Because however, we conceive of the nature of things in a two-fold respect, either according to their progression, or according to their conversion; hence, when we survey their progression, we begin from first natures, and say that causes are in their effects. But we assert the converse of this, when we survey their conversion. For then we say that the things caused ’ exist in their causes. This second mode therefore, Plato delivers to us shortly after, when he places body in soul, and analogously soul in body. Now, however, treating of tie mode of progression, he places intellect in soul, because the whole of it has the form of intellect, and nothing pertaining to it can be assumed, which is not under the dominion of an intellectual nature. But soul in body, because this according to the whole of itself participates of soul, and no part of it can be assumed which is inanimate; but even that which is deprived of its proper life, so faras it isa part of the universe, is animated, For as we say that providence proceeds every where, and is every where because itis present with all things, and leaves nothing destitute of itself; after the same manner likewise, we say that intellect is in

' For δια νὸν here, it is necessary to read δια your, * After ovsapou in this place, it requisite to supply yap. 7 For ra aria here, it is necessary to read ra acriara.

7 For ra aria here, it is necessary to read ra acriara.

344 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11.

soul, as circularly illuminating the whole of it, and soul in body, because it is present with the whole of it.

Nor docs Plato speak after this manner, and Orpheus after another; but fit be reyuisite to give my opinion, the conceptions of the theologist become manifest through what is here said. For Ippa who is the soul of the universe, and is thus called by the theologist, perhaps because her intellectual conceptions are essentialized in the most vigorous motions, or perhaps on aceount of the most rapid lation of the universe, of which she is the cause,—placing a testaceous vessel on her head, and encircling the fig leaves that bind her temples, with a drazon, receives Dionysius (or Bacchus}. For with the most divine part of her- self, she becomes the receptacle of an intellectual essence, and receives the mun- dane intellect, which proceeds into her from the thigh of Jupiter. For there it was united with Jupiter, but proceeding from thence and becoming participable by her, it clevates her to the intelligible, and to the fountain of her nature. For she hastens to the mother of the Gods, and to mount Ida," from which all the series of souls is derived, Hence also, Ippa is said to have received Dionysius when he was brought forth from Jupiter. For as Plato before observed, it is im- possible fur intellect to accede to any thing without soul, But this is similar to what is asserted by Orpheus ; by whom also Dionysius is called the sweet offspring of Jupiter. This however, isthe mundane intellect, which proceeds into light conformably to the intellect: that abides in Jupiter. hus too, the di- vinely-delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] says, that the world derives its com- pletion from these three things (viz. from intellect, soul amd body}. Soul there- fore says [in the Chaldean Oracles,] concerning Jupiter fabricating the universe : +} soul reside after the paternal conceptions, hot, and animating all things.’ For the father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in sluggish body.” Plato likewise, bears testimony tu the Oracles, when he calls the Demiurgus father, and represents him yvenerating souls, and sending them into the generation of men according to the first life. And thus much concerning these particulars. Since however, us we have said, both soul and intellect give completion to one animal, Plato appears tome to use very appropriately the words to constitute and co-fabricate, through the common preposition σὺν in both,

* For Aawy in this place, 1 read Aueor. 2 je. To the region of ideas, and an intelligible nature,

3 For θερῴηχόνσα here, read θερμὴ ψυχώνσα.

soon kl TIMEUS OF PLATO. 519

2 je. To the region of ideas, and an intelligible nature,

3 For θερῴηχόνσα here, read θερμὴ ψυχώνσα.

soon kl TIMEUS OF PLATO. 519

exhibiting the union of the universe. For by always making diviner to be more comprelensive than less excellent natures, he causes the world to become one ; but through the forms in each he manifests in the one composition, but in the other

demiurgic art.

“Tn order that itmight become most beautiful according to nature, and the most excellent work.”

In what is here said, Timeus recurs to the principle from which all the before- mentioned particulars were deduced. For the world has arrangement on aecount of soul, soul subsists on account of intellect, but intellect: proceeds into the uni- verse on account of intelligible beauty, and the world participates of this in order that it may also participate of the one ; and this is the end to it of its composition, that it may be rendered most beautiful and the best. But it becomes most beau- tiful indeed, on account of the beautifying cause which subsists in the intelligible, but the best, or most excellent, on account of the fountain of good. For the good is the most excellent of all things. And through all these, the world becomes most similar to the Demiurgus. For he was called by Timaus most excellent. IIe however, is the best of demiurgic causes, just as the good is simply most excel- lent, existing beyond all the divine causes. But the world is the most excellent work, for itis a fabrication. Vor here also the world participates of deity ; since the goodness which is above intellect is deity ; and on this account the world ts denominated most excellent. In an admirable manner Plato likewise, does not -peak of the deity of the world in the same way as concerning intellect and soul, viz. as acceding after intellect. For the union of intellect with its proper deity is ineflable, and itellect itself being divine proceeds from the father, which also is the peculiarity of total production. For as intellect indeed, it derives its subsis- tence from the total fabrication, but as a divine intellect, from deity.’ Plato therefore, does not make a division into deity and intellect, in consequence of constituting the intellect of the world from the father. What however, is the ~ meaning here of according to nature? Perhaps this is significant of order, according to which the universe is likewise enabled to participate of divine beauty ; and there- fore will be the same with according to order. Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

* Instead of axo rns odns hicre, I read axorys Ocoryros.

Tim. Plat. Vou. 1, +e ξ ;

Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

* Instead of axo rns odns hicre, I read axorys Ocoryros.

Tim. Plat. Vou. 1, +e ξ ;

the Demiurgus makes by his very being, and produces both intellect and soul from his essence. And it is not improbable that it is used, because this fabrica- tion, the universe, is complicated with nature, and the most beautiful here is not of such a kind as that which 15. better than nature ; but that which is above nature, is as it were mingled with nature, and intellectual with physical entities.

‘Thus therefore, it is necessary to say, according to assimilative rea- soning, that this world was gencrated an animal, possessing in trath for reality) soul and intellect through the providence of God.”

As the world itself is mingled, being composed of images and divine essences, of physical and supernatural things, thus also Plato calls the discussion of it assi- milative, and again truth. For according to that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, it requires assimilative reasoning, but according to the intellectual essence which is init, it requires truth, and also according to the divine cause from which it proceeds. Hence Plato, when about to speak con-

cerning the world adds the word assiuilative, or probable, but the word truth,

when about to speak concerning the providence of divinity, Farther still, you may perceive both assimilation and trathin the speaker himself; not only dividing these conformably to the nature of things. For he frequently apprehends the fubrication of things in a partible manner, assuming reasonings, divisions and com-

positions, though all things subsist at once in divine production, And frequently, ᾿

he recurs to the whole intelligence of the father, asin the axioms, ‘de was good,” and “it netther was nor will be lawful for that which is most excellent to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful.” Vor in the former of these his appre- hension is assimilative [but in the latter, comes into contact with truth). For from the multiform knowledges that are in us, he indicates what pertains to divine and demiurgic intelligence. But how, say they, dues he detine the universe to be an animal animated, or possessing soul, and endued with intellect ; for it seems indeed, that ἀνέρα is a certain part, but anated agenus? In answer to this, it is necessary to recall to our memory those Platonists who say, that animal extends as far as to plants themselves, and to sce how, according to. this ductrines every thing animated is an animal, but not every animal is animated. For intelligible animal is beyond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the ra- tional soul an aninal! but also arranges lite after the rational soul, he very pro-

* Zwov is omitted here in the original,

aaa

ee a Sea ita renner ieee

ROOK 11. ΤΙΜ δ OF PLATO, 347

For intelligible animal is beyond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the ra- tional soul an aninal! but also arranges lite after the rational soul, he very pro-

* Zwov is omitted here in the original,

aaa

ee a Sea ita renner ieee

ROOK 11. ΤΙΜ δ OF PLATO, 347

perly denominates every thing animated an animal, but not vice versa. If however, this be the case, having said that the world is an animal, since there is an intel- ligible animal, and also a sensible animal participating of a rational soul, he properly adds, that itis animated. And since of souls, one kind is endued with intellect, but another is deprived of it, in addition to the universe being animated, he likewise asserts that it possesses intellect. For it seems, that animal indeed, accedes from the first intelligible," and thus also from the intelligible father, who is prior to the intellectual Gods. But the animated accedes from the middle cause, both the triadic and the hebdomadic.’ And the possession of intellect ac- cedes from the intellectual father Jupiter]. For if you survey these as with “reference to the Demiurgus alone, according to the paradigm which is in’ him, the universe is rendered an animal; but according to his royal soul, animated ; and according to his royal intellect, endued with intellect. All these however, Plato comprehends unitedly in the words, “ through the providence of God.” For from thence the universe is rendered an animal, anda blessed God,‘ becoming perfect through the providence of divinity. You may also sce how the discourse proceeds from goodness through will, and ends in providence. For will indeed, is sus- pended from goodness, and providence from will. And the universe is gene- rated, on account of the providence, the will, and the goodness of the father ; the last of these being essence prior to essence [i. e. being superessential essence], the second, being as it were power prior to powers, and the first, energy prior to energies, Tor these pertain to the Gods so far as they are Gods. For goodness indeed is unific of essence, and is the flower of it ; but willis the measure of power ; and providence is an energy prior to intellect. For this I think, the very name itself manifests... We therefore thus distinguish animal and animated.

lamblichus however, arranges animal, with every thing that has life, but anima- fed, with the peculiar participation of souls. And perhaps he also, through the

‘i.e. Fromro er ov, or from being characterized by the one, and which is the summit of the in- telligible order.

* ice. From animal itself or Phanes, the extremity of the intelligible order.

dice. The animated accedes from the life, which is in the order called intelligible, and at the same lime intellectual, and also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life is the middle cause ia both these orders.

* For καὶ δαιίμὼν in this place, read ευδαιμων.

dice. The animated accedes from the life, which is in the order called intelligible, and at the same lime intellectual, and also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life is the middle cause ia both these orders.

* For καὶ δαιίμὼν in this place, read ευδαιμων.

S ice. ilporoa providence, is au energy πρὸ νὸν prior to intellect.

448 PROCLUS ON THE {Book 11.

possession of life indeed, comprehends intelligible animals, but through the ani- mated sensible animals alone. But it may be inferred, that the world is an ani- mal from its sympathy; that it is animated, from its perpetual motion; and that itis endued with intellect, from its excellent order. Lor if according to this, mortal’ are co-passive with celestial natures, and the latter impart an effluxion to the former, the universe is one animal connected and contained by one life. For if this life were not common there would not bea sympathy of the parts in it. Jor sympathy is effected through a participation ef the same nature. And if the world is perpetually moved, itis governed by soul. For every body which is itself moved inwardly by itself, is animated; but the body which is moved externally, is inanimate. If therefore, the universe Is always moved, what is it which moves it? For this is either immoveable, or self-motive. Butitis not lawful for the im- moveable cause of motion to approach without a medium to things which are moved by something different from themselves. Hence, it remains, that the self- motive nature is that which always moves the world. But this is soul. The world therefore is animated.

Moreover, in the third place, if? the universe is always arranged, and if all things are co-ordinated to well-being, and there is nothing adventitious in’ the polity of the world, intellect governs the world. For the connexion, the order, and the sacred Jaws of the natures contained in it, bring with them manifest syinbols of intellectual government. Aristotle also, in another way shows this, when he says that of animated natures, animals have the left hand and the right, but plants have the upwards and downwards, and also the meht hand and the left, so that the world is animated and an animal. But it is likewise endued with intellect. Por that which moves itis intellect. According to both plilo- sophers therefore, the world is an animal animated and endued with intellect ; except indeed, that according to Aristotle, it is animated, as having an insepa- rable lite; for he does not admit that 1 has an intellectual soul, bat that it has an intellect above soul, and which is essentially suspended from another intelli gible animal For what) Plato calls animal itself, he calls eternal animal, as an his Metaphysics, when he says, “ We say that God ts an eternal animal.” And in short, since there are in the world things that are moved, and things that are immoveable, things which are always one or the other of these, and things which

are sometimes in motion, and sometimes are tmmoveable, itis necessary that the

' Ttis necessary here, to supply ra Oynra.

* Fe is omitted here in the orginal.

‘TIMEUS OF PLATO. 349

ROOK 11.}

causes of both these should preside over the world. Soul therefore is the cause of motion; on which eccount also Plato in the Laws admitting [for the sake ot arument] the universe to be immoveable, gives motion to it by the introduction of soul, Andinthe Phaedrus taking away soul, he makes all things to stand still. But itis evident that intellect belongs to immoveable natures. And beings that are always moved, are moved about those that are immoveable, and on accomnt of the permaneney of the latter, the former are perpetually moved. Hleuce it entirely follows, that there is a mundane intellect above soul. By no means therefore, must that which Chrysippus devised, be ascribed to the world. For he confounded imparticipable with participable * causes, by sup- posing them to be the same with each other, and also the divine, and the intellee- tual, the immaterial and the material. For the same God, and who according to him is the tirst God, pervades through the world, and through matter, and is both soul and nature inseparable from the subjects of his government. Plato how- ever, establishing prior to the whole world three causes, goodness, intelligible animal, and the demiurgic intellect, imparts from these to the world in the first place, a perfect intellect always fixed in energy, exempt from matter, and full of undefiled intellections. In the second place, a divine intellectual soul, evolving the essence of this one intellect, dancing round it, and convolving the universe. In the third place, a union of the total essences in the world, and one deity and eoodness, connecting all the mundane multitude, and causing itto be one. And in the fourth place, a providence extending to all things its inspective care, sub- sisting likewise from itself, and causing itself to be exempt trom all the subjects of its government.

Since however, as we have before observed, it is necessary to survey the pro- cressions and the conversions of wholes, both these are accomplished by Plato. For he delivers the progressions of them when he says that the Demiurgus placed intellect in soul, and soul in body ; but their conversions, when beginning from the world, he calls itan animal animated, and endued with intellect, and con- nects it through soul with intellect, which is the peculiar work of conversion. And in the last place, he reiers the composition of the world to the demuiurgic providence, through which conversion is imparted to all things. For goodness indeed, unites the Demiurzgus to te exe. But will supplies wholes with good. And providence converts all things to de good. For, as we have said, goodness is

* [tis necessary liere to supply καὶ peGexras.

450 PROCLUs ON THE [Βοοκ lt,

For goodness indeed, unites the Demiurzgus to te exe. But will supplies wholes with good. And providence converts all things to de good. For, as we have said, goodness is

* [tis necessary liere to supply καὶ peGexras.

450 PROCLUs ON THE [Βοοκ lt,

analogous to essence, will to power, and providence to energy ; because the first indeed, establishes all things; the second moves them to progression; and the third recalls them according to the retrogression of all things to that which is prior to intellect. If however, the Demiurgus adorns the universe on account of coodness, but through adorning it causes it to possess intellect, and to be animated, and doing these things, eflects them on account of providence, (for these were generated through the providence of God)—if this be the case, itis necessary that it should be the same thing to produce onaccount of goodness as on account of provi- dence. And this very properly, because providence is the energy of goodness. So that according to Plato, providence is nothing else than an energy conformable to good, For in our concerns also, we say that to provide for some one, is to be the cause of good to the object of our pros idential care. Not only, therefore, must provi- dence be detined to be that which converts all things to the first, but also to be that the energy of which extends to all things, and which adorns all things according to one union. And this is in reality providence, the communication of good to all things, the conversion of all things to and the participation of the wiver (of every good), who imparts to every thing that which it is able to receive. It is requisite likewise to remember what the Cheronean (Plutarch) says about the name of providence, as that which Plato exhorts us to conceive of as something divine. If also the Demiurgus is intellect, and providence so far as he has something which is better than intellect, he has deservedly this name, on account of an energy which is above intellect. For all things aspire after good, but all things do not aspire after intellect. For such things as are perfectly destitute of intel- lect do not desire it, lest their desire should be in vain, or they should be deprived of the end [which is their proper good}. And because he is providence indeed, he is suspended from the good itself; but because he is intellect be is suspended from the first intellect, For the first intellect (i.e, Saturn] is not that which intel- lectually sees and fabricates, but that which alone intellectually perceives; and on this account, it is a pure intellect, as we learn from the Cratylus. Hence also, according to Plato, the latter may be said to be orice," as having one energy directed to himself: bat the former Gece, dogethor with ΠΝ energy ΘΟ ΟΝ ing also w power fabricative of the universe, and not: only lovinhatively regulating: things, posterior to himself, but also abiding in his own accustomed manner, as Plato says shortly after.

* Proclus says this, alluding to the Chaldean oracles, in which Saturn is called ence beyond, and Jupiter twice beyond.

BOOK 11.} TIMZUS OF PLATO. 351

“This being determined, let us consider what is consequent to these things; viz. according to the similitude of what animal, the constituting artificer constituted the world.”

Plato clearly exhibits to us through what is here said the connexion of the problems, and the suspension of secondary from primary natures. For the words, “ this being determined,” and ‘ let us consider what is consequent to these things,” indicate the connexion of what has been with what will be said; and that through the truth of the former, the latter receive the principle of investigation. For since it has been shown that the universe was rendered an animal conformably to the providence of God, it is necessary that it should be assimilated to intelligi- ble animal. For where did the Demiurgus look when he made the world to be an animal, except to the intelligible? Por it was one of the things pre-demon- strated, that the world being most beautiful, was generated according to an eternal paradigm. If therefore, the Demiurgus making it to be an image of the intelligible, constituted it an animal, the paradigm itself will be an intelligible animal, For if that was not an animal, how could that which was generated an image of itt be rendered an animal? For so far as it is similar to that, it was gene- rated an animal. For it is sensible indeed, not as similar and separate [but as visible and tangible}. These however, (i. e. visibility, and tangibility,] it obtains through a corporeal nature. But it is an animal, as being similar to intelligible animal. And if itis similar, it is from thence allutted the morphe of animal. For images also, have not only their forms, but their appellations, so far as they are formalized, from their paradigms. So that if life 15 imparted to the world through the paradigm, it is also similarly called an animal and animated from it, because the cause of its whole animation pre-exists in intelligibles. For the same reason likewise, itis endued with intellect. It may however, in a greater degree be called an animal, on account of the most principal cause, because the paradigm is the cause of animation, of the supply of intellect, and as I may say, of all life. For every thing enducd with intellect, is also animated, and every thing animated ts also an anunal ; but the converse is not true. For every animal is not animated. For that

* Instead of πως τον ro exewo yeyovos εἰκων in this place, it is necessary to read πων τὸ κει ον yeyorns «ιλων.

* The words αλλ᾽ ws eparov καὶ axroy are omitted in the original, but, as it appears to me, ought to be inserted,

452 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11.

which participates of a rational soul is animated. Nor ts every thing which is. animated endued with intellect. For the genus of men that participate of intellect,

which participates of a rational soul is animated. Nor ts every thing which is. animated endued with intellect. For the genus of men that participate of intellect,

is small ; so that animal 1s more comprehensive than all the rest. And with those

things indeed, with which the rest are present, animal also is present; but it is

not necessary that the rest showld be inherent in those things with which this is

present, That however, which iy more comprehensive, is nearer to the first prin-

ciple. But that which is nearer? to it, is of a more causal nature, since the first

principle 15 the cause of all beings. That Plato also? not only knew intelligible animal, but also the intelligible animated, ἰδ manifest from what he says in the Sophista, Por placing tite and soul in being, and wishing likewise to give to it motion, he adds, * But that which hay intellect and soul, if it ts not animated, must

remain entirely immoveable.” Wence there are, intelligible life, and intelligible animal; the cause of soul, and the animated ; the cause of intellect, and that

which is endued with intellect. And animal itself is beyond all the intelligible paradigms. Hence, Plato says, that the discussion of the similitude of the world to intelligible animal, is consequent to the problem concerning the composition of it. For because the universe being assimilated according to the form itself of similitude, was rendered an animal by the Demiurgus, ἐλ may more properly be called an animal, with reference to which the aniverse was generated an animal. For it exists as an animal on account of the intelligible, and not on account of that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner. [1 ts necessary however, that animal should be present with the universe, either from matter or from form; so that if the world is not an animal from its subject matter, itis so from form. If however from form, that which is primanly animal

is the cause to it of form.

It remains therefore, to survey in the next place after this problem, to what animal the universe is assimilated. For that it is assimilated, is evident from what has been already said, but to what it 15 assimilated, must next be con- sidered. For there is a multitude of intelligible animals, which Plato also indi- cating, inquires to what animal the Demiurgus constituted the world similar. Por beginning supernally from intelligibles, animal proceeds through all the middle

orders τ in one of these orders, subsisting intelligibly alone; in another intelligibly

" For avOpwxwe yap yevos, poayyu ἐστιν οὐ μετέχον, it is necessary to read, αὐ flpwawy yap 7Ev0s, ἤραχυ ἐστιν του vou μετέχον. Vor Plato says this in the latter part of this Dialogue.

* For αλλον here, it is obviously requisite to read ey yurepor.

nook We] TIMEUS OF PLATO, 353

indeed, but as in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and) in another intellectually

Vor Plato says this in the latter part of this Dialogue.

* For αλλον here, it is obviously requisite to read ey yurepor.

nook We] TIMEUS OF PLATO, 353

indeed, but as in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and) in another intellectually

alone. And in one of these orders indeed, animal subsists intellizibly alone, but

as in intellectuals; but in another vitally. And thus in each of the intellects

there is intelligible animal, subsisting appropriately in each. For every intellect

has a conjoined intelligible. Very properly therefore, does Plato investigate

what kind of animal is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is super-mundane,

or intellectual only, or intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, or intelligible

only. For the nature of animal’ proceeds according to all the orders of intellect.

But Plato admits that the differences always subsist in the first animal itself: according to union, and gives a progression to them according to appropriate

numbers. For as the first animalis tetradic, thus a different animal is defined

according to a diflerent number. And in those things in which there is the same

number, in these there is a variety of subsistence according to the peculiarities of animals, Lor itis necessary that in animal also, there should be the monadic

prior to the multiplied ; because this * is more allied to (he onc. And universally,

every divine multitude begins from a monad. As therefore, the Demiurgus is the

monad of all eflective causes, though the effective peculiarity is in many Gods,

thus also animal itself is the monad of all animals; in which Tihewise the most

total paradigms of mundane natures, and the one cause of the whole world pre-

eNist.

Whi. however, some one may say, does Plato call the intelligible paradigm animal? Because itis the supplier of life, as T have before observed 5 and because it generates the causes of the whole vivilie series, and the fountains themselves of lite. Because likewise, itis replete with the first and intelligible life. For the one being, or being characterized by the one, is beyond life. But the middle order of intellizibles is the first life, and is one and infinite. Animal itself) how- ever, being full of intelligible life, is very properly called animal. For as it is eternal, on account of being filled from eternity, thus also it is aw animal, on account of its reception of life. For it ts intelligible, as being arranged [immedi- ately} after intelligible lite. Tt is therefore called an animal, not as sensitive, nor as having impulse, but as being vital. For every thing which lives, is according to Plato, an animal.‘ For because it has life, says Timeus, it may be justly called ananimal.” Hence also, Plato calls plants and seeds animals, characterizing the

' For ἢ τὸν vow gums here, it is necessary to read ἡ τὸν ὥνου peas. * For roury here, read τοῦτον

* For roury here, read τοῦτον

Zim. Plat. Vor. J. Ye ὦ

554 PROCLUS ON THE acne,

animal by vitality. If therefore, the intelligible paradigm lives, as being eternal ; for eternity, as Plotinus says, is the life of all things, so that the eternal lives κα and if every thing that lives is an animal, hence the intelligible paradigm is an animal. And you may from hence assume that this paradigm is in the third trad of intelligibles. For it ig not in the first triad; for this is prior to life. Nor is it in the second ; for this is life. Hence it isin the third. For it does not exist out of intelligibles; since Plato on this' account alone calls the paradigm intelli- gible, though he knew the super-mundane demiurgic intellect. But neither does he call the latter intellizible, nor the former intellectual. Before therefore, he assumed every thing which perpetually exists as the paradigm of all generation ; among which eternally existing beings, animal itself and the Demiurgus are included ; for each of these always is. Eternity likewise, which is the first thing that always is, and the one being itself, which is eternal being according to cause, are in the number of eternally existing beings. Now, however, he calls animal itself the paradigin of the world considered as living. Fur perpetual being was the paradigm of disorderly generation ; since from thence, forms without distinction, were present with the disorderly nature, prior to the generation of the universe. But though we should assume animal itself, which has the forms of the elements, this also is te paradigm of the vestizes of the elements. So far, however, as it 1s animal, it is the paradigm of this universe now possessing life. So that simply considered, animal itself, and the intelligible paradigm are not the same. For eternity like- wise, which always exists, is the paradigm of time, but is not an intelligible animal 5 since not every paradigin is an animal belonging to the intelligible order. But if animal itself is eternal, eternity is prior to it, whichis not an animal, For prior to animal itself, there is no other animal ; since neither prior to any other of those things to which we apply the term itself, is there a certain -form prior to it. As there- fore, eternity is prior to animal itself, not being yet an animal, so hkewise, being itself is prior to eternity. Hence also eternity is that which is being, and is a certain being, Animal itself therefore, is the third intelligible triad, concerning which the (Chaldean] Oracles say, “ It is the operator, and the giver of life- bearing fire. It fills the vivific bosom of Hecate,? and pours on the Synoches the fertile strength (in fireendned with mighty power.” For all these assertions in no respect differ frorn saying that all-perfect intelligible animal is the fountain of all intellectual

’ For δια re here, it is necessary to read δια rovro.

? For exaorns here, read Exarns.

? For exaorns here, read Exarns.

nook 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 335 lite, and the cause of every paradigmatic hyparxis, And thus much concerning this particular.

With respect to the words of the text, “fo constitute in the similitude,” manitests that the universe is in the highest degree assimilated to its paradigm. For not every image is constituted in similitude, but that alone which is perfectly similar ; since this is not the case, where dissimilitude predominates. Vor then similitude is not the end. But the words, “the constituting artificer constituted,” clearly de- monstrate to us, that the Demiurgus of the universe makes by his very being, and. possesses energy essentially, For Plato does not call him in one way, and the effective energy proceeding from him in another, but he calls both by one name. Farther still, the words likewise appear to signify, that the Demiurgus always produces, and that he always produces perfectly. Tor the word constitu- ting, Manifests an ever-present making; but the word constituted, an all-perfect making, and which is suspended from its cause. But by the conjunction of both these expressions, itis very manifest that the maker of the universe generates eternally all things, his productive energy neither commencing, nor ending at

a certain time,

“ We must not therefore assert, that he thought it would be adequate to its dignity, to assimilate it to any one of the animals which naturally exist in the form of apart. For that which is similar to an impertect thing, can never at any time become beautiful.”

As there are many intelligible animals, some of which are more total, but others more partial,’ some of which are united, but others disided, and some are detined according to bound, but others according to infinity; Plato inquiring what the all-perfect paradigm of the universe is, and from what intelligible animal the world is suspended, thinks that no partial animal ought to be placed in this order. For each of these is imperfect as with reference to the whole. For it is possible for the imperfect to be so called in a twofold respect, either with refer- ence to its own nature, or with reference to that which is better and more causal, And the former indeed, it is not even lawful to conceive of divine natures. For each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted. For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

‘It is obviously necessary in this place, to supply the words, των δὲ μερικωτερων.

356 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

For each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted. For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

‘It is obviously necessary in this place, to supply the words, των δὲ μερικωτερων.

356 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

order. But the latter ranks, as it is said, among the things that are usual. For as in the Banquet, Plato calls that which is not primarily beautiful, but participates of beauty, indigent of beauty, thus also he calls that an imperfect animal which is not the first animal, nor animal itself, but is such by participation, and subsists according to a progression from that which is first. If therefore, every partial animal is imperfect, but the paradigm of the world is all-perfect, the paradizm of the world will not be a partial amimal. Por whether does the Demiurgus intellee- tually perceive this all-perfect and first animal, or not? It is impossible indeed, that he should not intellectually perceive those things which we perceive when our soul energizes intellectually. But if he thus sees it, and all intellectual perception

of the Demiurgus is production or making, it is necessary that he should make:

δ; by intellectual perception itself. What therefore can he make more divine than the universe? For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, when looking to that which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato when investizating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect animal,

What therefore can he make more divine than the universe? For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, when looking to that which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato when investizating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect animal,

What then, some one may say, are not the sun and moon and each of the stars beautiful? But how is this possible? For each of these is assimilated to a partial animal. To this we reply, that each of these is beautiful, when surveyed in con- junction with the whole, and co-arranged with the whole: just as the eye and the chin are beautiful, in conjunction with the whole face, and while in the whole ; but surveyed by themselves apart from the face, do not extibit the beauty which is adapted to them. For in subsisting as a part and not as a whole, cach when essentially divulsed fromthe whole, sutters a diminution of its own proper beauty. The pertect therefore, and the beautiful are present with these which are parts, on account of the whole. ‘The cause, however, of this, says Porphyry 15, that in intelligible forms the part isa whole.t | For all such things are in each partially, as are in the whole all-perfectly, on account of the union of intelligible forms. And the asseruon is indeed true, that each of the parts in them is in a certain respect a whole, each receiving the form of whole, and becoming essentially united on account of its Communicating with all, and being all things according to participation. Nevertheless the wholeness of it subsists partially, and not like that wholeness which is simply a whole. For itis one thing to be alter a solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of cach.

* Instead of ro cNoy μέρὺς ἐστιν, it is necessary to read ro pepos ὑλὺν Core.

-- -τοτοτεςσσ σα καιοαταξυς

BOOK I] TIMMUS OF PLATO. 357

For itis one thing to be alter a solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of cach.

* Instead of ro cNoy μέρὺς ἐστιν, it is necessary to read ro pepos ὑλὺν Core.

-- -τοτοτεςσσ σα καιοαταξυς

BOOK I] TIMMUS OF PLATO. 357

intellect possessing all things ina way adapted to itself, one form having dominion, which makes the intellect to be such an intellect, and a certain intellect; and ano- ther thing to be all things, without a partial peculiarity, being all things so far asin- tellect, and not so far asa particular kind of intellect. What) then, are not these also generated according to intelligible paradigms, viz. the san and moon and each of the stars? How therefore, are these beautitul? To this we reply, that these are beautiful, but not most beautiful. Butthe world is that which is truly most beautifal. As therefore each of these is perfect, but not all-perfect, so likewise each is beautifal, but not ke the universe most beautiful. For that each of these is perfect, Plato manifests farther on, when he says, “ that the world was generated perfect from things perfect, anda whole framwholes.” Uence the perfection of the whole is one thing, and ofthe part another. And the wholeness of the all-perfect is different from the wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is in the most beautiful is one thing, but that which receives a more partial partict- pation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

And the wholeness of the all-perfect is different from the wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is in the most beautiful is one thing, but that which receives a more partial partict- pation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

The words however, {in the form of a part,” may be easily understood, if they are considered as signifying the same as, in the order of a part. And this is the same with, fecoming a part. But the divine Tamblichas thinks fit to add the conjunction «sto the words inthe form, and to understand the whole as implying that every partial animal in intelligibles, naturally exists as in the form of a part. For since part in them is not such as it is in sensibles 3 since each is there accord- ing to its own order all such things as the whole is; on this account the philoso- pher adds, asin the form, in order that surveying the appellation of part ina manner adapted to forms, we may not understand it as a thing attended with interval, and susceptible of division, and thus relinquish the union of united and impartible essences. For these according to the philosopher himself are impart- ible and united. But with respect to the word “ naturally,” we wust not now under- stand by it according to nature, but the being cssentalized. For all essences ure Sroquently called natures, as by Socrates in the Philebus, when he says,“ hence, in the nature of Jupiter you may say, that there isa royal soul, and a royal intellect, according to the reason of cause.” But the words, “ he thought it would be adequate touts divnity,’ are said as if spoken in conjunction with the Demiurgus, and as truly apprehending the dignity of a divine cause. For he who mystically narrates the evempt and all-perfect intellectual conceptions of a divine nature, has an arrange- ment in conjunction with him. And the words, “ for that which is similar to an im- perfect thing can never be beautiful,” is indeed true, but is attended with a doubt.

358 PROCLUs ON THE [BOOK II,

And the words, “ for that which is similar to an im- perfect thing can never be beautiful,” is indeed true, but is attended with a doubt.

358 PROCLUs ON THE [BOOK II,

For if in that whichis a whole one thing 15 more, but another less excellent, must not the whole become inferior to its more excellent part, by the addition of that which is less excellent? But the doubt may be solved by observing, that the co-arrangement of the less with the more excellent makes the whole to be one and perfect, but when they are not conzlomerated with cach otber, then the mixture of the less diminishes the power of the more excellent nature, If however, some one should make a syllogism from opposites, through what is here, and what has been before said, so as to infer that every thing which is generated according to an eternal, is not generated according to an eternal paradigm, we may solve the objection by observing that what 15 employed by the objector as the middle term, isnot so. For in one place, the words “in order that it might be beautiful,” ma- nifest that which is beautiful, whether ina certain respect, or simply ; but in another place, they manifest that which is most beautiful. For a part has indeed the beauty of a part, but simply considered, is not beautiful. But that alone is absolutely beautiful which is a whole, to which also the beauty of the parts contributes 5 this beauty pertaining to certain things, and being itself a cer- fain (and not atoiversal) thing. For every part is for the sake of another thing, 1. δὶ the whole, and the beauty which it possesses has the order of matter with reference to the beauty of the whole. Hence itis not so beautiful as to be most beautiful. From what has been said, those assertions Likewise may be confuted, which mnake the good to be a certain intelligible form and not prior to all intelligibles. For if it is a certain form, itis also a part of the whole intelligible profundity in which it subsists. But every part, as it is here said, is imperfect; so that the good likewise is imperfect. How therefore being imperfect is it the most happy of all things? In reality also that which is sinjjlar to it is not beautiful. Nor are all beings similarly with reference to it, either more good, more beautiful. “Uf therefore the good being a part, will suffer things of this 7 it will not be a part of the intelligible. Moreover, neither 15 it the whole of the intelligible. For being the whole of the intelligible, over what will it still reign? = Since neither is the sun which has an arrangement analogous to the good" the whole of that which is visible. It is necessary therefore, that the good should be beyond the intelligible, and be neither a part nor the whole of it. Neither therefore, will either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with ¢he good ; since each of

these is a certain whole comprehensive of all forms.

* For τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν bere, read τ᾽ αγαῦφ.

een] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 359

Neither therefore, will either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with ¢he good ; since each of

these is a certain whole comprehensive of all forms.

* For τ᾽ ἀγαθὸν bere, read τ᾽ αγαῦφ.

een] TIMEUS OF PLATO. 359

“ But we should admit it to be the most similar of all things to that animal of which other animals, both according to one, and according to genera, are parts.”

Some, as Atticus, assert that this “ according to one, andaccording to genera,” gives a division to individual opposite to that of more common forms. But they call individual forms those that are proximate, and the causes of individuals; such for instance as man itself, horse itself, and each of such-like forms. And they denominate genera the more total and comprehensive paradigms of these. Others again, as Amelius, say that Plato by these words, distinguishes that which is particular from things that are more common. For some things are paradigms of parts, but others of forms, Theodorus also, following Amelius, says there are twofold intellects, one of these being divided into wholes, but the other into parts. And that these are the same with, “ according to genera, and according to one.” But others, as Nenarchus, assert, that according to genera inanifests the pre-existent intelligible causes of animals; such for instance as the celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, which are shortly after mentioned by Timeus. And that by “ according to one,” the formalizing principles in each of these many are indicated. For in celestial natures, the paradigm of the sun is different from the paradigm of the moon. In terrestrial natures, the paradigm of men is different from that of ions. And in a similar manner in the natures which have an intermediate subsistence. The divine Iamblichus however, turns into a path of interpretation contrary to all these. For they indeed make the “ accord- ing to one,” subordinate to, and more partial than, “ according to genera ;” but he, on the contrary, makes it to be more venerable, as it is fit that in intelligibles unity should precede multitude. He says therefore, that all other animals are the parts of animal itself, both according to one, and according to genera. For they are comprehended and perfected by animal itself, both according to the multitudes they contain, and according to their unities. Nor is there any one of them which does not proceed from the intelligible. For intelligible animal is com- prehensive of all the things posterior to it, not as deriving its completion from them. For itis a whole prior to,’ and does not derive its subsistence from parts. Nor is it a whole, as being predicated of parts; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

* Intelligible animal, or animal itself, isa whole prior to parts, because it comprehends parts in itself causally,

360 PROCLUS ON THE [rook 1.

Nor is it a whole, as being predicated of parts; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

* Intelligible animal, or animal itself, isa whole prior to parts, because it comprehends parts in itself causally,

360 PROCLUS ON THE [rook 1.

a whole, as a primordial principle, and as filling all things posterior to itself with itself. Hence it comprehends what are called parts tinpartibly, many species uniformly, and exists in an all-perfeet manner prior to secondary paradigms. For this principle indeed, is the universe intelligibly ; but of the natures posterior to it, one is all things celestially, another atter a solar, another after a terrestrial manner, and another in some other way, according to the different causes of mundane natures. So that this principle comprehends all things all-perfeetly, but all things are comprehended by each of the natures posterior to it partially, as with reference to the intelligible allness. The world therefore, is also similar to these partial animals ; since itis likewise similar to the Demiurgus ; but it is most similar to animal itself, so far as it is an animal. For animal itself was primary intelligible animal. Henee, that which is most similar is so ina two- fold respect; either because it is similar to other things, or because other things are similar to it. But this is especially the case with the universe, and it is espe- Gially similar to animal itself.

* For this indeed, has all intelligible animals comprehended in itself, just as this world contains us, and such other animals as are the objects . μὲ ” of sight.

Plotinus supposes animal itself to exist ina twofold respect. For atone time he considers it to be more excellent than intellect, as in his treatise intitled Different Considerations, but at another, aa inferior to it, as in his treatise Coucern- ing Numbers, when he says that being ts first, afterwards intellect, and afterwards animal itself. But Theodorus, who says, that each of the demiurgt has a triples hyparxis, thinks fit to call the third in each, animal itself. From both, however, the truth may be assumed. From the admirable Theodorus indeed, that it has the third order in intelligibles; but from the most divine Plotinus, that it is inferior to one intellect, but beyond another. And it must be said, that unfold- ing itselfanto light at the end of intelligibles, it generates from intelligible life all the number of intellectual, supermundane, and mundane animals, supernally as αν ἀν τὸ the last of things. Tt is likewise comprehensive of all things, being ex- empt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing ta itsclf{ the causes of them, For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologizing

* For τρίτην here, it is necessary to read rpm Nyy.

Βοοκ 1] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 361

Tt is likewise comprehensive of all things, being ex- empt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing ta itsclf{ the causes of them, For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologizing

* For τρίτην here, it is necessary to read rpm Nyy.

Βοοκ 1] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 361

concerning Phanes. The first God therefore, with him, has the heads of many animals, viz. of aram, a bull, a serpent, and a fierce lion." He also proceeds from the primogenial egg, in which the animal exists spermatically ; and Plato knowing this calls this mighty God animal itself. For what difference is there between calling an occult cause an egg, or that which is unfolded into light from it, an animal? For what can be generated from the exg of all things, but an animal? This egg however, was the offspring of ether and chaos, the former of which is established conformably to the bound, but the latter to the infinity of intelligibles. For the former is the root of all things, but the latter has not any boundary. If therefore that which first consists of bound and infinity is that which is primarily being, the being of Plato will be the same with the Orphtc egg. And if Phanes is from this, who is arranged according to animal itself, it is necessary to investigate it as sitnated next to eternity according to Orpheus, which is a medium between animal itself, and that which is primarily being.’ And thus it will be more clearly evident, that animal itself is no other than the Phanes of the theologist. For if Phanes first proceeds from the egg, which is manifestly with Orpheus the first intelligible intellect, but that which first and alone proceeds from an egg, is necessarily nothing else than an animal, it is evi- dent that the most mighty Phanes is nothing else than the first animal; and, as Plato would say, animal ttself. This therefore is demonstrated.

Let us however, in the next place, survey what is consequent to this. Phanes, therefore, thus unfolding himself into light from the occult Gods, antecedently comprehends in himself the causes of the secondary orders, viz. of the effective, connective, perfective, and immutable orders; and also contains in himself according to one cause, all intelligible animals. For he excites himself to the most total ideas of all things. Hence also, he is said (by Orpheus] to be the first of the Gods, and to have a form. But he produces all things, and unfolds the intelligible and united’ causes of things, to the intellectual Gods. Hence too, the Demiurgus being filled from these causes, gives subsistence to this visible

* This is an Orphic line, which is not noticed cither by Gesner or Hermann in their collection of Ormhic fragments. It is however in the printed original in a defective state: for it is, cae cas Tarptovs opias, χαροπον re λέοντος. But from Eschenbach, who quotes it from ἃ manuscript, it may be amended as follows: κριὸν καὶ ravpov, opios, yaporow re eovros.

It is however in the printed original in a defective state: for it is, cae cas Tarptovs opias, χαροπον re λέοντος. But from Eschenbach, who quotes it from ἃ manuscript, it may be amended as follows: κριὸν καὶ ravpov, opios, yaporow re eovros.

* Itis here necessary to supply the words τὸν xpwrws ovros.

Σ For ηνωμενὼν in this place, it is obviously necessary to read ἤνωμενα, in order to agree with acria.

sim, Fisk , Vo. I. 2Z

362 PROCLUS ON THE {[BooK 1,

world, and causes it to contain all sensible animals, both such as are more divine, and such as are mortal, which are properly Gzqzuara’ thremmata, or things which are nourished, as entirely participating of the nutritive soul. All bodies likewise, may properly be called Sesupara, ts being the progeny of nature, and as ulways living from, and being connected by it, even though: they should be perpetual bodies; but not as requiring externally adventitious nutriment. Unless indeed, it be requisite to call all things in the world Szeumara, us being nourished by the hing of visible natures through the communication of ight, Por Socrates in the Republic says, that the sun is the cause of nutroment and generation to all such things as he illuminates, Por every visible thing is notished bem perfected: by light, Poras we learn inthe Politious, itis possible to he nourished externally, and not only internally, Phe Demiurgus therefore, comprehends all that) the world contains, in order that this sensible world may be ἐδ πα pertect trom the parts that are in it, conformably to a sitmilitude to him, Hence, this world is a Various animal, according to a different part of itself emitting a different voice, and from all its parts one voice. For it is also one, fas well as many}. By a much greater priority however, the intelligible world is one animal and a multitude fof animals], contracting multitude in the one, just as this visible world also, exhibits the one in multitude. And the latter indeed, is a whole from parts 5 bat the former is a whole prior to parts, cxemptly, uniformly, and according to cause, comprehending intelligible antinals. Por from it the fountains of divine natures, and all the most total genera proceed. Flence also, the theologist represents it as a most tutalanimal, surrounds it with the heads of aram, a buli, a lion, and a dragon ; and ascribes to it primarily the female aud the mate, as lo the first animal.

Female and father, strong and mighty God,

ry bi ve. 4 2 Enicapxus,

says the theologist. He is likewise the first God that is represented with wings. And what occasion is there to be prolix? For if he has his progression from the primogenial egg, this fable manifests that he is the first animal, ifit is fit to pre- serve the analogy. Vor as the egg’ antecedcntly comprehends the spermatic

* The word used by Plato here for animals. * In the origival erroneously npuxe xpos.

+ For ro ev ον here, it is necessary to read ro wor.

Vor as the egg’ antecedcntly comprehends the spermatic

* The word used by Plato here for animals. * In the origival erroneously npuxe xpos.

+ For ro ev ον here, it is necessary to read ro wor.

πον τ TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 303

cause of the animal, thus also the occult order,‘ uniformly comprehends the whole of the intelligible. And as the animal now possesses in ἃ distributed manner, such things as were in the egg spermatically, thus likewise this God produces into a visible subsistence that which is ineffable and incomprehensible in first causes, Concerning these things however, what has now been said may suflice for the present.

If however, as this world comprehends in itself all visible natures, so its para- digm comprehends all intelligibles, and the mode of comprehension, as we have said, is different in each, yet at the same tine the visible in the former is analogous to that of the latter. For Phanes supernally illuminating intelligibles with intel- livible light, causes all of them to be visible, and exhibits all things [in the intel- ligible] generated from invisible causes ; and the world imparts visibility to bodies through the light of the stars. Farther still, this also may be considered as admirable in the doctrine of Plato, that at the same time that he preserves the union ofintelligibles unshaken, he imparts to them an unmingled purity. For if all of them were so united to each other as to be confused, and so as not to permit the peculiarity of each to remain undefiled, there would have been no occasion to enquire, according to what kind of paradizm the universe was gene- rated, Por in things confused there is no distinction of quality. And if these were so divided from each other as to be without any communion, some intel- ligibles would not comprehend, but others be comprehended. For to comprehend and be comprehended pertain to order and communion of powers, and to the -rapld conspiration of all secondary natures to become one. Moreover, for the union of them to subsist from essence, bat their separation to be rendered appa- rent from externally proceeding energies, will be the peculiarity of incorporeal and immaterial eflects. For if they are surveyed, themselves by themselves, all will be found to be in each other, on account of their being, as it were, of the same colour, and especially if the unitics of them are seen with the eye of intel- lect. But from secondary natures, and from their participants, we collect their unconfused union. Vor whence is the separation of these derived, except from the unmingled purity of their, efficient causes? For things which are confused with each other, give subsistence to other such-like natures, [i. e. to natures which ‘are similarly contused.]

* ile. The first triad of the intellicible order, which is called by Plato in the Parmenides το ¢r 11, the one being, or being characterised by, and absorbed as it were in lhc one.

404 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1f.

e. to natures which ‘are similarly contused.]

* ile. The first triad of the intellicible order, which is called by Plato in the Parmenides το ¢r 11, the one being, or being characterised by, and absorbed as it were in lhc one.

404 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1f.

“ For the divinity wishing to assimilate this universe, in the most exqui- site degree, to that which is the most beautiful, and in every respect per- fect of intelligible animals, he constituted it one visible animal, contain- ing all such things within itself, as are allied to its nature.”

Atticus, in what is here said, doubts whether the Demiurgus is comprehended by intelligible animal. For it would seem, if he were comprehended, that he is not perfect. For partial animals, he says, are imperfect, and on this account things which resemble them are not beautiful. But if he is not comprehended, animal itself will not be more comprehensive than all intelligibles. And having doubted, he easily solves the doubt, by supposing that the Demiurgus is above animal itself. On the contrary, Porphyry gives an order to the Demiurgus infe- ror to the intelligible. Bor establishing a supercelestial soul to be the inaker of the world, he places in intellect the paradigm of cenerated natures. Phe divine Iamblichus, as a medium between both these, connects and unites the paradigm to the Demiurzus, through the union of intellect with the intelligible, But Amelius makes the intelligible, which is detined according to being, to be the same with the Demiurgus."| We however say, that ammal itself is prior to, subsists in, and is posterior to the Demiurgus. For it proceeds to every intellectual order both total and partial, The Demiurgus himself likewise, sees himself, and the natures prior to himself: for it is not lawfal fur him to look to natures posterior to himself. Beholding therefore, Uhese superior natures, he produces all things, and makes the universe, so faras it is the universe, or the all, to be the image of the whole intelhi- eihle world. The Demiurzus however, is comprehended by the intelligible, accord- ine to the cause of the intellectual Gods which there subsist 5 not as beng a part, vrone species of it; but as a second order inthe order which is prior to it. Fora divine intellect is in one way said to be comprehensive of forms, and in another way to comprehend partial intellects. Foreach of the latter indeed, is all things ina self-perfect manner 5 but each of the former is united to other forms,” but is not all things. For each is itself preserving its own peculiarity, unmingled and unconfused. According to the same reasoning also, the intelligibles which are in intelliible intelleet, are comprehended by it in one way, but in another way the

intellectual orders which proceed from it. For you may say, that each of these

' Por τῷ μὲν τὸν δημιονογον in this place, itis necessary to read ry μέντοι δημιυυργῳ.

2 Por τῶν αλλων ceo here, read τοῖς ἀλλοῖς εἰδέσιν,

For you may say, that each of these

' Por τῷ μὲν τὸν δημιονογον in this place, itis necessary to read ry μέντοι δημιυυργῳ.

2 Por τῶν αλλων ceo here, read τοῖς ἀλλοῖς εἰδέσιν,

Slant

DOOK 11.} TIMUS OF PLATO. 365

“being self-perfect, is comprehended in all-perfect animal. All such things there- fore, as are in the paradigm, are likewise in the Demiurgus ; and in making the world with reference to the paradigm, he also makes it with reference to himself. With respect to al/ness (παντοτης) however, one is intelligible, but another intellec- tual. For both the tetrad and the decad contain all things in themselves; but the former unitedly, and the latter distnbutedly. The decad likewise, though it con- tains all such things as the tetrad contains, yet because it contains them in a more divided manner, itis more imperfect than the tetrad. For the tetrad being nearer to the monad is more perfect; and in proportion as quantity is diminished, the Inagnitude of power is increased. So that the Demiurgus possessing ἈΠῸ such things as intelligible animal possesses, yet at the same time, he has an allness inferior to that which is intelligible. In short, as comprehension is twofold, the one being such as that of parts in their wholeness, but the other, as that of effects in their causes, Plato now assumes the former of these, and says, that the genera and species ofanimals, are comprehended as parts in their whole, i. ον in animal itself ; all which likewise, he denominates imperfect, as with reference to the whole. But the Demiurgus indeed, proceeds from thence as from a cause, yet he likewise possesses all things intellectually. The Demiurgus therefore, is comprehended by intelligible animal according to the reason of cause, and is not so compre- hended as a part, so as to be also imperfect. Hence likewise, Timzus in a cer- tain respect thus speaks. For the Demiurgus has all intelligible animals compre- hended in himself. For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion to it, as a whole which is not prior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

For in reality, these are contained in him as parts, which remain in unproceeding union with their proper wholeness, and give completion to it, as a whole which is not prior to parts, but is from parts. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

In the next place, this also deserves to be surveyed, viz. in what an admirable manner Plato, at one time ina way known to us, passes from images to para- dizms, and at another time, from paradigms to images; at one and the same time indicating the connexion of things, and their progressions and conversions. For when he says, that as this world comprehends us, thus also animal itself comprehends intelligible animals, he recurs from sensible animals to the causes of them. But when he says, that divinity wishing to assimilate the world to the most beautiful of intelligibles, rendered it comprehensive of all things, he is willing to pass from causes to their effects, imitating the progression of secondary natures. He is led however, to such a transition as this, through analogy. For as effects are to each other, so are the paradigms of them. And the more total and the more partial,

366 PROCI.US ON THE [Βοοκ 11.

subsist in both according to the same ratio. Why however, does he call animal itself the most beautiful of intelligibles, though it is the end of intelligibles? May we not say, that though there are intelligible orders prior to it, yet the most beautiful is inferior to them?) For they do not participate of beauty ; but the producing cause of beauty, and the first beauty and elegance subsist in them. Hence also animal itself is according to Orpheus, intellectually unfolded into lightin this order. And as beauty had a prior existence in che first intelligibles, unitedly and without inter- mission, hence Phanes is called by Orpheus, “the very beautiful son of ether,” and * delicate Love.” Because therefore, this God is the first that is filled with oceult and ineffable beauty, hence also he is denominated most beautiful, being the first of participants, though all intelligibles are united to each other. For it is not proper to divide them from each other, after the same manneras the intellectual orders, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore, are beautifally asserted (by Orpheus and Plato.

For it is not proper to divide them from each other, after the same manneras the intellectual orders, but survey one and an indivisible union of them. These things therefore, are beautifally asserted (by Orpheus and Plato.

That however, which is most synopucal' in the words of Plato, is this, that he says animal itselfis the most beautiful, not of all intellgibles simply, but of mtelhgible animals. Por comparing all-pertect animal with more partial animals, he says, itis the most beautiful of all intelligible animals ; so that if there is some- thing more excellent: than the nature of animal, it has nothing to do with the present assertion. Tt as necessary however, that there should) be a thing of this Kind, because bemy itself, and beauty itself are more simple than the nature of animal, on which account also they are participated by things which are not animals, Moreover, the interpreters say, that the word asysinilation is appropriately assumed by Plato. For he is frequently dubious ccncerning the mode of par- teipation, Whether itis from: forms themselves being present with sensibles, or from their communmeating with them im some other way: but he is not dubious whether or not it is stmilitude which makes the sensible world to be the image of the intelligible. Dividing however, they say, that of physical forms indeed, the sensible world participates as of impressions in wax, but that it receives the representations of psychical, and the sunilitudes of intelligible forms.* So that since Plato is speaking concerning intelligible paradigms, he very properly, as they say, assumes similitude, Parther still, the world is an animal, as the image

1 Por συνεκτικωτατον here, Tread σννοπτιλωτατων.ς * Concerning the mod > in which forms themselves are participated by sensibles, see the Notes to my translation of the Parmenides of Plato.

BOOK 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 4207

of this intelligible animal, and of intelligible allness. But it is visible as being assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. For what colour is there, that

the visible is here.

‘The Gods adinir'd, mv ether when they saw A light unlook’d for, bursting on the view,

Prom the immortal Phanes’ glittering skin ;"

But it is visible as being assimilated to the splendour of its paradigm. For what colour is there, that

the visible is here.

‘The Gods adinir'd, mv ether when they saw A light unlook’d for, bursting on the view,

Prom the immortal Phanes’ glittering skin ;"

fsays Orpheus}. And the world comprebends all kindred natures, because it is comprehensive of all sensibles. But Plato adds, “as are allied to its nature,” because intelligibles are paradigms to the world of things which are according to nature, and not as some Platonists are accustomed to say, of things preterna- tural, Torin short, mundane things being divided into such as are according to na- ture, and such as are preternatural, into universals and particulars, and into essences and accidents, we always admit that there are formal causes of the more, hut by no means of the less excellent. For that which is produced from ideas, proceeds through nature. But if this is the case with that which is according to nature, but not with that which is preternatural, that which is generated from ideas is a certain whole, and is perpetual, For if this is not admitted, one of two things must take place, either that things contingent will have no existence, or that of forms some will necessarily produce, but it will happen that others may either produce or not produce. And in the third place, every thing whieh pro- ceeds from ideas is essence... Vor since they produce by their very being, each is productive of essences. For it would be ridiculous to say that a partial nature is effective of essence, but that intelligible form gives subsistence to accident? These things however, we shall elsewhere more copiously discuss. Bat what- -eyer the world contains is allied to it, because all things in it subsist according to intelligible causes. Plato likewise appears in this place to have given a definition uf the world, viz. “one visible animal, comprehending in itself all animals.” For intelligible animal also is one, but is not visible. And the sun, and each of the monadic natures, [or those natures of which there. is only one,jis one visible animal, but does not comprehend all others. So that it is evident that the above is the detinition of the universe. Let us however proceed to the words of Plato. |

* For ro ov «πεστιλβε in this place, it is necessary to read ry μὲν αἀπεστιλιβε. Ὁ For συμιλεβήκοτος evos νποστατικον, read ovp/3e/3qxoros εἰναι νποστατικον.

368 PROCLUS ON THE [oon τι.

“ Whether therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it more right to say that there are many and infinite worlds ?”

Ὁ For συμιλεβήκοτος evos νποστατικον, read ovp/3e/3qxoros εἰναι νποστατικον.

368 PROCLUS ON THE [oon τι.

“ Whether therefore, shall we assert that there is one world, or is it more right to say that there are many and infinite worlds ?”

This problem follows indeed logographically what has just now ' been said. For because he had detined the world to be one visible animal, comprehending within itself all such animals as are naturally allied to it, it is necessary that he should think this to be worthy his attention and discussion, whether the world is one certain thing, or not. For of physiologists, some make the world to be one; but others assert that there are many worlds; and others contend that there are not only many, but also infinite worlds. The consideration of this likewise, has a connection with what has been before said, derived from the things themselves. For since it has been shown that the world is the image of animal itself, and is an animated animal, endued with intellect, it was requisite to add a summit to the discussion of it, by showing that itis also one, For thus he will demonstrate that it isa God, in consequence of participating a unity which is above intellect. For it was not only possible for him to say that it is an image because other things also are images, some being fashioned by nature, but others by art. Nor an animal alone, because there is a multitude of partial animals, Nor alone animated; for man likewise is an image, and an animated animal. Nor alone endued with intellect; for both a demon and an angel are amimnated animals possessing intellect. But this which especially and primarily pertains to divine natures, he before suflered to be ineffable, through the cause which we have already assigned. Now, however, he adds the one, and the alone. For every thing which ts monadic in the world is divine, as being an image, if it be. lawful so to speak of ἐμὲ one. But I denominate divine, that which is such as the anzelic, as the dwemoniacal, and as that which is in partial souls. For each of these is divine, so far as it 1s suspended from its proper deity, and cach of these ts monadic. Such monadic natures however, as have generation and corruption, and are expelled into the mortal abode, are opposed to every thing divine. Hence this problem 1s suspended from what has been before said. For since the paradigm of the universe is indeed a God, and 15 intelligible, is the suppher of lite, and is also intellect ; according to that which is divine in him, he makes the world to be one; according to the one and the intelligible, he causes it to be sensible; but according to the one, the intelligible, and life, he makes it to be

* For ra νὸν here, read ra νυν».

nook 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 369

nook 11. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 369

animated and an animal; and according to all these and intellect, he causes it to be endued with intellect. For union accedes prior to other things, and posterior to other things. Animal energizes prior to, and in conjunction with other thaigs, And the gift of life generates and proceeds together with, and prior to intellect.

From what however is now siown, and from what has been before demon- strated, you may assume, that at the same time, the paradigm of the universe is unical, and the whole multitude of intelligibles. And neither is the simplicity of ewithout multitude, nor the multitude of it divided; but it has the all-various at once consubsistent with ¢he one, the monadic with the all-perfect, and the uniform with the multiform. For because it proceeds indeed from the good it is united. But because it pre-establishes in itself the order of intelligible ideas, it is ἃ}}- perfect. And as infinite, it unfolds the multitude of intelligibles ; but as contained by bound, it is only begotten. As proceeding likewise from being characterized by unity, it has the relation of a monad ; but as being the third from it, it produces in itself all the intelligible Gods, and on this account is demonstrated to be all- perfect. These things, however, we shail more fully unfold as we proceed.

But there is a controversy with the interpreters about the text. For to some of them it appears that two things are now distinguished by Plato, the one, and all multitude. And the word whether being applied by the ancients to two things, seems to testify in favor of their opinion, But to others, it appears that there is a division into three things, the one, finite multitude, and the infinite. And the patrons of this interpretation are Porphyry and Jamblichus, who speak conforma- bly both to the things themselves, and to the doctrine of Plato. For shortly after he takes away two things, but assumes one thing from division. But from three things, an ablation of two and the position of one is eflected, and not from two things alone. Nevertheless the word whether’ seems to contradict what they assert. It may be remedied however by saying that cither whether signifies the same as shall we therefore ; (zw ap ow τὸ πότερον orci ταυτον) for it is frequently thus assumed by the ancients; or that the words, or not (ἢ ov) are wanting to the sentence; and that it will be perfect by reading, whether do we rightly assert that there is one world, or not? And if not, whether there arc many, or infinite worlds ? Plato omitting to ‘say this through conciseness. Perhaps too; you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words much and finite.

* For πρότερον here, read sorcpor,

Tim. Plat. | Vou. i, ZA

870 | PROCLUS ON THE (wooK 11.

And if not, whether there arc many, or infinite worlds ? Plato omitting to ‘say this through conciseness. Perhaps too; you may say, it is not without design that he omitted the words much and finite.

* For πρότερον here, read sorcpor,

Tim. Plat. | Vou. i, ZA

870 | PROCLUS ON THE (wooK 11.

For to say how many, or so many, is to speak in a way that gives completion to what is said. And as ifthe paradigm is not monadic, s0 as to be the cause of one thing, the things generated are intinite 5 after this manner itis probable that there are infinite worlds, if there is not only one. For the vacaum being infinite, will be the recipient of infinite worlds.

“ One [i. e. there will be but one world,] if it be admitted that it is fabricated according to the paradigm.”

Again Plato in concord with himself, announces the whole of the conclusion prior to the demonstrations, previously to beltef, dissolving the doubt. For the word one is uttered analogously to, if seas generated, and to he was wood,‘ and the demonstration on account of it, is conformable to the proper method. | For it is himself who doubts, himself who dissolves the doubts, and himself who demon- strates. Through the doubt, indeed, converting himself to intelleet; but through the concise solution of the doubt, energizing according to intellect. For to com- prehend the whole of a sentence in one word, is animage of intellectual projec- tion, And through the demonstration descending from intellect to dianoia, For every one who demonstrates, receives the principles of lis demonstration from intellect. Butitis intellect, says Aristotle, by which we know terms 3 for through this we apprehend (true) beimes by simple projections, Such therefore throughout is the form of the words.

Let us, however, if you think fit, in the first place, svilogistieally survey the trath of the words themselves. The whole sentence, therefore, is of the following kind, If the world was generated according to a paradigm, and the paradigm is one, then the world is one." Bat the antecedent is true, and) therefore the consequent also is true, That the world, however, was generated according to a paradigm, was asserted before, and was mentioned both by Plato and ous. But that the paradigm is one and monadic, Plato asserts as he proceeds, ‘The assumption therefore being true, it remains to see how that which follows from it is true. He says then that if the world imitates especially and accurately the para- dizm, it ought to imitate it ino all thines, and ought to resemble the essence

of it. For if it imitates the paradigin in some things, and not in’ others,

* Instead of ro ἀγαθὸς ἣν in this place, it is requisite to read rw az ules ny.

* The words ὁ κόσμον apa ἐν ἐστιν, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

BOOK "1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 371

For if it imitates the paradigin in some things, and not in’ others,

* Instead of ro ἀγαθὸς ἣν in this place, it is requisite to read rw az ules ny.

* The words ὁ κόσμον apa ἐν ἐστιν, are omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.

BOOK "1.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 371

it will not be the imare of ἃ certain whole. For the paradigm making by its very being, it makes a certain image of the whole of itself. But this being the case that which is generated with reference or according to. the whole paradigm itself, is monadic, is perpetual, and is an animal. For as he who imitates the whole of Socrates expresses the whole of his life, after the same manner, the world being fashioned in the resemblance of animal itself, imitates all things mit, so far as itis naturally adapted to such an imitation ; possessing all things sensibly which animal itself possesses intelligibly,

Some however oppose what is here said, by adducing the multitude of men and of horses, Por man itself is the cause of many men, horse itself of inany horses, and this is the ease with every other form or idea of the like hind. But if some one should say, that these beeause they are parts of other things, are on this account monadic, the oljector will not cease adducing tous the sun and the moon, and all the parts of the world which are monadic. Tence more profound solutions of the objection are requisite. The philosopher Porphyry therefore striving to solve the didiculty, says, that forms as they proceed, always descend into mulutude and division, and pass into balk, and an all-various distribution into parts. Tfenee an intelligible essence, procceding into the world, terminates ina divided, gross, and material multitade, though on high itis united, impar- tible, and monadic., To every thing, therefore, which is intelligible, nothing else imparts the whole, for the intelligible itself gives subsistence to it. Hence it constitutes it as great as it is able to become. But this universe supplies man itself with matter. And on this account the matter of one form receives many Impressions of that form. "The world, therefore, is one from one (paradigm), and a Whole froma whole. But man is numerous trom one torm, the world supply- ing the matter of it. Why, therefore, says he, are there not many suns and moons? For the matter of these is from the universe. To this he replies, that to incorruptible natures in the world, though they may be parts, the monadic is appropriate; but to corraptible natures, multitude. For if there were not many participants of the same reason (or form) but only one corraptible participant, the form would perish, this being corrupted. It is necessary, however, that all [mate- rialj forms perishing, the full perfection of the world should still remain. Such therefore is the solution of Porphyry. |

It is necessary, however, that all [mate- rialj forms perishing, the full perfection of the world should still remain. Such therefore is the solution of Porphyry. |

The divine Tamblichus however reprobates this solution, as dissolving no one of the doubts, For let, says he, the whole sensible world possess impartible natures partibly, indivisibles divisibly, and monadic natures multitudinously, yet

372 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook τι,

why do some things in it still remain monadic, but others not? For this is what was dubious from the beginning. He therefore adduces a certain solution of the doubt, which is indeed admirable yet is inwant of assistance. For he says that of forms some rejoice in sameness and permanency, but others in motion and dif- ference. And that some, indeed, are the causes of monadic and perpetual natures, but others of such as are mutable and multitudinous. And this indeed is very admirably asserted, but requires a certain admonition, which it is necessary to make, by considering that atter the one two principles proceed, bound and infinity, as Socrates asserts inthe Philebus. And as of numbers, some are more monadic but others are dyadic, though all numbers derive their subsistence from the monad and at the same time from the duad, thus likewise, though all forms subsist accor- ding to these two principles, yet at the same time some are the progeny of bound, but others of infinity. And what occasion is there to speak of forms; since of the Gods themselves, some belong to the co-ordination of bound, but others to that of infinity, both according to their whole orders and according to parts? According to total orders indeed, because every paternal, connective, and demiurgic series is defined according to bound; but every vivitic and effect- ive series, according to infinity. But according to. parts, because of the pater- nal and of the vivilic series, some belong to the order of bound, but others to that of infinity. If, therefore, this is the case with the Gods, why is it wonderful that of forms some are more than others allied to bound, but others to infinity? And according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic things, but others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is requisite tu assist this solution.

And according to this analogy some forms give subsistence to monadic things, but others to those that proceed into multitude. After this manner, therefore, it is requisite tu assist this solution.

Our preceptor, however, dissolves this doubt after another manner, multifarious. ly. Tle says, therefore, that every intelligible nature is uniform and_ eternal, but that of mundane things, some are able to be more, and others less assimilated to the essences of intelhgibles. For such things as are more 1mmaterial and pure, are capable of being assimilated ina greater, but such things as are more material and gross, in a less degree. As all paradigms therefore subsist in monadic and eternal essences, the more excellent natures in the universe especially imitating the causes of themselves, are generated in all things most similar to their para- digms, viz. according to the monadic, the essenual, and the perpetual; but the less excellent, being allotted a secondary form of similitude, are in a certain re- spect assimilated to their causes, and in ἃ certain respect not. Hence, as there are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculi-

BOOK τι. TIMAEUS OF PLATO 373

Hence, as there are these three things in intelligible forms, viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal, whether do mundane natures imitate the monadic and perpetual peculi-

BOOK τι. TIMAEUS OF PLATO 373

arity of intelligibles, but not the essential? By no means.’ For it has been de- monstrated that it is requisite the things which proceed from them should be essences, since they produce by their very being. Will mundane natures there- fore be imitations of them according to the monadic and the essential, but not according tothe eternal?) This however is impossible. For each of them will perish ; being monadic indeed, but not perpetual. For because not perpetual, it will vanish into non-entity ; but in consequence of being monadic, there will not be that from which it may be generated. Besides, every thing which subsiste from immoveable causes, is immutable in essence. But forms are immoveable, for they are intelligible. Either therefore itis possible for all things to imitate them in all things, or in certain things. But it is impossible for all things to imitate themin all things. For the natures which are more remote from their principles are in a less degree assimilated to them. Just as with respect to Pythagoras, who possesses all sciences, he who is nearer to him, receives all his knowledge secon- darily, but he who is more remote from him, learns some of his sciences, but is unadapted to the reception of others. Ifitis impossible therefore, for all things to imitate them in every respect, it remains that this must be effected by them in certain things. And ifin certain things as there are three peculiarities which are characteristic of intelligible forms,’ either imitating the extremes, they become destitute of the middle, or receiving the two first, they will appear to have re- sinquished the third, or not partaking of the first, they will participate of the two which are posterior to it. It has however been shown, that neither the first nor second is true. T/ence it is necessary that they shoulg not express the monacic pecu- liarily of forms, but only the essential and the eternal. On this account all mundane Sorms indeed are essences, and are always invariably the same, but all of them are not monadic. For all mundane forms do not subsist commensurately to ali the powers of their paradigms. But that every intelligible form, and whole paradig- Taatic cause having a primary subsistence, is monadic, eternal, and essential, is evident. For whatever is not essence, will be an accident. Every accident, however, subsists about matter, and is conversant with things which are in matter, but not with those which are in separate causes. If likewise an intelligible form is not eternal, neither will the image of it be perpetual. It is necessary however that it should, if the world always consists of allforms. But the principle perish-

If likewise an intelligible form is not eternal, neither will the image of it be perpetual. It is necessary however that it should, if the world always consists of allforms. But the principle perish-

‘Instead of ro δὲ ovewées ov, ovdayws; in this place, it is necessary to read ro δε ουσιωδε: cv, ovdapws; : * Viz. the monadic, the essential, and the eternal.

374 PROCLUS ON THE [noox 11.

ing, that which is derived from it can by no possible contrivance be preserved. And if an intelligible form is not monadic, it will be no longer primarily a para- digm. For it is impossible for any thine to be two things primarily, as Socrates says in the Republic. Vor whence is allness derived to these mundane forms, except from one certain common form? These three things therefore are present with all first paradigms. And it seems that the monadie Is present with them from bound, the perpetual from infinity, and the essential from the first essence.

Farther still, it is also possible for us after another manner to solve the doubt. Vor of the things contained in the world, some indeed subsist from the first fabri- cation fice. the fabrication of the Demiurgus}] alone; but others from the tirst and also from the second Cor the fabrication of the junior Gods]. Those, there- fore, that subsist) from) the first fabrication, are invariably the same, and are monadie, imitating the onlyness of their producing ‘cause. Por the sapermun- dane fabrication is immoveable, one, and eternal. Bat things which proceed from the second fabrication are mutable, are borne alone In multitude, and sub- sist differently at diffrent times. — Por the second fabrication is multiform, makes that which it makes with motion, and has time but not eternity connascent with itself. Henee the things which proceed from it are very inutable, and inultiplied, and entirely moved. For things which proceed from causes that are moved, are naturally of this kind. Whence also ΤΠ think the Demiurgus, having constituted all the monadice and perpetual natures in the world, excites the junior Gods tu the fabrication of mortal natures ; ino order that these, so far as they have some- thing perpetual, may derive their subsistence from hin, but so far as they are mor- tal, fromthe junior Gods, And that so far as one thing participates of one form they might be constituted by hin, but so far as this one is multiplied, they might derive their subsistence fromthem. For the mutation and multiplication of mor- tal natures are from many canses, and such as are moved.

For the mutation and multiplication of mor- tal natures are from many canses, and such as are moved.

Aeain, therefore, this also may be said, that the only-begotten is threefold. Por it either signifies the monad of its proper series τ according to Which signification, the form of man is monadic, and the form of horse, and every form of things of this kind. Orit signifies one thing participated by one thing, according to which signification man and horse are not monadie, but the form of the sun and the form of the moon. Or it signifies that which has no other thing co-ordinate with itself, according to which ineaning the above-mentioned natures are no longer

only-begotten, since they are co-ordinate with each “other bat whole auinal [or

Por xpayparos here, it is uccessary ty read nupayorros.

wooK 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 375

wooK 1] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 375

animal itself} is only-begotten, in consequence of not being co-ordinate with any other animal, As the only-begotten, therefore, has a threefold subsistence, if you assume that which is truly: only-begotten, it is the third, as the cause of all animals, having the relation of a monad to all of them, being participated by one thing, and not being co-ordinate with any animal, but being truly monadic. This, however, being assumed, that which is conjoined with it now necessarily follows. For if the paradigm is only-begotten, that also which is generated according to itis only-begotten, imitating the only-begotten nature of the para- digin, and nothing else besides the world is a thing of this kind. For no other thing besides animal itself, is according to this signification, only-begotten, Farther stll, it is requisite to solve the doubt after another manner, by consider- ing as follows: Every form is gencrative of onc thing, and of a multitude. Of one thing, indeed, because it constitutes a monad similar to itself, prior to the multitude which 1 produces. But it produces a multitude, because every monad has a number co-ordinate with itself. Animal itself, therefore, as a monad, constitutes the whole world. But according to each order, it gencrates a number! analogous to the whole, and Which is able to preserve the similitude to the universe contorinably to that series, Hence the solar paradigm, generates Indeed the visible sun itself, but it likewise zenerates a number of solar animals possessing the same form, according to a similitude to their proper form, And of animals of this kind, some are celestial, but others sublunary, so that such a number as this extends as far as to the earth. Man itself, therefore, does not gmncdiately produce this infinite multi- tude of men; for progression is no where without a medium; but through numbers proximate to the monad and appropriate. lence, since an intelligible form is one, itis necessary thatit should not immediately produce the infinite, but ins the first place a monad, afterwards an appropriate number, aud so on in suceession. For between the intellizible form which is one, end the sensible wich is multiplied, the medium is the form which is sensthle indeed, but monadte 3 through proceeding becom= ing sensible; but through preserving the similitude of its paradizm, having a monadic subsistence. For it may be said to be {ταν absurd, that divine, intelligible, and immoveable causes, should not be primarily the causes of things essentially immu- table, but of things matenal and mutable. For how is it possible that things which are in the profundity of the universe, cau be conjoined with those super-

ἡ Ap Opoy is omitted in the original.

* In the original δία τῶν ενυλων, καὶ μεταβλητων; but δία ought evidently to be expunged.

376 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11

For how is it possible that things which are in the profundity of the universe, cau be conjoined with those super-

ἡ Ap Opoy is omitted in the original.

* In the original δία τῶν ενυλων, καὶ μεταβλητων; but δία ought evidently to be expunged.

376 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 11

mundane natures ; things deprived of intelligence, with intellectuals ; perfectly sautable, with eternal natures; very composite things, with such as are simple; and things which in their own nature are dissipated, with united essences? It is necessary, therefore, that man itself, and each of such-like forms, should generate stable monads prior to a dispersed multitude; from which the progression of each to its appropriate number is derived. It is likewise necessary that these monads should exist in the second fabrication. Hence they remain invariably the same, as being alone produced by an immoveable cause. You must not wonder, therefore, #f some one should call man immortal, a brute rational, and a plant intellectual. For each of these is primarily a thing of this kind. But pro- gression producing a diminution of the all-various imitation of the paradigm, exhibits some things sensibles, others irrational, and others intellectual im capacity. For as the water, which primarily proceeds from its wuntain, is most similar to the fontal water, and preserves its proper purity undefiled; thus also the natures Which are first unfolded into hight from intellyible forms, genuinely preserve the similitudes of their paradigms ; batas they proceed, dissolve the perfect sumilitude, and are filled from their subjects with composition and inelegance.

In another way, likewise, the solution of the things investigated may be attempted. For of fabrication the first is total, one, and impartible; the second is partial and multiplied, and proceeds according to a distribution into parts; and the third is not only partible like that which precedes it, but comes into contact with generated natures, and with the forms they contain, Vou have also these three fabrications in Plato, viz. the Jovian, the Dionysiacal, and the Adonaical (or pertaining to Adonis), conformably to which he divides his three polities, as we have elsewhere shown. The third fabrication, therefore, ts the cause of wholes’ and parts, and of things which are not monadtc. The second is the cause of things which are monaaic indeed, but are not wholes. And the first 1s the cause of the whole and the monadic. For such is the universe, which is not a part of any thing, as the sun and moon are, and each of the peculiar parts of the world. If therefore Plato had now spoken concerning cyery fabrication, it would have been requisite to annex the extensions of forms into multitude, and their divisions. But since the present discourse is alone concerning the whole fabrication, or the fabrication which has a total subsistence, what occasion is there to disturb ourselves, in con- sequence of not remaining in the first fabrications, which are eflected by an

* For edwy here, it is necessary to read odwy,

BOUK 11.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 377

377

mmoveable and total cause? For the whole Demiurgus is a fabricator totally and monadically ; since also producing many Gods, he produces them monadically. Por each of the Gods belonging to the inerratic sphere, is constituted according to one form; since the form of earth is different from that of water, and the form vs water from that of fire; the parts of which have a temporal generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, do such perpetual natures as the stars, and also partial souls, differ in form from each other, For every individual and at the same time partial nature, is material. If also partial souls produce different peculiar lives, from exerting the reasons they contain, it is evident that they pos- sess the reasons of all things universally, and subsisting in forms alone, so that the progressions of each of them are according to different forms. This number too of forms must be placed in the fountain of souls unically (or having a subsis- tence characterized by unity), but distributedly in the principle* of souls. For how is it possible it should not be necessary, souls being finite, that the number of them should pre-exist in the causes from whence they are derived ? Since even nature comprehends the numbers of the things which she produces according to numbers. If, however, the Gods are monadic, and souls, the genera between these, are like- wise monadic ; so that each thing which the Demiurgus constitutes, is entirely monadic. "This likewise appears to be the cause of the perpetuity of the things which he produces, that each receives the whole form of the paradigimatic cause, Ilence every thing which proceeds from the whole Demiurgus has a nature of this hind,

It, therefore, he gives subsistence to the world, the world is one; both on account of the demiurgic monad, and the onlyness of the paradigm; which Plato, as it appears to me, knowing, says, “if it be admitted that itis fabricated according to the paradigm.” For by not saying if it was generated, but Wit was fabricated, accord- ing to the paradigm, he indicates the onlyness both of the paradigmatic and the demiurgic cause. For the Demiurgus is a monad, and the paradigm also is a monad; and therefore this universe being generated by a monad, with reference to amonad, is monadic. Why, therefore, you may say, is he satisfied in what follows, with the demonstration from the paradigm? We reply, because the

“i.e. In Rhea, or the vivitic Goddess, considered according to her first subsistence in the intellec- tual order of Gods. :

>i. δ. In Proserpine, who subsists in the vivific triad of the super-mundane order of Gods, which order consists of the Gods who are called apyac or Principles. See the 5th and 6th Books of my Transla- tion of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, for an account of the deities called fountains and principles.

Tim. Plat, Vou. I. 3B

478 PROCLUS ON TIE [8οοκ τι.

See the 5th and 6th Books of my Transla- tion of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, for an account of the deities called fountains and principles.

Tim. Plat, Vou. I. 3B

478 PROCLUS ON TIE [8οοκ τι.

paradigm is more united than the Demiurgus. For the Demiurgus himself is a monad, through his similitude and analogy to the paradigm. This however is evident. For among the kings, he is analogous to it ; and both the Demiurgus and the paradigm are analogous to the intelligible monad.' Hence, since the monadic nature is from thence derived to the Demiurgus himself, what ought we to think concerning the universe? Js it not, that it primarily possesses its only- ness from the paradigm? The paradigm, therefore, is a more principal thing, for the purpose of demonstrating the onlyness of the world. And again, you may see, that these are three monads, viz. animal itself, the demiurgic cause, and the universe. But the first, is an intelligible monad, the second, an intellectual

monad, and the third, a sensible monad.

“ For that which comprehends all such animals as are intelligible, can never be the second, [or co-arranged] with* any other thing.”

The necessity of these demonstrations is admirable, showing that all-perfect animal is one and monadic,' similar to those methods through which in the Sophista, he demonstrates that the multitude of beings is to be referred to one truly existing being. For if there are two principles of beings, either each of them is primarily being, or only one of them. But if only one ofthem, the other will proceed from this. And if each, itis necessary there should be another being, from which both of these are beings. For cach of these is a certain being, and not simply being. After the same manner likewise, he now shows, that all- perfect animal is one. So that according to all the orders of things, that which is said to exist primarily, will be only-begotten. For being itself is primarily being, Just as anima! itself is here demonstrated to be primarily animal, or only-begotten. For how is it possible this should not be only-begotten? For if there is another animal co-arranged with it, either each has all things, or one of them has all things, but the other not, or neither of them has all things. For besides these, there are no other consequences. If, therefore, it should be said that neither of them is all things, each of them is imperfect. We however are speaking of that which is all- perfect, and we investigate whence it possesses all things. For it must not be

ice. To the summit of the intelligible order, or being itself. > In the text of Proclus μεθ᾽ erepoy erroneously instead of μεθ᾽ ἐτέρον.

> Τὰ the original ἐν ov καὶ pevoy. But for μενον Tread μοναδικον.

nook 11.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 379

For it must not be

ice. To the summit of the intelligible order, or being itself. > In the text of Proclus μεθ᾽ erepoy erroneously instead of μεθ᾽ ἐτέρον.

> Τὰ the original ἐν ov καὶ pevoy. But for μενον Tread μοναδικον.

nook 11.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 379

said, that the sensible universe has indeed all things according to its own order, and that the soul possesses all reasons, as is evident from the things to which it applies itself, and from assigning to every thing its appropriate reason; but that there is not a certain intelligible, which is truly comprehensive of all intelligibles, Just as soul contains all things dianoetically, and the universe sensibly. For whence is allness derived to these, except from intelligibles? If, therefore, the intelligible is all- perfect, that will be the paradigm of the universe which is prima- rily all. But if one of them is all things, and the other not, these will neither be co-arranged with each other, nor con-numerated 3 but that which has not all things will be inferior to the other, and that which is all-perfect’ will have a more com- prehensive power. Hence the one will be a part, but the other a whole; and both will not be all-pertect animals, but one of them will be more perfect than the other. For that which has a diminished perfection is not all-perfect. But if each of them is all things, whence did they obtain all things? — For it is necessary that they should reccive this allness from something. For as participating of one form, they subsist from one cause, And thus the natures which similarly participate of all things, possess this allness from one cause. There will therefore be a cause prior to them ; since it is necessary that where there are two things there should be an antecedent cause, which conducts them together. This cause, therefore, which is prior to them, is either all things indivisibly, or divisibly. But if indivisibly, another cause will be requisite as amedium. For the medium between that which is perfectly indreisible, and the duad which possesses all things divisibly, is the monad whieh has all things indivistbly;' this indeed being itself united by an indivisible cause, but uniting the allness which is in the duad. Hence that which primarily comprehends all things ts the monad which is prior to the duad. But in that which subsists indivi- sihly, the sced and cause are contained of an allness which is characterized by unity. Deservedly, therefore, is all-perfect animal said to be monadic, and incapable of being the second with another thing, not only as the words appear to say, because it is not conjoined with another, but because if it were arranged with another, it would be secondarily, and no longer primarily all things. For after all-perfect animal, there are causes which are co-arranged with other kindred natures, but which have not primarily all things. hat, however, which primarily possesses all things is monadic. But if it is comprehensive of all things, there will

For after all-perfect animal, there are causes which are co-arranged with other kindred natures, but which have not primarily all things. hat, however, which primarily possesses all things is monadic. But if it is comprehensive of all things, there will

* The original is, τοῦ yap αδιαιρετως παντὰ ovros, και rns δυαδος τῆς παντὰ ἐχούσης, μεσον ἐστιν ἡ μονας n Tarra ἐχϑυσα διηρημενως. But it appears to me to be neocssary to read, agreeably to the above transla-

tion, τοῦ yap αδιαιρετως παντῇ ovros, καὶ τὴς ἑναδος τὴν παντα ἐχούσης διηρημενως, μέσον φστιν ἢ μονας ἢ ταντὰ ἔχουσα αδιαιρετωι.

380 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 11.

not be an intelligible animal besides it. For if there were, this would no longer be all-perfect, but a part. And that will be the whole of which this will he alone a part. For it is necessary that multitude should stop at the monad.

Why, however, does Plato say, the second with another thing? For it would have been sufficient to have said, with another by itself, or the second, by itself. But he conjoins both, for the purpose of indicating that the nature which 1s co-ar- ranged with another, and is not monadic, cannot as we have before observed, be the first. Perhaps likewise, it signifies the contrary, and that what is said pertains to thingsand not to words. For the form which is incorruptible natures entirely subsists with another. For the human form is in this individual, and in that, the partici- pants being many, and on this account each is with another. That form, however, which is perpetual, yet not a whole, though it may be monadic, and on this account not with another, yet it is more imperfect than a certain whole. But that which is neither in many things, nora part with another thing, 1s not secon- dary, as being one and a whole, and not a part. Very properly, therefore, does the theologist produce Phanes, the only divinity bearing the seed of the lustrious Gods,’ from the God who 15 occultly all things ; and from Phanes gives subsis- tence to all the second orders of the Gods. For Heaven indeed proceeds toge- ther with Earth. But she,

Again th’ extended heav’n and earth? brought forth.

Aud Saturn proceeds together with Rhea. For according to a third progeny, Earth produced [as the theologist says,] “seven pure beautifal virgins with rolling eyes, and seven sons that were kings, with fine long hair.” But the Demiurgus, who is the great Jupiter, is conjoined with Juno. Hence also, she is said to be of equal rank with him, and proceeds from the same fathers. Phanes, however, proceeds by himself alone, and is celebrated as female and father. 116 also produ- ces the (three) Nights, and is present with the middle Night. For he

Pluck’d the shorn flower of Night.’

According to this theologist therefore, all-perfect animal is not the second with another, but fills the orders of Night, and also fills the celestial orders with the

> For θεὸν κλυτὸν here, it is necessary to read θεων κλυτων.

For he

Pluck’d the shorn flower of Night.’

According to this theologist therefore, all-perfect animal is not the second with another, but fills the orders of Night, and also fills the celestial orders with the

> For θεὸν κλυτὸν here, it is necessary to read θεων κλυτων.

τ, οὶ The intellectual Earth brought forth the sensible Heaven and Earth.

2 In the original avros yap ens παιδὸς ἀφείλετο covpipoy arfos, But for ens waséos, it appears from Eschenbach to be necessary to read τῆς Nu«res.

Book 11} TIMUs OF PLATO, 381

allness of himself; in imitation of whom, Jupiter likewise, produces twofold orders, the super-celestial and the mundane. Phanes, however, gives subsistence to twofold triads, but Jupiter to twofold duodecads. For on this account bis sceptre is said to consist of four-and-twenty measures. Hence, the demiurgic is always assimilated to the paradigmatic cause, but proceeds into multitude from intelligible union. These things, however, are also elsewhere discussed.

But that animal itself rejoices in onlyness, is also manifested through the Orphic theologies. For as Phanes is the offspring of an egg, it is evident that he isan animal, At the same time also, he is called by Orpheus the happy aad venerable Metis, bearing the seed of the illustrious Gods; to whom Jupiter being analogous, is likewise denominated by Orpheus Metis and a demon.

One power, one demon, the great lord of all.

Thus too, the Oracles call this mighty God (i.e. animal itself] the fountain of fountains, and say that he alone generated all things. “ For from thence the gene ration of abundantly-various matter entirely’ leaps forth. Thence a fiery whirl- wind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the same time into the cavities of the worlds. For all things thence begin to extend their admirable

rays downwards.”

“For again, another animal would be required about these two, of which they would be parts; and it might be more rightly said, that the

universe is assimilated to this comprehending third, rather than to the

other two.”

This which is now asserted by Platu, may be easily demonstrated from the demiurgic goodness. For ifthe Demiurgus is good, he fabricated the universe with reference to all-perfect aniinal. Buthe is good and the best of causes, and therefore he assimilated the world to all-perfectanimal. Forit is necessary that the first Demi- urgus should be intellective of the first paradigm ; and that being intellective of it, he should be the maker of that which is in every respect most similar to it. Forif there is nothing which is intellective of it, it will no longer have the order of a

paradigm, with respect to that which is fabricated by the first Demiurgus. If,

however, you should say, that it is necessary there should be other secondary causes, which produce with reference to more partial paradigms, you say well

If,

however, you should say, that it is necessary there should be other secondary causes, which produce with reference to more partial paradigms, you say well

* For Oey aby here, read ενθεν apdny. And for apvépow, αμνδροι.

Γ.

382 τ PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ τι.

indeed, but at the same time you should preserve the universe one, For the fabri- cations of these partial paradigms are parts of the universe, in the same manner as the paradigms, and vice versa. As therefore paradigms are parts of paradigms, demiurgic’ are parts of demiurgic causes, and fabrications of fabrications, it is necessary that the wholeness of the universe should be the image of all-perfect animal; and that a!l-perfect animal should be the paradigm of the universe. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that animal itself is one, and alone, as being monadic. The world therefore is one and monadic, in order that it may perfectly imitate its paradigm. For as it primarily receives a simuar idea of it, how is it possible it should not adumbrate all the nature of it, im consequence of having been generated intellectual, perpetual, and monadic?

“Tn order, therefore, that the world from its onlyness or being alone, might be similar to all-perfect animal, on this account the artificer nei- ther made infinite, nor two worlds.”

Again, Plato reminds us of the Demiurgic cause, in order that we may un- derstand also from this, that every thing which is generated by the whole fabri- cation, 15 monadic, perpetual, and intellectual; and that the Demiurgus is the cause of all things, in consequence of producing the monnds of them; but that he delivered the multitndinous and partial fabrication to the yunior Gods. | Farther still, he also latently teaches us who this all-perfeet intellect is, the name of which is so celebrated by the more modern philosophers ; viz. that it is intelligible intellect, in which the universe primarily subsists. Before, therefore, he called it distributedly “ according to all things perfect,” because he then celebrated its all- ness; but now speaking of it collectively, he calls it “ a/-perfect,” since his dis- course is about the only-begotten.

The infinite, however, in a certain respect is, and ina certain respect is not. Buta thing is said to be infinite ina three-fold manner ; either according to power, or according to multitude, or according to magnitude. The infinite therefore according to power isin divine natures, and in the world. For thenever-failing, and the per- petual, are the peculiarities of the infinite according to power. But the injinite ac- cording to multitude partly is, and partly ts not, Lor it has not an at-once collected subsistence, but exists according to a part. And the infinite according ta

Ἰ Instead of δημιονρ npura here, itis neccessary to read δημιονργικα,

BOOK 11 TIM.ZEUS OF PLATO. 383

But the injinite ac- cording to multitude partly is, and partly ts not, Lor it has not an at-once collected subsistence, but exists according to a part. And the infinite according ta

Ἰ Instead of δημιονρ npura here, itis neccessary to read δημιονργικα,

BOOK 11 TIM.ZEUS OF PLATO. 383

magnitude, neither erists according to a part,’ nor has any existence whatever Hence the infinite according to multitude, if it exists in the worlds, in the first place, will be without arrangement with reference to itself. For what order can there be in the intinite of things first and second, where there is no first? Jn the nevl place, it will not hace one producing cause. Lor if ithad, that cause would produce the one prior to multitude, and the whole prior to parts. For being itself one it would first assimilate to itself the things posterior to itself. For every cause which is effective of things according to nature, produces things similar to itself. But there is no first in those worlds, since they are infinite. And if they suppose other worlds consisting of others, either the causes of them will be unco-ordinate or co-ordinate. And if co-ordinate, it is necessary that the worlds should have one co-arrangement. But in the infinite there is no order. To which we may add, that the intervention of a vacuum in the middle, will separate the worlds. Bat if the causes are unco-ordinate, we must admit that there is a divided and unsympathetic multitude in the principles. This, however, will entirely abolish both all the causes themselves, and the things posterior to them. For the causes will be corruptive of each other, not being able to subsist in conjunction with, in consequence of being perfectly foreign from each other. But the things which proceed from them, collapsing, will stop, and will not have any thing from whence again they can be generated, the principles being destroyed.

Perhaps, however, some one may say that there is neither one world, nor infi- nite worlds, but many and finite. For we have heard of a certain Barbaric opinion, which the Cheronean Plutarch relates,’ placing in one equilateral. tri- angle the intelligible world according to the middle of it, in each of the sides sixty worlds, about the intelligible, and in each angle one world; all of them (except the intelligible) being such worlds as that in which we are comprehended,

So that there are three leaders, and thrice sixty others, under them. For the angular are of a more ruling nature than the lateral worlds. "This opinion, there- fore, introduces a multitude of finite worlds, and makes the intelligible to be one of them. Unless, indeed, you arrange the intelligible world in the middle, as the

' The words, ovée xara μέρος are omitted in the original; but, as it. appears to me, ought to be inverted.

"This opinion, there- fore, introduces a multitude of finite worlds, and makes the intelligible to be one of them. Unless, indeed, you arrange the intelligible world in the middle, as the

' The words, ovée xara μέρος are omitted in the original; but, as it. appears to me, ought to be inverted.

* These arguments, which possess an invincible strength, fully show the futility of that very popular theory of the moderns, that there are infinite worlds. For like most other modern dogmas, it is unscientific aud rambling.

4 See Plutarch’s Treatise on the Sileuce of the Oracles.

284 PROCLUS ON THE {Boox "1.

For like most other modern dogmas, it is unscientific aud rambling.

4 See Plutarch’s Treatise on the Sileuce of the Oracles.

284 PROCLUS ON THE {Boox "1.

root of all things, but the three angular worlds as connective of all things, and causing all things to be one, according to one mundane intellect, one soul, and one nature. Or according to the empyrean, etherial, and material world, For an angle is connective of the sides. But the three sixty worlds may be said to be the multitude according to each sphere of these. For the spheres are twelve in number; and the multitude in each is spherical, of which the pentad is a symbol, being the first spherical number. Hence there are thrice sixty worlds, because there is an intellectual, a psychical, and a physical series, accord - ing to each sphere of which the pentad is a symbol; or because there is an empyrean, etherial, and material multitude of Gods. If, however, some one shomld not admit that these things are obscurely signified (in this narration of Plutarch}, but should assert that the worlds are truly divided according to num- ber, we ask him, whether it is better to make one world comprehensive of all things, or many worlds separated from each other? Por the former makes multitude to be connectedly contained by the monad, and parts by the whole ; but the latter dissipates production into an unco-ordinate multitude; though nature, and every cause of this kind, makes amonad prior to multitude, and a whole connective of parts. Jf likewise the worlds being spherical, touch each other, they will touch according toa point, but in the whole they will be separated from each other, and will be more unsympathetic than sympathetic. Itis neces- sary however that things which proceed from one cause, should be co-passive with each other, and give completion to one lite. Butif they do not at all touch each other, they will be [entirely] separated. How also, Aristotle would say, will things which are upward be downward, and things which are duwnward be upward, interval being external to the worlds?) And how will this thing pertain. ing to the worlds be arranged here, but another there? For that which is upward to us, will be to others downward. Will not the earth therefore of the other worlds, and every thing there which is heavy, be impelled to this world, if the motion of that which is heavy tends downward? But at one and the same time, a body which in one of those worlds tends upward, will, as proceeding to this world, tend downward. And there will not be an order of motions, or powers, or of things which are co-ordinate in the universe. Unless some one should say in answer to this, that there is a different middle in each of the worlds : for the middle isnot the middle of a vacuum, but of a world. Each part therefore of a world tends cither to the middle, or to the circumference of that world, but not to that which is foreign to it. All the things, however, that are in other worlds, are

Each part therefore of a world tends cither to the middle, or to the circumference of that world, but not to that which is foreign to it. All the things, however, that are in other worlds, are

ROOK 11. TIMAUS OF PLATO. 335

foreign to each other. If therefore, some one should think that these assertions are worthy of belief, let them remain as such.

Plato however, has chosen the most principal and proper cause of their being but one world, viz. that which is derived from the paradigm of the universe ; but has omitted as concauses the above, and such-like causes. A demonstration also of this kind is definite. For it does not separately confute those who say there is a multitude of worlds, and separately those who introduce an infinite number, dispersed in different places, and intercepted by a vacuum, but at one and the same time he shows that the assertions both of the former and the latter are false, directly proving that the world is one from the onlyness of the paradigm. And farther still, he avoids the modes of argument which are derived from matter. Lor he neither demonstrates, as Aristotle docs, from matter being one, nor from places being definite according to nature, nor from essence, i.e. matter which is a body, being united, according to the doctrine of the Stoics. For Plato alone or especially employed, says Theophrastus, the cause which is derived from prooidential inspection ; beautifully testifying this of Plato. As we have said therefore, he ascribes the onlyness of the world to the paradigm. For if the pa- radigm is one, and the Demiurgus is one, it is necessary that the world should be one. -Or rather, if the paradigm is one, and the world adumbrates the onlyness of the paradigm, the world is onc. But the antecedent is true, and therefore the consequent. For the paradigm is one, as he before demonstrated, and constituted the world conformably to the onlyness of itself, For as the in- telligible paradigm was generated one from the one which is the good, so likewise with reference to itself being one, it constituted the world only-begotten. Hence the world is one. And neither are there many worlds ; for there are not many first paradigms ; nor infinite worlds ; for the infinite according to multitude, does not even exist in mortal natures, so far is it from having a subsistence in perpe- tual beings.

Hence the world is one. And neither are there many worlds ; for there are not many first paradigms ; nor infinite worlds ; for the infinite according to multitude, does not even exist in mortal natures, so far is it from having a subsistence in perpe- tual beings.

But it is possible, says Porphyry, to use the demonstration of Plato in all other principles. For through this, not only intelligible animal is demonstrated to be one, but also the first Demiurgus. And inshort, it may be demonstrated, that there are not many principles of intelligibles, but one priticiple. For again another principle of their being many would be requisite, through which the principles themselves are unbegotten. For every thing which is naturally inherent mmany things, is necessarily derived from one cause. He therefore who says, that God and matter are principles, must be compelled to admit that there is a certain

Tim, Plat. Vou. I. - 950

380 PROCLUS ON THE TIMZEUS OF PLATO. [woox τι.

other cause prior to them. For neither is matter sufficient to itself, nor will God be comprehensive of all things [if there is another principle independent of him). It is necessary therefore, that there should be a cause prior to these which com- prehends all things, and which is truly suthcient to itself, and is not in want of any other thing.

“ But this heaven (or universe} was generated, is, and will be one and only-begotten.”

It is necessary therefore, that there should be a cause prior to these which com- prehends all things, and which is truly suthcient to itself, and is not in want of any other thing.

“ But this heaven (or universe} was generated, is, and will be one and only-begotten.”

The only-begotten indeed, adumbrates the monadic cause, and indicates an essence which is comprehensive of all secondary natures, and has dominion over wholes. Fur the theologist is accustomed to call Proserpine only-begotten ; ας pre- siding ina leading and ruling manner over all mundane natures, and as the cause of only-begotten animals, For the Goddess who ts posterior to her gives subsistence to the animals which are not only-begotten, as being irrational, The theologist there- fore, on this account calls Proserpine only-begotten, though he produces another divinity from the same causes as he produced Proserpine, Unity however, ts imparted to the universe from the one unity of unities. For as the being which ts every where, is derived from being itself, so the one! whichis in all things is from the one itself. But the words “ was generated, ts, and τοῦδ be,” manifest the tem- poral perpetuity of the universe, which is extended with the infinity of time. For the term weas, is indicative of the past, the term is, of the present, and the term will be, of the future time. Again therefore you have the term ove couformably to the image of the one being [the summit of intelligibles); but the terms was, és, and will be, conformably to the image of eternity. Bor the infinity ΟΥ̓ time imitates the eternal infinity. But all these are according to the image of animal itself. For this was) primarily monadic, and traly an eternal one. But the world is monadic and perpetual through the initation of it. Parther still, the term “was generated,” ts significant of perfection ; the term “4s,” of the participation of being ; and the term “will be,” of perpetual yencration, through which the world has a never-failing subsistence. So that of these, the first is from the one; for from thence perfection in imparted to all things, But the second is from the one being, And the third is from eternity ; for from thenee the never-failing is” inhe- rent in wholes.

' For ro ey πᾶσιν ov here, itis obviously necessary to read ro es πᾶσιν ev. ’ y a

BOOK III.

' For ro ey πᾶσιν ov here, itis obviously necessary to read ro es πᾶσιν ev. ’ y a

BOOK III.

THe present treatise in one way surveys the world according to the wholeness which it contains, conformably to which also it is similar to all-perfect animal, and was generated an only-begotten animal, animated and endued with intellect ; but in another way, according to the division which is in it; as when it divides the soul from body, and likewise things which have a more formal order, But how does the psychical breadth proceed from fabrication, and according to what kind of reasons? For since the world is an animated animal and endued with intellect, three things are exhibited in it, viz. a certain body, soul, and. intellect. ὦ Intellect however, is entirely unbegotten : for it is allotted an eternal essence and energy. But body is entirely generated: for it consists according to the whole of itself. in the whole of time, And soul is of a middle essence. As therefore, it is arranged in the middle of impartible and partible natures, after the same man- ner also, it is the boundary’ of unbegotten and generated essences. Hence it is generated indeed, as with reference to intellect, but is unbegotten, when consi- dered with relation to a corporeal-formed nature. It exists also as the end of eter- nal beings, but ranks as first among things that are generated. On this account therefore, Plato delivers to us an all-various generation of body, producing it wholly from causes different from itself; but he produces soul both trom itself, and from the total fabrication and vivitication. He does not however, in words devise any generation of intellect. For neither is intellect produced according to idea, nor does it admit of any name of generation, being entirely unbegotten, and eternal. It is however unfolded into light from wholes, but abiding in them

* For epwshere, it is necessary to read opos.

388 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK "ι.

For neither is intellect produced according to idea, nor does it admit of any name of generation, being entirely unbegotten, and eternal. It is however unfolded into light from wholes, but abiding in them

* For epwshere, it is necessary to read opos.

388 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK "ι.

inherently, it proceeds unitedly, together with its more total causes. Hence it abides impartible and undivided, being preserved by undefiled and inflexible powers, while another life is distributed and divided about the parts of the um- verse. Plato therefore, delivers the first: hypostasis of the universe from fabrica- tion, viz. an hypostasis according to wholeness; according to which it becomes animated, divine, and endued with intelleet, conformably to a similitude to all- perfect animal. But he adds asecond hypostasis, which divides the world ac- cording to wholes, and the production of total parts; soul and the corporeal- formed nature existing according to this hypostasis. For intellect is entirely unbe- gotten, as we have said, because it is without generation and indivisible; except that it proceeds in an unbegotten manner, from the providence of the Demiurgus. But he calls the nature which receives intellect, the evolution ἡ itself into light of soul. For the Demiurgus himself places the circles of soul in intellect, unfolding it without division, as being impartible, and without figure, as being pertectly unfigured. And he delivers after this, the third hypostasis of the universe, divid- ing it according to parts, and giving perfection to each of the parts. For he delivers to us, how fire and air, water and earth are generated. But in the Jast place, he surveys the energy of fabrication which is effective of body ; and neither in this does he descend to particulars," but abides in the whole elements. — For the total fabrication is the fabrication of wholes, and of total parts. But he deli- vers the formation of individuals, and of things which are truly partial, to. the junior Gods ; in order that imitating the providence of their father about wholes, they also may receive a similar fabrication about particulars, and may have that analogy to him which he has to the intelligible paradigm. For being intellectual as with reference to this paradigm, and having the order of intellect, as with relation to intelligible intellect, he becomes himself intelligible to the mundane Gods.

As we have said therefore, fabrication being triple, the first, according to whole- ness, the second, according to a division into wholes, and the third, according to a division into parts,’ Plato now intends to deliver to us the middle or second fabrication ; having indeed a transition of this kind consentaneous from. things themselves 5 and having also an opportune progression to this from what had been

" For aagaow here, read expavau.

* For ra sadeora, read ra καθέκαστα.

things themselves 5 and having also an opportune progression to this from what had been

" For aagaow here, read expavau.

* For ra sadeora, read ra καθέκαστα.

Ὁ In otber words fabrication is either Jovian, or Dienysiacal, or Adontical, as was before observed by Proclus.

BOOK 111. TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 369

before said. For since he had defined the world to be one visible animal, compre- hending within it all such things as are naturally allied to it; that the world indeed is one, he demonstrated from the onlyness of the paradigm ; but that it is visible, and that it is comprehensive of all kindred natures, is rendered manifest to us by the division of the universe into wholes. For if we can discover from what cause the world is visible, and how all the elements are co-arranged in it, and through what analogies, we shall easily perceive that it comprehends all kindred natures, and that there is nothing sensible which is not contained in the one ambit of the world. Perceiving this however, we shall sufficiently obtain the object. of investigation, For this was, how the world is visible, and how it is comprehep- sive of all things which are naturally allied to it. For from what has been before said, we assume that the world is alone; but from these things, that it is all-per- fect.

“Since, however, it is necessary that what is generated of a corporeal nature should be visible and tangible ; but without fire nothing can become visible, neither can any thing be tangible without a certain solid, nor solid without earth ;—hence divinity beginning to fabricate, constituted the body of the universe from fire and earth.”

Plato having a little before given the definition of that which is generated, call- ing it that which is becoming to be, and which is perishable, he defined it to be that which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense. But demonstrating that the world is generated, he converts the definition. For he says that sensibles are seen to be things which are becoming to be, and are generated. But now transferring that which is itself generated, to the order of a subject, he predicates of it the visible and tangible. For these are the extremes of sensibles, just as the sight and the touch are the extremes of the senses. Hence there, as 1 have ob- served in what he says respecting the world being generated, he converts the definition. But here he gives it according to nature. For that which is becoming to be was in the order of the indefinite. But as he said in the hypotheses, that which is the object of opinion in conjunction with sense, is to be assumed in the definition. Ie says therefore, it is necessary that what is generated should be | sensible, not indeed every generated nature, but that which we before called gene- rated, viz. the composite nature, and which is always becoming to be through the whole of time. For soul also is generated, but the discourse is not about this.

the composite nature, and which is always becoming to be through the whole of time. For soul also is generated, but the discourse is not about this.

200 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11.

If however, some one should say that according to Plato material forms and qualities themselves are apprehended by sense, and yet are incorporeal, and at the same time have generation, let him know, says the divine Tamblichus, that these likewise contribute to the hypostasis of bodies, and are surveyed in conjunc- tion with them. Since therefore the world has a certain corporeal and likewise an incorporeal portion in it, and this latter is two-fold, one being inseparable, but the other separate from body; since also the portion of the incorporeal, which is separate from body is two-fold, viz. psychical and intellectual; and further still, since the world also has the unbegotten and the generated, but the whole of every thing which consists of the unbeyotten and the generated, is generated, Plato very properly calls the whole world something generated and corporeal. formed. For if a whole consists of the mortal and the immortal, the whole is mortal ; if from the unbegotten and the generated, the whole is generated 5 and if from the incorporeal and the corporeal, the whole has the form of a corporeal nature. For if indeed, the incorporeal itself is co-passive with body, it becomes itself corporeal-formed, and not the whole only. Ty, however, that which is prin- cipally and properly incorporeal, is itself exempt and impassive, being raised above body, this more excellent nature is not indeed body, since it remains tn its own purity, but the whole may more justly be denominated corporeal-formed. Hence, since the world participates of many and blessed prerogatives from. its generator, but partakes also of body, itis deservedly called corporeal-formed, visible and tangible, according to the whole of itself Tor it is generated. But that which is generated is visible and tangible and has a body, as was rightly asserted before.

Plato beginning therefore from body, in the first place gives it to be sensible according to the extreme senses. In the next place, he imparts to it that which is more perfect than this, viz. the bond through analogy, which is connective of the bodies it contains, In the third place, he makes it to be a whole consisting of the wholes of the elements. Afterwards, in the fourth place, he gives ita sphe- rical figure, in order that it may be most similar to itself according to form. In the fifth place, he shows that the world suffers all things in itself, In the sixth place, he distributes to it an appropriate motion. Afterwards, in the seventh place, he animates it through a divine soul. In the eighth place, he imparts to it atemporal period. Afterwards, in the ninth place, he establishes the senes '

For cepa here, itis necessary to read σειρα.

βοοκ 111.] TIM.LUS OF PLATO. 391

Afterwards, in the seventh place, he animates it through a divine soul. In the eighth place, he imparts to it atemporal period. Afterwards, in the ninth place, he establishes the senes '

For cepa here, itis necessary to read σειρα.

βοοκ 111.] TIM.LUS OF PLATO. 391

of Gods in it, who conjointly produce the perfect year. And _ in the tenth place, he makes it to be perfect from all animals which are assimilated to the four ideas {in animal itself]. And thus through the decad he gives completion to the whole fabrication of things. ‘These particulars Lowever will be unfolded as we proceed.

And _ in the tenth place, he makes it to be perfect from all animals which are assimilated to the four ideas {in animal itself]. And thus through the decad he gives completion to the whole fabrication of things. ‘These particulars Lowever will be unfolded as we proceed.

Now therefore, we shall observe, that since the world possesses interval, and is apprehended by sense, it is known through the sight and the touch; being visible indeed, in consequence of being wholly filled through the whole of itself with light ; but existing tangible in consequence of being a solid. For itis suf- ficient for it to receive through these senses, all sensible aatures. The visible also, and the tangible conceived as always existing in the world in the four ele- ments, are contraries. For these as being most distant from each other and un- der the same genus, are contraries. For both are sensibles, and this is their com- mon genus, and they are most distant from each other, since the one is immedi- ately sensible, but the other is not sensible without a medium. If however, we lvestigated the contraries in the elements so far as they are mutable, we should not say that they are fire and earth, but fire and water. For water espe- cially extinguishes fire. Each also of the assertions is true. For it is common to both to have their contrariety consist in being extremes. And in this the asser- tions accord, as in senstbles indeed, carth being contrary to fire, but asin things of a mutable nature, water to fire. Hence also Plato opposes the visible to the tangible. Or, [it may be said] that he assumes the sensible clements, as not yet considering the mutation of them, according to which water is more contrary to fire than earth. What Plato therefore here says, is not as Theophrastus thought, imperfect : for he doubts as follows: Why does Plato say that the peculiarity of five is visi- bility, and of earth tanzibility, but does not at all mention the peculiarities of the other elements? We reply, it is because we see the world, and also touch it, but we do not taste, or hear, or smell it. The world itself also is visible and tangible to itself. And as being luciform indeed, itis visible, perceiving itself through divine light, which is extended through all heaven, and is similar, as Socrates says in the Republic, to the rainbow. or this divine light is that which is primarily visible, and pervades through the whole world. For as the sphere of the sun is the sight of the soul which is in it, thus also the sight of the sphere" is that divine light, which pervades through all visive* natures, and operates on, and imparts life to things that are visible. You may likewise say, that this is

* For ψυχης here, it is necessary to read ogaipas. * Instead of eparwy in this place, I read σρατικων.

392 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 111.

You may likewise say, that this is

* For ψυχης here, it is necessary to read ogaipas. * Instead of eparwy in this place, I read σρατικων.

392 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ 111.

the first and most principal sight, but not that which subsists in conjunction with passion, and which is separated from visible natures. But again, the world as being solid and full of life, has what is called a co-sensation of itself. For we also have a co-sensation of the motions or passions which inwardly subsist in us. And through this consciousness, the world becomes tangible to itself. The most proper solution however of the doubt, is that which says, that Plato assumes the extreme elements prior to the others, because the latter subsist for the sake of the former. And he intends to show that the rest are constituted as the bond of the extremes. Orit may be said, that through the extremes he also comprehends the media. For as the universe is defined through fire and earth, and the media which are comprehended in these, thus also through the visible and the tangible he comprehends all the variety of sensible natures.

Orit may be said, that through the extremes he also comprehends the media. For as the universe is defined through fire and earth, and the media which are comprehended in these, thus also through the visible and the tangible he comprehends all the variety of sensible natures.

This however, he employs as anaxiom. For it is usual with him prior to each of the subjects of discussion, to assume an axiom from which he demonstrates the thing investigated. Thus for instance he assumes axiomatically the sentence, “ Jn him who is good envy ts never ingenerated about any thing,” in order that he may demon- strate that the Demiurgus imparts good to all things. And again, in this way he assumes the words, “ Jt neither was, nor will be lawful for the most excellent nature to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful ἢ in order to show that the uni- yerse is an animal endued with intellect and animated. This too, is the case with the words, “ That which is assimilated to an imperfect thing can never become beauti- ful ;” in order that he may survey what the nature of the paradigm is, according to which the Demiurgus constituted the world. After the same manner therefore here, previously assuming as an axiom, that what is generated ts visible and tangible, he de- monstrates from this, how the elements contribute to the composition of the world, md how they are arranged in the universe. For if itis necessary that the world should be visible and tangible, fire and earth are necessary to it: for that which is primarily visible is fire. In the first place, indeed, because visible natures them- selves are luminous substances: for all colours are the progeny of light. In the next place, because (he sight itself is light proceeding from an etherial-formed essence. And in the third place, because sight, and that which is visible, require the con- gregating power of light, in order to their existence in energy. ΕῸΓ what else Is it than light that collects both these together? So that the world will be in want of fire, in order to be visible. To which also may be added, that Pythagoras in what he says to Abaris, demonstrates that the eye is analogous to fire. For it ts the most elevated of the instruments of sense, just as fire is of the elements, and em- ploys as well as fire acute energies. The conical emission also of its rays, has no

ποὺ κ 211.} TIMAUS OF PLATO. 393

For it ts the most elevated of the instruments of sense, just as fire is of the elements, and em- ploys as well as fire acute energies. The conical emission also of its rays, has no

ποὺ κ 211.} TIMAUS OF PLATO. 393

small similitude to the pyramidal form of fire. Plato however, does not say that fire alone is vistble: for this is false in a twofold respect. For fire itself by itself, unmingled with the other elements, is by no means externally) visible, but is ouly visible in mental conception, And farther still, none of the other elements will be visible af tire alone is visible. It is) one thing therefore, to be visible through fire, and together with fire, and another for fire itself to be the only thing visible, Henee, he does not assert the latter, which may be confuted in a twofold respect, but the former, because nothing is visible separated from fire; from which also you may assume, that all bodies part'cipate of fire. But in different bodies there is a diflurent fire. For light, flame, and a burnins coal, are not the same thing. But fromon high there isa diminution as far as to the earth of fire which proceeds from a more immaterial, pure and incorporcal naturc as far as to the most matcrial and gross bodies. Vor there are streams of fire under the earth, as Empedocles somewhere says ;

Beneath the earth buro num‘rous fiery streams.

Nor ought we to wonder how fire, though in water, is not extinguished. For all things proceed through each other, and that which predominates is different in diferent things. Light also is fire pervading through all things. Numenius therefore, being of opinion that all things are mingled, thought that nothing is simple. But Plato knew the mixture of things, and separately delivered the nature of each, fashioning the elements from figures,

Perhaps however, the wonderful Aristotle will object to what is said, not admitting that every thing visible is such through the participation of fire; because the choir of the stars, and the great sun itself, though they do not consist of fire, yet at the same time are visible. But if some one should say to him, that with respect to fire, one kind is material, but another immaterial, as with reference to sublunary fire which is material; that one kind is corruptible, but another incor- rupuble; that one is mingled with air, but another is pure; and in short, that there are many species of fire, perhaps he will assent to the assertion, and also to the theologists' who cals the suna fire which is the channel of pire, and the dispensator of fire, and all such-like appellations. For to what else can he ascribe visibility, than to that which is generative of light? But what except fire is a thing of this

"viz. The Chaldean Theurgists. See my collection of the Chaldean Oracles.

Tim. Plat. | Vou. I. 3D

494 PROCLUS ON THE [Bpoow Itt.

For to what else can he ascribe visibility, than to that which is generative of light? But what except fire is a thing of this

"viz. The Chaldean Theurgists. See my collection of the Chaldean Oracles.

Tim. Plat. | Vou. I. 3D

494 PROCLUS ON THE [Bpoow Itt.

kind? For earth’ is effective of that which is entirely contrary to light: for it is the cause of darkness. And that which is more terrestrial participates in a less degree of light; but air and water are diaphanous, and are not of themselves visible. Hence each of these is a medium between that which is primarily visible, and that which obumbrates visible natures; cach being the cause of visibility to other things, but not to itself, so far as each of these is diaphanous, but other things are transparent through these. It remains therefore, that fire alone illumi- nates the things with which itis present, and makes them to be visible.

If however, some one should say, that the celestial element which is visible and iluminative, is not fire, we ask him, whence does the fire which is here, become such as itis? Por if each of these is generative of sensible light, Why may not each of them be fire, though the one is immaterial, but the oiher material ? When, however, I say that the one 15 immaterial, [ mean as was before observed, that itis so when compared with the grossest* matter, which is not able to sus- tain forms, so as to prevent them from gliding away, and which is distinguished from the matter that mvariably remains im its Own proper form, For we learn that matter pervades through the whole world, as the Gods also say.

Hence Plato, as he proceeds, calls matter the receptacle of the universe.

Such therefore, as are the kinds of light, such also are the kinds of fire; and analogy shows that the hight which is from the celestial element is from fire. Hence, it must be said, that Plato does not characterize fire by heat, nor by being, moved upward ; for these things are the peculiarities of the fire which is here, and which is not in its proper place; but that he characterizes it by visibility. For through this he comprehends all fire, the divine, the mortal, the caustic, and the vehement. Farther sull, the same things must likewise be said concerning earth, that earth is that which is primarily solid. For it must not be said that earth derives its sohhuity from some other place; but in sensibles, that which is especially solid, has this pecularity, prior to such things as are less solid; since also that which is especially hot, is hot prior to things which have less heat, and from this things which have Jess heat, participate of this quality. If therefore, earth is more solid than the other elements, but that which is most solid is the cause of things which are less solid being solid, and things which are less such are not the causes of: sulidity to those which especially and particularly have this power; —if this be

If therefore, earth is more solid than the other elements, but that which is most solid is the cause of things which are less solid being solid, and things which are less such are not the causes of: sulidity to those which especially and particularly have this power; —if this be

* Ynstead of πη in this place, it is necessary to read yn.

* Lor Taxyvrarny here, itis necessary to read wayyraryy,

BOOK 111.} TIMZUS OF PTATO. 395

the case, it is necessary that earth should be the cause of solidity to the other elements, having itself a subsistence contrary to fire. And if indeed, we assume things which are apparent to our senses, viz. heaven as fiery, and the earth on which we walk, as especially earth, the contrariety of these will be manifest, the former being always in motion, but the latter being immoveable; the former being transcendently visible, but the latter tangible: and the one being most attenuated through light, but the other most gross through darkness. But if we wish to survey the first elements of these, viz. fire itself so far as fire, and earth itself, so far as earth, we shall shortly after unfold all the oppositions of these, when we discuss the analogy of the four elements. “That visibility therefore, is the pecu- liarity of fire, and tangibility of earth, we may from these things assume to be most true, lence Porphyry says, that of demons some, being visible, have in their composition more of a fiery, in consequence of not having any thing of a resisting nature. But others, participating also of earth, are capable of being touched. Ile adds, that such as these appearing near Tialy about the Tuscans, not only emit seed from which worms are generated, but also strike against other things, and Jeave behind them ashes ; from which likewise he shows that all things participate of earth. There is not, however, the same nature of earth every where, and in all parts of the world, but in some places it is more pure and immaterial, and without gravity. Lor not gravity, but tangibility, is the peculiarity of earth. But in other places, itis more material, and heavy, and is moved with difficulty. In some placcs likewise, it exhibits solidity alone; but in others, it receives other genesiurgic and material powers, after the same manner as fire.

Lor not gravity, but tangibility, is the peculiarity of earth. But in other places, itis more material, and heavy, and is moved with difficulty. In some placcs likewise, it exhibits solidity alone; but in others, it receives other genesiurgic and material powers, after the same manner as fire.

If however, these things being asserted by us, Aristotle should doubt, how if fire isin the heavens it is moved circularly, and not in a right le, we must adduce in answer to him, what Plotinus says, that every simple body, when in tts proper place, either remains immoveable, or is moved ina circle, in order that it may hy xo means relinquish its proper place. For if itis moved in a different: manner, it will cither no fonver be inits own place, or will not yet be init. A celestial body therefore, being fiery, is necessarily moved in a circle. For earth also, if it were moved without leaving the place about the middle, would be moved in a circle. For when fire is moved to the upper region it is so moved in consequence of being ina foreign place. For the same reason likewise, a clod of earth is moved downward ; and in short, the local motions of the elements in ἃ right line, ure occa-

* Instead of wa μη Se ws in this place, [ read wa μηδαμωε,

396 PROCLUS ON THE. (moun at,

sioned by their being preternaturally disposed ; so that it is false to say that fire is naturally moved in a right line. For it then especially subsists according to nature when it possesses its proper place. — But when it tends to its proper plaice, it is not yet in a Condition conformable to nature. This however being demon- strated, itis evident that the celestial fire when it is moved, is moved ina circle ; and nothing that has been said disturbs the Phatoute assertion. For if fire is moved in aright line,’ it is not yet in its natural place. Butaf itis in its nataral place, it will cither be immoveable, or moved in acirele, ΠΝ impossible however, that it should be immoveable: for all fire is naturally moveable. Tu its natural place therefore, it is alone moved in a circle. But let us return to the thing pro- posed to be discussed,

Butaf itis in its nataral place, it will cither be immoveable, or moved in acirele, ΠΝ impossible however, that it should be immoveable: for all fire is naturally moveable. Tu its natural place therefore, it is alone moved in a circle. But let us return to the thing pro- posed to be discussed,

If therefore the universe is generated, itis necessary that it should be sensible. But if sensible, itis visible and tangible, And itso, it consists of fire and earth, But if this be admitted, it also consists of the middle clements. | For tire and earth areas much disjoined from cach other as the sight and the touch, and require the other clements as connecting media. Tfhowever, the world is visible, itis neces- sary there should be fire; and if tangible, 1Ὸ is necessary there should be earth, Bor that which is solid is tangible, and is also able to resist the touch; since that which is friable, and cannot sustain the touch, is by no means κι]. Tence Pythagoras calls the earth the sustainer, as being solid, and resisting the touch, and as moved with dituculty, and participating of stable power. If therefore, as we have said, fire is requisite in order that the world may be visible, but earth, that itimay be tangible, divinity beginning from fire and earth, made the universe, Not that he first made these ; for we have already reyected the generation which is according to time; but since every physiology commences from contraries, on this account Plato says that the composition of the universe orianated from fire and earth, in order that it might become visible through fire, and tangible through the solidity of earth, which with great accuracy he calls ὦ certain solid. Por ἃ physical solid is one thing, bata mathematical solid another, And the datter ts intangible, but the other, which the discussion now requires, is tangible, Por that solid is tangible, which as physical Pence those are absurd who doubt why earth alone ix solid: for, say they, water and air are also solids, Por it may be said, in answerto them, that resistance expecially pertains to earth; since tt is the support and foundation of the other elements. For earth supports water, and

* The words ex’ evOecas, are omitted in the original

BOOK 111.} ΤΙΝ ῦ5 OF PLATO. 297

both earth and water support air. Earth therefore, is the first tangible, and the first resisting substance, and on this account is the first solid. We shall omit how- ever to notice those who say that Plato here calls the three elements after fire, earth, For if this were admitted, it would not be possible to assign what is the medium of earth and fire.

“ΤῸ is impossible however, for two things alone to cohere in a beautiful manner, without the intervention of a certain third ; fora certain collec- tive bond is necessary in the middle of the two. But that is the most beautiful of bonds, which causes itself and the natures which are bound, to be one.”

But that is the most beautiful of bonds, which causes itself and the natures which are bound, to be one.”

In what is here said, a bond is assumed as affording an image of divine union, and the communion of powers, according to which the intellectual causes of wholes effect their generations. But beauty appears to be assumed, as having an uniting and binding essence and power. For the words, “ to cohere ina beautiful manner, and the most beautiful of bonds,” appear to me_ to be significant of this. Beginning therefore from the duad, as allied to generation, progression and difference, Plato introduces union to the participants of it, and an harmonious communion through a bond, imparting to the world this as the second gift from the Demiurgus. We shall however here avoid the introduction of such doubts as are adduced by those who do not rightly understand what is said by Plato. For neither do those who say that semicircles require no bond in order ἴο the generation of a circle, speak rightly; fora circle does not consist of semicircles, Lut on the contrary, the circle now existing, and not subsisting from these, the diameter being drawn makes the semicircles. And this is evident from the name affording a generation to these from the circle, but not vice versa. Nor do those speak rightly who assume the monad and the duad, which in a certain respect are opposites, and have no medium. For Plato does not absolutely say, that there is something between all things, in whatever manner they may exist, which gives perfection to the hypostasis of one composite. For he says, that two things alone cannot beautifully cohere without a third. But the monad and the duad are not contraries, since the duad consists of monads. Nor again, is there any rectitude in the assertions of those who introduce things that are corrupted together, as for instance, wine mingled with honey. For these no longer exist

498 PROCLUS ON THE (BooK τι,

when the mixture takes place. We however, do not investigate how things are corrupted ; for this is not wonderful ; but how remaining what they are, they are co-harmonized with each other. For this bond‘ is the cause of safety to the things that are bound, but not of their common corruption and abolition. Nor do those speak rightly who adduce as a witness the communion of man and woman, which requires no third thing to its subsistence. For through ignorance they do not perceive the greatest bond, that of love, which excites to communion, in one way indeed, to a communion of the psychical life, and in another to that of the physical life. For the bond through animation is the medium in these. Nor are they right who adduce things which are melted together, as gold and silver. For of these there is the same essence; since both are water. ΑἸ these theretore, wander trom the conception of Plato.

For the bond through animation is the medium in these. Nor are they right who adduce things which are melted together, as gold and silver. For of these there is the same essence; since both are water. ΑἸ these theretore, wander trom the conception of Plato.

We however, again say, conformably to what has been before observed, that it is necessary these two things should be assumed, in the first place, in order to the g, and in the next place, in order that their coalition may not be corrupted. For they would no longer be bound, but would cease to exist, In the third place, also, it is necessary that they should truly be the clements of

composition of one thin

that which consists of them. For having these conditions, they will entirely be in want of a certain third thing to their colligation, For what, since they are separate, divided, and most distant from each other, will collect them into one ? Por if nothing accedes to them, they will remain divided, and will subsist after the same manner as before. But if something accedes to them besides what they already are, this thing which accedes will become their bond. For it was this which collected them mto the composition of one thing. A bond, however, is said to be so ina threefold respect. For one bond is that which pre-exists in the cause of the things that coalesce. But another is that which is inherentin the things themselves that are bound, and which is co-ordinate to, and connascent with them. Anda third is that which exists in the middle of these, proceeding indeed from the cause, but presenting itself to the view* in the things that are mutually bound. Ifyou are willing also, one bond of an animal, and of the parts in it, is the one reason which is pre-established in the cause itself of the ammal. But the nerves and the fibres are another bond, connecting the parts of the animal, And another bond is the physical reason or productive and forming power, which

* For ov yap δέσμος ουτος, It is necessary to read 0 yap de opios ovros.

* For evgau operos in this place, it is obviously necessary to read eppawoperos,

Book 411] TIM ALUS OF PLATO, 399

* For evgau operos in this place, it is obviously necessary to read eppawoperos,

Book 411] TIM ALUS OF PLATO, 399

proceeds from the cause of the animal, and employs the nerves, and all the inate- rial organic bonds tor the colligation of the animal. For this bond is neither exempt from the things that are bound, nor yet ranking among things which are withont eflective power, is it destitute of the true cause. You must not therefore, understand the bond which is now mentioned by Plato, according to the first mode; for this is not attended with cause ; but cause is entirely exempt from the things which proceed from it, so far as itis cause. But Plato says, that the bond isin the middle of the things that are bound. That, however, which is in the middle of certain things, is not separated from them. Nor does this bond subsist according to the organic and Jast kind of bond. For the bond which is confor- mable to this, is not the lord of itself nor of its own proper union. Plato how- ever adds, that the bond of which he is sneaking, makes both itself and the things which are bound to be one. Forit is possible for this to be arranged in the middle, But it possesses such a power as this through analogy, whichis the most beantiful bond, and which imparts to it a power that causes all things to have sameness and union. This bond therefore, is inseparable from the things that are bound, and is analogy, which is different from all the natures that are bound, but has a subsistence in them. The demiurgic will likewise, is a bond, but is exempt from the things that it binds; “ 1/y τοῦ, says the Demiurgus, being a greater and more principal bond than those with which you were bound at the commence- ment of your generation.” 11 remains therefore, that we must understand the bond here mentioned, according to the middle mode, and as having a middle form, so us to be neither ellective nor organic.

Whence then is the conception of such a bond derived, and of what is it the symbol? Jt proceeds indeed from the one cause of wholes. For the power of imparting union is present to all things, from that fountain of all union, through which also intellect is conjoined to the intelligible, and which produces the light of truth, or the first of bonds, through which all things are connected with each — other, and become perfectly one thing through similitade. It is through this like- wise, that things which have proceeded from their proper principles are converted to them. But this bond also proceeds from the one being, which is the first of beings, and which unitedly comprehends the causes of all things, according to the bond and divine union contained in it. It likewise proceeds from all-perfect animal. For every intelligible animal is by a much greater priority united to itself, than a sensible’ animal; and the causes of wholes which it contains, pervade

* For ἡ το νοητὸν here, it is evidently necessary to read ἥ ro αἰσθητον.

It likewise proceeds from all-perfect animal. For every intelligible animal is by a much greater priority united to itself, than a sensible’ animal; and the causes of wholes which it contains, pervade

* For ἡ το νοητὸν here, it is evidently necessary to read ἥ ro αἰσθητον.

400 PROCLUS ON THE [BooK 115.

through each other prior’ to analogy; which analogy imitating, makes all things to be in all, and imparts the same powers to different things. It also proceeds from the connectedly-containing cause. For analogy inserts connexion, causing the natures which are bound by it, as Plato says, to be indissoluble by every thing except by him who binds them. Hence this bond proceeding from these causes, is connective, is the cause of the communion, and one union of separated natures, and is the supplier of harmony, and of the conspiration hastening to unity of dif- ferent things; in order that it may be similar to the causes from which it was derived.

These things, however, being thus divided and defined, let us return to the thing proposed to be considered. For since it is necessary that the world being generated should be visible and tangible, it will be in want of fire and earth. Of fire, indeed, because it is visible. For vision? is of an etherial nature, on which account also it emits rays; and that which collects both sight, and that which is visible, is light. Batall lightis from fire; for it is not from earth, which produces darkness. As we have before observed, however, there are many kinds of fire. Because likewise, the world is tangible, itis in want of earth. For earth is that which is especially solid: for it is nore stable, and more of a resisting nature than the other elements. But that which is especially solid is especially tangible. For it in a greater degree sustains resistance, than that which is not solid. Hence earth is especially tangible. Let :t therefore be admitted, that there are primarily these two elements in the universe, and that they are contrary to each other ; fire indeed, being analogous to form, to the masculine nature, and to things of this kind ; but earth, being co-ordinate to the female nature, and to matter, Tfence, of these, which are thus oppositely divided, in’ their essences, powers, and energies, in the senses by which they are perceived, and in the places of their abode, there will not be one order, nor one world, unless a bond acecedes to them, and communion with each other. For it is impossible for two things to cohere in a beautiful manner without the intervention of a certain third. And Plato indeed adduces an universal assertion by saying, “a certam or some third thing.” But if you add the words, “ which are entirely contrary,” (immediately after the words, * or two things alone”) you will render whatis said mcontrovertble, and more acknowledged.

And Plato indeed adduces an universal assertion by saying, “a certam or some third thing.” But if you add the words, “ which are entirely contrary,” (immediately after the words, * or two things alone”) you will render whatis said mcontrovertble, and more acknowledged.

* For xpos ἀναλογίας in this place, read πρὸ ἀναλογίαν, *j.e. From the middle triad of the order of Gods called intelligible and at the same time intellectual,

2 For co oper here, itis necessary to read ro ὁρᾷν.

nook 11} TIM.EUS OF PLATO, 401

For it is impossible for two things which are most contrary to concur into one composition with each other, without the intervention of a third. For either they collect themselves, or they are congregated by another thing. Being, however, contrary, and most distant trom each other, and secretly tlying from each other, through the fear of losing their own essence, they cannot bring themselves toge- ther. [lence they are congregated by something else. But this is a bond; so that they are in want of a certain third thing. The universe, therefore, proceeds from the duad to the triad. Por it began indeed from the duad, because all gene- ration subsists in a way adapted to this principle. For difference, the infinite, and the Empedoclean strife [as being allied to the duadj are adapted to generated things. But the universe proceeds as far as to the triad, through the bond which is now mentioned. Again, therefore, a certain medium must be assumed between earth and fire, which is collective of both, And let this for the sake of an example be moisture, which is common toair andicater. Lor this' is connective indecd of carth, conglutinates it, and holds it together, so that it may not be dispersed ; but being as a subject to fire, it imparts to tt nourishment and permanency. From this triad, how- ever, the tetrad will shortly atter be unfolded, because the natures which are bound together are solids. Hence it is rightly said, that a bond imparts beauty, and an harmonious communion and union, But what this bond is, and how it is inhe- rent in the things that are bound, Plato shows through the following words.

“ This, however, analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the most beautiful manner.”

“ This, however, analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the most beautiful manner.”

Tt must be said, therefore, that this analogy is the bond which is now inves- tigated 5 but that the middle or media, are after a certain manner bonds. For analogy is in those things which have the same ratio, and is naturally adapted to bind itself in conjunction with them; them indeed, through ratios; but. itself, through preserving the same form in things numerically different, and continuing to be one in multitude. For it has this from itself, and according to its own reason, and this consentaneously. For analogy proceeds from equality. But equality is of the co-ordination of unity. For as the monad is the fountain and root of quantity considered by itself; so is equality of all relative quantity, having the order of a monad, to all habitudes. For that we may omit other middles or media, which more recent philosophers have added, I mean Nicoma-

ἡ For τὸν yap, tead rovro yap.

Tim, Plat. Vou, I. ot ἜΣ

402 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 111.

chus, Moderatus, &c.,’ we shall confine ourselves to the three media from which Plato constitutes the soul, arithmetically, geometrically, and harmonically.

Tim, Plat. Vou, I. ot ἜΣ

402 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 111.

chus, Moderatus, &c.,’ we shall confine ourselves to the three media from which Plato constitutes the soul, arithmetically, geometrically, and harmonically.

It may be seen, however, how all these middles are generated: from equality, by the following method. Phe arithmetic middle, indeed, after this manner: Make the first number equal to the first; the second to the first and the second 3 and the third to the first, second, and third, Three monads therefore being pro- posed, there will be produced according to this method three terms, vin. 1. 2. 3. preserving an arithmetic middle. Bor this middle consists in equally surpass- ing according to number, and being equally surpassed.’ But the geometrical middle is produced as follows: Make the first equal to the first; the second, to the first and second ; and the third to the first, to twice the second and the third. For again, there being three monads, there will thus be generated the three terms 1. 2. 4. forming the geometric middle. Por the peculiarity of analogy consists in preserving the same ratio in greater and lesser terms. And the harmonic middle, which has the third order, is generated in the following manner : Three monads being proposed make the first equal to the first, and to twice the second; the second to twiee the first, and twice the second ; and the third τὸ the first, to twice the second, and thrice the third. For by this method the three terms 3. 4. and 6. will be produced, form- ing the harmonic middle. For the harmonic middle, according to the Platonte definition itself, consists ino surpassing and being surpassed by the same part of the extremes? All the middles, therefore, have their generation from equality.» But if this be the ease, they have the uniform, and a power which collects things, and causes them tobe one. For equality is analogous to sameness, to the monad, to bound and to similitude, through which communion is produced in’ beings. Hence Plato appropriately adds the words, ‘naturally adapted,” beewuse the ana- logies and all the tiddles have the spontaneous, Por they neither introduce an artificial, nor an adscititious bond, but present themselves to the view in) the

essences and powers themselves of things. “For when either in three numbers, or masses, or powers, as is the

* For an account of these media, see my Theoretic Arithmetic. > fu the original, by some negligence of the transertbers, after ww δε urepeyopern, being equally sur- assed, the words κατὰ ψυσιν αὐτὸν ὁ yidoougys, Lumediately follow, which are obviously totally foreign to this place. > Thus 3 is surpassed by 4, by 1 which is a third part of 3, and 6 surpasses + by 2 which is a third part of 6.

ROOK 411} TIMEUS OF PLATO. 403

> Thus 3 is surpassed by 4, by 1 which is a third part of 3, and 6 surpasses + by 2 which is a third part of 6.

ROOK 411} TIMEUS OF PLATO. 403

middle to the first so is the last to the middle; and again, as is the last to the middle, so is the middle to the first; then the middle becoming both first and fast, and the last and. the first becoming both of them middles, it will thus happen that all of them will necessarily be the same. But becoming the same with each other, they will be one.”

Tn the first place, it is requisite to explain what is here said mathematically ; and in the next place, physically, as being that which is especially proposed to be effected, For it’ is not proper to separate the discussion from. its appropriate theory. There are therefore some who think that Plato in these words detines the geometric middle, and among other things which they assert, they say that the geometrie middle is properly exclusive of all the others analogy ; but that the others may be justly ealled middles. — Nicomachus also is of this opinion, and he speaks rightly. 10) geometric proportion is properly analogy ; but it is requi- site to call the ethers middle, as Plato also says further on inthe gencration of the soul, But the others are improperly" called analozics. Vo others, however, these appear not to have apprehended the meaning of Plato properly. For they say that it is not definitely asserted in these words, that there ought to be the same ratio; but thus much only is said, that it is necessary there should be such a ha- bitude of the last to the middle as there is of the middle to the first. But this is common to all the before-mentioned middles, For as the monad is to the duad, according to the arithmetical middle, and the equal in quantity, so is the duad to the triad. | For by as much as the duad is surpassed by the triad, by so much is the triad less than the tetrad. And as the monad is to the duad, ac- cording to the geometric middle, so is the duad to the tetrad, For the ratio is the same. And as the triad is to the tetrad, according to the harmonic middle, and the part of the triad by whicn the tetrad surpasses it, so is the tetrad to the hexad. For by that part of the triad by which the triad is exceeded by the tetrad, by the same part of the hexad is the tetrad sarpassed by the hexad, Sach, therefore, is their opinion, though Plato clearly assumes the geometric iniddle. For itis the peculiarity of this proportion, that the first has the same ratio to the middle that the middle has to the third term. As, however, there are three middles, the arithmetic, the geometric, and the harmonic, and these being such as we have shown them to be, Plato very properly assumes these

* For καταχρώμενοι here, 1 read καταχρήστικωε.

404 PROCLUS ON THE (BooK 11,

As, however, there are three middles, the arithmetic, the geometric, and the harmonic, and these being such as we have shown them to be, Plato very properly assumes these

* For καταχρώμενοι here, 1 read καταχρήστικωε.

404 PROCLUS ON THE (BooK 11,

three subjects, numbers, masses, and powers. For the arithmetical middle is in numbers; the geametrical is ina greater degree conversant with continued (than with discrete} quantity ; and the harmonteal middle is in) powers, For it is conversant with sharp and flat sounds, And after this manner you may speak, distinguishing the middles according to their predominance,

All of them, however, may be assumed in numbers, in masses, and Jn powers, And how, indeed, they may be assumed in numbers is evident; for it has been shown by us. But they may also be assumed in masses. For three equal mag- nitudes being proposed, you may be able, by using the before-mentioned three methods, to devise other magnitudes, at one tine producing an arithmetic, at another a geometric, and at another an harmonic middle. Jn powers likewise after the same manner. For let there be three equal powers, as for instance, three highest Aupateé (vraras) sounds, all of them homotonous, or of the same tone. You will produce therefore from these, the arithmetical middle, if you place the first sound, that is Aypate, equal to the first; but the second, to the first and second, as for instance, another sound emitting a sound the double of the first. And letit be nefe or the last sound, which has a double ratio to Aypate. But the third sound must be placed equal to the first, second, and third. Por it will be a sound which wall have a triple ratio to Aypate, surpassing ucte by as much as γος surpasses Aypate. And these three sounds, Aypate, nete, trite-hyper- holéon, Will avithinetically differ from cach other. But you will make the geometri- eal middle, if the Aypate being posited, you make the first equal to the first, but the second equal to the first and second hypate. And let this sound be mese : for this is capable of emitting a sound the double of kypate. But if you make the third sound equal to the first Aypate, and to twice the second, and the third, you will have a certain chord which will sound wete-huperbolaon, For this will be ca- pable of producing a sound the double of mese, and the triple of Aypate. These three sounds Likewise will form the geometric middle. ALL the middles, therefore, are seen to exist in numbers, im masses, and in powers. Number, however, is more adapted τὸ the arithmetical, bulk to the geometrical, and power to the har- monic middle. And hence Plato uses these three, viz. numbers, masses, and powers.

It is well, likewise, that assigning certain common ratios, he commences from the middle. For it is this through which all analogy consists, collecting the

———

BOOK 111. TIMASUS OF PLATO. 405

And hence Plato uses these three, viz. numbers, masses, and powers.

It is well, likewise, that assigning certain common ratios, he commences from the middle. For it is this through which all analogy consists, collecting the

———

BOOK 111. TIMASUS OF PLATO. 405

extremes according to ratio, from one power to the other. For analogy is that Which is principally and) properly a bond. Butitis a bond as that ¢hrough wehich, and the unddle. Por through the middle analogy binds the extremes. From this, therefore, he commences as most allied to the nature of analogy, and because habitude receives its completion through it. Hence, also, they are called middles, and because sameness is the end of all this analogy. | For since they proceed from equality, but equality is sameness, it converts all things to sameness. Sameness, however, may be properly and principally asserted of the geometric middle, for there is the same ratio; but equality of the arithmetic ; and similitude of the harmonic middle. And in the third place, the ascent is through sameness tounion, For analogy indeed is suspended from = equality,” being a πα ingenerated in the boundaries of equality. But equality is suspended from same- ness, and sameness from union.

It is necessary, however, after the mathematical resumption of these words, to direct our attention to the physical theory, For itis not fit that those who apply themselves to this discussion, should dwell on mathematical speculations ; for the dialogue is physical; nor that they should neglect such speculations, investi- gating only what relates to sense 3 but it is requisite to conjoin both, and always connect physics with mathematics ; just as the things themselves are connected, are homogeneous, and of a kindred nature, according to the progression from intellect. For, in short, if the Pythagoreans arranged the mathematical essence as a medium between intelhgibles and sensibles, as being more evolved than intelligibles, but more universal than sensibles,* why is it requisite, omitting mathematics, to pay attention to physiology aloue? For how is the sensible nature adorned, according to what reasons is it arranged, or from what reasons does it proceed, exceptitrom those that are mathematical? These reasons there- fore for productive powers], are primarily in souls, descending into them from intellect; and afterwards they are in bodies, proceeding into them from souls. Hence it is necessary not to remain in mathematical speculations as some do; for this produces false opinions in the auditors, and induces them to think that physical figures and numbers are mathematical. It is also in another respect absurd. lor the reaxons of nature do not receive the accuracy and firm-

* Tnstead of εξηρτηται yap ἡ μεν ex rns ἀναλογίαν, it is requisite to read in this place, εξηρτηται yap ἢ) μὲν ἀναλογία εκ τὴς ἰσότητος,

* For των νοητῶν here, it is obviously necessary to read τῶν αἰσθητῶν. |

lor the reaxons of nature do not receive the accuracy and firm-

* Tnstead of εξηρτηται yap ἡ μεν ex rns ἀναλογίαν, it is requisite to read in this place, εξηρτηται yap ἢ) μὲν ἀναλογία εκ τὴς ἰσότητος,

* For των νοητῶν here, it is obviously necessary to read τῶν αἰσθητῶν. |

406 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 111.

ness of the mathematical reasons. To which may be added, that in so doing we shall not follow the demonstrative canons, in which it is said that) things pertaining to one genus must not be transferred to another, Neither therefore is it possible to survey physical objects arithmetically.

Let us, therefore, if you think fit, discuss the theory of the proposed words - physically. ‘The first analogy then, according to which nature inserts harmony in her works, and according to which the Demiurgus adorns and arranges the universe, is one certain life, and one reason, proceeding through all things ; which first, indeed, connects itself, but afterwards the natures in’ which it exists 5 and according to whieh sympathy is ingenerated ἴῃ ἈΠ mundane essences, as existing in one animal, and governed by one nature, This life, theretore, which is the bond of wholes, total nature for nature which ranks as a whole] and the one soul of the world constitute, The one intellect ihewise generates it; and always more excellent beings, insert in mundane matures, a greater and more perfect union. Lat it be said, therefore, that the habit which predominates in material subjects, that material form, and the powers of the muddle elements, are bonds. All these however, have the relation of things without which the primary bond 15 not participated, and are analogous to the middle in mathematical entities, through which habitude subsists in the extremes. But the lite of which we are speaking, which collects and unites all things, and is suspended indeed from its proper causes, but binds the things in whieh at is inherent, Is fru/y analogy, and preserves both its own union and the union Of its participants, Again, therefore, a bond is threefold, For the common powers of the elements are one bond 5 the one cause of bodies is anothers; anda third is that which as the middle of both the others, which proceeds indeed from the cause of bodies, but employs the powers that are divided about body. And this is the strong bond, as the theolo- wist says, which is catended through all things, and is connected by the yolden

chain. For Jupiter after this, constitutes the golden chain,’ according to the

‘ t

admonitions of Night.

But when your pow’r around the whole has spread A strong cocrcive bond, a golden chain

Suspend from ather,

' This golden chain may be said to be the series of unities proceeding from the one, or the ineffable principle of things, and extending ay far as to matter itself, And of this chain, the light immediately

proceeding from the sun is au image.

BOOK αι} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 407

BOOK αι} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 407

Physical analogy then being a thing of this kind, let us survey in what things, and through what, it is naturally adapted to be established. As Plato therefore says, It subsists in nambers, masses, and powers. — Physical mambers, however, are material forms divided about the subject i.e. about body}. But masses are the extensions of these forms, and the separations or intervals of them about matter. And powers are the things which connect, and give form [or specific distinction) to bodies. For form is one thing, and the power proceeding from it is another. For form indeed is impartible and essential, but becoming extended, and dilated into bulk, it emits, as if it were a blast from itself} material powers, which are certain qualities, "Thus, for instance, in fire, the formand essence of it is impartible,’ and is truly the image of the cause of fire. For in partible natures there is that which isimpartible. But from the form in fire which is impartible, a separation and extension of it take place about matter, from which the powers of fire are exerted, such as heat, or refrigeration, or moisture, or something else of the like kind. And these qualities are indeed essential, but are by no means the essence of fire. For essences are not from qualities, nor are essence and power the same ; but every Where the essential precedes power; and from that being one, a multitude of powers proceeds, and that whieh is divided, trom that which is indivisible; just as from one power many enerzies proceed. For by how much more each thing proceeds, by so much more is it multiplied ἀπ divided, conformably to {the characteristic of] its principle and cause, which is impartible and indivisible, As in every body, therefore, there is this triad,’ T mean number, bulk, and power, analogy and the physical bond, occupy from on high the numbers, masses, and powers of bodies, and likewise congregate their partible’ essences, and unite them for the purpose of producing the one completion of the world. They also insert communion in forms, symmetry in masses, and harmony in powers. And thus all things are rendered eflable and consentaneous to each other. But this analogy proceeds from the middle to the first, and from the third to the middle ; from the first also to the middle, and from this to the last; and again, from the last to the middle, and from this to the first. Beeause, likewise, a bond of this kind imparts progression and conversion to bodies, it begins indeed from the

‘Instead of ro μὲν εἰδὸς αὐτὸν καὶ oumna, ἀμέρους ἐστε καὶ orros ἄγαλμα τῆς αἰτίας τὸν Rupes, It TS requisite to read, τὸ μὲν εἰδὸς αὐτὸν κας οὐσία «μέρες ἐστι, και οντῶς AYAAPaTHS αἰτίας τὸν RYPOS.

δ For τὸν rpirov rovrov in this place, it is requisite to read τὸν rptagou rovroy.

? Instead of apepers here, itis necessary to read μέρισταν.

408 ᾿ PROCLUS ON THE {Book 111.

δ For τὸν rpirov rovrov in this place, it is requisite to read τὸν rptagou rovroy.

? Instead of apepers here, itis necessary to read μέρισταν.

408 ᾿ PROCLUS ON THE {Book 111.

middle, in consequence of being connective, and the cause of union, and is * defined according to this peculiarity. But it proceeds from the first through the middle, to the last, as extending and unfolding itself, as faras to the last of things. And it recurs from the last to the first, as converting all things through harmony to the intelligible cause, from which the division of nature, and the separation and interval of bodies were produced. For by converting them to this cause, according to one circle, one order, and one series, secondary being suspended from primary natures, it causes the world to be one, and most similar to. the intelligible [paradigm]. For as there all things are truly united to each other, 50 here all things are adapted to each other. And as intelligibles proceeding trom the good, are again converted to it, through the goodness which is in them," and through the intelhyible monads ; thus also sensibles: proceeding from the Demi- urgus, are again converted to him, through this bond, whieh is distributed and pervades through all of them, and binds all things together, For in this respect it imitates the intelligible, But it) subsists intellectually in intellect, totally in wholes, and partially in partial natures,

After the same manner, therefore, as the intelligible, the sensible world has all things, according to all its parts. Por fire, so far as it is tangible, participates of earth, and earth, so far as itis visible, participates of fire, and each participates of moisture. For earth indeed is conglutinated and connected through moisture, and its dissipated nature is united through it; but tire is nourished and increased by it. So that the extremes are the middle, in order that what is said may become physically manifest in things that are Known by us. The extremes, there- fore, are ina certain respect the middle, as preserving through it their proper idea, and remaining such as they are. And moisture itself, so far as itis coloured, participates of fire, and so far as itis re-Invigorated through heat. But again, so far as it is tangible, 10 participates of earth. So that each of the extremes gives perfection to moisture. These things, however, will shortly after become more known to us,

But through this harmony and analogy, in the first place, sameness presents itself to the view, and in the next place union. For bodies themselves according to their own nature are partible, aud are subdued by differences and strife. “These, however, at the same time through harmony, are leagued in tdendship with same- ness, and through sameness with union. For through analogy the universe 15

' Por ev avry read ey avros.

BOOK 111. TIM.£Us OF PLATO. 409

“These, however, at the same time through harmony, are leagued in tdendship with same- ness, and through sameness with union. For through analogy the universe 15

' Por ev avry read ey avros.

BOOK 111. TIM.£Us OF PLATO. 409

completely rendered one, this having the power of making things that are divided to be one, of congregating things that are multiplied, and connecting things that are dissipated. Hence, theologists surveying the causes of these things in the Gods, enclose Venus with Mars, and surround them with Vulcanian bonds; the difference which isin the world being connected through harmony and friendship. All this complication and connexion likewise has Vulcan for its cause, who through demiurgic bonds connects sameness with difference, harmony with dis- cord, and communion with contrariety. And this being eflected, Apollo, Her- mes, and each of the Gods laugh. But their laughter gives subsistence to mun- dane natures, and inserts etlicacious power in the bonds. Let these things, how- ever, as it is said, be preserved in sacred silence. But now, from what has been discussed, let thus much be manifest to us, that the physical bond being Vulcanian and demiurgic, (for the one and all-perfect Demiurgus comprehends also the pro- duction which is through necessity, as being Vulcanian and Dionysiacal, and causing each of the parts of the universe to be a whole,) is collective of contraries, and connective of material things; uniting their essences, measuring their masses, and harmonizing their powers. It likewise makes all things to be in all, and exhibits the same things in each other, according to all possible modes, empy- really, aerially, aquatically, and terrestrially.

“ Tf then it were necessary that the body of the universe should have been generated a superficies, and not have depth, one medium might have been suticient for the purpose of binding both the natures that sub- sist with it, and itself. But now it is requisite that it should be a solid, and solids are never adapted to each other by one, but always by two

media.”

The scope proposed to us (in the Timeus], is, as we have before observed, to learn how the universe is constituted, and of what it consists. But this being the design, we may see in what a well-ordered manner the discourse devises. the composition of the four elements. For it is impossible that there should be one simple element alone; since there would not be generation. For all generation is ascertain mutation. But all mutation is naturally adapted to be effected in two things. All generation likewise is from contraries. But a simple element itself, is by no means contrary to itself: for it would be itself corruptive of itself. If, therefore, it is necessary there should be generation, it is

Tim. Plat. Ὁ θῖν ἂν ᾿ 3F

410 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 115.

All generation likewise is from contraries. But a simple element itself, is by no means contrary to itself: for it would be itself corruptive of itself. If, therefore, it is necessary there should be generation, it is

Tim. Plat. Ὁ θῖν ἂν ᾿ 3F

410 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 115.

necessary there should not be one element only. For as Hippocrates says, if there was one element only, it would be impossible for things to be changed. For mutation and motion are not to the similar, but to the contrary. Hence there is not one simple element only. If, however, there is not one, but two at least, it is necessary that these should be contraries: for generation 15 from contraries. It is necessary, therefore, that there should be two elements having in a becoming manner a nature contrary to each other. Hence, if they are contraries, they will be in want of a certain bond and medium, For it is impossible that two contraries can ina becoming manner coalesce, without a third thing ; since it is necessary that a bond should intervene, which is collective of both. For being themselves contraries, they will avoid communion with each other. Hence it is necessary, there should be another third thing which conjoins them and leads them to the completion ofone thing, But it is likewise necessary that this medium should be of a biformed' nature. For if the elements which were to be bound were superticies, one medium would be sufficient, But since they are solids, they are connected through two media. For the duad being the primary leader of solids, is also allotted the primordial cause of the bonds that are in them. Hence, likewise, Timieus calls a binding of this kind harmony, as inserting in the extremes ἃ symmetry of communion with each other. The analogy also which is in solids is introduced through two media. For two media analogously come between two similar solids. If, therefore, these things are rizhtly asserted, all the elements are four; and there is neither one alone, lest we should destroy mutation; nor two contraries without a third thing, lest there should not* be a bond of things which are hostile to each other, Por there will not be order and ornament from two things most foreign to each other, Butif you con- ceive a certain thing of this kind, the solution of the doubt will be easy, Moreover, neither will there be alone two things which are not! contravies. For they will not be able to operate on each other, Por whiteness suffers nothing from ἃ line, but from blackness. Nor does heat suffer any thing from whiteness, but from cold,

Again, therefore, it must be said still more universally, reasoning from things known, that either there is one clement alone, or not one. If, however, there is only one element of the world, the variety of the phenomena, the opposition of the cir-

» Por δεειδεν here, read &voedkes. > Ove is omitted in this place in the original.

2 Ory is also here omitted in the original.

If, however, there is only one element of the world, the variety of the phenomena, the opposition of the cir-

» Por δεειδεν here, read &voedkes. > Ove is omitted in this place in the original.

2 Ory is also here omitted in the original.

BOOK 111.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 411

culations, and the war of generation, will be subverted, and either all things will be perpetual, or all things will be corruptible. Butif there is not one element only, there will either be two elements, or more than two. And if two, they will either be contraries, or not contraries. Tf, however, they are not contraries, there will neither be action, nor passion, nor opposition in bodies, nor will there be genera. tion in things which have generation. But if they are contraries, these will require amedinm. And if this be the case, there will either be one medium, or two media, Itis impossible, however, that there should be only one medium: for the elements are not superticies. Hence there are two media. But if there are two media of two things, all are four, That so many elements therefore in number are suflicient to the world, is through these things manifest.

Let us, however, if you please, concisely survey the mathematical meaning of the words before us, and afterwards adduce the physical theory pertaining to them. For how of two similar superticies or planes there is one medium, and of two similar solids two media, we will survey in number by themselves. For the primordial and spontaneous nature of numbers, is to be embraced prior to geome- trical necessity. Tn the first place, therefore, let there be two square numbers 9 and 16, the less of which has for its side 3, and the greater 4, By multiplying these and making 12, we shall have an analogy in the three terms 9, 12, and 16." Let two numbers likewise be assumed, which are not squares indeed, but at the same time are similar planes, and Jet them be 18 and 3.2," the former being gene- rated from the triad and hexad, but the latter from the tetrad and ogdoad. [{ therefore, we multiply either the triad by the ogdoad, or the hexad by the tetrad, we shall have for the product 24, binding in analogy 18 to 32, according to a sesquitertian ratio. This, however, is caused by their sides having the same ratio, If, therefore, the sides of the assumed numbers are found to receive no analogous mean or medium, all the planes generated from them will have but one medium, according to the before-mentioned mode,’ But if the sides themselves should be

* For as 9 isto 12, sois 12to 10. Ὁ The two similar plane numbers 18 and 32 here adduced by Proclus, prove that Gaston Pardies was greatly mistaken in asserting in his Elements of Geometry, “ that if two numbers are similer planes,

Ὁ The two similar plane numbers 18 and 32 here adduced by Proclus, prove that Gaston Pardies was greatly mistaken in asserting in his Elements of Geometry, “ that if two numbers are similer planes,

the greater may be divided into as many squares as there are units in the less.” See the Translation of this work by Harris, p. 133. For 32 eannot be divided into as many squares as there are uoits in 18. And 32 and 18 are evidently similar plane vumbers, because their sides are analogous. For as 3 is to 6 so is 4 to 8. Υ

2 The sides of these numbers are 3, 6, 4, and 8, and they have no analogous mean. For there is no

geometrical mean between 3 and 6, nor between 4 and 8, [lence the planes generated from them, vis.

18 and 32, will have but one medium, which is 24,

412 PROCLUS ON THE [BooR 11}.

found to receive a certain analogous mean, the planes also produced from them, will necessarily receive more than one mean. For let there be two squares 16 and 81, and let the side of the former be 4, but of the latter 9. Since, therefore, the analogous medium between 4 and 9 is 6, according to a sesquialter ratio, it is necessary that more than one mean should fall between them. For the tetrad multiplied by the hexad will produce 24; but the hexad multiplied by itself will produce the square of itself 36; and multiplied by 9, will produce 564. And there will be a continued analogy, in the terms 16, 24, 36, 54, 81." Hence, when the sides have an analogous mean, the planes produced from them, will have more than one mean. Hence, too, Plato appears to me to say very cautiously, not that there is entirely one medium in similar planes, but that it is possible for one to be suflicient. For more than one plane being produced, one medium would be suf- ficient to conjoin them, viz. 36 alone, according to the duple sesquiquartan ratio.” And thus much concerning similar planes.

For more than one plane being produced, one medium would be suf- ficient to conjoin them, viz. 36 alone, according to the duple sesquiquartan ratio.” And thus much concerning similar planes.

Let us, however, now pass onto similar solids, and survey the media in these. In the first place, therefore, let there be two cubes 8 and 27, the former having for its side 2, and the latter 8. Of these cubes, there will be two media, the one being produced from twice two multiplied by three, 1. e. 12, and which on this account 15 (4exis) a Seam, but the other from thrice three multiplied by two, 1. e. 18, and which is therefore (πλίνθος ᾽) a tile. These will make a continued analogy with the before-mentioned cubes, according to ἃ sesquialter ratio.” And here you taay see how each of the media has two sides from the cube placed next to it, but the remaining side from the other cubes This however will be useful to us for the purposes of physiology. Again, ifthe numbers were not cubes, but similar solids, they will likewise have two analogous middles or means. For let there be two similar solids 24 and 192, the sides of the former being 2, 3, 4, but of the latter 4, 6, 8. And from the duad, the triad, and the ogdoad, 48 will be produced, but from the tetrad, the hexad, and again the tetrad, the product will be 96. Ilere too, each of the media will have two sides from that similar solid of the ex- tremes which is next to it, but one side fromthe other cube, in the same manner

' For as 16 is to 24, sois 24 to 36, sois 36 to 54, so is 54 to 81, the ratio being sesquialter.

* For 36 is a geometrical mean between 16 and 81, according to a duple sesquiquartan ratio, For 36 contains 16 twice, and a fourth part of it, i.e. 4also; aud 81 contains 36 twice, or 72, and 0 besides, which is a fourth part of 36.

3 For riiOus here, read Au os.

* For 12 contains 8 once, and the half of 8. And ina similar manner 4%=1} and 77=11),

δ Fos 12=2x 2X3, 2 being the cube root of 8, and 3 being the cube root of 27; and 18=3X3x 2.

BOOK 111. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 413

3 For riiOus here, read Au os.

* For 12 contains 8 once, and the half of 8. And ina similar manner 4%=1} and 77=11),

δ Fos 12=2x 2X3, 2 being the cube root of 8, and 3 being the cube root of 27; and 18=3X3x 2.

BOOK 111. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 413

as in the media of the before-inentioned cubes. Hence between similar solids, two media are sufficient; just as Plato says, that two media adapt solids to each other, but never one medium. What then, some one may say, is there not one medium alone of the two solid numbers 64 and 729, which medium is 216? For G4 is a cube produced from 4, but 729 from 9. And 729 is the triple and su- perparticular ogdoan part of 216; and after the same manner 216 of 61. For each contains the other thrice, and three eighths of it besides.". And this will not only be the case in these, but also in other numbers: for these are the smallest numbers which admit of this. In answer to this however it must be said, that the above-mentioned numbers are cubes and at the same time squares; the one, i. e. 64, being the square of 8, but the other, i. 6. 729, being the square of 27. Hence they have one mean, not so far as they are cubes, but so far as they have the tetragonic peculiarity, For the tetragonic side of 64, i. e. 8, being multiplied by 27, which is the tetragonic side of 729, produces the analogous mean 216, according to the method delivered [by mathematicians] of finding the mean be- tween two squares, He who makes the objection, therefore, using solids not as solids, binds them together by one medium. But if he had surveyed them so far as they are solid numbers and cubes, he would have found that there are also two media between these, the one being 144, from four times 4 multiplied by 9, but the other 324, from nine times 9 multiplied by 4.

But Democritus + doubts, how it is said that one analogous medium falls be- tween two planes. Vor by assuming four lines in continued proportion, it may be shown that the squares from them are analogous;’ so that two analogous media will fall between two extreme planes. He adds, that different persons have been involved in different difficulties through this doubt, and have been led by it to the duplication of the cube, and such-like investigations. Plato, however, does not say that one medium only falls between any casual planes, nor again two media between casual solids, but between those that are similar, and in an eflable ratio, and which have their sides arranged according to numbers. For

* Thus 729 contains three times 216, i. ὁ. 648, and three eighths of it besides. For the eighth part of 216 is 27, and thrice 27 is 81, the difference between 729 and 648. And thus also 216 contains 64 thrice, i, e. 192, and 24 besides, which is three cighths of 64. ᾿

* This is most probably the junior Democritus mentioned by Porphyry in his life of Plotinus,

For the eighth part of 216 is 27, and thrice 27 is 81, the difference between 729 and 648. And thus also 216 contains 64 thrice, i, e. 192, and 24 besides, which is three cighths of 64. ᾿

* This is most probably the junior Democritus mentioned by Porphyry in his life of Plotinus,

" For let the lines be as the numbers 2. 4. 8. 16, which are in continued proportion; then the squares of them 4, 16. 64. 256 will also be analogous. Foras 4is to 10, so is 16 to 64, and so is

64 to 256.

414 PROCLUS ON THE (BooK 111.

the things generated by the demiurgic God, are effable with reference to each other, and are variegated by demiurgic numbers, as Plato says in another part of this dialogue. And it is requisite to assume similar planes, and solid numbers, and to survey in these the truth of the Platonic assertion. We shall show there- fore at the end of these Commentaries, how itis possible, two right lines being civen, to find two analogous media, selecting for this purpose the demonstration of Archytas, rather than that of Menwchmus, because he uses conical lines, and in like manner rather than that of Eratosthenes, because he employs the apposi- tion of a rule."

With respect however to the things investigated, it must now be said that Plato appears to have perfect contidence in arithmetical demonstrations, since it is also possible to find in geometrical figures of two solids an analogous medium. For if there are three analogous right lines, a, 2, y, in a duple ratio, the squares from them will be in a quadruple ratio, as £4, ior, and ὃ. But the solids from them will bein an octuple ratio, as 913, 25, and y. Hence there will be three cubes, the extremes of which will have one analogous mean, And it is manifest that all cubes are similar to each other. For the angles are the same in each cube and are equal 5 and they are also comprehended by similar planes ; and the multitude of them is equal. Moreover, we may thus demonstrate in the same manner as Democritus, that two analogous media fall between two similar solids. For that all squares are similar to each other is evident ; since the angles are the same in each, and are equal, and the sides are analégous. Hence it seems that Plato employing numbers, shows that solids are never co-adapted by one mean, but always by two media. For in these, as you see, the extremes are cubes, and at the same time similar planes. For 613, is from usr, and az. But the other of the extremes 7, is from Β, and 4, and there is the same ratio of the sides. There is therefore one medium of these, so far as they are similar planes, but not so far as they are solids. So that you will have the solution of what is said, by assum- ing numbers. Tor it is possible to find the same numbers which are at the same time similar solids and planes; but it isimpossible to assume geometrical figures which are at one and the same time similar planes and solids; since this also may be said, that all of them being cubes, the form of them is one. But Plato

* From the most unfortunate loss of the latter part of these commentaries of Proclus, this method likewise of his fiuding two analogous media between two given lives, is lost.

poor 11 TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 415

But Plato

* From the most unfortunate loss of the latter part of these commentaries of Proclus, this method likewise of his fiuding two analogous media between two given lives, is lost.

poor 11 TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 415

assuming that the means are similar to the extremes, is thus confident in the theorem. For how would the extremes be in want of other bonds, if they had entirely the same form? And how would the media communicate with the extremes, and differ from them according to the sides, if they were all of them cubes? Hence it is evident that he assumes the media, as being truly media, and thus says, that solids are never conjoined by one, but always by two media ; every mediam containing the communion and difference of the things of which it is the medium. For to say universally, that all solids are connected through two media, makes the media to be infinite. It is manifest, therefore, that he assumes things which are most distant, and in every respect contrary to each other, and which have all the sides opposite to all; these in natural bodies being corporeal powers. But le does this, in order that of the media, one of them may have a greater communion with one of the extremes, but a less with the other; and that this may be vice versa with the other medium. Unless that also is true which is asserted by our preceptor. For he says that it is necessary to assume the same ratio in the media or means, as there is in the sides of the extremes. Thus, for instance, if one of the cubes is 8, but the other 27, we shall find the media of them, if we take their sides 2 and 3, and multiply the square of 2, i. e. 4 by 3, and the square of 3,1. 6. 9 by 2, For then the media will be 12, and 18, which will conjoin the extremes through the sesquialter ratio, which is the ratio of the sides of the cubes. Hence, as there is the same ratio in the sides of the cubes, and in the media, Plato says that there is necessarily two media, and this in amanner more consonant to the proposed physiology. For in the powers of the elements, and in simple forms, the Demiurgus inserted communion prior to

_ things of a composite nature. We however conjoin the extremes through the

octuple ratio, the sides of them not having an octuple ratio. For the mean being assumed in a duple ratio, the extremes will have a quadruple ratio. Thus, for instance, in the three proposed terms, if we assume a fourth analogous term, we shall find that as the side 2 is octuple of the side 16, so the first cube is con- joined to the fourth through the octuple ratio. For if you add 16, as a fourth term to 2. 4. 8, the cube from 16, is conjoined to 8, through the octuple ratio which 64 has to 8, and 512 to 64, and 4096 which is the cube of 16;to 512." So that the sides of the media receiving an octuple ratio, two media will fall between

For if you add 16, as a fourth term to 2. 4. 8, the cube from 16, is conjoined to 8, through the octuple ratio which 64 has to 8, and 512 to 64, and 4096 which is the cube of 16;to 512." So that the sides of the media receiving an octuple ratio, two media will fall between

" If each of the terms 2. 4. 8. 16, is cubed, the four terms 8. 64. 512. 4096, will be produced, and C4 is octuple of 8, 512 of 64, and 4096 of 512; and the first cube 8 is conjoined to the fourth 4096, through the octuple ratio.

416 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 111.

the extremes. But ifa fifth analogous term is added, the sides will no longer be conjoined in an octuple ratio but in the ratio of 16 to 15 and on this account there will be three analogous media between the two cubes. What Plato says, therefore, is true according to the before-mentioned method. Are not the sides also co- adapted to his purpose? And it is requisite to say, that there may be one medium between two cubes, yet not according to harmonic ratios. Hence, when there is truly a colligation of the extremes through these ratios, then it is perfectly requisite that there should be two media. Through these things, therefore, it is manifest mathematically, that similar planes require one medium, and similar solids two media, and that they can never be bound by one medium alone.

Through these things, therefore, it is manifest mathematically, that similar planes require one medium, and similar solids two media, and that they can never be bound by one medium alone.

Being impelled, however, by these observations, let us sce how physical concep- tions accord with them, and let us adapt probable to scientific assertions. And in the first place, let us survey whata physical plane is, and how in planes of this kind, there is one medium, but two in physical solids. The divine Tamblichus indeed (for this man in a remarkable degree comprehended a theory of this kind, others being as it were asleep, and conversant only with the mathematical meaning of the words) appears to me to distinguish things simple from such as are composite, parts from wholes, and in short, material powers, and material forms, from the essences to which they give completion. And some of these, he calls superficies, but others solids. For as a superticies is the ultimate boundary of a mathe matical body, so likewise material form, and material power, are the morphe and boundary of their subjects. ‘These things, therefore, being thus divided, in things of a simple nature, one medium is suflicient, because there is [one] difference of the reasons and forms, and according to the common bonds of the reasons and the life. Lorin these there is one medium, Hence quality 15. uniformly connected with quality, and power with power, according to the difference and sameness of forms. But in things of a composite nature, there are very properly two media. For the duad is the supplier of all composition and separation. Every composite nature however consists of many essences and powers. Hence, there are many media. And these at least are two-fold. For there is one medium according to form, and another according to subject.

We however, conformably to physical principles, speak as follows, receiving auxiliaries from what Plato says as he proceeds. Or rather, let us speak from the beginning. There are some physiologists then, who ascribe one power to each of the elements ; to fire indeed heat, to air frigidity, to water moisture, and

’ ty earth dryness; in so doing entirely wandering from the truth. In the first

ROOK 111. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 417

There are some physiologists then, who ascribe one power to each of the elements ; to fire indeed heat, to air frigidity, to water moisture, and

’ ty earth dryness; in so doing entirely wandering from the truth. In the first

ROOK 111. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 417

place, because they subvert the world and order, For it is impossible for things to be co-adapted to each other, when they possess the most contrary powers, unless they have something incommon. In the next place, they make the most contrary natures allied to each other, viz. the hot to the cold, and the moist to the dry.’ It is necessary however, to make things which are hostile more remote than things which are less foreign. For such is the nature of contraries. In the third place, therefore, the first two powers will have no sympathy whatever with the rest; but will be divulsed? from each other. For it is impossible to say What is common to humidity and frigidity. And in addition to all these things, aa the elements are solids, they will not be conjoined to each other by any medium. It has however been shown that it is not possible for solids to be conjoined through one medium. Nor can they be conjoined without a medium. For this is alone the province of things that are perfectly without interval.

But some others, as Ocellus, who was the precursor of Timwus, attribute two powers to each of the elements, to fire indeed heat and dryness, to air, heat and moisture, to water, moisture and coldness, and to earth, coldness and dryness, And these things are written by this man in his treatise On Nature. In what. therefore, do these err who thus speak ? In the first place, indeed, wishing to dis- cover the common powers in the elements, in order that tiey may preserve the co-arrangement of them with each other, they no more assign communion than separation to them, but equally honour their hostility and their harmony. What kind of world therefore, will subsist from these, what order will there be of things which are without arrangement and most foreign, and of things which are most allied and co-arranged? For things which in an equal degree are hostile and peaceful, will in an equal mode dissolve and constitute communion. But this communion being similarly dissolved, and similarly implanted, the universe will no more exist than not exist. In the second place, they do not assign the greatest contrariety to the extremes, but to things most remote from the extremes ; though we every where see, that of homogencous natures those which are most distant have the nature of contraries, and not those which are less distant. How likewise did nature arrange them, since they are most remote in their situation from each other? Was it not by perceiving their contrariety, and that the third was more allied than the last to the first? How also did she arrange the motions

How likewise did nature arrange them, since they are most remote in their situation from each other? Was it not by perceiving their contrariety, and that the third was more allied than the last to the first? How also did she arrange the motions

δ For ro evayrwrara here, read ra evayrwwrara, and for ry θερμὸν re ψυχρῳ, το Oeppor, x. XA. * For arnprnyeva in this place, I read διηρημενα.

Tim. Plat. Vou, I. 3G

418 PROCLUS ON THE Peeve,

of them, since fire is most light and tends upward, but earth is most heavy and tends downward? But whence were the motions ofthem which are most contrary derived, if not from nature! If therefore, nature distributed to them most contrary motions, it is evident that they are themselves most contrary. For 45. the motions of simple beings are simple, and those things are simple of which the motions are simple, thus also those things are most contrary of which the motions are most contrary. And this may occasion some one to wonder at Aristotle, who in what he says about motion, places earth as most contrary to fire; butin what he says about powers, he makes the most remote of similar natures to be more friendly than those that are proximate, when they are moved with most contrary motions, Por as the clements have contrary places in- their positions, as they have contrary motions in dations, as they have contrary powers, eravity and levity, through which motions subsist in their forms, thus also they have contrary passive qualities. Aristotle Iimself likewise manitests that earth is contrary to fire. For wishing to show that itus necessary there should) be more bodies than one, he says: ‘ Moreover, af earth exists, itis also necessary that fire should exist. For in things, one of the contraries of which naturally is, the other likewise has a natural subsistence.” So that neither was he able afler any other manner to show that there are more clements than one, than by asserting that fire is contrary to earth,

For in things, one of the contraries of which naturally is, the other likewise has a natural subsistence.” So that neither was he able afler any other manner to show that there are more clements than one, than by asserting that fire is contrary to earth,

Farther still, as the elements are solids, how can they be bound together through one medium? For this is impossible im solids, as we have before observed. Hence those who assert these things, neither speak mathematically nor physically, but unavoidably errin both these respects. For physical are derived from mathe- matical entities. Jundus therefore alone, or any other who rightly follows hin, neither attribules one nor two powers alone, to the elements, but triple powers ; fo fire indeed, tcnuity of parts, acuteness and facility of motion ; to air, lenuity of parts, obtuseness, and facility of motion ; to water, grossness of parts, obtuseness, and facility of motion ; and to earth, grossucss of parts, obtusencss, and difficulty of motion, But this is in order that each of the elements may have two powers, cach’ of which is common to the clement placed next to it, and one power which is different, in the same manner as it was demonstrated in mathematical numbers and figures 5 this different power being assumed from one of the extremes 3; and also in’ order that earth according to all the powers, may subsist oppositely to fire; and that

For; cay here, it is obviously necessary to read exurepar,

BOOK 1411. TIMA&US OF PLATO. 419

TIMA&US OF PLATO. 419

the extremes may have two media, and the continued quantities two; the latter having solids for the media, but the forme., common powers. For let fire indeed be attenuated in its parts, acute, and easily moved. For it has an attenu- ated essence, and is acute, as having a figure of this hind ji. οὐ a pyramidal figure], and on this account.is incisive and fugitive,’ and permeates through all the other elements. It is also moved with facility? as being most near to the celestial hodies, and existing in them. For the celestial fire itself is moved with celerity, as is likewise sublunary fire, which is perpetually moved in conjunction with it, and according to one circle, and one impulse. Since therefore, earth is contrary to fire, it has contrary powers, viz. grossness, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion, all which we see are present with it. But these being thus hostile, and being solids, are also similar solids. For their sides and their powers are analogous. For as the gross is to the attenuated, so is the obtuse to the acute, and that which is moved with difficulty, to that which is moved with facility. But those are similar solids of which the sides that constitute the bodies are analogous. Tor the sides are the powers of which bodies consist. ence, as fire and earth are similar bodies, and similar solids, two analogous media fall between them; and each of the media will have two sides of the extreme situated next to it, and the remaining side from the other extreme. ITence, since fire has for its three physical sides the triple powers, tenuity, acuteness, and facility of motion, by taking away the middle power, acuteness, and introducing instead of it obtuse- ness, we shall produce air, which has two sides of fire, but one of earth, or two powers of fire, but one of earth; as itis fit that what is near should rather com- municate with it, than what is separated in the third rank from it.

Again, since earth has three physical powers, contrary to the powers of fire, viz. grossuess of parts, obtuseness, and difficulty of motion; by taking away diffeully of motion, and introducing facility of motion, we shall produce water, which consists of gross parts, is obtuse, and is easily moved; and which has indeed, two sides or powers common with earth, but receives one from fire. And thus these media will be spontaneously conjoined with each other; com- inunicating indeed in twofold powers, but diflering in similitude by one power ; and the extremes will be bound togetiier by two media. Each element also will thus be in a greater degree conjoined to, than separated from the element which is

* For vearioy in this place, read νπαικτικον τ"

* Instead of axernros here, it is necessary to read evaeynror.

420 PROCLUS ON THE [ποοκ 111.

Each element also will thus be in a greater degree conjoined to, than separated from the element which is

* For vearioy in this place, read νπαικτικον τ"

* Instead of axernros here, it is necessary to read evaeynror.

420 PROCLUS ON THE [ποοκ 111.

near to it; and one world will be perfectly effected through all of them, and one harmonious order, through the predominance of analogy. Thus also, of the two cubes 8 and 27, the medium 12 being placed next to 8, will have two sides of this, but one side of 37. For 12 is produced by 2 Χ 2 Χ 8. But itis vice versa with 18 For this is produced by 3 X 3 X 2. And the side of 27 is 3, in the same manner as 2 is the side of 8. The physical dogmas therefore of Plato about the elements of the universe, accord with mathematical specalations,

Hence these things being thus determined, let us physically adapt them to the words of Plato. We calla [physical] plane or superticies therefore, that which has two powers only, but a [physical] solid that which has three powers. And we say, that if we fashion bodies from two powers, one medium would conjoin the elements to each other. But since, as we assert, bodies possess triple pow- ers, they are bound together by two media. For there are two common powers of the adjacent media, and one power which is different. And the extremes themselves, if they consisted of two powers, would be conjoined through one medium. For let tire, if you will, be alone attenuated and easily moved; but earth on the contrary, have alone grossness of parts aud immobility, One me- dium therefore, will be sufficient for these. For grossness of parts and facility of notion, and tenuity of parts, and difliculty of motion, are all that ts requisite to the colligation of both. Since however, each of the elements is triple, the extremes require two media, and the things themselves that are adjacent, are bound toges ther throngh two powers. For solids, and these are things that have triple con-

trary powers, are never co-adapted by one medium,

“Thus therefore, the divinity placing water and air in the middle of fire and earth, and rendering them as much as possible analogous to each other, so that what fire is to air, that air might be to water, and what air is to water, that water might be to earth, he bound together and constituted the heaven, visible and tangible.”

Some of the Platonists, being impelled. by the assertions of Aristotle, extend through the whole world one passive matter, not at all different from that of the heavens, and in consequence of embracing certain barbaric opinions, give to the world a fifth body, end refer the doctrine concerning it to Plato, For Aristotle, following these opinions, introduced a filth element. And this ina certain re- spect he obscurely signifies, adducing the observations of the Barbarians as a

BOOK 111. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 421

And this ina certain re- spect he obscurely signifies, adducing the observations of the Barbarians as a

BOOK 111. TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 421

testimony of the perpetuity and sameness of the motion of ether. But others assert, that the heavens are of a diflerent essence, as having a different form of life, a more simple motion, and a more perpetual nature ; but that Plato is now speaking about the sublunary elements, and adorns these by analogies. These menindeed, speak rightly, both with respect to things, and the opinion of Plato, in asserting that the nature of the heavens is different from mutable, and in short, material things; but at the same time ' they neglect the Platonic words, in which the philosopher says, that “ ¢he Demiurgus bound together and constituted the hea- ven [or the universe} through the analogy of the four elements ;”? and again, in another place, “ that he eluborated the idea of the stars, for the most part from fire.”

Let us therefore, if you are willing, preserving the opinions of both these men, perspicuously show, that the whole world consists of the four elements, and that the heavens are of a different essence [from the sublunary region]. And in the first place let us discuss the latter, For it is necessary, either that the heavens, should be entirely different from the four elements, being, as some sav, a fifth ele- ment; or that the heavens should consist of the four elements ; or from some one of the four; or from more than one. And if* the heavens consist of the four, they either consist of elements specifically the same with the sublunary, or of others. Tf however, that element is different from the four, how does Plato say that the whole world consists of the four elements? But if it is constituted from one of the four, how does he say shortly after, that the stars consist for the most part of fire? And if the world is constituted from more elements than one, [but not from all the four] how will it happen that a divine body will not be imperfect, and how wiil it possess all things, though the earth, and in short the sublunary region, have all things? Bat, if the world consists of all the elements, how does it happen, that in the heavens the composition of them is indissoluble, but in these [(sublunary] realms is dissoluble. For they will not be indissoluble on account of equal domi- nion. For whence, if there is equal dominion, is the variety in the heavens produced ? And how does Plato say that fire for the most part predominates there, if there is an equal domination? But if the heavens consist of four elements spe- cifically different from the four sublunary elements, how, since they are com- posites, are the heavens moved with a simple motion? Where also are the whole- nesses of the things which are there mingled !

' For ἡμῶν in this place, it is necessary to read opws. * Ecis omitted here in the original,

409 PROCLUs ON THE [BOOK ti.

Where also are the whole- nesses of the things which are there mingled !

' For ἡμῶν in this place, it is necessary to read opws. * Ecis omitted here in the original,

409 PROCLUs ON THE [BOOK ti.

Such therefore being the doubts, it is better to say that all heaven consists of fire, which there predominates ; but that it also comprehends according to cause, the powers of the other elements, such as the solidity and stability of earth, the conglutinating and uniting power of water, and the tenuity and transparency of air. For as earth comprehends all things terrestrially, so the heavens comprehend all things according to a fiery characteristic. So that one thing [1 e. tire} has dominion, and the other elements are comprehended init) causally. Tt is necessary how- ever to think, that the fire which is there, is not the same with sublunary tire, but that itis divine fire, consubsistent with life, and an imitation of intellectual fire. And that the fire which is here 15 wholly material, venerated, and corraptible. Genuine fire therefore, is in the heavens, and total fire for the wholeness of tire] is there. But earth is there according to cause, being another species of earth, and as itis fit it should, connascent with divine fire, possessing solidity alone, in the same manner as fire possesses an illuminative power, And as this celestial fire is not caustic, neither is the earth which is there gross, but the suminit of each is there. And as genuine and truly existing fire are in’ the heavens, so real earth is here, and the wholeness of earth 5 but tire is here according to participation, and materially, in the same manner as earth is primarily. For that which remains is in each appropriately ; there the summit of earth (or earth according tu cause 5} but here the dregs of fire. But this is evident from the moon which possesses something solid and dark, and obstructing the light. For to obstruct is alone the province of earth, The stars also obstruct the sight, as producing a shadow above themselves. And it is evident this being the case, that since fire is in the heavens, and also earth, the diaphanous media between these, are likewise necessarily there printarily 5 air indeed, such as the most pure and agile air which is here; but water, such as the most exhaleable with us, and even still purer than

these; in order that all things may be in all, but appropriately in each, Lor on

this account we characterize fire by visibility, which is deservedly the peculiarity of

all fire. For as carth is primarily tangible, so fire is primarily visible ; because it is not in want of any one of the other clements, in order that it may be visible, as the others are inowant of the iluminative power of fire to their visibility. But fire becomes itself visible through itself. And this is common to all fire. Phe question therefore is solved.

But fire becomes itself visible through itself. And this is common to all fire. Phe question therefore is solved.

That all the progression of the elements however, may become manifest to us, and the gradations of them, itis requisite that we should begin the theory of them from on high, ‘These four elements therefore, fire and air, water and earth,

υουκ I.) TIM AEUS OF PLATO. 423

subsist primarily, and uniformly according to cause, in the Detuinreus of wholes. For all causes are antecedently contained in him, according to one comprehen- sion. Elence he comprebends the intellectual, divine, undetiled, and vicorous power of fire; the connective and vivilic cause of air; the prolitic and regermi- nating hyparxis of water; and the firm,’ stable, immutable, and unvacillating idea of earth, The theologist therefore, knowing these things, says of the Demiurgus,

ilis body's boundless, tim, and tiery-brights And,

"The wide-extended all-pervading air, Forms lis broad shoulders, back, and bosom fair, Hlis middle zone ’s the spreading sea profound,

Ihis feet, the roots deep-fix'd within the solid ground,

But from these demiurgic causes, a progression takes place of these four elements into the universe, though not immediately into the sublunary world. For how can the most immaterial natures give subsistence without a medium, to the most material; and immoveable natures, to those that are in every respect moved? For the progression of things is nowhere without a medium, but exists according to a well-ordered gradation, The generations also into these material, dissipated, and dark realms, are effected through things of a proximate nature. For these are capable of being fashioned by the junior Gods, and especially so far as they have a tangible composition, But the Demiurgus is the father of greater and more beautiful effects. :

Since therevore, the elements in the Demiureus himself are intellects, and impar- ticipable intellectual powers, what will be the first progression of them? Ts it not evident, that they will stil continue to be intellectual powers, but participated by mundane natures? For the progression from imparticipable intellect is proximately to that intellect which is participated. And in short, the progression from impartici- pable causes, is to those that are participated, and from supermundane to mundane forms. These powers however, still remaining intellectual, but participable, what kind of diminution will they have? Is it not this, that they will no longer be

* For yovincsin this place, it is necessary to read povipos.

424 PROCLUS ON THE foun ti,

These powers however, still remaining intellectual, but participable, what kind of diminution will they have? Is it not this, that they will no longer be

* For yovincsin this place, it is necessary to read povipos.

424 PROCLUS ON THE foun ti,

intellectual? But I call intellectual natures, the forms of intellect, and of an essence truly intellectual. Being however, participable, but no longer intellec- tual, it is evident that they will not be immoveable. And not being immoveable, they will be self-motive. For these are proximately suspended from immoveable natures; and the progression is from things essentially intellectual, to those that are so by participation, and from immoveable beings, to those that move them- selves. These elements therefore, will subsist in life, and will be intellectual according to participation, and self-motive. But itis evident what that is which will proceed from this. For the descent from life is to animal; for this 15 proximate to life. And from that which is self-motive according to essence, to that which is selfmotive according to the participation of life. And so far indeed, as the elements proceed from life to animal, they are changed; but so far as they proceed from that which is immaterial to immaterial natures (1 mean immaterial as with reference to mutable matter,) and from a divine life, to a divine essence, they are assimilated to truly immaterial essences. Here there- fore, taking away the immaterial, and the immutable, you will make the material and the mutable. And through this they will be inferior to the natures prior to them; but through the order and symmetry of their motions, and the immutability in things mutable, they will be assimilated to them, If therefore, you also take away this order, and survey the great confusion and instability of the elements, you will have the last of all things, and those which are allotted an ultimate separation, being the dregs of all the elements prior to these. Hence, of the elements, some are immoveable, intellectual, demiurgic ; others are intellectual indeed essentially, and immoveable, but are participated by mundane natures ; others are self-motive, and have their existence in lives ; others are self-motive, but live (i. δ. are animals], and are not lives only; others are alter-motive, but are moved in an orderly manner; and others, are disorderly, tumultuous and confused,

The difference of the elements therefore, being so great, what occasion is there to disturb what is here said by Pl: to, as if the elements existed only in one way ? For it is necessary to survey the clements in as many ways as there are media between the Demiurgus and sublunary natures; because their progression 15 through media. The elements therefore, are in the heavens, but not! after the

* Ov is omitted here in the original.

BOOK 11|.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 425

-V

The elements therefore, are in the heavens, but not! after the

* Ov is omitted here in the original.

BOOK 11|.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 425

-V

same manner as tn genesinrzic bodies 3 for neither do they subsist in the heavens, alter the same manner as in the Demiurzus. But prior to the sublunary elements, there are, the celestial fire (and this light manifests which is a species of fire) and celestial earth. Or Why does the moon being illuminated produce a shadow, and Why does not the solar light pervade through the whole of it? It is also necessary that the middle elements should. be in the heavenly bodies, but that ditl-rent ele- ments should abound in different parts of the celestial regions. And in some places indeci, tt is necessary that tne fiery nature should widely scatter its splendour, on account of solidity, as in the starry bodies ; but in others, that it should be concealed from us, as in the spheres that carry the stars. Lence, the peculiarity of all fire is vist- bility, but neither heat, nor floating, And solidity and tangivility, are the character-

“astics of all earth, but not gravity, sinking, and a downward tendency. It therefore, We assume these peculiarities, we shall find that fire and earth subsist also analo- gously in the heavens ; fire indeed, defining the essence of them, but each of the other elements being consubsistent with it.

It therefore, We assume these peculiarities, we shall find that fire and earth subsist also analo- gously in the heavens ; fire indeed, defining the essence of them, but each of the other elements being consubsistent with it.

Por again, this also may be said, that causes and the efficients of certain things, every where antecedently comprehend the powers of the natures which are adorned and produced by them 3 and especially when they produce according to nature, For thus nature possesses the form of the teeth, the eves and the hands, through which also she gives morphe to matter, And not every eye possesses interval, but there is something in which it has an impartible form. Again, soul is one, and contains in itself that which is divine, and that whieh is irrational. And in the divine part of itself, it comprehends rationally the irrational powers, by which it governs, and arranges ina becoming manner irrationality. And neither is the unity of the soul, nor its multitude destroyed through different essences. For these things subsist in one way in the superior, and in another in the inferior part. Ina similar manner, the world also is one and many ; for the heavens are one thing, and generation another. And ceneration ts adorned from the heavens ; and these elements are in the heavens, but celestiaily. For they are in soul, psyehically, in intellect, intellectually, and in the Demiurgus, demi- urgically. For how could the sublunary elements be governed by the etiluxions from these natures, unless they also subsisted in them after another manner? Thus also in the arts, we may see that the physician does not preside over the carpenter ; for the physician does not anteccdently comprehend in himself the works of the carpenter. Nor does the mechanic preside over the cook ; for the former does not antecedently comprehend things pertaining to banquets. But it

Tim. Plat. : Vou. I. 41]

426 PROCLUS ON THE ; [8οοκ lt.

is the province of that which antecedently comprehends the whole power of a thing, to govern it. Hence it is evident that the mechanist entirely presides over the carpenter, and the physician over the cook. If therefore, the heavens govern all generation, the elements will be contained in them primarily.

The Pythagoreans however say, that the clements may be surveyed in the heavens in a twefuld respect, in one way indeed prior to the sun, and in another after it: for the moon is ethereal earth. This therefore, the theologist clearly

asserts. Lor he says:

Another boundless earth besides he made, Which Gods se/ene, mortals meae call,

With num’rous houses, ties, mounts adorn’d.

This therefore, the theologist clearly

asserts. Lor he says:

Another boundless earth besides he made, Which Gods se/ene, mortals meae call,

With num’rous houses, ties, mounts adorn’d.

But they say that the planct Mercury is ethereal water, Venus air, and the sun fire, And again, that Mars is eclestial fire, Jupiter celestial air, Saturn celestial water, and the inerratic sphere celestial earth. And thus speaking ina divided manner they make the extremes to be every where fire and earth, but conjoin the ethereal natures through media, viz. through Venus and Mercury: for both these have a collective and unifying power. But they conjoin the celestial natures, through Saturn and Jupiter: for through these that which is connective of wholes, and the commensurate, accede to all things. What we now say, however, is con- formable to the history delivered by many [of the Pythagoric doctrines], For that this mode of distribution is not Platonic, we may learn from this that Plato arranges the sun immediately above the moon, afterwards Venus, and then Mercury.

It is necessary therefore to understand, that all the elements are in each of the celestial spheres, since in the sublunary elements also, each participates of the rest. For fire participates of earth; since being moved with facility, it would most rapidly perish, ifit was entirely without stability. And earth participates of fire; for being moved with difficulty, it requires heat to resuscitate and restore it. As this therefore is the case in these sublunary elements, much more must all the elements be in each of the celestial spheres, though some of the heavenly bodies participate more’ of fire, others of air, others of water, and others of earth.

Again therefore, from the beginning we must say, that the elements being con-

‘Madey is emitted in this place in the original,

ev aa ae Sen eee oe te ee! ee δὰ τρια»

BOOK 111. TIM.GUS OF PLATO. 427

Again therefore, from the beginning we must say, that the elements being con-

‘Madey is emitted in this place in the original,

ev aa ae Sen eee oe te ee! ee δὰ τρια»

BOOK 111. TIM.GUS OF PLATO. 427

ceived in one way as unmingled, but in another as mingled, the first’ mixture of them produces the heavens, which contain all things according to a fiery charac- teristic. [But the second mixture of them produces the sublunary rezion]," in which all things subsist according to a middle characteristic. And the last mixture of them produces the subterranean realins, in which the dregs of all things are con- tained, Pyriphlegethon, as they say, and Acheron, Ocean and Cocytus. Hence it may be said, that the four unmingled elements are every where, and that there are five, all heaven being assumed as one element; but that the last elements are comprehended in she earth. The five elements however, are said to be the ele- ments of the world ; and on this account the world derives. its completion from them. But it must be said that the four elements are the elements both of the heavens and of generation. Hence the heavens are of a fifth essence, besides the four elements ; but are mingled from the simple elements. For these sublunary four are not in the heavens, but the summits of them are there, and all the four elements unmingled, and separated from each other by their proper forms. And these assertions are most concordant with Plate, who at one time says that the heavens consist of the four elements, bound together by analogy, and that the whole world is constituted from these; but shortly after fashions the five fizures, and calls them five worlds. For these things give a fifth essence to the heavens, introduce a tetractys of the elements, and accord with truth. For all things are inthe heaven according to a fiery mode; and on this account it is a simple body, different from that which is sublunary, and. truly comprehends all things pertain- ing to these material masses. We must not therefore admit that all earth is heavy, nor that all fire is light; but sublunary earth aud fire are perhaps things of this kind, while those in’ the heavens subsist after another manner. For the solidity and stability which are there are derived from earth. And hence each of the spheres is not moved according to the whole of itself [but revolves round an im- moveable centre]. But the celestial light, and facility of motion, are derived from fire. The connective and transparent nature of the heavens are from air 5 and their equability and smoothness, from water.

That Plato however, affords us these auxiliaries, he clearly shows shortly after, whenhe says, “ that hewho constituted the world composed itfromall fire water, airand earth, leaving nopartnor power ofany oncof them externally.” For he does not sa y from

“ae appears.that the words τῆς ἕε deurepas τον υποσεληνὴῆν τόπον, are wanting in this place, in the orginal. ;

;

428 PROCLUS ON THE (BOOK "11,

tire or water simply, but from a// fire and all water, through which he indicates that there is much fire in the universe, and of a different nature, and also much water, and which is essentially different. Moreover, the theology of the Assyrians hich was unfolded into light from divinity, delivers the same Wangs. For in that theology, the Demiurgus is said to have made the whole world from fire, water, carth, and all-nourishing ether or air; and the artificer is said to liave fashioned the world as it were withhis own hands. For it says,“ there was a certain other inass of fire.” But he fashioned, as it were manually, all things, in order that he might conglomerate the mundane body, “ that the world might) become manifest, and might not appear membrancous ;” which is the same thing as to say, that it might not alone bear the obscure and imbecile vestiges of forms. For the word mem- brancous signifies the ladistinct subsistence of reasons (or forms). As we have said therefore, the Oracles also bear witness to what is asserted by Plato, since they too generate the world from the four elements. And thus much concerning the concord of philosophers about this particular: for we shall see in what fol- lows, if there is any difference respecting it in the doctrine of Plato,

It is manifest however, that the elements are every where bound to each other by analogy." For analogy, as we lave said, imitates divine union, and is a de- miurgic bond. And the analogy indeed in mathematics, possesses the accurate and the scientific: for the ratios there are immaterial. Bat in physies this is no longer similarly the case. For the analogy which is in’ the heavenly bodies participates of a certain accuracy 3 but in sublunary natures the analogy is less accurate, because it is Conversant with matter. Again therefore, the order of the elements becomes apparent, and we see that Plato very properly procures from the mathematics belief in. physical reasons. For they are causes, and the demi- urgic progression is effected through soul. The veneration also of physical es- sences appropriately proceeds through media; and celestial matures are ina certain respect more allied to accurate reasons, but sublunary natures have an obscure truth. Plato therefore knowing these things, adds, * as much as possible,” in order that you may not entirely require in’ physical reasons a mathematical accuracy. For if you are willing to evamine each of the elements, you will perceive an abundant mirturein it. Thus, for instance, air is not simply a thing of attenuated parts. Furit has also sumcthing gross, nebulous, and aqueous. Nor ts water simply casily moved. And the part of fire itself which is mingled with air, resembles the

1 Instead of ors de avadoyia δεδεικται ἰὼ this place, it is necessary to read, ore δε avaduyeg δεδησεται.

noow it] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 429

Furit has also sumcthing gross, nebulous, and aqueous. Nor ts water simply casily moved. And the part of fire itself which is mingled with air, resembles the

1 Instead of ors de avadoyia δεδεικται ἰὼ this place, it is necessary to read, ore δε avaduyeg δεδησεται.

noow it] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 429

obtuseness of air; and this necessarily. For it is requisite to conjoin the summits of secondary with the dregs of primary natures.

Farther stall, we ought also to understand the manner in which Plato constitutes the analogy. Hor he begins from the media, and preserves the order of the terms, just as the Demiurgus made all things to be in each other,’ together with preserv- ing the distinction of them; and he denominates all this contexture a bond and composition, For it is a bond indeed, as imparting union and analogy from the demiurgic cause 5 but it is a composition, as being thence produced according to essence itself Por some one may bind things which he did not compose. ‘This however, is not the case with the Demiurgus, but he is the father, he is the uni- fying cause, and he is the guardian of all his own works. In addition to these things also, it must be observed that Plato assumes here, as we have said, the geo- metric mean, and indicates that this is analogy, For it is the peculiarity of this middle to have the same ratio, Tlence some persons properly call. it analogy, The other media therefore, appear to be the suppliers of more partial goods to the world, and not to be the sources: of the order which proceeds through all things, and of uninterrupted connexion, For in the generation of the soul the other* media are assumed for the sake of binding together the geometric ratios, and are comprehended in the whole geometric middle, as in that which is alone analogy.

“Hence from these and things of this kind, which are four in num- ber, the body of the world was generated, being concordant through analogy, and possessing friendship through these, so as to conspire into union with itself, and to be indissoluble by any other nature than by him through whom it was bound.”

That the tetrad itself of the elements, primarily proceeded from all-perfeect ani- mal, (or it was the intelligible tetrad) and that on this account. all things enist _tetradically, becomes 1 think evident through the words before us + and also that generation proceeds to the tetrad from the monad through the duad. For the world is only-begotten and one. Afterwards we find it is nec essary that there should be the visible and tangible in it; in the next place, we find that these being much separated from each other, are in want of a certain third thing; and in the

" For ev ἀλλοις here, it is necessary to read ey αλληλοι». * There is an owission in this place of at adda.

420 PROCLUS ON THE [ποοκ 11,

* There is an owission in this place of at adda.

420 PROCLUS ON THE [ποοκ 11,

third place, that the medium is biformed, and thus we arrive at the tetrad. This therefore, is what the Pythagoric hymn says about number: That it proceeds from the secret recesses of the monad, until it arrives at the divine tetrad. And this gene- rates the decad, which is the mother of all things. TVius also the father of the Golden Verses, celebrates the tetractys itself, as the fountain of perennial nature. For the world being adorned by the tetrad, which proceeds fromthe monad and triad, is terminated by the decad, as being comprehensive of all things, That the world likewise is one through analogy, subsisting from these elements, and from such like things according to powers, and from so many according to quantity, Plato clearly manifests by saying, that not the sublunary region, but the body of the universe, Was venerated from the four elements. But the friendship of the world is the end of the analogy, through which also the world is) saved by itself Por every thing which is friendly, wishes to be preservative of that to which it is friendly : but every thing foreign turns from, and does not even wish that to exist to which it is abhorrent; 50 that the nature which is friendly to, is preservative of itself. The world however, is friendly to itself through analogy and) sympathy, and therefore it preserves itself! Butat is also preserved by the fabrication of things, receiving from it an ineflable guard. Tfence also, the theologist denomi- nates the bond derived from the Demiurgus strong, as Night is represented say- ing to the Demiurgus,

But when your power around the whole has spread

A strong coercive bond.

Analogy however, imparts this friendship to the world, by connecting and com- prehending the powers of the elements that are init. Total nature likewise im- parts it, producing the sympathy and harmony of contraries. But prior to nature, soul imparts it, weaving the one life of the world, and co-adapting all the parts of it to the whole. And still much prior to these, it is imparted by intellect, which produces in all things, order, perfection, and one connexion. And even prior to an intellectual essence, the one divinity of the universe, and all the Gods that are allotted the world, are the primordial causes of the union that is init. But much prior to this, the one Demiurgus imparts this friendship to the world. This greatest however, and most perfect of bonds, which the father on all sides throws round the world, as being eflective of the friendslip and harmonious communion init, is denominated by the [Chaldean] Oracles, the bond of love heavily-laden with fire. For they say, “ The paternal selfbegotten intellect understanding bis works,

BOOK 111.} TIM.LUS OF PLATO. 43h

For they say, “ The paternal selfbegotten intellect understanding bis works,

BOOK 111.} TIM.LUS OF PLATO. 43h

disseminated in all things, the bond of love heavy with fire.” And they add the cause why he did this, “ That all things might remain' loving for an infinite time, woven together intellectaally in all the light of the father.” For on account of this Jove, all things are adapted to each other, “That the elements of the world might remain running in love.” Hence, the mundane elements are bound together, possess friendship, and this indissoluble for an infinite time, through the will of

2

the father. If also together with these,” you are willing to survey the super- mundane cause of fhendship, you will find this likewise celebrated by theologists. For the Demiurgus produced Venus, in order that she might beautifully illuminate all mundane natures, with order, harmony, and communion. And he also pro- duced Love as her attendant, who is the unifying cause of wholes. The Demiur- cus however, likewise possesses in himself the cause of Love. For he is “ Metis the first generator, and much-pleasing Love.” Hence he is very properly the cause of friendship and concord to his fabrications. And perhaps looking to this Pherecydes said, that Jupiter when he was about to fabricate, was changed into Love. Because however, he constituted the world from contraries, he led it to concord and friendship, and disseminated in all things sameness and union which pervade through wholes.

Through these things therefore, the world is indissoluble, and it is likewise so from its maker. For how can that which generates all things by its very existence, be the cause of corruption to all things? Besides, every thing which i8 corrupted is corrupted either from = matter, or from form, or from its maker; and from each of these in a two-fold respect. For it is corrupted from the maker, either being imbecile, as a partial nature; or changing its intention, as ἃ partial sou]. Itis also corrupted from form, either not being well constituted at first, or being dissolved in the course of time. And it is corrupted from matter, either being inwardly deprived of symmetry, or sustaining violence externally. As corruption therefore, is produced in a sixfold manner, Plato subverts all the modes of it. For the world is not in either way corrupted from its maker. Not from his want of power, because the Demiurgus is the best of causes, and imbeci- lity has no place with him, since he governs the universe by inflexible powers.

* For Mn ée here, read Mnyyy δε.

* In the original πρὸ rovrey, but as Venus is posterior to the Demiurgus, who has previously been said to be the cause of friendship to the world, it appears to me that we should read wpos rovrwy, oF rather πρὸς rovrocs, as xpes seldom signifies wilh, when it governs the genitive,

432 PROCLUS ON THE [RooK 11.

Nor from his will, becanse he does not at different times will different things ;

Nor from his will, becanse he does not at different times will different things ;

and because, to be willing to dissolve that which 15 beautifully harmonized, and ©

well constituted, is the province of an evil nature. But he is good, and the universe is beautifully harmonized. It is a similar thing therefore, for the Demiur- gus to be willing that the universe should not exist, and for him not to be good. Nor is the world corrupted from form; for itis harmonized according to analogy, and is perfect and one. And through harmony indeed, form vanquishes; but through wholeness and onlyness, the world will never be deprived of congruity, Nor is it corrupted from matter. For its inherent analogy subverts the pnvation of symmetry. But its onlyness removes it from the reach of external viclence, By no means therefore, is it possible tor the universe to be corrupted. Why then does Plato add, that it cannot be corrupted, except by him by whom it was bound? Itis evident indeed, that it every where belongs to him who binds, to dissolve. And you may assume from this, that the world is generated in such ἃ way,' as alone subsisting from another cause. For as it is not dissoluble by any thing else than its generator; so it is not generated by any other than by him who bound it, which is, as we have said, through his possessing the cause of the dissolution of that whichis bound. What is here said also has another indica- tion. For the universe is indissoluble by every thing, except by him who bound v. For it is not indissoluble by him; since this is a small thing to assert. But on the contrary, itis eternally bound by him. As if therefore it should be said, that he who possesses scientific Knowledge, ts meapable of being deceived by all things except by intellect; for he is not incapable of being deceived by intellect ; since it is not sufficient to intellect that the soul is not deceived, but that it possesses wisdom; thus also the world is not indissoluble by hitn who bound it, but is rather bound by him. For by other things it is indissoluble ; bat to him it rather belongs to bind, and not to dissolve. Just as it belongs to the sun to Huminate, and not to darken. For this is the province of certain other things.

* But the composition of the world received one whole of each of the fourelements. For it was constituted by him who composed it, from ald fire, water, airand earth; and he did not leave externally any part or power of any one of the clements.”

* Instead of euros here, it s requisite to read ovrws.

πθοκ 111] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 133

For it was constituted by him who composed it, from ald fire, water, airand earth; and he did not leave externally any part or power of any one of the clements.”

* Instead of euros here, it s requisite to read ovrws.

πθοκ 111] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 133

Plato knew, as we have before observed, that there are many differences of fire, of water, and of each ofthe other elements; from all which, he says, the worid derives its completion; and he confers this as the thira demiurgic gift on the world. So that we must not wonderif he leaves the summits of the four elements in the heavens, but the middle progressions of them in the sublunary regions, and the last dregs of them in the subterranean realms, distributing the elements analo- gous to the three demiurgi Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto. For each whole of them is assumed, and the universe consists of all of each; whether you speak of that which is primarily fire, and is celestial, or of that which has a middle rank, or of that which is the last, which is disorderly and confused, and is coloured over with certain fiery qualities. Kor such as we suppose the confused and in- ordinate to be, such especially appears to be each of the subterranean elements ; because fabrication in proceeding, ends gradually in that which is unadorned, and which participates in the smallest degree of order. These things, therefore, are manifest.

We say, however, that part and power differ; so far as a part of each of the elements, Is of a similar essence with the whole of which it is a part, but power gives completion to each of the elements, For a part of fire is fire; Sut power is one of the many peculiarities in fire, such as motion, acuteness, and tenuity. Itis evident, therefore, that all tire, and all the powers of fire, and of the other elements, are comprehended in the world. What then, some one may say who is impelled by the divine wisdom which is beyond the confines of common philosophy ;' who divides all things, into the empyrean, the etherial, and the material;* and who calls the visible alone the material world, what shall we assert of the firma- ments that are above the world, whether it be requisite to call them Olympus, or empyrean, or ethers? May we not say, that though those firmaments should not consist of the four elements, again it is true, that no part of the four, is external to the universe, or rather, as Plato says, is erternally. For the term ectlernally, is more emphatical, because it manifests, that the violence which these clements bring with them, is not within the universe, but externally invades it. For those lirmaments are fiery, and are comprehended in the whole world. And again it

* Proclus means by this, the wisdom of the Chaldeans, as delivered in their Oracles.

For those lirmaments are fiery, and are comprehended in the whole world. And again it

* Proclus means by this, the wisdom of the Chaldeans, as delivered in their Oracles.

> According to the Chaldeans there are seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean and the first; after Wis, three ethereal; and then three material worlds, which consist of the inerratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region.

Tim. Plat, Vou. i. 41

434 PROCLUS ON THE [ϑοοκ "17.

is true, that there is no fire out of the universe, but the universe comprehends the whole of it, such as the universe is, and such as is the amplitude of its bulk. So that the assertion of Tiinwus 15. perfectly true. But why then, some one may say, does he give subsistence to the universe, beginning from the inerratic sphere? Is it net because it belongs to a natural philosopher to discourse about visible, and in short, sensible natures? Perhaps, too, he very properly alone makes mention of these, as pertaining to the fabrication of Jupiter. For of those [10 e. the empyrean, etherial, and material worlds] the etherial is most vivific, but the empyrean is paternal, and the material is demiurgic. For the fire which is the first beyond, did not englose its’ power in works, but in intellect : for the artificer of the fiery (i.e. the empyrean) world ts an intellect * of intellect, says the Oracle. Unless it be requisite to say this, that Plato produces soul analogous to the etheral worlds, but intellect, to the empyrean world. Ifence also he says, that soul was mingled from three parts, but that intellect is impartible. For the etherial is triple, and the Psycho- crator, or mingler of soul, who ascends into the cetherial worlds, is a Teletarch. " We Jearn, alsu, that the empyrean world is one, and is essentially intellectual. These things therefore must hereafter be considered : for itis very dubious how they accord with the dogmas of Plato. Now, however, let us pass on to the words that follow.

“ For by a dianoetic or reasoning process he concluded, that it would thus be a whole animal in the highest degree perfect from perfect parts. And besides this, that it would be one, as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced. And further still, that it would neither be obnoxious to old age, nor disease. For he intel- lectually perceived, that the heat and cold which meet in body, and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers, when they surround bodies externally, and fall on them unseasonably, dissolve their union, and introducing diseases and old age, cause them to perish through decay.”

’ For ex buvapuy here, read env δνναμιν.

* Instead of γον yap ws, it is necessary to read νὸν yap vous.

Ὁ The Teletarchs subsist at the extremity of that order of Gods which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See the 4th Book of wy translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

Ὁ The Teletarchs subsist at the extremity of that order of Gods which is called intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See the 4th Book of wy translation of Proclus on the Theology of Plato.

Book 111} TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 430

Plato assigns three causes, that I may speak summarily, through which no element is left externally to the universe, viz. perfection, unity, and perpetuity. But all these reciprocate in the subject of them. For if the universe is perfect, there is nothing external to it. For another world might be generated from that which is external; since why should one thing be generated from these elements (which are within the worldJ, but nothing from those (which are external to it}? And if there is nothing external to the world, the world is one. Again, if the world is perpetual, there is no body external to the universe, homogeneous to the elements which are init. For if any thing should invade it, it would injure, and dissolve the universe. For being external, it would be foreign to the world, and being foreign it would molest the universe. And if nothing is external to the world, the world is perpetual. For it will not have that which is corruptive of it. If also the admonition respecting the onlyness, perpetuity, and perfection of the universe, is true, it was before assumed from the paradigm. For that was all- perfect, uniform {or having the form of one], and eternal ; the second of these, on account of the one being, from which the only-begotten is derived; but the third, through eternity, from which perpetuity is derived ; and the first, through com- prehending all the forms of intelligible animals. For this is the peculiarity of all- perfect animal. But the all-perfect, indeed, is the cause of pertect natures ; the uniform, of monadic; and the eternal, of perpetual natures 3 since every producing cause, produces that which is second similar to itself, and especially when it pro- duces according to essence, and has an essence inenergy. At the same time, also, each of these is demonstrated from these as material causes. For if there is nothing external to the universe, and if it comprehends all appropriate parts, it is one, perfect, and perpetual, Some one however may doubt, how Plato arguing from perpetuity, says that nothing is left external to the universe, For there are other perpetual natures, such as the celestial bodies, and yet something is external to them. But may you not say of these, that other things are external to them, and yet not external? For as naturally separated from other things, there is something external to them ; but as being co-passive with them, and comprehended together with them as most principal parts of the universe by one nature, there is notany thing external to them. But if any thing was external to the universe, it would be external alone, having no sympathy with the world. It would also be a thing of a foreign nature, would be destitute of the life which is in the world, and would be cut off from it, by the intervening vacuum.

It would also be a thing of a foreign nature, would be destitute of the life which is in the world, and would be cut off from it, by the intervening vacuum.

If, likewise, some one should doubt concerning the psychical vehicles, how they

436 PROCLUS ON THE : [ROOK ae

are not passively affected by these elements, since they do not vanquish them in the same manner as divine bodies, it must be said that they would suffer from them, if they consisted of things similar to the elements. But now being com- posed of other things, they remain according to hypostasis ' indissoluble. Αἱ the same time, however, they are not entirely impassive ; but material bodies being agglutinated to them, they are hindered from their natural motion, and are moved in an inordinate manner; neither being able to be moved circularly, on account of the connexion with them of the material bodies, nor to proceed ina right line, on account of their own nature. Hence also Plato calls the periods of our souls, disorderly and confused ; not only on account of the psychical motions, but hke- wise on account of the motions of our vehicles, in consequence of such ἃ con- glutination taking place from these sublunary bodies. Tf therefore the universe is perpetual, and always subsists according to nature, it will be requisite that there should be nothing external toit. Por this being perfectly foreign trom it, and fall- Ing on it externally, would become the cause of its corruption, You may also say conversely, that the words, “ar order that the universe may be perpetual,” are the conclusion; but thatthe middle term and the cause of the conclusion Is this, that there ts nothing external to the universe. For because there is nothing external to the universe, nothing can introduce corruption to it, as something foreign; so that itis perpetual. To the universe therefore this is the cause of perpetuity ; but to the parts init, not this, but other things are the cause of incorruptibility ; such for instance as, the being constituted by the one Demiurgus. For he is simply the cause of immortality to all things; so that the universe is ina greater degree incorruptible. For it is incorruptible on account of the Demiurgus, and because there is nothing external to it. Thus, likewise, it is possible to convert the other parts of the text, as, that because there is nothing external to the universe, the universe ts ouly-begotten ; that the only-begotten may be threefold, viz. on account of the paradigm, on account of all matter being comprehended im it, and on ac- count of the Demiurgus being one. And, also, that the universe is a/l-perfect, hecause It is comprehensive of all things. Each of these assertions therefore is evident. But with respect to the things which are the converse of these, such as that, if the universe is only-begotten it has nothing external to it, this is immedi- ately true of the universe alone; and the demonstrations will be as follow: The universe Is only-begotten ; but if itis onty-begotten, it will have nothing external

For uxcOcow here, it seems necessary toread vrooraay.

book 111. TIMEUS OF PLATO. 437

to itself, from which another thing of the like kind may be generated. The universe is indissoluble; but if indissoluble nothing foreign to the natures of which it consists, will be external to it. The universe is all-perfect. For the all- perfect is that which is not defective in any thing. Hence Aristotle also says, that the universe alone is perfect; but all things in it are imperfect, as being parts of the universe. These therefore, that I may speak summarily, are the particulars which are discussed by Plato.

If, however, you are willing, we will recur to the words themselves. Through the words therefore, “by a dianoetic or reasoning process,” he evolves the intellec- tual perception in the Demiurgus, calling it dianoia; since he apprchends it dianoetically and not through simple projection. For a various evolution of cause, ts the work of dianoia ; but a uniform apprehension, and the comprehension of all things inone intellectual perception, are the employment of intellect. Pjato therefore, making himself the promulgator of the causes antecedently comprehended in the Demiurgus, refers his own discursive energy to the uniform intellectual perception of the fabricator of the world. ‘Thus also the oracles call the partible intellection of the Demiurgus, dianoia. For they say, “I soul being hot and animating all things dwell after the paternal dianoias.” But the words, ‘ a whole animal in the hichest degree perfect from perfect parts,” assimilate the world to the intellectual wholeness, and the intelligible allness. For parts sabsist with a reference to whole, and are not perfect from themselves ; but they have indeed the perfection of parts, yet are simply destitute of perfection. "The universe, however, is properly awhole. Jor a whole totally ts one thing ; a part totally is another ; a whole parti- ally is another ; and a part partially ranks in the third place. And the unrerse, indeed, is a whole totally, as being a whole of wholes. But each of the spheres is a part totally, according to the second Jorm of wholeness. And partial animals, are wholes partially. For the third wholeness is in these, but with a partial peculiarity. And the parts of these are parts partially ; for they are parts alone.

Moreover the words “as nothing would be left from which any other such nature might be produced,” is an explanation of the cause through which the world is one ; but it is an explanation ofthe material cause. For if there was any thing of this kind external to the world, another world greater or less might be generated from it. For the Demiurgus would not leave it unadorned; because he wishes

’ In the original ro ray apa παντελες, but apa is evitlently superfluous, For that the universe is all-

perfect, is now about to be proved,

4838 PROCLUS ON THE | [ποοκ int.

For the Demiurgus would not leave it unadorned; because he wishes

’ In the original ro ray apa παντελες, but apa is evitlently superfluous, For that the universe is all-

perfect, is now about to be proved,

4838 PROCLUS ON THE | [ποοκ int.

all things to be good, and nothing to be bad, But if the world is one, nothing of such a nature as the things from which it is generated, is left external to it. Perhaps, too, Plato adds this, on account of the celestial bodies, and in short, on account of monadic natures. For the celestial bodies are monadic, no other things being left external tothem from which such like bodies could be generated. For each of them consists of those things, which im magnitude, power, and multitude, are constitutive of them alone, but of no other thing.’ //ence also they are called monadic, because they alone consist of these things alone. Nor is any one of the simple bodies (1. ον of the four elements], such τὰ ἈΠ respects as the clement? of each of these [eelestial bodies}, From = the elevated conceptions therefore of Plato, it follows, that then alone a thing is corrupted by the natures that surround it, When it Consists of the same things as those by which itis surrounded ; so that there are as many diflerenees of fire, and of each of the elements, as there are monadie natures from whieh) the universe consists 3 and: the Dc miurgcus coustt- tuted asimany ideas of simple bodies, as of the composite natures, whieh he in tended to produce, Hence, all of them give completion to oue certain thing, and nothing else is generated from: them,

Bat the words, πω" obuovious to old age, nor disease, Wave ἃ manifest Cause. For disease arises from the want of symmetry inthe things that enter into the body, some of the parts nus being augmented by others, and dissoleing the analogy with the remaining parts of which we consist, through which a superabundance and deficiency of the humours are secretly introduced, and old age accedes, nature becoming imbecile, as Plato says further on, through contending against many things that externally attack it, and enduring a numerous succession of labours. For the concoction and management of the food, purgation, and all such things as are the works of nature, are not without labour. And trom this you may assume, that the Deminrgus who renders the world free from old age and disease, possesses the fountain of the Pwonian series. Por it’ is necessary that the truly existing cause, and which is alone the cause of health, should subsist prior to the genera- ted cause, or the cause of health which the world contains. For, in short, if the cause of symmetry is the health of the cloments, it is necessary that this should exist in the most beautiful manner in the universe, in which there is mn the most

* Tustead of ἀλλ᾽ οὐδε ovSevos here, it is requisite to read αλλὸν δὲ οἱδενος,

For, in short, if the cause of symmetry is the health of the cloments, it is necessary that this should exist in the most beautiful manner in the universe, in which there is mn the most

* Tustead of ἀλλ᾽ οὐδε ovSevos here, it is requisite to read αλλὸν δὲ οἱδενος,

* For owy τὸ ἐκάστου τουτων στοιχείων, | read cior τὸ ἕκαστον τουτων στοιχέιον. The eclestial bodies consist of, what Aristotle calls, a fifth element, and which is essentially different from cach of the four elements,

BOOK 110.) TIM-EUS OF PLATO, 439

eminent degree a symmetry of all the elements; so. that the fountain of this is primarily with the Demiurgus. And it seems that there is one concurrence with each constitution of composite natures, and which is a certain demiurgic health ; but another which renovates the existing state of being, or the state of being, which is still preserved, or is in a perishing condition; which is preserved, indeed, in the natures that are connected by indissolable bonds, but is in a perishing condition in those whose connecting bonds are dissoluble. For indissoluble natures, as being finite, and having a finite power, are in want of renovating causes: for they are renovated from things which possess infinite power. And here indeed (1. e. in what Plato now says] the providence of divinity about the universe, in order that it may be free from disease, concurs with the composition of the universe. But the providence mentioned in the Politicus, according to which divinity coming into contact with the helm of the universe, corrects what was vitiated in a former period, is the paradigm of the second kind of health, which is of a renovating nature, [ence also theologists refer one kind of health to E:scula- pius, this being all the medicine of things preternatural, whether it perpetually or sometimes only represses a preternatural subsistence. But they generate another prior to Esculapius, which is consubsistent with the fabrication of things, and which they produce from Persuasion and Love. Uence, as Plato says, the universe is from intellect: and necessity, intellect’ persuading necessity; but necessity being converted to intellect, in order that it may lead all things to that which is best. For it is evident from these things, that the universe subsists according to nature, from its first composition, through the persuasion proceeding from intellect, and the conversion of necessity to intellect. lence, it is manifest that. the Demiurgus comprehends the fountain of health, both that) which is Esculapian, and that whichis Demiurgic. And thus much for this particular,

lence, it is manifest that. the Demiurgus comprehends the fountain of health, both that) which is Esculapian, and that whichis Demiurgic. And thus much for this particular,

But the constituted body, is a composite, and alter-motive. That which is selfmotive therefore, is preservative of itself; but that which is alter-motive, in a particular manner requires not to be disturbed by other things, The universe, however, so far as itis a body is alter-motive. But Plato assumes heat and cold as things ofan eflicacions nature, and as possessing strong and vigorous powers; the former producing corruption through section, but the latter through violent con- gelation, But the word unscasonably manifests the privation of symmetry, and the ‘inaptitude arising from the want of symmetry, and besides these, the incursions

* For τὸν τὸν here, read τὸν you.

440 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 111.

440 PROCLUS ON THE [poox 111.

from chance. For it appeared to those who leave something external to the universe, that it was proper to commit the accidents of bodies to fortune and chance. Plato, however, in saying that heat and cold by surrounding and falling on the world, would introduce disease and corruption, may seem to grant that the world is in short both hot and cold. For if it did not suffer something of this kind, though the natures which surround it should be hot and cold, it would suffer nothing from them. For he says that the world would suffer by the things which would surround it. And if indeed it consisted of things some of which are hot and others cold, it would suffer by these; but if of others, which have strong and vigorous powers, it would suffer from them, For whether these surrounding natures should happen to be contrary to the things of which the world consists, because contrary, they would cause the composite on which they fall, to decay ; or whether they were similar, they would dissolve the proportion according to which the world was constituted, through being mingled with the similar natures that are in it. As he speaks, therefore, of every composite, he very properly makes mention of heat and cold, as of things universally known. For there 3a certain composite, and it consists of these, and is known to all. Tlenece, because it is known, he mentions these. Since, however, every composite does not con- sist of these, he adds, in what he afterwards says, universally, ‘ and all such things as have strong and vigorous powers,” though they should not be heats and colds. For it is necessary that every physical body should have a physical power, through which it may be able to act according to nature, If, therefore, any body should surround the world, whether similar or dissimilar to certain things contained in it; if dissimilar, indecd, it would disturb the world; but itis necessary that what is impassive should not be disturbed by that which is foreign, and by something which is situated ia a certain place; and if similar, In consequence of being mingled with what is similar to it, it would dissolve the ratio of the elements in the world, from which it is constituted according to the most beautiful Lond. Such therefore is the explanation of the particulars of the text.

Let us, however, survey itself by itself, how there is nothing external to the uni- verse. For why did not the Demiurgus who constituted matter, fabricate many kinds of matter, and many worlds?) May we not say, that he constituted matter, and always constitutes it, according to the unity which he contains, so that on this account, he very properly produces but one matter ; and that the multitude of sensible forms possess differences, which distinguish them from each other, but that matter is without difference and without quality? Por though we should

BOOK IIL.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 441

Por though we should

BOOK IIL.) TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 441

orant that there are many kinds of matter in this universe, yet we must say that there is one matter which proceeds from on high through diminution, as far as to the last dregs of things, which last sediment also is truly formless, the summit of matter having a great alliance to forms. For all things according to their summit are most allied to the natures prior tothem. So that there is one, and vet not one matter, which proceeds through all things, itself subsiding into itself. Onaccount of this matter, therefore, the Demiurgus produced one world having itselfa diminution with reference to itself.’ | Every thing likewise which makes by its very existence, being one in itself, makes one image of itself, and one whole form; and especially when it remains immoveable. For being moved, it is pos- sible for it to make other and other images of itself. Farther still it may be said, that to divide production into multitude, is no lonzer the effect of power, but of imbecili- ty. But to comprehend multitude in unity, and to connect thewhole number of things through the monad, is the province of admirable abundance. Vf, therefore, total pow- éris in the Demiurgus, if he is an immoveable cause, if he fabricates by his very being, and if he generates that which is similar to himself, he generates the world one, Whole, and perfect. What then, it may be said, is not the Demiurgus able to

govern many and infinite worlds? We reply, that multitude and the infinite (in quan-

tty} are not the prerogatives of power, but that it pertains to power to congregate things that are divided, and to give bound to infinites. For this assimilates things to the good, 0 which also the Demiurgus extends all his productions. "This, therefore, is demon- strated through many other arguments.

That Plato however, in an admirable manner informs us, that nothing is left external to the universe, from which any thing else of the like kind could be ge- nerated, and that each of the things that are monadic alone consists of the simple | natures of which it is composed, and there are not other? things external to it of a similar kind, from which any other such nature could be produced, we may learn by observing that he says, an all-various inequality exists in the seeds of bodies. And also, that on account of this inequality, the differences of fire, and ofeach of the elements, are incomprehensible. Hence, all fire is not ’ similar to all fire, though visibility is common to all. On this account likewise, there is a certain fire which burns, and this is all-various from the smallness and magni-

{ For aura εἰς eavrny here, it seems necessary to read αὐτὸν εἰς eavroy. I

* Instead of καὶ μὴ εἰναι exros avrov, adda rovros ὁμοία, it is necessary to al και μὴ εἰναι eKTos

“avrov ἄλλα κ. ds

ἡ Οὐχ is omitted here in the original.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. aK

442 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ rit;

I

* Instead of καὶ μὴ εἰναι exros avrov, adda rovros ὁμοία, it is necessary to al και μὴ εἰναι eKTos

“avrov ἄλλα κ. ds

ἡ Οὐχ is omitted here in the original.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. aK

442 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ rit;

tude of the elements of which it consists. And the same thing is true of all the elements. Each of the monadic natures therefore, consists of all such things, as are contained in it alone, but in no other thing whatever. Hence it is not ex- ternally mingled with them nor is connascent with them. But you may also as- sume this from these sublunary bodies. For not every one is nourished by every one, but different bodies by ditlerent things, because all of them are not similar to the elements of which they consist. But each body becomes greater through those things by which itis able to be nourished, the things that enter into it re- ceiving the places of those that depart from it. On this account, therefore, cor- ruptible natures perish, because there are external to them things of a kind similar to those of which they consist, and which are contraries some to one thing, and others to another. Each of these also, being added to their appro- priate natures, introduce corruption to composites, by dissolving the symmetry which is in them. In things that are corruptible therefore, the reason or product- ive principle, especially effects a difference, since itis very different from that of simple natures. But in things that are indissoluble, the difference, and tbe reasons of the composition cf them, pertain to the same things. Hence, they are indissoluble, and in short monadic, alone existing from elements alone, ac- cording to one reason, and one symmetry. These things, therefore, should be examined more fully. Por we shall find that they subsistin a beautiful manner,’ if we look to things, and do not restin words alone, as is the case with many who meddle with the theory of these particulars. Let us, however, proceed to what

ux next said by Plato.

“ Through this cause, therefore, and this reasoning, he fabricated the world one whole, perfect from containing in itself all wholes, and free

from old age and disease.”

Cause indeed, uniformly comprehends every thing which proceeds from it, but reasoning comprehends its productions ina divided manner, as we have before observed. So that the universe as one whole is comprehended by its cause, and is generated according to cause ; but as consisting of all wholes, it is generated by a reasoning process.’ And itis generated one indeed, by the demiurgic deity,

MInstead of evpyooper yap ov καλως ἐχόντα, it js obviously necessary to read ἐυρησομεν yap καλως

€yorvra. * A reasoning process in the Demiurgus signifies, as has been before observed, a distributed or divid-

ed cause of things.

BOOK 111. TIM.ZUS OF PLATO. 443

* A reasoning process in the Demiurgus signifies, as has been before observed, a distributed or divid-

ed cause of things.

BOOK 111. TIM.ZUS OF PLATO. 443

and according to divine union; but a whole according to the wholeness which is connective of intellectuals." For this producing totally renders the universe a whole. And it isa whole containing in itself all wholes, according to the divided causes of forms. For the monad possesses with itself the whole number [of which it is the cause.] The universe also is perfect, as being always converted to its principles, and imitating the demiurgic conversion. But it is free from old age and disease, as having a flourishing, vigorous, and ever vigilant life, and as par- ticipating of admirable powers. For from the causes which renovate the world a pure and unwearicd life is imparted to it, and from the inflexible * Gods, unde- filed power. And through the former indeed the world is free from old age, always becoming new ; but through the latter, it is free from disease, being puritied from every thing preternatural. The Demiurgus, however, comprehends the cause of both these.

“Βαϊ he gave to it a figure adapted and ailied to its nature. For to the animal which was to comprehend all animals in itself, that figure will be adapted, which contains within its ambit all figures of every kind. Hence he fashioned it as with a wheel of a spheriform shape, every where (or fromall the parts} equally distant from the middle to the bounding extremities; this being the most perfect of all figures, and the most simi- lar to itself. For he conceived that the similar is infinitely more beauti- ful than the dissimilar.”

After the total causes of the world, the whole composition of it, and its essence consisting of total plenitudes, Timaus speaks concerning the figure of the uni- verse ; the most similar of all figures, being essentially imparted to it by the Demi- urgus. And this is the fourth demiurgic gift conferred on the universe. There are therefore, other demonstrations both physical and mathematical, that the world is spherical, which we shall afterwards discuss. Now, however, let us first direct our attention to the Platonic demonstration, which is truly a demonstration, and together with ¢hat itis, showing why it is. The demonstration therefore, is

' The wholeness which is connective of intellectuals, constitutes the middle trad of the order of Gods which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual. See Book iv. of my translation

of Proclus on the Theology of Plato. * These are the Amilicti or Curetes of the Grecks, and form the a triad of the intellectual

order of Gods,

444 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

See Book iv. of my translation

of Proclus on the Theology of Plato. * These are the Amilicti or Curetes of the Grecks, and form the a triad of the intellectual

order of Gods,

444 PROCLUS ON THE [Book 1.

triple, the first being derived from ¢he one, the second from intelligible beauty, and the third from intellectual production. Or rather each of these is manifold, and at least triple. We may say then, immediately with respect to the demonstration from the one, that the Demiurgus is one, and you may also say that the paradigm is one, and that the good is one, From these things likewise, you may assume, that in figures that which is especially one is more divine and more perfect: than that which is not one. For that which ¢he ove is in the Gods, that which the one intelligible animal itself, is in intelligible animals, and that which the one maker and father is among the Demiurgi, that the sphere is among solid: figures, For the one is comprehensive of many unitics, animal itself, of mtelligible animals, the one Demiurgus, of many causes, and the one spherical figure, of all figures. The second demonstration therefore, is from the beautiful and the becoming. For the spherical figure’ is becoming to the receiver, to the giver, and to the paradigm. To the receiver indeed, because he being perfect, is friendly to the most perfect of firures, and he who is comprehensive of all things, is friendly to that which comprebends all things in itself. But it is becoming to the giver, because he being intellect, and converted to himself, generated a becoming figure, and most simi- lar to himself. For as Plato says in the Laws, intellect possesses intelligence similar to the motion of a sphere fashioned by a wheel; being extended according to the same things, after the same manner, in the same, and about the same. And itis becoming to the paradigm, because the intelligible universe is a thing of this kind, converging on all sides to itself,

On all sides like a sphere’s revolving bulk, Well from the middle pois’d with equal force,

And round its stable centre glad to run :

says Parmenides. The same things also are asserted by Empedocles. For he makes a two-fold sphere, the one being sensible, in which strife predominates, but the other intelligible, which is connected by Venus. Ie likewise calls the one the image of the other; but it is evident which of the two he denominates the mage.

The third demonstration therefore, is from the allied. For a spherical figure is allied to the universe; since it is allied to the one, to the Demiurgus, and to all- perfect animal. To the one indeed, because of the oneness of a spherical figure.

“ Yor ro rperoy here, it is necessary to read ro σφαιρικον.

noox it] TIMEZUS OF PLATO. — 415

For a spherical figure is allied to the universe; since it is allied to the one, to the Demiurgus, and to all- perfect animal. To the one indeed, because of the oneness of a spherical figure.

“ Yor ro rperoy here, it is necessary to read ro σφαιρικον.

noox it] TIMEZUS OF PLATO. — 415

For as the world is one, so likewise the figure of it is uniform. Buta spherical figure is allied to the Demiurgus, because he contains all things intellectually in himself. And it is allied to the paradigm, because it first proceeds from it. Hence this figure, is primogeniat to the world. It also presents itself to the view, in the occult order itself.'’ For (what is said in the Orphic verse ]

Unwearied in a boundless orb it moves,

is asserted of that order, But itis more clearly seen in’ all- -perfect animal, For itis said of this divinity by the theologist, that he is excited in an ineffable circle. And it is still more clearly visible in the [intelligible and at the same time] intel- lectual Gods. For there, intellectual figure, the rectilinear, and the circular sub- sist, as it is asserted in the Parmenides. Farther still, after these Gods, this figure is seen in the Demiurgus. For ashe is intellectual intellect, the universe subsists appropriately in him, and he receives demiurgic powers from the Gods that are prior to him. Hence also he is the Demiurgus of all mundane figures. But what shall we say after the Demiurgus of much-honoured Vulean? Does he not fashion all mundane natures, elaborating all heaven and generation, and making

Bracelets and chains, and necklaces and rings.*

For how is it possible, since he produces the essence of the mundane body, that he should not impart a figure adapted to each of the bodies contained in the world? He however gives figure to the universe as it were with his own hands; but the Demiurgus by his will alone. For manual operation with him is will, and pro- duction is intellection. And thus much we have inferred from these particulars. Because, however, the spherical figure is allied and adapted to the universe, it is necessary that the universe should have a figure of this kind. Perhaps, indeed, because’ a sphere, as those who are skilled in mathematics say, is the most capa- cious of all solids that have equal perimeters, and as we shall shortly after show by collecting what they have asserted. Perhaps also because every polygonous figure of εὐθεῖ sides may be inscribed in ἃ sphere ;* but it is not possole to

th At the extremity of the first triad of the intelligible order. ἢ iad XVIIL. v. 402. -

7 Orcis omitted here in the original

Tustead of εἰς αλλο σχῆμα duvaroy εγγραφεσθαι, it is necessary to read, εἰς σφαιραν δυνατὸν eyypae φεσθαι.

4

f { ! { | {

\

“48 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook 111.

ἢ iad XVIIL. v. 402. -

7 Orcis omitted here in the original

Tustead of εἰς αλλο σχῆμα duvaroy εγγραφεσθαι, it is necessary to read, εἰς σφαιραν δυνατὸν eyypae φεσθαι.

4

f { ! { | {

\

“48 PROCLUS ON THE [Rook 111.

inscribe-every polygonous figure of equal sides in another figure. Hence a sphere is most adapted to that which is to contain all things in itself: for the five regular figures may be inscribed in it. If therefore, you look to corporeal masses, all inasses of equal perimeters will be comprehended in the sphere. Not that they will be so contained in as to have their surfaces equal to the spherical superficies : for they will be less than it. But if all figures may be inseribed in the spherica! superficies, which is not true in other figures, this also is more appropriate to the things proposed. For Plato likewise says that this figure is adapted to that which is to comprehend in itself all figures. For intending to fabricate the body of the universe, through the five regular figures, he very properly looks to all the figures which are about to be comprehended by the universe. So that he evidently directs his attention, not to corporeal masses, but to the inscription of figures.

Farther still, you may also say in a more perfect manner, that the nature which is to comprehend all things in itself, ought to have dominion over all that it con- tains: for it will not otherwise be comprehensive of them. But that which has dominion over all things, assimilates all things to itself, For nothing has dom- nion over things foreign and dissimilar. That, however, which assimilates all things to itself, will be by a much greater priority most similar to itself; in order that it may impart similitude to other things. But that which being a body is most similar to itself, is spherical. Hence the body which comprehends all things in itself, is spherical. This figure, therefore, is adapted to the world: for it is most perfect, and most similar. It is most perfect, indeed, as being comprehen- sive of all things, and as having an unceasing motion. Fora right line is imper- fect, as always capable of being extended ; but a circle and a sphere are most perfect, as not receiving increase, and as making the end of their motion the beginning. Such therefore is the meaning of what is here said by Plato.

Let us, however, consider the dogma by itself, conformably to the intellectual conesptions of lamblichus. Since, therefore, it is necessary that the world should be assimilated to the whole soul which rides as it were in it, itis also necessary that it should become similar to the vivilic body of that soul. Hence, as the Demiurgus constituted the mundane soul, according to two circles, thus also he fashioned the universe of aspherical figure, assimilating it to the self-motion of soul. fence too, our vehicle is rendered spherical, and is moved circularly, when the

Hence, as the Demiurgus constituted the mundane soul, according to two circles, thus also he fashioned the universe of aspherical figure, assimilating it to the self-motion of soul. fence too, our vehicle is rendered spherical, and is moved circularly, when the

\ soul isin a remarkable degree assimilated to intellect. For the intellection of soul, and

\ . . . . . . . . “he . . . the circulation of bodies, imitate intellectual energy, just as rectilinear motion imi- tates the ascent and descent of souls. Vor these motions pertain to bodics, which

|

BOOK 111.} TIM.EUS OF PLATO. AA?

are not in their proper places. Farther still, the unceasing motion of the universe, is similar to infinite power; its uniform circulation, to simplicity of essence ; and the circulation of wholes, after the same manner, and about the same centre, to eternal permanency. Again, as the one motion of the world comprehends all motions, one wholeness, all wholes, and corporeal parts; and as one nature, comprehends all second and third natures, thus also it is necessary that the one mundane figure, should be comprehensive of all figures. This figure, however, is spherical, at the same time being one, and capable of containing multitude ; which is a circumstance truly divine, to have dominion over every thing multitudinous: without departing from unity.

In addition also to these things, as intelligible animal itself comprehends all intelligible animals, according to one union, thus also the world being assimilated to its paradigm, comprehends all mundane figures, according to the spherical figure. Fora sphere alone is able to comprehend all the elements. As there- fore the world by its onlyness adumbrates the intelligible universe, thus also by its spherical figure, it imitates the comprehension of wholes in that universe. Far- ther still, the world through this fizure is assimilated to intelligible beauty. For how is it possible that a thing which is perfectly equable, commensurate, and similar, should not be in a remarkable degree beautiful? If, therefore, it is neces- sary that the world should be the most beautiful of sensibles, it is requisite that it should have a figure of this kind, on all sides equal, definite, and accurate.

If, therefore, it is neces- sary that the world should be the most beautiful of sensibles, it is requisite that it should have a figure of this kind, on all sides equal, definite, and accurate.

sides the same, pertains to the cause of bound. Farther still, that which is cole lective of many things into one, and likewise the generative, and the spermatic, rejoice in a figure of this kind. But this is manifest in seeds, and in the more ptin- cipal parts of animals: for nature renders these as much as possible, spherical. Again, the immutable, the unbroken, and the perpetual, are most adapted! and allied to a spherical figure; since in consequence of every where verging to itself, it is most powerful. For the centre is unific and connective of the whole sphere. Very properly, therefore, did the Demiurgus constitute the universe, which is connective of itself, of a spherical figure. These things, therefore, may be philosophically said concerning this particular.

* Yor owecora here, read οἰκειοτατα.

448 PROCLUS ON THE [Βοοκ ut,

After another manner, however, the same thing may be syllogistically inferred, physically in the way in which Aristotle endeavoured to prove it. For since the universe is moved in a circle, and it has been demonstrated by him that there is nothing external to the extreme circumference of the world, neither vacuum, nor place, it is necessary that the figure of the universe should be spherical, and not rectilinear. For if it was rectilinear, there would be a vacuum. For as the universe revolves in acircle, it would never have the same place through the alter- nate mutation ofthe angles and superticies. For since of every other figure besides a sphere, the lines from the middle are unequal, there will be a vacuum according to the less interval, where the bulk of the body is not. Whether therefore it be according to length, or according to breadth, there will be, during the revolution, a less interval, For a vacuum is perfectly equidistant; bat where there is no body nor figure, there will be a deficiency, In Consequence of the magnitude being less than the vacuum.’ Farther still, from secondary natures also, you: may assuine physically, that the universe is spherical. For the earth Is spherical, as is evident from all things every way tending to the middle of it. But water is dil- fused round the earth, and itis spherical. For there is a contlux of it into the concavity, till it comes into contact with the central part of the earth, The ar also surrounds the water and the earth, and the fire surrounds the air. It, however, this be the case, the heavens likewise will be spherical. For there will be a vacuum within them, unless they also spherically comprehend tire.

It, however, this be the case, the heavens likewise will be spherical. For there will be a vacuum within them, unless they also spherically comprehend tire.

Again, nature distributes to the first of bodies, the first of figures, and a simple figure, to a simple body. For in each genus of things, ¢#e one is prior to the many, and the simple, to the composite. As, therefore, we distribute motions in a way adapted to their works, to simple works indeed, simple notions, but to composite works, Composite motions; thus also there is an allotinent of appropriate figures, one kind to simple, but another to composite bodies. Ligure, however, ts, as tt

were, the visible resemblance of form, the morphe of morphe, and as it were anafiation of

the peculiar hyparcis of each particular thing. Hence, that which is essentially simple, proceeds into a simple figure, but that which is variously mingled, has also a co-mingled idea of figure. Farther still, the celestial motion is the measure of notions ; but the measure in each thing is that which is least. The least motion, however, is the swiftest. But circulation is the swiftest of motions. If, however,

"Tustead of over ro σχημα ἐλλείψει, δια τὸ peyeNus, ἐλαττον ον τὸν KEVoU in this place, it is necessary

to read, ονὲς ro σχημα, ἐλλείψει, δια ro peyeOus ἔλαττον ον τὸν κενὸν.

BOOK 111. TIM EUS OF PLATO, 449

this be the care, the heavens are spherical. For the sphencal is the swiftest of motions, IN consequence, as the Elean guest says, of proceeding on the smallest foot. Again, of bodies, some consist of similar, but others of dissimilar parts. "To bodies, therefore, of dissimilar parts, dissimilar figures are necessarily distributed by nature. For polygonous and, in short, angular figures, are of this kind, and wiso those that consist ofmany superticies. But to bodies of similar parts, similar fizures are adapted contermably to their excellence. For the sphere alone among solids is a similar figure; since all the rest have dissimilar ficures. For some have two superficies, ἂς ibe cone, others three, as the cylinder, others four, others five, and others more than five, as pyramids on polygonous bases arranged in sue- cession. If, therefore, ether consists of similar parts, but the figure of that which consists of similar parts is similar, and the similar is spherical, ether is spherical. After this manner, therefore, we may physically prove that the world is spherical,

If, therefore, ether consists of similar parts, but the figure of that which consists of similar parts is similar, and the similar is spherical, ether is spherical. After this manner, therefore, we may physically prove that the world is spherical,

If, however, it be requisite to elucidate what is said, by mathematical demons strations, let us summarily relate what appears to be the truth to those who are skilled in these particulars, In the first place, therefore, they endeavour to prove {that the universe is spherical] from the stars being moved in parallel circles, both the fixed stars, and the planets, the sections always becoming unequal, as we approach to the north; so that some of the circles touch the horizon; but others which are less than these, do not touch it. And, at last, there is a certain immoveable point, about which all the circulation is moved. In the next place, they infer this from the nights and days becoming unequal, conformably to the solar motions to the north or south. In the third place, from shadows. For whence is it that the sun when he begins to rise," and also when he sets, is more northerr. to us, and appears to pass beyond the crab, but when he is in the meridian, he sends the shadow to the north; unless from the universe being moved in acircle, which inclines to our motion? Farther still, they prove that the universe is spherical, from the stars which are not moved according to depth, always appearing to have an equal magnitude. For if the heavens were not spherical but cylindrical, or some other such like figure, it would be requisite that the sun, when he becoines more southern to us, should appear to be less, oir account of the inequalily of the interval.*| Nothing of this kind, however, is seen to take place. From these things, therefore, astronomers, in short, endeavonr te prove that the universe is splirical.

* For encyec here, it is necessary to read ἀνίσχει». ἢ For vrocracews in this place, it is necessary (o read arorrasews.

Tim. Plat. γον i. af

450 ; PROCLUS ON THE {Book 411.

Vv

From these things, therefore, astronomers, in short, endeavonr te prove that the universe is splirical.

* For encyec here, it is necessary to read ἀνίσχει». ἢ For vrocracews in this place, it is necessary (o read arorrasews.

Tim. Plat. γον i. af

450 ; PROCLUS ON THE {Book 411.

Vv

But that a sphere is the most capacious of all bodies that have equal perimeters, is also demonstrated by them. Likewise that all bodies of equal sides may be inscribed ina sphere, but not all of them in any one of the polyedra. Nor is there any occasion that we should transcribe what is demonstrated by them. For we write to him who has been sufficiently instructed in these particulars. At the same time, however, thus much must be related, that they demonstrate the super- ficies of the sphere to be more capacious than that of all other solid bodies of equal ambits, and they particularly demonstrate that it is more capacious than the bodies which are called by Plato, equilateral and equiangular polyedra; partly employing the propositions of Euclid, and partly those of Archimedes. As I have said, therefore, the demonstrations of this may be obtained from their writings. Ttais our intention, also, after we have commented on the whole of the Titmeus, to discuss more fully in a collection of the Mathematical Theorems in the Timieus, such mathematical particulars as are disseminated in the Comment- aries; in order that the lovers of truth, by having a collection of these things, may be assisted in the all-various comprehension of the mathematical parts of the dialogue, But enough of mathematics.

Tet us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey after what manner each of them is delivered. That in intellectuals! then, figure is after whole, and that Plato having demonstrated the universe to be a whole, very properly in what follows teaches us concerning the figure of it, we have before observed. Since, however, this proceeds into-the universe fruin the demiurgic cause, on this account he says that figure was given to it from thence. But the giver evidently possesses by a much greater priority that which he gives. The spherical figure, therefore, is in the Demiurgus, but mitellectually ; so that it is in all-perfect animal intelligibly, and in that which is still prior to the latter of these,* occultly. For if it be requisite to speak what appears to me to be the truth, where intellect is, there

>

also the spherical peculiarity exists. For intellectual energy has an essence of such a kind as that to which the Athenian stranger or guest assimilates it.? But in one place, this peculiarity subsists unitedly and intelligibly, as those say who are divinely wise. In another place, it subsists intelligibly, indeed, but with a

* i.e. In first intellectuals, or in other words, in that divine order which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual. 2

In another place, it subsists intelligibly, indeed, but with a

* i.e. In first intellectuals, or in other words, in that divine order which is denominated intelligible and at the same time intellectual. 2

i.e. In being itself, or the summit of the intelligible triad. ὁ Τὰ the Luth book of the Laws, he assimilates it to the revolution of a spnere fashioned by a wheel.

BOOK 111.]} TIALEUS OF PLATO. $51

more abundant intelligible division. In another intellectually, but accompanied

with an all-various diversity. And in another sens:bly, accompanied with separa-

tion and interval, And _ this last, indeed, is not simply called by Plato spherical

(σφαιρικοην), but spheriform (σφαιροειδές), as being an imitation of the intellectual or

intelligible sphere. For the universe also is moved in a circle, because it imitates

intellect. Bul either the intellectual or the intelligible universe, will be most principally

spherical ; and that which ts truly astronomy, will be conversant with these. For this

ἐξ fo astronomize above the heavens." Moreover, to be from all the parts equally

distant from the middle to the bounding extremities, pertains indeed, to the

sensible sphere, because all the lines from the centre of the earth to the extremities

of the sphere are equal. For from all the parts is significant of distance accord- ing to the three intervals (of length, breadth, and depth}. It also pertains to the mathematical sphere. For there there is a middle, and the intervals are from all the parts equal. After another manner likewise it pertains to intellect. For to converge to ilsclf, and to be as it were of the same colour acoording to every part of étsclf, and to have all the powers in it conjoined to the one of itself, ἐδ the spherical pecu- liarity in intellect. Proceeding also still higher, it will no longer be possible to separate the centre from the sphere, on account of the ineflable and united nature of the intelligible* peculiarity. Le says, therefore, that it is the property of the sphere to have all the right lines every way equal from the middle, in order to distinguish it from the circle. For the term every way, or from all parts, does not pertain to this, since it has only two intcrvals.

Le says, therefore, that it is the property of the sphere to have all the right lines every way equal from the middle, in order to distinguish it from the circle. For the term every way, or from all parts, does not pertain to this, since it has only two intcrvals.

Plato likewise uses the expression lo fashion as with a wheel, because bodies with us are rendered more accurately round throngh a wheel which cuts off the inequalities of the bodies. And that the simi/ar and the perfect especially pertain to the spherical peculiarity, is evident. The similar, therefore, is analogous to the one, but the perfect to the good, so that through both he refers the spherical pecu- liarity to the first principle of things, by saying that itis most similar to itself, and most perfect ; equallizing that which is most unical and most boniform. For neither the mixed perfect or similar, nor the right line, which always receives an addition and may become angular; but the spherical peculiarity alone, is most similar and most perfect. After this, he adds, which is evident, “ that the similar ts better than the dissimilar.” For similitude is of an uniting, but dissimilitude of a

* Which the Coryphean philosopher mentioned by Plato in the Thextetus, is said to do. * Instead of rns voepas cSuorgros in this place, it is neccssary to read ras voqrys ἐδιστητοε.

452 PROCLUS ON THE {[nooK 111.

* Instead of rns voepas cSuorgros in this place, it is neccssary to read ras voqrys ἐδιστητοε.

452 PROCLUS ON THE {[nooK 111.

dividing nature. And the former belongs to the co-ordination of sameness, but the latter to that of difference. And the former is the cause of simplicity, but the fat- ter of variety to things. As the artiticer therefore of the universe found, that among things naturally visible, the intellectual is more beaatifal than that whieh is dest- tute of intellect, thus also he thought that the similar is better than the dissimilar. For in intelligibles, similitude is better than dissimilitude, in powers, πὶ intellectual perceptions, and in productions. Whenee also some one may wonder at those Platonists, who admit that difference is better than) sameness, though Plato says that the similar is infinitely more beautiful than the dissimilar, At the same time, also, dissimilitade is ima certain respect secretly introduced into beings from matter, but similitade accedes from forms alone, and intellizible causes. Sinilitude, therefore, is infinitely better than dissimilitude ; 50 that sameness is also more excellent than difference. ‘This is the judgment of Jupiter. Through this, also, in the universe the similar is better than the dissimilar, in essences, in motions, in figures, and in all other things. For the progression of things Is very properly effected through the similitude of productions to the cause of the produc- tion; and again, conversion is the primary leader of another similitude. Very properly therefore is the world, on account of these things, under the dominion of similitude, being a God according to form itself. Hence Plato also endeavours to show what the figure of the world is, from similitude, and the Py thagoric Timeus himself, assigns this as the first cause of its fisure, in conjunction with making a physical mention of it. “ For a sphere alone, says he, both when it is quiescent, and when it is moved, is capable of bem co-adapted in the same place; so as never to fail nor receive another place.” Aristotle likewise after finn, well knew, that with whatever other figure you may surround the universe, you will make a vacuum, through the alternate mutation of the angles, and the une- qual distance of the extremes from the middle.

“He also accurately elaborated the external circumference of the uni- verse, and rendered it smooth, for the sake of many things.”

Some one may think that the same thing which was before asserted, is again here repeated. For in what docs this smouthness differ from rotundity, or what mutation is there of similitude? In acertain respect, therefore, this universe com- prehends what has been said about similitude; but at the same time, there isa difference between surveying what the nature is of the whole figure which per-

BOOKIII.] TIM £US OF PLATO. 153

In acertain respect, therefore, this universe com- prehends what has been said about similitude; but at the same time, there isa difference between surveying what the nature is of the whole figure which per-

BOOKIII.] TIM £US OF PLATO. 153

vades as far as to the centre of the earth, and alone considering itself by itself, the most external superficies of the universe. And what is here said about smooth- ness, conteads as it appears to one thing, viz. to show that the universe is neither in want of gnostic, nor of partible motive organs, for the purpose of acting upon, orsuflering from other things ; introdaciny this as the fifth deminreie cilt to the world. What is said, therefore, about the sindothness, is a medium between what is asserted respecting the bulk, and the soul of the universe. For the proximate boundary of body is smoothness 3 but the exempt boundary is soul, and prior to soul, intellect. For this is the boundary of soul itself. And prior to intellect, the one deity which connects the whole mundane multitude, is the boundary of the body of the world. You may therefore speak after this manner.

But you may also say, according to a more perfect mode, that. the universe being a luminous whole, it is most Juminous according to its external superticies, and is full of divine splendour. For on this account also poets place Olympus on the summit of the world, being wholly luminous, and light itself.

Nor clouds, nor rain, nor winter there are found," But dazziing spleodour spreads its radiance round.

Of this luminous subsistence, smoothness is a symbol. Why therefore are the summits of the universe smooth? Plato says, for the sake of many things. For they are so, in order that it may be spontaneously conjoined with soul and intel- lect, and may be adapted to supermundane lights, through a similitude to them, Smoothness, therefore, is sixnificant * of the highest aptitude, through which the uni- verse is able to receive the illaminations from iniclicca and soul ; in the same manner as mirrors receive the representations of things by their smoothness. Formerly also by theologists, a mirror was assumed as a symbol of aptitude, to the intellec- tual completion of the universe. Hence they say, Vulean made a mirror for Di- onysius, or Bacehus, into which the God looking, and beholding the image of himself, proceeded: into the whole partuble fabrication of things. You may say therefore, that Plato reminds os of this catoptnc apparatus, ino what he now says of the sniouthness of the external superiicies of the world, Hence the corporeal

* fom, Odyss. vi, v. 45. Butin Proclus for ava bad \or aibon, read a\\a μαλ᾽ αιθρη.

ἢ For συμμακτικη here, read σημαντικη.

ie, PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ 111.

vi, v. 45. Butin Proclus for ava bad \or aibon, read a\\a μαλ᾽ αιθρη.

ἢ For συμμακτικη here, read σημαντικη.

ie, PROCLUS ON THE [βοοκ 111.

universe is a thing of this kind, externally smooth, according to which also, it ix connascent with its own intellect, and with the Demiurgus, Henee tov, pocts establish the Demiurgus on the highest summit of the world; it being allotted so great an aptitude from him, to the participation of intelligible causes,

If you are willing, also, according to another mode, smoothness itselfis a symbol of the divine and simple life in the world. We, therefore, since we havea partible life, have also the parts of the body multiform, and variously mixed, because different things are prepared by nature for a different life, But the universe has one and asimple Jife. For it is purified from those things of which terrestrial animals are in want, through a material: and partible life. Menee it is. the reei- pient of one life, butis exempt from a various life. Itis also prepared for one, but is unreceptive of a divided life. On this account, it is said τὸ be accurately elaborated eaternally, and rendered smooth, because it is fitly adapted by the demiurgic cause, to the reception of one life, being constructed as the orzan of such a life. What follows, however, is shgmiticant of this,

“Nor was the addition of eyes requisite to the universe: for nothing visible was left external to it. Nor was hearing necessary : for there was nothing externally audible, Nor was itinvested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration,”

Through these things, Plato appears to do nothing clse, than to take away a partible life from the universe, and the partible organs, which are suspended from us, when we descend intu generation, For while we abide on high, we are not at ail in want of these multiform lives, and partible organs. But the luciform vehicle is sufficient, which possesses all the senses unitedly. If, therefore, we are purified from every !ife of this hind, when we are liberated from generation, what ought we to think respecting the universe? Ts it not, thatit has one simple life, thatitis wholly vigihintly excited to it, and is equally in every part prepared for the completion of one Lite? Or taust we not in a much greater degree admit) hese things of the universe! Por wholes are more divine than parts, and comprehending than comprehended natures, And thas much as to the cotmmon conception of the things proposed,

Since, however, in whatis now said, and in what follows, Plato takes away

nooK 111. TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 455

Por wholes are more divine than parts, and comprehending than comprehended natures, And thas much as to the cotmmon conception of the things proposed,

Since, however, in whatis now said, and in what follows, Plato takes away

nooK 111. TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 455

all sense from the world, viz. sceing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching, let ug in the first place consider this, whether the universe is sensitive or not. For of the ancients, some were led to one, and others to another opinion on this sub- ject. We indced hear theologists speaking of the fountain of sense, and asserting of the father [i. ον of the Demiurgus] that he possesses intelligibles through intel- lect, but introduces sense to the worlds."| And again, we hear from the Greeks,

Sun who see’st all things, and dost all things hear,”

Seeing and hearing not existing in him partibly, as in us, but according to one life, and one subject. Since in us also, Aristotle proclaims, that there is princi- pally one sense, and one principal sensorium. Nor were the wise men among the Greeks ignorant that there are divine senses, nor did they refuse to assert of the Demiurgus himself,

The undecaying royal ether forms Hlis intellect from falsehood free; by which He all things indicates and knows; nor voice, !

Nor sound, wor rumor can Jove's cars clude.

And why do I speak of theologists, when Plato himself says that the universe is an animal, and that animal is characterized by sense? So that asserting likewise that a plant is an animal, he immediately imparts to it a certain other sense. On hearing therefore, as [have said, these things, we are unwilling to admit that the universe is without sensation. For in the Theetetus, sense is said to be the frus- tration of truth ; and it is universally agreed that its knowledge is passive, and conversant with the images of things. lence, it is better, in order that we may be in the middle of both these, to take away from the universe every sense of this kind, and to give to it another more excellent than this, and more adapied to the Gods. What, therefore, is this sense, and after what manner may it be assumed? That the universe, indeed, is sensitive, we may render manifest from its being an animal, and from the soul of it being dianoetic and doxastic, and imparting to the mun- dane body a participation of both these, which participation is an image of dia-

Ὁ This is asserted in the Chaldean Oracles. * Cayss. XT. v. 108. * Foravéa here, read avéq; nod for mAvOer im the foliowing line, ἡ ληθει. These verses are Orphic.

456 PROCLUS ON THE [Boox 11}.

ποῖα and opinion ; and this we say is the mundane phantasy itself, adumbrating

intelligence, and possessing invisible sensations * of the sensibles which exist in

every period. It is possible, therefore, from these and many other arguments, to be persuaded that the universe possesses sensation. Batit requires an appropriate

It is possible, therefore, from these and many other arguments, to be persuaded that the universe possesses sensation. Batit requires an appropriate

inspection, to know what sense it possesses. Tsay then, that of sense, the first

and most principal kind, is that which imitates intellect. For every where things | that rank as first, have an imitation of the natures prior to them. Hence, this sense is conjoined to things that are first, comprehending in itself the sensible object of its perception, and neither passing from some things to others; for this is the

province of sense distributed into various parts; nor proceeding outwardly 5 for this is imperfect ; but it possesses the whole of what is sensible in itself, and 13, as it were, rather consciousness than sense. The second kind of sense after this, 1s that which proceeds indeed outwardly, but according to a perfect energy, which every where always apprehends the whole object of its knowledge with invariable

sameness, and is purified from all passion, and from all the imbecility which 18

adapted to partible and material organs. But the third kind of sense is that, which suffers from externals, and is mingled from passion and knowledge; be- ginning indeed from passion, but ending in knowledge. And the last kind of sense is that with which the most obscure knowledge is present, which ts full of passion, and proximate to physical sympathy, so as not to have a kuowledge of the forms

of sensibles. Thus, for instance, it does not know that the thing which acts on it is hot or cold, but alone perceives that what falls on it is pleasant or painful, Por Timzus farther on informs us that the sense of plants is a thing of this kind, being an apprehension alone of the pleasing and the painful from sensible ob- jects.

Sense, therefore, thus procceding supernally, the world, indced, 1s sensitive according to the first kind of sense. For according to the whole of itself itis the thing seen, and the eve [by which it is seen]; since we also say that the sun, and each of the stars, is aneye. Phe whole world therefore is sight and that which 15 visible, and is truly comprehensible by sense and opinion, Hence the knowledge in itis all-perfect, its sense is tudivisible, and itis itself all things, viz. that which is sensible, the senusorium, and sense; just as the Demiurgus of it, 15. intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. As, likewise, it comprehends in its whole body partial bodies, so inits fofal sense it contains many senses. And it does not

» αισθησεις is omitted in the original.

BOOK 111.] TIMAUS OF PLATO. 457

intellect, intelligence, and the intelligible. As, likewise, it comprehends in its whole body partial bodies, so inits fofal sense it contains many senses. And it does not

» αισθησεις is omitted in the original.

BOOK 111.] TIMAUS OF PLATO. 457

know the colorrs and the sounds of sensibles, but the essence of all of them, so far as it ® material and undivided. Hence also it has a sensible essence, and essentialty, but not according to accident, sensible. For as that which is always intelligible, is not in a certain respect intelligible, and ina certain respect not, but is wholly intelligible, though not to those beings whose intellectual perception is partible, but to a divine intellect; after the same manner the venerated sensible nature, is not in a certain respect sensible, and in a certain respect deprived of sense, but is wholly sensible, not to us whose sensible perception is partible, but to ¢o¢al animal, in which also there is a total sense. For as the in- tellectual perception of the Gods is of one kind, but that of men of another, thus also the sense of Gods is different from that of partible animals; the former having a knowledge of partial essences, but the latter of things alone pertaining to essences. The world therefore, has the first sense, Which is immutable, united to the object of knowledge, and all-perfect according to energy. But total animals, which are purified from generation, are allotted the second form of sense. For because indeed, they are parts of the universe, the sense of them proceeds to the whole ; for there is also something of them which is external, But because they are exempt from generation, they comprehend that which is sensible impassively and energetically. And such partial animals as have communication with gene- ration, and employ as organs, luciform vehicles, possess sense mingled from passion and knowledge. But there are also certain iast animals, such as plants, which participate of a vestige only of life and sense; one kind of sense being total, another partible, another knowing the essences, and another the images of sensibles.

It is not proper, therefore, to be disturbed, because Plate takes away from the world, all partible organs. For hearing is not divided in it from sight 3 since neither, as we say, is the one divided from the other, in our spirit, but there are init, as Aristotle says, one sense which is truly so called, and one principal sen- sorium. Hence the world is neither in want of eyes extended to things out of itself, nor of ears,’ to receive information externally, but it is itself both eye, and that which is visible, ear, and that which is audible ; and the one sense in it knows all sensible natures. For whence also is the one sense in us which is prior to the many senses derived except from the universe? The world therefore, knows all the beauty that is in itself, through sight; and through the hearing all the har-

For whence also is the one sense in us which is prior to the many senses derived except from the universe? The world therefore, knows all the beauty that is in itself, through sight; and through the hearing all the har-

* Instead of ovrey here, it is obviously necessary to read wre.

Tim. Plat. Vou. I. 3M

458 PROCLUS ON THE [Boom 111.

mony which pervades through wholes. Hence it neither requires eyes in order to see, nor ears in order to hear. It possesses also this eyeless peculiarity according to the image of the intelligible God,’ to which it is assimilated. For Orpheus says that this God has eyeless Love,

In his breast feeding eycless, rapid Love.

Thus therefore, the universe is conjuined through fove to the natures prior to itself, and beholds the beauty which is in them through that which is in itself; and this not by perceiving with paruble senses.

“Nor was it invested with surrounding air, that it might be in want of respiration. Nor again, was itin want of any organ, through which it might receive nutriment into itself, and discharge it when concocted. For there was no possibility that any thing could either accede to, or depart from its nature, since there was nothing through which such changes could be produced. For indeed, the universe affords nutriment to itself through its own consumption; and being artificially fabricated, suffers and acts all things in itself, and from its own peculiar operations. For its compo- sing artificer thought that it would be much more excellent, if sufficient to itself, than if in want of other things.”

Through what is here said, Plato takes away two other senses from the universe, the smell and the taste. The former indeed because it is without respiration, For not every thing which respires isin want of smell, though every thing which has smell respives.” But that which respires is more perfect. Phis therefore, he takes away from the universe, Hle also takes away the taste, because the universe is not nourished, Por the animal which is nourished, is in want of the taste. Again therefore, how shall we say? Must it not be thus, that these partible senses are notin the universe, but that it contains one simple sense in itself, which has a knowledge of all colours, sounds, juices, spirits, and qualities, the sensivle essences themsclyes existing in the universe as in a subject. For if the one

* i. δ. Phanes, or animal itself, the exemplar of the universe. * Tnstead of ro yap avaxveur δειται rns cogonoews, εἰ καὶ μὴ παν TO EXOY οσῴρησιν, ἀαναπνένστικον ἐστι, in

this place, it seems requisite to read, ov yap παν αϑαπνγεον δειται rns oogpnoems, εἰ και παν TO ἐχον κι Δ.

BOOK 111.] TIM.£US OF PLATO. 459

* Tnstead of ro yap avaxveur δειται rns cogonoews, εἰ καὶ μὴ παν TO EXOY οσῴρησιν, ἀαναπνένστικον ἐστι, in

this place, it seems requisite to read, ov yap παν αϑαπνγεον δειται rns oogpnoems, εἰ και παν TO ἐχον κι Δ.

BOOK 111.] TIM.£US OF PLATO. 459

[common] sense which is in us, uses all the partible senses, and knows all things according to the same, how much more must the world know at once all the variety of sensibles, according to one reason, and one sense? As therefore, it is one in essence, and as it is allotted a uniform figure, thus also it has one sense, comprehending in itself all sensibles. For it likewise contains one nature, which connects and vivifies all bodies. And these are the dogmas respecting the universe.

Let us however, discuss the particulars of what is here said by Plato. In the first place therefore, he admirably refers the use of the smell to respiration, but not to the discrimination of fragrances ; giving us the more comprehensive cause, as existing in respiring natures. For when we have a sensible perception of fragrant or fetid substances, we respire; but when we respire, we have not entirely a sensation of them. For respiration is more natural, and more comprehensive than the proper subjects of the smell; since such animals as have the sense of smelling, but do not respire, in consequence of not having lungs, are more imperfect than those that do respire. Very properly therefore, does he frame his argument from more perfect animals, that if the universe had the sense of smelling, it would be requisite that it should have it accompanied with respiration, in the same manner as the more perfect of smelling animals. But in the second place, he refers the use of the taste, to nutriment. For nature formed this as a criterion of juices, through which nutriment and increase snbsist. For that which is without moisture has the power of manifesting this. The world however, is not in want of nutriment externally, but imparts it to itself, increases itself, and is the cause of its own consumption. And in the first place, if you are willing, it effects this, according toa division into two; the heavens augmenting and changing all things, but the sublunary regions being increased and consumed. For the gene- ration of one thing is the corruption of another. But of each of these,’ the motion of the heavens is the cause. In the second place, the world eflects this from the heavenly bodies themselves, receiving by their motions an analogous increase and consumption, according to their risings and settings, their visibilities and occulta- tions, their elevations and depressions, their illuminations, and mutations of light; through which the celestial bodies receive and lose a certain thing, in the same manner as sublunary natures. For from these, generation also is changed.

' For exarepas here, it is requisite to read ecarepwes.

460 PROCLUS ΟΝ THE [βοοκ 111.

For from these, generation also is changed.

' For exarepas here, it is requisite to read ecarepwes.

460 PROCLUS ΟΝ THE [βοοκ 111.

And again you see that the natures which are above the moon, have increase and consumption according to analogy only; but that sublunary natures are essentially the recipients of both these. But the moon is between these, and is truly an isthmus, exr- hibiting in herself the beginning of mutation according to an increase and diminution of lisht. For in the bodies prior to it the same form perfectly remains, in their increase and consumption; and in the bodics posterior to it, their very existence is naturally adapted to reciprocate. But in the moon the essence remains, but the light is changed evternally according to daninution and increase, which is not the case with the lumina- ries that are above it. WWence it is not proper to say, that the heavenly bodies are nourished from exhalations, as some fancy they are. For things which are in want of an intlux externally, and receive addition and ablation, have not indisso- luble bonds. Hence the celestial bodies remain immutable ; as of the ancients Proclus, Mulotes, and Philonides assert, and of those that are more modern, al! the Platonists from DPlotinus. For as Plato has not yet delivered to us the generation of the heavens and stars, how could he speak about the nutriment of them? And it seems, that now gencrating the elements alone, and perceiving that these proceed through each other, and that all are in all, he calls this mutual transition, the nutriment of the universe, of itself by itself; since it both acts upon anid suffers in itself, by imparting to all things, all the things of whieh it consists. Hence When he likewise constitutes the other natures (i. 6. the celestial), then he intro- duces their iluminations, and the communion of all of them with each other, through these. Alone therefore, directing his attention to the composition of the four elements of the universe, and perceiving that in these, there are certain com- munications with each other, he says, that the consumption of some, is the nutri- iment of other parts of the universe. But it is not yet manifest what each of these may be. Now however, thus much is evident, that all the parts confer something on each other, in order that the universe may become one, and are in each other, so as to nourish each other, and this without any diminution of themselves. For all things of which the universe consists, are in the earth, and ἃ} of them are hkewise in the middle elements; and thus the whole world is nourished by itself, from its own parts, having all things in all.

For all things of which the universe consists, are in the earth, and ἃ} of them are hkewise in the middle elements; and thus the whole world is nourished by itself, from its own parts, having all things in all.

Farther sull, this also may be said, that if nothing proceeds to the universe, there is no body external to it, and that if nothing departs from it, there is no vacuum out of the world. For it would be in vain not being the recipient of any thing, as that is which receives the world: which things were particularly em-

BOOK 111.] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 401

braced by Aristotle, who subverts the existence of a vacuum in energy, and preserves the world only-begotten, But that nothing departs froin, or accedes to the universe, Plato infers, the latter indeed, becanse there is nothing external to it, and the former, from the universe making the consumption of itself, its proper nutriment. As therefore, not having the organs of nutrient in itself, it has nutri- ment, and is that which itself nourishes itself, and is at the same time nourished ; thus also, not having senses extended outwardly, it possesses sense in itself, and is itself sensible to itself. And that Plato intended the latter should be inferred as well as the tormer, I think he clearly manifests by saying, that “ the universe suffers and acts all things tn itself, and from its own peculiar operations.” But if all that is gencrated, is the consequence of the universe acting on and suffering from itself, it must not be said, that either consumptions or corruptions are simply evils. For neither does a worthy man, and much less the universe, do any evil to him- self. And this indeed, is a divine corollary, which is to be assumed from what Plato says.

For neither does a worthy man, and much less the universe, do any evil to him- self. And this indeed, is a divine corollary, which is to be assumed from what Plato says.

Again however, he recurs to the true cause of all mundane effects, viz. the demiurgie art, and the principle which is perfective of wholes. For from thence art also proceeds into the demiurgic order. Hence the Oracles call the Demi- urgus of the universe ove who produces works by art; which expression Plato divides, at one time calling the things contained in the world, the works of the Demiurgus, [as when he represents the maker of the world saying] “ ofwhom Iam the Demiurgus and father of works ;° just as the Oracles also when they say; for understanding the works of the paternal self-begotten intellect ; but at another denominating the energy of the Demiurgus art, which in the end becomes the cause of the sufficiency of the universe to itsclf, For the Demiurgus being good, raade all things simitar to himself; i. e. he made all things perfect and self- sufficient. For self-sufficiency is an element of the good. By no means however is the world, as possessing the power of beng sufficient to itself, diculsed through this self- sufficiency from its maker, but is ina greater degrec united tohim. For by how niuch the more self-sufficient it is, by so much the more is it constituted ina similitude to him. And by how much the more it is assimilated, by so much the more perfictly is it united, to the deniurgic.gooduess. The universe therefore is self-sufficient, as being the object of sense to itself," and as not being in want of other sensibles. For to these the appellation of indigence belongs. But it is in want of the Gods, as being

" Eavry is omitted in the origiual. .

409 PROCLUS ΟΝ ἘΠΕ {800K 111.

always filled by them. Or rather neither is it in want of these, for divinity is every where present, and the universe is always prepared for the reception of divine goods.» And as the similar is better than the dissimilar according to the judge- nent of Jupiter; so likewise, the self-suflicient is more divine than that which is indigent. For the self-suflicient has dominion in the Gods, and similitude in beings. And this is another dogma of the mighty Jupiter.

“ But he neither thought that hands were necessary to the world, as there was nothing for it either to receive or resist ; nor yet feet, nor any other members which are subservient to progression and rest.”

And this is another dogma of the mighty Jupiter.

“ But he neither thought that hands were necessary to the world, as there was nothing for it either to receive or resist ; nor yet feet, nor any other members which are subservient to progression and rest.”

The touch is the last of the senses, and of this an animal especially participates according to the whole body, but particularly according to the hands. For these have the greatest power of touching, as may be seen in the operations of them. Since however, the hands afford us a twofold use; for through them we receive things that delight us, and repel such as pain us; but the universe cannot receive anything, for it has every thing which it wishes; nor repel any thing, because there is nothing foreign to it ;—this being the case, itis not at all in want of hands. For as Aristotle says, neither nature, nor God, does any thing in vain. So that the Demiurgus did not make hands to adhere to the world, because they would have been added in vain. Since however, that which is motive 1s suspended from that which is sensitive, but [mean that which is maturally motive, the discussion of Timwus, appropriately and at the same time reasonably proceeds, froin the sensitive to the progressive organs. For the feet were formed as instruments for rectilinear motion, as likewise were the other parts subservient to progression, such as the leg, the knee, the thigh, and any other such-like part. Its impossible however, for the universe to be moved ia a right line: for, as we have before shown, there is no vacuum external to the universe. Through these things there- fore, he takes away the progressive and sensitive parts. And here again it may be said, that in taking away the motive organs, he alone takes away feet, but not wings; because feet are suflicient to more perfect animals for the purposes of motion ; doing the same thing here as he did respecting smelling and respiration,

Again however, it must be said, that these organs are by no means in the universe, but that sense and motion after another manner are. For since every

* For opowrnre in this place, itis obviously necessary to read. 9 opovorns.

BOOK I11.] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 463

For since every

* For opowrnre in this place, itis obviously necessary to read. 9 opovorns.

BOOK I11.] TIM-EUS OF PLATO. 463

thing sensible of whatever kind it may be is comprehended in it, and it is itself the first sensible, it has also one sense conjoined to a sensible of this kind, just as the intelligence of the Demiurgus is conjoined to the whole of the intelligible, and is said to absorb the universe in itself. After the same manner therefore, the universe absorbs itself by the sense of itself, and comprehends the object of know- ledze, by a connascent knowledge, Besides, it has indeed powers: which appre- hend and are the guardians of all things, and these are its hands. It possesses likewise perfective orders, and these are analogous to nutritive parts. And it exhibits vivilic causes, which correspond to the parts of respiration. Besides these also, it has other powers, some of which fill it with invisible causes, and others conjoin it to intelligible light; of which the latter are analogous to seeing, but the former to hearing. By those also who survey it physically and theologi- cally, it will be found, that it has a motion analogous to this sense. For as it has a sense of itself with itself, so likewise it has a motion in itself, and circulating about itself, and both these, according to the similitude of its paradigm. For in this there was intelligence converging to itself, life converted to itself, and know- ᾿ ledge not subsisting according to transition, nor according to a distribution into parts, but selperfect, and united to intelligibles themselves. For such is the intel- lect which is there, energizing prior to cnergy, because {according to the Oracle] it has not proceeded, but abides in the paternal profundity, and in theadytum according to the God-nourished silence.

* For from among the seven species of local motion, he distributed to it that which especially subsists about intellect and wisdom, and which is adapted and allied to its body.”

Of the ancients, some converting the world to intellect, and imparting to it mo- tion through love about the first appetible, say that nothing proceeds into it from intellect, thus depriving intellect of fecundity," and giving it an arrangement equi- valent to that of lovely sensible objects, which have nothing generative in their own nature, Others on the contrary, acknowledge that intellect, or soul, or whatever that may be which is above the world, operates on it, yet they do not give to the world a spontaneous and proper motion, but only say that it is exter- nally convolved inacircle. These however, Aristotle blames, as subverting the

* For povipow here, it is necessary toread γονιμον,

464 PROCLUS ON THE [Book its.

These however, Aristotle blames, as subverting the

* For povipow here, it is necessary toread γονιμον,

464 PROCLUS ON THE [Book its.

perpetuity of the universe. For that which is violent ts not perpetual.’ But Plato guarding against the oversights of both these, assigns to the world a proper and spontaneous motion, and shows that the Demiurgus is the cause of this motion. And this is the sixth demiurgic gift imparted to the world; as imitating * the motion of intellect, which the world possesses both from itself, and from the father, For the expression he distributed, refers us to the paternal cause. For from that trom which essence, from that also motion according to nature, is imparted to the universe. But the words, “ adapted and allied to its body,” refer us to the peculiar nature of the world, through which it is excited by itself to a motion of this kind. For it possesses symething adapted and allied to the motion ina circle, both ac- cording to the self-motive nature, and to its figure, whichis spheneal. Perhaps also, ifhe had asserted one of these things only, the other might have been in- ferred. For [πὸ had said, that the motion of the universe was adapted and allied to it, whence did it possess this except from the father, from whom also its essence is derived?) But if this motion was imparted to it by the Demiurgus, he entirely gave to the recipient an appropriate motion, he being intellect, and assign- ing to all things that which is according to desert. The Philosopher however, combines both these in order that you may see thessimilitude of the world to the Demiurgus. For as he himself intellectually perceives himself, 1s converted to himself, and surveys intelligibles through energizing about them, which be- come the centres of the demiurgic intelligence ; thus also the world is moved about itself, verges to itself, and harmoniously revolves about the middle, which becomes the centre of the mundane motion, And as the Demiurgus is said to absorb the intelligible, by * proceeding to it, thus also the world is said to comprehend initself, the centre of itself, Lor the absorptions which are celebra- ted by theologists, are certain comprehenstons, Bat the absorptions by grandfathers comprehend intellectuals intellizibly, and those by sons, intelligibles intellectually.

' ifthe principal parts of the universe therefore are perpetual, and that they are so is most fully de- moustrated in these commentaries, it necessarily follows that the modern system of astronomy, which fills the heavens with violent motions, is false.

1 Instead of exuir μιμονμεένὴ KU NOLS in this place, f read are vou μιμουμενὴ κινησι».

8 For εἰς ἐαντὸν χωρέειν here, read Tp €ls €QVTOV χωρειν-

4 Instead of αλλ᾽ ae μὲν xpoyoraae τὰ voyra περιλαμβανουσι voepus, ac δε τῶν παιδων, τα νοερὰ vonrws in this place, it is necessary to read, αλλ᾽ ac per προγονίκαι ra veepa Keprappavovar sonrws, αἱ

ὃς Tw παιδω», Τα μλύητα bOEPWS,

8 For εἰς ἐαντὸν χωρέειν here, read Tp €ls €QVTOV χωρειν-

4 Instead of αλλ᾽ ae μὲν xpoyoraae τὰ voyra περιλαμβανουσι voepus, ac δε τῶν παιδων, τα νοερὰ vonrws in this place, it is necessary to read, αλλ᾽ ac per προγονίκαι ra veepa Keprappavovar sonrws, αἱ

ὃς Tw παιδω», Τα μλύητα bOEPWS,

e κεν γι ἢ TIM-EUS OF PLA‘TO. “ὦ For thes: ding, the generators of them again convert them to themsclves, and er min their own allness. Theuniverse therefore linitates bob thes mdeed, as it revolves about the centre, and comprehends the centre

in tating the progonic ἃ absorption ; but so far as it comprehends its owa imitself, affording nutriment to itself by its own consumption, and again

Ag initself the natures distributed from itself,—-so far it imitates the com- sension of children in their fathers. And these τ things indeed, are asserted

“τ the sake of the analogy of the universe to the two fathers.

Again, however, you may see, how the Aristotelie axiom is here pre-assumed, that the riotion is simple ofa simple body, In the first place, therefore, the body inthe world whichis more simple than other bodies, is moved with a circular motion, as being adapted to it; and inthe next place, the whole universe is thug woved. For the body which is posterior to it, is as much as possible convolved inacircle. For what else is the meaning ef the word adapted, than that the mo- tion ina circle is natural to the essence of the universe? For as it was allotted a spherical figure, so likewise a circular motion according to nature. And farthor sull another Aristotelian axiom is also here pre-assumed] that a circular motion has nothing contrary to it. For as there are seven Jocal motions, that which is in acircle,the upward, the downward, that which is to the right hand, and that which is to the left, that which is anterior, and that which is to the posterior parts, you will find that six of these havea contrary. For the motions are coutrary, which are from contrary to contrary places. But the motion in a circle is exempt from all contraricty. For since the motions in a right line are generated and contamed by the motion ina circle, as Mechanics demonstrate, how can it be said that any one of these is contrary to it? For the contrary is corruptive and not generative of the contrary. Nor does Plato stop here, but having mentioned the peculiarity of the circular motion, he shows its admirable transcendency above the other notions, For he denominates it to be that which subsists about intellect and wisdom, and this not simply, but he also adds especially. For of these seven motions, the circular imitates intellect, and the intellectual life, being established in the same, and about the same, according to one reason and one order, and possessing a motion which is vanquished by permanency. But all the

"i.e. "Phe absorption of Phanes, the paradigm of the world hy Jupiter. Ὁ For ra:rys here read ravra. :

Ton. Plat. | Ἷ Vou..1, 3.N

a RN eT

But all the

"i.e. "Phe absorption of Phanes, the paradigm of the world hy Jupiter. Ὁ For ra:rys here read ravra. :

Ton. Plat. | Ἷ Vou..1, 3.N

a RN eT

466 PROCLUS ON ‘THE [BOOK 411.

remaining ἡ motion pertains to soul. For in this, Srom whence, and whither, and fFansition first subsist. In her also the intelligible is the upward, but the sensible downward. And the circle of sameness, indeed, is the right hand, bot the circle of ditlerence, the left. Intellect likewise is before her, but nature behind. Por thus she was constituted at first. And circulation, indeed, is adapted to intelicet, according to buth numbers, whether you wish to adduce the monad itself, or tie heptad, enumerating it the first’ or the seventh motion. Jur the monad and the heptad, are certain intellectual numbers ; the monad tndeed being directly intellect, but the heptad, the light according to indedlect. dnd on this account also the mundane intellect $s, as Orpheus says, both monadic, and hebdomadic. Farther suil, the monad is Apulloniacal, but the heptad Minerval. Again therefore it is intellect and wisdom. So that circulation through the alliance of numbers, shows that itis suspended from intellect and wisdom. Bet rectidmear motion, demenstrates through the Aerad its alliance to the psychical peculiarity. For the number six is allied to the soul, and this will be manifest as we proceed. Let us however pass on to what

is next said by Plato,

“ Tence by a circumduction according to saineness, in the same, and in itself, he caused it to be moved convolving in a circle. But he sepa- rated from it all the six motions, and framed it’ void of their wandernng progiessions, And as feet were not requisite to this persodical motion, he generated the universe without legs and fect.”

We have before observed that intellect and wisdom are the paradigms of circu- ‘ation. But what this is, and how it is assimilated to intellect, is delivered in the words befure us. For circulation is a motion which is led round according to sameness, and in the same, and in itself, as Timeus here says, and the Athe- nian guest in the Laws, Of which definition indeed, the words * accerding to sameness,” signify according to one reason, and one order. For what if the universe should be moved circularly indeed, but should be differently changed at different times, by rising or setting, as the fable says in the Politicus. That we may not therefore apprehend this to be the case, the words * according to same- yess are placed respecting it, before the rest. The Platonic Severus therefore, for we shall here speak frecly against: hirn,) is not right in admitting fabulous eirentations. and thus making the world to be both generated: and unbegotter.

' Yor ἡ &e λοιπή, πασαν τὴν a }read, ἡ δε λειπὴ πασα, τὴν yey.

ne,

mI EN Oe SY emer

ROOK Ε1|,] TIM-LUS OF PLATO. 467

and thus making the world to be both generated: and unbegotter.

' Yor ἡ &e λοιπή, πασαν τὴν a }read, ἡ δε λειπὴ πασα, τὴν yey.

ne,

mI EN Oe SY emer

ROOK Ε1|,] TIM-LUS OF PLATO. 467

The universe indeed, Plato says, is moved according to sameness, and after a similar manner; and according to one reason and one order. But such a eireu- lation as Severus speaks of, subverts the one order of motion, The mode, how- ever, in Which such ἃ motion is fabulously introduced, is shown by our preceptor in his Commentaries on that dialogue, ' conformably to the meanine of Plato. Bat the words ‘in the same,” manifest the immutable in transition, and that the motion is vanquished by permanency. For because there is not a vacuum external to the universe, but it is necessary that the universe should be moved, being a physical body; for nature is a principle of motion; it is moved convolved about itself, and in the same place. For the bulk of the universe occupies the whol- of place, and possesses by its parts the parts of interval; and asa whole being iminutable, it is locally moved in its parts. But the words “ in itself,” inanifest Mat itis moved on account of this very transition of its parts. For it does not require the transition of another thing, in order to the motion of ttself, but itsel: yields to itself, aud itself is transferred into the place of itself’; so that itis moved mitself, the parts of it being transferred by their motions into the places of each other. Llence, through the words “ according (0 sameness,” you have tire perpetual ; but through the words “ in the same,” the immutable; and through the words “ in itself,” the form of the transition. And from all these you have, that circulation is a Motion unceasing, remaining in one place, and eflected by the transition of the parts into the places of each other. But being such it is evident, that it is most similar to intellect. For intellect eternall energizes intellectually, is established in the same order, and all things in it are intellectual, most energetic, and Possess an ever-vigilant lite. And this indeed is evident.

gr about the

It is however worthy of admiration in Plato, that when discoursing

essence of the universe, he assimilates it to itellizible animal; but that now teaching us concerning the motion of it, he refers the similitude of it to intellect; delivering to us from these things, the analogy which is in them, viz. that the intel- ligible has the relation of essence, but intellect of energy. When, likewise, he says that the universe is spherical, he at the same times cives it to be moved in a circle, and to be convolved. For it appears to be moved in a circle according to

the greatest circle which is in it. Because however ἃ cylinder is moved in 3

When, likewise, he says that the universe is spherical, he at the same times cives it to be moved in a circle, and to be convolved. For it appears to be moved in a circle according to

the greatest circle which is in it. Because however ἃ cylinder is moved in 3

"siz. On the Pobticus, ta which dialogue it is fabulously asserted that the sun and stare pox sefon the place from whence they formeily rose, See this fable explained in the notes to my transtation of that dialo ue.

408 PROCLUS ΟΝ 'THE | [βοοκ itt.

circle when it is rolled along, he adds, for the sake of accuracy, the word convol- ving.’ Itis also admirable in hiro, that he takes away the six motions from the universe. For this is most peculiar to the world, there being in the stars an advancing motion, The world, therefore, is truly inerratic, not only because the summit of itis a thing of this hind, but because itis moved with one and the same simple motion.

It is necessary however to observe, how the turm of motion which exists in the

most principal part of the universe, is said to have been given, as appropriate’

to the whole world, by the father. For all the other parts, participate of the circulation of the world; and the inerratic is present with some of them more manifestly, but with others mure obscurely. Por the streams under the earth being moved in a disorderly manner, and differently at. different times, are espe- cially said to wander. But the sublunary elements being naturally moved from one place to another, participate of less wandering than the subterranean effluxions. For those things wander which are transferred from one place to another. And the divine bodies in the heavens, wander still less than these. For so far as they are moved according to length, and also according to breadth they are wanderers; but so far as they are moved according to the equable and orderly, and according to one reason of motion, they are inerratic. But the world itself may most properly and principally be called inerratic, as not receiving the representation of any other motion.

But the world itself may most properly and principally be called inerratic, as not receiving the representation of any other motion.

If also you are willing to make a division im incorporoal natures, the irrational life wanders in a remarkable degree, not having the measure of its energies from itself. The soul that opines rightly wanders, but less than the irrational life. For this soul also participates in a certain respect of wandering, through being ignorant of cause. But the soul that possesses scientific knowledge, wanders still less than this. For in such a soul, the transitive form of life alone produces the wandering; because it Is not arranged to one intelligible, but becomes a different intelligible m different forms. And intellect alone is inerratie amoug beings, always intellectually perceiving the same thing, and energizing towards and about the same thing. The world, therefore, which imitates intellect in its mouon, is deservedly truly inerratic, always making the same uniform period after the same manner. That however which is thus moved, has no need what- ever of the addition of feet, or in short, of progressive organs. And hence the universe Was generated without fect and legs. Theoloyists also wishing im @ coral

' Yor rpepopyeroy here, it is obviou.tly necessary to read erpeooperer.

TIM.EZUS OF PLATO. 469

ROOK 111.

respect to indicate this to us, are accustomed to call the God who is the Demiurgus of the corporcal nature, lame in both feet, as constituting the universe without legs and feet. They say too that the Gods laugh at him with inertinguishable laughter, and by their laughing incessantly attend with providential care to mundane natures.

“All this reasoning, therefore, being employed by the eternally exist. ing God, about the God that would αὐ a certain time or once exist; in consequence of this reasoning, he made his body smooth and even, every where from the middle equal and whole, and perfect from perfect bodies.”

“All this reasoning, therefore, being employed by the eternally exist. ing God, about the God that would αὐ a certain time or once exist; in consequence of this reasoning, he made his body smooth and even, every where from the middle equal and whole, and perfect from perfect bodies.”

What is here said, imitating the one intellect, and the united intellection of wholes, collects all things into the same, and refers them to one summit, the fabri- cation of the corporeal system. It is necessary, therefore, that we should recol- lect What has been before said. It was said then, that the elements rendered all things in the world concordant through analogy ; that the universe was gencrated a whole consisting of wholes; and that it is spherical and smooth, and has a knowledge of itself, and a motion in itself. But this being the case, it is evident that the whole world itself, is assimilated to all-perfect animal. The orderly dis- tribution of it, however, according to wholes, proceeds analogous to second and third causes. And the number of the elements, indeed, and the unifying bond of them through analogy, proceeds conformably to the e-sence which is uncoloured, unfigured, and without contact ;' for there number subsists. But the first whole- ness Which adorns all things, and which consists of the whole elemen:s, is assimi- Jated to the intellectual wholeness.* The sphericity of the universe is analogous to the intellectual figure. Its sel@sufficiency, intellectual motion, and convolution* in sameness, are assimilated to the God who absorbs in himself all bis progeny [i.e. to Saturn]. Its possession of soul, is analogous to the vivific cause [i. 6. to Rhea]. And its participation of intellect, is analogous to the Demiurgic intellect ; though all these proceed from this, and from the natures prior to it, to which these are respectively analogous. And the more excellent natures, indeed, are the

' This essence forms the summit of that order of Gods which is called intelligible, aud at the same lime intellectual.

* This forms the middle of the above-mentioned orders

2 And this forms the extremity of that order.

* For τροφὴ here, it is necessary to read στροφη.

470 PROCLUS ON THE {[BooK tit.

causes of all the things of which secondary natures are the causes; but the latter are the causes of fewer effects than the former. For the Demiurgos himself, so . far, indeed, 5 he is intellectual, makes all things to be intellectual; butso far as he is being, he is the father of all bodies, and incorporeal natures; and so far as he is a God, he constitutes matter itself. In what is here said, therefore, Plato makes a summary repetition of all such particulars as the universe derives from the intellectual Gods. And thus much concerning the whole theory,

In what is here said, therefore, Plato makes a summary repetition of all such particulars as the universe derives from the intellectual Gods. And thus much concerning the whole theory,

It is requisite, however, that we should understand the truth pertaining to each of the words. Directly, therefore, the words “all this,” imply that you should survey in one the whole cause of the corporeal-formed nature, and know the di- vision of forms. For wholeness is assimilated to one thing, figure to another, and motion to another. And the word ¢/és indeed indicates union ; but the word al the number of causes. Moreover, the words "ἢ reasoning employed by the eternally eristing God,” make the essence, and at the same me the intelligence of the Demiurgus to be eternal, through which the world ts perpetual. [tis necessary likewise to observe, that Plato by arranging the Demiurzus among eternal beings, gives to him an eternal order, so that he will not faccording to Plato} be soul. For in the Laws he says, that soul is immortal, indeed, and indestructible, bat is not eternal. Hence every one who fancies that soul is the Demiurgus, seems to he ignorant of the diflerence between the eternal and the indestructible. But the word “reasoning” is significant of a distributed fabrication. And the words “that would ata certain time erist” are not slguificant of a beginning according to time, as Atticus fancied they were, but that the world has an essence conjoined with time. For time was generated together with heaven [or the universe, } and the world is temporal, and time is mundane, Jor they were co-produced with each other, and are consubsistent from one fabrication. ‘Phe words therefore a¢ a certain time or once do not signify a part of time, but reason Is time as compared with eternal being. For that is truly always being ; but the temporal always is once as With reference to the eternal, justas that which is being, after a venerated manner, is non-being with reference to that whieh as intelligibly being. Hence thouch the world exists through the whole of time, yet the existence of it con- sistyin becoming to be, and is ina part oftime. ᾿ΕΝ. however is once, and is not simultaneously in alltime, buat Is always once, For the eternal is always in the whole of eternity; bat) the temporal, In a certain time, is always ata different time in another time, As with reference therefore, to the eternally existing God, the world is very properly called, © the God that would once erist.” For as with re-

Hat a τς

ROOK Lh] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 471

471

ference to that God who is intellectual, this is sensible. Hence, the consible world isindecd generated, or becoming to be, always, but is once. For it has its ex- istence partly, always advancing to being from eternal being. For since, as we have Letore observed, it las an eternal power of existing derived from a cause dierent trow itself, and the power which it possesses it possesses terminated, but by always receiving, it always is, having the power in that which is terminated numbered to infinity ;—this being the case, it is evident that it is once, from the once always acquiring existence, and always becoming to be, in consequence of that which gives it to exist, never ceasing.’ According to its own nature, however, it is once, and has a renovated immortality, as Plato says in the Politicus, possess- ing its being in advancing into existence, and on this account participating not at once wholly of the whole (of time} but once ; and this again and again, existing in generation, and not being without an extension [of existence]. Unless, there- fore, the word once signifies with Plato the whole of time. For the transitive subsistence of time, as compared with eternal energy, is once, and the whole of time has the same vatio to eternity, as ihe part of time the once to the whole of time.

If yon are willing also to consider what is said after another manner, since Plato has hitherto fashioned a corporeal nature, bat has not in words constituted soul and intellect, he denominates the God that would exist, and who subsists in discourse according to a part, once. For divinity indeed constitutes collectively parts and the whole, but language divides things which are consubsistent, gene- rates things which are unbegotten, and distributes according to time, eternal natures, “The God therefore, that would once exist, is the God that would exist in the discourse, in which there is a distribation into parts, and composition, For. ihe Pythagoric Timaus likewise, indicating this in his treatise to those who are aie to understand him, says ‘ that before heaven (or the universe] was generated

- in words, there were idea and matter, and God the Demiurgus.” For that he

fashions the generation of the universe in words, he clearly manifests in what he says. Moreover, with respect to (he smooth and the even, they manifest, as we have before observed, the one comprehension in the world, and the greatest apti- tude to the participation of a divine soul. But the words, “every where from the midave equal,” define the peculiarity of the spherical figure, For this is every Where equidistant, according to all intervals. And the words “ whole, ang

ἡ Instead of και δια το μὴ λεγειν, τὸ διδον aes γινόμενος in this place, it is necessary to read, καὶ δια τὸ μὴ ληγειν τὸ διδεν, ace ywopercs.

472 PROCLUS ON THE {pook if.

And the words “ whole, ang

ἡ Instead of και δια το μὴ λεγειν, τὸ διδον aes γινόμενος in this place, it is necessary to read, καὶ δια τὸ μὴ ληγειν τὸ διδεν, ace ywopercs.

472 PROCLUS ON THE {pook if.

perfect yrom perfect bodies,” establish the world in the highest degree of similitude to all-perfect animal ; for that was in all respects perfect 5 and, likewise, to the Deimiurgus himself. For as he is the father of fathers, and the supreme of rulers, thus also the world is the most perfect of perfect natures, and the most total of wholes. You may likewise say that the world is smooth, as not being in want of any motive, or nutritive, or sensitive organs. For this was proximately demon. strated. But “it is every where equal from the middle,” as having a spherical figure, and ‘a while and perfect,” as being all-perfect, and leaving nothing exter- nal to itself: for this is properly a whole and perfect. And it consists of perfect

bodies, as being composed from the four elements. It is also said to be in the And thus Plato beginning from

singular number a body, as being only-begotten. rfection, he again converts it

the only-begotten, and proceeding as far as to pe through the above-mentioned particulars to the same thing [1. ὁ. to the only- begotten}; imitating the progression of the world from its paradigm, and its

perfect conversion to it.

END OV VOL. 1.

ἐξ ον" μενον

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COMMENTARIES OF PROCLUS

on .nr.

TIM/EUS OF PliATO,

IN FIVi; JiOOKs;

CONTAINING A TUT AM HY OF

PYTIIAGOIUC AND PLATONIC PHYSIOLOGY.

TRAN5LATJ I» IHOM THE GREEK,

JJY THOMAS TAYLOR.

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Vjtulliiimis IXawrui.

TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

Loncon:

PRINTED FOR AND SOLD BY THE AUTHOR, NO. 9, MANOR PLACE, WALWORTH, SURREY,

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PROCLUS

THE TLW/EUS OF PLATO.

“ Placing also soul in the middle, he extended it through the whole of the world, and besides this, he externally circumvcsted the body ot the universe with soul.”

l)i vinity produces all things at oner, and eternally. For bv his very being, and according to an «ternal intelligence of wholes, he generates all things from himself, supermundane, and nil mundane beings, intellects, souls, natures, bodies, ami matter itself. And indeed, the at-oncc-collectod subsists in a greater degree in the demiurgic production of things, than in the solar illumination though in this the whole light proceeds at one and the same tune from the sun. lint the sun who imitates his father through the visible fabrication, evidently yields to an eternal and invisible production. As we have said therefore, all things being produced at once and eternally from the fabrication [of the Demiurgns], the order of the efforts is at the same time preserved. For in the producing cause there was an eternal intelligence anil order prior to the things that are arranged. Whence though all things are at once from one cause, yet some have the first, but others a subordinate dignity. For some things proceed in a greater, hut others in a less degree. And some indeed, are co-arranged with the Demiurgns accord¬ ing to union, others according to contact, and others according to participation. For intellect is able to lie connascent with intellect through union. But soul is naturally adapted to be conjoined with intellect. And bodies are formed to par-

1 For »\<a«i;s berf, it ii obviously mccsvary to rrad qXiacqi.

VOL. II.

Tim. Plat.

A

o

PROCLUS ON TUT

[BOOK 111.

ticipate of it alone, just as tilings in the profundity of the earth, participate of the solar splendour. Since therefore all these exist m the world, \iz. intellect, soul and body, and all are produced at once, and since at the same time, there is in these an order proceeding from the Deuiiurgus, the discourse about them, atone time I>eginning from on high according to progression, ends in tin* boundaries ol fabrication, but at another tune being impelled from tin; last oi t lings, lecurs to the summits ol the universe, conformably to things themselves. 1 01 a 1 tilings pro¬ ceed from, and are consorted to the principle and cause from which lay pio- ceeded, thus t \hibitiug a o< rtam demiurgic t ircle.

1 01 a 1 tilings pro¬ ceed from, and are consorted to the principle and cause from which lay pio- ceeded, thus t \hibitiug a o< rtam demiurgic t ircle.

Ill \\ hut has been belore s.iid, theleloie, Plato delivered to lis the Older of the plenitudes of the world according to progression, when he represented the Deiuitirgus placing intellect in soul, but soul in body, and thus fabricating the mm or-e. lint in what is now said, In* gives cuinph lion to the world according to mint rsion. And first imh t d, assuming tin contrarii s that an in the universe, he adds two media to these, and unib > tin m through analogy. In tin: next place, pei ti t ting it a w hole tit wholes, he surrounds it w ith an inti llectiial fig ire, rentiers if capable of participating of a tin ine lile, and imparts to it a motion w Inch imi¬ tates iutelh i t. AI wa vs lil>i w ise, t ausing it to heroine more pt i let t by the addi¬ tions, after all tin sc, he introduces soul into the univ* 1 st-, and tills all things with life, though diflcrcut natures with a tliileri nt life. 11* also places intellect ill soul, and through this conjoins soul to its fountain 1 or the soul of the universe, through p irt it ip.it mg of intelh et, becomes conjoint d w itli mtt Uigiblcs tin in -t ati, And thus In* cinls at the principle from which the mundane intellect, stud, and the hulk of boilv proceed, l or dividing the universe triply, into intellect, soul, and both, he first discusses the more subordinate <>1 these: tor sut i is the mode according to conversion. And the discussion indeed ol the fabrication of boilv is terminated, having th livt-red the essence, figure anti motion ol it.

The theory of soul however, is conjoined to this, ju-t as hotly it-r 11 is sus¬ pended horn a div ine soul, anil tin-animation which the discourse now at Ids, is the seventh demiurgic gilt imparti tl to tin- world. Hut the discussion ol the soul is I think twofold ; the one indeed delivering the essence ol it, hut tin* other its communion with hotly*. Plato however selects the lath r ol these, and thinks tit to mention it !r fore the forun r. Pt rliaps imb ed, bet ausc it is a medium bi tween the reasoning about body, ami the speculations about the essence of soul. I'or the habitude of soul to body, is in a certain respect a medium between body, ami

1 In-mail of tfwfHv oi in this place, il is requisite to n act cp/iUfittot. l or avitiTiirarc here, ll is necessary lo read <ri/icroruutru.

HOOK 111.]

TIM 111 S or I’LATO.

n

I'or the habitude of soul to body, is in a certain respect a medium between body, ami

1 In-mail of tfwfHv oi in this place, il is requisite to n act cp/iUfittot. l or avitiTiirarc here, ll is necessary lo read <ri/icroruutru.

HOOK 111.]

TIM 111 S or I’LATO.

n

soul itself. And it is necessary that tin; leading to principles should he through media. Perhaps too, he selected the latter, because he was not willing to con¬ nect the soul w ith body, according to time ; nor again, when separate, ami ex¬ isting: by itself to conjoin it to the world, lint to deliver the communion of soul with body prior to tin* veneration ol soul, contributes to this, lair the genera- tiou of the soul is sufficient to c\iueo, that the corporeal bulk also of the world h unhegotten [according to time]. For if he ascribes generation to unbegotten natures, yet in thoe there will be another mode of generation. lint if prior* to the apparent generation, he brings into the same condition both body and soul, such a generation will be unbegotten, and the animation will be perpetual ; iu ither soul being generated in time, nor body differing in time from soul. And thus much concerning the principal parts of tin* order in what is said.

And thus much concerning the principal parts of tin* order in what is said.

lilt respect however, to the middle position of soul, ditferent interpreters ex¬ plain it differently. For some say that the middle is the centre of the earth; others, that the nmon is the middle, as the isthmus of generated and divine natures ; others, that it is the sun, as lining established in the plan; of a heart; others, that it is the inrrratic sphere; others, that it is the equinoctial, as hounding tin* breadth of the world; and others, that it is the zmliack. And some indeed, place in the centre the ruling power of the universe; others, in the moon; others, in the sun ; others, in the equinoctial ; and others, in the zodiark. Jhil to the first of these, the power ot the n litre hears witness, tins 1 >* ing connective of < v« i v tin idatimi; to the second, the motion of the moon, which hi a various manner changes generation; to the third, the vivifu: heat of the sun; to the fourth, the facility of the motion of the equinoctial circle; and to the fifth, the rircul ition of the st.irs about the zodiaf k. Against all these however. Porphyry and Iamliliehus write. Illuming them for understanding the middle locally, and with interval, and inclosing in a certain part the soul of the whole world, which is every w here present similarly, and which rules over, and leads all tilings by its motions. Of these divine men likewise, Porphyry indeed, assuming this to be the soul of the universe, interprets* l/ic middle accord¬ ing to the psychical essence : for this is the middle of intelligible* and sensible*. In thus speaking however, lie will not appear to say any thing, as pertaining to the words of Plato. But if we should assume that the universe derives its com¬ pletion from intellect, soul and body, and is an animal possessing soul and intel¬ lect, in tins system wc shall find that soul is the middle. Plato therefore, having before said this, will appear to say nothing else now, than that the soul of the world is arranged so as to extend its energies through the universe, being allotted

1 For rpa i r»ji faHCjHvrn ytytotvt hero, read irpo Trjt, *. X.

4

PROCLUS ON TII li

[book hi.

Plato therefore, having before said this, will appear to say nothing else now, than that the soul of the world is arranged so as to extend its energies through the universe, being allotted

1 For rpa i r»ji faHCjHvrn ytytotvt hero, read irpo Trjt, *. X.

4

PROCLUS ON TII li

[book hi.

tlie middle order in it. For again secondary natures participate of those prior' to them; just as hotly which is the last of things, participates of soul which ranks m the inithlle, ami soul participates of intellect, which is prior to it. But tin* philo¬ sopher Iambiichus thinks that by soul, we should understand that soul which is exempt, siijK-rmundane, and 1|1 m rated, and which has dominion mer all tilings. For accorduiir to him, Plato dues not speak ot the mundane soul, hut ol taat which is imparticipahle, and is arranged as a monad above all mundane souls. For this is the first soul, and the middle is in this, as being similarly present to all tilings, in consequence of not belonging to any body, nor subsisting; in anv way in habitude, hut similarly animating, and being equally separated from all mun¬ dane natures. For it is not less separated from some, and more from others; since it is wi;limit habitude , but is similarly separated from all; though all things are not separated from it after the same manner. For in the participants of it, then* are the more and the less.

For it is not less separated from some, and more from others; since it is wi;limit habitude , but is similarly separated from all; though all things are not separated from it after the same manner. For in the participants of it, then* are the more and the less.

Our preceptor however, interprets the middle in a way more accommodated to the words of Plato. For since the soul of the universe has indeed that which is supermundane, and exempt from the universe, according to which it is con¬ joined to intellect, which Plato in the Pluedrus, and Orpheus in w hat he says about Jlippa, denominate the head of the soul; and since it has a ho another multitude of powers, proceedin’' from this monad, divided about the world, and appropriately present to all the parts of the universe, in one way indeed about the middle, in another about the » arlli, in another about the sun, and in another about each of the spheres; this being the ease, lie says that the present words indicate all these, so that soul animates the middle in oneway, hut the whole bulk in another, and leaves something else prior to these powers, exempt from the universe. In onler however, that we may not negligently attend to what is said by Plato, hut may exhibit the variety of the psychical powers, thus much must be said, tb it soul mucli prior to body, is a vital world, and is both one and number. And through tin* one indeed, if is superior to ev< ry habitude of form ; but through multitude, it governs the different parts of the universe. For by its guardian powers, it contains the unti e; since the whole sphcie is gm trued Jiom thence, and con¬ verges to it. Besides , every thing turbulent m the u <n Id, is colLcted about the middle, and requires a divine gum d, capable of it) r inging, and di taming it m its proper boun¬ daries. Hence also, theoh gists terminate the progressions of the highest duds, in that place; and the Pythagoreans call the middle the tower of Jupiter, and the guard-house of

1 Instead of yap avrr,i, ra rvv rpoi uirui iu tliin place, it is necessary lo lead /ueny«

yap ai< ra burrrpa r*y wpo avrwe.

HOOK III.]

TIM/1XS OF PLATO.

5

Jupiter. But by its stable, and at the same time vivifying powers, if contains the sphere of the earth. By its perfective, and generative powers, the sphere of renter. By its coih vective, and motive pnutrs. the air. By its umlefiU dpowers, fire. And by its intellec¬ tual pearers, all Inarm. Of these also, it contains in one wav the lunar sphere, in another, the solar sphere, and in another, the sphere of the fixed stars. For the souls of each of these govern in conjunction with the whole soul of the universe, their appropriate portions of the world.

Of these also, it contains in one wav the lunar sphere, in another, the solar sphere, and in another, the sphere of the fixed stars. For the souls of each of these govern in conjunction with the whole soul of the universe, their appropriate portions of the world.

Such therefore, I win;*; the mode of animation, Plato, as he is accustomed to do, beginning from the last of things according to conversion, first animates the mid¬ dle, afterwards the universe, and in the third place, leaves something of soul external to the universe. For as lie constituted body prior to soul, and parts prior to wholes, so likewise he delivers the animation of the world, beginning from the last of things. For according to a progression from on high he said, that the Deiniurgus placed intellect in soul, and soul in body; but teaching us in what is now said, animation according to conversion, he first animates the middle, and afterwards the universe. For the river of vil ification proceeds as far as to the centre; as the Oracles also say, when speaking of the middle of the five centres, which extends from on high entirely to the opposite part. “And another tilth middle fiery centre, where a life-bearing tire descends us fur as to the material rivers." Plato therefore, beginning from those things in w Inch ani¬ mation ends, recurs to the whole piodui tiou ot file, and prior to this surveys the exempt power of the soul. Hence we must not place the ruling part of the soul in the centre; for thin part is exempt from the universe ; but a certain power of it, which is the guardian of the whole [mundane] order. For nothing else in the, universe, is so capable of entirely subverting wholes as the ci ntre, and the power of the centre, about which there is an harmonic dance of the universe [if they are in a defective condition] Hence too Plato, divinely as it appears to me, does not place the soul in the middle of the universe, but soul. For these dirt'ei from each Other, because the former establishes the whole of soul in the centre, but the latter places a power of it in tin* middle, and a ditferent power in different paits of the world. Plato therefore says, “ placing soul m the middle;" which is he same thing ns giving the participation of soul to the middle, and extending its total powers to the universe; the Demiurges left external to the universe, a power of the soul more divine than all the others, established in itself, and exemptly con¬ taining and connecting the whole world. And what occasion is there to be prolix in investigating the meaning of Plato, since the philosopher himself shortly after, when discussing the animation itself of the world, says, “ but soul unfolding herself to the extremity of the universe, from the middle, circularly covered it as with a veil.

IMtOCLUS ON THE

[hook in.

0

IMtOCLUS ON THE

[hook in.

0

herself being convolved in herself. 9 This however does not at nil difler from the words before us. For to extend every nay from the middle, is the same tiling as to be un¬ folded from the middle to the extremity of the universe. But there soul herself from herself, illuminates the centre of the universe, and the whole sphere of it, by her jwwers; and here the Delnitirgus is the cause of animation, and introduces the bonl into the universe. For the same Illinois effected by both, demiurgically indeed, and intellectually, by the cause, hut self-motnclv, by soul. Now how¬ ever, the philosopher dcli\crs the honil derived from fabrication alone. For w« particularly refer wholes, and such things as are good, to a diyine cause, but partial natures, and things which are not <piod, we think umvorthv of di\ine pro¬ duction, and suspend them from other more proximate causes; though the-so also, as has been frequently observed, subsist through dixinity.

As there is therefore a communion of a di\me, and likewise of a partial sou! with bodies, that communion -a hieh subsists according to a beneficent will, and dais not depart from intelligible progressions, is divine; but that z. hich subsists di cording to a dejiuxion of the uugs of thi soul, or uuduciti/, or flight, is u it limit (l ml, though in this also, there if a complication with self-mot ice energy, and the trill of providence. Nevertheless, the* communion with body which is according to divinity, is mani¬ fest through the jire.-eiico ot divinity ; but that which is from soul, is apparent through the representation ot aberration wliieli it exhibits. Ibnee, sinee the animation of the world is two-told, prim-t iling from tin- 1 )i iniurgiis-, and from feclf-motion, IMalohtre very properl\ gi\cs the preli n-mr to that cause which subsists according to divinity, as Ik mg wholly most adapted to wholes.’ Fur the words “ placing, he c.t Undid, and he lovered as with it veil" lire the names of demi¬ urgic works. For the first of these sanities the It rinination of the soul, the «econd, the psychical middle which proceeds through all things, and the third, exempt transcendency. For to cover as with a Veil, indicates that the soul compre¬ hends the world eteiy way, unites it through In rsclf, leads it to one life, and docs not leave any thing external to its appropriate proxidence, nor destitute of its nature.

“ And causing circle to revolve in a circle, lie established heaven [or the universe] one, single, solitary nature."

The philosopher Porphyry well interprets the meaning of circle revolving in a circle, l'Or it is possible, says he, for that which is not a circle to 1 h* moved in a circle, as a stone when whirled round ; and also for a circle not to be mo\cd in

* l’or rou uWoii here, it i* necessary to read run o W.

BOOK 111.]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

7

BOOK 111.]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

7

a circle, us a wheel w hen rolled along. But it is the peculiarity of the world, that being circular it is moved in a circle, through h.irmonimislv revolving about the centre. In a still greater decree however, the do me laiiililidms, appropriately interprets the meaning of these words. For he says that the circle is twofold, the one being psychical, hut the other corporeal, and that the latter is moved in the former. For tlu> is conformable to what has been before said, ami accords with what is afterw ards asserted. For Plato himself shortly after moves the corporeal nature accordin'; to the psychical circle, and renders the twofold circulations analogous to the periods in the soul. And such is the interpretation according to both these philosophers.

Moreover, to comprehend the whole blessedness of the world in three appel¬ lations, is most appropriate to that which subsists according to a triple cause, viz. the final, the paradigmatic, and the demiurgic. I’or of the appellations them¬ selves, the first of them, viz. owe, i> assumed from tin* final cause; (or the one is the same with the good. I’uit the second, viz. single or only, is assumed from the para¬ digmatic cause. For the onhf-heyotten and onli/ms.s (uovfieru) were, prior to the universe, m all-perfect animal. And the third, viz. the solitary, i< assumed from the demiurgic cause. For the ability of using itself, and through itself governing the world, |noreeds from the demiurgic goodness. The world therefore, is owe, so far as it is united, and is converted to the vtic. lint it is single, so far as it par¬ ticipates ol the inti lligihlr, and rompr«‘ln*n«l>j nil things in itself. And it is solitary , so far as it is similar to its lather, and is able to save itsi If. l*rom llie three how¬ ever, it appears that it is a God. For the one, the perfect, and the se//-su//icient, are the elements of deity. Hence, the world receiving these, i> also itself a God; being one indeed, according to liyparxis ; but single or only according to a per¬ fection which derives its completion from all sensible natures; and solitary , through being sutlicient to itself.' For those that lead a solitary life, lieing con¬ verted to tin mselves, have the hopes of salvation in themselves And that this is the meaning of the term solitary, will he evident from the following words of Plato;

" Able through virtue to eon vet sc with itself, indigent of nothing exter¬ nal, and sufficiently known and friendly to itsell.”

For in these words, he clearly manifests what the solitariness is which lie ascribes to the world, and that he denominates that being solitary, who looks to himself, to that with which he is furnished, and to his own proper

1 The world is jing/r, or alont, because llicre i* not another world equal to it; but it »s solitary* because it is sulhcicnt to itself, bo that the alone, and the solitary, have not here the same meaniuj.

8

8

PROCLUS ON TUI

[BOOK 111.

measure. For those that live in solitary places am the saviours of them¬ selves, so far as respects human causes. The uni*erne therefore is likewise after this manner solitary, as being sufficient to itself, and preserving itself, not through a diminution, hut from an exuberance of power; for self-sufficiency is here indicated; and as he says, through virtue. For he alone among partial animals [such as we are] who posst sses virtue, is aide to associate* with, and love him self with a parental affection. Hut the vicious man looking to his inward liaseness, is indignant with himself ami with his own essence, is astonished vvi.ii externals, and pursues an association with others, in coiisei|uence of his inability to behold himself. On the contrary, the worthy man perceiving himself beau, titul rejoices and is delighted, and producing in himself beautiful conceptions, gladly embraces an association with himself, l or we are naturally domesticated hj the beautiful, but hastily withdraw ourselves from deformity. Hence, if the world possesses virtue adapted to itself, in its intellectual and psychit al essence, and m the |ierfcction of its animal nature, looking to itself, it loves itself, and is present with, and suffieii nt to itself.

Ills proper therefore, to assert these things to those vvho place intelligible* cxtimal to intellect. For how can that which t< nils to other things, and as being deficient is indigent of externals, l« blessed? Hence, it the world is through virtue converted to itself, must not iutelleet do this m a much "renter decree? Intellect therefore intellectually pereciv. - it^i-ll' And this is among the number of things immediately know n. this uUn ileserves to be ri marked, ileal Plato when he gives animation to the world, directly imparts virtue to it. For the par¬ ticipation of soul is immediately accompanied with the fulness of virtue, m the lieiii" which subsists according to nature ; since the one cause of the virtues, 1 is also co-arranged with the fountain of souls,' and the progression of this fountain is conjoined with the progression of soul. For with respect to virtue, one indeed is unical. primary and all-perfect; but another subsists in the ruling supermun¬ dane Gods ; another in tin* lilierated Hods; and another is mundane, through which the whole world possesses nude tiled inti Uigence, an undev iating life, an energy converted to itself, and a purity uumingled with the animals which it < on- tains. From this virtue therefore, the world becomes known and friendly to itself. For knowledge precedes fnmiliuritv.

Since the universe also is intellectual, an animal, and a Hod, so far indeed, as it is intellectual, it becomes known to itself; hut so far as it is a (iod, it is friendly to itself For union is more perfect than knowledge. If therefore, the universe is known to itself, it is int* lh dual ; for that which is primarily known to itself is

If therefore, the universe is known to itself, it is int* lh dual ; for that which is primarily known to itself is

i. r. Vela.

' i. c. J.a: j.

UUOK Ili.J

Tl MAX'S OF IM.ATO.

9

intellect. And if it is friendly to itself it is united. But that which is united is deified; for the one w liirli i-. m intellect is a (iod. Airnin therefore, you liave % irlue, a knowledge of, and a friendship with itself, in the world; the first of these proceed¬ ing into it from -mil; the second - from intellect ; and the third from deity. Hence Plato very properly adds, that on account of these things, the world was "ene- rated by the Dcmiurppis a ldessed Hod ; for the presence of soul, the participation of intellect, and the reception of union, render the universe a (iod. And the blessed < iod which lie now mi ntioiis is the (iod “ xrhnat a certain time would exist animated, endued with intellect, and united Union however, is present with it according to the bond of analogy ; but much more from the one soul and the one intellect which it participates. For through these, greater bonds, and a mure excellent union proceeded into the universe. And still beyond these unions, divine friendship, and the supply of good, contain and connect the whole world. J'nr (hi bond u Ini h jmn m Is from intelh < t ami soul is strong, as Orpheus also says ; hut the union of the golden chain [/. c. of (he tlcijic scries] is still greater , and is the iau sc of gnu Ur good to all things.

Moreover, felicity must likewise be assumed in a way adapted to the universe. For since it is suspended from the p it< rn d intellect, and the whole fabrication of things, and since it live- conformably to those* causes, it is consequently happy (fj'i'xianiv)' from them. For the Demiur^iis also is denominated a da-inon by Plato in the Politicos, and a "real ibeinon by Orpheus, when he says,

(•in' llic "i< ;it (I,« iiiini and tInc lord of all.

lie therefore vvho lives according to the will of the father, and preserves th»* iiiLelleclual nature w hicii was imparted to him from thence immutable is happy and blessed. The first and the all-perfect form of felicity likewise, is that of the world. The second is that of the mundane (toils, whom Plato in the Phaidrus (■alls happy (bids following the mighty Jupiter. The third is that of the genera superior to us [vi/. the leiicitr of an"-Is, daemons and heroes], loir there is one v irlue of angels, another of difiions, anil another of the heroic genera : and the form of felirity is triple, being different according to each genus. The fourth formof felicity is that which subsists in the undetilcd souls, who make blameless descents [into the realms of generation,] anti exert an inflexible and untamed life. The fifth is that of partial souls [such a« ours]; and this is multiform. For the soul which is an attendant ou the moon, is not similarly happy with the soul that is

1 i. r. Havmz a Kood (l,t mon

The fifth is that of partial souls [such a« ours]; and this is multiform. For the soul which is an attendant ou the moon, is not similarly happy with the soul that is

1 i. r. Havmz a Kood (l,t mon

* Instead <»J m f'aifittr tysttro fisyai n»o Tai rwi’, it if rd|Ui«lf to read tit isnfjir yrrtrv^tyai

u ? » X (.« uTa irwr.

?•. Vol. II. B

10

IMtOCLlIS ON TIIK

{ BOOK III.

suspended from the solar order ; hut as the form of life is different, so likewise perfection is defined l.y different measures. And the last form of felicity is that which is sis-n in irrational animals. For every thin- which obtains a perf.-ction adapted to it accord in-to nature is happy. For through its proper perfection, it is conjoined to its proper ihvmoii, and partakes of his providential can*. I ie forms of felicity therefore, 1 m in- so many, the tir>t and highest must lie plaeed in the world, and which also is now mentioned bv l’lato. \\ e nm-t not. however, woinh r that he immediat. Iv calls the world a < It id. from its p irtieip itinii of soul. For every thin- is deified ihrou-h that wliieli is proximatcly prior !■» it ; the corpo¬ real world indeed through soul; hut soul through intellect, as 1 lie Athenian guest also says; (lor he asserts that by receiving intellect soul Incomes * ^■•*«!.) and intellect throu-h the one. Hence, intellect is dome, hut not a God. 1 The out however is no lunger a God throu-h an\ thin- . l>i*. hut is primarily a God ; just as int. lleet is primarily -nostir, as m»u 1 is primarily self-motive, and as hudy 11 primarily in place. Hut tie -e thill-► being p*-i-l«-< lly true, and peculiar to IMato, it is necessary to survey in what follows, where he i stahlishes intellect in soul, as here he plaei s soul in hodv.

“ B u t, indeed, iliviuitv did not thus afterwards artificially produce the soul, as we just now endeavoured to say, junior to the hodv. I 01 hew in conjoined these, would never permit that the more ancient, nature should be governed by the younger.”

IMato knew that the mode according to conversion, eutiivlv delivers as first, things which arc second in order. For things which are proximatelv partici¬ pated, are secondary to those that are rveiiipl ; and such as are more known to

the hearers, are inferior to invisible ihiii-s. Tin* cause however of this is, that

when we now survey beings we ire in a fallen condition. I m when we menu hi^h, mid b« hold the tlun-s tli.it are lu re limn .1 certain shadow, we me ahh to perceive their «1 imitintiv•• nature, in consequence ol associating w ith inti Hi—ibles. and bavin- them before mu eves, lint falling into generation, and surveying tlun^s as it were III a siipnu eoiulition, we Iiis( perceive niboU, and things proximate to our senses, as III -i It- placed nearer I • Us \ Oil be^ilinill- ll'olil tin se, w*- recur through reminiscence to bein-s themselves and truly existing essence.

* t. r. lullllrcl, i' in it' ‘>"11 oat tire ilivim , uml n> I j (■■*!; I'ul " la » •' s»|“ r ** ,r ‘ ,I|,M 1 < i>iimiIi«Mi ill »illi ll, it o Him ■>

r.ooK ni.j

\ or plato.

if

The survey therefore from on high, will be lli.it of souls abiding there ; but the sur¬ vey from beneath, will h<* that of souls who have separated tin inselves [from the in¬ telligible world]. And tlie judgment indeed, which originates from things essential¬ ly more aneii nf, is that of souls living according to iute'd-cl; but the judgment " liieh proreeds from secondary to first natures, is the judgment of fallen souls. For truly existing being i' near to souls that abide in the intelligible; but non- to those that are in a fallen condition. For that which abides, abides in lieing, and that which falls [from the intelligible], is situated m non-bein". But to each of these, that m which it dwi lls is more proximate.

I’lato therefore, knowing these things, and that we recur from subordinate to more excellent natures according to a well-arranged ■ progression, thinks tit to make mention of the nature of things, conformably to which the elder is more excellent than the younger, and through this common conception, to arrange the soul prior to the body. 1 or he reminds us that the former is older, but the hitter younger, through an hypothetical guiditnre. For if the soul rules over the body, it is more ancient than tiie bod y. But it does rule over the body: for it leads every tiling m the universe* by its motions. And body, indeed, is alter-motivi?; but soul is naturally adapter] to move both itself, and other things. It is therefore mole aneu lit than the body. It this however be the case*, it is iiece>sarv to conceive ot it by itseil, not as being g< nerated post< rior to the hndv, as we imagine it to be, but giving it a supernal origin, we shoultl survey the corporeal bulk of the universe, unlohled as n were into light from it. For the universe derived its subsistence through soul, imitating the progression of it through its bulk, but the conversion ot it through its figure. These things, however, we shall again

discuss.

For the universe derived its subsistence through soul, imitating the progression of it through its bulk, but the conversion ot it through its figure. These things, however, we shall again

discuss.

But, it you are willing, let us now survey each of the words of the text of Plato. In the first place then lore, wilh re.'per I (o the soul, he manifests that he speaks of every s,nd by adding the .11 tit lr the. For he does not s.iv as lie did l».-lore, •• /Vuiv/yg st.ul m tin u but the soul. For there, there was a power of tiie whole soul about the middle; but lure, every soul is said to l»e more an¬ cient than body. In the next place, the older and the i/nun^tr, are not to be assumed according to tune, 1 - \tticns apprehended they wen*: for the father at once constituted the soul, and surrounded the body of the universe with it, as with a veil. But tb* y must be assumed in the order of essence. For the essence which is more proximal- to the Domiiirgiis [is older]. If you wish also to understand tin: older and the younger according to time; the lime which is in tin: soul, is older and more divine, but tin* time which |M-rtains to body is

12

PKOCI.US ON TIIE

| BOOK 111.

younger. And soul, so far as soul, is not corporeal time; but tlie time belonging to body in suWdinate to that of soul. For a- there is a different form of motion in both, so likewise the time in each is different. In the third place, lie uses the expression “ artificially produce," in the most propi r sense, in speaking of the soul; clearly indicating that it is a self-motive thing, that it is lull ol reasons, 1 and is inventive 1 of all-various contrivances. .

Farther still, the power of more ancient ruling over junior natures, proceeds into the universe from intelligibles themselves.* For there 1‘rotogonus, [or animal itself,] who is so denominated by all [the («odsl, is the king ut all the iutcllci tual natures. Ami in the intellectual order, the eldest ot the sous ol Saturn, is said

to Ik* the father of all things.

Hut Jove was born tin liist, and more lie knows.

For every where that whu h is older, is the symbol ol a limit inti Her tual, total and monadic life; hut that which is younger, of a life which is partible, proceeds to secondary natures, and is multiplied. Hence thevivilie (.oihlesses, they call on» older, but the other younger.’ Ami of the demiurgic Gods, they

denominate one prior, but the other junior, whom likewise tin y call lecrnt. In

the next place, the word cmijninid, clearly makes the »oul which is the subject of the present discussion mundane, and not hbcratul , nor the one soul \\hi< i exists prior to tin* nuuiv. l or the latter is exempt Irom all souls, and oturi souls proceed alrout it as a centre; hut the torun r receives a colijum turn wit t boilV, tiler ted according to the will ol the father.

l or the latter is exempt Irom all souls, and oturi souls proceed alrout it as a centre; hut the torun r receives a colijum turn wit t boilV, tiler ted according to the will ol the father.

“ We however, participating in a certain respect much of that which is casual and without design assert things ol this kind.

What is the reason that we are unwilling to transfer our intellect from f tings that are of a junior nature, to those that are i ssentially more ancient f It is

’ For \oyov In re, rud Xoyuv.

* Xnd for ri|»<Tii.w» read ciyrriu/i.

» For Of uvtuv naOijiri ry t cr/ry, it n obviously net c-oary lo read ill this place, uir uvrwe * aiOr/cfi tw »• vor)Tw »•.

4 Instead of rtvTtpa i in tins place, it is requisite lo rtad >orpu»rip«i.

5 i.e. Rhea u the older, but Juno the younger v,\itic C tailless.

6 The prior Deiuiurgus, is Jupiter, but the junior llaertius.

1 i. e. Not belonging to the order of (,mis denominated hbtrattd, and who are also called tuper- Cfltthal, a* being immediately above lhe mundane (mile.

* 111 the ong'njl, fiu it run uinar, airu tuv ifwrfpuie wi rpfnf.t'Ttp*tv, **■* r« car vvtnuy fiHOfivrfoa

r.ciDK III ]

1 IMPELS Of PLATO.

13

Localiso our intellect resembles one asleep, ami liecause we are full of an irratio¬ nal and disorderly nature. For the words casual, an A rashly, are significant of those tilings. For since we possess sense, and sensihles are P 1 need UTore our view, together with %\ liit-li we are nourished, we first apprclu ml things of a junior nature, as being more familiar to us. And through sense indeed, we are borne along rashly and without design ; but through sonsililes which are placed Is-forc us, w e live in a casual manner. For those that remain on high, as sense is with them at revf t and there is no sensation of the sensihles with which we are now conversant, have nothin" occurring to them of a casual nature. But we, since we have sense, and sensihles are before our ej« s, live casually and without de¬ sign. And as it is said, we form a judgment of things with the head down¬ ward;’ which is also conformable to what Fmpcdodes lamenting our fate savs :

Many dire words and cares nbtmui llie mind.*

For many things invading us who are truly slaves, as having Income exiles from deity, blunt and clog our speculation of real beings. Since however, as this philosopher also says, the casual, and that which is without design, accede to us externally, on this account, l*lato says, that we participate of them, and not that these are exeited from onr essence : for we are essentially intellectual. But since tin re is likewise a participation from more divine natures, Plato adds the word much, in order thid he may indicate the imh finiteness and confusion of a participation of this kind. For the participation of div itter natures, introduces to the participants, union, bound and order.

But since tin re is likewise a participation from more divine natures, Plato adds the word much, in order thid he may indicate the imh finiteness and confusion of a participation of this kind. For the participation of div itter natures, introduces to the participants, union, bound and order.

“ Hut the artificer of the world constituted soul both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient than body, as the despot [or lord] and ruler of its servile nature; and that from certain things in the follow¬ ing manner.”

Porphyry subdividing, conceives the words to signify, that soul is more ancient than body in generation, but prior to it in virtue. Botli however, or cither, max be signified, and prior to and more ancient than , may be conjoined to the words in ge-

ftr rifiuv pvvXofii fia Toy rout ; but it appears lo me llial tlie wools ui wpririivTtpw ought to be expunged, unless »<• rrail instead of them ot«n orrpvr, (as more familiar to us), aud that for/icvXe- fuOa, wt sluMild read ov fiovXofiifla.

1 I'or KapawmovfirOa here, it appears to be requisite lo read *aptf wmovfjtba.

* In the original, veXXa it itn' firm, -u r< appXvyvvo i fupifjyai. But for ra r« il is obviously ►ary to read ron rf.

14

PROCl.L'S ON THK

[hook III.

1 I'or KapawmovfirOa here, it appears to be requisite lo read *aptf wmovfjtba.

* In the original, veXXa it itn' firm, -u r< appXvyvvo i fupifjyai. But for ra r« il is obviously ►ary to read ron rf.

14

PROCl.L'S ON THK

[hook III.

ncration ; anil apain, either may be conjoined to the words w virtue. But "( lie- ration when ascrilwd to the soul, is not that which is accord ins to time ; for I Mato in the Pint elms demonstrates that the soul is nnh.-otten and ind.Mrii.Mil.le; hut is an essential progression from inlelliuihk* causes. I*or of beings, some are in¬ telligible and nnhe^otteii, hut others are sensible and generated. And thetm dia Ik*, ween these, are intelligible and general.-.!, l or some things are entirely in- composite and impartible, and on this account are unbt-otten ; but others which .subsist between these, are intelligible and generated, belief naturally impartible and partible, and after another manner simple and composite. Genera¬ tion therefore, in the soul is one lliiii” but that in the body another. And tin* one, indeed, is prior and more aneieiit ; tor it is more proximate to the l)eiuiur*4iis of all things; but the other is secondary and more recent ; for it is more remote from the one [tabrirative cause nt all. ImiIIht sti! , \irtueis present with the soul, and it is also pr. sent with the body, and the whole animal; but the \ ntue of the soul is more divine, and that of the body, abject. And tin-former is of a more niliuir nature, and is nearer to the mm a! causes of intelliuibh Grtiie; hut the latter is of an attendant nature, and is more remote from iiilelh-ibles. Can ration, kuar, muni ft its progression, hut virtue, perfec- tivnundimivusiun ; of whit !», the former is from the fot ntam ot the soul . 1 but the latter is inherent in souls from i'onlal \irtue, (i. e from Vesta j. 'Hie prior list It also, and the more ancient, have a certain tlitli n nee w itli respect to each other. J-'or prior inthed, is si'jiiifieant if order alone ; but the more am nut, of the han- scemlcney of cause u ith nfireme to tin thing caused. Not eveiy thina therefore whieh is prior, can al>o be c died more atiei. nt, but that whit h is the leader <>l essence to seenmlary natures. Both however are true of the soul. F«.r sin* is allotted a prior order, beim; the sist, r of body, aeeordin- to the progression ot both from one fabriealion ; and >he ^viierates and adorns body in coiijnm lion with the father. IW the first pro-eny of raiiss, produce as they proceed the s* corn! progeny, in conjunction with tin* eau-es ot tin uist ns.

IW the first pro-eny of raiiss, produce as they proceed the s* corn! progeny, in conjunction with tin* eau-es ot tin uist ns.

What, however, shall vve say of the words , the lord and ruler 9 Do not both indicate, that the soul supplies all things with^ood, that it provides in every respee, for the hotly, ami that it pn-serves its own proper good in a thuinshin- condition.* And how is it possible, that Plato should not manifest these things throiuih these wolds? For a despot or lord, alw ay s refers lh»r good ' ut those that

• Ii i, nct-Cssarv In 11 1 <» »u|i|ilv riji yi'X’O t hv louiltaiu ot I lie v»ul i~ Juno,

1 I'or ui/if»iii"t' in tin* |»I.u.e, read m/iuioi.

I l„,icud of ru TU,V uvuO-. n. a^.,... ill this |il.iee, U is m|iiisilf to re.ul ru ruie

uyuOu uvayfpet.

mink m.J

TIMAiL'S Ol- PLATO.

16

lie govt rn<. to Ins own good. Hut a ruler looks to the good of those who are obedient to him, ami eo-arranges all things with r« ferenre to it. 'Y\\c despotic jti cMiliarily, howncr, is present with tin: soul, in eonsefpieneo of her performing all tilings (of the sake of herself; hut the ruling peculiarity, through tilling all things with good. I’or her providential energy is not diminished, through referring all things to her own proper good. And her good remains unchanged, while she gives eomph lion to her providential energies. In another wav also she is a ruler and a despot: tor she proceeds both from the ruling, and the tout d soul.' Uerause likewise, the universe is her dwelling, she is railed it despot. And U-cause she lr ids all things by her motions, she has a ruling power. In rouseipn nee too, of h.mug dominion o\er wholes, she is a despot ; hut because she assimilates all things to the intelligible, she rules over the universe. If however, she was thus constituted at fust, as a despot and a ruler, these things arc essential to her, I mean the despotic and the ruling peculiarity, lint it they are essential, i!i-v are always present with her. And if indeed they were present with her in capacity alone, she would be impi rlei t, which it is not I ivvful to assert ; but it m energv, th it which is governed by In r alvvavs was, and was adorned by her. The uni¬ verse itself therefore, if it was so generated, as to be governed by soul, is consiih- sistent with soul. Tor that wInch is governed is simultaneously conjoined with that w Inch governs. Ilenee through both, we mav discover the perpcliniv of the uiiiM ise, and that to govern is not aecuh ntal to soul, nor to In governed, to body, but that I he soul is, by its very essence, tbe despot of tin- body, and body the vassal of the soul. On this account also, they are spontaneously conjoined to e ii h other; and the body is excited to the participation ol the soul, and the soul to the ear* of the liody .

On this account also, they are spontaneously conjoined to e ii h other; and the body is excited to the participation ol the soul, and the soul to the ear* of the liody .

Part her still, tin* intention ol the words “ from cerium things of ter the / o'lo„ii/g manner, is to lead into light the genera and the things v.iiirh constitute the soul, and also tin* mode of the mixture of them, and the reasons according to which the mixture is divided. Tor the corporeal nature was ni.uh I*y divinity to consist of certain elements, and after a Certain mamn r, ami lie urtiiieiaiiy devised a 'i i tain analogy ol them and physical hum], lint if divinity artificially produced till 1 soul from certain tilings, and alter a n rtnui manner, lie constituted both the subject of her as it were, and the form, it is ridiculous therefore to say, that the essence of her is unliegotten, if-shc consists of certain elements, but that the form of her is generated. Tor Plato says, that divinity produced, both the mat¬ ter as it were of the noul, and the reason according to which slw» is diversified

1 mi. Mir j>i(Kcrilv frimi Prr>'rr|>inr ami Juno.

I'KOCLUS ON Till-:

[BOOK III

id

w ith such forms as she possesses ; Ijeincj Wind by certain media. If however, divinity generates the elements as it were of her, viz. essence, same, and different, and from these the whole, every tiling that is essential in the soul is ge¬ nerated.

“ From an essence always impartible, and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again from an essence which is partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence."

“ From an essence always impartible, and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again from an essence which is partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence."

In the first place, it is requisite to show through 1 what cause Plato ih-thers the generation of the soul, si nee it is according to him unbegotten; in the next place, to divide appropriately the whole psychical generation ; in the third place, to de¬ monstrate the middle n it lire of the soul ; in the fourth place, to speak concerning the genera ol those things, from which Plato constitutes all other beings and the soul; in the fifth place, to show how the'mixtuiv of these genera is to he assumed m tin* soul; in tin* sixth place to demonstrate what thd> impartible and the partible natures are; and in the seventh place, to unfold the meaning of the words of Plato, and to ewnce that they accord with all that has been before said. For if we are able to discuss all these particulars, we shall obtain in an appropriate manner the end of this investigation. Ia t us liegin therefore from the first, because some of the ancients have blamed Plato, asserting tli it he does not rightly investigate the principl of a principle, and the generation cf -’'•>viii«-gntten thing. I or it we investigate the < aiises of first nattires, and coins ive g< derations of things self-suhsisteiit, we shall ignorantly proceed to infinity, and have no cud of the theory. Fur as he w ho thinks that all things arc demonstrative, especially subverts demonstration itself, after the same manner also, he who investigates the causes of all things, entirely subvr ,ts all beings, and the order of tin til proceeding from a certain definite principle. 'Filings of this kind indeed, are objected by Theophrastus to Plato, concerning the ir< m ration of the soul, who likewise says, that we ought not to investigate the uhi/ in all physical inquiries. Fur, he adds, it would Ik ridiculous to doubt whv fire burns,on wliat account lire exists, and whv snow refrigerates. Hut those who have written against him in defence of Plato say, that alone to know the on or that of natural tilings,’ is irrational knowledge, and isado.xastic, or Sensitive apprehension of them; but that to add likew ise the uhy t and to investigate the caitsi *of them, is truly the employ incut ofdianuia, and a scientific intellect. For in this right opinion differs from scientific reason.

* vi/. Merely to know that they exut, without knowing the bon, or u~hy tf.**y exist

BOOK 111.]

TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

17

For in this right opinion differs from scientific reason.

* vi/. Merely to know that they exut, without knowing the bon, or u~hy tf.**y exist

BOOK 111.]

TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

17

We however, attending to what both of them say, think that the latter speak well, but in the first place, we would ask Theophrastus himself, whether the cause of no one tiling is to be assigned, or of a certain tiling ? For if of no one thing, besides subverting science which especially knows causes, he will also accuse himself, by enquiring whence thunder is produced, whence winds arise, and what are the causes of lightning, corruscatiuns, fiery whirlwinds, rain, snow and hail; all which in his Meteors, he very properly thinks deserving of an appropriate conjej tural dismission. Hut if the cause of a certain thing is to be assigned, why are some things pertaining to physics to lie surveyed according to causes, hut others are to he delivered irrationally without cause? For it does not follow that in things in w hich that tfny c.rist is manifest, in these it is likewise known why they o\i*-t. But after Theophrastus, we shall ask the lovers of Plato, whether we are entirely to investigate the causes of all things, or not of all things ? For if of all things, we must therefore investigate the cause of the one, which we say is more excellent than cause. For that the one is, we may learn from principles. For if not the one, but multitude ([is the principle of things,3 w hat is it that unites ; since that which is united is from the one, just as that which is essentialized is from essence, and that which is animated is from soul ? But why the one is one cannot be unfolded, for it is more ancient than every cause. And if we are not to inves¬ tigate the causes of all tilings, why should we investigate the cause of soul, and the generation of it from a cause, but should hy no means do this in other tilings?

But why the one is one cannot be unfolded, for it is more ancient than every cause. And if we are not to inves¬ tigate the causes of all tilings, why should we investigate the cause of soul, and the generation of it from a cause, but should hy no means do this in other tilings?

Since however, we have separately interrogated each of them, we shall doubt with ourselves for both of them, through what cause Plato indeed devises the generation of the soul, and the progression of it from a cause, but Theophrastus condemns ail doctrine of this kind. And having doubted we say, that to Theo¬ phrastus, and all of the Peripatetic sect, the ascent of their speculation, is [only] as far as to the motive forms of the universe ; whether it be proper to call these souls, or intellects.' But by Plato, these as falling short of the lir>t dignity among l>eings, in consequence of I icing participate, are considered as having an order very remote from principles. For prior to these, are the intelligible ami intellec¬ tual orders of beings, from which these derive their progression. And prior to tin 'se orders, is the number of the Gods, causing beings to become one, and con¬ nected, and illuminating them with div ine light. And again, prior to this number, is the imparticipable one, from which this numlier unfolds itself into light through the natures by which it is received. For it is necessary that imparticipable forms

Tim. Plat.

' i. e. The souls of the celestial and sublunary spheres. VOL. II.

c

18

PItOCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

KhouUl fwUsitft prior to those that art* participated, and prior to imparticipables, the unities of them. For the united is one thin" and unity another, and prior to the multitude of unities, the one fountain of them exists.

VOL. II.

c

18

PItOCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

KhouUl fwUsitft prior to those that art* participated, and prior to imparticipables, the unities of them. For the united is one thin" and unity another, and prior to the multitude of unities, the one fountain of them exists.

Such therefore I icing the opinions of both these philosophers, Theophrastus indeed, since he asserts that the soul is the principle of motion, and does not admit that there is any thin" else prior to this principle, very projierly thinks that principle on 'lit not to Im investigated. For he "rants that the universe is ani¬ mated, and on this account divine. Fur if it is divine, says he, and has the most excellent life, it is animated; since nothin- is honourable u it It out soul, as he writes in his treatise On the Heaven, lint Plato admits that there are mundane intellects, prior to the celestial souls, and plior to these, iut< Meets without habitmleLto souls], and prior to these, the divine order. Hence, he very properly delivers the soul produced and Generated from another principle; though he also knew that gene- ratioii of another kind has not only a place in bodu but also in souls, so lar as they participate of time. For in divine soi.ls likewise there is time, since, as Plato says ill the Phadrus, they survey through time real being itself. lor all transitive in ition has tune conjoined with it. And thus much tor the tiist ot the before-mentioned problems. For at the same tune, it is sullieiently demon¬ strated, tl at Plato rightly delivers the generation ot the soul, though it is essen¬ tially unbe_M*tt< n, and tli it the argument whii h is urged against it, is partly right and partly not. l or to him who admits that the soul is the first thing, it is coiise- ijueiit to subvert 11 it* gem ration of it. For troiu w hat is the generation ot it, vv hell there is nothing prior to it f This very thing however, is not true, th.it soul is the first of all things. For that which Vristotle says concerning body, that being finite, it alvvavs receives the power ot being always moved, but does not levttVi the infinite at once, the same, thing also must necessarily be said concerning the soul, that it does not at once » uergi/.e aci ordmg to all things, so that it dues not at once possess ail the infinite power, from which it always i.*nergi/es, nor does it energize at once according to every power, so as always to possess one energy. For ot all power, there is one energy ot one power. Home it always receives the power of energizing alvvavs, and on this account does not always energize with invariable sameness, but dillercnlly at dillen nl times. So that m short it is true, that every thing which energizes according ta tune, always reaives the power of energizing, yet does not at once receive the u hole power, and on this account is generated.

That the soul however, is not the first of beings' is evident. I* or th.it which is

So that m short it is true, that every thing which energizes according ta tune, always reaives the power of energizing, yet does not at once receive the u hole power, and on this account is generated.

That the soul however, is not the first of beings' is evident. I* or th.it which is

first is pn sent with all things, and it is necessary that all things should p irti* ipate

1 lion .at ufori i v f uv irpo tovtuv i/ yi’X'O hi this place, «t is necessary to real ■* -< ou w P u,ro> '

rvr u» Tur il)\oi.

hook in.]

TI M/EUS OF PLATO.

19

I* or th.it which is

first is pn sent with all things, and it is necessary that all things should p irti* ipate

1 lion .at ufori i v f uv irpo tovtuv i/ yi’X'O hi this place, «t is necessary to real ■* -< ou w P u,ro> '

rvr u» Tur il)\oi.

hook in.]

TI M/EUS OF PLATO.

19

of the principle of all, or not participating of it should entirely perish. For essence and hv parxis are imparted to all things from the first principle. But soul is not present with all things, nor is it necessary that all things should participate of soul. But of bodies, some are inanimate, and others are animated. It is likewise necessary that the tirst of all things should he one. For it it were multitude, it would have that which causes things to l>e one, prior to itself. For there will not Ik* a dispersed multitude. But soul is a multitude. The first of tilings also is beyond all essence; since every essence has multitude in conjunction with itself; for there are in it 1 cl ill* rence and saineni ^s, life, anil eternal energy. But soul is an essence. Every where too, the first genus is free from evil; hut the genus of [partial] souls is at a certain time naturally adapted to become evil. And this in short inav In* demonstrated through many arguments. The design however ot Plato is, through the above-mentioned cause, to unfold to us the psychical c-s< nee, to show how it subsists, and to teach us from what elements it is composed, and according to what reasons. For as with respect to our body it is easy to know, that it contains the face and the hands, the thighs and the feet, and all such other parts as are obvious to every one; but to know how it is com¬ posed from the inward parts, from what particulars, and according to what ratio, rerpiires medical and anatomical information ;—after the same manner w ith respect to the soul, it is not difficult to show what it is according to its total powers, hut to unfold the very essence of it, as far as to the elements of which it consists, and to survey the all-various reasons in it, w ill he the work of the most accurate theory concerning it. And this indeed, Plato endeavours to do, anatomizing as it were the psychical essence, and d< mutating the whole of it to those who are aide to follow him. As we have said therefore, we may thus reply to the first of the inquiries, l or that Plato very properly says, that the essence of the soul is generated, we may learn, by considering that he called the corporeal-formed nature generated, liceaireit is always becoming to he, and receives an infinite power of existing. For the soul also is a thing of this kind, and is not aide to receive at once the whole infinity of ta-ing. This is evident from its living in a discursive manner, and producing different reasons at di lie rent times, not having ' the whole of nil infinite life at once present. By always therefore evolving its own life, it is evident that it has an essence always generated, or becoming to I e, and always advancing to the infinite, hut not being infinite. Hence it always receives a life which is essential, and entirely natural to it. For that which is jierfective of a thing is to that thing entirely according to nature. Moreover, if it

Hence it always receives a life which is essential, and entirely natural to it. For that which is jierfective of a thing is to that thing entirely according to nature. Moreover, if it

* i. f. In the first essence.

20

PROCLUS ON THE

[book lit.

18 self-motive, [as Timtrus asserts, then we must admit, that it imparts to itself at once, the whole of the essential life which it possesses in itself, and thus it will lie uiiliejrotten and at the same time]' generated ; being indeed, through the essence and life which it always possesses, ever-living, and ever-existent, but in conse¬ quence of alw ays receiving these, alw ays becoming to Is* essence and life. For it exists in a twofold respect, from itsilf, and from the natures prior to itself. And through itself indeed, always existing ; hut through the natures prior to itself aluays becoming to be. Or rather through the latter having both, viz. to be that which it is, and to be generated, but through itself to be that which it is on,y. For it alone pos¬ sesses from the natures prior to itself the perpetual reception of something ; Aris¬ totle also rightly asserting that nothing is the cause of itself, the well being ot which is according to time, and has not ail eternal subsistence, 1 lest the cause which ourrht to be prior to the thing caused, should be eonsubsisteiit with that which is generated. He nee time and eternity subsist about the soul ; eternity indeed, so far as the soul is unhegotten; but time so far as it is generated. On this account the soul is in a certain respect eternal, as indestructible, but is not simply eternal, as Plato also says in the laws, lbit the second tiling proposed to be done, was to divide the whole generation of the soul in an appropriate manner. \ his how¬ ever, w e shall afterw ards accomplish, again assuming the principle from the things themselves.

In every nature therefore, there are essence, [tower [and energy. And essence indeed,]' is that according to which an existence as lire, or to be fin*, is present with tire. Hut power is mu thing, and » nergv another. For one thing dries, but another beats, and other things produce a change in a different wav. It is neces¬ sary therefore, that in the soul also one thing should he essence, another power, and another energy. And it is. requisite that he who wishes to apprehend and survey the whole of the soul, should speak about all these. Ot the gt iteration of the soul therefore, then* will in the first place he three heads; the first, concerning its essence; the second concerning its power; and the third concerning its energy. For this will he a jw-rfect disquisition of the things proposed for consideration.

* from itit* version of Lcoiiivus Tlmiiwus, it up|K*ars that the words within the brackets are wauling in the printed original, and I ha\e accordingly inserted them from his version.

1 In t lie original, cyOwt too ttxoyrvt, uti wiry tone tuvry amoy, o Kara yoy tv

* from itit* version of Lcoiiivus Tlmiiwus, it up|K*ars that the words within the brackets are wauling in the printed original, and I ha\e accordingly inserted them from his version.

1 In t lie original, cyOwt too ttxoyrvt, uti wiry tone tuvry amoy, o Kara yoy tv

r\(t, n\V oi-s. uivvivi, which I eoini us '1 lionr.vus erroneously translates as follows: Quaiuohrem uptime Arislotrlts loquitur, ipiamlo ilicit, nullani rein sihi ipsi causam < sse, neque Uni|>oraleuj, neque seiupi- lernant. Fur an rtrrnul nature is sclf-subsisteut.

* The words wilhiu the brackets are wanting in the original, but both the sense and the version of Tliomaus require they should he inserted. Hence after to it tvyafiu, it is necessary to add, to it tytp-

yua *a4 i) fit* uvota.

ROOK III.]

TINLIXS OF PLATO.

21

* The words wilhiu the brackets are wanting in the original, but both the sense and the version of Tliomaus require they should he inserted. Hence after to it tvyafiu, it is necessary to add, to it tytp-

yua *a4 i) fit* uvota.

ROOK III.]

TINLIXS OF PLATO.

21

Wi- may jwrcrivr however, that tlir* psychical esv,-nce is a certain threefold nature. For tin* hyparxis of it is one tiling, and tin* harmony in it another, according to which its essential multitude is eonnerted ; since it is not one essence 1 like intel¬ lect, nor divisible to infinity, like body which is posterior to it ; hut it is divisible into more essential parts than one, of which it consists, yet they are finite in number, there not being more parts of the soul than these, since these parts of it cannot be divided into others, as will be evident as wc proceed. And the form which is effected from tin se is another tiling; so that the essence of the soul is one anil threefold. For the monad and the triad are adapted to it, since we divide the whole soul into three parts. Hence its essence is one anil triple: for hyparxis is one tiling, harmony another, and form another. And the first of these indeed, alone defines existence, the second harmonizes the essential multitude, hut the third contains the peculiarity of the whole system. All these likewise, are in each other. For hyparxis has with itself an harmonized multitude; since it is not without multitude; nor is it multitude alone iinharmouized. And harmony is itseli essential, and is connective ot essence, to whicli also it gives form. Hence likewise it is shown in what resj>eet the soul is harmony, and in what respect it is not, and that Plato accords with himself in asserting here that the soul is harmony, but in the Plurdo confuting those who maintain that it is. For 1/ is one thing to he the harmony of itself aiul of other tilings, ami a differ, nt thing to he the harmony of another thing alone. F'or the latter produces harmony in a subject, and a harmony inseparable from the things harmonized, anil established in a foreign seat, lint the former produces a separate harmony, subsisting from itself, and converted to itself. Form likewise , is comprehensive of harmonic reasons, contains the hyparxis of the soul, and is the one raison according to which the soul is that which it is. All these therefore are in each other, viz. hvparxis, harmonv, and form, and the essence of the soul is one and triple; since it also consists of three genera, essence, same and different. And again, hyparxis indeed, is rather defined according to essence, but harmony according to sameness, and form according to dilfcrcnce, through which it is separated from all things.

And again, hyparxis indeed, is rather defined according to essence, but harmony according to sameness, and form according to dilfcrcnce, through which it is separated from all things.

Since therefore, we find that the soul is triple from the loginning, possessing essence, power and energy, and again, having essence itself triple, according to hyparxis, according to harmony, and according to form, from these wc shall make a pentad; arranging by parxis as the first, harmony as the second, idea or form, as the third, power as the fourth, and energy as the fifth. F’or the pentad is adapted to the soul as to a medium, containing the bond of the monad and the

* iestcad of ovre ft mu eunat is tim place, il k Decenary to read cere fttas nou.

22

PROCLUS ON THE

[book hi.

ennead, just as Hie soul is the Imnd of the intelligible and sensible essence. Adopting likeni>e this arrangement, we shall divide the whole theory concerning the soul into live heads; in the fust place, speaking concerning the hyparxis of the soul; in the second place, concerning the reasons and harmony in it; in the third place, discussing the idea of it ; in the lourth place, the many powers it contains; and in the fifth place, directing our attention to its energies. For Plato also w hen he speaks about the mundane, body, surveying the corporeal- formed nature of the world itself, by itself, delivers in the first place the nature which is the subject of body, and produces the elements of which the world con¬ sists. In the next place, he delivers the harmony of the elements; for analogy, and the bond subsisting through analogy, are an image of the psychical harmony. In the third place, he delivers the idea of the world exhibiting it to us as a spherical whole of wholes. Ill the fourth place, lie unfolds to us the powers of the world, giving to the spliel't s mdi ed, partible* powers, and such as are ctlecled through partial organs, bill to the animal of the universe, whole and perfect powers. And in the fifth place, he delivers to us the energies ot the world, sur¬ rounding the bod v of it with a wise and intellectual motion. A Iter the same in .in¬ ner likewise, he divides 111 these five heads the theory of the soul. I hat till* »,ene- ration of the soul therefore, is very properly surveyed by Plato, and in how many, and what heads it is divided, may' through these tilings be manifest.

A Iter the same in .in¬ ner likewise, he divides 111 these five heads the theory of the soul. I hat till* »,ene- ration of the soul therefore, is very properly surveyed by Plato, and in how many, and what heads it is divided, may' through these tilings be manifest.

After this however, we must discuss that which we proposed, as the third subject of enquiry, viz. how, and on what account we say that the soul is of a middle nature. For it i* necessary that this should In known prior to the reason¬ ing concerning it. Since then there are many things which proceed from the one, as »ar as to Ibrmh *S> I ind tin l.i't matter, h l tis see vvliat are the peculiarities of the first beings, what of the last, and what are allotted a middle order, and how they are adapted to tin* essence of tin* soul. I he follow mg tin relore, are tin* peculiarities of inti lligihles, ti id v existing being, the eternal, the impartible, the immove ible, the entire, the perfect, a sii|>erplcmtude ol existence, an unwearied and unrestrained life, that vvliii h is motive of all things, similitude, the being present with all things, and the lieing exempt from all things. For all tin se properties are unfolded into light m intelligible.s, according to the progressions of being. But again, there are certain oilier peculiarities ol seiisibles, such as the billowing, that which is not truly-existing being, that which is temporal according to essence, the partible, that which is moved, the partial, that which is in want ol another, that which Is always tilling with existence, that which lives according to participation, that which is altcr-molivc, dissimilitude, and that which on npics place l»y its parts. Between these, which arc opposed to each other as things first to tilings last, there are

nmiK ill,]

TIM.ELS OF PLATO.

23

Between these, which arc opposed to each other as things first to tilings last, there are

nmiK ill,]

TIM.ELS OF PLATO.

23

certain media, through \\liicli it is entirely requisite that the progression from lir»t to la>l natures, should he effected. For things similar to their producing causes proceed prior to such as are dissimilar; because similitude is allied to the otic, and all timers aspire after the one. The media therefore, between these extremes are, that which is not truly-existing being, yet is more excellent than non-being, but is inferior to real being, that which according to essence is in a certain respect eternal being, but exerts its energies in time, that which is impar¬ tible, according to its most divine part, but is distributed into parts, according to the all-various progression of reasons, that which itself moves itself, that which rules over alter-motive natures, but is inferior to immoveable beings, that which presents itself to tiie view' partially m conjunction w ith its wholeness, that which is in a certain respect a whole, according to the possession of all reasons, but which appears to be partial, according to diminution, and transition of energy. It is also that which perfects itself, and is pi rfected by natures prior to itself, and is more perfect than things which are adapted to be alone perfected by another. Jt likewise tills itself with power, and is tilled by other things, lives from itself, and receives lift; from others, being more divine than the natures which live only by participation, but inferior to those that primarily posse-s life. It is moreover, motive of other things, but is moved by first natures, is similar and at the same time dissimilar, and is exempt from the last of things, and is co-ordinated with tin in.

It is moreover, motive of other things, but is moved by first natures, is similar and at the same time dissimilar, and is exempt from the last of things, and is co-ordinated with tin in.

Sui'h therefore being the peculiarities in essences, let us consider where the soul is to be arranged, w hether in the lirst, or m the last of things. If however, in the first of things, it will be truly-existing being, will be entirely eternal and immoveable, and every thing else consequent to real beings, and we shall neither preserve the partible nature of the psvehical reasons, nor psychical time, nor self- motion, nor a transitive i n< igy, nor anv other thing of the like kind; though we clearly perceive these things in all our souls, lint now we investigate such things as are common to all souls, and which are essentially inherent in tin in, such as are the above-mentioned peculiarities. So that if they are inherent in all soiils, being common, souls will not belong to the lir-t of things, and to eternal lieiiigs so far as they are souls. But neither do they rank among the last of things. For if they did, vve shall make the soul alter-motive, partible and composite, and alone j»erfocted by other things, every thing contrary to which We see even in our souls. For they move and perfect themselves, and conduct themselves as they please. Much more therefore, will divine souls possess the cause of their proper perfection, will lead all things by their own motions, will be converted to, and know themselves, which it is impossible for alter-motive natures to accomplish.

PROCLUS ON THE

[book hi.

24

If however, it is not possible for the soul to be placed either in the first, or in the last of things, we must give to it a. certain middle situation; and this very pro¬ perly, in order that it may imitate the first causes of itself. For the Goddess who is the cause of the soul, has a middle rank among the Gods, as she also apj>eared to have totheologists.she being collective of the two fathers,' and from her own how els emitting the life of the soul. As in the fontal therefore, so likew ise in the ruling Gods, we may &*e the psychical principle shining forth to the view ; so that the soul very properly proceeds as a medium between intelligibles simply and sensihles, between beings that are alone eternal, and those that are simply generated.

You must not however, apprehend its middle nature to lie a thing of such akirul, as to l»e collective of the extremes, hut exempt from the things collected. Fur it is not bi tter than intelligibles, but the end of them. Nor again, is it a thing of such a kind, a> to lie inferior to both: for it transcends sensihles which are moved by it. But since it is a boundary or end, it is the boundary of intelligibles, but the prin¬ ciple of sensihles. By no means, however, must it Ik* said, that it is such a boun¬ dary and su< h a prim iple, as a point is in a line. For it is not in the things that are bounded as a point is in both the sections of a line. But it is in one way the boundary of intelligibles, as presenting itself to the view after the intelligible hypostasis, and in another way the principle of sensihles as Inking exempt from, and motive of them. For thus it will afford us a certain analogy, and it will l»e as alter-motivu are to self motive natures, so are self-motive to immoveable natures. It will also possess the bond of beings through its proper middle condition, evolv¬ ing indeed united causes, hut collecting the dispersed powers of sensihles. And it will be comprehended indeed, by the essence which is immoveable, and always possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, but will comprehend alter-mutive, and all variously mutable generation. It is liken ise intelligible, as with reference to generated natures, but generated as with reference to intelligibles ; and thus exhibits the extremes in the middle ; imitating in this resjeect the Goddess who is the cause of it. * 1 or she is on eve n/ side luminous, and has a face on ex cry side.

She hi, raise possesses the rudders of the universe, recoiling in her bowitts the progres¬ sions oj intelligibles into her; being filed from the intelligible ' life, but emitting the rivers of the intellectual* life ; and containing in herself the centre of the progression

' Tin* cause of tin* soul n Mu a, hIiu is Collective of ttie two father*, Saturn ami Ju|ut* r , Juno also i* tin* iJUK* ot tin* soul, liut slit is a subordinate cause, being contained in (lie vital fountain of IUiea,

* i e. It lira.

* For rorp,n liere, it is necessary to read ioij-ij,.

4 And instead of riip’iji litre, vie must read totpai.

TlOOK III.]

TIM. PUS or PLATO.

25

oj oil beings. \ pry properly therefore, is tin* soul both mihegntfen and generated And dll', indeed was before demonstrated from die two-fold life whirh is in her, m/. the e ssential aud the transitive; 1 but it*ma\ now ho shown from lu-r w hole¬ ness and her parts. 1-'or how i> [real] Iwing unhegotien, except I»y Inn ini; tin* infinite power of existing:, al onrt* wholly present ? And how i> hmlv generated, except by having infinite power always flowing into it, in consefjuenre of not being aide to receive the whole of it at once?

1-'or how i> [real] Iwing unhegotien, except I»y Inn ini; tin* infinite power of existing:, al onrt* wholly present ? And how i> hmlv generated, except by having infinite power always flowing into it, in consefjuenre of not being aide to receive the whole of it at once?

r l lie Mini therefore, as Iwing incorporeal indeed, has through its< If an infinite power of existing, not being generated according to the whole of itself, hut immortal; hut according to its parts, it is always generated to infinity. For if it iiad the same total infinity always present, there would he the same inlinitv of the whole and the part, of the perfect and the imperfect, of that which contains and ol that which is contained. Jiut this is impossible. Moreover, neither can the whole o| it always he hi generation, or heroming to he, hut a part of it lie eternal bring, lest the parts should he better than the whole. 11 cure rice versa, the whole /■' infinite bung, but the purl becoming (a be. So that the lixpo^tasis of it possesses infinite power, aud is venerated to infinity ; and tints at one and the same time, it participates of hein^, and is the first of generated natures, body * both in the whole and in the parts of it being in generation. It is not therefore siiflicir lit to say that it is generated, in consequence of energizing partiblv. hut it is requisite to see how this pre-e\i>tent in the very being of the soul. 1 or every energy which is according to nature, has an essence which antecedently assumes the cause ol the energy ; so that the soul likewise pre-assumes the seed of a hte which is according to time, aud which is common to every soul. For it is neces¬ sary that this also should he generated, and not finite be. If however this be the case, si net the soul pnssisscs being according to (he whole, it has to be generated in its parts. Aud how this is true we have shown. And thus much may suffice con¬ cerning the middle of the soul.

I^‘t also the inti-lligihle breadth, the psychical multitude, and the sensible nature, he separate trom each other; and let the last of things he suspended from those that rank as media, and the media from those that are the first. Ia‘t the soul likewise, lie tie* one bond of beings, subsisting in them. For the one also hinds all things, hut ill an exempt manner. For all things are united to each other as homogeneous, and as being derived from one cause, anil extended to

1 II bHore ilfiuoiislnilrit licit the mmiI, iii €<*UMr<| insure of bring self-motive, produces itself, and iv without "enrralmn; hut in coioei) uence of alwnvs receiving essence and lilt irotn the natures superior lo ilv-lf, it is always becoming to he essence and life, aud is always generated.

* For mi trufinret here, read rov wparor.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II.

I)

26

PROCLUS ON TIIK

[BOOK III.

one object of desire. Hut the soul likewise binds beings, as existing in them. And as in analogy, the middle [lertains to the things that are hound, thus too, the soul must Ik* admitted to lie the middle of lsiugs, binding and at the same time lieing hound as being of a self-motive nature.

These things being discussed, it i' necessary in the next place to show, how, and from what genera this soul, which contains the bond of beings, subsists. Ihit it is more necessary to speak first about the genera themselves, what they are, whence they proceed, and how. For it is requisite to know wholes prior to parts. This therefore, is the fourth of I he things proposed, and we shall discuss it to the utmost ot our ability. That the tnt< lligihle world therefore, coiupn h< mis the causes of secotidarv natures, and that .ill tonus are there, intelligibly or intel¬ lectually, or in whatever way you may he willing to call them, lor they subsist ill both wavs, has been ih inonstratecl in many treatises, and will lie ih moiistrated by Plato in what follows. Of forms themselves however, some are most total, and extend to every thing. Others ire most partial, and are as it were atomic forms. ,\nd ollu rs siihsist hi tween these, extending to many, but not to nil things; as the plena guest or stranger likewise shows in the Soplusta. lor mail is Iroui man itselt, and horse is Iroiu horse itsi it l>ut the sum u "ha s is in men and horses, and in many other things, is Irom similitude itself; and m like manner the dissimilar. Dillerenei*, and sameness however, vvlueh me m all Iwings, are from the sameness and ditlennee which are there Hence some things are from atoime forms, otla rs Iroiu middle, and others trom the most total forms; since also of the sciences which me hi us, same look to one scnuliju object, as medicine to health, hut othii's extend to many, as ant him lie to philosophy, to polities, to the teetonu science, and to main / ot hit's. And this is not only the ease utth arithmetic, hut also with the nnasuninf science, and tilth statics, l'ur Plato says, that uthcr all ot some of the fiihriaiticc arts, regime the assistance oj these, and without these have no accuracy, lint others look to all the aits, and not to those that arefahricatire alone , but to such also as contribute to the contemplative sciences, ax is the case with the dmdtuy ait, as Socrates says in the Plnlehiis. As therefore in the st a net s there are some that are most total, so m inti lligible causes, some are most partial, so tar ns the [initial is III them, and are the leadeis of appropriate numbers ot similar tonus; but others are widely extended, such as the equal, the similar, and the whole: lor whole so lur as whole is not common to all tilings ; since a part, so far as it is a part, is not a whole. < Min is hovvi ver, extend to all things, of w hu h all beings purtu ipate, >o t tr as they are l>eiiigs,and not so far as thev are hv mg,or animated,or possess some other peculiarity ,hut accoiding to the appellation of being. For since being is the fust [ot intclligiblesjt he eaiises also of exist! nee vv ill leave the most total order in the genera ot being. Hut these genera

For since being is the fust [ot intclligiblesjt he eaiises also of exist! nee vv ill leave the most total order in the genera ot being. Hut these genera

ROOK in ]

TIM/'EUS OF IM.ATO.

27

are five in numlter. viz. essence, sameness, difference, motion, and permanency, For every bring i*' essmtialized, united to itself, and separated from itself and from other things, pror eeds from itself and its proper principle, and participates of a certain fpiiel and jiermauency, so tar as it preserves its own proper form. Whe¬ ther therefore, there is an intelligible, or sensible, or middle genus of things, it consists of these ; since all things are from these. For all tilings do nut live, nor are all things vv holes, or parts, or animated; but of these genera all things parti¬ cipate. And with whatever tiling essence is not present, neither will the other genera be present: for they subsist about essence. Sami ness also not existing the whole will he dissipated. \nd the ditference of one tiling from another being' abolished, there will only be one thing, and that void of multitude. Motion like- \ wise not existing, things would Im* unenergetie and dead. And without * per- inanem y they would Im' unstable, and immediately hurried away to non entity. Hence, it is necessary that in ail things there should be each of these, ami that essence should subsist as the first of them, this lieing as it were the Vesta and monad of the genera, and hav ing an arrangement analogous to the one. lint alter this it is necessary that samenessanddiflereiice should subsist, the formerlreingana- logous to bound, but the latter to infinity. Anil in a similar manner it is reipiisile that there should be permanency and motion, the former being especially seen about the powers of beings, but the latter about their energies. For every ’ In'ing, so far as being participates after a manner of a certain essence, as it is written in the Sophista, and in the Parmenides. But every essential po.ver is either under sameness, or under diflercnce, or under both; heat indeed, and every separative power, being under ditference, but cold and every collective power, under same¬ ness. And whatever [tower is a medium between these, Wing under Iroth. For every energy [is either motion or permanency, or is m a certain rrs|»ect both these. For the energy of intellect,] 1 and every energy w hich preserves in the same condition that which energizes, or is that about which it energizes, is rather per¬ manency than motion. But the energy of bodies on each other, is a motion which does not sulfur them to remain in the same condition, but removes them from the state in which they are. And the energy which changes the subject of its energy in the same and about the same, is a stable motion. Every Iveing therefore, participates by its very existence of this triad, viz. of essence, jvovver and energy, on account of these five genera, and also is, possesses capability and

And the energy which changes the subject of its energy in the same and about the same, is a stable motion. Every Iveing therefore, participates by its very existence of this triad, viz. of essence, jvovver and energy, on account of these five genera, and also is, possesses capability and

* rii-ru o omitted in the ordinal.

* Instead of irnrrn yap to or hi this place, it is obviously necessary to read rar yap to or.

1 Both the sense and the version of Lconicus Tlioiuacus require the insertion in this place of if *ir>j#i» tar i, ^ oraeu, rj »vi. trtpytta yap rev rov.

28

PROCI.US OS TIIK

[book 111.

energizes. In short, since* every tliiiur xxhie-h in any way whatever has existence, consists of ImuiikI ami infinity, it is i sscntializeil irnleed and subsists ae-e-ordin" to a participation c»l both these. lbit it possesses sameness xvith itself thron'di the communion of these two; anil dillcivucc, through the division n f tlu-in- Nince also it is not the first, it proceeds from the principle of things, am | ; ,bidi s m it, so that it is both Mimed and is permaiieiit. TIiim* liie centra therefore are in entry Iwienr, so far as it is In inn, tlmnuli they subsist difl'en utlx in dill'erent lieinirs. I'or iutelli-^ibles hate all these esseutialli ; intelliuibleand at the s,mi,, tune intei lei tu d natures, possess them u cording to sameness ml* lleetuals ai ctirdim' to ilillerein e; psychical natures aecmduu to pelmaiienev ; and corporeal natures uiccordin^ to motion. Hut \u e ieisa, if life is motion, and sluggishness perman¬ ency : tor souls indeed, are essential ||\| S, but bodies aie alter-Uloti\e. Ii how¬ ever, motion am! permanency are prior to sameness and ilitli-reiiee, as we may di nioiistrale from other reasonings, * ailing the progression of each thm^ from its cause,* a motion prior to energy, and its abiding in its , aiise, a pernianeiiey prior to the iiueiieriietic eondition w bit h is oppos, ,| to cncrirx ;—it this be the ease, aft. r intelliiribles, the inti Nimble and at the s one time intellectual natures, will subsist according to permanency, hut inlellei luaU accord iu?> to motion. Souls also will dins subsist according to same ness, but bodies accordin'.; to dilleiem e. Hut if we should sax that lile is niolioii, and immutable inti'lli^i iiee permaneiicv, :i”ain in- ti IImibh s will bee liarai t. rized according to (lie essential ; but intelligible and at the same time intellectual natures, Inin.; lixes, aeeordiu^ to motion ; ami intel- lee tu.il naluies, heiii'4 e ssent lal i/ed m intellect, a. cording to p. nil am iicx ; for -mimlaiie nature s ch ine thi ir permaiieiiex from intellec t. M-xrliical natures also

cording to p. nil am iicx ; for -mimlaiie nature s ch ine thi ir permaiieiiex from intellec t. M-xrliical natures also

xx <!l t ms subsist accord ii il;Io sameness, because thex contain tlu- bond 1 of impar- tdde s and partibles ; but cerpon tl nature s xxill subsist accordim; to tlilli-reucc i lor m these, as tbc'y an p utihle, strife lias ilomiuioii. The*se lixe- natures lioxxevc r, are silcfcsiw to e aeli othe r, xiz beinm life, inte lle c t, soul, and body ; because; the total m nera whic h are 1 prior to forms, are likewise- Inc. \ml thus much may he said couceriihi£ the live 1 ”e ncra miners.ellx ; only ohserxin;; in adelition, that the* .same* things an; called both ue nera and elements. And the first e»f sec'imd natures iiideeel arecalle'd •jciiera ; hut the.se* remaining imdiiuiiiished and e xempt lrom partial natures, are the eause-s of their e xi-te ru e 1 . Hut e ac h of the- sexeral

Inst, d.l wl r.i .S. I( r,r.i, tm .ora r» uvro her. 1 , it is net vssary In rt .nl rn K , , u „ na< „.ijro

turn rv ui'ro.

I his progression is tlitnliiTr ili “aiillj c.ille.t liy Proelus, an intffablr unfolding into light.

tor a bond is union, and sameness is union of essence.

HOOK 111.]

TIM.rX'S or PLATO.

'29

tilings of which the whole consists, an* railed elements. J’or tlie "encra hi the Dcmim" ii-n ^i\e oomph tion to the demiurgic hein*:, and are the elements of it; hut they are th<‘ genera of all the forms contained in the intellects that proeeeil from him. and also of all those tii.it are in souls and bodies. 1

J’or tlie "encra hi the Dcmim" ii-n ^i\e oomph tion to the demiurgic hein*:, and are the elements of it; hut they are th<‘ genera of all the forms contained in the intellects that proeeeil from him. and also of all those tii.it are in souls and bodies. 1

L t us, however, n you are Milling, proceed to the fifth head, and consider how these genera subsist in souls, and why IMato assumes them. Since, therefore, it has been shown that the soul is the medium between beings and non-beings, and that it knows all beings, both mtelli^ihles and sensililes, whether accordin'.: to the same or accord im: to dilli rent reasons, as some say, it is necessary that the cssi nee ot it should proceed from tile genera of beiii'j. For if it did not proceed from these, but from certain others, it would not be able to know all things, nor to S apply itself to all things. Hence as it knows man aceordin^ to the reason [or form] whir h it contains of man, and d.i'iuon according to the form which is in it of (hemon, thus also it knows hem;: itself, aerordim: to the participation in it of helm:, and ditlereneo according to its participation of difference. So that it will contain all the genera, but in a wav adapted to it»< If. l or it appears to me, that on tins account Plato constitutes the soul from the first *^em ra, and from numbers and harmonic ratios ; and likewise, that lie places in it tin* principles of figures and divine motions, in order that hv antecedently (or cansallyj comprehendim: the reasons of all disciplines and of ilialeetie. it mi^ht thus know all things, vi/. the ? essences, the nimiliers, the harmonies, the figures, anrl the motions ot whieh wholes consist. ll seems likewise, that h< constitutes the soul, as beiim allied to iutelli^ihles, from the genera ol beiiu;, whieh primarily subsist in them ; hut that he <:ives tenure to the soul, as Iwiim alheil to sensililes. For thini;s which are t i it I v figured are sensible*. And that as beim; a medium between intelli^ibles and sensililes, he imiils it with hariiionie ratios ; though m intelligible forms also, there are the form of harmony, and the form ol figure. Hut harmony itself, is not harmonized, nor is figure itself figured. For things which have a primary sub¬ sistence do not exist accordim: to participation. In sensible** also, harm>mv and the genera of hein^ subsist but partibly ; but in souls they subsist iucorporeally and at the same time compositely, 1 and participation manifests their composite nature.* For participation pertains to composites, hut incorporality is the pecu¬ liarity of simple natures. It is necessary however for that which primarily parti-

* Tor Tuiy €V nubia'll yfiwr here, It It requisite to n ail TVv rr ovfinoi titvr.

* In dead of t) a/i/wua ill tins plarc, il is iit-cosarj to rcait airrrj rj append.

1 I'or aevrOrrvt iirrr, il is uc« cssary In read trvrlkrwt.

It is necessary however for that which primarily parti-

* Tor Tuiy €V nubia'll yfiwr here, It It requisite to n ail TVv rr ovfinoi titvr.

* In dead of t) a/i/wua ill tins plarc, il is iit-cosarj to rcait airrrj rj append.

1 I'or aevrOrrvt iirrr, il is uc« cssary In read trvrlkrwt.

* instead of to wrVtTvr avrvr trj\er 10 tbo place, it o requisite to read to «r(kr«r «u tw tf

30

PROCLUS ON THIS

[book III.

cipates of then! to be a tiling of this kind. Plato, therefore, from these genera con¬ stitutes the psychical essence, producing in the first place the subject 1 of this essence from the ini<h!le genera. l'or as we have said of the elements, that all of them are in the heavens, in the sulilunary region, anil under the earth, and that all things consist indeed of the four, yet not of the same elements, but hea\en of the summits of them, generation ot the second, and the subterranean regions of the last procession of the elements; thus all things consist indeed of these genera ; but intelligible* of such of them as are first, impartible, immmcahle anil entire ; self-inutile natures, of such as are’ both impartible and partible; and eorporeal- formcd natures, of such as are partible. l'or such as are the genera, such also are the essences, Impartihh natures, hmicicr, precede those that are impartible, and at the same time partible ; and the lath r precedi partible natures, l or the im¬ partible is nearer to tlu mu ; since it is impartible on account of union. Since therefore the p»\ i local issi nee has been shown to be the inedmm of beings, it ierv propel I v consists ol the nmldli* genera of being, \ i/. ot essence, same, and ditlerent [of a middle charai teristic 1 . l'or I’l ito in the Pha*drus complicating: the powers denied from these, denominates them a charioteer and horses; because the existence of the soul is defined bv these. lint we may survey permanency and motion m the energies of the soul. l'or permanency and motion are in tlx* essence of it. l’or it constitutes itself, abides ami proceeds, and is eternal ; motion and |h*rmanericv being superior to sameness and difference. For it abides m eternal natures according to permanency, and proceeds, In ing inured. Hut through progression it is separated into united multitude. The genera of being however, are more c learly seen m tin energies of tin* soul.

For it abides m eternal natures according to permanency, and proceeds, In ing inured. Hut through progression it is separated into united multitude. The genera of being however, are more c learly seen m tin energies of tin* soul.

You may also say that Tima us ill constituting the essence of the soul, after ano¬ ther manner assumes motion and permanency prior to sameness anil difference. For the soul is not only the medium between the impartible and the partible essence, but also between the essence which always subsists with invariable sameness, and that which is in generation, or becoming to In*. Hence, through subsisting with invariable sameness, if participates of permanency according to its essentiality, but through lieing generated, of motion. Unless it should In- said, that because same and different appropriately belong to the Demiurgus, Tiina-u* delivers a precedaneous generation of these. \\ hat then is the charac¬ teristic of each of the middle genera 1 .May w< not say, that since essence con¬ sists of hound and infinity, when the former vanquishes the lath r, it produces the

* l'or virtp** mu' lirrr, riMil vroktiji* toy.

1 lor ru avTvkinim, uvTutv ufufnrrw vat furptGr** here, it is ilfCCSMiry to read ra it avTGkirrjru

c k rwr ufitpiOTW tui fupiOTwr •

LOOK 111.]

TIM l'US OF PLATO.

31

1 lor ru avTvkinim, uvTutv ufufnrrw vat furptGr** here, it is ilfCCSMiry to read ra it avTGkirrjru

c k rwr ufitpiOTW tui fupiOTwr •

LOOK 111.]

TIM l'US OF PLATO.

31

impartible essence; but that when infinity vanquishes bound, it produces the partible essence ; and that when the power of these two is equal, they produce the middle essence? And a^ain, wlo-n sameness vanquishes dill* fence, it makes an impartible; but when dillerence vanquishes sameness, a partible saim ness and dillerence: and win u the power of each is equal, they produce a sameness and dillerence of a middle nature. When likewise permancuev vanquishes motion, an impartible, but when motion subdues permanency, a partible; and when the power of each is equal, a middle motion and permanency is produced. Since however, sameness and dillerence eousis) o| both these [i. e. oi hound and infinity] it is necessary that m these also, either bound should have dominion or infinity, or that tin power ol’earh should Is* equal ; ami thus that eithei an imparti¬ ble, or a partible, or a middle sameness and dillereuee should 1 m* elli •< t< d And the like must also necessarily taki place m motion and permanency. For every hyparxis, power, and energy, are from both these; ami are either characterized by bound, or by infinity, or not by one of these more than the other. Hence the whole of the intelligible and intellectual breadth, 1 is said to be hound, and to be in siieb a manner the Mime, as to render it necessarv to inquire whether there is dif/i rent e in it; and also to be in siieb a wav permanent, as to render it dubious whether it lias any iutelleetual motion, lint every coiporeal-lbrmed nature is allied to infinity, to dilierenee, and to motion. And souls exhibit alone and the same tilin', multitude and union, that wbieli is stable, and that which is moved* For there i i. e. m intelligible and iutelleetual natures] the essence is one in each intellect; but in soul, then* i> one and not one essence in each. For tin re are many cs.u nets in tier// soul, and ns mum/ us the parts into uhie/i etich may In divided. And as body bane; partible may In divided into infinites, souls [on the contrary] are divisible into jinit < v, m the same manner as number is divisible into monads, /fan e also, soim have thought propel to rail tin soul numbt r, as divisible indeed, bat into im¬ partible*, and not into things ninth may always In lUriduf. Hence too, the impar¬ tible oi the soul is twofold, vi/. according to that which is as it were a whole, and according to the last oi tin 1 parts. ]*or every number likewise, according to its proper form, is one and impartible, but according to that w hich is as it were the matter o| it, it is partible ;‘ yet not the whole of this, hut in this also the last in which the division t< miniates, is impartible.

]*or every number likewise, according to its proper form, is one and impartible, but according to that w hich is as it were the matter o| it, it is partible ;‘ yet not the whole of this, hut in this also the last in which the division t< miniates, is impartible.

1 I^unit'll* I hniiia'iiv appear* from ho version to have read in his manuscript r.njrot* rnr in lliis placr, iii'U ,i»l of iMpm mi ; Iml it ii[i|if ao Iona* tlmt we should read ioqrcr on torpor xui irXfiroi. tor what I’rorluv here says, applied to every intelli^iliii* ami intelleetnal essence, hut in a tian*rcndcnt decree lo the loriner.

1 Tim* tor instance, seven monads or unit*, are as it were the matter of the number seveu, but the heptadic form proceeding from the licptad itself which siijiervciics and invests these monads, is one and impart i bie.

#*

32 PItOCLUS ON 1'IIL [book hi.

If you are willing likewise, this may he surveyed after another manner. Since these middle genera are three, when essence vamiuishes same and different, then according to the mixture of the media, a divine soul is generated, and the more and the less in the domination, produce the extent according to breadth ofdivine souls. Hut whell sameness and at the same tune essence, vanquish difference, then an angelic soul is generated. \\ hen sain* in >s alone predominates, a da iuonia- cal soul is produced; hut when sameness toget her w ith ditfereiice, have dominion over essence, then an heroic soul is generated; and when difference alone pre¬ vails, a human soul is produced. I'or it is impossihle that the (extremes should vampiish the medium, hei use lliev cannot without it he conjoined with each other, lint according to eat h of the mixtures, the more and the h ss of the pre¬ dominating natures produce thehn adtli ol souls. 1 liese things, linvvrv* r, xxill In* mole till lx discussed elsewln re.

1 liese things, linvvrv* r, xxill In* mole till lx discussed elsewln re.

It ieiuaills tin r< line, ill the next place, to consider what the impartible, and also w hat the partible form of « >s* lice is. For among the more am u nt interpre¬ ters, there w as a di/lereiiee of opinion on tins subject. I h nee concerning these things, let Us fust speak more generally, hut alt* rwards, in a iiiaiim r more proxi¬ mal* to the proposed subjects ol inquiry. i or it is possible to .speak in both these ways. \\ e say, tliei <-lore, that ex cry Hit*lligilile and intellectual essence both total and partial, and which is imiuaterial and separate and prior to the eternal, or wInch is eternal, is impartible; but that all essences which proceed about bodies whethcr they are mundane 1 i\is, or natures which verge to corporeal masses, or physical reasons which are divided about the body that is void Of (piahty, ar< partible. 1 or all th* se are div isible about bodies. And some of them indeed subsist in these visible bodies and are in them as in a subje* t. Hut others have an ess* nlial subsistence, and are the forms of life, but are inseparable from bodies, as nature. And others are distributed into parts imbed, but collect themselves into tin* impartible, as sense. And if you are willing, you may say that the impartible essence is triple, subsisting according to being, according to life, and according to intellection. And the essence which subsists according sensible perception, is instead of intellection ; that which subsists according to nature, is instead o! lif* ; and that which subsists according to the forms that are div id« d about the bulks of bodies, is instead of 1 m ing. Fur the three latter being images of the three former have a subsistence contrary to them with respect to their order to each other. Hut the media between these are the being, life, and intellei ti*ui in souls, w Inch preserve the order of the natur* s prior to tin m, through a .similitude to them, but have a distribution into parts equal 1 to the natures that

* I r«jm ill*' version ill 1 .1-011 it US Tiioma lit, lllstrllil of roe £t fitfuouvv yen;, roil fitru ruvra in

this place, it appears vo sliouM re.nl ^tlie seieo also requiring lllis tinemlalion) roe £e fir^te/wv ru ifu>v r C/i* prart vru.

BOOK III.]

IIM/UJS <>i PLATO

.Tl

BOOK III.]

IIM/UJS <>i PLATO

.Tl

are posterior to them. Wn must therefore give a triple division to all things, ami thus dividing, we must arrange the psychical essence Ix-twecn the impartible and the partible nature, as being the imago of the former, but the paradigm of the latter; and as abiding and at the same time proceeding ; as simple and compo¬ site ; and as exempt from, and co-arranged with the corporeal essence. I’or the appropriate middle nature of it, presents itself to the view according to all these. And thus in a general way we may admit every essence lietwoen the one and the soul to be impartible, and every essence between the soul and bodies to be partible.

If, however, it lx* requisite to define the partible and the impartible in a more proximate manner, we must speak as follows: The Demiurgus constituted the universe an animal, animated and endued with intellect, conceiving that the animated is better than the inanimate, and tin: intellectual than that which is deprived of intellect. Hence there is in it a corporcal-forined life, according to which it is an animal: for being bound with animated bonds, it became an animal. The soul itself however, is not mingled with body. For the opinion that it is, Socrates also reprobates in the Pir.edrus. Hut the soul is divine, ac¬ cording to which the universe is animated, having indeed a connascent life, and having likewise a separate life. Then: is also in it, an immaterial 1 and divine intellect. For it is necessary to call this an essential intellect, hut not 1 an intellect which subsists as a habit of the soul. For the Demiurgus did not con¬ stitute the latter, hut the soul, according to the motion of itself about the intelli¬ gible, as Tinueiis afterwards says. So that the universe has a triple life, viz. cnrporeal-formed, psychical, and intellectual. And the intellectual life of it, indeed, is impai tihle, as lx*ing eternal, as at once comprehending rverv intelligible, as immoveable, and as united, according to a supreme transcendency of secondary natures. Hut the cnrporenl-formed life is partible, as proceeding about corporeal masses, being mingled with body, and verging to subjects. And the psychical life is tliig middle lietvveen both, transcending the latter through a separate subsistence ; through circularly covering externally as with a veil the hulk of the universe, as has been saitl, and will he again asserted in what follows; through being extended to intellect, and yet again being inferior to it; through jierceiv ing intellectually in time; through evolving the impartiality of the intellectual life; and through in a certain respect coining into contact with body. Plato, however, by constituting the mundane eoul from these media, manifests that it is a medium lietwecu the natures that are si-

1 For nvrot here, it is necessary to read «vXm.

* For aAXo ^njr here, it u necessary to read aXX’ cv.

VOL. II.

Tun. Plat.

E

34

Plato, however, by constituting the mundane eoul from these media, manifests that it is a medium lietwecu the natures that are si-

1 For nvrot here, it is necessary to read «vXm.

* For aAXo ^njr here, it u necessary to read aXX’ cv.

VOL. II.

Tun. Plat.

E

34

PKOCLUS ON Till:

[BOOK 111.

tuated on each side of it, lint that it is not the medium lietween every intellectual and corporeal essence. For it is not the medium of partial intellects, and the forms which are distributed in the parts of the universe. It is likewise the peculiarity of the soul of the universe, neither to consist of numbers, nor ot these or those reasons, nor of so many circles. For all these ami other things, are common to every div ine, du-moniaral, and human soul. llut the Juculiuritji of it is, fur the essence of it, to he the medium between the following i rtrentes, xiz.thc out mundane mUlUet , and the whole cf the partible essence which is distributed about bodies. \nd it is the medium ot these, not so far as mt« Meet is gnostic, or vital, nor so tar as nature is the hto ot bodies; for the discourse is not about knowledge, nor about lives ; but so far as these are certain essences, the forim i beiii” an impartible essence, but the latter an essence divisible about bodies. For on this account we also endeavour to assume both bnii^ and generation, the impartible and the partible, according to the hvparxis of the soul, disinissiii" mutations and energies, not seeking to per¬ ceive tin 1 energies of the soul, but the essence of it, which is uuh« gotten and at the same timt generated. 1

1

It is likewise evident, that the essential bound of it, is more unical than all the bounds that are m all other souls, and that the infinite of it is more comprehensive than all the infinites in other souls. I'or neither is every bound equal to every bound; some bounds beinjj more total, but others more partial; nor is every infinity equal to every power. So that neither is every essence equal to every essence, bill one is total, and another partial. I he essential tin relore, of the soul of the universe, is more total than iwiv psychical essence, the hound in it is the most total of all psychical hounds, and its infinity is the most total of all the infinites in souls. For the extremes of these are, the simply impartible essence, and the simply partible about bodies, not about some, but about all bodies. For the soul of tin- sun, is the mi diuiii belvvi-eii a certain impartible esscm e, (and not of the impartible iudcfuiiti ly,) and a certain partible essence, and not every essence which is divisible alumt bodies. 1‘lato, likewise, assuming this in the first place, as the peculiarity of the mundane soul, connects the remaining particulars, as be- loniiinjr to tin" discussion of a soul ot this kind, viz. number, harmony, and form. Hence the impartible must not now be said to be every intellectual essence, but only the essence of tin* mundane intellect. And in the soul of the.situ, it must he said to be the essence of the solar intellcc'., and m a similar manner in the soul of tin moon, and in all other souls. For every medium lias peculiar proximate extremes, and will be the medium of these, and not of all extremes every where.

1 Then- is nulliiii" mure in I lie iiii^in.il in tlin place tliaii, «X\« ci^inc iui 7<yl<-y<o'|J , . but it is obviously Itijuisite to oad u X \u uvim* uurr/t uyt i t i/ror >ui VV "f ll> '!*'•

noon Hi.]

TIM.EL'S OF PLATO.

.15

1 Then- is nulliiii" mure in I lie iiii^in.il in tlin place tliaii, «X\« ci^inc iui 7<yl<-y<o'|J , . but it is obviously Itijuisite to oad u X \u uvim* uurr/t uyt i t i/ror >ui VV "f ll> '!*'•

noon Hi.]

TIM.EL'S OF PLATO.

.15

Tims too, darinons who are more exalted than partial souls, subsist as media between their proper intellects, and the bodies that are eonnaseeiit with them. So that Plato, if he had discussed some one ut other souls, would not have said that tin* essence of it is a medium between the impartible essence, and the essence which ;s divisible about bodies, but between this or that impartible and partible essence belonging to partial natures. Pot articles manifest the transcendent and the total, as Plato elsewhere determines, asserting that when we say the b« autiful, we manifest one thing, but another when we say lieautiful. And the former manifests the exempt, but the latter, some one of the things co-ordinate with others. \nd if you are willing to adopt here what is said by the illustrious Theodoras, intillert e without habitude, the life about bod) subsists in habitude, but the soul is the medium between the two, lieing a certain half-habitude. And according to the groat Iainbliclms, intellect indeed is exempt; the life about body, is co-arran^ed with corporeal masses; and the soul is exempt from, and at the same time co-arranged w ith the corporeal life. livery intellect, therefore, is impartil>le, as having cne essence, one sameness, and one ililfen nee, of which it wholly consi-ts. Put every soul is partible, because earh mixture of the elements in it of which it consists, is divided into many parts, each of which is compounded of all the ni'in rn ; so that there are many essences in each mixture, many same¬ nesses, and many differences, which arc co-divided together with the parts that are in it. What the parts are however, and bow many, he demonstrates to us, bv using media, and sections through sesrpiioctavcs, and leimmas, as will 1 m* manifest as we proceed.

What the parts are however, and bow many, he demonstrates to us, bv using media, and sections through sesrpiioctavcs, and leimmas, as will 1 m* manifest as we proceed.

Moreover, this is evident, that, we say that intellect so Jar as it is intillict, is im¬ partible, conceiving that the multitude rj'forms though tin 1 / arc in it, arc (liferent from it; and that the soul, so far as it is soul, is partible, not surveying at the same time the forms that are in if, but solely looking to the psychical essence, and abo to the intellectual essence, and to ca< h separate fiom the other. Hence the intellect which is participated by the soul, is call* d by Plato an impartible essence ; but the corporeal j armed life which proceeds from the soul, and has the rela¬ tion of splendour to it, is said by him to be divisible about bodies. For intellect, indeed, is analogous to the sun, soul to the light proceeding from the sun, and the partible life to the splendour from the light. Very properly, therefore, do we conceive these assertions to be more accurate than the former; because it is necessary that the Demiurgus should be the lord of every impartible, ami of every partible essence,' in order that the recipient may have a place, that the nature w hich consists of

1 Oveiat it onultcd 10 tbc original.

PHOCLUS ON THE

f DO OK 111.

SO

both may lx' mingled, and all such other particulars may be effected, as Plato adduces in what follows. Iamhlirlms, therefore, and together with him Theodo- doms, refer what is here said to the supermundane soul; but we are of opinion, that Tinnius generates through these things the soul of the universe, as the words also manifest.

Iamhlirlms, therefore, and together with him Theodo- doms, refer what is here said to the supermundane soul; but we are of opinion, that Tinnius generates through these things the soul of the universe, as the words also manifest.

We think it requisite however, that the lovers of contemplation, should inves¬ tigate what the partible and tin impartible are 1 in the supermundane soul For a supermundane intellect is seated above everv soul, lhit what is the partible in the supermundane soul * For c< rlain sensible bodies are not suspended from such soul-,. For as the\ are siip» riiiimdaiie, the re\er>e of what takes place in human souls is true* of them ; sinc e bodies are suspended from t n< h of the latter, through whic h also they are mundane. Hut a pe c uliar intellee i is nut established above them, on winch account they do not alw ays perceive intellectually, llodies, how¬ ever, are suspend* d from all the souls that arc between human !l, »d supermundane souls. Hence also they are mundane, !»eing more redundant than supermundane souls hv the* connexion of body. And there is a peculiar intellect from w liieh they arc* suspended, on whic h ac count likewise* they an* not always in the* intelligible. For the immoveable* is effecti\e of eternal e nergy. Hence since the extremes, viz. supermundane and mundane souls, bare a contrary mode* of subsistence*, and as it would -c*c in, flu* lath r be mg deficient according to the- partible*, but the former exceeding according to the impartible ;—this be ing the case, we say that the* part¬ ible of supermundane souls, is not that wbic li is di\idl'd about bodies, but about the mundane sends 1 themselves. For they proximate ly transcend these, just as mundane souls transcend the partible essence which subsists about bodies. Hence* the supermundane* souls aie* media hetvvee n intelh e'ts and mundane souls ; intel¬ lects baring a subsistenc e* unmingled w ith body, but mundane souls, transition in intelle-etions. But the impart Hit t*f hut/ian souls, so Jar as there is a thing of this haul in them, is ui tin souls that are above them, which are a heaps intellective, from v hieh human souls are suspcndi it, anil oj which they at a certain time participate, as fur as thei / are able. Fur through these, as media, thep arc lihtuise conjoined with the intellects that an above souls, and become intelh tual.

These, howe\e*r,’as we* have saiel, be mg th* e xtremes, all the intermediate souls have a jx*ciiliar impartibilitv and partibility, w hether the-y have* a divine or elie mo- niacnl allotment ; rational ehemnus, and prior to these the soul of the unive rse*, be mg me din be*tween the w hole* mundane* intellect which has an impartible essence,

1 Tin tennis n ro «ui arc omitted in the original,

i'l yiui it omitted in the original.

BOOK 111.]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

07

BOOK 111.]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

07

ami the partible essence which sulisists aliout bodies. And we assert these things looking to all that has been Indore said, through which we have manifested the trutii of them, from the words themselves ol Plato and not from our own concep¬ tions. Fur by those :■ ho raison from the [Chaldean] Oracles, it must be said that supermundane souls ride in certain supermundane ethereal and empyrean bodies. Or how could those bodies lie moved unless souls moved them in a manner more divine than that of mundane souls ? But if this l»e "ranted, it may also be admitted that partial souls have an impartible intellectual essence above them, and one certain power nf intellect, which illuminates similar souls ; and that on this account they are partial, and intellective at a certain time, the souls which are suspended from each total intellect being alone a In ays intellective.

Farther still, in order that these things may accord with the Orphic doctrines, we must say, that Orpheus does not predicate the impartible of every intelligible, or intellectual order, but that according to him there is something sujierior to this appellation, just as other natures are more excellent than other names. For he does not adapt the appellations of king and father to all the [divine] orders. Where then shall we first see the impartible according to him, in order that we may apprehend the divinely inspired ' conception of l*lato? Orpheus, therefore, establishing a Demiiirgus * of all-divided fabrication, analogous to the one father who unfolds into light the total fabrication, produces from him the whole mun¬ dane intellectual multitude, tin* numlwr of souls. and corporeal natures; this JD< miurgus generating all these unitedly, hut the Gods that surround him, dividing and separating his fabrications. He says, however, that all the other fabrications of the God, were distributed into parts by the deities who are of a dividing cha¬ racteristic ; but that the heart alone was undivided through the providence of Minerva. For since he constituted intellects, souls, and bodies, but souls and bodies receive much division and s« paration into parts in themselves, and intellect remains united and indivisible, Iiemg all things m one, and comprehending intel¬ ligible wholes in one intellection;—hence he says, that the intellectual essence alone, and the intellectual numlier, were left preserved by Minerva. For he savs,

l lie ini* Ilecttial licart alone remain'd.

Clearly calling it intellectual. If therefore the imdividl’d heart is intellectual, it will evidently he intellect and an intellectual iiiiidIht, yet not every intellect, but that which is mundane, l or this is the undivided heart; since of this also the

1 For rtflr> brre, rtad trOtor.

* i. r. IWchut.

38

PKOCLUS ON Tin:

[rook mi.

* i. r. IWchut.

38

PKOCLUS ON Tin:

[rook mi.

divided God was the Demiurgus. Orpheus, therefore, calls the intellect of Bac¬ chus, the impartible essence of the God. But he denominates his genitals, the life which is divisible about body ; this lieing physical and productive of seeds. This also he says Diana, who presides over all tin* generation in nature, and ob- stetrieatrs physical reasons, extends as far as to the subterranean realms, distribu¬ tin'.,' the prolific power of Baet Inis. But all the remaining body of the God, forms the psychical composition, this likewise being divided into seven parts.

All ibe scuii |i irti tlii\ scat lei <1 ol itic bo\ ,

says the theulogist concerning the Titans; just as Timms also divides the soul into seven parts. Perhaps too lie reminds us of the Orphic' 'V itamc distribu¬ tion into parts, when he says that the soul is extend, d* through the whole world ; through which the soul not only circularly covers the universe as with a veil, but likewise is extended through the whole ot it. Hence, Plato very properly calls the essence which is proximat. lv above soul, impartible. Anil, in short, he thus denominates the intellect which is participated by the soul, tallow ing the Orphic fables, and wishing to he as it were, the interpreter of arcane and mystical assertions. Returning, therefore, to the words ol Plato, it is necessary to show that what has been before said a< cords with his conceptions.

These things, however, being discussed by us, it is wonderful, since intellect is an impartible cs-ence, how Parmenides in the second' hypothesis, distributes leina into infinite parts, ami together with bang, (be cue ; as it is acknowledged by nearly all the interpreters that the subject of that hypothesis, is the nature that is lieyond souls. Or may it not lie said, that the distribution into parts which is there spoken of, signifies the progression of the many unities 4 from the one bi ing [or being characterized by the one), these unities proceeding in a well-ordered manner from their proper principles, into an appropriate multitude ? Plato, how¬ ever, does not intend to signify that the one being derives its completion Irom these many unities, in the same manner as he say s, that soul being one, has a multitude which terminates in it. But his meaning is that the one bang precedes the many unities and at the same time beings, and that the multitude ol these is subordinate to it; and also that both utiical and all i“>v ntial number, are causally comprehended in it; just as in this dialogue he calls animal itself one whole, hut

' t or re nratitr<u p^apuv, re. O^uou a.o/n^M., in lh«S » “<* d h 'p" h a U

ftlV 1 . X«

1 til Wad of rtraypti rjr here, U is neiesjary lo read Ttraptvnv.

O^uou a.o/n^M., in lh«S » “<* d h 'p" h a U

ftlV 1 . X«

1 til Wad of rtraypti rjr here, U is neiesjary lo read Ttraptvnv.

‘ For r,„ ...nrvhm, .1 in ueces>arv to riad r.,e tevr.pa,. For the whole progression of true Wing „ diNcuNM'.i in the second hypolhesis of ihe Parmenides. See ruy translation of .1, and ihe Holes on it.

4 Instead of ruWwr oi oiyruy in this plaee, it is requisite to rt^if ou^wi.

BOOK III ]

tim t;us or plato.

3 »

the four ideas the parts of it; animal itself not deriving its completion from them, hut they being comprehended in it, as distributing by the multitude of themselves the monad of that one bring, each of them having the power of a part of it, hut all of them not being equivalent to the whole monad of it. For thus also both numbers, the unical and the essential, are parts of that one l>eiiig [discussed m the Parmenides] not being completive of i*, so as that it consists of each of these. And thus much in answer to this doubt; hut let us proceed to the words betore us.'

“ From an essence always impartible and subsisting with invariable sameness, and again, from an essence which is becoming to be partible about bodies, he mingled from both a middle form of essence.”

That by the one impartible essence, Plato means the intellectual essence, which in the whole of itself participates of eternity, and by the essence which is partible about bodies, that wbieli is ms, parable from corporeal masses, and is allotted its hy- parxis in the whole of time, he manifests by saying that the former of these “ subsists ith invariable sameness," and by denominating the latter “ that which is becoming to he in order that lie may not only call the soul impartible and at the same time partible, hut abo inti Uigible, and the first of gem rated natures. For an eternal perpetuity is one thing ; but that whir li subsists according to temporal infinity is another,having its hypustasis in extension; and that is another which is mixed from both, such as is the perpetuity of the sou). For the soul is immoveable indeed ac¬ cording to essence, but is moved according to intellections, and is i ternal according to the former, but temporal according to the latter. It is likewise evident, that the .soul necessarily has something of this kind according to liyparxis, or she would not exhibit in her natural energies, the peculiarity of genera*',,n, and temporal extension. And it appears to me that Plato in an ndmirahli manner perceiving this says, that the Pemiurgus not only made the soul a medium between the impartible essence, and the essence which is partible about bodies, hut abo that \ ^ he made it a medium between the essence which subsists with invariable same- / ness, and that which is generated, or becoming to l»e. For how could lie appro¬ priately w rite the Psyrhogony,’ if there was neither generation, nor composition in the soul? How also would it be possible to take away parts from that which

For how could lie appro¬ priately w rite the Psyrhogony,’ if there was neither generation, nor composition in the soul? How also would it be possible to take away parts from that which

1 Leonii u* Tliomxus lias omitleii to traii'lafe the whole of what 11 here said about the supermundane »oul, bcpiiiiimg (Yon, the wool', *' IIV think it it rrquiutt,’' ami ending with the ,above paragraph.

* ». c. (Jonitrmug the generation of the *oi»I.

44

PKOCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

w essentially impartible ( For of simple natures there is not any generation what¬ ever. And even such forms as are material, are without generation and corrup¬ tion, as Aristotle says. For through their simplicity, they preserve in the last of things, the peculiarity of the first forms. It i> possible, however, to deliver in words the generation of things which receive any hind of composition. In order therefore, that lie might demonstrate these things which are very properly circu¬ lated about the soul, he calls it the medium between the eternal and the generated li \ postasis.

In order therefore, that lie might demonstrate these things which are very properly circu¬ lated about the soul, he calls it the medium between the eternal and the generated li \ postasis.

Prior to this, however, we should ratlu r make tin* following division ; that it is necessary with rcspectto the impartible and partible.cither that hotli should he prior to the soul, or both posterior to the soul, or hoth in the soul; or that the one should Ik* prior, hut the other posterior to the soul. Hoth, therefore, will not lie prior to the soul since the soul is hi tter than the partible life ' w liieh is rising into existence; [for she has a nature separate from bodies, but the partible life is merged in bodies. IS or is it fit to say that hoth are posterior to the soul:] * for the impartible essence is eternal, and subsists with invariable sameness. Hut the soul is not entirely eternal, since, as he s,i\s in the I,aw s, .she pai ticipates of generation. IN or are both in tin* soul; because it is impossible for all tlie.se which difler from ca< h other, to give completion to one thing; viz. for the inseparable and the separate from bodies, the unbegntten and the generated. Hence it remains, that the one which is more excellent should he prior, lint that the other which is less excellent should he posterior to it Sinee, however, these subsist about it, it is necessary as it does not consist of these, that it should consist of tilings analogous to them, which either have a subsistence separate from each other, or mingled together. But it is impossible that it should consist of them s» parale from each other: fur Plato elf-arly says, that these are mingled logellu r. Hence it is neces¬ sary that the essential part of the soul should consist from the mixture of these. And since in the soul one thing is better, hut another worse, that which is impar¬ tible m it [is h*ss excellent than the impartible prior to it, and that which is partible in it] * is better Ilian the partible nature which is posterior to it. For Wing a medium, it has that w hich is more excellent, in an inferior manner, hut that which is less excellent, in a superior manner. And this indeed is evident

1 &wi)i is omitted in the original.

* The words wiihiu the brackets are added from the version of Thomrus, being omitted in the onglbdl.

J Here likewise, the words within the brackets, are wanting in the original, and are supplied from the .ersion of Thomaus. So that in the original after ro puy aptp.orty, it is necessary to add, yripny t[ft row *po avnji nptpiorov, to It pitpiaroy.

hook ill ]

TIM/T.rs Ol PLATO

41

snce it iloos not consist of these very tilings themselves, Imt' of others that are analogous to them.

So that in the original after ro puy aptp.orty, it is necessary to add, yripny t[ft row *po avnji nptpiorov, to It pitpiaroy.

hook ill ]

TIM/T.rs Ol PLATO

41

snce it iloos not consist of these very tilings themselves, Imt' of others that are analogous to them.

But that the essence of the soul lines not consist of those, as giving completion to it, is evident. For again let us make this ury tiling the subject of considera¬ tion. In the first place, tin refort t how is it possible for the impartible to Ik* mingled vv ith the partible, and the eternal w itli the generated ; for these are in a cer¬ tain respect contrary to, and most remote Irom each other, so that as we hare In-fore said, the\ can by no means be conjoined vv itli each other. In the second place, shall we not make the soul posterior and secondary to the things that are in it, * and the essence inseparable from body more ancient than that which ^separate, if it consists of an essence which is divided about bodies? Farther still^iow can the soul lie justly said to be a third thing ; for that which is a third tiling is e\ idently so in conjunction with the other two, which are preserved and not corrupted, lhit things that are mingled together, are no longer themselves, but a certain other tiling, and not a third tiling is produced from them. For they themselves have no i \istenee, but are corrupted through the mixture. 'Again, if the Demiurgus taking a portion of the impartible constituted the soul, that which is said to lie an impartible essence will no longer he so. l'nr how can any one take away a part of it, if it is impartible ? But if he consumed the whole of the impartible in the essence of the soul, he will no longer he beneficent, in eonseipieuee of consuming' more divine natures, which are nearer to himself and are more causal, into the hypostasis of less excellent natures. In addition to these things alsoj if the soul derives its romplelion from a generated partible nature, that partible nature will not only be divisible about bodies, but likewise about the soul. Hence the impar¬ tible itself, and the partible itself do not, as some fancy, give completion to the soul; hut that winch is asserted by Plato is true, that the Demiurgus from the impartible essence, and from that which is partible about bodies, mingled a middle form of essence. So that the same thing is partible indeed, as with reference to that which is impartible, hut impartible with reference to that which is partible, and truly affords us the middle nature of the soul.

So that the same thing is partible indeed, as with reference to that which is impartible, hut impartible with reference to that which is partible, and truly affords us the middle nature of the soul.

Moreover, this third thing itself, exhibits to us the nature of analogy iiiexistent in tbe soul. For if the same thing is both the middle and the third, but ibis is as the first,and is also as the last, the soul is at one and the same time, tin* iirst and the last; which analogy is naturally adapted to effect in the most beautiful manner. And if this third tiling is also the middle, it w ill evidently, since it is one thing, be the mid¬ dle of two certain extremes, and not a middle together with another thing. For it

Tim. Plat .

1 V\A’ it it.uiling lure m liie original.

* I "»r fierur III lliis Jil.it c, rrltd rir’ uvry,

VOL. II.

42

PROCLUS OS THE

Fbook hi.

would be the fourth, four things being analogous. But if three tilings are analo¬ gous of which the soul is the middle, it is not simply the middle of essence and generation, but of an essence which is entirely unbegotten, and of an essence Incoming to be partible about bodies, being itself an essence w hich is both im¬ partible, and becomng to he partible, yet not about bodies, but liecoining to 1m* partible by itself, and being not at all in want of bodies, in order to be that which it is. To consist also of both these is adapted to the soul, not only, as some sav, liecausc it subsists at» a medium W tween both, but because it is both, being impart- ibles ironically, but partible* |uiradigmutirully. For it possesses the reasons of both. All things, then fore, subsist in it co-ordiliati ly. Since, however, intellect is all things, and the sensible nature is all things, Plato adds, “ in the middle” showing by this how all things are to he assumed m the soul, vi/. in a middle way, and neillu r primarily, nor according to the I ist mode of .subsistence.

Since, however, intellect is all things, and the sensible nature is all things, Plato adds, “ in the middle” showing by this how all things are to he assumed m the soul, vi/. in a middle way, and neillu r primarily, nor according to the I ist mode of .subsistence.

Again, after another iiiuuiut also, the essence of (he soul consists of both, as Wing produced by the whole demiurgic intellect, in which impartible* and parti¬ ble* subsist paradigmatic.illy and according to cause. Since, however, [the inundauej intellect also proceeds according to the whole of this intellect, the words “ in the middle" manifest the peculiarity of the psychical hypostasis. And how is it possible that the words “he vun^lcd, should not W* adapted to the essence of the soul, not only bei ause the impartible and partible of it subsist according to union, similar to the mode m which the things that are mingled proceed through each other, but also W-cause the peculiarity of life accords w ith the soul, and the IVmiiirgus* constitute* the soul m conjunction with the vivilie (bidders, and mingles the genera of it ill the ( 'rater. Further still, the wold middle shows “that the soul constitutes its* If, and doe* not alone sustain from the dc miurgU energy, the mixture of the genera ill each other, a* if it were a certain passion.' The words likewise " aJ'urm uf ijocmcy,” sullii a nl 1 y indii ate to u* the comprehension of cllecls 111 t li< IT causes. I'or if essence in the I >i mini gus I* a genus, hut III the soul a form or species, the former is comprehensive of the latter. But it may be called a genu* as W ing exempt from the form of the soul, and generating it. And by W ing exempt, indeed, it ditlers from the co-ordinated genera that are m species ; lint by generating this form, it transcend* tilings that are heterogeneous. For these are unprolilic of genera. After another manner, therefore, these genera and sjM-cies must Ik* assumed. For they are prolific, full of power, comprehensive of individual forms, and have an exempt nature. (>einis, therefore, is the essence

* I he Mvnli, uti •> h.ftuivpy ■-» are Mauling in ibe original.

1 t"riv here, irml

* Ltomcui Tliumau* ba* omitted to tranuldtc tile whole of thil siiiUnir.

non* hi.]

TiM.iirs or im.ato.

43

(>einis, therefore, is the essence

* I he Mvnli, uti •> h.ftuivpy ■-» are Mauling in ibe original.

1 t"riv here, irml

* Ltomcui Tliumau* ba* omitted to tranuldtc tile whole of thil siiiUnir.

non* hi.]

TiM.iirs or im.ato.

43

in the Pemiurgus ; hut the form or species of this, is the impartible essence. The essence likewise, which is the medium between the impartible essence, and that whii h is divi'ihlo about bodies, is the second form. Hut the third is that which is partible about body. And the last is the corporeal-formed nature. For in these forms there an the prior and the posterior; liecau.sc the genera produce anti give subsistence to the first, middle and last forms. And the whole intellectual essence indeed is impartible as one; that which is partible about bodies, is mul¬ tiplied on account of its distribution about them; and the medium between these is one and not one. For intellect has one essence, one sameness ami one ditler- cure, so far as it is intellect. Hut the parts of the whole soul from which it is composed are many, and adapted to each other. In each of these parts, also, there are essence, same, ami different; and there arc as many essences, same- nrsM s, and difli retires as there are parts. Tin se parts, likewise, are inched num¬ bered, vet are at the same time many, and each of them is one and not' one, but intellect is one essence, one sameness, ami one ditlermce. And tbe nature which is partible about bodies, has one of these in tins place, but another in that, lx ing co-divided with its subjects, just as body itself is not merely divisible into many, but into infinite parts. Hut the soul being divided, into tbe essence of many things, possesses also union, having an hypostasis separate from bodies. .So that again, there are here two media, between truly existing essence, and that which is truly generation, and lietwern the iinpariibilitv of the former, and the infinite divisibility of the latter, viz the soul, and the essence which is partible about bodies, and which is not the same with this generation truly so called. And soul indeed, is in a greater degree impartible, in consequence of verging to itself; but the essence which is divisible about bodies, is,in a greater degree, partible, liecause it lielongs to another thing, and does not subsist iroin itself. Flato therefore says, that the soul consists of this, and the impartible essence, because it is a medium between tilings which are entirely exempt from bodies, and those w hich are merged m bodies, and between tilings which subsist from themselves*, and those which lxdong to others, so that it both subsists from itself and pertains toothers.

By no means, therefore, must we say that it is a medium in such a way as to have something incorporeal, and something corporeal, as Eratosthenes appre¬ hended, or ascribe with Severus geometrical interval to the essence of it. For a mixture can never be effected of that which is without, and that which possesses interval, and of the impartible and body : for neither can there lie a mixture of \\ a point and a line. But if there ran lx- no mixture of the impartible and a line,

' Ov i* omitted 10 the original.

44

PROCM'S ON THR

[BOOK III.

much less ran there l>c n mixture of it with n certain other dimension [viz. the dimension of depth]. For that which is triply partible, is more distant from the impartible, than that which is partible in one way only. We say, however, that th«* intellectual essence always remains one, that the partible consists of many essences, and that the psychical i-. one, and not one, so as to preserve the one in Iwing multiplied, and multitude in being united. For the Demiurgiis did not so divide it, a-> to consume the whole in the division, but preserved the one of it in t he multiplication, and the whole in the divisiun of it. Nor is this wonderful, since in bodies, likewise, all which are partible, there is, as the Flean "in-st or stranger *a\ ■*, a certain one wlm h is connective of the parts. And Aristotle also asserts that in partible n ilures there is something impartible; so that the soul will much more remain a whole and one, when multiplied and divided lienee, like¬ wise, it is impartible, as Tun eus says. lint it tin* one of it was not 1 preserved, it would lie alone partible: ju>t, for instance, as it y oil should say that the dianoe- tic and dove tic powers of tin: soul, are two essences, ami yet at the same time the whole soul is one tiling which energizes dianoetically and dov.istically, in consequence of converging to itself. \\ e tin refort In ing impi lied from w hat Plato liims ll'savs, thus interpret the impartible and the partible essence.

\\ e tin refort In ing impi lied from w hat Plato liims ll'savs, thus interpret the impartible and the partible essence.

Of those, however, prior to us, ami who make tin* essence of the soul to he inatheruntieul, as being a medium between natural and supernatural things, some asserting that it is number make it to consist of the monad as impartible, and the indefinite du.id as partible. Hut otln rs, considering it as a geometrical hypostasis, assert that it consists of a point and interval, the former being impartible, but the latter partible. Aristander, N'limenius, and their followers, and many other of the interpreters, arc of the former opinion, but Scv crus is of the second. Others, again, as Plutarch and \ttu us, survey ing the physieal esst nee, say, that the irra¬ tional part which precedes [in the ordi r of physical theory] the rational part, is tin- partible essence; but the divine part of the soul, the impartible. And they make the rational essence to consist of the two, of the latter, as that which adorns, and of the former as a subject. They likewise s.iv, that the soul is unhegotten according to its essence, but generated according to its form. Others, however, as Plotinus, who consider the words of Plato in a more philosophic manner, sav, that tin- soul is a medium between intellect and sense, the former being impartible, but the latter divisiblc about bodies. Hut others proceeding higher, and placing two intellects prior to the soul, one possessing the ideas of wholes, but the other of partial natures, >ay that the soul is the medium between these as

* Mi? ii oniittid in tlic original

noo* in.]

TiM.Kl S OF PLATO.

I r,

Hut others proceeding higher, and placing two intellects prior to the soul, one possessing the ideas of wholes, but the other of partial natures, >ay that the soul is the medium between these as

* Mi? ii oniittid in tlic original

noo* in.]

TiM.Kl S OF PLATO.

I r,

«lrn\ ing it* subsistence Imm both. I'or thus Thi'minnis, the Ashm an, says, who f*>un<i llus opinion in Porphyry as «l<-ri\•■(! from tin' Persian*. These things* therefore, Antoninus ivluti-s who was i|ii* dis< iph* of Ainmuiiiiis. To the first of tlir-s-**, Imwcv. r. k must lx- said, that since Plato dors not make the soul to lie iiuiiiIht, it IS alisunl to investigate the principles of mimhi-r of which the soul consists. Hut to the second, that Plato says the soul is incorporeal when com¬ pared with every body, and that it has a self-motive essence; hut that nothing which possrsses interval is a tiling of this kind. To the third it must he said, that IMato is not of opinion that the irrational is more ancient than the rational part. Tor divinity, as he says, did not think lit that the more ancient should In* governed by the junior nature. To the fourth, tiiat the discussion is not concern- “ ing the psychical knowledge, hut the psychical essence. And hence it is not pro¬ per to say, that the soul is a medium between the two gnostic powers, the intellectual and the sensitive. And to the fifth, that every intellect is unbegotten, and separate from bodies. Hut IMato calls the soul a partible and generated essence, giving it a division opposite to the essence which subsists with invariable sameness, ami to that which is partible about bodies, and separating it from tho essence w hich is external to bodies, and always is. As these particulars, however, have lieen siilu iently discussed, let us consider w hat follows.

“ And again alter the same manner, with respect to the nature of same and the nature of different, he constituted the soul in the middle of the impartibilitv of these, and of the nature which is divisible about bodies.”

“ And again alter the same manner, with respect to the nature of same and the nature of different, he constituted the soul in the middle of the impartibilitv of these, and of the nature which is divisible about bodies.”

Essence, as we have said, lias the first oirhrin the genera, because it is as it were, the Vesta of being. Sameness, therefore, has the second ; and difference, the third ordi r. for some consider difference as having a dignity snjwrior to sanii ness. Hut IMato, in what he before said, has < learly evinced that the similar is better than the dissimilar; and now assuming sameness after essence, directly givt s it the preference to difference. And as we have said that the middle essence is inferior to the intellectual essence, lint transcends that which is divisible about body, thus also we say that the sameness of the soul is inferior to the impartible, but is more united than the partible sameness, and in a similar manner with resjK ct to diffen nee. Hence in the essence of intellect, the sameness, being one* collects itself, and also the essential difference, to the essence which is there, and is one; just as the difference lieing one, separates itself, nnd the essence and same¬ ness from each other. Hut m the soul sameness collects into one the differences

PROCLUS ON THE

[hook III.

46

which are many in the many parts, and dillerence separates the samenesses. I know, therefore, that some l'latonists, arrange sameness in impartible, hut dillerence in partible natures, ami thus make tlie soul to consist of both, as a medium between sameness ami dillerence. Those, however, do not* attend to what Plato here savs, that the soul is a medium between the impartibility of sameness and dillerence, and the partihility of the nature which is divisible about bodies. It is likewise requisite to know that these are the genera of being, and that it is necessary these should be every when* appropriately, in impartible, and partible natures, and m the media between these, and again in intellectual es¬ sences, in souls, in natures, and in corporeal masses. I'or I should be ashamed to divide the genera as thev do, placing one here, hut another there. For if thev had said, that sameness predominates in intelligible and impartible natures, but dillerence in sensible^, and partible natures, they would have spoken rightly. But if they assert that imparliblcs are separate from difference, neither will they be able to give to tin m sameness. For the one ditiers from the same.'' And if they say that partible natures are separate from sameness, they subvert the essence of them.

But if they assert that imparliblcs are separate from difference, neither will they be able to give to tin m sameness. For the one ditiers from the same.'' And if they say that partible natures are separate from sameness, they subvert the essence of them.

Following therefore things themselves, we must admit that the genus of same¬ ness subsists with a demiurgic peculiarity, but that the species of it, is the imparti¬ ble and the partible, and the medium between both. And again that the genus ot difference is dcmiuigic, but the species of it, the impartible and the partible, and that which is intermediate. Admitting this likewise, we must assign media to tin: soul, and complicate them with the middle form of essence, mi order that we may constitute the existence of the soul. For thus I think we shall lie able to adapt the words of Plato to things. For he says, that as m essence, so likewise in the nature of same and tie nature of different, the Demmrgus mingled a third thing from both, and after the same maimer. And as there, that which was mingled from both was a species or form ot essence, so here, tin medium between same and diflcrciit, is a sjiecies or form. Foi it is possible to Ire a medium not as form, but as a whole composed of the extremes, as an animal which consists of soul ami body. In order, therefore, that you may not ignorantly conceive this to he the case, lie adds, “ and after the .same manner;" that here also, that which consists of both may be a form and not a whole.

“ And taking them as three beings, he mingled all of them into one idea."

* On i> tn*re omitted hi llie nrginal.

1 lor if uuiiditiMei I no diAmno', they will be I lit same with rack oilier, and will l>e tht one. For iu the one there is no difference. So that the one will not differ from the tame.

BOOK III.]

TIM/F.US OF PLATO.

47

1 lor if uuiiditiMei I no diAmno', they will be I lit same with rack oilier, and will l>e tht one. For iu the one there is no difference. So that the one will not differ from the tame.

BOOK III.]

TIM/F.US OF PLATO.

47

That the throe demiurgic genera, are the causes of hypostasis to second amt third forms, Plato I think sufficiently manifests in saying, “ and taking them as three things” For where do they subsist? Evidently in the Demiiirgus. For heeontuins that which he takes. Hut he receives them from superior causes. For since sameness having in a greater degree the form of bound, consists of bound and infinity, and also difference which has more the form of infinity consists of these just as essence similarly proceeds according to both, it is evident, that we must rather place in bound [than in infinity] the sameness and difference of the impartible, but those of the media similarly in both, and those of partible natures rather in the infinite than in bound ; just as the first difference has the infinite, in a small degree only declining from bound, and the fir^t sameness has bound in a small degree declining from the infinite.’ Hence Plato says that the Demiur- gus received them as three, Ireing separated from each other. And since the forms that art* in him,’ hasten to the generation of other things, on this account also, he constitutes other things from these. If therefore we understand by hangs things prior to the generation of the media, we must say that these subsist in him according to cause. For these were in him prior to the tilings generated by him. Hut if by beings we understand the media, v\e must understand them as things constituted. For they are now lieiiigs, because they were produced bv him prior to the mixture, each apart from the other; and essence, sameness, and difference were now generated each by itself. May not hnwevi r the words lie in¬ terpreted more simply, vi/. the Pemiurgus “ taking than being three” for so many things he i fleeted from the three, the extremes Is'iug now now constituted by him, according to the preexistent causes w hich he contains ? And these genera indeed lie produced according to demiurgic lrcing ; but he added idea to all the three ac¬ cording to the union in himself, and the deity in him, which is the cause of the union of multitude. And you see, that each of the three was a form, and that which was produced from the mixture of tiie three, was one idea. Hence it is— necessary to say, that the soul is a form of forms; and, in short, to concene nothing in it as a composite and corporeal.

And you see, that each of the three was a form, and that which was produced from the mixture of tiie three, was one idea. Hence it is— necessary to say, that the soul is a form of forms; and, in short, to concene nothing in it as a composite and corporeal.

The triad, therefore, is adapted to the essence itself of the soul; since it was before shown that the soul is triadic. For we divided the whole of it into es¬ sence, power and energy ; essence, into hyparxis, harmony, and form; and liy- parxis, into what is properly called essence, same, and different. Nor is it proper to wonder, if we make a part of essence to Ik* essence. For the one genus of being is called essence, and that also which is generated, as it were, from all the ele-

1 In the original there is an omission hero of rov axrtpov.

* For tv rat>T|i m this place, it is necessary to read tv <wry.

48

PROCLUS ON Till-

[book 111.

merits of being, is denominated essence. If, however, we should again inquire, what it is that makes this one idea not to be any casual soul, but the mundane soul, but elsewhere a different soul; we reply, that it is the total nature of the genera that are assumed. For the mundane soul is a medium, not of casual extremes, hut of a total intellect, and total corporeal nature, according to which the world is an animal, tustas it is endued with intellect according to its impartible nature, and animated according to its middle nature. The predominance likewise of essence, cruses it to be the mundane soul; for this makes it to be divine ; just as t a* pievalence of sameness alone, produces a (heiuomacal soul, and ol diflerciice alone, a partial soul. A different habitude therefore to the extn mes, product s a diff. relic* in the media. Anti tin mixture of the media, defined according to the prevalence ol one thing, evidently « hanges the whole.

“ Co-aclapting by force the nature ot ditlcient which it was difficult to mingle, to the nature ot same.”

relic* in the media. Anti tin mixture of the media, defined according to the prevalence ol one thing, evidently « hanges the whole.

“ Co-aclapting by force the nature ot ditlcient which it was difficult to mingle, to the nature ot same.”

I It) w is the nature of dilft rent difficult to Ik* mingled * lueause it has a sepa¬ rating and dividing power, ami is the cause of progressions and multiplications. 13 ut every divine heing begins his energy from himself. Hence also th«* nature of different separates itself from other things and from itself. For it generates multitude in itself. On this account, it is said in the Sophisla, that it makes Imth other tilings and itself to he non-heings, separating them from other beings, lienee’ll is ditheult to he mingled, possessing this dilheulty, not troin .u * ideiit or any deviation, hut having an essence which is the cause ot ot lit mess, oft u* 1111- confused hypostasis of forms, and of uniningled simplicity. Possessing likewise Midi a power as this, it is a certain contrary hotli to sameness and to essence . 1 And it is contrary indeed to sameiu because sameness is the cause of union, communion and connexion ; hut dilleiviicc, of separation, of an inability to he mingled, and ofotherness, lint it is a certain contrary to essence because essence is being, but difference is non being, as is d< moiistraled in flic Sophisla. l'or the nature of different b< mg divided into minute parts, lwcomes the principal of non- lacing. That we may not, therefore, be involved in ambiguity by perceiving an at-once-cullected mixture of tin- genera, lie in the fu>t place mingles same with different* and sa\s that divinity <o-adapted the nature of difh-reiirr to that of sameness, as harmonically conjoining it with middle sameness. Afterwards, he

1 l'or r r o> tiiv uirmi litre, it i» necessary lo reait *710, ri|e iraor.

* Insle.nl of ro Mii’-( r ro Our<(ny ^171 uva 111 tins jilace, il b oliviomly reijimile to rcail ro ravToy ry Curifiy /o>* roiy.

HOOK III ]

TIM.EUS OF PLATO.

4<>

mingled both with essence. For Plato having said, that divinity co-adapted

tin; natim* of dillerence to that of sameness adds, “ that he mingled them with f«( nee, and made nn thing from the three." For because osence is c« nnective of the two genera same and different, but thesi; an; co-ordinate to each other, it is necessary that tliese should m the first place be mingled with each other, and in the second place, that both should be mingled with essence. And thus much con¬ cerning the order in the mixture. The farce , however, employed in the mixture, i^ not adventitious, nor such as the force which is preternatural, but indicates a transcendency and abundance of power; for such is demiurgic power. .So that it is able to unite difference, to divide sameness, and to p oduce one harmony from both.

The farce , however, employed in the mixture, i^ not adventitious, nor such as the force which is preternatural, but indicates a transcendency and abundance of power; for such is demiurgic power. .So that it is able to unite difference, to divide sameness, and to p oduce one harmony from both.

“ But having mingled these two with essence, and made one thing from the three, he again divided this whole, into appropriate parts.”

As the equal and the unequal are conjoined with quantity;' and as all quan¬ tity is either equal or unequal, or rather is equal ami at the same time unequal, for every quantity at once participates of both ; and as the .similar and the dissimilar are conjoined with quality, and every quality is both similar and dissimilar; thus, also, same and different are co-existent with essence ; and all essence participates of sameness and difference. For these are essentially, or according to existence itself, inherent in things, and not according to quantity or quality. Hence they are essential, being the media between the divine genera, and those things which are inherent in quantities and qualities. For sameness, indeed, is suspended from bound, but difference from infinity ; just as similitude and equality, are suspended from sameness, but dissimilitude and inequality from difference. Hence, also, Plato in the Philebus, produces bound and infinity from [the highest] Hod: for the) are divine genera. But in the Sophista, he denominates same and different the genera 1 of being. And the former subsist about the one, but the latter about essence. Again, also, you see how much more venerable Plato is than all other physiologists, and even than Aristotle himself. J’or they making their principles to be contraries, introduce organic, material, and partible contrarieties. And even the most venerable of them, refer contraries to excess and defect; badly assuming the privation of measure in the principles of things. For measure is more divine than the privation of measure. But Plato refers contraries to

Tim. l*lnl.

1 l or u/errp rornv try here, read utntp ry rnny. * For you roi> hitci lu re, read yo-i; tov orr-ji. VOL. II.

G

50

PROCl-L’S ON THE

[BOOK 111.

For measure is more divine than the privation of measure. But Plato refers contraries to

Tim. l*lnl.

1 l or u/errp rornv try here, read utntp ry rnny. * For you roi> hitci lu re, read yo-i; tov orr-ji. VOL. II.

G

50

PROCl-L’S ON THE

[BOOK 111.

sameness and difference, through which he comprehends all the contrarieties in soul, in nature, and in body ; and he places these in the Demiurgus, in order that he inav trite to them generative, cosmurgie,* immaterial, and exempt powers. Having likewise placed them there, lie constitutes the soul from them, producing from these, that w hich is as it were the subject of it, and the being of it, s,> far as being, and not so fir as ,t is a being with a certain quality, in order that it may imitate primary being. 1 'or he afterwards assigns to the soul harmony, torm, powers, and energies, thus rciid» ring the discussion ol it peilect. l’or we shall be able to sum \ its dignity, ai d its order in the world, which is of i ruling nature, if we perceive how by all the gi nera that are in it, it contains mundane essences ; how 1 1\ its ow n harmony, it co-hannom/es the whole world ; how !»y its own figure, it comprehends all mundane forms and ligun alter what manner, by the powers that are in it, it is able to perl- < t all physical, and all rational, or artificial powers; % and bow In its ow n proper • nf rgies, it excites mundane productions.

\\ by, therefore, did not Plato say, that the soul is a medium between intellect and si use ? Because lie says, t!i it inti !le« t and sense, are celt tin gnostic powers. But bis inti ntnui was to th liver the middle nature of it in c-sniees, anti not in powers. Wliv, however, did lie not say, that tin* soul is a medium between idea and things whi« li ar»* invested with form ? Because it was not now proposed by him to teat h us what the quality is of its form, but what its essence is. But it is not the same thing to speak of the i nee, as it is to speak of the form of a cer¬ tain tiling. I or form t xhibits an os nee of a ct rt tin quality. W hv then, did he not place the soul as a medium beiwivn intelligible and sensible numbers ? Be¬ cause in the following part of tin* discussion, lie assigns to it an harmony, accord¬ ing to which it ranks as a medium between separate numbers and separate lcaniiony, and si n>able numbers, and the hanuony which is inseparable from subjects. For according to the conception of Plato, tlie* soul is neither harmony itself, nor the harmony which is in things harmonized. Harmony itself, indeed, is uniform and separate, and is < vempt from all harmonized natures, ol whatevt r kuul they may be; being that alone which is called hanuony ilst.lt. But the harmony which e m things harmonized, pi rt.uiis to other things, ami is naturally adapted to be moved hv others. And the middle of both, is the harmony ot the 'Old. For this is that u huh is jirst tun niomztJ. Hein e also it imparts hanuony to other things, lor that which is able to impart stunt tiling to another thing, is t itht-r the form itself [which is participated}, or prn lanlv participates of it. I nis harmony therefore ol the soul, i' inferior to intelligible harmony, and to mtt liigihlo

* i. c. Powers efleclive of tlie worlit.

TOOK III ]

TIM XL’S or I’LVI'O

.'ll

numbers, but transcending sensible harmony, it hkevvi-e transcends sensible numbers. And if it be requisite to speak concisely about each of these, each of them is fourfold. For with respect to number, the first is divine, the second essential, the third psychical, and the last physical. And the first, indeed, has the form of unity, the second is immoveable, the third is self-motive, and the fourth is alter-motive. \\ ith respect to harmony, a!>o, the first is in the Gods, the second i> in truly -existing beings, the third is in souls, and the last is in the natures which are harmonized by other things. If, therefore, it had been now proposed by I’lato to speak concerning the psychical harmony, he would have said that it is a me¬ dium Wtween impartible and partible harmony. But since the present discussion is concerning the essence of the soul, he says that it is a medium between same and ditl'erent.

But since the present discussion is concerning the essence of the soul, he says that it is a medium between same and ditl'erent.

Here, likewise, it i> necessary to observe, that Plato in what is now said, makes as it were a conversion of the progressions of the psychical essence to their prin¬ ciples. Tor since the form of the mixtures i> twofold, the one .subsisting accord¬ ing to the mixture of the extri mes, which we have in the mixture of essence, same¬ ness, and difference; lnit the other, according to again collecting the media into one whole ;—the- being the rase, in the former mixture he began from essence, and ended in the latter; but vice versa in the latter. For he first co-harmonized the latter with sameness, and thus afterwards both with essence, and ended m essence, from which according to progression he began. Every where, however, that which is a whole' is subordinate to the two principles. For when he pro¬ duces the soul from impartiblcs and partibles, he places the impartible analogous to bound, but the partible to infinity. For the infinite is the cause of multitude, hut hound of union. And when he co-harmonizes difference with sameness, he assumes difference as in the genera of being, belonging to the co-ordination ot the infinite; hut sameness, as belonging to the co-ordination of bound. When like¬ wise he mingles the two with essence, he assumes essence .as having the form of unity ; but sameness and difference as dyadic, and opposed to each otiicr. And he does not cease collecting the multitude together, till he evinces the whole to be one. For the one is more excellent than essence itself, and the bitormed princi¬ ples [bound ami infinity]. The mixture, however, being as we have said, twofold, the one constituting the elements themselves, the other being that which consists of the elements, Porphyry rightly inquires whether the Demiurgus made both these in the Crater [i. c. Juno], or one of them out of, but the other in it; and lie

1 Instead of b nv, r^rrm rwr ivo ro t* ep\uv in this place, it is rfipdiitc from the vcrs.cn

cf Leonicus Tbonurus to read TtiiTo^e* b or mr^roi rmv Ivo to c\cv np^uy.

54

PKOCLUS ON THE

[BOOK III.

univenw*. since it is not lawful to refur the deteriorations’ of partial souls to such as are divine, Plato adds, tjiat divinity divided the soul into appropriate parts. For here that which divides, divides according to an intellectual cause, and that which is divided, is divided essentially. This mode of division, therefore, is adapted hoth to the divider, and the tiling divided ; since it is beneficent, and perfective of the essence of the soul, introducing it to intellectual variety,' and making it all-perfect, by inserting in it all the reasons of beings.

This mode of division, therefore, is adapted hoth to the divider, and the tiling divided ; since it is beneficent, and perfective of the essence of the soul, introducing it to intellectual variety,' and making it all-perfect, by inserting in it all the reasons of beings.

If then we assert these things rightly, it is not proper to separate the soul from union in the division of it, nor to consume the wholeness ol it, into the genera¬ tion of the parts, as the words of Tim vus seem to indicate when hesavs, that the thing mingled was consumed into these parts. Nor must we fancy that this was ns it were the division of a certain rule. J or .ill these modes are corporeal, and h\ no means adapted to immaterial essences. For every thing which is generated bv the Demiurges, must necessarily remain the same, since he always produces after the same manner, being immoveable and < ternal in bis energies. It is neces¬ sary, therefore, that the whole should always remain a whole; that the generation of the parts should be effected, the wholeness remaining; and that this should not lie consumed in the division of the parts. Hence, we must conceive, that the essence of the soul is one, and at the same time many, the whole remaining and being distributed into parts, and possessing continuity, and being, at the same time, divided. Nor must we imagine that the continuity of it is accompanied with interval; fur it is continued and without magnitude , like the continuity of tune; nor that the division of it is according to monadic numbers. For a thing ol this kind is quantity which does not accord with continuity . 1 But we must collect these into one, as it is fit with incorporeal natures, and must survey in the soul, the whole in conjunction with 4 the parts. Plato also manifests, that it is not proper to depart from union in the division, through the following words :

“ At the same time minglingcach part from same, different, and essence. But lie began to divide as follows."

If the "enera which constitute the soul, are in all the parts T of it, and the whole

* Tor ra «\arrw ficra here, read «\arru/mr«.

1 1 fumAiue is omitted in ibis place in I be original, but ought from tbc version of Thom.ru«, lobe u- kcrltd.

1 Viz. a ibuig of tins kind is discrete quantity.

* For/ice in this place, read firra

* Slffna iv is omitted in the original.

IHIOK III.]

TIM.KUS OF PLATO.

1 1 fumAiue is omitted in ibis place in I be original, but ought from tbc version of Thom.ru«, lobe u- kcrltd.

1 Viz. a ibuig of tins kind is discrete quantity.

* For/ice in this place, read firra

* Slffna iv is omitted in the original.

IHIOK III.]

TIM.KUS OF PLATO.

consists of parts similar to itself, it will in no respect be separated from continuity and union. For if in bodies similars cohere with each other without a medium, how much more in an incorporeal nature must all the things that are as it were parts, lie united, and the whole he vanquished by unity, neither tin* parts being confused, through the position of the whole, nor the wholeness taken away through the separation of the parts? Yon may also assume from these things, that the soul aerording to all the parts of itself, is both impartible and partible. For if every part of it participates of all the middle genera, nothing m it can hr assumed w hi* h lines not eonsist ol these. The ancients also, looking to these tilings, concluded every where concernin'.; it, that all of it is being, life, and mfi llect, ami that whit h< ver you may assume of the three, you may infer that it contains the rrmninmi; two ; since all things in it proceed through all, the whole is one, the one of it is all perfect, and a part in it corresponds to the whole. But if each of the parts of it In ini; many, is a certain essence, as numerous as are the parts, so multitudinous also is the essence, in a similar manner also with respect to same¬ ness and difference, each of these in intellect indeed is one, and on this account it is impartible. For in intellect one tiling is not a part different from another. l*ut in the soul both these are divided according to rsseutial nundrer, and the parts of it are adapted to each other, causing it to Ik* one tiling from many, and a whole from parts.

For in intellect one tiling is not a part different from another. l*ut in the soul both these are divided according to rsseutial nundrer, and the parts of it are adapted to each other, causing it to Ik* one tiling from many, and a whole from parts.

Moreover, this also deserves to lie considered, that according to the generation of the elements, he [vegan as we have said, from essence; hut according to the composition of the whole, from difirrrucc; co-ndnpting tiie nature o (different, which is dillicult to he mingled with same, and mingling both with essence, llut according to the division of the whole into harmonic ratios, he began from same¬ ness. For he says’ that lie divided each part mingled from same, different, and < ssrnre. 1 or a coinnii neement from essence is entirely 1 adapted to the genera¬ tion of simple natures ; since essence is more simple than other things. 1 o the composition, however, of the whole, a commcneeuient from dilfercnce is adapted. For the generation of the whole from parts begins Imm things subordinate to the whole. And a enmnu neenunt from sameness is adapted to the hypostasis of harmony. For the Deinuirgus was willing th.it tins should terminate in tin* sameness and roinmiinion of the things that were divided. And, in short, he was willing that hurmonv should Is* etlcctive ol the sameness of the things harmonized.

These particulars, however, having been discussed by us as tar as we are able,

• For court here it is obviously ncccoary |o read

* Iustcad of rarrr birr, read

PROCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

C>C>

These particulars, however, having been discussed by us as tar as we are able,

• For court here it is obviously ncccoary |o read

* Iustcad of rarrr birr, read

PROCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

C>C>

it is necessary in the next place to premise those things which ought to l»e readily known hy us concerning numbers, and the harmonic ratios of the soul, in order that we may not attempt in vain the interpretation of what follows It is neces¬ sary then-fore to premise such things as are usually mentioned m harmonic dis¬ cussions, viz. what sound, inter*al, and system are, and that the Pythagoreans did not assume the symphonies in harmony from any thing else than numbers, and not from all these, but from multiples and super-particulars. 1 or they said that the diatessaron is in a sesipiitertian ratio ; hut the diapente in a sesquial- ter; and the diapason in a duple ratio. And again they said, that the diapason and -it the same time diapente is in a triple, lnit the disdiapason in a quadruple ratio. .For the diapason and at the same time diatessaron, did not appear to them to be symphonious, because it consists in a multiple soper-parlienl ratio, \ i/. in the ratio of It to 3. For b is a medium between the two, producing with the less numlx-r a duple, but with the greater, a su! isesqiiitcrtiau ratio. These tilings therefon*, must he premised, and also that the si-squioetave is m the ratio of a tone; that the sesipiitertian ratio consists of two tones and a leimma; and the sesquialter of lliree tones and a leimma. 1 lint we shall afterwards learn what the ratio of the leimm a is. Moreover, the Pythagoreans said, that there arc- three genera of harmonies, the diatonic, the enharmonic, and the chromatic. Likewise, that the diatonic consists of a semitone (hut this which I now call a semitone is not properly so, hut a leimma), and of a tone, and another tone. But the enharmonic consists of a diesis, another diesis, and a ililone. Ami the chro¬ matic of a semitone, another si untune, and a trisemitone. But diesis is as it were the fourth part of a tone, not hi ing in reality a fourth, as neither is a leimma accurately a semitone. These things, however, we shall demonstrate in what follows.

But a 4 there are three genera, each of which is a certain division of the tetra- ehord, Plato appears to ha* e used the diatonic genus alone. I’or he thinks lit to divide the seMjuitrrtian ratios, into sesquioctaves and leimmas, hut not into enharmonic dieses; since some of the ancients called a semitone diesis. Plato, likewise, seems to have assumed this genus, 1 mean the diatonic, as more grand, simple, and generous, than the other genera; though the enharmonic: appears to lie more adapted to erudition And if it he requisite to declare my own predic¬ tion on this subject, the enharmonic genus, presides over all tin- hie which is

• After Xti/j/zarti 111 tlie original, it is necessary to su|>|dv from tlie version of riioma-us, the word* to Xe i' ik Tfutuv rdiur k«i Xti/iftfiTB i I relcr llie reader slio is desirous of thoroughly understand¬

ing what is here, and fat (her on, said, to in> Theoretic Arithmetic.

HOOK III,]

TIM.tlS* OF PLATO.

57

divisible about bodies, 1 just as llie diatonic presides over the rational lie Hence the enharmonic genus, is adapted to instruct and discipline llie «iiv isihb life, lint the cliromatic genus presides orer tin corporeal idea itself. Helici: it is e/l'emuiate and ignoble. The enharmonic genus therefore is deseneiilv tbs i- plinativc, • Hence, Socrates in the lb public thinks lit to mention it particularly, in w hat he says about harmony. And Timauis knowing this, anil having beard Socrates asserting these things on the preceding day, at the same time constitutes the essence oi the soul through the diatonic, and not through the enharmonic genus; the latter, as we have said, being adapted to erudition. Tor on tln> account, the ancients called the leadt i s [or preceptors] of these diseiphm s Ilarmnnici |or skilh d in music]. Aristoxenus therefore, in the first hook of his Harmnnir Klemeuts, says, it happened that those wen: truly called Hannonici, who formerly employed themselves in what pertains to music. Tor bring solely engaged in bannonv they neglected every other pursuit. In which Aristoxenus also asserts what is wonderful, vi/. that the ancients had no knowledge of the diatonic diagram. Tor lie thus writes: “ As an indication of the truth of this, their diagram alone exhibits enharmonic systems, but no one ever saw a diatonic or chromatic dia¬ gram delineated by them." It is worthy of admiration, however, that lie should assert these things, since Plato exhibits a diagram according to the diatonic genus, and also Timauis himself. Perhaps therefore what Adrastus says is true, who derides Aristoxenus as a man of not very elegant manners,* but studious of appearing to say something new.

Perhaps therefore what Adrastus says is true, who derides Aristoxenus as a man of not very elegant manners,* but studious of appearing to say something new.

Plato, therefore, in the diatonic genus, makes a division of letrachords, and proceeds not only as far as to the diapason, hut also as far as to a quadruple diapason and diapente, adding likewise a tone. Or according to Severiis, Plato did not produce the tetrachords without a tone, but ended m a leimrna, and not in a tone. If, however, some one should doubt, how Plato produced the diagram to such an extent, let him attend to the words of Adrastus. Tor he says that Aristoxenus, extended the magnitude of hw multiform diagram, as tar as to the diapason and diatessaron, and the symphony of these, in consequence of prefer¬ ring the information of the ears to the derision of intellect. Hut the more modem musicians extended the diagram a-* far as to the fifteenth mode, vi/. to the thrice diapason and tone, in so doing looking solely to our utility, and thinking that those who contend in singing could not exceed this, nor their auditors judge clearly beyond

1 Instead of rou wrpi tom irw/i im firpiarcut m this place, il is neeewary lo read rqi *-«p« rmi empimw • * For m *«£k>« here, it u requisite from llie version of Thomarus, to read ro

hm. Plat.

VOL. II.

II

68

PKOCLUS ON Tin:

[BOOK III.

it. Plato, however, looking to nature, constitutes the soul from all these, in order that it might proceed as far as to solid tuuuliers, as it ought to preside over bodies. For the progression a> far as to the quadruple diapason and diapeiite, necessarily follows the seven terms [or hounding number*]. llut tliis is evident from tlie greatest term liciug twenty s* veil. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

For the progression a> far as to the quadruple diapason and diapeiite, necessarily follows the seven terms [or hounding number*]. llut tliis is evident from tlie greatest term liciug twenty s* veil. And thus much in answer to the doubt.

In short, then are these three things into which the consideration of harmony inav be divided. One of these is the « \posilion ot the seven parts. The second is the insertion of tin* two media. I'he third is the div ision of the sesipiitertian and sesquialter ratios, into sesquimtaves and leimnias. Hence some, a** Ad rust us, are acciistomed to make three triangles, and in one of them, v\ hit h is the least, to describe the seven parts, making the summit ot the triangle to be one of die parts, and distributing the other six about tins. In one ot the sides also, they describe I lie whole duple order, hut in th< other, the wind triple order. Murcov* r, in the other triangle, which is greater, ami contains the former, they increased the immhers, and attain in a similar manner in** ited two nu-dia, arranging the duple separate from the triple numbers ; and placing one of the parts at the summit. But in the third triangle, which comprelicnds liotli tin* others, tiny described after the same maim* r the whole di r, r rmi. Olliers attain, adopting a description in tlie form of the I* tier X, arrange the numbers successively, as m the s* etion of a rule, according to three centers, assuming the first, second, and third immhers, as we aFo shall do. I his method likewise is adopted by Porphyry and Severus. And such are the particulars which ought to In premised, ami also licit Plato divides this h ail into three parts, in the lii"t ot the three, discussing the seven parts, in which there are three duple, and three triple intervals, according to the geometrical middle, i c. according to the same ratios. But in the serum! part, he discusses the iiiseition of the other two media, viz. the harmonic and arith¬ metic, into each interval ot the duple and triple numbers. \nd m the third part, he considers the division of the sesipiitertiau and sesipiialter ratios, into scsijuioe- taves and leimnias, and as far as to these • Mends the discussion ot the parts of the soul.

It is necessary however to he well acquainted with such things as are said about the three media, and to know tin ir dilh-rcnccs, ami what the methods are through which they are discovered. The arithmetical medium, therefore, is that in which the middle t* rin exreeds and is e\e* eded by an equal 1 quantity, as tuav In* seen in all the numbers that are in a consequent order, conformably to the definition of Timams himself. But tlie harmonic medium is that in which the

* \ocv is omillttl in the original.

BOOK III.]

TIM /HUS OF PLATO.

But tlie harmonic medium is that in which the

* \ocv is omillttl in the original.

BOOK III.]

TIM /HUS OF PLATO.

middle term is exceeded by the greater, I»y tin* same part of the greater, liy which it exceeds the loss tmn, as in tin* mimlirrs 3, 1 ami 3. For here 1 is exceeded l>v ti 1»v *2, \\ is tin* tliird part of 3, ami it exceeds 3 the less term l»y 1, which is the third part of 3.’ Ami the geomi trical medium is that, in which there is the same ratio of the greater to the middle term, as there is of the middle to the less term.

The methods however of discovering these, must in the next place he unfolded hy us. Id two terms, then fore, he given, hetwivn which it is proposed to find an harmonic, and also an aritlum tie medium ; and let the terms have a duple ratio, as for instance 1*2 and 0. I take, therefore, the excess of the greater mini her above the less, which is evidently 3, and dividing it into two equal parts, 1 arid the half to the less nu miter, and make this the middle term. Hence is the arith¬ metical medium In-tween 12 and 3. For the excess is three, hotli of the greater ahovc the middle, and of the middle above the least term. Again, taking the difference of the extremes, w hich is 0, I multiply this by the less term, and the product is 30, and dividing this l»y the sum ol the extremes, i. e. hy 13, the quo¬ tient 2 is produced, which is the breadth ol the comparison * lo tins also, I add 0, ami I have the harmonic middle 3. y For hy that part of the greater term 1*2 hy which 3 is exceeded hy it, hy this part of the less term 0, 0 exceeds the less. For it is exceeded h\ the third pari of 1*2, and hy a third part ol 0 it exceeds 0. Again, let there lie a triple interval, as for instance lit and <»,’ adding these together I make 24, of which taking the half, 1 have the arithmetical middle 12. Again, taking the i \c< ss of 13 above 0, i e. 12, I multiply it hy the less term 0, and the product is 7*2. This 1 divide hy 24 the sum of the extremes, and 3 the breadth of the comparison is produced. Afterwards, 1 add this to 0, and 1 have ft for the harmonic medium, which exceeds ami is exceeded hy the same part of the extremes. Thus also, if 1 and *2 were the extremes, hy adding them together, and taking the half of both, 1 shall have 1 and the half of I, for the middle term ol the aritlm.etieal middle. Hut taking the excess of the greater term above unity, and multiplying it hy the h*ss term, viz. unity hy unity, I have t from both. Afterwards dividing* this hy 3, the sum of the extremes, I shall

' Il.immmr proportion mav also lir d, liool In lie that, in which the difference between the greatest anil niiddic li-rin, ;■> l<> the dilVcrrnic IkIwicii Ihe iniilillc and least term, as (lie greatest term is to the l< ait 4 Inis in i!ie iionihi rv (>, l, 3, as ti— t t—3 :: (i: 3 ; via. as 2 is In I, so is C to 3.

as 2 is In I, so is C to 3.

1 Fv the brtndth cf the con/iari-rn, Prochis means the ratio of the terms first proposed to etch other, winch m this iii'l nne i'duple.

* er is mmltcil ill the orii,uidl.

* For TapaXafjtir here, it i> obviously necessary to read firfuiur.

PHOBIA'S ON THE

[book 111.

<K>

have the breadth of the third part of 1 ; in order that 3 being compared to one may make the third part of I. Addin" therefore, this * to !, I shall have \ whicliis the harmonic medium Ix-twcen 1 and «, in the same manner as before. Hence, by employing these methods, we shall in a liecomimr manner fill all the double and triple intervals, with arithmetical and harmouiacal middles; which Tiimeus has comprehended in the geometric middle, and which he increase's by the insertion of the other middles.

In short, sinca* Plato makes mention of the three middles, which are compre¬ hended in the "cometric middle, let tin* following theorem In* added [as a corol¬ lary] to what has been said. If the analogy consists in four terms, and one of the intermediate numbers produce s an arithme tical middle, tin* other will produce an harmonic middle, and vice versa. For let there be four terms, it, A, c, d, so that the first a,' is to b, as c is to d, and let b he an arithmetical middle, [so that a, b, d, are in arithmetical proportion,] 1 say that c is an harmonic middle*. For because the product of a by d is equal to the product of b by c, but b is an arithmetic middle and tin* product of c by a added to tin* product of c by d is the double of the product of A by c, as m the arithmetic middle; this luring tin? case, it follows that the product of c by a add* d to the product of c by </, is tin* double of the pro¬ duct of a by d . 1 I tut this was the property of the harmonic middle, viz. that the product of the middle by the e\tn men, is the double of tbe product of the ex¬ tremes. Again, let c In* an harmonic middle, I say that A is an arithmetic middle. For sinee the product of r by a added to the product of c by d, is tin* double of the product of A by c, the sum of a added to d is the double of A. 1 13ut tins is an arithmetical middle, when the sum of the t xtrenies is the double of the middle term. Airain of these four terms, let A be an arithmetic, hut c an harmonic mean, I say that as a is to A, so is c to d. For because tin* product of t by a, added to tbe product of e by d, is the double of the product of a by d, on account of the harmonic middle, hut tin* sum of u added to d, is tin double of A on at count of tin* arithmetic middle, hence tin* product of a by d will Ih* espial to tin* product of A bv c. As a therefore is to A, so is c to d.* But this was the peculiarity of the geometric middle. Hence those* two middles are contained in the geometric

* a is omitted in tins place in llie original.

* a u to b!!c: d !iy hvpothesis, ami therefore ad—be. Hut ca -fed— Cbc ; and because be—ad, therefore Cbc—Cad

Hence those* two middles are contained in the geometric

* a is omitted in tins place in llie original.

* a u to b!!c: d !iy hvpothesis, ami therefore ad—be. Hut ca -fed— Cbc ; and because be—ad, therefore Cbc—Cad

* Since ta + cd=Cbc, it follows since c multiplies all tbe three terms ca, cd, Cbf, that a-*-d—Cb.

* a+dxC—Cad. But Cbxc=2ad, and therefore bxc=axd. Hence a: b^c : d. Tbe trulbof lL>s nu\ be seen in numbers, by |>uUini; (j. 12. 1*. lt>. for a. b. c d.

BOOK III.]

T1 MAIL'S OF PLATO.

01

middle, 1 and reciprocate with each other, Since however we have premised thus much, let us proceed to tiie text of Plato.

“ In the first place, he took one part from the whole. After this, he separated a second part double of the first: and again, a third part, sesipiialtcr of the second, but triple of the first.”

The mathematical theory is neither to he entirely despised [in the present discussion] nor to he alone embraced itself by itself. For the latter will not exhibit to us the things which Plato intended to represent to us in images, and the former will cause the whole exposition to Is* unproductive of advantage. For it is uecessarv to consider the essence of the things which are the subject ot discussion, as on a scour ■ foundation. As we observed therefore Indore, we shall proceed in a middle way, first mathematically, in a manner adapted to the sub¬ jects, and after this we. shall unfold the division presented to our view in the text. The Pvthagi.re.ins then conceive magnificently, respecting the division or -a etion of the rule ill this place, viz. that Plain unfolds in it the essential causes, and the reasons which are generative of mathematical theorems. I<et us, therelore, as I have said, lir-t mathematically exercise the reasoning power of the reader, by contractedlv explaining w hat is asserted by many, at tin: same time abstaining from controversy, and investigating the truth by itself. Our discourse, however, will he in short, concerning these five particulars; viz. concerning multiple ratios; the media that subsist between these; the scscpiitertian and sesrpiialtrr ratios, which present themselves in the middles; the scsipiioctaves which fill these inter¬ vals; and the Icimma. For it is necessary that the diagram should In* comprehen¬ sive of all these, and he condensed with all these ratios.

For it is necessary that the diagram should In* comprehen¬ sive of all these, and he condensed with all these ratios.

That we may proceed therefore in order, we shall assume the ratios which are first mentioned by Plato, in the numbers from unity. Let unity then be posited, and the double of this g; afterwards .3, which is sescpiialter indeed of 2, but triple of 1; then i which is the double* of 2 ; afterwards ft, the triple of 3; afterwards 0 , the oc tuple of 1 ; and after all, the seventh term, whii h is twenty-seven times 1. Some, therefore, as we have: said, arrange these munis rs in the form of the letter X, making the monad the summit, and arranging the* double umiuIkts here, but the triple there. Ihit others more conformably to Plato, arrange them m one order only. For he does not say, that lla* triple were apart from the duple numbers,

' After the wont »J>io y in the* original, it in m-cessArv to mipply from the vcr»*n of Iconic - uf Thoma u» I he woriU, rrptryi rra« ap« n« tvri prooTrjTti <r rp yfu/ifTfiirrj

1 Tor rpirXaeia heir, il if obviously necessary to reicl fiwKniua.

1MIOCLUS ON THE

[bouk m.

<32

1MIOCLUS ON THE

[bouk m.

<32

hut he alternately mixes them, as proceeding in a right line. If, however, Plato had stopped here, there would have been nothing further for us to dismiss. But since he Ionise If exhorts us to hind the douhh and triple intervals with harmonie and arithmetic middles, and it is not possible to discover these middles between 1 and 2, some first number must he assumed, which leeing the least, may have a half and a third part. For eu ry number may have a double, and this must there¬ fore 1 h- investigated. 1/ t then b he assumed, ami the double of it 12, the former having the same ratio to the latter as 1 to 2. Between these then fore, \i/. 1 and 2 multiplied bv b, placing as media 8 ami M, we shall have the above-mentioned middles. For 0 exceeds and is exet edi d by the same part of the extremes ; hut 9 exceeds and is exceeded aecending to an t-ipial number. lienee by multiply¬ ing: 1 and 2 six times, we shall find numbers receiving the befure-meiitiimed middles. In a similar maimer by multiplying by b the remaining double and tuple numbers m the hefore-inelitioned order, we shall liml the terms which we may Ik- able to condense with arithmetic and harmonic middles. For sextuple numbers will Ik* produced from all the before-mentioned orders, by arranging other iiuiiiImts, only observing that 48 eiught to Ik- placed before 5-1; ill this respect departing from the. arrangement of Plato, who plac es !» before 8, m order that he might alternately change the duple and triple* ratios. \\ c, however, make this alteration, as consentaneous to the* multitude ol the monads, and the nature ot increasing number. Hence 8 and it come between band 12; lent between 12 and tlu* double of it 21, the harmonic mean is lb, and the arithme tic 18. And between the* third double 1 21 and -lit, the harmonic mean is 82, but the arithmetic 38. But in triple* nimilie.s, between b and 18 which are thu lirst triple*, the har¬ monic middle is !>, but the* arithmetic 12. Betwe en the second triple 18, and 51, the harmonic middle is 27, but the* arithmetic 3b. And In-tween the* third triple 54 and lb2, the harmonic middle is 81, but the arithmetic 108. The double and triple intervals therefore, are divided by these* two middles. So that these terms will he successive to e ach other, viz. (i. 8. 0. 12. lb. 18. 24. 27. 32. 3b. 48. 51. 81 108. 182.

If, however, it was possible in the terms described by us, to divide the* sesepii- tertian ratios, inte> sesejuioctaves and leimmas, we* should leave no occasion to pree- eeed ativ further. But now, as this is not possible, we are in want of another method. Since, there fore, it was proposed at first, tee condense? the duple ratio, with the he*fori*-tncntione*d middles, and with scsepiioctaves, it is necessary that tlu subduple term, should have the sesejuitertiaii together with the two sesepiioctaves.

’ For rj>ir\(t(ucu lien , it is obviously necessary to reael?i*Xa<uoL.

the duple ratio, with the he*fori*-tncntione*d middles, and with scsepiioctaves, it is necessary that tlu subduple term, should have the sesejuitertiaii together with the two sesepiioctaves.

’ For rj>ir\(t(ucu lien , it is obviously necessary to reael?i*Xa<uoL.

•took III.]

TINL-EU3 <>l PLATO.

83

Ix-t there he taken then in the first place, the third number from unity, according to an octuple ratio, viz. 84. From this it is possible to form two sesquioctaves. For every multiple number is the leader of as many multiple ratios denominated ('mi i itsi If, as it i» it"< If distant from unity. But it has not a sesipiiti itian. 1 Itv tripling therefore 84, we shall have 192, the seMpiitertian of which 1 - 258, but the sesiplioclave 218. and of this tin* sesqnioctave is ‘213.* But the ratio of the leimma is that which remains after the ablation of the two sesquioctaves '213 and 2 !8. For from every sesquitt rtian two sesquioctaves licinjr taken, the ratio of the leimma is left. But of 2-'#G the sesqnioctave is 233, which preserves an arithme¬ tical mean Iwtween 192 and 331, which has a duple ratio to 192, and a srsquiter- tiau to 233. If, therefore, it were possible to form two sesquioetaves from 283, we ini^ht also condense this sesquiterlian with sesquioctaves and a leimma. iSovv, however, this is not possible. For the sesqnioctave of it, 324, has not an eighth part. Hence if we wish to preserve unity always undivided it is impos¬ sible there should be a sesqnioctave ratio to it. For the eighth part of it is 40 and i. By doubling this, therefore, in order that we may make the half a whole, we shall be able to assume the eighth part of it. On this account, however, we shall be compelh d to double all the numliers prior to it, and also those posterior to it. Hence instead of 192, we shall have 331 ; instead of 210, 432; instead of 213, 18f>; instead of 258, 312; ami instead of 283, .'#73. And of tln> the s< Mpii- octave, is (#18, and of this 72.9.' Afterwards 788, which is the double of 381, has the ratio of a leimma to 729. After this manner, therefore, the double interval is Idled with sesquialtcr, s) squiterlian, and sesqnioctave ratios, in the numbers, 381. 132. 488, .#12. .#78.848.729. 7G8, Hence if we wish lo till the whide diagram, and to describe all the munhers in a consequent order, instead of the first part we must assume 381; instead of tin* double of the first, 7G8; instead of tin* triple of the first, hut tin* sesquialtcr of the second, 1152; instead of the quadruple of the lir<t, 1538; instead of the fifth part which is triple of the third, 3158; instead of the sixth part which is octuple of the first, 3072; and instead of the seventh part, which is the twenty-seventh pait of the fust, 103G8.

If, therefore, we also wish to condense these terms with harmonic and arithme¬ tic midrib's, which I join;; inserted, make sesquialtcr and sesquiterlian intervals, the intermediate numbers will 1m* 384, and 788, the double of 381; 512, which produce* an harmonic, and 578, which makes an arithmetic middle. But if we

1 The number 61 has not a sesquitertian in whole numbers. Fur as 3 is lo 4 <o is 01 to SjJ.

* For as fl is to 8, so is 243 to 216.

* For as b is to 0 so is 576 to 618 ; auil also so is 64b to 7 -9*

64

PROCLUS ON THE

[book III

wish to assume the above-mentioned middles of the triple interval, viz. of 304 and 1152, then 576 will preserve the harmonic ' middle, which filled for us the arithmetic * middle in the double 1 interval; and 760 will be the arithmetic middle, which was the greater extreme of the double interval. Again, if we wi-di to assume the same middles of the duple and quadruple, i. e. of the middles between the terms 760 and 1536, the former of which is the double of 301, and the latter the quadruple, the harmonic midtile will bo 1024, ami 1152 t ic arithuie- tic middle. If also we widi to condense the second triple, the terms of which are 1152, and 3456 [the former being the double of 576, and the latter the triple of 1152 ] then 1720 will give us the harmonic, and 2301 the arithmetic middle. And if we wish to condense the third double, w hich consists in the terms 1536 and 3072, then 2 ) 16 will be the harmonic, and 2301 the arithmetic middle. But if we wish to condense the third triple, with similar middles, but I mean the fifth and seventh part, the extremes will be for us 3456, and 10360; but the harmonic middle will be 5101, and the arithmetic 6012. If again, we should condense each of the sesquin rlians which present themselves from these mid¬ dles, and sesquialters, with sesquioctaves and a leimina, this will lie manifest to us after the whole exposition, when we exhibit the whole diagram with all the terms in a consequent order, which has indeed 24 s ( squioctaves hut 9 leimmas.

These things therefore, having been elucidated by us, we shall observe thus much concerning tlie leimmu, that as it is not possible to divide any superparti- tular into equal ratios, a semitone cannot be assumed in numb* rs ; hut taking the ratios which are contiguous to each other, vi/ the seventeenth and the sixteenth part, and demonstrating that the seventeenth part is greater than that which is called the leimina, and vvh eh is h ss than an accurate M ini- tone, it is inferred that the leimmu and also the seventeenth part are less than a semitone. But that it is h s S than a semitone, is demonstrated as follows; I>‘t there lie given the term 16 and the sesquioctave of it 16. Betw een these placin': 17 it will divide the scsquioctave into unequal ratios, vvhii i will he near to the semitonic interval, since 17 dillirs from the extremes by unity alone. And it is evident that it will make a greater ratio with the less t< rm; because in all arithmetical proportion, the ratio is greater w hieli is in the lcssteims, so that the seventeenth part is less than a semitone. .Moreover, the leimmu is less than the seventeenth part, as is evident from the terms exhibited by IMato. For since 256 has to 243 the ratio of the leimina, as we shall demonstrate in what

» For aottlfiiTTui)*' here. m the orijiinut it i» necessary lo read npfioy^y.

’ For mj» alto here, we mini re-d apiD^ntttv.

1 And for rp*»Xa<riy, il is requisite U> read }iw\avi{-

"'•] TJMyEUS OF PLATO. , ;5

follows where we shall show that the radical ratio of the leimma is in these nuinhers , anti since 256 exceeds 243 hv less than the seventeenth part of it;

for if exceeds it hy 13 unities, hut the seventeenth part of 2 13 is more than 13;_

tills bring the case, much umre is the ratio of the h iinma less than the seinitonie interval. Hence the ratio which remains to the completion of a tone, and which is called the ratio oi an apotome, is necossanlj greater than a semitone.

I arther still, this may also he deinonstrated after another manner, as follows: Lctthe iiuiiiIhts 2-i 6 and 243 Ire given, and let there lie assumed three numlMTS in a conseipient order, in a ratio of this kind ; from 256 indeed, 63336, but Irom 243 39049, and from both 6>Z08. These three numlien, therefore, are analogous in the ratio of the leimma, which, if it is a semitone, will be the tonic ratio ot the extremes. lint if it is greater than a semitone, that also wi ! he greater than a tone; hut if less, that also will he less. The sesrpiioctaTe how ever of 3309, is 664310 i. But this is greater than the greater term.

lint if it is greater than a semitone, that also wi ! he greater than a tone; hut if less, that also will he less. The sesrpiioctaTe how ever of 3309, is 664310 i. But this is greater than the greater term.

Afu r another and a third way the same thing may also Ire demonstrated, viz. that a tone cannot he divided into two erjual parts, hating the same ratio as that of 230 to 243. For if we take the eighth part of 213, w hicli is 30 \ and add this i irf to it, we shall make 73 w hich has a sesquioctave ratio to 243. You see therefore that 230 has to 2 43 a less ratio than 273’, to 230. For 250 has to 243 a superpartient ratio, exceeding it hy -Vj ; hut 273 } exceeds

2oO, hy ,\\\ __ But the ratio is greater which exceeds hy seven¬

teen and more, than that which alone exceeds hy thirteen, according to the ratio of excess. A tone, therefore, cannot he divided into equal parts, hut this is ts < leimma , as I lato also calls it, and that which has the greater ratio is apotome, as musicians arc accustomed to denominate it. For let 273 have to 213 a srsqui- octave ratio, hut 230, to the same 213, the ratio of the leimma, which has a loss ratio than that of the seventeenth part, it is evident that 273’, which has- the ratio of a tone to 213, will bate to 250 the ratio of the apotome, which is the remainder of the leimma, lreing greater than the seventeenth part, which we have demonstrated to lx* less than the ratio of the leimma. If therefore we multiply these right times, we shall find the first numbers winch in perfect unities have the ratio of the apotome. For the octuple of 243 is 1914, of 25G is 2048, of 273j, 2187. Hence the ratio of the apotome in radical numlrers (tv Wj}it<Tiv ’) is that of 2107 to 2040. And we shall he in want of these three terms which arc in a consequent order, in the diagram. Let then these terms be, 243, 2«>6, 273 m . But on account of [the fraction] let the octuple of these be the

II .-fyiijr is a primary ratio, being as it were a bottom or root, from which other ratios arise.

Tim. Flat. Vou II. j

I'KOCLUS ON THE

[BOOK 111.

Gf>

Let then these terms be, 243, 2«>6, 273 m . But on account of [the fraction] let the octuple of these be the

II .-fyiijr is a primary ratio, being as it were a bottom or root, from which other ratios arise.

Tim. Flat. Vou II. j

I'KOCLUS ON THE

[BOOK 111.

Gf>

numbers 1944, 2048, 2187, in order that the terms may be in perfect unities, and not in the parts of unity. Because however, it is necessary that the rat io of the leimma should !*e that of 250 to 2 18, we may demonstrate it to he so as follows: If from the sesquitertian interval, two •sesquioctaves are taken away, the terms which comprehend the remaining interval, will have to each other the ratio of 2od to 243. For let a b Is* sesquitertiau off, and let c he takt n away, which is suhses-. quioctave of the sesquioctave a b. And in a similar matin* r let */ he t.iki n from c. 1 say that d will have to < the proposed ratio. For from n b let c he taken which is «qual to ; b, and #/which is eipial c b. Since therefore, as ab is to c, so is c to d ; for they are sesquioct nos ; it will al-n he as a z is to b z, so is b z to be. Hence the remainder a z will he to the remainder ; r, as whole to whole, i. e. as*/ b In b z. But a b is sesquioctave ol b z. I leiice b ; is sesquioctave of c I. l>t - /, | H . placed equal to ze. Hence 2 //is octnph o (ha. But * e is equal to 2 //. Hence f h is eighteen times h a. Again, since z b is sesquioctave of be, tore is ses¬ quioctave of*/, hence b e is octuple oft =. Of such numbers then fore as z c is 8, of such t b is hi, and zb 72, For 72 is sesquioctave oft»4. But tin* whole a b is 81 ; for this is tin soqiiioctave of 72. The numhers, therefore, are quadruple.

1 fence of mr h numhers as <* b is 32 t, of such e b, i e. </, is 2o(>. F or 32 1 is qua¬ druple of 81, and 258 of 04. But numhers which are equally multiplied, have the panic ratio as their parts. Since tin r* loie </ b is sesquitertiau ol e, of such num¬ bers as */ b is 32 I, of such t w .11 he 2 13. For 32 I contains 2 13, and a third part of it, viz. Hi. But it has appeared, that of Midi numhers as ab is 321, of such d is 250. Hi-nee of sin li numbers as </is 250, of such * is 2 13.

It is manifest, however, that this ratio of the leimma is m the least terms. l or they are first terms with relation to each oilier. And this is evident from sub¬ traction. For they end m unity, the less bring always taken from the greater. But if they are first terms, it is evident they are the least of those that have the sain, i i(io with ihrin. If, tin leforc, two srsquinrtaves are taken From the sesqui- t rtian inti ival, the remaining terms will have the ratio of 2*>0 to 213.

But if they are first terms, it is evident they are the least of those that have the sain, i i(io with ihrin. If, tin leforc, two srsquinrtaves are taken From the sesqui- t rtian inti ival, the remaining terms will have the ratio of 2*>0 to 213.

'This therefore being demonstrated, let then- betaken in a consequent or«h r */ b fm the tonic ratio, be for the ratio of the leimma, ad for the ratio of that which is called a semitone, and </ to c for the ratio of the comma. I’or the ratio of the excess of the apotome, above that winch is truly a semitone, and which cannot !>e obtained in numhers, is thus called. I his then is demonstrated. Io wl.a, k,.s Imvii said however, it must be added, that we leave called the ratio of db a semi¬ tone, not that a sesquioctave is divided into two equal ratios ; for no superparti- * ulai ratio is capable of bt mg so divided; hut because the followers of Aristoxe- nus assume a semitone after two sesquioctaves, the ratio of a semitone is as- sii.iird, aswehav. said, according to their position, in order to discover what

HOOK 111.]

TIMJEUS OF PLATO.

* ho r:itio is of the comma and aj>otom<* to the ratio of the leimma. This therefore is asserlt-d through the cause w hicli has been mentioned by us. For that every super- pailit ular ratio is incapable of being divided into two espial ratios, is one among the things that are demonstrated. Thus much, however, must be added, for the sake of elegant erudition, that as the Pythagoreans neither admit that there is a semi¬ tone from which together with two sesijuioctaves a sesquitertian ratio is produced, nor the symphony diapason and diatessaron, as the followers of Aristoxenus admit;—this being the case, the musicians posterior to him, the disciples of Ptolemy, grant with the Pythagoreans, that what is called a semitone, is not truly so, but reject the opinion, that the diapason and diatessaron are not sym¬ phonies, We, however, necessarily demonstrate the former, on account of the opinion of Plato; but not Im mg compelled to demonstrate the latter, liecause Plato says nothing about it, we shall at present omit it.

.Since then we have shown in what numbers the ratio of the leimma, and the ratio of the apotome are first found, we must likew ise show, in what numliers the ratio of the comma, by which the apotome exceeds the leimma, is first disco¬ vered. This ratio therefore is in perfect [i. e. in undivided] unities, as the ancients say, that of 53144 1 to 524288.' But if to divide unity makes no difference, let the ratio of tin* leimma be taken in that of the numbers 25G to 213. But the ses- rjuioctave of 213 is 273 and of 258 208. 1 Another leimma is that of 209 to 213 For this is the ratio of the leimma. For 20.9 contains 258 and thirteen units, and 250 also contains 243 and thirteen units. Because tin refore 250 con¬ sists of 213, and besides this of thirteen units, which arc the numerator of 243 ; lienee the 13 hv w hich 250 exceeds 243, contains in itself A’ parts of 243. Fach likew ise of the thirteen units by w hich 250 exceeds 243 contains in itself F of 243. Hence 200 + A\ w ill have tli^* same ratio to 250, as 250 to 213,’ being in a Miperpartient ratio to it, and having A’» parts of it, and 243 units. lit nee that which remains, vi/:. 273 has the ratio of the comma to 200 and A\. So that it is shown in what numliers of the monad when divided, and in what two leim- mas taken from the sesijuioctave, the ratio of the comma is first found. It is evi¬ dent therelore, from what has been said, that we have effected what we promised to do. The terms likewise, and all the intervals, are condensed with harmonic and arithmetic middles, and the divisions of the sesqui alter and sesquitertian ratios, into sesquioctaves and Icimmas, have been effected. For as there is a

* Lcomcu* Thoinaeu* has in his version -SCV’98.

* 288 H oiui.icri in the Greek, and also in the version ofTbomirus.

2S« 1-VK52I* 1T90*

"T~ ; TjJSO mx Mi frlSSU.

«8

BKOCLUS ON THE

[book lit.

«!up!e interval lietwoen 301 and 700, the term 432 which i« sesquioctave to 301, and 48 'J which is sesquioctave to 432, fill between them, and also 512 which makes a leiintna with 400. And thus far the sesquitertian ratio consists of two tones and the leimma.

«8

BKOCLUS ON THE

[book lit.

«!up!e interval lietwoen 301 and 700, the term 432 which i« sesquioctave to 301, and 48 'J which is sesquioctave to 432, fill between them, and also 512 which makes a leiintna with 400. And thus far the sesquitertian ratio consists of two tones and the leimma.

A-rain 570 is scsquioctavc to 512, fl-IH to 570, 72?) to 018, and 708 has the ratio of the 1« iuuna to 720. And from these the sesquialter is fdled, having three sesquioctaves, and ont leimma.' Hut the whole is duple, consisting of live ses- qiiioetavi-s, and two leimmas. A"ain, according to the above described terms 304, and 700, the term 512 produces an harmonic, but 570 an arithmetical medium. Farther still, 00 1 is placed as scsquioctavc to 700, but ‘*72 is sesquioctave to 001, and 1021 has the ratio of the leimma to 072. To 1021 also 1152-is scsquioctavc. And now after the duple the sesquialter ratio is produced, "hie i m «k* s a trip e ratio, viz. the ratio of 1152 to 301. Hut between tins triple interval, 570 is the harmonic middle to the extremes, but 700 the arithmetic middle. For a theorem of the f ullouiw' kind is universally demonstrated, that ij of the same let m, one number i t double, but another triple, ami a certain mean of the double is assumed according to arith¬ metical proportion, this m an u ill be to the triple number an harmonic middle. But the great!r term in the duple ratio,ill Fa me the arithmetical mean in the triple. Tims for instance, in the above terms, 708 is the double of 304, but lloi is the triple. Between also the duple terms 700 and 301, an arithmetical mean 570 is assumed ; and the same mean between the triple terms 3H1 and 1152 is seen to be an har¬ monic mean. And 700 which was duple, becomes between tin* triple terms an arithmetical mean. Afterwards, 12!>0 is sesquioctave to 1152, and of this 14513 is the sesquiuctave, to which 1530 lias the ratio of the leimma. And as far as to this, the second duple is tilled, bein^ composed ol the se>quialter and sesquifer- ti in ratios, tin* extremes of which are 700 and 153*1, and are divided into five sesquiuctaves and two leimmas. It likewise has for the harmonic mean 1021, am! for the arithmetical mean 1 152.

A^ain, 1720 is sesquioctave to 153*5, of this 1 J> 14 is sesquioctave, of tins 2107 Is sesquioctave, and to this 23o t has the ratio of the leimma. But the sesquioc¬ tave of 23**1, is 25!*2 ; of this 2010 is the sesqmoetave, and to this 3072 has the ratio of the leimma, which is octuple ol the t’lr-t [tart, filling the third double. And farther still, the sesquioctave of 3**72 i> 315*5. Ami as far as to this t ie second triple extends, having lor its extr« iiies 1 152 anil .115*5, and for its harmo¬ nic- mean 172*5, but for its arithmetical nn-aii 23**1. In addition to this also, the

* 1 ,ir 70 S i> tcitjuullcr In !>l t, and bctvveiu lluae Ihu tecno, ilnrc tire ihe above llin-c sevquioctavci. jud one leumna.

HOOK Ml.]

In addition to this also, the

* 1 ,ir 70 S i> tcitjuullcr In !>l t, and bctvveiu lluae Ihu tecno, ilnrc tire ihe above llin-c sevquioctavci. jud one leumna.

HOOK Ml.]

TIM /EL’S or PLATO.

fly

sesquioctave of 3450 is 3888, but of this tin? sesquioctave is 4374, to which 4008 has the ratio of the lcinuna. The sesquioctave also of 1008 is 3101, and of this again, the sesquioctave is 5832, to which 014 1 has the ratio of the leimuia, the sesquioctave of who li in (581*2. And this again is another duple' [ti/.. 3450 and 091*2] after the before-mentioned three dnples [and afterwards another sesquioc- tave : for 777fl is sesquioctave to flJ»12j :* lor in the third triple, there is also a certain duple. And again, the sesquioctave of 7770 is 07 10, to which 0210 has the ratio of the lcinuna, and of 0210 the sesquioctave is 10308. And as far as to this, the third triple is extended, lieiug comprehended in the terms 3150 and 10308, and having two means, the harmonic and the arithmetical, the former ol which is 3101, but the latter 0912.

The double and triple intervals therefore are filled with middles, and with wwjuioctaves and leimmas. The whole likewise of this diagram has nine lcimmas, and twenty-four sesqnioctaves. Tor the intervals are le^s in number than the terms by one. It also proceeds as far as to a quadruple diapason, and a diapente ami tone. Adrastus how ever, who was a lover of the arts, makes the figure, as we have said, in the form of the letter 7 ,; and places the terms in certain triangles. And in the interior triangle, indeed, he places the ratios that are in monadic imml>ors [i. e. that consist in the numl»ers within t* nj ; but in the trian¬ gle next to this, the sextuple of these numbers, w hich have two middles according to each duple or triple interval. And in the outermost triangle he places the terms winch make the whole of the lieforc-mentioned diagram. What we have said, however, will become manifest from the delineation. But between the double and triple intervals, lie inscribes all the above-menlioiii d numbers, which we have not thought tit to add. being unwilling to introduce a [needless] multitude of terms. Tor such a disposition of terms, and the insertion of the same numbers twice, is unmethodical. Tor many of the same media are found between the duple and triple intervals; since the triple intervals themselves consist of duple terms and sesquiallers. What is s,*ul by Plato, therefore, has been elucidated by ns. Tor two media have been discov* red between all tb*‘ duple and triple inter¬ vals. And from these media scsquialter anil sesquiterlian ratios having lieen produced, these are divided by the sesquioctave; a portion being left in both, which has the ratio of the leimma. From these likewise, assumed in an orderly

* Fur tiaTatrvr here, it 11 necessary lo read iir\nirtoy.

And from these media scsquialter anil sesquiterlian ratios having lieen produced, these are divided by the sesquioctave; a portion being left in both, which has the ratio of the leimma. From these likewise, assumed in an orderly

* Fur tiaTatrvr here, it 11 necessary lo read iir\nirtoy.

* The word* within the brackets arc supplied from the version of Thoma-us, where however it ■■ necessary to read scsquioctavuin instead of sesqutallerum.

70

PROCLUS ON THE

[book in-

manner, the terms which comprehend the whole diagram will be found to be thirty-four only.*

Siuce, however, the Pythagoric Timieus says that the terms of the diagram are thirty-six, and vet assumes the same extremes as Plato, viz. 301 and 10308, in order that these philosophers may not appear to Ik* in any respect discordant with each other, let us show how the other two ti rm.s are inserted. These tin n there¬ fore li. e. the Pythagoreans] were willing that there should not only he the ratio of the leimma in the diagram, hut also that of the apotome, whieh they twire dis¬ covered, both m radical iuuiiIrts, and in those alone which are the triple of these. Adding likewise one term to each, they introduced this into the diagram. But Plato makes no mention of the apotome-; whence aKo we being satisfied with the leimma, have alone employed the above-enumerated terms. Pur how, since lie assumes the diatonic genus, could he make use of the apotome, the sesquioetave not being divided in this genus; the apotome being produced when the sesqui- octave is divided ? For the part of the sesquioetave which remains idler the leimma, is the apotome. Hence, since Plato does not mention the apotome, and it is not possible for it to occur in the dialotiii genus, it would lx ridiculous in us to end« avuur to insert other terms, in ordt r that we may h ive the apotome, the thirty-four terms Ih mg sufhi i« lit to the completion of the sesquioct; ves and lcimmas. It seems also, that the number 3 1 is adapted to the diatonic genus, in

* Thu will he evident from the following diagram, which also will he found to contain a quadruple diapason, together with the diapente and tone.

Sesq. ^esq Lemma, ‘'esq. Sesq Sesq l eimma. JS4, 432. 4Sb. 512. 576. 648. 779. 768. Tlie first duple interval.

Sesq. Sesq. Leimma. Sesq. Vsq. Sesq. Leimma. 86 4. 972. 102 4. 1152. 129<i. 1 45S. 1536. The second duple interval.

Sesq Sesq Lviinma. Sesq. Sesq. Leiuima. 1728. 194 4. 2187.* 2304 2592. 2‘Jl6. 3l>72.

The third du|ile interval.

Sesq. St-sq Leimma. Sesq. Sesq. la-imma. 3456. 3SS8. 437 1. 4008. 5184. 5832. Mil. The fourth duple interval.

* 2187 •» the octuple of 273

Sesq. Sesq. Ijcimma. Sesq.

6912. 7770. 8718. 9316. 10308.

I lie third triple interval.

2187.* 2304 2592. 2‘Jl6. 3l>72.

The third du|ile interval.

Sesq. St-sq Leimma. Sesq. Sesq. la-imma. 3456. 3SS8. 437 1. 4008. 5184. 5832. Mil. The fourth duple interval.

* 2187 •» the octuple of 273

Sesq. Sesq. Ijcimma. Sesq.

6912. 7770. 8718. 9316. 10308.

I lie third triple interval.

lu this diagram it must be observed, that the last term of each interval forms a sesquioetave with the first term of the interval that it next m order The first triple interval likewise begins with tin term 384, and ends at the term 1152. The second triple interval begins at 1152 and ends at 3456. And the third triple interval begins at 3430, and ends at 10308.

HOOK II!.]

TIM.EUS OF PLATO.

71

which alone the sesquinctave ratio is found. For it consists of the terms 10 and 10, which are to eacli other in a sesquiortave ratio. For the sesquialter and sesrjuitertian ratios, and leiinmas, are also in the other genera; hut the sesqui- octaves are found in this alone of the three genera. Hence tliis ratio of the sesquinctave, very properly produces hy composition the niunher of the parts: and this being the second, is adapted to the second progression of the soul from the first intelligible principles.

It there lore \ie assume the less- term of the third double, viz. 1.13#!, and airun the se>quiorta\e of this 1728. and afterwards the sesquioctave of this- I‘M1, and again the tritone of this 2187, there will he one interval of the extremes. Because however 2018 h is a sesquilertian ratio to 1550, hut 11)14 has to it the ratio of the leimmn.it is necessary that 2187 should make an apotome to 2048. For an apotome is, as we have before said, that which remains to a tone, after the lcimma. In a simi¬ lar manner also, hv assuming in the third triple, 4800, which contains the tritone * 8501, * and also assuming 8144, which makes a sesquitertian ratio to 4608, hut to 5882 lias the ratio of the leimma, we shall necessarily have the apotome in the ratio of 0501 to 01 14. which are triple of the radiral terms that were before discovered hv us m the third double. For it is evident that the ratio of the apotome is radically in those terms. For 2187, and 2018, are demonstrated to

}>o first terms to each other hv the theorem of subtraction: first terms- bein°*

*

necessarily such as arc least. The multitude indeed of the terms descrilied hy Tinneus, is demonstrated l»y Philol.nts; hut the diagram of Plato proceeds without tin* ratio of the apotome. And thus much concerning these particulars.

The multitude indeed of the terms descrilied hy Tinneus, is demonstrated l»y Philol.nts; hut the diagram of Plato proceeds without tin* ratio of the apotome. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Since however we have lie fore observed, that if of one term two numliers are assumed, one of which is the double, hut the other tin* triple of it, the mean which between the duple terms is arithmetical, is between the triple terms harmonic, hut the duple term is between the triple terms, an arithmetical mean, we will now concisely elucidate and at the same time demonstrate this theorem. I> t then b he the double of a, hut c the triple of it, and between a and /;, let the arithmetical mean he d. I say that will happen which is enunciated in the proposition. For since b is the double, hut c tin triple of a, of sueli numbers as a is two, b will lie four, and c will be six. Hence of sm h as b is four, c will bo six. By so much,

’ For TfttTor here, it is neccs«ary In re lit rptrovuv.

* According In t)u moderns, a Inlouc is a dissonant inters si, oliierssisc tailed a «iipcrfluous fourth.

It is also a kind of redundant third, consisting of two tones, and two semitones, one greater and one less. And the ratio of the tntoue i a, |j to J2. Tins however does not accord with the ratio of the tritone given by I’roclus, both in this plate, and above. For I fins is uot to 0561 as 32 to 45, bul as 32 to 45 IJJJ. Nor in the other instance above, is lyii to 21 b7 as 32 to 45.

7 1

PROCLUS OS THE

[BOOK III.

therefore doe* c exceed b as b exceeds a. Hence b is an arithmetical mean between a and c. Again, Iveeause of such as a is two, of such b is four, hut the arithmetical mean between them is d; hence d will |e three of such nuinhers, as a is two, and b four.' But of such as b is four, of such c is six. Of such there¬ fore, as a is two, of such d is three, and c is six. ! Ieuce d compared to a and to c, will produce an harmonic midtile/ l or by the same part of the greater it is ex¬ ceeded bv the greater, and by the same part of the less exceeds the less. And thus much concerning this particular.

! Ieuce d compared to a and to c, will produce an harmonic midtile/ l or by the same part of the greater it is ex¬ ceeded bv the greater, and by the same part of the less exceeds the less. And thus much concerning this particular.

Seierus, however, thinks that this diagram should not end in a tone, but in the leimma, because Plato terminates in this all the discussion concerning the division of the soul, lu order, therefore, that it may terminate in the leimma, Severus transfers some of the terms, and makes all of them to he thirty-four. But as in the thirty-fourth term, the half of unity occurs, lie doubles the terms, and makes the first part to !>e 788, vvhii h is the double of 381. <M this, therefore, lu* places the sesipiioctave 881, and of this again the sesipiioctave 872. l'o this also he adapts according to the leimma, 1021. But ot this he takes the sesipiioctave 1152; of this the sesipiioctave 1288; and ol this again the sesijuioclaie 1158. But to this he adapts according to the leimma 1538, and places the sesipiioctave of this, 1728, and of this again the sesipiioctave 1811. To this likewise he adapts according to the ratio of the h iiuma, 2187. And of this lie assumes the sesqui- octave 210 1; of this the sesquioctave 2002; and of this again the sesipiioctave 2818. To this also he assumes 3782, which has the ratio of the leimma to it, to this the sesipiioctave 3158; a id to this in a similar manner 3888. 'l'o this likewise he adapts as the leimma 4371; of this he assumes the sesquioctave 4808; of this the sesipiioctave 5181; and of this again the sesipiioctave 5832. ‘l'o this also he adapts according to the ratio of the leimma, 8144 ; and ot this he assumes the ses¬ quioctave 8812 ; of this the sesipiioctave 7778; and of this again the sesrpeoctave 8718. To this likewise he adapts as a leimma P218. But of this he makes the sesquioctave 10388; of this also 11881; and of this, agon, he makes the sesqui- octave 13122. 'l’o this he adapts as a leimma 13824 ; ol this also he assumes the sesquioctave 15552 ; of this the sesipiioctave 17 188; and of this, again, the sesipii¬ octave 18783. And to this he adapts 20838, having the ratio of the leimma. As far as to this, therefore, he gives completion to the diagram, making the leimma to 1 m* the end ; except that in these terms, there is first the sesquilei tian, after¬ wards the sisqnialter, then the sesquitertian, and afterwards the sesquialter ratio.

* Hence a* 2, 3, V are in arithmetical proportion, so likewise will their eijuiinulliples, 2x. in. lx.

* For 2, 3, anil 6 arc id harmonic proportion, and therefore their eijnimuitiples also are in the same proportion. For 6 ex* eeds 3 bv (he half of 6, and 3 exceed* 2 bv the half of 2.

BOOK III.]

TIM /El'S OF PLATO.

73

Arxl again the sesqniterlian, afterwards the sescjuialfor, and then three sesquialter* in a following order, as is evident from tin* above description.

For 6 ex* eeds 3 bv (he half of 6, and 3 exceed* 2 bv the half of 2.

BOOK III.]

TIM /El'S OF PLATO.

73

Arxl again the sesqniterlian, afterwards the sescjuialfor, and then three sesquialter* in a following order, as is evident from tin* above description.

It happens, therefore, in this diagram, that there is a quadruple diapason, that the diapente occurs once, and that tin* tone is redundant. I’or three s'*sfpii;dters, make one diapason and tone. The diagram, however, does not end in atom*, hut in the leinima. Hut this was the tiling proposed to he effected. .Severus, there¬ fore, does not take aw ay the tone, luit does not end in it. So that the w hole diagram according to all the terms, consists of a quadruple diapason, and the diapentes, and one tone. If also we wish in monadic numbers to assume these intervals, we must survey tin* progression extended as far as to twenty-seven. For *2 is double ot unity, 4 is the double of 2, 8 of 4, and It; of 8. And as far a- to this the qua¬ druple diapason extends. Hut of Hi, *21 i> the sesquialter, and this is the diapente, and to this *27 has a sesquioctave ratio. So that the before mentioned symphonies are |w?riect« d horn one part, as far as to twenty-seven. This, therefore, as I have said, is common to all the diagrams. Hut they difibr from each other in this, that some are in tin* form of the fitter x, but others are in a right line. For of the ancients, Adrastus employs figures in the form of X, but Severus ri^ht lines, which in my opinion is Ijetter. For in the figures which are in the form of the letter x, the same numbers are found twice in differt nt places. Hut this is discor¬ dant with the things themselves. For there are not two parts of the soul which are the same. Hut all these numbers are parts of the soul. Tlicv differ also in this, that some of the diagrams end in a tone, but others in the leimma. Some al*>o are more perspicuous, though the same numbers are assumed twice, as is the case w ith those diagrams w Inch distribute the duple and triple 1 ratios in the sid< s of triangles. Hut others place each numlier once mall the intervals, though this causes a more ditlienll ilivision of the duple terms, into super-particular and super-partienl ratios. We have tbefore premised such things as may contribute to tin* theory of the psychogonic diagram, to those who survey it mathematicallv.

As we are enterin': however on the more important explanation of the words of Plato, we think it requisite to speak in the first place, concerning the division itself according to which the soul is divided in these ratios, and to take avvavhy argu¬ ments such things as arc* an impediment to our apprehending the truth respecting it. Let no one, therefore, think that this division is corporeal. For it has l>een before demonstrated, that the middle nature of the soul is exempt from bodies, and at the

Let no one, therefore, think that this division is corporeal. For it has l>een before demonstrated, that the middle nature of the soul is exempt from bodies, and at the

Itoth the sense of what is here said, and the version of Thonia:us, require the insertion in tins place of sai rfttrXarrwvt.

Tim. Plat.

\ OL. II.

K

74

PROCLUS ON TIIK

fBOOK III.

same lime from every partible essence which is distributed about them. Nor must it be supposed that the soul is Ik tier indeed than bodies, but that it is divided after the same manner as the terms or boundaries, and intervals by which bodies 1 are measured. For things that have interval, are not wholly and through the whole present with themselves, ami when divided, are not able to preserve an unconfused union. Hut the soul participating of an impartible allotment, is united to it-elf, and exhibits all the same eh ments subsisting the same in all its parts Nor again must this section of the soul, be considered as a division of numlier. For tin* soul is imb ed number, vet not that which is according to quantity, but that which is essential, self h goften, having the form of unity, and converted to it-elf. Nor h t the prest nee ot tin >e ratios in all tin parts be com¬ pared to spermatic reasons. For fh.se are imperfect, coipon al-forined, and miU-nal, and entirely fall sliort of the immaterial and pure essence of the p-j du¬ cal reasons. Nor let any one assimilate the before-mentioned parts to the theorems of si ielice, because each theorem possesses the vv hole [science of wine i it is a tin mem]. For we do not now ( misiib r the knowledge, but the es-< m e ot

M , u p Nor is it propi r to think that tin- dilh-rem • > of i s-etu e>, are similar to the distinctions of habits. For the killer are entirely varied in tin natures that po—I — 111 . Ill, but the lull ill i are i slablisln d with invariable sann ness in d< liniir- gic boundaries. Il. nee if is necessary to suspend the primordial principle of the psychogenic division from the demiurgic cau-e, and from perfect measures, which eternally pre exist in real beings ; to wbicb also the l)i iiiiurgus looking, divides the soul. For as be divided this universe by intelligible paradigms, thus also hr separates the essence of the soul by tin* most beautiful boundaries, assimilating it to the more ancient and primordial ( auses. I he mode therefore of division, is im- i uih nut, inttilt ctuuf, nndt filed, pn/, t (ire of the t ssem c of lhe soul, gt m rain e of the multitude in it, co lit, live through hurmuni/ into one order, and connect ire of divided parts, at one and the same time being the cause of the umningled purity of the multitude in the soul, and producing a communion of reasons conn rging to the same essence.

\ m l tlir Demiurgiis, indeed, appears to consume the whole by ibvulmg it into parts. J’or thus also in a certain rc>j»ect Timieiis says, that he consumed the iJwlc from which he cut off these parts." I hi-, however, is not the case, but it is necessary to preserve both impartible, and that the wholeness remaining imparli-

* For airtjy lien*, u i*> necessary l<» re.nl uurn

1 For aXXu hafitptoTcv lu re, it is necessary to rca»l a\\' aprpioTo*.

BOOK 111.]

TIM.EUS OF PLATO.

75

l>lo, tin? division into multitude should he effected. For if we assume one of these only, I mean the sec tion into jiarts, we shall make the soul to he partible alone. The u hole there/ore is distributed into parts, and at the same tunc the n hole remains. Airain, the impartible of the soul equally participates of the impartible and the partible. For it is well said, as we have before observed, by the ihcmoniaral Aristotle, that there is something impartible in partible natures, which is connec¬ tive of them ; so that it is much more necessary, that something impartible should remain, in things which have not only a partible, but also an impartible nature. F’or if this did not remain, that which consists of both would lie alone partible. It is evident however, that it is necessary the whole should remain in the pene- i at ion of the parts, it the Demiurgus is an eternally producing cause, lint he constituted the soul one w hole, prior to the division of it. For he did not obli¬ terate it in producing something else. lint he always produces every thing, and eternally, and causes that which is produced to remain what it is. Hence the wholeness is not destroyed, when the parts are constituted, but it remains, and precedes the parts. For he did not produce the parts prior to the whole, and afterwards generate the whole from these, but vice versa. The essence therefore of the soul is at one and the salt*® time a whole, and lias parts, and is one and multitude. And such is the division of the soul which Tiuucus assumes.

For he did not produce the parts prior to the whole, and afterwards generate the whole from these, but vice versa. The essence therefore of the soul is at one and the salt*® time a whole, and lias parts, and is one and multitude. And such is the division of the soul which Tiuucus assumes.

The mode, however, of unfolding it, should accord with the essence ( ,f the soul being liberated from visible, lint elevating itself to essential and immaterial har¬ mony, and transferring from images to paradigms. For the symphony which flows into die ears, and which consists in sounds and pulsations, is very different from that which is vital and intellectual. IVo one, therefore, should stop at the mathematical theory, but should e\< ite himself to a mode * of survey adapted to the essence of the soul ; nor should he think that we ought to direct our attention to interval, or the differences of motions. For these are assumed n mutely, and are by no means adapted to the proposed subjects of investigation. But he should survey the assertions by themselves, and consider how they afford an indication of the psychical middle, and look to the demiurgic providence as their end. In the first place therefore, if you are willing thus to survey, since wholeness is triple, one l*eing prior 1 to parts, another consisting of parts, and another lieing in each of the parts, as we have frequently elsewhere demonstrated ;—this being the case, Plato has already delivered the wholeness of the soul which is prior to parts. For

1 For mroi' lierc, read rpowov.

* Instead of wpet rwr ptpm* in this place, it is accessary to read rpo r w ,

76

PKOCLUS ON THE

[DOOK. lit.

For

1 For mroi' lierc, read rpowov.

* Instead of wpet rwr ptpm* in this place, it is accessary to read rpo r w ,

76

PKOCLUS ON THE

[DOOK. lit.

he made it to he oih? whole prior* to all division into parts, and which as we have said, remains what it is, without In-in- consumed in the production of the parts. For to Ik 1 willin- to dissolve that which is well harmonized is the province of an e\d nature. But the dissolution is ell', clod l.y c onsuming the whole into the parts. In what is now delivered however, he constitutes it a whole from parts, consum¬ ing the whole mixture into the division of its essence, and through the harmony oHI.e parts, remlei.n- it a whole de novo, and . aium- it to he complete from all appropriate parts. Hut lie shortly after teaches us the whoh u. - which is in each of the parts, div ulin- the w hole smil into certain circles, and in oat h of the cm les ins. rtin- .,|| I!,,- irasons, wlm h lie had air. ady mad. manifest to us m what he had 1*. fore said. For lie had said, that in . a. I. of the parts there are three [i. e. same, dill, rent, and essence| in the same manner as in the whole. h\« ry part then lore, as well as the whole, is in a certain n sp. et a triadic whole. lienee it is necessary that the soul should have three wholenesses, because it animates the universe, which is a whole of wholes, each of which is a whole aecordin- to the wholeness which is in apart. So that the soul animating the universe in a twofold respect, hotli as it is a whole, and is consisting ot total parts, it requires two wind, in -M S, and tran-e. ml- the tiling that are animated, havm- snmi thin- external in them, so as circularly to cover the universe, as Tiuia-us says, as with „ veil, Jlv the wholeness, therefore, which is prior to parts, the soul entirely runs above the universe, hut by the r. maiiiin- two connects the universe and the parts it contains, these also In in- vvholi s.

In the next place, it must he observed, that I’lato proceedin'.; from the be-m- njnjr to the end, preserves the monadic and at the same time dyadic nature ol the soul. For he reduces the hyparxis of it to essence, same, and dillereiit, and distributes the number of it aernidm- to a twofold division, h. -liniiii- from mu oart. into duple and tuple numbers. He also surveys the media or middles, in one of them comprehends the other two, 1 and acoordiri- to each ot these unfolds twofold se-ipiialt. r and sesi|iiitertian ratio-, and a^ain cut- these into sesijuioc laves and Icimuias. In what follows lihev ise, he divides the one leli”th into two, and the one li-ure of the soul into two periods. \ml, in short, lie no- where omits the monadic and at the same time dyadic, and this with the trr. ..test

' Amt lur iri * a»*H pf/HOfM/v here, also, read rrpo k. \.

In what follows lihev ise, he divides the one leli”th into two, and the one li-ure of the soul into two periods. \ml, in short, lie no- where omits the monadic and at the same time dyadic, and this with the trr. ..test

' Amt lur iri * a»*H pf/HOfM/v here, also, read rrpo k. \.

1 i. e. I» the •■e.inielrie luiilille I.r |o.>j><>rlion, n lm ii n.ui|m lr. uds arnliinHical and harinoiiual |>l..p>>r(:o(i I 11 to an\ three iliimhers ill arilhun lieal |»r..|.orli*ni, a fourth uuaili. r is a.ldul, so a> i.. |ir.i<luie i;e..u.etiii.il |ir..|nirli.ui, then this 11n41url11.11 will i«.iu|ireheud hulh that whiili is arith- uiftKnl, ami lh.il which Is hurilionieal Thus ll tu the terms 1 . 2 . J a luurlli Urm is added »il. <>, M> ilul U Iiiav he 1 ; 2 : : 3 : <>, llicn 1 , 2 and 3 aie ui arillmu lital, and 3 and 0 111 harmonic,

proportion.

DOOK III.]

TIMEX'S OF PLATO.

77

propriety. For the monadic alone pertains to intellect, on which account also intellect is impartible. lint the dyadic pertains to hodv, whence in the genera¬ tion of the corporeal-formed nature, Plato hejjan from the dnad, fire and earth. «md arr.m^i d tvvo oilier genera ol element's b< tween these. 1 he soul, however, oein; a medium Is-tween intellect and body, is a monad and at the same time a duad. Hut tIn* cause' ot this is, that in a certain respect it equally participates of bound and infinity ; just as ml. Meet indeed, is allied to bound, but body rather pertains to infinity, on account of its subject matter, and divisibility ad infinitum, ^viid if after tins manner, some n fer the impartible and the partible to tbe monad •iiid i ml i finite duad, t hey ‘•jirak con to nimbi v to tilings tin-in selves * but if as making the soul to Im> number, in no respect difieriii" from monadic nuinliers, they are '* r ) bir Iroin asserting that wlm h happens to tin* essence of the soul. The soul, then-fine, is ;i monad and at the same lime a duad, adumbrating hy the monadic, intelleetu.il bound, but by the dyadic, infinity; or by tin* former, Inan^ the linage, indeed, ol the impartible, but by the latter bi ini; the paradigm of partible natures.

In addition to these things also, it is requisite to survev, lion a two-fold work, of the D* miiiriius is here delivered. I o*r he divides the soul into jiarts, hanno- lii/es the di\ided parts, and renders them concordant with each other. But in <... < 11 hit th. so things, he em r.ri/es at one and the same tune Dionysiaeallv [i. e. Barehical \ ] and Apollouiacally. I or to divide, and produce vv holes into parts, and to preside o\er tlie distribution <>| lorms, is Dionysiaral; but to perfift all things harmoniealIy, is Apolloni.tral. As the Deiniur^us, therefore, comprt bends in hiiiLsell the cause ot both these (>ods f hr both divides and harmonizes the soul. Lor the hebdomad is a number common to botli those divinities, since theolotjists also say that Bacchus was div ulrd into seven parts :

As the Deiniur^us, therefore, comprt bends in hiiiLsell the cause ot both these (>ods f hr both divides and harmonizes the soul. Lor the hebdomad is a number common to botli those divinities, since theolotjists also say that Bacchus was div ulrd into seven parts :

Into sci€-n parts tlie Titans cut the bov.

And they reier the hrptad to A|»ollo, as containing ail symphonies. For the duple diapason first subsists in tin* inonad, duad, and tetratl, of which numbers the hebdomad consist-,. Hence they call the (iod Ilebdoma'retes, or horn on the seventh day, aiui assert that this dav is sacred to Inin;

l or on tins day baton , bore * llic bind Ulm wi art a •M.UIcn sword.

Just as the si\th tlav is sacred to Diana. This number, indeed, in the same manner as the triad, is imparted to the soul from superior causes; the latter from intelligible, hut flu former from intellectual natures. And it is also imparted from »liese very divinities [Apollo and Bacchus], in order that by a division into

tor ai£ior here, it is obviously necessary to read atrtor t<.

1 or yjtvoauy a ytipara iierr, read x/>vira«opa y<u aro.

78

l'KOCLUS ON THE

[BOOK III.

seven parts, the soul may have a signature of the Dionysiacal series, anti of the fabulous laceration • of Bacchus. l'or it is necesfurv that it slioultl participate of the Dionysiacal intellect; anti as Orpheus says, that (rearing the Coil on its head, it slioultl Is* dmdetl conlbrinalily to him. But it possesses harmony in those parts, as a symbol of the Apolloniacal order. I'or in the lacerations of Bacchus, it is Apollo who collects and unites tin; distributed parts of Bacchus, according to the w ill of the father [JupiterJ. In these mimlreis also, the three middles are com¬ prehended.* These therefore being tlu< i , adumbrate not only in the sold but every where, the three daughters of Themis. And the geometric middle, indeed, is the image of Kimoima. 1 * * * * 6 7 Hence Plato in the Law s s lys, that she adorns polities, and disposes tin m in an orderly man in r, and he liken ise cell hrali s her as the judg¬ ment of Jupiter, adorning the universe, and comprehending tlit true political science. But tin* harmonic middli is an image ol Dice or Justice, distributing a greater ratio to greater, hut a less to lesser terms. This lmwewr is the work ofjiistice. And the ai ithiiu tn al middle is an image ol Peaee. * For it is this, as It Is also said in the Laws, which imparts to alt things tin iipiat aieoiiluig to quantity, and makes peoph at peaee with people. 1 or the solid analogy fi. e. the triplicate proportion] prior to these, is sacred to tin ir mother '1 hemis, who com¬ prehends the powers of all of them. * And thus much universally concerning tin ■sc three limldh s.

1 or the solid analogy fi. e. the triplicate proportion] prior to these, is sacred to tin ir mother '1 hemis, who com¬ prehends the powers of all of them. * And thus much universally concerning tin ■sc three limldh s.

Tin se tlirei middles ’ lunvi ver, may In- said in a w ay adapted to what has Keen before observed, to be the sources of union and connexion to the soul, or in other words, to l*e unions, analogies, and Immls. lienee also limans denominates them bonds. I’or prior to this, he h id said, that the geoim trie middle is the most beautiful ol bonds, and that the other middles are contained in this.* But every bond is a eerlain union. It therefore tin middles are bonds, amt bonds are the unions of the tilings that are hound, that which follow s is e\idenl. Hence thes« pervade through all the essence of the soul, 1 and render it one from many

1 fur r III lilt* |tl.it r, l«l<l iteiifiii} ^,111..

1 I i*. ill llir iiuiiiIm 11 I. .’ 1. I. li. Ilir lirliiliiiii.nl, n» I’iih In* ulrnm - ', »'ili»i»lnii; «*f 1. « Jlii'l I I nr

I. .V unit J. an in arilliiurlit al |iri>|M>rlinii. '1 hr inimhcr* J. uml (i. uml alto 1. uiiil ti. me hi hul- nniuic.il |ir<i|>nrln>ii. Ami llit iiiunher* 1. 2 .1 ami (i. arc m gtouu Itical |>io|uirlu>ii.

1 Instead i>f (vri'iui here, it h in cnuri to luil l.nu/nai

* For triplicate, coiim.-Us nf geometrical |>r<>{>>>r(i<>0, au<l geomclric.il colilam* in ilt< If, n> v*r line brforr •Imwii, ihe arillum lu al, uml I lie li.miuiiiic.il |>r<>|>orlmn ; uml llicrcfmc lri|>liculc, or solid ana¬ logy, comprehend* in itM-lf llir three middle*.

1 Mffforijrri I* omitted III the original.

6 For O' Tovrun lit rf, it is ub\ touslv nftmarv to r«*ad o rovry.

7 The words y*\, f /* uc omitted in the original, but evidently ought to b* inserted.

HOOK 111]

TIM ILLS <>i PLATO

79

1 Mffforijrri I* omitted III the original.

6 For O' Tovrun lit rf, it is ub\ touslv nftmarv to r«*ad o rovry.

7 The words y*\, f /* uc omitted in the original, but evidently ought to b* inserted.

HOOK 111]

TIM ILLS <>i PLATO

79

wholes, as they are allotted a pow< r of binding together tilings of a various nature. A'J however they are three, the geometric inuhile hinds every thing that is essential in souls, For esseiire is one reason, proceeding through all things, and connect¬ ing first, middle, and last natures, just as in the geometric middle, one and the same ratio, pervades pi rtcctly through the tlirei: terms [of whit h the proportion consists]. Hut the harmonic middle connects all the divided sameness of souls, imparting to the extremes a communion of reasons, and a kindred conjunction. And sameness, indeed, is seen in a greater decree in more total, hut in a less decree in more partial natures. And the arithmetical middle l>indstlieall-v ariousdiversitvof the progression ofthe soul, and is less inherent in things which are greater, hut more in such as are less, according to order. Fur difference has dominion in more partial, just as same¬ ness has in more total and more excellent natures. And these two middles have something hy which they communicate with each other, in the same manner as sameness and difference. As essence also is the monad ofthe latter, so the geo¬ metrical middle is the monad ofthe former. The geometric middle, therefore, is the union ot the essences in all the A 1 terms ; the harmonic of the erjually numerous samenesses; and the arithmetical, of the differences.' Hence all these extend through all tin* terms, or how could a certain whole he produced from them, unless they were as much as possible united to each other ? Kssontiallv indeed, hy the geometric middle, hut in another and another wa\ hy the remaining two. On this account also the arithmetical and harmonic middles become the consum¬ mation ofthe geometric middle, in the same manner as sameness and difference, contribute to the perfection of essence. For because the arithmetical and har¬ monic middles subsist oppositely with reference to each other, the geometric middle connects and, as it were, weaves* together their dissention. For the harmonic middle indeed, distributes as we have said, greater ratios to greater terms, and less ratios to less terms; since it evinces that things which arc essen¬ tially greater and more total, are also more comprehensive in power than such as are of an inferior nature. Hut vice versa, the arithmetical middle, distributes less ratios to greater terms, 1ml greater ratios to less terms. For difference prevails more in inferior natures, just as sameness on the contrary, lias greater authority in superior than in inferior natures. And the geometric middle extends the same ratio to all the terms ; imparting by illumination union to first, middle, and last natures, through the presence of essence to all tilings.

And the geometric middle extends the same ratio to all the terms ; imparting by illumination union to first, middle, and last natures, through the presence of essence to all tilings.

The Demiurgus therefore imparts three connective unions to the soul, which Plato denominates middles, as binding together the middle order of wholes.

* It i* litre necessary l« tlie wools t] rwr trrpori |rwr.

* For here, it is necessary lo read rvt

80

PKOCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

And of these, the geometric middle collects the multitude of essences, and causes essential progressions to lie one : for one ratio is the image of union. But the harmonic middle, hinds total samenesses, and the hyparxes of them into one communion. And the arithmetical middle, conjoins first, middle, and last dif¬ ferences. For, in short, diil'erenre is the mother of numbers, as we learn in the Parmenides. These three, however, \i/.. essence, sameness, and dillerenee, are in each part of the soul, and it is requisite to conjoin all of them to each other through a medium and colligative reasons.

In the next place, w e >..) that the soul is a plenitude of reasons, she being more simple than seiisihh-s, hut more composite than intelligihles. Hence imnrus assumes seven ratios m the soul, viz. the ratios of equality, multiplicity, suhumlti- plicity, the sup* rparticular and superjiartient ratios, and the opposites of these, the siihsiijHTpartic.ilar, anil subs.qierpartient, hut not the ratios which are eom- pounded from these. For these are adapted to corpor. a! reasons, since they are composito and partible. The reasons in the soul, however, proceed indeed into multitude and partihility, vet together with multitude, they exhibit simplicity, and the uniform in conjunction w ith a distribution into parts. Hence tin y are not allotted an hypostasis in the monad, and the impartible, in the same manner as intellect. For intellect is alone monadic ami impartible. Nor does the mul¬ titude of them proceed into composite reasons. And multiple ratio indeed is in oneway only partible, viz. according to the proluiitu 1 or greater term : for the hyJ>olo"Os, or less term, is without division, and is not prevented from being unity. But the siiperparticular, is divisible in a twofold respect, viz. according to the prologos and hypologos; hut is impartible according to dillerenee.* And the biqverpartient is partible, both according to the prologos and hypologos, and ac¬ cording to dilh reiice. 1 So that the first of these, is div isihle in one way only, the second hilariously, and the third trifarioiisly. But equality is impartible. Tlie sold therefore constitutes the universe by these ratios ; the cnrporeal-formed nature indeed, by that which is tnl iriously partible; the nature oi superhetes by

But equality is impartible. Tlie sold therefore constitutes the universe by these ratios ; the cnrporeal-formed nature indeed, by that which is tnl iriously partible; the nature oi superhetes by

* Thus for instance, 3 .! to 4 is a multiple ratio, which ill its lowest terms, is that of S to 1 . But J it div isihle, ami 1 accurately speaking is nut. Broclus, therefore, in what he now says, speaks of multiple ratio when reduce*! lo its lowest terms.

1 Thus llie superparlicular ratio of 0 lo 1, o in Hs lowest lerms the rate * f 3 lo , and bolh 3 and J are divisible, dut this latio according to the differ*nee of the terms, is indivisible; for this difler-

tiKC h 1.

t hus for instance, the su|vrrparlieul ratio 3 to 5, which is superhiparticnl, being in Us lowest terms, for this isthe case with all superpartient ratio*, is evidently partible, both according to the pto- logot and hypvlogoi ; and it is al»o partible according to the difference of the terms. For tins dif¬ ference is

BOOK III.]

TIM XUS Ol PLATO.

81

that which is hilariously partible ; every linear nature, hy that which is partible in one way only ; anti hy the impartible the impartihility which comprehends all things. For there is something impartihle in partible natures. These things, therefore, are truly asserted.

81

that which is hilariously partible ; every linear nature, hy that which is partible in one way only ; anti hy the impartible the impartihility which comprehends all things. For there is something impartihle in partible natures. These things, therefore, are truly asserted.

It is necessary however, to survey these after another manner; premising, that mini hers which are more simple, and nearer to the monad, ought to he conceived as more primary than those w hich are more composite. For Plato also. Inn ing arranged one part prior to all the rest, refers all of them to this, and > mis in terms which are especially composite and solid. Having therefore premised this, I say that equality and the ratio of equality, has the relation of a monad to all ratios. And what the monad is in quantity perse, that the equal is in relathe quantity. Hence conformably to this, the soul introduces a common measure to all things which subsist according to the same reasons; which measure likewise, brings with it one idea the image of sameness. But according to the suhmultiple, and multiple ratio, it governs all the whole series of things, connectedly comprehend¬ ing them, and exhibiting each total form of mundane natures frequently produced hy itself m all mundane beings. Thus, for instance, U produces the solar, and also the lunar form, in divine souls, in demoniacal and human souls, in irrational ani¬ mals, in plants, ami in stones themselves, and adorns the most universal genera hy the more partial series. And according to the snperparticular and suhsiiper- particular ratios, it adonis such things as are wholes in their participants, and which are participated according to one certain thing contained in them. But according to the buperpartient and subsuperpartient 1 ratios, it adorns such things as are wholly participated by secondary natures, in conjunction with a division into multitude. For of animal indeed, man participates, and the whole of this form is in him, yet not alone, but the whole is in him according to one thing, t it. the human form; so that it is present to its participant with the whole, and one certain thing w hich is a part of it. But what are called common genera, par¬ ticipate of one genus, yet not of this alone, but together with this of many other genera also, which arc parts, ami not a part of that one genus. Thus, for instance, a mule participates of the species from which it has a co-minglcd generation. Each species, therefore, either participates of one genus according to one, and thus imitates the superparticular ratio w hich contains the w hole, and one part of the whole; or it participates that which is common and many things besides, and thus imitates the superpartient ratio, which together with the whole possesses also many parts of the whole. And besides these there is no other participation of

Tim. Plat. •

1 Xwt-rifitptf as omitted in lb* original.

Von. II.

L

8*2

I'ROCLUS ON THE

And besides these there is no other participation of

Tim. Plat. •

1 Xwt-rifitptf as omitted in lb* original.

Von. II.

L

8*2

I'ROCLUS ON THE

[hook hi.

sjiecies or forms. Looking also to these things, we may be able to assign the specific c uises of those natures which subsist according to one form, as, for in¬ stance, of the sun, the moon, and man ; as likewise of those that subsist according to manv forms, together with that which is common. For there are many things of this kind m the earth, and in the sea; such as animals with a human face and the extremities resembling those of a fish, and animals in the form of dragons, hut with a leonine face; these liming an essence mingled from many things. All these ratios therefore, are \erv properly antecedently comprehended in the soul, as they define all the participations of forms in the universe. Nor ran there be any otlu r ratios of communion besides these, since all things receive a spe< ilic distinction a< cording to tin sc.

All these ratios therefore, are \erv properly antecedently comprehended in the soul, as they define all the participations of forms in the universe. Nor ran there be any otlu r ratios of communion besides these, since all things receive a spe< ilic distinction a< cording to tin sc.

Again, tin n fore, the hebdomad of ratios corresponds to the In hdomad of parts. And the soul is wholly through tin whole of itself hehduinatic, in its parts, in its ratios, and in its circles. For if the demiurgic intellect is n monad, hut the soul primarily proceeds trum intellect, it will have the ratio of the hebdomad to it. For the hebilomail is paternal and motherless. \nd jierhaps equality imparts to all tin 1 psychical ratios, a < imiinuiiioii ot the «ipial, in ordef" that all may commu¬ nicate w it h all. lint tin- multiple ratio a thirds an indication of the manner in w Inch th< ratios that are more single, un asure those that are multitudinous, the form* r w hoilv proei eding through the w hole ot the latter ; those* that are impartible mea¬ suring those that are more distributed into parts. The superparlieular how¬ ever, and siihsiijierpaitit ular ratios, indicate the dillerenec according to which whole ratios tin not eoiiimuim at< with whole, hut ha\e indeed a partial habi¬ tude, yet are conjoined affording to one certain most principal part of tin in- selves. And the siiperpaitieiit and siilisiipiipartunl ratios allord an indica- tioii of the last nature, according to w hich there is a certain partible and mul¬ tiple d communion ot the psychical ratios, on account ot diminution ami infe¬ riority. For the mure elevated of these reasons are united wholly to the whole of cat h other. Hut those of the middle rank are conjoined, not through the w hole of themselves, but according to the highest part. And those of the third rank, partibly coalesce according to multituih s. 1 say, for instance, essence communi¬ cates with all the ratios, measuring all their progressions : for nothing in them is unessential, lint 1 sameness, being itself a genus, especially collects the sum¬ mits of them into one communion. And diflm-ncc particularly measures their divisions and progressions. 1 he communion, thcivlorc, ot the psychical ratios, is every w here 1 exhibited. 1 or it is i it In r all- p< rh 1 1, or alone subsists according to the summits, or according to extensions into multitude.

‘ tor < t bt here, it is nerrssary In r* ait ») be.

1 licit ail of w\>iy in tins jil.nr, il is rcijuisilc to read xn»rax‘>n.

HOOK III]

TIM/EUS or PLATO.

a:i

1 or it is i it In r all- p< rh 1 1, or alone subsists according to the summits, or according to extensions into multitude.

‘ tor < t bt here, it is nerrssary In r* ait ») be.

1 licit ail of w\>iy in tins jil.nr, il is rcijuisilc to read xn»rax‘>n.

HOOK III]

TIM/EUS or PLATO.

a:i

hart her still, in tin 1 next place li t us survey, how tin* seven parts 1 are allotted tlu ir livpn-tasis. Tli.- first part then, is most intellectual and the summit of tli<* soul, conjoining it to tht one itself, and to the hvparxis of tin- first essence. IlfiK'f also it is railed one, as having the form of unity, and the number of it pro- reeding * into multitude, is detained by union. It is likewise analogous to the rauso and centre of the soul. For the soul abides according to this, and does not depart from wholes. And the tetrad indeed, is in the first monads, on arroimt of its stability, and rejoicing in equality and sameness. Hut the ogdoad is m the monads of the second order, on account of diminution, and the prmidrnrc of the soul whirl) extends as far as to the last of things, and that which is most material.’ And the triad is in the monads of the third order, on account of the circumduction to the all-perfect of the multitude w hich it contains. And at the same time, it is evident from these things as from images, that the summit of the soul, though it has the form of unity, yet is not purely one, but this also is an united multitude. Just as the monad, is not indeed without multitude, yet at the same time is unity. Hut the one of tin’ finds is our alone. And the ewe of intellect is more one than multitude, though this also is multiplied. Hut the one of the soul is similarly one and multitude; just as the unity of the natures posterior to it, which are divisible about body, is more multitude than one. And the one of bodies, is not simply one, but the phantasm and image of unitv. Hence the Uean guest, or stranger, sacs that i very tiling corporeal is broki n in pieces, as having an adventitious unity, and never ceasing to be divided. Hut the second part multiplies the part prior to it, by Generative progressions, which the duail indicates, and unfolds all the progressions of essence. Hence it is said to lie double of the first, as imitatin'? the indefinite duad, and the intelligible inlinitv. And the third part again converts all the soul to its principle; and it is the third of it winch is convolved to the principles. This, therefore, is measured by thA first part, as being filled with union from it; but is conjoined more parliallv to the second part. And on this account it is said to be triple of the first, but si-squi- alter of the second ; being half contained indeed bv the second, as not Inning an equal power with it, but perfectly by the first. Hut again, the fourth part ami 1 resides this the fifth, evince that the soul peculiarly presides over secondary natures. Lor these parts are tin* intellectual causes of the iiirorporenis which are divided about bodies, as they are planes and squares; the former being the square of the second, and the latter of the third part. And the fourth part," indeed, is

Lor these parts are tin* intellectual causes of the iiirorporenis which are divided about bodies, as they are planes and squares; the former being the square of the second, and the latter of the third part. And the fourth part," indeed, is

1 Tlir«r *c\cn parls arc line iiiiiiiIkt» I. C. J. 4. 8, 27.

* 'porev >“••>« i* nmiltcd in (lie original.

’ Tor arfjorarov here, 1 rud «»i\orarv*

64

PROCLUb ON THE

[dook 111 .

the cause of progression anil generation, but the fifth, of conversion anil per¬ fection. For both are planes; but one is from the second part, subsisting twice from it, anti the other from the third part, thrice proceeding from it.' And it seems, th it the former of these planes, is imitative 1 of the generative natures which are divi¬ sible about bodies; but that the latter is imitalixe of intellectual conversions.* Forall knowledge converts that which knows to the tiling known; just as every nature wislii- to generate, and to make a progression to that which is inferior. And the sixth and seventh parts, contain in themselves, the primordial causes of bodies and solid masses: for these numbers are solids. And the former ol them, indeed, is lmm the second, but the hitter from the third part. But Plato m what he says convert¬ ing the hi>t to the first parts, and the terminations of the soul to its summit, places one part as octuple, but the other as twenty seven times the first. And thus the essence of the soul consists of seven parts as abiding, proceeding, and returning, and as the cause of the progression and regression of the essences divisible about bodies, and of bodies themselves. If, also, you are willing so to speak, Ilecause the soul is allotted an hypostasis between impartildes and p irtibles, she imitates the former through the triad of the terms, but antecedently assumes the latter from the ti trad. But the w hole of her consists oi all the terms, lieeause the xx hole of her is the centre of wholes. It is possible also to dixide these parts according to tin* duple order, if you assume the summit of the soul, and consider the permanency, progression, and regression* of it, and also the i oiixersioii to it of things proximatelv posterior to it, and the last subjection ol solids, or rather the diminution of tlit* cause of them, according to tin* duple ratio. 1 or you xxill find that the xvliole of this co-ordination pertains to the prolific du id. Blit again the regression of itself to itself, and of the natures proximatelv posterior to it, and of those that rank in the third degree from it, to the uniform and collective essence of w holes, subsist according to the triple order. '1 he arithmetical there¬ fore and harmonic middles, give completion to these intervals, xxliicli are essen¬ tial, and Mirvevcil according to existence itself; some of them as xxc haxe said, binding tlit ir samenesses, tint others their difleretit es.

'1 he arithmetical there¬ fore and harmonic middles, give completion to these intervals, xxliicli are essen¬ tial, and Mirvevcil according to existence itself; some of them as xxc haxe said, binding tlit ir samenesses, tint others their difleretit es.

Farther still you m »y al-u say, in a way more proximate to the things them- v< !xes, that the smd according to one part is united to the natures prior to it, and

' The third part i* 3, and J) u c«|ual to 3 + 3 + 3.

1 I or -><» here, it ij tn*i’es***ir\ l»* IT.id

» Iiistiail ef-, 01 .^«/<u> T,)i ir f v.„. v »i if!-** OJI vJo X i}i «iri<Tr,>orruor 111 this pl*ce, il Is

necessary t« n-j.l i uiifuriil.ihly In I In* xcro.in ol'Tliolun-in, ij it r vr tct(>~r twiorpc yi>vr)T«r), except llul hercabo for it is requisite to rtatl /njjFjnci}.

* 1 here is an omission here hi the original, of it

BOOK III.]

TIM,El'S OF PLATO.

85

this part is the summit of the soul; hut according to the duple and triple part, it proceeds Imm intellect, and returns to it;’ and according to the double of the double, anti the triple of the triple, it proceeds from itself, and attain returns to itself, and through itself a> a medium, to the principles of itself. For through being tilled from these principles it is prolific * of secondary natures. And as indeed, the progression from itself, is suspended from the natures prior to itself, thus also the conversion or regression to itself’ is suspended from the regression of tli*‘ beings that are prior to it. lhit the last parts, according to which it consti¬ tutes the natures posterior to itself, are referred to the first part; in order that a circle without a beginning may hr; unfolded to the view, the end Im mg conjoined to the beginning, and that the universe may become animated, and at the same time endued with intellect, the solid numbers being co-arranged with the first part. Moreover, he says that from these middles, sesquialler and sesipiitcrtian ra¬ tios, and also sesqWioetaves, become apparent. What else, therefore, does he intend to indicate by these things, than the more partial dillerence of the psychical ratios? And the sesquialter ratios indeed present us wit ii an image of partible communion, hut arrording to the first of the parts. The sesipiiterliau ratios, of partible communion according to the middle terms. And tin* sesquioctaves of this communion, according to the last b rms. Hence also, the middles or pro¬ portions arc conjoined to each other, according to the scsipiioetave ratio. For as being surveyed according to opposite genera, they have the smallest communion; hut they are appropriately conjoined to both extremes.

Hence also, the middles or pro¬ portions arc conjoined to each other, according to the scsipiioetave ratio. For as being surveyed according to opposite genera, they have the smallest communion; hut they are appropriately conjoined to both extremes.

1 imams also adds, that all the sesrpiitr rt inn ratios are filled by the interval of the sesquioctave, in conjunction with the leimma ; indicating that the terminations of all tin ■se ratios, end in more partial hypostases, in consequence of the soul com¬ prehending the causes of the last and |>erfectly partible essences in the world, and pre-establishing in itself, the principles of the order and harmony of them, according to the demiurgic \vill. Tin* soul therefore, possesses the principles of

harmonious progression and regression, and of the division into things first, middle and last; and is one intellectual reason or ratio, receiving its completion from all ratios. And again, that all the harmony of the soul, consists of a quadruple diapason, diapente and tone, is consonant to these things, l'or since

* According to the version of Thoniaeui, there is an omission here in the original, of the words vara bt rr)V bcw\aruav vat rfuwXairiar, avo rev rev rpoutr i, ioi rpol airror ixierptijHi. Indeed the sente requirei tbit addition.

* For porvpot in this place, it it necessary to read yonpot.

* The words ovrvt rj eii caiTijr ewnrrpo^ij, which are omitted in the original, ought to be inserted, conformably to the version of Thomaais,

PllOCLUS ON Tin:

[BOOK Ilf.

80

Indeed the sente requirei tbit addition.

* For porvpot in this place, it it necessary to read yonpot.

* The words ovrvt rj eii caiTijr ewnrrpo^ij, which are omitted in the original, ought to be inserted, conformably to the version of Thomaais,

PllOCLUS ON Tin:

[BOOK Ilf.

80

then* is harmony in the world, anil also in intellect ami in soul, on which account Tiina-us says, that the soul participates of harmony, and is harmony,—hence the world participates of harmony decadically, hut the sou! tetradieally, and hannonv pre-exists in intellect monadically. And as the monad is the cause of the tetrad, hut the tetrad of the derail, thus also, the intellectual harmony, is the supplier of the psychical, and the psy< local of sensible harmony. lienee Tiuucus conceived that the quadruple diapason, is adapted to the harmony of the soul. For the soul is the proximate paradigm of the harmony in the sensible world. Since however, live 1 figures and live centres in the universe, give* oomph-lion to the whole, the harmony diapente also, imparts to the world the symphony which is in its parts. Since, likewise, the universe is divided into nine parts, the sesipiioc- tave produces the communion of the soul with the world. And In re von may see that the soul comprehends the world, and makes it to he a whole, according to cause, * as one, as consisting of four, and also of five parts, and as divided into nine parts, harmonizing and causally comprehending the whole of it. For the monad, the tetrad, the pentad, and the ennead, 1 procure for u> the whole numlier, according to which all the parts of the world are divided. Hence the ancients assert that the ."Muses and Apollo .Musageles, preside over the universe; the lat»er supplying the one union ol all its harmony ; hut the former connecting the divided progression of this harmony, and rendering their number concordant with the tight Syrens mentioned in the lb public. I bus therefore, in the middle of the monad and the ennead, the universe is adorned tetradieallv and pentadi- callv ; tetradieally indeed, at < ordmg to the four ideas of animals, which the para¬ digm comprehends; but pentadicallv, according to the live figures, through which the Deiniurgus distributed all tilings, hinis* If, as Tima-iis says, introducing the tilth idea, and arranging this harmonieallv in the universe.

Again therefore from the lieginiiing, we mav sav, that the Demiiirgus having twofold powers, the one being ellective of sameness, as we learn in the Parme¬ nides, hut the other, of diflcrcnce ; he both divides and hinds the soul. He is also the filial cause ol these, m order that the soul mav become the middle of wholes, being similarly united and divided, two tilings existing prior to it, divine natures as unities, and beings as things united ; and two also being posterior to

He is also the filial cause ol these, m order that the soul mav become the middle of wholes, being similarly united and divided, two tilings existing prior to it, divine natures as unities, and beings as things united ; and two also being posterior to

' tor *in ru In-re ri .nl * or«. 'I tn-M- live li^uri-j arc tin toe regular limlies, viz llir ilmli-c.ilirilron, t lie |i\ r uni I, llir inl.ilntlinn, tin ii ii'.ilitilrmt, .uni llir iiitu- tint I lie loo iililri'i .10 tin- linrtlirrn, smith* 01, 1 .oli 111, nnl hi 'Ii ru r« nlie-i, him I lln «< nfrr nl tin- imivrr>r.

1 rmii lln- n r.inii nl I limn 111 >, it o in.-* i-'>;irv In iii'i-it in tlio tin unriU, ij 4- v \ r J rvr o-oyior

wtfin yn, mi n\i ►- mir inrun worn, v, tin ii are wanting in 1 lie nominal.

* l'nr <1 ru lirrr, rt jit iioui

TOOK lll.J

TIM AX’S OF l’LATO.

H7

1 rmii lln- n r.inii nl I limn 111 >, it o in.-* i-'>;irv In iii'i-it in tlio tin unriU, ij 4- v \ r J rvr o-oyior

wtfin yn, mi n\i ►- mir inrun worn, v, tin ii are wanting in 1 lie nominal.

* l'nr <1 ru lirrr, rt jit iioui

TOOK lll.J

TIM AX’S OF l’LATO.

H7

it, viz. those which are divided in conjunction with others.' ami those which are m every respect partilile. or it you are w illin'; prior to the former, the one itself, hut posterior to the latter, matter itself, tlint the efficient causes of these divisions and bonds, are .vow and different , which arc the jm niliarith s of the demiurgic order. And the paradigmatic causes are tin* sections and bonds of the father. For he’ first cuts, and binds with ineffable bonds. These things also, arc obscurely indicated hy thco/ngixfs when they speak if the Saturnian sections and bonds with which the niaKer of tin unirtrst is said In surround himself, and which arc mentioned by Socrates hi the ( latylns. Hut the lonual causes of the divisions indeed, are the numbers, for according to these the parts are distinguished. Hut of tin; bonds, the middles, and flu* ratios which give completion to these, are tin* formal causes. I’or it is impossible to survey concanses which have the relation of matter, in souls which are incorporeal.]* r \ hese things lieinjg premised, it is evident that the Pemiurgus energizing with twofold powers, viz. with such as are of a dividing, and such as are o| a binding nature, he divides (he tnformed essence of the soul, and the tore* told mixture, the whole remaining that which it is, by the primordial causes ot all div ision, and makes the vv hole of it to consist of scv< n parts, and seven niembeis, comprehended in intellectual boundaries. For since tjie Pemiurgus constituted the soul as tin* medium between an impartible essence, and that essence which is divisible about bodies; but the impartible essence is triple, abiding, pro¬ ceeding, and returning he pre-established the similitude of this in three parts. And lie adumbrated indeed, tin; permanency 4 of this essence bv the first part; but the progression of it by the second ; on which account, perhaps, it is said to be double ot the first part. l*or every tiling which proceeds, has permanency pre-existent to its progression. And he adumbrated its regression by the third part. Hence this part is triple of the first. For every thing which returns, lias proceeded and been permanent.

Since, however, the soul produces the essence posterior to itself, it contains the total essences ot it in itself; the whole of the incorporeal essence indeed, but which is inseparable trom bodies, according to the fourth ami fifth part; but the

The words fi'r qAAm? are omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted conformably to the version of Thomarus.

For onniv here, read mnoi. The Chaldean Oracles also sav that the Demmrgus glitters with intellectual sections.

are omitted in the original, but ought to be inserted conformably to the version of Thomarus.

For onniv here, read mnoi. The Chaldean Oracles also sav that the Demmrgus glitters with intellectual sections.

All this part within the brackets, is omitted m the version of I'hoiuarus, with whom such omissions arc not unfrnjuent.

# For yon/me here, it is necessary to read ftovtftor.

1 Instead of oAij« here, read oAai.

8ft

PttOCLUS ON THK

[dour III.

mhole of the corporeal essence, Recording to the solid nmnliers, viz. the sixth and seventh part. Or [it may 1m- said] that the soul being self-siihsMrnt, and self- energetic, produces itself and converts itself to its principle, according to the square numbers ; hut all the partible ess,-nee posterior to itself according to the culs-s. These seven parts therefore, being divided as we have said, into three and four, the one ratio of geometric analogy, hinds them essentially ; hut the harmonic middle, hinds them according to sameness; and the arithmetical according to difference. These parts however are inserted between the "enmetrii: middle, and are said to give eonipletiou t.i the double and triple intervals ;* heeaiwc all sameness anti all ditl'erence, arc uniformly compn ln nded by essence, and the harmony which subsists according to it. Hut from these middles, the multitude of sesquialter and sestjuitertian ratios, and seMpuoctaves, becomes apparent, this multitude indeed, being of a binding and connecting nature, in the same manner as the middles, but more partially, l or these indeed, are certain ratios; but each of the middles consists of many ratios, which are either the same or diflerent. As analogy then fore, or proportion, is more comprehensive than ratio, thus also the above-mentioned middh-s, allurd a greater cause to the soul, of cornua t* ) con¬ taining the multitude which is in it, since they ini* lU-ctually pi rvaile* through the whole of it. Hence the sesijuialler, and sesquitertian ratios, » r ' ceitain more partial bonds, and an- comprehended in the middles; not accord ng to d liferent habitudes of them with reference to the extremes; Ibr this is mathematical; but according to causal comprehension, and a more total hypostasis.

Hence the sesijuialler, and sesquitertian ratios, » r ' ceitain more partial bonds, and an- comprehended in the middles; not accord ng to d liferent habitudes of them with reference to the extremes; Ibr this is mathematical; but according to causal comprehension, and a more total hypostasis.

Again, these bonds, contain the second and third progressions of the ratios; the sesipiialter indeed, conslringing the harmony ol the ratios, through the live centres; hut the sesipiitertian exhibiting their power, through the four elements ■which are everywhere; and rendering all things intelligible and allied to each other; and tlu- seMpiioctaves co-harmonizing the division into !> and ft. Hence, as the world consists of eight parts, and also of nine, the am ieiils.at one time establish right Syrens, and at another nine Muses, as presiding over the universe. Min e the harmony of the whole of things proceeds from these. I he m-stpiilerliun there¬ fore, and sesqmalter ratios, are more total than the ses.piioctaves, bi-cai se they are the suppliers of a more pei fe.t symphony, and antecedently comprehend in less numbers, the harmonious section ol the world. Here therefore, the divisions are separated from each other in their parti* ipauts; hut in the incorporeal reasons

• Tin- irvrn term* I 3. V «>. 8. J7, are raid t>\ P.oclun to t»e inserted between the geometric Dint- die, became I 2. 4 8. and also J. 0. ?7, are in geometric |>ro|toil«>n.

1 f or bocovva* here, read 7o;»oi-»«e

UOOE III.]

TJM.EUS Of i’LATO.

V «>. 8. J7, are raid t>\ P.oclun to t»e inserted between the geometric Dint- die, became I 2. 4 8. and also J. 0. ?7, are in geometric |>ro|toil«>n.

1 f or bocovva* here, read 7o;»oi-»«e

UOOE III.]

TJM.EUS Of i’LATO.

of the soul, the more'total contain the more partial. Since, however, the srsquior- taves are the muses of the mo-t partial symphony, that uhic.li is posterior to them is not undeservedly said to he imp< lied into the la^t order of the univi rse. j\ot that even this is dissonant to the whole itself, since it compels ihe partial rfliuxinns from each of the elements, into the place under the earth. Tor as the elements exist in many places, in the heavens, and in the sublunary region, this biuinia collects the last dregs of them there, and conjoins them to wholes ; so that Imtli together may give completion to the whole harmony of the universe. In short, theretore, the soul is the cause 1 * * 4 of all the harmony in the centres, and hi the elements of the universe. Ilem e also we say, that the harmony of it is entirely intellectual and essential, causally preceding sensible harmony. And Tinueus wishing to indicate this through images,* employs harmonic ratios, and pre-sup- poses in the soul some causes more comprehensive than others, and which subsist prior to every form of the soul ami to all its knowledge. lienee I think it is not proper to discuss any thing of this kind, so as to explain [in a merely mathematical wa\] either tin* parts, or the ratios, or the analogies; hut it is requisite to survey all these essentially, according to the first division itself, and harmony of the soul. It is also necessary to refer all things to the demiurgic and intellectual cause; but to comprehend the sesquioelaves and leimmas in the srsquitertian and si squialter ratios ; tin se in the middles ; and these in one of them which is the most principal of all ; and likewise to reduce the more partial to the more total causes, and sur¬ vey them divided from them. And thus much concerning the harmonic ratios, lint again adducing the text from the beginning, let us endeavour to discuss it more clearly.

“ lie first took one part from the whole. In the next place he took away the double of this. And after this, a third part, which was sesqui- alter indeed of the second, but triple of the first."

We hate before observed, that it is not proper to until rstand what is here said by Plato, lnathematieallv, but phvsicallv, or plul osopbically. For the essence of the soul, does not con.-ist of mathematical numbers ami ratios, but all these numbers and ratios, adumbrate its truly 1 existing essence, ami the demiurgic ami vivific divisions in it. llut of what things the mathematical ratios are images,*

1 The words rj v-i'X’J n,ria e<rn, arc omitted in llic original.

* For rtriruv here, il i>> necessary to read n.i i ui .

1 Instead of cvrwt in this place, it is requisite to read orr*n.

llut of what things the mathematical ratios are images,*

1 The words rj v-i'X’J n,ria e<rn, arc omitted in llic original.

* For rtriruv here, il i>> necessary to read n.i i ui .

1 Instead of cvrwt in this place, it is requisite to read orr*n.

4 For tutorvt here, it if necessary to read #«« occ«.

VOL. II.

'J im. Plat.

M

IK)

IMIOCLUS ON Ti!li

[hook hi*

am! how they develope tin* essence of iheboid of the universe, it is not easy for those to assign, who do not look to the conception*! of Plato. But this is mani¬ fest from the discord of the interpreters; ami the opposition of the modern to the more iiin'ieiit expositors, e\ Hires the dilliciilt) of tins theory. I or some of them think fit to li ter to the se\eil spheres, the lit st seven terms, to w hull \ve have us- mimeil ns analogous the iiiiiiiIsts that exhibit the whole diagiam. But otlw is

refer tin III to tin* 1 11st allies 11 1 the spheres from the relit re ol the earth, III W 1 1 ii 1 1 place the) arrange the monad. Others again, refer them to the motions of the spheres. [()thers, to the magnitudes of tin* stars. And others adapt them to the xeloeities of the celestial orbs.]’ But others, refer them to other such like expla¬ nations. '1'ln ir interpretations lion ex er, are attended xxitli inanx difficulties, and aiming the rest xxitli this, that they are discordant xxitli the observations of recent astronomers, and to the demonstrations given bx them. lo xxhicli also may he added, that Plato no where defines, either the magnitude, or the distance, or tin* swiftness, or the motion of the stars ; hut admitting that one star is greater than another, he tloes not add how much, and atti r xxliat manner, it i> greater. Anil that the thing proposed by him to be discussed m this part, is psychogony, and not cosmogony. For though it is requisite to eflect the same tilings, in a certain respect, in the soul, and in the world ; vet it is proper first to survey *he powers in tin* soul itself, ami flit* reasons of the things which are eflected external to it. But their explanation of the terms or numbers given by Plato, is especially contrary to them, l'or in the terms, that xxlucli lias the tilth order, is greater than the sixth, as for instance, ft than ».* In what they say, however, the fifth magnitude, or interval, or whatever they wish to call it, is entirely less than the sixth. Their expositions, therefore, do not accord with the Platonic terms.

Their expositions, therefore, do not accord with the Platonic terms.

After these, there is another trilie of interpreters, who give a more important explanation of these partii ulars. l'or Amelins not adopting the opinion,—which he saxs was that of Plotinus, xxas delivered by him, in Ins unwritten or oral con- fercnees, and has been siitlii ieiitl) confuted bx those posterior to him,*—endea¬ vours to explain these terms after anotln r manner. l'or since tin* soul is compre¬ hensive of all mundane natures, as for instance of (_«ods, tla-mons, and men; lie says, that in one wav it comprehends according to the monad, every mundane

* The word* wit inn the hraikets are wauling in the original, ami are inserted from the version of Leitnieus Tlnmiirus.

* Fur w< rrooy here, read irftvrtpoy

* For €i-Tu)ut here, it is necesiar) to read oirahii.

* l lie beginning uf this sentence is wanting in the original, but is supplied from the version of Thoiuicus.

>1 ' M > U III ]

TIM.T.US OF PLATO.

91

"finis of Gods; nor must we wonder, if the soul should lie said to l>e compre- hensive of Gods. This opinion, therefore, some one of those posterior to Ann 1ms refer to him. For find is multifariously predicated, since not only the super- essential and intellect are called Cods, hut likewise dome souls, anil divine bodies. lie is therefore of opinion, that the soul of the universe comprehends according to its unity the divine number; but according to its duad and triad, the d.emomacal genus. For since daemons are suspended from the Cods, and preside out us, this soul, according to the duad, excites the providence of them; but perfects, according to the triad, the conversion of them to the Cods. For, as we have said, the habitude of them is twofold, because they are between the Gods and us. But according to the tetrad and ennead, it providentially attends to all human life. For this also is tw ofold, being divided into the Iretter ami the worse. And by the ennead indeed, it adorns the more excellent, but by the tetrad arranges the subordinate life, lastly, by the oetad and the number twenty-seven, it proceeds to every thin", and as tar a> to the last of things, anti perfects tame animals by the odd, but savage animals bv the even numl>er. For it adorns each thin” by appropriate powers; subordinate natures, every where by ev< nnumbers, but more venerable and powerful natures, and which in a "renter decree are allied to the finds, by odd uumls-rs.

For it adorns each thin” by appropriate powers; subordinate natures, every where by ev< nnumbers, but more venerable and powerful natures, and which in a "renter decree are allied to the finds, by odd uumls-rs.

Porphyry, however, after a certain admirable manner, (though these things have been before related) evinces by many arguments, that the soul is harmom/ed, and that it tills the whole world with harmony. Blithe infers this from the soul hein" a multitude. Being however a multitude, it is either witliout arrangement, or is hannoni/.ed. But it is true to assert the latter of it, and not the former. For being the faoricalion of intellect, how can it be inordinate, and unharmonized ? 1 Ie also infers it from this, that the soul conducts every thin" in the world by harmonic reasons, and refers the generation of animals, and the one co-ordination of them, to the universe. What, however, these reasons are, which are st*eii to subsist in the very hy postasis of the soul, he neither teaches, nor thinks them deserving of attention; but says that the essence of the soul possesses m itself harmonic reasons, not as the images of some things, and the principles of others, but as binding together the multitude of powers it contains. For it it is in reality not only impartible, but also partible, it is not only necessary that its csst-nce should l>e vine, but likewise that it should l»e multitudinous. But if multitudinous it must either be innumerable, or numerable. It is impossible, however, that it should lie innumerable. For an innumerable multitude is inordinate. It is therefore numerable. But if numerable, • it either consists of tiuharmoni/cd or of harmonized parts. It is however impossible that it should consist of unbar*

in

IMtOCIX’S ON THE

[book III

nionized parts: for it lias not any thin*; of this himl naturally. It therefore entire¬ ly consists of harmonized parts ; hut if of harmonized parts it must necessarily subsist according to the most excellent harmony, since it is the first of things harmonized. The most excellent harmony however, is that which is according to the diatonic genus: lor this is venerable, abundant, and grand. Hence, the soul is entirely harmonized conformably to this ; so that its essence vvi 11 consist ol parts harmonized according to the diatonic genus. These- things, however, being true, nothing prevents the harmonic ratios from being at the same time images ol certain

divine things ; just as the body of this soul is indeed spherical, yet through its

sphericity, is said to be an imitation ol intellei t, and these things accord w ith each other. And thus far Porphyry, who, in what he here says, allords us an oc< asion of collecting something true concerning the soul

And thus far Porphyry, who, in what he here says, allords us an oc< asion of collecting something true concerning the soul

IJnf the divine lauiblichiis celebrates these numbers with all his power, as ex¬ hibitin'' - certain admirable peculiarities. And he calls indeed the monad, the cau-e ofsanieiu» uni union ; the iluad, the supplier of progression and separation; and the triad the leader of the regression of the things that have proceeded. lie aUo >avs, that the te»rad is truly all-harmonic, containing all ratios in its< If, and unfolding in itself the second orderly distribution of things; and that the euuead is effective of true perfection and similitude, being perfeet from pet feet numbers, and participating of the nature ol sameness. But ho calls the ogdoad, the rinse of universal progression, and of pervading through all tilings. Lastly, he says, that the number twenty-seven is ef¬ fective of tin- regression nt tin last of things to the lirst, in order that on ouch side ot the tetrad, there may he permanency, progression, and regression, there primarily, hut here secondarily. For the ennead has ail alliance to the monad, bi > iu ,r it iwu.’ one (*v y!ov c>a a ); hut the ogdoad to the duad, being the cube of it, ami the number twenty-seven, to the triad, through a similar cause. Through the former numbers therefore, the soul imparts to more simple natures, permanencie s, progressions, and regressions, but through the latter it imparts these to more com¬ posite natures. But tlie tetrad being the middle, because indeed, it is a square, lias permanency ; but because it is eveiily-even, lias progression ; and because it is tilled with all ratios from the monad, has regression. 'I In se, however, are symbols of divine and arcane things.

After this explanation, which i v thus admirable, the philosopher I heodorus, proceeding in a certain path peculiar to himsclt, say s, that the soul is tin* third principle after the one principle of all things, one soul lieing fontul, another uni¬ versal. and another the soul of this universe, lie also says, that the lir^t ol these is indivisihle, the second divisible, and that the third possesses all-various divi¬ sions. Since therefore, there is a triple difference of soul, that which is soul itself

BOOK III ]

TINLFA’b OF PLATO.

03

and another the soul of this universe, lie also says, that the lir^t ol these is indivisihle, the second divisible, and that the third possesses all-various divi¬ sions. Since therefore, there is a triple difference of soul, that which is soul itself

BOOK III ]

TINLFA’b OF PLATO.

03

and is fontal, subsists between the impartible ami partible essence; of which the former is universal intellect, but the latter is divisible into atoms. Hence the first soul is the medium between these, as subsisting from both which are prior to it, and becoming one whole from the three middle genera. Hut the second, and which is universal kind, is divided into parts, and is harmonized For the first soul, abiding wholly in itself, a division is produced, which is a progression from the soul that is a whole prior to parts, into the soul that consists of parts. And the third soul is that which is fabricated through right lines and circles. Form this the division manifests a diminution from that soul which is a whole prior to parts. Hence he divides the whole of this discussion concerning the psychogony into three parts, conformably to the three souls that have been mentioned; one subsisting according to the mingling, another according to the harmonizing, and another according to the forming energy of intellect. Having therefore, made this division of the psychogony and souls, he considers the distribution into parts, and the seven terms, as alone pertaining to the universal soul. Re¬ ferring likewise thc-a» terms to the division of the universal soul, lie thinks it necessary that celestial natures should be produced bv this soul from the duple, but sublunary natures from the triple order. For he distributes appropriati num¬ bers to each of the elements, to earth indeed 7, to tire II, to water!), and to air 13. For the geometrical.proportion, which is l, 2, 4 [and the sum of the lernisof which is 7] pertains to earth ; perhaps indeed on account of the name ; and jrcr- liaps also, because' as e-art h contains tbe remaining elements, so tin- geometric comprehends the' other middles. Hut the arithmetical proportion which pertains to wate r, is ‘2. 3. 4; through ‘2 communicating with earth, and be cause likewise, it is especially friendly to multitude, and consists of an element which is the most multitudinous of all others, viz. the* icosaedron. And theharmonieal proportion, which pertains to air, is 3. Lti; because this communicates with the arithmetical, according to two of its te*rins 3 anil I, which are the greater in the former, but the less terms m the* latter, proportion. Since, however, the' harmonic middle is (wo- fold, consisting e it tier in the* duple* ratio of the* extremes, or in the* triple- ratio ; lor Plato assumes it as the middle of either duple* or triple* terms;—hence, making the e'xtivmes to be 3 and <>, according to tbe double* <*f the extremes, [i. e. accord¬ ing to a duple* ratio] he* obtains the* peculiar element of the air, viz. the ortaedron, which has 0 according to the* angles, but 4 according to the base of the* two pyra¬ mids, ami 3 according to the superficies of the nrtnedmn, which is trigonir. But according to the other harmonic middle, which is 2. 3. he obtains the ele¬ ment of fire; U'causo these? according to the two tonus 3 and (i communicate with the tonus prior to them [3. 4. 6], which are there the extremes, but are here the

But according to the other harmonic middle, which is 2. 3. he obtains the ele¬ ment of fire; U'causo these? according to the two tonus 3 and (i communicate with the tonus prior to them [3. 4. 6], which are there the extremes, but are here the

94

PROCLUS ON TIIK

[BOOK III.

greater terms; and moreover, because the element of fire has 0 sides, but twice the tetrad, in its angles and HiijR-rficies, and a triangular base. Very properly, therefore, does 7 pertain to earth, 9 to water, 13 to air, but 11 to fire; the ratios being assumed iu the above-mentioned numljers, from which they are pro¬ duced. For 7 consists of 1. 2. and 4 ; 9, of 2. 3. and 4 ; 13, of 3. 4. and (J; and 11, of 2. 3. and 6; each having two terms in common with the number next to it, just as the elements have two sides in common. From the composition how¬ ever of these, a triple order is effected. And of the middle terms of the propor¬ tions proximate to each other, the one is gn atcr than the other, which is also the case with the extremes, as is evident in earth and water, and in fire and air,* as is evident in the given terms. Again, he attributes the iuiiiiIm r 15 to celestial natures; the monad indeed, to the crcle of same, but the double hebdomad to the circle of different, on account of the twofold circulation of each, viz. of the spheres themselves, and the stars contained in them, which are seven, the spheres being also seven. These things, how ever, which are mathematically asserted, bring with them a certain not inelegant theory, lhit how they are assimilated to the things which are now discussed, and how they may Is* Py thagorieally interpreted, is not at all noticed by Theodorus, in stu h a way as to be able to satisfy him who does not negligently attend to what Plato siys. All these particulars are indeed ele¬ gantly invented, but ho refers the analy sis of the Platonic diagram to monadic ntmiliers, not looking to the ratios resulting from them, so as to assume every¬ thing, viz. the middles, the sesiptialtcr ami sesipiitertian ratios, the sesipiioctaves and leiminas ; it being by no means possible to diseovi r these m tin* first num¬ bers, which he emplovs iu the above-mentioned distributions, into the elements and tin heavens.

the middles, the sesiptialtcr ami sesipiitertian ratios, the sesipiioctaves and leiminas ; it being by no means possible to diseovi r these m tin* first num¬ bers, which he emplovs iu the above-mentioned distributions, into the elements and tin heavens.

After these, therefore, let us survey another mode of dismission, which is adopted by our preceptor, is generative not of one only, but of many and admir¬ able conceptions, and which we also made use of liefore. lie says then, that each of these things may be considered iu a twofold respect, in the w hole soul of the universe as one, according to union, and m the many ratios, and in ihe multitude contained in it, according to division. For the soul is both one ami multitude, one reason, and the numlier of all-various forms, and imitalesthe demiurgic whole¬ ness, and the* separation of the powers of the father. In the first place, tin re fore, we must understand what it is according to the whole of itself, abiding, and pro-

• Thus tu the nunilrt r* 1 i. 4, w Inch |>ertain lo chi ill, and in 2. 3. 4, w hit h pertain to water, t lie mid¬ dle term 3 ii greater than the middle term 2, and lint is also the case in I lie niiiuhers 3. 4 and 2 I, ft, the former of which pertain I j air, and the latter to fire. In the extremes also, the extreme 2 is greater than 1, aud the extreme 3, than g.

BOOK lit.]

TIM.FATS OF PLATO.

U.l

4 and 2 I, ft, the former of which pertain I j air, and the latter to fire. In the extremes also, the extreme 2 is greater than 1, aud the extreme 3, than g.

BOOK lit.]

TIM.FATS OF PLATO.

U.l

ceeding in itself, ami returning to itself, and also providentially attending in one way to the immaterial and pure forms of mundane natures, hut in another to all bodic s, and the partible essence. Understanding this likewise, we must say, that it abides according to the run: or first part; but proceeds according to the second, the progression being conceived to l>e divine, and not according to passion or imbecility; and that it returns according to the third part. For the perfective accedes to beings from this. Hut being all-jM'rfrct, and established* in iutelligi- Idcs, and abiding eternally in intellect, it also providentially attends to secondary natures. And in one way indeed, it providentially inspects the natures that are proximate Iy suspended from it, hut in another, solid masses themselves. It like¬ wise attends to each of these in a two-fold respect. For tin* natures which proxi¬ mate!) participate of it proceed from, and return to it; proceeding indeed, ac¬ cording to the prolific power of the fourth part, but returning to their one cause, according to the re-elevating power of the fifth part. We may also survey these solid numbers in corporeal masses; which proceed indeed, according to the octu¬ ple of the lir-t part, this numlier Iveing dyadic and solid, and at one ami the same time prolific, and capable of proceeding to all things ; hut they return according to the number twenty-seven, this being a solid conversion, as triadic, and as per¬ taining to the nature of sameness. For such is the odd number. Hence, there are three progressions, ami three regressions, about the one and united perma¬ nency of the soul. Hence too, there are three even and three odd numbers, proceeding from the monad, and complicated with each other; because the sold itself abo proceeds, and returns. And proceeding indeed, it produces the first receptacles of itself, and that whic h is primarily invested with figure. Producing it also, it imparts interval to it and bulk. Put in its regression to itself, it causes it to be spherical, and on this account causing it to be a thing of this kind, it produces the world in it; ellerting the progression of it according to the even • number, but the regression according to the odd number, and both these cubic- ally, lieeause it is the generation and regression of solids. The progression therefore, and regression are triple; the first being unligured, the second accom¬ panied with figure primarily, and the* third secondarily; but ail these as in numbers.

In the next place, we must pursue the theory, conformably to the multitude which is in the soul, and say that the ratios in it are comprehensive of ratios.

■ For twcpryitvifv here, read triipKp o-ijr.

In the next place, we must pursue the theory, conformably to the multitude which is in the soul, and say that the ratios in it are comprehensive of ratios.

■ For twcpryitvifv here, read triipKp o-ijr.

* For apuKvi ill (Inn place, read apr iarwi.

* It is occeaury here io mpply (he word* rpwrm, ( it.

96

PROCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

And some of them indeed, are divided in it, after the manner of wholes, hut others after the manner of parts.* And some are total, others generic, others specific, and others partial. The total indeed, are such as the ratios of the middles ; but the generic, are those which are found in the duple, or triple terms; and the tqseeific, are those which are under these.* For each of them has a multifarious subsistence. Hut the partial ratios are those of the sesquioctaves and leimmas, into which, as parts, all the sesijuialter ami sesipiitertian ratios are di¬ vided. We must also say, that the soul cont tins tin one union of the ratios, through the essential monad ; but the diiision of the ratios, through the* progression of the duael ; ami the comprehension of them , 1 through the multiple terms. I'or these are comprehensive of the super particular ratios, and have an essence more total than these ratios; just as the super-particulars comprehend the sesqtiinckives ami leimmas; the former having the relation of species, but the latter being arranged in the order of parts. ] or to make the geometrical proportion alone comprehensive of the other two middles, m the first place, causes the whole essence of the soul to be as it were demiurgic geometry. For elsew here, Plato calls this analogy the judgment of Jupiter. In tin next place, it show s that these two mid¬ dles, when surveyed with the geometric middle, and comprehended m it, dispose wholes in an ordi rlv manner according to justice; but that when separated from it, they are the causes of confusion ami iuju-ti« e. For a distribution of tin* equal to things unequal, is entirely unjust; as is aho, the conjunction of eontraries to inch other, without a certain geoinetrieal equality Hence tin* harmonic middle is in w ant of the geometric analogy, in order that it may bring together contraries elegantly, just as Plato did, m harmonizing lire and earth, through tin* two elements [of tnr and water]. Jin* arithmetical middle likewise, energizing together with this, possesses rectitude in its operations. For thus the unequal in uiu*qual things is equal.* Distributing therefore equals to iiiiequals, it preserves tin* peculiarity of itself, and exhibits distribution according to desert, which is the prerogative of the geometric middle.

Farther still, we must say, that the soul imitates the first principles of things.

' For firpi here, it n ubuuuslv necessary to read utpvr.

* i. e. They are llie livpologi, uliuh have been before explained.

Farther still, we must say, that the soul imitates the first principles of things.

' For firpi here, it n ubuuuslv necessary to read utpvr.

* i. e. They are llie livpologi, uliuh have been before explained.

* llctweeii Am and rcWaiXurnuH lure in I lie original, st is necessary 1o insert, conformably to the version of Tlloinxus, the words rrjv fen ?m -roiintov, ij Ae rue Auyue irepio^ij Am. e. A.

* Thus in the terms 1 2. 3 0, wlinli are in geometric pioporliou, the terms 1. 2. 3 also being in arithmetic proportion, the difference is uni rpial between the terms 2 and 3. and the terms 3 and fi, and also between the ternib 1 and ?, and 3 arid t>, but the ratio is ecpial ; and therefore, by the union of the arithmetic with the geometric middle, the unequal in unequal numbers is equalized.

book III.]

TIMfEUS OF PLATO.

97

Through the first part indeed, the one cause of wholes; through the duple pro¬ gression, the Informed principles after the one; through the even and odd num hers, tht' male and female of the Gods; through the triadic division of each, the intelligible triads; and through the hebdomad of terms, the unical and intellec¬ tual hebdomad. Through the first part also the soul makes ’ the world to be a self-perfect God; through the dyadic it exhibits the multitude and variety in it; through the division of even and odd numbers, it divides the whole of the male and female, from the Gods themselves as far as to plants ; according to the duad and triad indeed, the male and female in tli*' Gods, but according to the tetrad and ennead, those which are in the genera superior to us ; and according to the two cubes, [0 and *27] the male and female which proceed as far as to the teries- trial and ultimate * species of life. But through the heptad of terms, it connects and guards all things, provides for them intellectually, and orderly disposes wholes in a becoming manner, stably and invariably. It likewise through this, adorns the parts of these, and the parts of the parts, and whatever there may be among the last of things, which is of itself irrational, and as it were the leinuna of the fabrication of the world. Hence conformably to these conceptions, we may be able to interpret the several words of Plato, and looking to these we may dissolve many doubts. Ijet us therefore from the beginning refer the words of Plato severally to these, according to the explications of our preceptor.

Hence conformably to these conceptions, we may be able to interpret the several words of Plato, and looking to these we may dissolve many doubts. Ijet us therefore from the beginning refer the words of Plato severally to these, according to the explications of our preceptor.

In the first place therefore, not to say that the Demiurgus inserted the parts in the soul, but that he took them away from it as being already* in it, and that having taken them away, he again gave completion to the essence of the soul from them, indicates to us, that this mixture is not as it were the subject of the soul, nor as the matter of it, or that it is similar to that which is invested with figure, ami receives this figure from the artist; but that being a form, it is the plenitude of forms; so that the indefiniteness and the matter, which are said by the more recent interpreters to Im- in intelligibles, have no place in the present theory. Secondly, to co-arrange all the other parts, viz. the terms, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8 and ‘27 with reference to the first part, ascribes the principal dignity to the monad, and does not permit us to conceive it to be such a thing, as the multitude fancy the monad to be, viz. that which is the least in quantity, and having the relation of matter to number, but leads us to consider it as the ruling principle of all the essence of the soul, as the root of the powers contained in it, and the Vesta of the

* Tor KaXn here, it is arrcuan to read rottt.

* Instead of yfcmir in tins place, at ^tp<rai is just before it, I conceive it to be obviously necessary to read re^orwe,

* Instead of ij?*i here, it is necessary to read ifXij.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II.

N

98

PROCLUS ON THE

[book III.

* Instead of yfcmir in tins place, at ^tp<rai is just before it, I conceive it to be obviously necessary to read re^orwe,

* Instead of ij?*i here, it is necessary to read ifXij.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II.

N

98

PROCLUS ON THE

[book III.

numl*r which gives completion to it. In the next place, does not the expression the double of the first part, accord with what has been said by us ? lor the double is entirely formed by the duad, and is inferior to the hyparxis which is charac¬ terized by unity. It also proceeds into multitude, lieing increased in quantity, but diminished in power. Such also is the mode of the psychical progression. For the soul abiding according to the most divine part of itself, and as Orpheus says, establishing its head in intellect, it proceeds from thence, according to the duad in itself, proceeding into itself, and generating the multitude of reasons, and all-various forms which it contains. II lving proceeded however, it again returns to its principle, thus producing a certain essential circle. Through this regression likewise, it is conjoined to the prolific power in itself, according to which it pro¬ duced itself, and to the monad which establishes it, and causes it to be one. 1 or the perfective and convertive power, is conjoined to both, vi/. to the prolific and to the one-making cause. And it it be rcipiisite to speak concisely, as hie pro¬ ceeds from being, but intellect is conjoined to life, and to being, thus also tin- progression of the soul, is from the prolific cause, but its regression is to both causes; in a sesipiialter manner indeed to the cause which is [immediately] above it; but triplv to the cause which is beyond this. 1 or it is tit that the convertive or regressive form should pursue the whole [of that to whn h it returns] and diminish division, which the ses.piiuller imparts. For the double b. ing vanquished through the whole of itself by the duad, the sesipiialter is indeed analogous to it, but diminisht s the ratio of suhjet lion. 1

For the double b. ing vanquished through the whole of itself by the duad, the sesipiialter is indeed analogous to it, but diminisht s the ratio of suhjet lion. 1

Farther still, it is evident that the triple exhibits the third interval in that whit h returns from tin* abiding principle. To which may In* added, th.it the triad fx-mg the first manlier, and primarily a whole, having a beginning, middle and end, is assimilated to the monad, which comprehends all multitude imieally. through this therefore, l*lato shows, that the subject of the soul consisting of three wholes, is again triple. For hi* divides it into the abiding, proceeding, and returning, according to the division of the divine genera. For in them also there is a triple genera, one of which abides, another proceeds, and another is converted, or returns to its principle. And one indeed is the cause of sameness, stable power, and essence; another, is tin* primary leader of generations, progressions, and multiplications; and another, is perfective, and the cause of the elevation of secondary to primary natures. But through the words that follow, he shows how

• Thus 2 to 1 is a ami 3 lo '2 is a sesquialter ratio. But the fatter is analogous to llie former :

for 2 : 1 ::3: ’. The sesquiafter however diminishes the ratio of subjection. For 2 contains 1 twice, but 3 contains 2 only once and one half of 2 besides.

BOOK III ]

TIMJEUS OF PLATO.

99

the soul adorns secondary natures, according to the very essence of itself. For prior to the soul imparting powers or energies, he demonstrates that it contains these ratios in itself, from which, and through which it governs, the first partici¬ pants of itself, and such things as are adorned by it, according to a second sepa¬ ration from it; itself indeed, having wholly the relation 1 of a monad, hut the} imitating its* progressions and regressions. For the soul prior to them, proceeds indeed dyadieally, hut is converted triadically. And the whole of it indeed that proceeds, is separated from that which abides: for it is separated doubly. But that which is converted, or returns, is separated by half. 1 For separation is the peculiarity of progression, but sameness and similitude of conversion. For that w hich returns, is made as it were that w hich abides, becoming all instead of one, and instead of a whole prior to parts, a whole consisting of parts. And it appears indeed to be the triple of that which abides; but is less than it in power, and comprehensive of the parts contained in it.

“ Then a fourth part, double of the second, a fifth, triple of the third, a sixth, octuple of the first, and a seventh twenty-seven times the first.”

And it appears indeed to be the triple of that which abides; but is less than it in power, and comprehensive of the parts contained in it.

“ Then a fourth part, double of the second, a fifth, triple of the third, a sixth, octuple of the first, and a seventh twenty-seven times the first.”

The all-perfect essence itself of the soul, is comprehended through the above- mentioned numbers; of which one abides in the soul, another, proceeds from, and another, is converted to it. Since, however, it is necessary to survey the parts of it, and the causes of those things that are in it, these also Plato copiously explains, delivering to us, the comprehending and comprehended ideas in it of all things. Through the fourth theretore, and the fitth parts, the soul comprehends the reasons of all its first participants. And it contains indeed, the progression of them through tin* fourth part, but their regression through the fifth. 4 [Hence Plato refers the fourth part to the second, but the fitth to the third, because parts imitate wholes, and subsist analogously to them.’] But through the sixth and seventh parts, it constitutes, as we have before observed, solid masses themselves; gene-

‘ It is necessary here, to supply the wool Anyoc.

1 For in this plarr, it is requisite to rrait nvriji.

1 That which proceeds is separated doubly from that wine h abides : for the duple ratio 2 to 1, or f is doubly separated I'roiu I- But that which is converted, or returns, is separated from the abiding principle by half. For’ differs from 1 by t. So that what proceeds, and also that which returns, are here to be considered according to habitude, i. e. according lo their proximity and alliance, the former to unity iimnerji itely, hut the latter to uuitv through 2 as a medium.

4 riie words, rtjy eiriirrpoyFje Sta rtj« ee/urrj/*, are omitted iii the original.

* file words within the brackets are supplied from the version ofThoinaeut.

100

PROCLUS ON THE

[boor hi.

4 riie words, rtjy eiriirrpoyFje Sta rtj« ee/urrj/*, are omitted iii the original.

* file words within the brackets are supplied from the version ofThoinaeut.

100

PROCLUS ON THE

[boor hi.

rating them indeed, according to the sixth part, but converting them according to the seventh part. For the total form of it, is terminated by the progression of these. And you may see how the numliers, and the order of the progression, are adapted to the soul. For the lieginning from the monad, gives to the soul a progression from intellect; but the termination in these cubes, evinces the harmony of all the celestial orbs,* for they produce by their composition the celestial harmony. Fach of them likewise is a harmony. For the Pythagoreans are accustomed to call a cube harmony, because it is the only figure that has equal* angles, analo¬ gous to the sides and the superficies.’ And the second* of the terms indeed, have a progression from, and a regression to the monad. Hut again, these remaining as wholes, the third’ of the terms are divided into that which proceeds, and that which returns, and are referred to tlu* tt nils proximately placed above them* And again, the fourth 7 of the terms, are referred to the monad; because of the m aen terms, the monad imitates that which abides; but the middle terms having the form of tlu duad,* imitate that which proceeds ; and the 1 ist terms, that which returns. For both the last tt rms are triadic. lair the octuple itself, is in a certain respect triadic, as proceeding into the third order. We have therefore the one wholeness of the soul in the mixture, the triple 9 of it in the third, and the qua¬ druple of it in the fourth terms; conformably to which also it fabricates wholes according to each form of providence. And in the wholeness indeed, we shall find it comprehending the triple form, but in the triple the tetradic form, and always collecting parts into union through whoh s.

“ Put after these things, he tilled the double and triple intervals, still cutting till* parts lroin thence 1 i. e. troin the whole , and placed them between the intervals."

Theologists say, that in the Deniiurgus there are dividing and connecting '*

• For aofionuy lirrr, it is necessary lo read ovpanwK

* Instrati of in this place, it is requisite lo reud tans.

1 The Pythagoreans railed a cube liarinuny, because it has 8 angle*, 12 sides, or bouudmg lints, and (i superfine*; auil 0, 8, 12 are in harmonic pmjiortion.

4 i e. 2 and 3. 1 i. e. 4 and y.

* For inrvKtifjcvvvt here, rtad virtpiti/iowi.

7 i. e. t> and ‘27, and llitse being tubes, are images of stability.

• y a* util as 1 may be said to have the form of the duad, in consequence of being a square number or the trevnd power

9 For txtxXciy lit rc, it is necessary to read rptxXcvy.

*° Instead of cvmuruui ui this place, its* necessary to read cvrftrruat.

nooK in.]

• y a* util as 1 may be said to have the form of the duad, in consequence of being a square number or the trevnd power

9 For txtxXciy lit rc, it is necessary to read rptxXcvy.

*° Instead of cvmuruui ui this place, its* necessary to read cvrftrruat.

nooK in.]

TIMiEUS OF PLATO.

101

powers, ami that through the former, he separates his kingdom from that of his father, 1ml through the latter, misjx mis the whole of his fabrication from the pater¬ nal monad. They likewise call energies of this kind, sections and bonds. According to these powers therefore, the Pemiurgus now' separating the essence of the soul in demiurgic bonds, is said to cut oil parts from its wholeness, and again to bind the parts with certain bonds through the middles, through which also, he makes that w hich is divided, to lie connected, just as through the sections he causes that which is united to be divided. Hence, that these things are conformable to theological principles, the words of Plato manifest. Li t us however see how they are so, by considering more minutely what he says. That the whole soul then, is with reference to itself, of the same essence, and consists of similar parts, and is as it were of the same colour, being wholly intellectual and intellectual reason, Plato manifests, by making both the wholes and the parts in it, from the same mixture. For the parts which are cut off from it, are certain divided essences in it. 'Flint there is also a certain dignity in it of iirsi, middle, and last forms, he evinces by adding the word still. For in those things, in which wo wr the same form more obscure, in these we employ the word still; as we do in the celestial essence, in consequence of perceiving a certain mutation about it, and also a si¬ militude to divine bodies, preserved in it. In order therefore that we may not suppose there is the same dignity of all the reasons in the soul, Plato adds the word still, indicating hy it that which wo have mentioned. For by how much the more inwardly wo proceed, and investigate the media of media, hy so much the more shall we meet with more partial forms. For comprehended are more par¬ tial than comprehending natures; ami the.latter are more divine than the former. The world likewise imitating this, has indeed about generation a divine body, hut about body the whole soul. All these before-mentioned sections therefore of the soul, both the generative (for these are the double intervals), and the perfec¬ tive (for these are the triple intervals), are comprehensive of more partial reasons, through which the parts of the universe .are adorned, us far as to the last of things.

“ So that in each interval' there are two middles, one of which, ex¬ ceeds and is exceeded by the same part of the extremes ; but the other, by an equal number surpasses one extreme, and by an equal number is surpassed by the other ." 1

In these words it must he observed in the first place, that the two middles are

* Tlic word iiatrrtj/jan is omitted »n the text of Proclus.

* In the text of Proclua also the following word* are wanting, njr i' /icr car* aptBpor vr »pex*»rar,

ifly k mrr^«pn)r.

10*

PROCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

said by Plato to be comprehended in the geometric middle; and afterwards, that he places the harmonic prior to the arithmetical middle, as being superior to it. For though the arithmetical middle has the spontaneous, and the simple, and an alliance to sameness; for equality is a certain sameness ; and hence Plato shows that m polities the arithmetical middle is effective of friendship, since it embraces the equal according to number, just as the harmonic is effective of justice, since it regards distribution according to desert; and still farther, because the arithmetical middle is allotted quantity per se, but the harmonic, relative quantity; and the for¬ mer is surveyed about the absolute quantity of the parts, hut the latter, about the relative quantity ; 1 for the third, or the fourth part, is the peculiarity of relative quantity ;—though all this be the rase, yet the harmonic, as being nearer to the geometric, is verv propertv arranged before the arithmetical middle: For it affords sameness in the extremes, and distributes greater ratios to greater, but less to less terms ; and through this, is more adapted to distribution according to desert. It must be said therefore, that the harmonic middle binds together all the psychical sameness, and imparts to celestial natures an indissoluble communion ; distri¬ buting to tin* greater circles indeed, greater powers and motions, but to the less, less powers. For the comprehending are moved sw ifter than the comprehended spheres. For the arithmetical middle connects all the difference in the soul, and imparts to sublunary natures, a communion with each other, according to an equal permutation. For among these, one thing is not at all more acted upon by, than it acts upon, others. And this property of being changed into each „tbi r, is equally inherent in all die r lements in generation, according to arithmeti¬ cal equality ; which also imparts to more attenuated natures, greater and swifter motions, hut slower and less motions to such as consist of larger parts.

“ I5nt as sesquialter, sesquitertian, and sesquioetave intervals were pro¬ duced from those bonds in the former intervals, he filled with the interval of the sesquioetave, all the sesquitertian parts.”

That from the above-mentioned tw o middles, the harmonical and the arithmetical bonds being produced in the intervals of the double and triple terms, the sesquiter¬ tian and sesquialter ratios appearing in those middles, are cut by the interval of the se-quioctave, is evident from w hat lias been said, and w ill also be manifest, if you direct your attention to the terms (3, H, 1*2, and 18.* l or in these, the double ami

1 Tor S to 1^, wbuli is dia]>ente, or sesquialter, is coui|M>unded of S to)), which is a tone - and 0 to 8, which is sesquitertian, or diafessaron

BOOK III.]

TftLEUS OF PLATO.

103

triple consist of sesquitertiau and sesquialter ratios. But how will these things accord with what has I icon lx fore said ? We reply they must he assumed con¬ sequently to them. For as the two middles divide the universe into two parts, so the sesquitertiau and sesquialter ratios constitute a more partial order of tilings. For these ratios adorn things which exist as wholes, and yet are parts of parts. Each of tin m therefore is a w hole according to the prolngos, hut a part according to the hvpologos, and a part of a jiart, according to the transcen¬ dency of the one with reference to the other. And since in each of the spheres there arc divine and da-moniacal, and also partial genera of souls, such as the genera of ours, and the secondary divine genera wholly participate of the whole of those prior to them ; hut the d.emoniacal genera, though they participate of the whole of divine natures, yet it is according to one certain thing, on which account they are said to he more partial, not being aide to receive all the peculiarities of them; hut the more partial of daunoniacal natures, at diil'erent times participate of a dill'erent peculiarity, and not always of the same characteristics;—hence, the soul partihly contains the ratios of these. And it contains the multiple indeed according to the participation ol the whole ; hut the superparlicular, accordin ,r to one part only, and that the most principal ; and the sup* rpartient according to a communion which is both multitudinous and partible of the participants with the things participated. lienee, through these, the elements and the ci h slid spin res are adorned; participating indeed of the third wholeness, hut at the same time being parts of the two sections ot the universe ; since every wholeness has also parts m conjunction with itself. Different peculiarities therefore pertain to a different sphere, ’ and a dillercnt number proceeds w ith a different element. The sesquioctave ratio also giving completion to the sesquitertiau and sesquialter ratios, generates these plenitudes of the total parts, and coharmoni/es them with their proper wholenesses. ^ on see therefore, that as in the mathematics, the geome¬ tric middle comprehends the remaining two middles, lmt they comprehend the sesquitertiau and sesquialter ratios, and these the sesquioctaves,—after the same manner also, the soul according to the w holeness of itself constitutes the whole world; but according toils essential duad, divides the universe into two parts, and produces the first parts of the universe, which are secondarily wholes. Ac¬ cording likewise to the causes of the third wholeness, it disposes in an orderly manner, and adorns the spheres ; hut according to numbers adapted to these parts, it fills them with appropriate forms and parts.

We may also sjieah as follows : This universe has indeed whole spheres; ami

1 For aXAip *^a» pa here, it i« Decenary to read oXAm

104

PROCLUS ON THE

[book tu¬

bas likewise divine, damoniacal and psychical animals in each sphere. For there are distributions of partial souls about each of the spheres. But the har¬ monic ratios of the whole soul, harmonize the essences which are divisible about bodies, and bodies themselves, l'or by its tcry essence [it contains all these, anti the ratios which comprehend them ;*] just as tire, lieing calefactive by its very ex¬ istence, is primarily hot. It contains therefore, the diatessaron harmony, through which it harmonizes the essences divisible about bodies ot each of the spheres, and of the divine, damoniacal, and psychical animals in each, and also bodies to each other. Nor is one thing casually comprehensive of another, nor do somethings casually follow others; lmt damoniacal follow divine animals, and psychical, such as are damoniacal; and conformably to nature, secondary are always co¬ adapted to primary essences. Hence the diatessaron harmony is in each of the spheres. And the ratios imb ed of each sphere to the divine animals contained in it, and of these to damoniacal animals, will be truly sesquioctaves, possessing a p» rfect interval; b< ing at one and the same linn: primarily harmonious, and adapted to bodies. For the ogdoad having a triple interval is corporeal formed, just as the ennead is a plane. But each is allied Inequality. And always se¬ condary corporeal essences are suspended from such as arc primary, paiticipatmg of them, and of the corporeal reason which they contain.* But this the part manifests which is said to he the eighth of the thing participated. 1 hat however vhich remains, is the ratio of psychical to da.-momacal animals, which has the relation of the leimma, is superpartient, and is adapted to thirteen parts. I*or these have not one life, since they ascend and descend, and partibly and anoma¬ lously enjov the natures prior to them. And since the number twelve is ascribed to the [mundane] (bids, and to the natures stijw rior to us, thirteen is adapted to those that do not rank in the number of the (iods. If also of psychical animals themselves, some pertain to undijilcd souls', which Plato is accustomed to call the souls of heroes; but others to gregarious souls, such as ours : if this be the case, the diapente 1 likewise will l>e in each of the spheres. And heroic souls indeed will preserve* towards the diemoniacal, tin: sosqmoctave ratio, through the undefiled form of life; but the souls of the multitude will have towards them the ratio of the leimma. .So that in each of the spheres, there will be sesquiterlian, sesquialter, uni sesquioctave ratios.

1 The words within the bracket* are wanting in the original, but arc supplied from the version of '1 honiauv

.So that in each of the spheres, there will be sesquiterlian, sesquialter, uni sesquioctave ratios.

1 The words within the bracket* are wanting in the original, but arc supplied from the version of '1 honiauv

* Instead of Toy <y avrjj in tins place, it is obviously necessary to read, rov ty avrott.

1 bur ill cadi of the spheres there will be divine, dauuoiiiacal, beroical, and gregarious souls, and appropriate bodies.

hook ill ]

TiM/r;rs or pi.ato

10.',

Or r itlier, it may ho said, (lint tin? universe is divided quadruply, according to tin' four ideas of i(s paradigm, but that in racli of the four parts, time are all animals, the divine, the da-mnniueal, the heroiral, and those of human souls, all which are harmonically co arranged with each other, and with nferenre to their proper wholeness, whether it be tin* heavens, the air, the water, or the earth, the wholeness producing the diapente ; but w ithout this it may be said there is the diatessaron, in the four species of animals, a; Plato himself divides—viz. into the universe, and (he all-various forms of animals. Hence, through these things Plato delivers to us ratios comprehensive of ratios, and perfect according to one harmony ; with which ratios being reph te, the soul tills this visible world, render¬ ing all tilings eflahle and familiar with each other.

“ Leaving a part of each of them. And then again, the interval of this part being assumed, a comparison is from thcncc obtained of number to number, viz. of 23b to 213.”

3U?

“ Leaving a part of each of them. And then again, the interval of this part being assumed, a comparison is from thcncc obtained of number to number, viz. of 23b to 213.”

3U?

AVhat ihis leimma is, what ratio it possesses, and how, bring adapted to con¬ cord, it becomes harmonious when eo-arranged with the other ratios, is evident through the mathematics. Hut there is a thing of this hind in the universe, as in a whole ; the ratio of the leimma being in the last of the animals comprehended in it, independently of the before-mentioned demonstration, according to the quadruple section of the whole. I’or from each of the spheres certain eilhixions, and mingled dregs of the elements proci ed into the subterranean regions; pos¬ sessing indeed, much of the tumultuous, dark and material, but at the same time contributing to the whole constitution and harmony of the world. Plato, therefore, placing the cause of these in the whole soul, calls it a leimma, which is significant of ultimate diminution, por since tlieologists arrange the powers of the highest Gods about that place, Jupiter adorning those parts, so as to render them adapted to the participation of such mighty divinities, what ought we to think about the soul of the universe? Is it not that it must in a much greater degree adorn every tiling which appears to he disordered, and that it must possess the cause of the hypostasis of an inordinate nature, and arrange it in a becoming man¬ ner, according to this cause? How, likewise, could it govern the universe, or conduct all things conformably to intelhct, unices it arranges that which is dis¬ orderly, aiul co-harmonizes the last of tilings, with the one life of the world? But if also in the Demiurgus, the causes of these pre-exist, as Orpheus says,

’I tic distant realms of Tartarus obscure,

Earlk’i utmost ends, lus holy feet secure.

VoL. II.

Ttm. Plat .

O

100

PROCI US ON Tin:

[book in

m!iv should it be wonderful, that tbe whole soul jvosses^ing all sivch things appropriately in itself, as a divine intellect possesses demiurgically, should antc- cedently contain the cause of the last parts of the world, and of that which is as it were, the sediment of wholes? l'ur the soul comprehends the invisible prior to the visible and .sensible world. AN hat the leimma is therefore, is through these things evident. Hence also the leimina, is both rjuadruple and single. And it is necessary that the soul should comprehend the reason of both, according to which the leiinma subsists rjuadriiply, and singly ; since it is requisite that tins should contribute to the unite r»e, and to each of its parts.

Hence also the leimina, is both rjuadruple and single. And it is necessary that the soul should comprehend the reason of both, according to which the leiinma subsists rjuadriiply, and singly ; since it is requisite that tins should contribute to the unite r»e, and to each of its parts.

If al»o you direct vour attention to the numbers ot the terms, you will perceive that these preserve a certain admirable analogy. 1 he progression, therefore, into a hundred binaries, manifests an all perfect diminution and separation from cause. For in the soul, it comprehends that which is most partial, and in tin* universe, that which is last, and most material. Hut the four and the live in 1 lie tens, suspend that which is last, and most material, from first natures, and co-arrange them with their principles, l'or the tetrad is allotted a demiurgic, and world-producing quality, lt.it the pentad recals every thing which has pro¬ ceeded, to powers who h have more of the nature of the cue. Again the triad and hexad in the units, impart perfection to these*, through conversion. Hut if also the ratio of-1."I to l'l is superpartieut,* neither will this number lx- dissonant to the* universe. For after the all perfect progression of seiisibles, and a diminution ns far as to the earth, which is said to lx* the twelfth part of tlx* world, all that is under it, will lx* tin* thirteenth part of tlx* whole. And the representations of tlx* elements, which proceed into the subterranean place, will he adapted to this number. That which is most material in tlx* universe therefore, proceeds to the utmost e*\W-nt, is adorned as it proceeds, and returns when adorned. In each part likewise, of the* uuive*r>e, there are tlx* last diminished genera of perpetual natures, to which the number twelve is ascribed; and with gie*at propriety, the-v have habitude, and communion with each other, according to tlx* thirteenth ratio, since the nunilx-r twelve was dedicated by the ancients to the [mundane] Cods, and to the genera that an* always si.sjx nele*el from them. All tlx-se* therefore, the soul unieally comprehends in the ratio of the leiinma. In addition to these tilings likewise*, the* ennead of the units, which three and six procure for us, indicates tlx* end of the psyoltii'al ratii»s. hor lxgm.img from the uionael, thev proceed to the cnriend, and from monads to de rails [i. e>. free.n units to tens], anel from these to hundreds. I or all the progression of the soul is

* l'<>r -13 contains 13, nglitccii linns, silh a riniaintliT ol £).

nooK in.]

TIM.El'S OF PLATO.

107

triadic, and likewise, its evolution into light from the demiurgic canse, Iwth according to essence, and according to harmony, as we have before observed. And thus we liave shown what it is which the Icimma manifests in the soul.

nooK in.]

TIM.El'S OF PLATO.

107

triadic, and likewise, its evolution into light from the demiurgic canse, Iwth according to essence, and according to harmony, as we have before observed. And thus we liave shown what it is which the Icimma manifests in the soul.

The whole psychogonic diagram however, has 3 t, or 30 terms. And on this account, the uuiiiIht 3d is adapted to the soul, as being generated from the hexad proceeding into itself; the hexad being ascrilied by the ancients to the soul, because it is the first evenly-odd numlier, just as the soul in the medium between impartible and partible natures,' to the former of which the odd numlier is allied, but to the latter, the even; and aho, because it is circular, in the same manner us the pentad.* The pirtod however, is the image of the intellectual circle, c% bang masculine , but the hexad of the psychical circle, at being feminine. If also yon direct your attention to 34, this numlier too, will be adapted to the soul; since intellect is a monad, as being impartible, but the world is a decad, and the soul a tetrad. Hence, all number is said to proceed from the penetralia of the monad, as far as to the divine tetrad, which brought forth the mother of all things, immutable and unwearied, and which is called* the sacred decad. But the tetrad has for its side the dead, and the double of the square of it added to 2, produces the above-mentioned number;* being an imitation of the soul, which is multiplied by itself, and together with its own prolific power. If likewise 34 is composed from the second sesrjuinctave, viz. from 1G and 13, it will happen, that as the sesquioctave is especially adapted to the soul, so also is this second sesqui- octave. For being a medium between consonant and dissonant intervals, it is adapted to the middle nature of the soul. And in short, the sesquioctave charac¬ terizes the diatonic genii*., according to which the whole soul is harmonized. But lieing assumed as the second, it will accord with the order of the soul, in which the genera of !>eing, have entirely a secondary subsistence.

Farther still, in addition to these things, since the whole diagram contains a quadruple diapason, which is the most full of all symphonies, but the diajrente once, and ends in one tone, it w ill possess the quadruple cause of the division of the world into four parts, proceeding as we have said supei nally, from animal itself, and the four ideas in it, through soul into the universe, and of the i>erfect har¬ mony in each of the parts of the world ; through w hich also, heaven is one world, concordant with itself celestially, and the earth has all things terrestrially, and

1 For the evenly odd nunilier is a medium bctwwn thr odd and the even number.

* For orrai here, it is obviously necessary to read wtrrat.

1 Instead of <Xvovn here, it is necessary to read aXcies^i.

4 i. e. 2X 4* + 2 = 34.

PROCLUS ON TilE

[book in.

10 if

* For orrai here, it is obviously necessary to read wtrrat.

1 Instead of <Xvovn here, it is necessary to read aXcies^i.

4 i. e. 2X 4* + 2 = 34.

PROCLUS ON TilE

[book in.

10 if

in 3 similar manner each of the tlcmnits between these. Since, houovcr, (lit* world is not only quadripartite, but lias five figures, possessing a tilth idea together with the four, the soul very projK-rly contains in itselt, alter the quadruple diapason, the symphony diapente ; the remaining section being that of the hea¬ vens into eitdit spheres, and of the whole woild into nine, over the former of which the Syrens preside, mentioned in the Kepnlilic, and over the latter the whole of the Muses, under whom tin - Syrens subsist. Ygnin theretore, a tone consenta¬ neously closes the whole diagram; and it is not possible to devise any other divisions than these which are delivered to us by IMato, I mean, the division into four, into live, into eight, and into nine parts, some ot which are mentioned in this Dialogue, and some in the lb public. Very properly therefore, is the whole psy- * hngomc diagram composed ol all the above mentioned parlieul.iis, I mean, a tone, the dia|M-nte, and the quadruple diapason, in order that you may see these throughout the whole world, a> having the power ol the whole diagram. All likewise are assumed according to all the divisions made by IMato ol mundane natures, which are triple, vi/. according to ideas, according to figures, and according to the spheres.

All likewise are assumed according to all the divisions made by IMato ol mundane natures, which are triple, vi/. according to ideas, according to figures, and according to the spheres.

All the other sesquiallcr and sesquioctavc* ratios therefore, were* the bonds ot more partial orders, comprehended either in the live parts ol the univeise, or in the divisions of it into eight and nine; a-, for instance, in the division of it into bods, da moils, souls, natures, and bodies. And ol boils, into those t .a 4 preside over different parts of the world. For in each part ol it, there are dillcrciit orders of (bids; those of tin? second rank being analogous to those that are prior to them. And m a similar manner with respect to du-itioiis, some are ot this, but ot icrs ot that series. Tin like also takes place, in souls, and natures, and bodies. Hut I lie diapi nte symphony, and the sesquioi lav* ratio, are not in v mi assumed all* r the quadruple diapason, but because tin y are comprehensive and eonneetive|u i-iinimoii, of wholes. I say, for instance, that the ratio of tin* ninth to the eighth sphere, comprehends and connects as one ratio, all the parts at once th.it are arranged according t*» a quintuple div isioii, mid all that are divided into eight oid nine. Ilul the U iinm is of nil the sc-quit* Ilian ratios are cilia r the ultimate, and very partible diminutions, according to each portion of the ipiadiipaitile dis- tr.hiition, or they are the common gills of all these ratios, into the last place of the universe; through which (bids, ila nunis, partial souls and iialm* >, proceed into that r* gitui, and at t old vv ilh each *ilher, * miliii mably to the ultimate and perl« « 11y partible symphony, Mich as vv.- say siqierparUnit rali.is possess. 11* m. IMato descending It* this adds, that the D. niiiiigiis diviiling the mixture, had now con¬ sumed the whole of it. For neither bod, nor nature, docs any thing in vain.

ROOK 111.]

TIM.BUS or PLATO.

10*J

11* m. IMato descending It* this adds, that the D. niiiiigiis diviiling the mixture, had now con¬ sumed the whole of it. For neither bod, nor nature, docs any thing in vain.

ROOK 111.]

TIM.BUS or PLATO.

10*J

Tlio Pemiiirgus therefore did not constitute a mixture of parts either exceeding nr deficient, bill produced it such as was suliicient to the wholeness itself of the soul, l’or tin* whole which is from parts, is neither more nor less than its proper parts, hut entirely derives its completion from appropriate parts. Hence the whole of that which is mingled, consists of harmonic ratios, ami all this harmony is, in short, the essential paradigm of the harmony of the universe, accor¬ ding to all the divisions in the world. Moreover, the whole number of the essen¬ tial monads of the soul is 10oi)l7,' proceeding according to all the orders of miml*ers. Decadieally, indeed, in order that the soul mav become mundane : for the decad is the number of the world, iiut pentadically, in order that it inav be converted to itself: for the pentad is sell comertive. Jhincadicallv, in order that it may not alone m contain the universe monadic-ally, but also as proceeding to the last of things from the monad. But tctradically, as collecting the ipiadri- partite division into one. And hebdoniicallv, as converting all things to the monad, to which tin- hebdomad is alone referred, being motherless and virile. And in the soul of the world indeed, the above number subsists totally; m divine souls, as having their energies directed to that 1 soul, it subsists both totally and partially ; in daunnus, as energizing still mon partially, it exists vice versa, partial¬ ly and totally ; and in human souls, alone partially, and alone gnosticallv. For thus all forms subsist in these souls, such for instance as the form of mail, of daMiion and of Hod ; in order that through these they may know, that all things subsist m more excellent natures productively, and at the same time gnosticallv. This mixture therefore, is alone the mixture of the whole soul, and it subsists after the same manner m each divine soul, ami similarly in du-monincal souls, each of whit li his intellect placed above its proper essence, a peculiar ve¬ hicle, and a life distributed about this. If, however, in partial souls, it be r«*rjuisite to assume the peculiarity of each, it is a medium between the impartible which is above, and the partible which is posterior to them,* or it is partly the one, and partly the other of these. And though we have elsewhere discussed this largely, yet we shall particularly inn stigate it, when we come to explain what is said by- Plato concerning the generation of partial souls.

' InUc.l t Ilf rvarni rnffi rr-rniir i ill till* place, It l» rcrjllidle to read, tryraKovrntu re nrtnpa\<,t -et.

* It iv necessary lirre !■» supply fiornr.

1 For Tftot mnoi' in tins place, read — on*

' InUc.l t Ilf rvarni rnffi rr-rniir i ill till* place, It l» rcrjllidle to read, tryraKovrntu re nrtnpa\<,t -et.

* It iv necessary lirre !■» supply fiornr.

1 For Tftot mnoi' in tins place, read — on*

* It appears to me lliat after rnaarijf ifny tn \n,t horn iu llic original in tlrs place, liie words /jr*rr

arc wanMii"; and tliat immediately afler, instead of ro re vr rp avrat «a< to fttr' avrat

fifptiTor, we should read top Tt vwrp avrat o/irptcrtv, cat rov per avrat fitpttrrcp .

110

IMIOCLI’S ON THE

[ROOK 111.

*• Havin'*, therefore, cut all this cl mil decomposition nccording to length, so as to produce two from one, he adapted middle to middle, each to the other, as it were in the form of the letter X."

In the first place, it is requisite to show mathematically of what kind the figure of the soul is, and thus, afterwards, introduce the theory of the things ; in order that being led in a becoming manner by the phantasy, we may render ourselves adapted to the scientific apprehension of what is said. All the numbers there¬ fore, must 1 m* conceived to be desclibed in one rule, as those who are skilled ill music are accustomed to do. And let the rule have the numbers according to the whole of its depth, and be divided according to its length. All the ratios therefore, will !>c in each of the s« etions. For if the division was made according to breadth, it would he entirely necessary that some of the niunlH*rs should be taken here, but others there. Since however, the section is according to length, but all the iiuiiiImts are in all the length, there will be the same iiiiuiIkts in each ot the parts. For it is evident, that it is not the same thing, to divide the length, and to divide according to the length ; since the latter signifies, that the section proceeds through the whole length, but the former, that the length is divided, ljet the rule, therefore, bo thus divided according to length,* and let the two lengths lx* applied to each other in the points which bisect the lengths, ye! not so as to l>e at right angles: for neither will the circles 1m* at right angles. Ia*t the two lengths likewise be so ineurvated, that they may again lx* conjoined at the extremities. Two circles therefore, will 1m* formed, of which one will In* in¬ terior, but the other exterior, and they will lx* oblique to each other. One of these likewise, is called the circle of the same, but the other, the circle ot the different. And the one indeed, subsists according to the equinoctial circle, but the other, according to the zodiac. For the whole circle of the different revolves about the zodiac, but that of the same about the equinoctial. Hence, we conceive that the right lines ought not to lx* applied to each other at right angles, but like

* In the original of this place there is nothin" more than rouo ynfi .ri ou ravror to fiTjtot. 1 i.e

rest of ihe sentence in the translation is added from the version of Tliouiaus.

Hence, we conceive that the right lines ought not to lx* applied to each other at right angles, but like

* In the original of this place there is nothin" more than rouo ynfi .ri ou ravror to fiTjtot. 1 i.e

rest of ihe sentence in the translation is added from the version of Tliouiaus.

* Thus for instance, tel ihe number* be disposed according lo depth as follows :

1 . 2 . 3 .

4

• •

8 .

‘-’7

Ac.

1 . 1 . .1

4

• V

S

J7

AC.

i . . a .

4

. >1 .

s .

■-*7

Ac.

i . g . a .

4

• !•

. S .

•7

iV c .

1 . J . 3 .

. 4

• ,‘J

. N .

. 'i:

Ac.

Then the line* drawn longitudina'b. will rcpiesvnt the division of the rule according I® length

BOOK lit,]

T1 MAX'S OF PLATO.

Ill

th<* letter \ as Plato says, so as to cause the angles to Ik? equal only at the summit, but those on each side, and the successive angles, to he unequal. For the equi¬ noctial circle does not cut the zodiac at right angles. Such therefore, in short, is the mathematical discussion of the figure of the soul.

equal only at the summit, but those on each side, and the successive angles, to he unequal. For the equi¬ noctial circle does not cut the zodiac at right angles. Such therefore, in short, is the mathematical discussion of the figure of the soul.

Again however, surveying the things themselves from the beginning, let us refer what is said by Plato, to the psychical essence. And, in tlie first place, we must obsone, that continued and discrete quantity are divided from each other, accor¬ ding to the mathematical sciences, and are in a certain way opposed to each other, so that it is not possible for the discrete to be continued, or the continued to be dis¬ crete quantity. In the soul however, both these concur, viz. union, and separ¬ ation. For it is a monad and number, one reason, one multitude, anil many things. And as being a whole indeed, it is continued ; but as number, it is di¬ vided, according to the reasons which it contains. Through its continuity like¬ wise, it is assimilated to the union of intelligible^, but through its multitude, to the separation of them. And by ascending still higher than these, wo shall find that according to its union, it possesses an image and representation of the one, but according to its division, of the multitude of the divine numbers. Hence, it nei¬ ther has an arithmetical essence alone ; for it w ould not be continuous ; nor alone a geometrical essence ; font would not 1m* divided, lint it must Ik* said, that it is at one and the same time both the arithmetical, and the geometrical essence. So far however, as it is the arithmetical essence, it has also, at the same time, the harmnnic.nl essentially. For the multitude in it is harmonized, and it comprehends in sameness, both absolute anil relative quantity. Hut so far as it i*> the geome¬ trical, it contains the spherical essence. For the ciicles in it are both immove¬ able and moved ; immoveable indeed essentially, but moved according to a vital energy. Or rather, it possesses both these at once; for they are self-motive. Hut the self-motive, is at one and the same time moved and immoveable. For it moves itself. Hut to move, or be the cause of motion, jiertains to immove¬ able power. The soul therefore, comprehends essentially all sciences ; geometry indeed, according to its wholeness, its figure, and its lines; but the arithmetical science, according to its multitude, and the essential monads in it, as we have before shown. Hut it comprehends the harmonic science, according to the ratios of numliers ; and the spheric science, according to its twofold circulations. In reality also, it is the essential, self-motive, intellectual, and united bond of the mathematics, comprehending all things unaccompanied with figure, and with limit filed purity. Hence it comprehends figures iinfiguredly, things separated, unitedly, and without interval things accompanied with interval. For these pertain to the essence of the soul. And it is necessary to survey all things in it aAcr this manner.

Hence it comprehends figures iinfiguredly, things separated, unitedly, and without interval things accompanied with interval. For these pertain to the essence of the soul. And it is necessary to survey all things in it aAcr this manner.

112

IMtOl'LlIS ox Tim

[hook iii.

Moreover, this likewise ought to be assumed from what hns been said, tliat nil secondary natures, are analogous to those? that are prior to them, and that e\erv where, (he one precedes multitude. For as the theory of the hyparxis of the soul commenced from its essence, and that of its harmony from the e/n part, thus ;dso the doctrine concerning its figure, places the one length prior to the two. And as sameness and dillereiici are from essence, so the triple and duple ratio are from the monad, but from the one h ngth, the circle of the tunic, and the circle of the different. As likewise, tin* antecedents are to the antecedents, so are the consequents to the consequents, and all things are homologous to each other, viz. essence, harmony, and form. Vnd all tilings are indeed everv when-, on account of the ps\chi«‘.d lile, beiii '4 as it were ot one colour, and of similai parts. The tome however, and the triple, subsist m a greater decree in the circle of (he same, but the d/jf event, and tin duple, in the circle ot the different. All the ratios likewise, arc e\ery where, but after a different manner in first and secondary natures; in the former indeed, intellectually, totally, and unitedly; but in the latter, doxastieally, distributively, and partially. And thus much concerning these particulars.

All the ratios likewise, arc e\ery where, but after a different manner in first and secondary natures; in the former indeed, intellectually, totally, and unitedly; but in the latter, doxastieally, distributively, and partially. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Concerning this section however, and the two lengths and circles, it is worth while to consider, what tin y must be said to be. For the ditine lainblu lms soars on high, and solicitously investigates invisible natures, viz. the one soul, and the two souls that proceed from it. For of every order an imparticipable monad is the leader, prior to the things participated, and there is a number appropriate to and connascent with impartu ipabh-s. 1 he «luail also is from unitv, in the same manner as in the < bids themselves. Tiuneus therefore, he savs, hav inn through the psychogony fabricat< d in words the one and supermundane soul, from which the soul of the universe and other souls are derived, now produces the duad from this. For the section manifests the demiurgic division, which proceeds in sameness and jierfei lion, generating the same things according to second iiuiu- l>crs. Hut the division according to length, exhibits to us the progression super- nallv proceeding from the Ibmiurgus. 1 hrough these however, two souls arc i;eni rated, alii r the one soul, eai h ot w Inch has the s une ratios, are conjoined to, and arc in each otlur, and are divided front each other. And they likewise preserve alt muiiingled purity, together with union with each other. ! or tin y are united to their own centres, and this is the adaptation of middle to middle, llut since aUo, these souls are intellectual, and participate of a divine intellect, the Demiurgus prior to the p m ration of the universe, bent them into a circle, and comprehended them in a motion according to the same, and in the same, making them to be intellectual, imparting to them a divine intellect, and inserting

SUOK 111 . J

TIM A'. US or PLATO.

11.i

tlx-(liiad of souls, in the intollectnul duad, which transcends them essentially [And thus far the divine lamhliclms.]

J

TIM A'. US or PLATO.

11.i

tlx-(liiad of souls, in the intollectnul duad, which transcends them essentially [And thus far the divine lamhliclms.]

We therefore admit, that all tin* is well said so far as pertains to the theory of things: for these particulars are prior to the world. Hence also in mundane natures, tin-re is the monad, afterwards the duad, and afterwards the heptad. I'or in tin universe there is one soul, which is that of the universe, lint alter this, there are two souls, which divide the heaven into the circulation of the same' .uid tin* ( in illation ol the different. And after those, there are seven souls, which distribute in an orderly manner the planetary spheres. We conceive it how¬ ever, to he more concordant with the words of Plato neither to understand what is now said, as pertaining to those super-mundane souls, nor to the multitude of mundane souls, hut as asserted of the soul itself of the universe. Plato therefore himself shortly alter, having spoken concerning all the divisions of the soul, says, “ lint when all the composition of the soul was produced coiifonnuhh/ to (he intention of its composing artificer , after this he fashioned within it the hole of a corporeal-formal nature. In which words he di nominates the soul one, and this as no other than the soul of the-universe. I'or it is this soul w hich comprehends the whole of a corporeal-formed nature. Hence the demiurgic divisions, and the two-fold lines and circles, must he assumed in this 1 soul; for in so doin^ we shall not he in want ol arirmm ills. Since therefore, it is the collector of all immoveable and niter-motive natures, of imparlihles and parlibles, of paradigms, and tlje last images, and of lriily-e\i>tini: beings, and such as are not truly beings, tin- nature '•fit is uiv properly two-fold, partly pertaining to more excellent, and partly to subordinate hem-.s. Ih cause however, these are entirely separated from each other, they require after a certain maimer two* media. Vnd m corporeal natures indeed, the two conjoining media an s< parated from each other; hut m incorpo¬ real natur. s it is one Informed essence, which hinds together tin* extremes ; one part ot vvliieh heini; conjoined to iutelhirihh-s, is intellectual, seienlilie, shining " ilh divine w isdom, ana^ome, and < om prebend in;; the causes of things; hut the other part hem”- pro\imate to partible natures, is effective of di lien nee, comes into contact with sensililes, recurs to the providential inspeetion of secondary natures, is artificial, and comprehends such other things as are allied to these. All the ratios iiowevt r, are in ea« h of these. I'or in this, the essence of the soul differs from the inlelh dual essence. I’or the latter indeed, is uniform, and anted -

* Tor uiTd' lierr, it is necessary to read ravriiv.

‘ Instead of »>r’ nvrni'f in tins jil.ur, il is rri|iiis:tc to read (T'nvnjf.

1 I', r trtif lirrc, read t v w.ir,

Tim. rial.

I’or the latter indeed, is uniform, and anted -

* Tor uiTd' lierr, it is necessary to read ravriiv.

‘ Instead of »>r’ nvrni'f in tins jil.ur, il is rri|iiis:tc to read (T'nvnjf.

1 I', r trtif lirrc, read t v w.ir,

Tim. rial.

V(1L. II.

P

TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

' LUOfc. III.

Ill

dently comprehends all forms inoiiadically ; but the former is dyadic, and con¬ tains the same reasons, dianoetically and doxastically; in one way indeed, in the circle of the same, hilt in another in the circle of the different. [And thus the soul imitates it* cause.] 1 For she is both a monad and a duad, as with reference to the monad [.Saturn], the father of the intellectual Gods. And the soul is a monad as with reference to t!ie mi!\er*e, hut a duad, with reference to intellect For in short division itself and multiplication derive their subsistence from this Goddess [Rhea]. The xixifir principle therefore, is the cause of progression, multitude, and multiplication. Hence some philosophers, assimilating to the Go,Is things which are derixed from them, think fit to arrange intellects accord¬ ing to the masculine, but souls according to the feminine genus o! the Gods. For intellect is indix isihle, and of the form of the odd numb* r; but soul is dix isihle and biformed And the former i- analogous to paternal, but the latter to prolific causes. And the one is allied to bound, but the other to infinity. If likew ise, I should lie ashed lioxx the soul is one, and hoxx it is Informed, I should say, that it is one indeefl, as self-motive' for this is common to all psychical life, and to the parts it contains; but that it is biformed according to two-told lixes, viz. the life wInch is conxerted to first natures, and the life which proxidentially attends to secondarv natures. I should also say, that according to the essen¬ tial it ha* one life : for >i If motion is the es-ence of the soul. Rut according to same and different, I should distinguish its txvo-lold lixes.

I should also say, that according to the essen¬ tial it ha* one life : for >i If motion is the es-ence of the soul. Rut according to same and different, I should distinguish its txvo-lold lixes.

Why lioxx ex er, <lid the Deiniurgus first constitute the soul rectilinear! y, but aflerxvarils circularlv, and after \x hat manner is a right line adapted to the essenr e of the soul 1 To this wi' reply, that it is requisite to conceive the sold as analo¬ gous to a right line. For as a right line proceeds xx it In mt curvature, and defi- niti Iv from this to that point; tor there is only one right line bet xx ecu txvo points ; and as it is infinite in its oxvu nature, so likewise the soul is generated an infinite poxxir. Intellect al*o, like an indix i*;ble point, i* the leader of the soul, compre¬ hending it indixisibly, and antecedently containing in an impartible manner the whole of its essence. For the impartible is allied to intellect; but that xxhich is primarily partible to soul. Rut a point and a line are things of this kind. Hence, a right line is xerx properly ascribed to the soul, and afterwards a circle, xxhich xxe say, an* simple lines. Rut a point is ascribed to intellect. For from thence

1 Tilt words wiilnn t lie hraikrls jic wauling in I tie original; t»ul il appears lo nit lli.it lh«y ought to \>r iii'irlol, though they were likewise wanting in Iti«* M's. of'1 homa-us. In the original therefore after the words u.VXui K *»■ ry Ourtp/w, I couceixe lliere is an omission ol »ui rwrwi V fitfwrai nje tairni ainur Rut tile foutal cause of the sou! is Illrea.

.. 111 .]

1 IM.TA S OF PLATO.

115

.is iVuin a certain adytum. the reason of (lie soul presents itself to the view, unfold¬ ing the impartibility of intellect, and announcing its occult and inefl’ahle union. Intellect itself however, i- tini 1 1 y established in itself, understanding all things w ith a tranquil energy ; being a point and a centre as with reference to the soul. For if the soul i> a circle, intellect is the centre, or’ the power of the eir- « It*. lint if the soul is a right line, intellect is a point, comprehending without interval that which has interval, imparlibly that which is partible, and rentrically * the eireular lorin. Intellect itself hovvever, is a circle as with reference to the nature of tin i foot/, ahoiil whit It * it on all sides converges, through a desire of the one, and of coni u t with it.

Intellect itself hovvever, is a circle as with reference to the nature of tin i foot/, ahoiil whit It * it on all sides converges, through a desire of the one, and of coni u t with it.

i’arllier still, after another manner also we may say, that a line is adapt* d to tin' soul. For intellect indeed, though some one should give to it motion, yet it has this energy intransitive. For it surveys at once the whole of the intelligible, having an eternal life, and energizing about the same things, m the same nature, ami according to the same, lint soul possesses a transitive energy. For at clitlo- rent tunes, it applies it*-* 1 to dillcreut forms. And this is true even of the soul ot the universe. For, as Plato sa\s in the Ph.rdrus, it is the p«‘* r.liaritv of soul to energize through time. lint every transitive motion is a line. F’or it has xcficnn• and :, /iit/ur, and tin* rectilinear, and one tiling tor the beginning, and aiiolln i- l*»r tht* end. No that in this respect we refer a line to (he p-vchical life. Again, the inmiov* able cause is motive *>l self-motive natures; for these pro\i- m ti< 1\ parli* ipale ot it ; but tin* self-mov ing muse is motive of aller-motive natures. Since iberelore, the sold prov ides for allcr-mnlive natures, being essmtiallv prior to tie m, and as living from itself, Irausci nils ali things (hit hav** an adventi¬ tious hl«*. eoiilonnahly to this, it also has tin* linear form m its providential ener¬ gies ; being motive, and constitutive nl alt* i-niolive natures ; just as a Ime is the dist.mee ol *»ue tiling Irom aiiolln r, and au < gr* >>ion <*r departure from itself. In what is said therefore, about the mixture of (he soul, and a|s () in what is said con¬ cerning numbers and middl'-s, Pinto uulolds the being itself of tlit* soul, and shows liovv it is one au*l many, what progressions n has, ami what regressions both to superior natiin s, and to itself; how it produces and converts things pos¬ terior to itself; and how it fills with ratios, and binds together the whole world. But m what he says concerning tin* right line and circles, he delivers to us the vital and intellectual peculiarity of the soul, and indicates how it participates of

' For •) licrr, a lire* w.v*\ to r*\i*l >«.

1 I lisle v«l of n-.Xin.n in tins |il.icr,il i-. oliwoutlv *icccs>-rtry to rc.ul turpi tut.

1 (1 \oyni litre aj>|it-.in lo In: wi|*crllti*«i>, av is alsorij* rw not in the nest line. For llic original is, rrpt r/r o \oyvt vntrn\‘ On trvrtvu roOy rov noi, cai rrjt -on not , tat rij* wpot ro tr mrrafjiji.

116

1'HOCLl'S ON THE

[hook ii r

oliwoutlv *icccs>-rtry to rc.ul turpi tut.

1 (1 \oyni litre aj>|it-.in lo In: wi|*crllti*«i>, av is alsorij* rw not in the nest line. For llic original is, rrpt r/r o \oyvt vntrn\‘ On trvrtvu roOy rov noi, cai rrjt -on not , tat rij* wpot ro tr mrrafjiji.

116

1'HOCLl'S ON THE

[hook ii r

tlw* lift* in intellect, and how it is converted to itself, so far as it is self-vital and self-moved. For the ri^ht line manifests the progression oftlie psychical life from more excellent natures; hut the inflexion into a circle indicates intellectual cir¬ culation. For the soul is allotted this power, and also that which is productive of the life in itself, from its father. Since however, the psychical life is tw ofold, the one heiii£ diunoetic, hut the other doxa>lic, two lines present themselves, and are l>ent into two circles.

For the soul is allotted this power, and also that which is productive of the life in itself, from its father. Since however, the psychical life is tw ofold, the one heiii£ diunoetic, hut the other doxa>lic, two lines present themselves, and are l>ent into two circles.

In short therefore, the essence of the soul, hein*; a whole and consisting of parts, is harmonized nmnher. Hut its life is rectilinear, and is uniform and In¬ formed And ils intellect i> dianoetic and doxa-tic. For tliere are in it Im- intr, life, and inti Heel. Oi rather prior to the gnostic, perceiv iii” that the vital pow ers are m themselves at one and the same tune tian-itive, and self-motive, we must say, that the ri"lit hue aiiuinlirates the transitive, hut the circle, the self-motive nature of these powers. For they are moved from themselves to themselves. 11 t no Timaus delivering to ns in what is here said, the \ ital motion hy its»-lf alone, assumes the rectilinear, and the circular motion, hut in what follows unfolds the gnostic motions of the eiri h-s ; the soul now In ruining sell-motive, in coiiseipienee of the whole of it inov in*; itself. It therefore, we now admit that tin: ri*_;ht lines are lives, and these essential; oil which account aUo, the I)eiiiiui”us made the composition ot the soul itsi li to he rei tiinn ir, as p<isM-ssiii<r hie hy its v» rv exist¬ ence ;—if wc admit this, tin n we mti -t s,»y, that the « in le manifests \\ hat the ipia litv is of tin* form of this life, viz. that it is self-moved, he^inniu^ from, and returning to its* It; and that it is not hk« (lie lit« of irrational natures, tending to externals as it were in a liidit line, as in ver lit 1114 aide to t oiivi i^e to itself, and as having an appetit* dir* ( tt d to otln r things placed externally to itsell 1 or the st If motive nature is moved truin itsell to itsell, sees itself, ami is present with itself, lienee also, such a form of life as this is circular. lor in a circle, the same tiling is the end and the hc^iuniii^, in the same manner as 111 that which is converted to, he”ms from, and ends in itself". I’lie ri^lit line therefore and tin* circle of tin-soul, are without interval; the former heim; I lie linage of life fsimplvl, hut the latter of life couverlive to itsell, and not absolutely of all life. I dr hoth these may he surveyed in souls; the ri^lil line indeed, according to the transi¬ tions of appetites; hut the circle a< coniine to a circumduction from the satin things to the same. And this Socrates knowing, says in the Fhadrus, that souls are carried round lira circle, revolving under iulrllieihh-s as ohjecLs of desire, lieine at different times happily afh i ted hy diflerent things, and n turning' from the same objects to the same. \\ hy therefore, should we any longer fear those skilful IVripateties, who ask us, what kind of line l*!ato here assumes f Is it

IiO O K 111.]

TI.M.TXS or PL \T< >

117

\\ hy therefore, should we any longer fear those skilful IVripateties, who ask us, what kind of line l*!ato here assumes f Is it

IiO O K 111.]

TI.M.TXS or PL \T< >

117

physical line? lint this would lip absurd : for this is the rnd of bodies. Is it tlioii a mathematical line? Hut tliis is not splt-moiivr, and is not essence. Plato how¬ ever says,' that the soul is an essence, and is spparatr from bodies. We say therefore, that they in vain make tin sr inquiries. For long before this, we have not erased asserting that this line is essential. And prior to us Xenoeratrs calls a line of this kind indivisible. I 1 nr it would be ridiculous in anv one to think, that there is an indivisible magnitude. It is evident however, that Xenoerates thought it requisite to rail the essential reason of a line an indivisible* line. Rut Plato, for the sale of concealment, employed mathematical names, as veils of the truth of things, in the same manner as thcnligis/.s employed fables, and the Pythagoreans symbols. For it is possible in images to survey paradigms, and through the former to pass to tin latter. Against sueh men however, as these Peripatetics, who are contentious, no arguments are sufficient. Rut let us return to the words of Plato, and direi t our attention to each of them.

Since therefore, the soul is one, is divided according to its parts, and is both one and many, Plato denominates it tins, as l>< inir one, but all, as b< ing multitude, an i\ composition, as both ; whirl) also show> that the csseitee of it differs both from things dis< ri le, and things continuous, For these are without communion 1 with each otlu r. Rut the soul i* one, and at the same Iim<• multitude, and is discrete, and continued. Since Imwevi r tin- psyehical reasons are Informed ; for the soul is of an ambiguous nature, and has two faces, conformabli/ to its para¬

Rut the soul i* one, and at the same Iim<• multitude, and is discrete, and continued. Since Imwevi r tin- psyehical reasons are Informed ; for the soul is of an ambiguous nature, and has two faces, conformabli/ to its para¬

digm, so that it in teller tually perceives the impartible essence through the circh of tin same, but contains ami connects the partible essence, through the circle of the different ; — lienee Plato rails it double. Rut because it has the same reasons or ratios, above and beneath, and not as some fancy, the duple ratios here, but the triple there, on this account, lie delivers it to us divided according to length. For this div ision alone, pvt serves every when- the same ratios. Rut the scission itself exhibits demiurgic si etion, which is appropriate to the l)i miurgiis. For the dead is seated by him, and is refulgent w ith intellectual sections, as some one of the (iods savs. 4 Moreover, the won Is “ middle to middle" indicate perhaps, that the division and contact of things intangible, are adapted to the psychical middle : for thev subsist in a middle way. For in intellect also there is division, ltccau.se there is difference, but it subsists primarily, and as it were occultly, and indivisible. In sensible* likewise there is division, but according to an ultimate distribution in-

* for fynenv lirrc, I rr.nl ipij/jir.

* Tlir word tiTVftov oiiulted in tlic original.

* For nm >jra here, it is ncccssarv lo read asoirovijra:

* Tim is asserted in ouc of the Cbahlcau oracles.

116

I'KOCLDS ON THE

BOOK lll.j

* Tlir word tiTVftov oiiulted in tlic original.

* For nm >jra here, it is ncccssarv lo read asoirovijra:

* Tim is asserted in ouc of the Cbahlcau oracles.

116

I'KOCLDS ON THE

BOOK lll.j

to parts. Hence also the union in these is obscure am! evanescent. Ilut in the soul both have a iniilille subsistence, in away adapted to it. And if indeed Plato had spoken concerning intellect and soul, he would have said, that the Dt-miurgus ap¬ plied the first to the middle, and if about body and soul, that he applied the middle to the last. But since he teaches us concerning the psychical duad, he say > that the Deniiurgus applied middle to middle. I 'el liajis loo, lit* says tins, be« a Use t lie con¬ tact of the soul is properly of a middle nature. 1'or the last part of the dianoetie. and the summit of the doxa-fie power, form the media of all the ps\ < bit al com¬ position. But tlu m 1 are conjoined to t leb oilier, and conformably to tin >e, one union is produced ot lbe>e two lives. lor in evt ry order t»l beings, the bases of first are united to the summits of >ei olid try n itiui '. The figure X however, pro¬ duced hv this applic atioii, lias a uit at allinity to the universe, and also to tin* soul. And a* I , orf>hi/n/ rclati s a character of this Lind, viz. X, surrounded by a arch,' is tilth the Ift/fitians a symbol of' tin mundane soul. I’m per'haps it signifies, through the riirlit lines indeed, tin* hilnriucd promes-mm of tin* sold, but through tin* cir¬ cle it-. mu I* »i in life, and regression according to an iutt-lh i tual « iri'le ^ e must not however conceive, that Plato thought a div me essence eolibl be iliseov'♦■red through these tiling'. I or tin* truth ot real beings • iniiot, as some lain y. be known from characters, positions, and vocal emissions. But these are alter all¬ ot her man ii« r symbols ot div iin* nalon - l or as a a i tain motwu, so tiheu ise a 11 riant figure and colour, are symbols of this laud, as the initiators into mysteries say. I or ditlerent characters and also diHeivnl signatures arc adapted to dithrent (mils; just as the present character is adapti d to tin soul. For the complication of the right biu*s indicates tlu* union «• I i hiloinu d lib* l or a ri"ht bin* itsi !t nUn,

a symbol ot a life which (lows from on lii"li. In mdt r however, that we may not, omitting the tilings l!n*iiisi Ives, be loo busily employed about tin* theory ot the character, Plato adds “ as it were,' indicating that tills is assumed as a veil, and fur the sake of concealment, thus endeavouring to invest with figure the mi- tigured nature of the sutil.

“ Afterwards lie bent them into a circle, connecting them botli with themselves, and with each other, in such a manner that their extremities might be combined in one, directly opposite to the point ol their mutual intersection. ’

That what is said hv Plato manifests through right lines the progression ot

’

That what is said hv Plato manifests through right lines the progression ot

* lustinJ of m/.Xoi m lias plate, il is requisite to read i;Oj

nook III.]

TIM AX'S or PLATO

I IfI

the soul, ami its providential attention to alter-motive natures, is I think evident tromvvh.it has heen already observed. And I also think it is proper to deliver the inlleetion into a eirrie analogous to these tilings. For since regressions an* in omit i in lit v with progressions, recalling fto the principle] things which have proceeded from it, lienee Plato says, that the light lines were Is nt into circles. Ami since also, the vital nature of the soul is intellectual, and npncataslutir, and evolves inti Iligihli- multitude, hence it is restored to the .same tiling again. Iie- eaiise likewise, it moves alter-nintive natures, the soul being converted to, and moving it sell’. a*» uding to all these particulars, circulation pertains to it. For the progression of it e> in continuity with its regression ; since it is not imperfect. And the motion of alter-inotive natures is suspended tmin the self-uiotive life. As the one of these also, is not siibv* rte*d, hut perfected by the other, after the sanu in.inner the composition ot .he right lilies is nut destroyed through the in¬ flection into < irclcs. hut the former remaining, the circles are generated. For all things subsist at on* e in the soul, so that as the continuous is simultaneous with til*' discrete, thus also me circular with tin* rectilinear. For it is necessary that the right and the circular should remain, just as the impartible and the partible sul>- sU( i _”ih<T in tin* s*itil. For the Demiiirgus makes eternally, so that the things vvhieii ;nv generated l»y him, an* entirely perpetual. Hence the right and the circular line are simultaneous in the soul, whatever each of them may he.

For the Demiiirgus makes eternally, so that the things vvhieii ;nv generated l»y him, an* entirely perpetual. Hence the right and the circular line are simultaneous in the soul, whatever each of them may he.

What therefore are tin* twofold circles, and how arc they in the highest degree adapt* <1 to the soul l If tin n the essence of the soul proceeding from intellect, was such as to l><‘ * ntirelv diilcrcnt from tin* intell* dual pccnli irity, the circular form would not he adapted to it. But since it is intellectual according to par¬ ticipation, and ail evolved and Informed int* llecl, oil account of its intellectual nature, it is a circle unligured, without magnitude, and self-motive ; hut on ac¬ count of its dyadic 1 nature, it is a twofold circle. For its progression also, in the same maun* r as its regression, is twofold, and its reason is twofold ; so that its int*-ll< dual participation is twofold according to its lives. .Since however, these hv« s are conjoined according to their fust progression, hut in proceeding are divided from each other, hut after the progression are again converted to their principles, hence they are again conjoined according to the peculiarity its*-|f of regr* ssion ; the first adaptation of the lines manifesting permanency ; hut their separation from eaeli other by division, their progression ; and their inflection/ their regression again to the same thing. For tin* more divine life which subsists

1 for (inttihkov Ii*t*\ il i* olmoutly nrrcnary to r*a*t ivufu>ov.

* \flrr rt)»tt nw' oAAijXwr t^iww in the original, the word* rqy wpvcfer, r»j« tt garanaftyrm arc c»i- dcntlv wauling.

120

IMtOCLUS ON T11E

[BOOK Ilf*

For tin* more divine life which subsists

1 for (inttihkov Ii*t*\ il i* olmoutly nrrcnary to r*a*t ivufu>ov.

* \flrr rt)»tt nw' oAAijXwr t^iww in the original, the word* rqy wpvcfer, r»j« tt garanaftyrm arc c»i- dcntlv wauling.

120

IMtOCLUS ON T11E

[BOOK Ilf*

according to regression, conjoins the end of itself with the beginning; and tlir more subordinate life converts the progression of itself to that which abides. Hence it converts this progression to the one intellect both of itsell, and of the more excellent life. The conjunction, therefore, of the two lives is there the contact of the one, being in an opposite direction to that of the other; because the union of the one is according to progression, but ot the other, according to re¬ gression, and regression is contrary to progre—>1011 ; tor the latter p. >tains to the nature of sameness, but the former to that of dill, rente. The lath r also imparts a collective similitude [but tin former, di\ision in the progressions.'] For their opinion must not lie admitted, who contend that the figure of the soul truly con¬ sists of two Circles. For if the < irch s are without breadth, how is it possible to cut one of them, since it has no latitmh ? lint if they are certain rings, how can the soul if it consists of these, be every way extended from the middle to the ex¬ treme heaven * For after what manner can rings be extruded through the whole of a spherical body? To which may he added, that these circles being corpo¬ ral will exhibit to tb a certain body « xlcrn d to the universe, and will also pro¬ duce a certain vacuum in the siiperticii s ot t!it- sphere, m consequence ot sunound- mg it, as is evident in the rings ot spheres. And il they are circles, t it \ must have profundity together with tin* body oflhe universe, on account ot their station from the middle as far as to the extremities of the world. It is necessary there¬ fore to conceive this vivitir figure ot the soul to he unligmvd, anti without interval, unless we intend to fill ours. Ives ami also the theory of Plato with much absurd¬ ity, such as that which is noticed by Aristotle, who on the -.opposition that the ^oul is a magnitude, demonstrates that as siirli it is alone partible, hut by iu> means impartible, ihougli its essenee, together with partibility, has also nnpaitihi- Jitv. lint whether it is a circle, or a ring, it will alone have a partible, anil by no

means an impartible nature.

“ JJe likewise comprehended them on till sides m that motion which convolved according to the same and in the same.

The mode of conception of the divine Iamblit 1 ms in what is here said, is truly divine, and firmly aillieres to the meaning ot Plato ; since he does not, like the interpreters prior to him, think that the motion which is convolved according to

The mode of conception of the divine Iamblit 1 ms in what is here said, is truly divine, and firmly aillieres to the meaning ot Plato ; since he does not, like the interpreters prior to him, think that the motion which is convolved according to

‘ The words within ihe brackets are »a«lin« in the original, hut arc supplied from llir vrrsmu ol Tltoiimii Heine alter the words avntyuiyvv i^mirijm oWui-t, it is naoun to ill i'll v ,r

htuijnct ► run ■xfH.bt'in.

> - III.

TIMvEUS OF PLATO.

121

"- 1 - u '* an ^ m 1 1‘'- sarnr, should bo understood :»s p rl Miiin^ to fhr soul 1

o! * o tioa of the soul is now in it, and not about it. II ronoives tii t il lb'* motion now spoken of pertains to inlelh-ei and m * inlellei tin! li e 1 • . ■ i no part of the remainder of this Dialogue s IMato appear to conjoin 1,,t ; « ' irtelhet. It is necessary, ho\ve\er. tliat lie siiould. in order that by

'1 *• • .1 he may demonstrate the universe to be an animal endued with soul

1 *" 1 W v nii, 't tie re fore conceive the motion which is convolved ac-

° 1 ’ ,5 "‘ “ml in the same; to be intellectual, l or this comprehends

tli. soul in the same maum r as the soul circularly covers tin* heaven as with a l"* ect, howeier, i-indeed an immovealile motion ; fm it subsists wholly 1,1,1 u>,ii* illy at mice. Hut soul is a self-moved motion. And the former is uni- toiui, but the luller bitormed. I lie lormer also is one and indivisible, but the iatli I i! vides and multiplies itsell. I lie soul, however, participates of intellect so far as it is inlellei tmd; and tlirmi”li it is conjoined to a divine mb llect. l-'or the soul of the universe purtieipal in- of intellect, ascends to the im. lli-ilile. It is in cessary, therefore, that the motion whu h iscircumvolved in tie same and about the same should tie inlelleetual, bein^ dill' ii u! from the motion o| the two circles, since it comprehends them. We miisi say, therefore, either that this motion per¬ tains to a participated intellect, which is proximately seated above the soul, or that it should be the motion of the Domm-ie of the soul. The latter however is impossible. Hence it must be admitted that this is the motion of a participated intellect. Hut that the motion which is convolved according to the same, and in the same. In in; mb lh ctual. and above the soul, is not the motion of die Demi- ur-us, may be learnt by con«idi iiii„, that he made the universe to be endued with inu-lhct, not nivim; himself to tin* miner*..*, m the same manner as the soul, but imparting to it another participated inti li. cl, which w ( li ue before ih moiistratcd

cl, which w ( li ue before ih moiistratcd

to be seat, d above tin* soul. l or plat im; intelh-et m soul.' but soul in body, In fashioned the univ. rse. And it is evi.h ut that he did not . (T> rt tins bv placing Imuscll in soul. Fur it would be rmieu'oiis tirat h** -l.onlo e i-arra iilk* himself with soul, hems wpanile from it. l*Lio then fore says, i„ what follows, of all [irue] heiiu, that m itlu r doe> any ollu i tiling proceed mto it, nor docs it proceed into any otlu * tiling. Hut this beinj; Inn , the Hemim^iis will not place himself in soul; and before he constitutes soul, suhsi-din:; by liims. If, lie will generate another bein^j, winch "hen lie hud venerated soul, he placed m the soul. If, however, this be line, die motion oi that intellect, winch is circumvolvcd accordin'* to the

* tor ijv-vyi i»«re, it is iitr»*»'.ar\ to rend rr vv\’l-

* It u ucrowry licre to su)>|>ly T.

VoI.. II.

Tim. Plat.

Q

I'ROCLL S ON T1IK

[book 111.

1 * 2*2

*>aine, and in the Mime, will comprehend these psychical circles, and not the motion of him who constituted both this intellect and soul, and who shortly after is s ud to abide in his accustomed iiuinm r, t xeinpt and separate from the universe. The mundane intellect therefore, is the intellec t of which we are speaking, the life of which comprehends the psychical lues, viz. the uniform life comprehends the Informed Iims, arid the eternal lit* the liies which are not eternally moved. Hence the whole soul proceeds alter this manner, being a monad and a duad, and as is e\ iilent from what has been said, w it hunt difleivnce w it h respect to itself. That which remains therefore, I’lato drillers in what follows, viz. how from the demiurgic divisions, one ot the circles contains m itself that which is more divine, but the other, that which i» more subordinate. For we have assumed tile's. 1 things for the sake of perspicuity Hut let us hear what is next said by Plato.

“ Ami ho made one ot the circles to be external, but the other internal. lie denominated therefoie, the lation ot the external circle, the motion of the nature of same ; but the lation ot the internal, the motion of the nature ol ililleri lit. ’

“ Ami ho made one ot the circles to be external, but the other internal. lie denominated therefoie, the lation ot the external circle, the motion of the nature of same ; but the lation ot the internal, the motion of the nature ol ililleri lit. ’

The divine Jumhlichiis refers these divine circles to the intellect which is sepa¬ rate, and to the mulled which is inseparable from souls, and to the motion which is com uli ed in the same, and on all sides comprehends them ; so that one of the circles comprehends the two .souls, but the other is in them ; and the one is un- miiigled with the other lilt 1 and the powers of the soul, bill the other is mingled with anti governs them; from which cause likewise, the whole soul, stably ener¬ gizes, ami is united to the Demiurgiis himself. \\ e however interpret the two t irt les to be the two-fold liies of tin* souls, n/. the proiuh ntially energizing 1 ami convertiie or regressive lives; and abo to be the two-fold powers, the diano- ♦ tic and duxastic. For the soul of the universe has both these; since Plato likewise ill the Pha dills says, that of tin 1 horses, out* pertains to tin nature of saim', but the other to the nature of i!i/fcrmt, though he also attributes horses to the finds,* hut such as are good, and consisting of tilings that are good. Here therefore the external circle is dianoetic, but the internal dosasfic. For the De-

* 1 nr * t-ijrivm hi llin it is in-ccssars lo nail »(<oicijrn«i». tor tlie Mini of lilt uinifn* always

liulli |«nn i ll nlully .uni rumritist Is, .uni llic lallrr energy is iiilclltclivc. linin', tlnrc would In 1 a laululocs in saying, the intr/ltctiie and cvmtr'ivt li\f>.

* 1 nr row 0 '<>vi line, it is necessary to rc.ul ren

HOOK III]

TIM /ELS OF PLATO.

123

linin', tlnrc would In 1 a laululocs in saying, the intr/ltctiie and cvmtr'ivt li\f>.

* 1 nr row 0 '<>vi line, it is necessary to rc.ul ren

HOOK III]

TIM /ELS OF PLATO.

123

iniurgus imparted to tlir* dianoctir circle a power, according to which it is more divine than the doxastic eir< le. J'or it is more united, and is inteliectual. For you must not suppose that to denominate, is the mere position of a name, hut in the dianoetie eirele is a participation of power, effective of sa meness; and in the dox- astic circle, or difference. Prior to this, therefore, Plato taught us the similitude of the soul itself to itself; hut now lie adds the transcendency and diminution of it with reference to itself, winch it possesses, and received from the Demiurgus; who made one of the circles to he external, so far as he rendered it more similar to intellect and the intelligible ; for they are properly external, as being exempt from all secondary natures; hut the other internal, as being contained by the more ex- cel'ent circle, as being that which ought to he governed by it, and as being of a subordinate nature. It was verv fir therefore from the intention of Plato, to adumbrate these circles mathematically, who, though they are equal, makes them to he unequal, and though they subsist similarly, rentiers them dissimilar, attributing to them for their essence, the demiurgic will.

It was verv fir therefore from the intention of Plato, to adumbrate these circles mathematically, who, though they are equal, makes them to he unequal, and though they subsist similarly, rentiers them dissimilar, attributing to them for their essence, the demiurgic will.

Some, however, here doubt, how. since the soul consists of similar parts, one of the circles pertains to sameness, but the other to dillerem e, ami the one is <]« nominated internal, but the other external ; for these things subvert similitude of parts. Porphyry, therefore, directing Ins attention to sensibles, and material mixtures, adduces as instances, water mingled with honey, and lmney mingled with wine; the whole consisting indeed of similar parts, but in dirterent persons producing a different passion. For some are more affected by the vinous flavour, hut others by the sweetness. Our father i. e. preceptor] however, thinks we should survey the mixture of the genera in a manner adapted to immaterial and incorporeal natures. But this is, not according to a confusion of forms, nor according to a corruption of powers, hut they lwing preserved, the mixture is according to a union and penetration of them through ear h other. For corruptions and the diminu¬ tions of powers, are m material natures, matter not being able to preserve ui hersi ll the dilleo lit peeuliarilies uucniiluscd and gt inline. For the peculiarity of immaterial mixture is for the same things to remain united and separated, and to lie co-mingled and uumingh d [hut in material mixture, the things which are mingled, arc said to he confused, and without separation from each other, Itecause this mixture is through computrefaction, and corruption].' It is easy likewise to call to our remembrance such-like immaterial mixtures as we speak of, from the sciences, from physical reasons, and from a multitude of lamps. For the many

* In the origins! iicrc, tin re i< nothing inure Ilian, to ra ^irvn m« nbuitpim uir' aXAij\wr *1.11 The rest in Uir sIkivc translation » supplied Iroin the vcrsiou of Thnmxus.

124

IMIOCLUS ON Til F

[BOOK III.

For the many

* In the origins! iicrc, tin re i< nothing inure Ilian, to ra ^irvn m« nbuitpim uir' aXAij\wr *1.11 The rest in Uir sIkivc translation » supplied Iroin the vcrsiou of Thnmxus.

124

IMIOCLUS ON Til F

[BOOK III.

liplils which produce out! light, :»t the same time remain unconfnsed. And t!ie multitude of physical reasons subsistin'.; all of tliem at once, are at the same time separati d from each other, accordin'.; to physical dillerence. The many sciences al>o are in each other, and are unmm_ r l< d with each other, lint this is evident from llteir energies. I'or it is impossible f.«r things that an* confused to employ their prn|K*r energies with purity. Hut the sciences energize appropriatr lv each with purity in itself. If there on* the -emra of the soul are immaterially mingled, thev ari* in eaeh other, and are cstahli'ln d ill themselves. liy their suhsistiui; liki n i.-e in e.u li otlu r, 11 11 . \ cause the whole soul to he a-» it Wen* ot a similar colour. 1 letu r eu rv part ot it con'Ms <*t these •_;< in-ra. lint through tin* genera lieim; establi'hcd in llnni'clvi s, and pri'i-rvim; their \ roper purity, dill’, rent pro- jM-rties shine forth, according to the dilh n lit powers ot the soul, and some things fan - \ ail more than others. I'or m things wliich an* mingled through the whole of tin nisei\i ", and an corrupt! d ti.,i tin r, tin re is « utin lv a similitude of parts, anil I hi le Is id'll a similar form. Hut where then* is the unmiuah d in the mixture, the iinconfii'i d in the complication, and purity in the separation, then it is possible for whoh s to pi rvade through w hull s, in order that < .o li part may consist of all; uid for each put to remain in it'< It in ordertli.it on>* tiling may haw* dominion III allot III r. 1 leiiee, it is not at all wonderful. Mine all the mi a pervade throu-h i ai h ot In r 111 the soul, and pit o ive at the salm - lime the uh a ot t leliiselvt s, that in one pi ti e s mu ness should pii iloiiiiliati , lint in aiiolhi r, the nature ot (I I Hi *ri III * , ailil that the ”i mis 111 e'seiice should lie i oiniuoii. oiiilim, the one middle of the soul, Mia in dim; to whi< li il is a m< ilium hetwnu t! < UupaitiMe • s'i nee. and that whieh is divi'ihle iihout hodies. Il'Uee too, the mil H om I||e, iis helll” o||e essi III e, hill till 111** Is IlllolUU ll, IU the -> iltl* lll.illll* i as till i ssi nee i» twofold, on it i omit of the two m ra. \nd tlnin unu h m atiswi r to the dollllt.

< UupaitiMe • s'i nee. and that whieh is divi'ihle iihout hodies. Il'Uee too, the mil H om I||e, iis helll” o||e essi III e, hill till 111** Is IlllolUU ll, IU the -> iltl* lll.illll* i as till i ssi nee i» twofold, on it i omit of the two m ra. \nd tlnin unu h m atiswi r to the dollllt.

Hut it is evident that tin* words “ he ninth are most propiilv i -'■im d by 1*1 <to, mi or ill r that a^aili the toriil of the middle nature Ilia V he pn -» I v • d SU the same luanin r as before when In* said, the l)i iniur*_ns “ <v trjih U'ly jitU'J and “i i-ininnil.” The expression too, “ he ihiii'iminntt,!. i' hit r aim'd appropriately t.i tin times piopu'i-i| to I i di'i iissed. I or since n.iiiii s u<* i*v■ ■ • i to the • hi l* «, at emdii ; to that w hit h pieih'ininati s, the i\pie."ion ** In n'< umnuftl main 'Is that the appellation is "iveu to them, not limn the whole hy parvis, hut ti in that « ha h pn doinmales in them. To assign naim s lihcw me altci the pnahn lion nl tin* i iii It s ( ui inifest' that names properly so i alh d regard I hi n tine ot things, I'or the J >i minibus dm * not thus d< iiotninate that vv hi* hi > ? t 1 < in le of the -ame, but that which was constitute.d such hy him. Ot tall [Hud u tive

HOOK III.]

TIM AX S OF 1'LATO.

125

t 1 < in le of the -ame, but that which was constitute.d such hy him. Ot tall [Hud u tive

HOOK III.]

TIM AX S OF 1'LATO.

125

energy possesses 11 10 most principal cause of the name. Ami the position of the name is an etmclivo eiieigy, since intellection there is not separated from fabri¬ cation, hut tin ( «nds proiluce by the very energy of intellectual perrejition [i. c. their intellectual |> ixvption is elleclivel. I*or tlius also by giving names to, they constitute tilings lia ins.-U< s. Ami it it he ntjinsite for me to give* inv own opinion, we may through these tilings perceive the arcana of tin theory of Plato. For he not only deliv* rs the !)■ iniurgus as a mnnenclator, who hist p qus names tothe two i:i dilations ol the semi j out prior to these unfolds the essential cha¬ racter of ii, v /. two s ■panite n it h ics, and the y produced from them, and also the two eii’i ies n-rfied t.iint e^e lutes ; which things theurgy hk ( wi e iinfohh tl after him.* i.oii.^ < o; iph lion to the character of the soul from chiasmi * and se- inieireh s. P \rj cal ir*;iv tie r< fore and thnraclers were first ilelivt red to u hy IMaio. wine lit u ii eta,illy saw, and which tin \\be men posterior to ium cmhraeod. ] ; or it i> mr. ssaiy to think, that there are psychical characters, and not only such as are common, like these, hut such as an peculiar, and wine h an. diilerent in dilii n-ut soul-; such for instance as thosi* fit ii rc tiles, IN ntlu us, Atreus, and ol IMaio him-ell, delivered to us hv the (iods themselves. J hese however, it belongs to the* (iods alone both t<» know and to unfold ; but the cha¬ racter winch is c ommon to every soul, beginning from tin* soul of the universe, Plato lirst liehcld, and committed to writing. He also shows that tin - J>< niur- "us is the maker of this, who iiiMjribes in the essence of the soul its 1 vivilic cha¬ racter ; gives name's a s we have? said to its two intellectual circulations, and assumes these from his own essence. For it is the* Di-miingus himself, who is especially characterized according to these gene ra ol name, I mean the .same and ihc different ; since one ot these euun< ntly pertains to hnn, as giving form to mat* ter, according to the lerininatimi.s of forms ; but the other, as collecting multitude to the one idea of tin- fabric: c»f die universe* as one prodm lion. Ilemce* also with Orphe us, the Jb-miurgiis particularly inienugalcs Night concerning these things, and says,

*1 <ii me iicivi .ui limits vv<ll as one subvivi,

\ et eat ii its i.atme »t palate jut sc iu r

For ll.e l)i mi •••pis caiiv- i*aeh thing to jm serve ils nature, se parate from others through tul (*i e, hut Im mak« s dl things to Im* one through sameness. The Oracles iixe, «e, by asserting, that the Demiurgtis is refulgent widi inte llectual

* For )i r ~ u< -me here, it ts rn|in<ilr le< rr.lii p>r aero, ami lor Otu,iyiii Otai,’yia.

* C'/i 1 i. e. Ii^urtj iti I lie form ol tlir tiller

The Oracles iixe, «e, by asserting, that the Demiurgtis is refulgent widi inte llectual

* For )i r ~ u< -me here, it ts rn|in<ilr le< rr.lii p>r aero, ami lor Otu,iyiii Otai,’yia.

* C'/i 1 i. e. Ii^urtj iti I lie form ol tlir tiller

1 It ..in ssaiy here iu the worth roe £»toyotikiv a*’ itiriji j^a,>airr/fMi, to t x]>tui|;e ««■’

126

PROCLUS ON THE

[BOOK III.

sections, manifest that power of him which is effective of difference. Hut he fills all things with love through the power which is eflective of sameness. Hence he very projs rly gives these names which are demiurgic signatures, to the circh*s of the soul of the universe from his own esssmee. This name therefore, "the circle of the same," is a di\ine name, as hearing the signature of the intelligihh cause of sameness, as is likewise, “ the circle of the different,' a> possess¬ ing the svinhol of the nature of dilli-rence. for with rcloieiice to the genera of Ixing, one of these circles is allied to sameness, hut the other to dilli-rence; hut with reference to the intellectual Hods, one ol them is suspended from the paternal, connectedly-containing, and immutahlc causes, hut the other from the prolific and vivific causes. And as wuh reference to intelligihles, the one in a greater degree participates of hound, hut the other of infinity. These signatures therefore from all the orders, cause one ot these* circles to obtain sin h a name, lint the other, a contrary name.

Some i lie however liinv say, what, then, is the one essence of the soul destroyed in tin-division of these twofold circles* We reply, hy no im ails, l or in divine natnn division is s ( » mid to union, and progression is the medium In-tween stable jiovver, and the |n-rfection subsisting in conversion or regression. Hut since the soul is a monad essentially and a duud, one and multitude, ahidmg, and at the same lime proceeding and returning, and is also united prior to division ; -hence tin-mixture of the soul subsists one whole, prior to the many parts, and being divided according to progression, is again united according to regression. The h s> therefore, is comprehend* d in the greater circle, l or as intellect comprehends the soul, illuminating it with its own light, thus also tin: circle of the same 1 imparts union and perfection to the inch of the dtfftrent, rendering it uudi filed m its providt ntial energies, united in its progressions, and in a certain re-jM-ct intellectual in its knowledge of sensihles. Ileucc likewise, in an admira¬ ble manner, one of the circles subsists, and is denominated according to the same, hut the other according to the different. Hut tin- essential as ht-nig common to Inith, is omitted, and is attributed to no one of the parts. lienee the soul accord¬ ing to this is mie, hut a* cording to the two circles is Informed, these being after a certain manner opposed to each other.

Hut tin- essential as ht-nig common to Inith, is omitted, and is attributed to no one of the parts. lienee the soul accord¬ ing to this is mie, hut a* cording to the two circles is Informed, these being after a certain manner opposed to each other.

“ ! It* liken ise convolved the circle of the same, laterally towards the right hand, bul the circle of the different , diametrically towards the left hand."

1 For a. oc b re, il is accessary to I ravruv.

BOOK 111.]

TIM/El’S OF I’l.ATO.

1*27

What is here said, as that which remains to bo discussed, is concerning the psychical powers, and the demiurgic separation of them from each other. For power is after essence; but energy has the third order, as we have before observed. This nl-o Plato hinwlf manifests to us, denominating the motion of these circles, the lation of the same and the lotion of the different, but not the essence of these. From these two circles also, he generates different powers, and afterwards unfolds to vis what kind of energies they possess. Such things as these likewise, he ns>< its in the Pha-driis, concerning the better and the worse of the two horses of the soul. What therefore does he lien* say concerning the powers of thi‘soul of the universe ? In the first place, as I have said, he divides the whole powers into two, I mean into the power of the same, and the po\v» r of the different; the former being analogous to bound, but the latter to infinity. Afterwards, he divides the power of the different, according to other peculiarities, and again collects them into less numbers, and through sameness unites the multitude. In the next place, he attributes things more excellent and divine to the In tl< r, but things less excellent to the subordinate powers. Thus, for instance, he attributes a convolution towards the right hand, to the lation of the circle of the sunn, but to the left hand, to the lation of the circle o \ the different. And to the former lie attributes the lateral, but to the latter the diametrical. For in the two co-ordinations of things, in the more excellent series there are [the same, the right hand, the equilateral and the rational ; but in the less excellent series]' the contraries to these, the dillcreut, the left hand, the longer in the other part, and the irrational. Such therefore, is the whole meaning of the words lie fore us.

Such therefore, is the whole meaning of the words lie fore us.

Ia t us however see what the truth is of the things; and in the first place, if you are willing, let us show how the right and the left hand subsist in the universe. For 1 know that the (hcmouiacal Aristotle calls indeed the eastern p trt of tiie world the right hand, but the western the left hand; since the first motion is Iroin the eastern, but the motion posterior to this, from the we>ti ru part-. In all animals, however, the principle of motion is on the right hand. And in this thing Aristotle accords with the dor trine of Pluto, and also in what he asserts conn ‘ruing the same and dif}\rent. He sa\s therefore that the inerratic spin re is the cause to all things of sameness of subsistence, but the plain tary spheres of a subsistence different at different times. This* however appears to me to be tin* illustrious peculiarity of the Platonic doctrine, that it dors not define these things according to our habitude, but delivers these proper-

1 1 lie word* within ttie brar kets are omitted in llic nrignt.il, but art* sii|>|diid from the version of " Thomaeus. Hence after tlic words r»-i fitv nj« rprirrorut nrrtv irnpat m the original, it is necessary fe» add, ro r avror, to rs toovXtvpor, to Xoyistie* in t r rip ^ofioroi, (. X.

I’HOCLUS ON THE

[BOOK III

1-20

Hence after tlic words r»-i fitv nj« rprirrorut nrrtv irnpat m the original, it is necessary fe» add, ro r avror, to rs toovXtvpor, to Xoyistie* in t r rip ^ofioroi, (. X.

I’HOCLUS ON THE

[BOOK III

1-20

Ut-N as proceeding from tin- fabrication itself of things. For if the ttemiurgus himself inserts in divine souls t!u: right hand and the left, each of these did not proceed into the world, < ither according to our position, or as a mere habitude, but they are essential peculiarities ■ ju-t as the paternal and maternal in the Cods, are the peculiarities of divine « ssenci >. lor e\t n m partial animals nature does not constitute some of tin* paits on the right, and otln rs on the left hand, accord¬ in': to men* habitude, hut according to physical powers. Anil this is evident from her fashioning some ot the parts on one side, but others [dillereiil liom these on the other side ; and making this to be the principle of motion, but that not. 'Ibis brim: the case, \\ hat ought we tothink lonerrningthr tabrieation its' hot tilings * Js it that it exhibits one tiling on the ri”lit hand, but anotlu r on tin* left, according to habitude alone* Hut how is tins possible, if we admit that it produces by its verv existi in e that w liu b it piodui es, or that a iliv me soul is an essence exempt from every tiling wliieb introduces accidents * Or must we not assert, it this is granted, that tin* nature ol the lalun ation ol things is in a greater decree gene¬ rative of essence than a divine soul is* Hut as it appears to me, w« must say that this soul physically in si its in bodies the right band and the lell, and sus¬ pends from its' If m a gnat« r d. give the right band as the prim ipb* of motion Hence, by a much greater priorilv, it is lit that the maker ol soul should pro- dun both tin -e di miiirgii ally in binisi If, and the light hand an intake as it were of himself; and thus m tin* world, that the inerratic sphere shouhl be circuiil- volv d to the 11” III, but the plain I ary sphere to tile a It * the loriili r hav mg a piiin- ordial life, aenie ol power, and i tlieaeious «inrgy ; blit the latter b« in'; prolific and \ arioiis, and Irom another source than ilsrll iv< riv mg the principles ol nin- tioii, lb lu e aHo in the univi rse the ineiratic spin re lias dominion uv r all dungs, convolving all tilings accord 111*4 to one circle; but the planetary sphere is mul¬ tiform, and as we hav said, is tin* cause ol dilh n lire to generated naturi s. And the one is the mi 11, ol lilt' Heel, but the other ol soul ; for tin* circle ol tin sonic is intellei tual. I11 the soul of the univi rse however, the ri^lit hand is lli.it which is coiivcit'd to inti Ihgihl.s, to truly existing beings, and the (>ods: lor it is a power which tills the soul with di»ine lilt . Hut tin 1 » It hand is that which is converted to the care, and ordeily distriliiituni of setisibles: b»r it is a power, motive ol all '•■eondaiv nature*; and stdivertivc of iiiordiiiatioti. It also produces separation and v.iiii ty in dt miurgii works.

Hut tin 1 » It hand is that which is converted to the care, and ordeily distriliiituni of setisibles: b»r it is a power, motive ol all '•■eondaiv nature*; and stdivertivc of iiiordiiiatioti. It also produces separation and v.iiii ty in dt miurgii works.

Farther still, the being convolved dumutricollu iiccorui/tg to the left /mini, may be s.ui! to i oiupn In nd the motion from the vvt >t to the east, and the motion to the obhtpic parts, thioi'gli tin; ohlnpiity [of tin zodiac]. Hut you may say that in the soul ISC If, tin cm W of diilcrcnce, being gnostic of all sensible natures, at once

tlOnK III.]

TIM/EUS OF 1*1,AT(>.

12<>

to i oiupn In nd the motion from the vvt >t to the east, and the motion to the obhtpic parts, thioi'gli tin; ohlnpiity [of tin zodiac]. Hut you may say that in the soul ISC If, tin cm W of diilcrcnce, being gnostic of all sensible natures, at once

tlOnK III.]

TIM/EUS OF 1*1,AT(>.

12<>

comprehends tlie cpjadniple order of things, through the four centres, ac¬ cording to which the visible motion of the bodies that revolve to the left hand and diametrically is effected ; just as the circle of the same, knows in— telligiblcs as primordial causes, as supernally unfolding all secotulary na¬ tures, and convolving according to one union the various order of sensibles. Again also, these things accede to the soul according to its similitude to the zr/iule vivificaticn For as the soul is a monad and duad according to this, so likewise it is allotted through it the right hand and the left. For in the vholc vivi/ication, these tilings first present themselves to the view, and are derived from it; one multitude being produced from the right hand, but another from the left hand parts, zchdhcr you call them head*, or hands, or intestines. For according to all these, theologists deliver to us the prolific powers of the Goddess. These things however being appropriately asserted, it is evident that it is not the same thing to say that a certain thing is moved on the right, or on the left hand, and that it is moved towards the right or the left hand parts. For the bitter of these assertions is attributed to tilings that are moved in a circle, manifesting that to be mou <i to the right hand parts is to be moved to that part to which the right band moves, and also that to be moved to the left band parti, is to lie moved to that part to which the left band moves. Since therefore, the right hand and the h it are called the east and the west through the before-mentioned causes, so that the lonner is the beginning of motion, hut the latter billows, and m a similar man¬ ner, the one being a power m the circle of the same, hut the other in the circle of the different, from which the motion of each is derived, the words “ towards the right and the left hand, are very projterly introduced by Plain. But to Ik* moved on the right hand or on the left, pertains to things that are moved in a right line, these being the boundaries * of the motions according to breadth. Hence ’1 imams, having before separated the six motions in a right line, from the motion in a circle, and lieginning in what is now said, from the soul, deservedly gives to it the difference of the millions towards the right and the left hand. And thus much concerning tlie^e motions.

Hence ’1 imams, having before separated the six motions in a right line, from the motion in a circle, and lieginning in what is now said, from the soul, deservedly gives to it the difference of the millions towards the right and the left hand. And thus much concerning tlie^e motions.

Lot u>, however, consider the remaining opposition. For Tiimrus, as in the world, convolves the inerratic sphere according to the side,but the planetary sphere according to the diameter, just as in the soul he convolves the circle of the same laterally, hut the circle of the different diametrically. In the first place, therefore, this must he considered mathematically, by drawing in a quadrilateral figure a

1 i. f. To Ccrrs, or RSiea, who contains in her n»ht hand parts Juno tefou stain ofaoula, and m lirr left Vesta the fountain of virtue.

’ For wopa ra ot ra here, it is necessary to read wcpnra orrn.

Am. Plat. Vol. II.

n

130

PItOCLUS ON Till*'

[BOOK 111.

diameter, and conceiting thnt the circle of the same,' is convolved according to the side, hut the c ircle of the different . according to the diameter of the figure. The quadrilateral figure, also, must Ik- adapted to the two circles, i. e. to the sum¬ mer and winter tropics; and we must conceit e, that they are moved with the motion towards tin* right hand parts, according to the two >ides which are simi¬ larly posited in hoth the circles ; and also that the nnddio or the circle of the jtfwu’j is united according to the gn atest of the two circ es, hut that the eucle ot the different, which is ohliqiiewith n fen-nee to hotli, is moved according to the diameter of this quadrilateral figure. For the oblique circle [i. e. tin* zodiac] is described about this, according to which all the period of the circle of the different is convolved.

For the oblique circle [i. e. tin* zodiac] is described about this, according to which all the period of the circle of the different is convolved.

Ideating however the mathematics, let us consider what the jiecuhanties are of the diameter and the side. For we shall find those of the latter to he, the unolr hque, the effahle, the comprehensive, and that which is connective of angles; hut on the contrary those of the former to he, obliquity, the irrational, the com¬ prehended, and that which divides angles. For according to all these \u culian- ties, the side difii-rs from the diameter. And llu-a* also are inherent in the cn- cles of the soul, l’or one ot flies** circles i-* all ed to simplicity, hound, and cud ; hut the other to variety, multitude, and the nature win* h possesses infinite power. The one likewise is connective, hut die other is the cause of division. And the .un¬ is allotted the dignity of comprehending, but the oilier that of bring comprehended. Hence the one is very prop* rly said to he convolved according to the side, as im¬ mutable, 1 as united, and as uniform ; hut tin* oilier according to tin: diameter, as rejoicing in progression, and multiplications, and as effective of dillereuce. For the diameter is greater in power than the side, divides the angles, makes many spaces from one, and is situated obliquely. Hence in what follows, Flato say s, that the lalion of the circ le ot the different is oblique. But a., t ie.->e partic » ais are indications of the nature of the infinite.

“ B u t he gave dominion to the circulation ot the same and similar. For lie suffered it alone to remain undivided.

Tins is the demiurgic sacred law, intelligibly proceeding from on high from in- telligibles; viz. that more simple should predominate over more various nature s,

* Tbt- circle of tfu tamt, is iu the universe the equinoctial circle; and the circle of Me tl.fltrtnt, •» ill* zodiac.

4 K. r ot tins place, read owa/uiAXa*xo».

HOOK III.]

TIM.IX'S OI FLAK).

131

that more simple should predominate over more various nature s,

* Tbt- circle of tfu tamt, is iu the universe the equinoctial circle; and the circle of Me tl.fltrtnt, •» ill* zodiac.

4 K. r ot tins place, read owa/uiAXa*xo».

HOOK III.]

TIM.IX'S OI FLAK).

131

the morr uniform over the multiplied, linitos over infinites, and t{ie more nv»*r tin* less intellectual. As therefore in inlclligibles, hound lias dominion over the infi¬ nite, in inteller turds tin* male ou r the female, in supermundane natures sameness over difference, and similitude mu dissimilitude, thus also in the soul, the period of the same predominate over the circulation of the different. Hence also in sen- sibles, the planetary is under th** dominion of the iuerratic sphere, <md every multiform genus of life is contained by the uniform genera. Hr nice from these things likewise it may he assumed, that sameness is Letter than difference; that again similitude appears to l>e more excellent than dissimilitude; and that the opinion of the generality of l'lulnni*ts is not true, that difference is Letter than sameness and dissimilitude th in similitude. For on account of the form itself of sameness, the circle of the same is more divine. For the undivided , signifies divine union, an indivisible life, and uniformity in powers. \\ by therefore, someone may say, if this is better, rltrl not the Dr miurgus sutler the whole soul to l>e undi- vided ? We reply, because it is requisite 1 that the soul should possess all forms, and all the reasons and causes of mundane natures. And that which is compre¬ hensive of twofold circles, I'i morr.-perfect than that which is deli tied according to one power. For that which is after such a manner the same, as in sameness to comprehend difference occullly, is more excellent than that which subsists ac¬ cording to the psychical middle. Hut it fx-rlains to the essence of the soul to have dominion over difference, in conjunction with sameness. For the intelligible and intelbrt, are as it were the circle of sameness alone, lint the sensible essence, is as it were the circle of difference alone. For in the former, difference subsists occultly; hut in the latter, sameness has an obscure and superficial subsistence. And the soul i* a medium between both, being a duatl, and having twotohl cir¬ cles, one of which pertains to intellect, hut the other to the sensible essence. It likewise possesses twofold reasons, the one intellectual, hut the other effective of the world ; and the one proceeding to truly existing Iwings, but the other coming into contact with seiixiblcs.

It likewise possesses twofold reasons, the one intellectual, hut the other effective of the world ; and the one proceeding to truly existing Iwings, but the other coming into contact with seiixiblcs.

“ But as to the interior circle, when lie had divided it six times, and ^ had produced seven unequal circles, each according to the interval of the double and triple ; each of the intervals being three ; lie ordered the circles [i. e. orbs] to proceed in a course contrary to each other; three of them indeed revolving with a similar celerity, but the other four dissimilarly to each other, and to the three, yet in a due proportion."

’ For here, read ibi.

PKOCLFS ON Till,

[BOOk. III.

13*2

e. orbs] to proceed in a course contrary to each other; three of them indeed revolving with a similar celerity, but the other four dissimilarly to each other, and to the three, yet in a due proportion."

’ For here, read ibi.

PKOCLFS ON Till,

[BOOk. III.

13*2

In the first place, if you are willing, let us now surrey "hat is said by Plato, astronomically. For this mode of doctrine is appropriate, and let us conceive the depth of the planetary spheres, as one tiling, and throughout similar to itself; because, as those who are skilful in things of this kind say, it consists of one matter; but is divided into seven orbs, which revolve in a certain respect con- ♦ rarv to each other. Or as some sa\, because the sun and the moon ait similarly moved in their epicycles, revolving in their mbs will, a motion contrary to that of the inerratic sphere. Hut others make one 1 at ion of the equable and the ano¬ malous. < >r tin re is one depth of the planetary spheres,] because as others say, Saturn, Jupiter, anti Mars, make the lust eastern phases, alter their conjunction with the sun, in const -ipienn of tin >un bciri" moved with greater celerity than these plain ts in coils* tpn nlia ? Hut the moon makes western phases, because lieilur moved more swiftly than tin- sun, slit* is perceived more easterly. Mrr- tm v ami Venus however sometimes appear to us m this way, and sometimes in that. Or there is one depth because tin planets make apparent stations, advan¬ cin'' motions, and relrourcssions, are diaim li n allv opposed to cat h other, ami revolve in contrary directions, souu brim; movi d tn the north, but others to the houtli. Or in whatever vvav von are willim; to eonsuler this allair ; tor there are different opinions on this Mihj et. Or, wliieli may lie more truly asserted, l»e- < aiise Plato savs, the l)ciiiiun;iis ordered the orbs to proceed ina course con¬ trary to eat l« other, he does not mean that the seven are moved m contrary ilirectiiuis, hut the one orb and the seven, on account of their contrary latino. For thus, m what follows, he says, that the planets and the inerratic sphere, are at one ami the same time moved with their proper motions, in cuiitraiy diivt lions. Plato, however, neither here nor elsewhere - makes mention of t pit vies, or eccen- trus but describes the seven eircles about one centre. lienee, he dot s not add other circles to these; nor does lie make a mechanical difference of the motions, j.’or ii U |, |M ndeiltlv of his omitlliU' to meiititm these, the hypothesis of epit yh s, and of phases, is l»y no m* alls adapted to the circles in the soul. I he eirele of the di/jtnnt, there fore, is tlivith tl into I In >e seven t irt les, three of which he says rt volve with a similar, but the other four, with a dissimilar o lerilv. J<»r three of t} iem , mz. the Sun, Mercury and Venus, as it is saitl m the Republic, are equal m their course; but the othi i four, viz. the Moon, Saturn, Mars, ami Jupiter, are umspial. At the same time, however, all of them revolve in a due proportion, both with reference to each other, and the universe; liecause the motion ol them is ♦ yolved accordiiifr to numbers. [Ami the periodic circulations of all of them,

the Moon, Saturn, Mars, ami Jupiter, are umspial. At the same time, however, all of them revolve in a due proportion, both with reference to each other, and the universe; liecause the motion ol them is ♦ yolved accordiiifr to numbers. [Ami the periodic circulations of all of them,

1 | or yvfttn hen 1 ! ii is iu* i '*21'

*'H»K III }

i im i;us or pla ro.

m:s

are terminated in a heronim" manner.’] It seems also, ax is manifest from what is liere said, that Plato places tin- difference of the < < j 111 1 it v ami inctpwlitv of the motions in the v i-ihle 01 hs of the planets, in the imeipi illy moved circles [i. e. spheres] hi whit h tliev are rarrit d, prior to the planets themselves. lienee, placing the circles alone in the soul, without the stars, (tor these he had not vet eonsli- tnteil,) lit says that some of these are mover! with an equal reierity, hut others with an unetpial celerity. Loth with reference to the former, and to themselves. \nd these things indeed are manifest.

The assertion, however, that eaeh of the seven circles was divided accord in" to tilt* interval of the ilonhle and triple, each of the intervals hein" three, is literally i onsidered ddiieult to he umlerstood. At the same time it signifies, that aecor- din:; to each interval of the double and triple intervals, each Iwin*; three, (for in four ti rms lln-re are three intervals) the se< lion was made, which is the same tiling as a division according to length ; in order that in eaeh of the seven c ircles, there nii^lit he all the intervals, and all the ratios. For if the section had l»ocii made according to one interval, some of the intervals would have heen distrihnted into some of the circles, and others into others. But because the division proceeds according to each, each part is a part of each, and all the circles participate of all the ratios. I nless indeed it may be more truly said, that the circles are divided six tunes, conformably to the number of the double and triple intervals, these l win £ six. For the intervals Ircin^ placed successively, and not divided accord¬ ing to d« pth ; (hut I mean hy successively, no as to he extended through the whole circle, just as they were arranged through the whole ri^ht line, from which Im hi" bent the circle was generated,)— this heinj; the case, it would Ik? ridiculous to make such a section according to depth, as to divide each of the circles in one part.

ridiculous to make such a section according to depth, as to divide each of the circles in one part.

'I liese things therefore heiii" premised, we shall further observe. Iiejrinnin:; from the pha iioniena, that since the Mml of the universe possesses the reasons of ail mundane natures, and powers which irive subsistence to them, it is necessary that it vhould not only contain the intellectual causes of man, and horse, and of other animals, hut likewise prior to these, of the w hole-parts of the world ; I mean of the inerralic and plain tary spheres. It is likewise necessary, that from the duad which is in this soul, the heavens should sustain a division into two parts; that prior to the seven planets, there should pre-exist in it the true hebdomad ; and that it should contain the causes of the dissimilitude and similitude of the circles.

1 The words within the hra« Jiels are wanlmp iu lli* original, l>nt art invrlcd fioin the vcru .c >J J lioma »iv

134

PROCLUS ON Till.

[ finoK ill

1 The words within the hra« Jiels are wanlmp iu lli* original, l>nt art invrlcd fioin the vcru .c >J J lioma »iv

134

PROCLUS ON Till.

[ finoK ill

For at our nature generates according to tlve reasons [or productive forma] in it, tvro eyes, five lingers, and seven viscera; for it antecedently comprehends the niimlwrs of these parts, on which account it always produces after the same manner, and "enemies the same form, when the impediments arising from matter do not prevent the generation accorvliii" to nature from taking place; and as tie* one sense in us, possessing the causes of these live senses, generates secondarily from itself, tlie powers which are distributed about the body; after the same manner also, the circle of the different, < omprt bends in itself the primordial causes of the seven cireles [or spheres,] according to which they are adorned, and dis¬ tributed in an orderly manner. For all heaven participates of both the circles; but the iuerratic sphere participates more of the em le of the same, and the plane¬ tary sphere, more of the circle of the different. Hence the former is indeed un¬ divided, hut the latter is divided. The hu im r ilso is moved from the east, hut the latter from the west. For the one indeed imitates the uniform [and intellectual power of the soul, hut the oilier its multiform powers,'] in consequence of re¬ joicing m motion and variety, though the inerratic sphere also is comprehensive of many divine animals. The circle of the same, likewise, comprehends the causes of all things, but it is without section ; because all the multitude in it is connascent with itself through union, and it is vanquished by the bond of same- uess. Hence also the intrratic sphere is mined with one lation. lint each of the seven spheres, comprehends a multitude of powers, some o< which are more total, but others are more partial. Now, however, Tim am s delivers the unities, and the fnM comprehensions of them; hut omits the inexplicable decrements of the divine reasons. For the circle [or sphere } of cm h, is a plenitude of appropriate life, which is ti ther of a connei tediy containing, or dividing , or binding, or anagogic, or (j smne o thcr such-like peculiarity. Many powers likewise contribute to its perfection, some of which are generative of primary and secondary Gods, but others of dan.ons, and ot/m s of partial souls.

\\ hy however, some one may say, did not the l)emiur"iis produce a peculiar circle of essence, as well as of sameness and dilference T We reply, Ix-cause these arc opposed to each other, but essence is common to the whole soul Hence ac¬ cording to tins the whole soul is one, hut is Informed according to those; just as of the rii,ht lines, one precedes the two. Here likewise the monad precedes* the l.< bduruad, just as the impartible of the soul, is the leader of the division into

Here likewise the monad precedes* the l.< bduruad, just as the impartible of the soul, is the leader of the division into

’ Here also llie wurds within ihe brackets are wanting in the original, and are supplied born the vei-ion of I'homsus; so that in the original after pioeotdr), the «*ords »a« n/tpne nji iwapi*, tl

t» lirafun roust be supplied.

1 l'or tt)v riji tpfopaNji tene in this place, it is necessary to read vpo ryt tplopalot «<m>

r* no k hi.]

1 I M El’S OF PLATO.

i zr,

seven parts. But the division of the hebdomad into jour and three, has a ssesqni- tertian ratio, bein^ t!ie first of the symphonies, ami has also the first nmnle rs of the even ami the odd. Of the three [circles] however, one [that of the Sun] fs analogous to truth; another [that of Venus] to beauty; and the third, [that of Mercury ] to symmetry : these three monads, as «e learn from the Philelius, l>ein:r situated in the \estibules of the good. But of the other four circles, one [that of Saturn] which is most stable, is analogous to permanency; another, [that of the Moon] which is moved with the greatest facility, is analogous to motion; another, [that of Jupiter,] which is of the most excellent temperature, to sameness; and an¬ other [that of Mars,] which is of a most dividing nature, to difference. \\ hv also*, it may Im> said, did not the Detniur^us place partial forms in the soul of the urn- verse, but only the genera of all-various forms? We reply, because it pertains to total fabrication, to effect the latter. For a distribution of reasons into numerous parts, is the province of partible production. For this receiving each soul divided into the common genera of all beings, pjives a distinct subsistence to the variety in them, according to the divine dividing art, ami produces the division of each, as far as to individual forms. Hence also, this fabrication is said to be partible, and to be secondary to the total fabrication. A division, therefore, adapted to the total genera of souls is delivered, and likewise a mixture of wholes adapted to the fabrication which is the subject of discussion, and is 1 total. These things, how¬ ever, are manifest.

But why, it may l>e said, do we make the division into the inerratir and plane¬ tary spheres alone, or rather into the paradigmatic causes of these, and not into the four elements ? For the soul of the universe, contains these also hv its powers, and leads them by its motions. In answer to tins, therefore, it is said by some, that all the quadruple order of the elements, is comprehended in the circle [or sphere] of the moon. F'or that which is material is but small as with reference to the universe, and is as it were a certain bottom of the world. For thus in the Re¬ public, Plato divides the w hole world, into eijrht whirls, comprehendin''

F'or that which is material is but small as with reference to the universe, and is as it were a certain bottom of the world. For thus in the Re¬ public, Plato divides the w hole world, into eijrht whirls, comprehendin''

the w hole of a material nature in the o^doad. These things therefore are said, and are well said. A-.;aiu, however, it may lx* more perfectly said, that through this monad ami heptad of circles, he comprehends all the parts of the world. For as in the heavens there are a monad anil a heptad, thus also analogously in the sphere of a-ther, some things are co-ordinate to the inerratic circle, hut others to the plauetary spheres. Ami the whole etlierial order which is there, imitates the heavens. This is likewise the case in the profundity of the air, in the masses of

* 1 or t»r#pf lu re, if i» nctf**«ir\ In h#pJ rmpy inti.

PROCLl’S ON THE

[book 1^

l.Hi

water, and in the bosoms of the earth. For not only the earth is divided analo¬ gous to the heavens, but also the other elements, and in each there are monads and heptads, comprehensive of the orders that are in them, and of empyrean, aerial, and aquatic plenitudes. 1 he circles therefore of the soul, antecedently comprehend all these monads and hebdomads; the circle of the Mime, containing some of them, but the circle of the different others. This likewise appeared to be the case, to the most scientific theolopists that rr« i e.t is/id.'

1 he circles therefore of the soul, antecedently comprehend all these monads and hebdomads; the circle of the Mime, containing some of them, but the circle of the different others. This likewise appeared to be the case, to the most scientific theolopists that rr« i e.t is/id.'

Plato al.-o will grant, that series extend from the inerratic and planetary spheres, as far as to terrestrial natures, whether they are divine, or da inoniaeal, or those of partial souls ; since he is of opinion that s« ries of the twelve liberated, leaders extend from on high as far as to the last ol things. For it is necessary that the less should follow the mole prim ipal periods, ami that the several subeelestial should imitate the celestial series. Hence the psychical circles will comprehend the causes of these, as being arranged analogously to them. If these things, how¬ ever, * are admitted, it is evident we must attain say that the planets which revolve with an equal ccleritv are arranged in the miiblle of the wholes ol the universe, not onlv as hi ing analogous to the monads in the v« slibuh s of the pood, viz. to truth, beauty, and iymmtti 1/ ; but liki w ise after auotli* r manner, vvlm 1 we before mentioned, as possessing the boinl of w holes ; so that they are established accord¬ ing to that which elevates secondary to fust natures, according to that which unfolds into li^ht first to secondary natures, and according to that w hicli similarly binds both of these together. Ol the rest, however, we must sav that earth and 1 liie inerratic spin re are analogous to the Synodic* Heaven and Larth [of the intel¬ ligible and at the same time intellectual order of (>ods]; 1ml that water and [tin planet] Saturn are analogous to Rhea and Saturn [of the intellectual order]; and air and Jupiter, to the Jupiter and Juno [of that order). After these, it will not be nnappropriate to say, that the Moon and Mars 4 have tin next order; the latter possessing the power of separating first and masculine from miiblle natures ; hut the former of defining and distinguishing third and as it were feminine natures from those of a middle order. Rut in the media, the extremes are, that which possesses an analogic power [i. e. Mercury], and that which has the power of unfolding into light [1 e. the Sun]. And the medium between these, is that which con¬ nectedly contains all things in amatory bonds [i. e. Venus]. This also theolopsti.

* fruilii), I have 110 doubt, means by llu»e the Chaldean thcologists For £ti liere, lead b-

’ For vara mi tins place, it is neccssarv to read vat.

4 Instead of ueoa litre, it u obs lously necessary to read apta.

BOOK III.]

TIM XUS or PLATO.

137

e. Venus]. This also theolopsti.

* fruilii), I have 110 doubt, means by llu»e the Chaldean thcologists For £ti liere, lead b-

’ For vara mi tins place, it is neccssarv to read vat.

4 Instead of ueoa litre, it u obs lously necessary to read apta.

BOOK III.]

TIM XUS or PLATO.

137

manifest. For they rail the first of these, the messenger of the Gods; the second, the gate of ascent ; anti the power which is in the middle of both, Venus' Ix.-ing the friendship or love, which is the connective medium of the universe ; whether the Sun is prior, and Mercury posterior to her, or vice versa. Perhaps too, they will revolve with eipial celerity, so far ns all of them look to one tiling, the hond of wholes; rind their energies will have this for their end, to establish nil things m one union, no that the universe may he tilled with its proper causes. All things therefore, are in the soul, according to nnicnl comprehension. For the eight circles arc pouers, uni tally comprehending things which subsist in a divided manner in scnsiblcs , both in the heavens, and in au k of the elements. And thus much may in short he said concerning all the circles.

Attain however, considering the circle of the different by itself, we say that its division into six parts, is most eminently adapted to the soul. For according to the doctrine of the Pythagoreans the soul is a hc.rad. And tin if arrange the monad as analogous to a point, but the hc.rad, to that which is animated, and the heptad, to that which is intellectual. But how is it possible we should not sav, that the number of seven circles is adapted to the soul, which is produced by the vivitic Goddess [Rhea], who is a monad, duad, and heptad, comprehending in herself all the Titannuhc ? Farther still, this may hr* considered after another manner; for the heptad is a number productive of opportunity (xmiemv as/i'xnf). ami is perfective and apoeata^tatic of periods. Inti is respect therefore, it subsists appropriate ly with reference to the soul, which produces and directs all things by its motions. If, however, this be the ease, it is evident that these eircles of the soul are gnostic, and by a tnurli greater priority, vital powers of it, both totradic and triadic. For through both, they are comprehensive of all sensihles, and through the triad know all the similitude in them, hut through the tetrad, all the dissimilitude, ami all the variety and genera which they contain. They know likewise, through these, whether sensihles in their existence, whatever it may be, participate of a certain truth, or symmetry, or beauty, from truly-existing beings.

Moreover, the subsistence of these seven geometrical terms in each of the circles, gives a septuple increase to the ratios. But this is an indication of the self-motive nature of the soul. For it generates and multiplies itself, and is at one and the same time a heptad, and a manlier proceeding from the heptad.

But this is an indication of the self-motive nature of the soul. For it generates and multiplies itself, and is at one and the same time a heptad, and a manlier proceeding from the heptad.

* Afpo<hr»j* m omitted in the original, but both the verdon ofTliomicus and the vnx of the passage require it should be inserted.

Tim. Plat.

Vol. II.

S

130

PHOCLUS ON THE

[book in.

Again, the psychical circles proceeding in a direction contrary to each other manifests that these powers proceed every where, are prolific of all things, and are tin* causes of the difference which is distributed every where, and of the contra¬ rieties which subsist about generation. For contraries exist in the soul, in the heavens, and in matter. But of material contraries indeed, generation consists. These contraries, however, derive their subsistence from the psychical through the celestial reasons, l'or some things have the relation o fjrvtn which , others that of through which, ami others that of hi/ which,' in the things which are generated bv them. Moreover the bimditude of the three and the dis¬ similitude of the four circles, are assumed appropriately to the numbers. For the triad indeed is perfective, and converlue to the same form. But the tetrad is piohtie, and tin* cause of all multitude. All the numbers therefore, \iz.

the monad, duad, triad, tetrad, pentad, he\ad, and lieptad, are entirely in the r-sence of the soul ; and aflt r all these, the square from the heptad. 1 All these likewise termin ite in the hept id. Hence, the essence ol the bcuil, is on all sides In hdomadie. And the circle uithc some indeed, is a monad; but the circle of the tlif/crent is, as wo have said, a lieptad. Fur the Juraicr is intellect in motion, but the hitter is a light occuriling tu intellect; in the same manner as the heptad, accord¬ ing to the Pythagoreans. The one also is impartible, analogous to intellect, but the other is partible; though it also consists of the impartible essence, and of the essence which is divisible about bodies. [The partible nature however is redun¬ dant]’ in it : for difference has dominion in it. Hence, the one is monadic, but the other licbdoiuadic ; not only because the lieptad |>ei tains to the essence of the soul through its similitude to the viiilic Goddess ; 4 (for she is a monad compre¬ hensive of two triads, which she contains in herself') but also because the primary distribution of the soul into parts is hehdomndic as has bet n before shown, l’or things which are distributed into parts from one impartible power, have the first number hebdomadie. The number also which is derived from the heptad, is adapted

* l'or a<g w Iu.-r»\ it i» requisite to read ur.

The number also which is derived from the heptad, is adapted

* l'or a<g w Iu.-r»\ it i» requisite to read ur.

* The double amt triple iutersaU that arc fillrtl with the arithmetical ami harmonical middles, are (he iiuiiiIhts (i. S. y. 12. 10. 18 2 -I. 27- 32. 3<>. IS. .St. 81. 10S. 102. And the double and triple inter¬ vals that are till* d hoth wilh the abuse-mentioned middles, and with sesquioctavesand leimnius, are the numbers, 3st. 4J0. ISO. 512. 570. 6 18. 7'-’}). 7<>b. 8bl. 072. H>2i. 1152. l'jyti. 1158. 15 10. 172s. lytt. COtS. 23ot. ‘2502. -jylb. 3072 . 3156'. 3.sS8. 437 t. 4bos. 51 St. 5832. 6l tt. by 10. 777<». S7ts. 9210 10308. And lire sum of the number of the leriiio of both these series, is ty, which is the square of 7.

1 It appears to me that the words w\eora£et to /iepurov, ought to be inserted in the original, after the words uXA‘ tv awf.

* viz. to llliea.

DOOK III.]

TIM.T1US OF PLATO.

13D

to tli\idince powers, in the same manner as the heptad. The latter, however, pertains to supermundane, [hut the former to mundane powers.]'

* viz. to llliea.

DOOK III.]

TIM.T1US OF PLATO.

13D

to tli\idince powers, in the same manner as the heptad. The latter, however, pertains to supermundane, [hut the former to mundane powers.]'

If however, it be requisite to refer all the composition of the soul, to the divine orders, for it has the images of all of them, the beginning of the reference, must be assumed from the former part of this dialogue, in which it is said, that the soul was fabricated, not as we say junior to the body, but both in generation and virtue prior to and more ancient, as the mistress and ruler of it. For Tima us thence beginning to speak concerning it, gives to it a superior dignity with respect to the generation of the whole corporeal composition. It must be said, therefore, that its progression, so far as it rules, and i" the mistress of the body, must be referred to the principle of all things. Hut so far as it is allotted a triple and united hv pos¬ tals we must refer it to the summit* of intelligible.*; and as generated from essence, same and different, to the whole of the truly intelligible breadth ; of which essence and being possess the summit ; but eternity which isthe cause to all things of permanency in the same, the middle; and intelligible animal, which causes itself to l>e different in its progressions to intelligible animals, the end. For the w hole there, as the Parmenides teaches us consists of dissimilar parts. This triple whole therefore [the soul], w hich is a mixture of dissimilar elements, is a thing of this kind. Hut so far a* tin* soul is a self-begotten and intelligible num¬ ber, we must refer it to the summit of tbe intelligible and at tbe same time intel¬ lectual orders. For there the first niimlx r subsists in conjunction with difference. For as theologists say, wo must survey that first order, as hi jug 1 the cause of tin* series of things, [and of other co-ordinations]* which are divided according to numl»er. Hut there also, Parmenides gives subsistence to the whole of number, ami from thence unfolds all things into light. And so tar as the soul is a whole consisting of three elements, we must refer it to the intellectual wholeness, whit h connectedly contains wholes and parts. For the three middles arc derived from those connectedly containing Gods. One [i. e. the geometric middle] proceeding from the first of these Gods, w ho comprehends the rest, and collects all tilings ac¬ cording to one reason, into one world, and one union. But another [i. e. the hariuo-

* Tin* words within 1 lie brackets, are wanting in llie original, but arc supplied from tbe version of Tlimir.rus. Hence it is requisite to add in tbe original afier vwrpKoefuau, the words orroi tr ran tycoir-

fitOif.

* For ravTorrjrn here, 1 read neporijra: for the summit of intelligible*, which consists of bound, infi¬ nity, and that ich'uh u mixed, is the first triple and at llie same time unites! Iivpost-isis.

* For ravTorrjrn here, 1 read neporijra: for the summit of intelligible*, which consists of bound, infi¬ nity, and that ich'uh u mixed, is the first triple and at llie same time unites! Iivpost-isis.

* For overwr here, it is requisite to read overnr.

* The words within the brackets are supplied from tbe version of Thorn te us; so that after tunas n the anginal, the words tat aXXwv rwriK^wr, must be added.

140

PROCLUS ON THE

[book 111.

nic middle] proceeding from the second of these Gods, who imparts adifferent bond to different things, a greater bond to such as are greater, but a less to such as aro It ».* And another [i. e. the arithmetical middle] being derived from the third of these Gods, who imparts by illumination from himself, communion to natures of a third rank ; through whom things that are less in bulk, are more united, but such

jij-p irreater, are united m a loss degree. 1 his however, is the distinguishing property of the arithmetical middle. So far also, as the soul has an idea and configuration of such a kind, and employs a rectilinear progression, and circular comer-ion, for the reason we have- Ijcfure-meiitioned, we must refer it to the triad of intellectual figure. For the right, and the circular line, fir.-t subsist in that triad. Ib nee in the idea of the soul, lines were assumed, and circles in conjunc¬ tion with, and m parate from each other. Again, so far as the soul receives monadic and In hdomadic powers, we must refer it to the iutelle* tual hebdomad, lint as !lie medium 1 between intelligible- and sensible-, and as assimilating si-nsibles to intel- ligibles, we must refer it to the ruling [supermundane] s« ri*->. For this series assimilates secondary natures to unieal summits. And as energizing according to twofold energies, some of which pro\ideiitially attend to sensible-, hut others adhere to intelligibles, we must refer it to the liberated Gods, who tcuieb and do not ton* li the universe. These observations tin relbre, wInch we have briefly made, will afford assistance to those who wish to perils*- the writings of our preceptor, iu which the truly arcane conceptions of Plato concerning these things, art- unfolded.

I am astonished however at those IMuUmists, who think that tin* soul should he divided according to parts into the celestial souls, viz. into the one and the seven of these. F or where is it possible in incorporeal natures, that there should he a division of this kind, vvhit h abolishes the w hole ? For such a distribution into parts as this, is the peculiarity of partible masses. Ami I also wonder at those, who think that these souls are entirely supi*rcelestial, since Plato in what immediately follows, shows that in all In* has said, he s|leaks concerning one soul, and this mundane. Hence, I think it is better to assume this as a principle, that it is here necessary,

Ami I also wonder at those, who think that these souls are entirely supi*rcelestial, since Plato in what immediately follows, shows that in all In* has said, he s|leaks concerning one soul, and this mundane. Hence, I think it is better to assume this as a principle, that it is here necessary,

* For in flie harmonic middle, the greater terms hare a greater ratio to each oilier lliau the less. Thus in 2. 3. b. the ratio of b to 3 is greater than that of 3 to 2.

* Of tins union ttie arithmetical ninhlle is an linage; foi m tins, there is a greater ratio in the less, an «t a less ratio iu the greater terms. Thus in 5. 0. 7- 8. the ratio of 0 to 5, is greater than that of 8 to 7-

1 For fstouy here, read fjtoqy.

* The English reader will find these arcane conceptions of Plato concerning all these orders of Gods, Luutifollv unfolded ill mv li.iinlatiuii of Proclus on the Fheologv of Plato.

HOOK III.]

TIM XL'S OF PLATO.

141

I In' whole should remain in the divisions, and that the discussion is concerning mundane animations ; nnd having assumed this, to say that the one soul of the world is indivisible, and at the same time is divided according to these powers; first into the duad, secondly into the triad and tetrad, and thirdly into the hebdomad, l'or the division of it is made according to these numbers. And such is our opinion on (his subjei I.

And such is our opinion on (his subjei I.

Thendorus the philosopher however, of Asiue, lieing full of the doctrines of IVumenius, speculates the generation of the soul in a more novel manner, from h tters, and characters, and numbers. 1 Hut the divine lamblichus blames every theory of this kind, m his treatise in confutation of the followers of Amelins, and also of Nuinennis, whether he includes IVumenius among those who adopted this method, or whether he anv where met with writings of the disciples of Amelins, containing similar opinions; for I cannot say. The divine lamblichus therefore says in the first place that it is not proper to make the soul every numlrer, or the geometrical number, on account of the multitude of letters, l'or the words body ('me*'*) and non-being itself («.■»; ov) consist of an equal number of letters. Non- being therefore, will also lie every number. You may also find many other things, consisting of an equal number of letters, which are of a vile nature, and most con¬ trary to each other; all which it is not right to confound and mingle together. In the second place, he observes, that it is not safe to argue from characters, l’or these subsist by position, and the ancient was ditli rent from the present mode of forming them. Thus for instance the h tter Z, which lie makes the subject of discussion, had not the opposite linos entirely parallel, nor the middle line oblique, but at right angles, as is evident from the ancient letters. In the third place, he adils, that to analyze into the primary ratios of numbers, and to dwell on these, transfers the theory from some numliers to others, l’or the licptad is not the same which is in units, and tens, and hundreds. This however, existing in the name of the soul, why is it requisite to introduce the disquisition of primary ratios? Tor thu^ he may transfer all things to all numliers, by dividing, or compounding, or multiplying. In short, he accuses the whole of ihis theory as artificial, and con¬ taining nothing sane. I am also not ignorant of the arguments of Aristotle against the psyehogony of Plato, and the solutions of those arguments, by certain Platonists; but I have not deemed it requisite to mention them any farther here, as I have elsewhere made thorn the subject of discussion, l or the soul is not a

* Proelus goes nu epitome of this theory, hut as it would l>c very ihtiicult to render it intelligible to the English reader, and as in ihe opinion of lamblichus, the whole of it is artificial, and contains nothing sane, 1 have omitted lo trauvlalc it.

142

PROCLUS ON THE

[book hi.

142

PROCLUS ON THE

[book hi.

circle as magnitude, nor is it requisite to think that to confute this hypothesis, is to embrace the Platonic theory. Hence I have thought tit to omit the farther consi¬ deration of these particulars, as I know that I have published a treatise in answer to the oppositions of Aristotle to the Tiimeus, in which there is no small discussion of these particulars, and where it is shown that magnitude cannot rightly lie ascriln-d to the soul, according to Tiimeus, and demonstrating from thence, that the soul cannot hv magnitude which i- partible, iutellet tually perceive intelligible^ which an* impartible! as in ither is it possible for the impartible to lie adapted to the partible. Nor must it be said that the motions of the heavens [are the motions of the soul of the universe]; 1 but that according to the doctrine of the 'Pima us, the former subsist from the latter. Nor must it be admitted that it is impossible tr<- rpienlly to understand the same thing by the same power, but this nue-t neces¬ sarily Ire: the case in more transitive i 1 it« llections, since intelligibles an* bounded, and intellection subsists in a circle. Omitting tin n tore, the farther consideration of these things, which are more amply discussed in the above-mentioned I realise, h t us direct our atti ntion to the words of the philosoplu r, w hich appear to me to exhibit the doctrine * of things themselves.

“ \fter, therefore, the whole composition of the soul was generated, according to the intellect [or intention] of its composer, in the next place, he fabricated within the soul, the whole of a corporeal-formed nature."

The first head, as we have before observed, of the discussions concerning the soul, was about its hyparxis, the second, about its harmony, the third, about its figure, the fourth, about its powers, and the fifth, about its energies. In all the other heads therefore, tin* philosopher has most perfectly instructed us. Hut the last, was that concerning the ( energies)>f the soul, which lu: adds in wh.it is now said. Since how ever, there is a twofold form of the energy of the soul, 1 mean the gnostic and the motive, lie separately discusses each of these; and shows how the soul by moving itself, moves other things, and how by knowing its* !f, it knows the natures prior, and also those that are posterior to itself. Such there¬ fore i* the scope of the words lx fore us. Hut that he did not teach u*', in what has been already said, concerning the multitude of souU as those assert, who say, that his discussion about the essence of the soul, pertained to that soul which is without habitude [to body] ; but about its harmony, to the soul which is called by

* The words within the brackets sre supplied from the Ttrsion of Thcmaeus.

* Iuitccd of Taputuetiv here, read wapakooir.

HOOK III.]

TIM.rXS OF I’LATO.

1 13

* Iuitccd of Taputuetiv here, read wapakooir.

HOOK III.]

TIM.rXS OF I’LATO.

1 13

them in habitude ; and about its figure, to the soul which ranks in a certain order; and farther still, that he did not teach us about supermundane souls, according to the opinion of others, who assert that he produces one, and seven supermundane souls, is I think through these things sullieiently manifest. For he conjoins to the universe, the soul which was fabricated according to the intention of the father, and constructs within it the whole of a corporeal-formed nature. And this is indeed evident from the whole design of the dialogue. For the whole discussion w as concerning the world, and not concerning supermundane progeny.

You may also see w ith w hat accuracy Tinueus adds each of the words. For the words, according to the intellect , manifest that intellect is the paradigm of the universe. For all-perfect animal is intelligible intellect, according to which this universe, and the soul of the universe were constituted. They likewise signify that nothing was constituted in vain, nor more nor less [than was tit] ; but that all things requisite to the completion of the psychical essence, were fashioned in a becoming 1 manner, and that the essence of the soul received all the demi¬ urgic will. For material natures, on account of matter, distribute into parts, impartible form, and that which is a whole is received by them as partial, and that which is without interval, as possessing interval. Hut the soul receives all the demiurgic fabrication, conformably to the w ill of the Demiurgus. The w ords also its composer manifest universal energy. For the words “ according to intellect" are indicative of completion ; but its composer of an energy, the whole of which is at once always present.* The words likewise, then-hole composition e>J the soul, manifest that nothing escapes the demiurgic art, but that the whole pro¬ gression of the soul, is governed by the form and power of the Demiurgus. Hut the words, “ in the nc.rt place" or “ after this" must not lie apprehended as having a temporal meaning, but as significant of order, l'or the separate life of the soul is one thing, and the secondary life posterior to this, and which commu¬ nicates with the body, is another. And in a divine essence, things more perfect precede such as are more imperfect. The words likewise, “ within the soul" evince that the world 1 is connascent with the soul, and the olFpring of it. For if the world proceeds in the soul, she is the mistress of its subsistence, comprehends the whole of its essence, and co-oj>erates with the Demiurgus m the orderly

* i» wunling litre in the original; but according to the version of Tliomxus,ought to be nililril.

* The word in the original is evnrmKri, in which word, an energy wholly,ever present is indicated by the prrjtosition 9*v.

* It is requisite here, to add ror tov/xov, omitted in the original.

(44

* The word in the original is evnrmKri, in which word, an energy wholly,ever present is indicated by the prrjtosition 9*v.

* It is requisite here, to add ror tov/xov, omitted in the original.

(44

PROCLUS ON THE

[BOOK 111.

distribution of body. For the soul of the universe is not 1 like partial souls, which receive bodies fashioned by other things, and on this account, at one time rule over them, but at another, are incapable of governing their proper organs. But proceeding from, she produces together with her father, her habitation, or rather her vehicle. Hence also, she governs the universe, and energizes eternal¬ ly, and without solicitude ami labour. For every thing which makes according to essence, makes with facility that which it makes.

Moreover, the words he fabricated manifest the production of the Demi¬ urges proceeding through solid and resisting substances; and also the ex¬ ternally adventitious formation of sensibles ; and does all but 1 represent him, employing Vulcanian 1 organs, by which he fashions the whole heaven from brass, depicting all things with forms, giving rotundity to corporeal masses, and figuring each thing with an appropriate form. .Since the fabrication however of the universe is triple; the first In-ing that according to which the Demiurgus produced it from the elements bound together by analogy, a whole of wholes; but the second being that according to which he adorned it from the whole spheres, since it is impossible, as it consists of the elements, that it should not be divided into the spheres ; and the third being that which gives completion to the universe from celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrcstial animals;— this being the case, Plato in what is now said, unfolds to is the middle fabri¬ cation. For he who fabricates tile whole of a corporeal-formed nature within the soul which is divided into circles, evidently fabricated it by dividing it into spheres, l'or the spheres are images of the circles [in the soul] which the De- miurgus forming, is said to have fabricated the whole of a corporeal formed na¬ ture, within the circles of the soul: by which aPo, it is evident, that the eight cir¬ cles comprehend in themselves the sublunary region, since the Demiurgus placed in them the whole of a corporeal nature. For if it w< re not so, Plato would have said, that the Demiurgus fabricated evtry thing celestial, and not every tiling corporeal within them. Fvery thing subcelestial therefore as being co-divideil with the heavens, is in these circles, or as being contained in the circle of the moon; theologists also calling the moon earth, through the alliance of the earth to it. Hence it is common to both of them to conceal the light.

“ And collecting middle to middle, lie co-harmonizctl them to each other."

1 Iustead of to yap in tins place, it o necessary to read cv yap.

* For pcrci\i here, read ,

4 Instead of in tins place, it it requisite to read Hpaiffreion.

Hence it is common to both of them to conceal the light.

“ And collecting middle to middle, lie co-harmonizctl them to each other."

1 Iustead of to yap in tins place, it o necessary to read cv yap.

* For pcrci\i here, read ,

4 Instead of in tins place, it it requisite to read Hpaiffreion.

BOOK III.]

TIMvEUS OF PLATO.

1 h r »

Porphyry, understanding by iniilcllc the physical part of the soul, endeavours to co-adapt it to the middle of the universe, though Plato does not here even in words, assume that which is physical. It, however, vve wish to interprt t what is now said more ngreahly to the meaning of Plato, we must say that the Pcmi- urgns placed in the soul, which has a middle order h< tween intellect and hotly, the middle of the world ; and not simply in the soul, hut in its most middle part.

For this is to rolled middle to middle. But that this is his meaning is evident from what follows, in which he says that the soul was every way (Mended from the middle to the extremities of the universe. Prom these things therefore, we may assume, that the whole ot a corporeal nature is every way similarly animated, and that the w hole of the mundane soul is on all sides exempt from the hotly, in order that it may imitate the whole Deiniurgus, who is present to all things, and separate from all. We may also assume, that the corporeal nature being the middle of the soul, makes the animation of it to proceed everyway similarly.

J'or if the extremes of the universe wen* conjoined to the middles themselves, some things would he more reunite from, but others neart r to the soul. It is ne¬ cessary however, that all things should remain as it were rooted in, and filled with life from it. But the adaptation of middle to middle, shows that the soul is similarly exempt from all things, and is equally distant from all Forifit was dis¬ tant from some things more, but from others less, we must ascribe to it a habi¬ tude to secondary natures. Kach of the assertions therefore is true, that body is the middle, and that it is adapted to soul, which is also a middle. Moreover,

“ to collect," exhibits the demiurgic union, and the bond according to which the universe is perpt tual. But to co-harinoni/e, indicates the harmonious association of the body with the soul; the latter performing w hat pertains to itself, and the former preserving its proper order, and neither divtiUing, nor drawing downw ard the mt< lleetion of a divine essence. For this is the harmonious form of commu¬ nion. If however, in the association of the less and the more excellent nature, either the former or the latter falls off from its perfection, and causes perturbation m the t nergies of the more excellent nature ;—in this case, such a communion is iinharmonious, 1 disorderly, and confused. Hence the soul subsists according to harmonic ratios, and the w hole of a corporeal-formed nature, is seen to be in »

Hence the soul subsists according to harmonic ratios, and the w hole of a corporeal-formed nature, is seen to be in »

friendship with it through analogy, and is harmoniously composed. What bonds therefore, can be more indissoluble, more perpetual, or more divine than these?

None, except it should l>c said the will itself of him, by whom the soul is bound, and which is exempt from the things that arc hound.

1 For €Kipfntwrei here, it n necessary to read nvnpfj ovrai.

Vou II.

Tim. Plat.

T

140

PROCLUS ON T11E

[book III.

“ But the soul being every way interwoven from the middle to the very extremities of the universe, and circularly covering it as with a veil, at the same time herself revolving in herself, gave rise to the divine commencement of an unceasing and wise life, through the whole of time."

The mode of animation according to conversion or regression, beginning, as we have ln-fore said, from lx m ath, proceeds to tilings on high, anil from the last, ends in the summits of things ; and such is the mode now assumed by Plato, for the soul proceeding from oil liigli, as far as to the last recesses of the earth, and illuminating all things with the light of life, the world being comerted to it, beginning from the last of tilings, is animated both according to its middle, and the whole of its interval. Besides this also, it external!) enjoys the intellectual illumination of soul. Hence, the soul is said to oci npv the middle of the universe, as placing in it the powers of itself, and a symbol ot its proper presence. It is likewise said to extend itself to the extremities of the universe, as vivifying it on all sides ; ami to circularly eovt r it as with a veil, in consequence of leaving powers ext nipt from partible masses ; in so doing, all but projecting the agis of .Minerva, from w hit li

A luu.illtd golden ornaments depend. 1

Through this likewise, it externally surrounds the whole world. And if it lx 1 re¬ quisite to s|R\ik the truth, Plato through these words ( loses the mouths of those who fancy that the figure of the sou! is truly circular, and thus possesses interval. For how is it possible for a < ircle to be interwoven with a hotly, and being extended equally to cover it with list If as with a veil, and thus be adapted to it, according to all the interval of the world 7 '1 his therefore immediately manifests, that

the imagination is false of those who apprehend the soul thus to subsist.

In addition to this also, it is necessary tosiirvtv that which we before asserted, that the being interwoven with, and circularly covering the universe as with a veil, assimilates the soul to the inlellet tual life, which prior to this Plato said, surrounds the two circles of the soul For as this life comprehends the soul, so the soul comprehends the universe. And farther still, it must be conside red how the soul is assimilated to those Gods, to whom Parmenides attributes the similar and dis-

And farther still, it must be conside red how the soul is assimilated to those Gods, to whom Parmenides attributes the similar and dis-

* This vtrst i$ front the Iliad, hut it has suffered much from the transcribers, l or in the Commen¬ tary of Proclus it is rrji tiaroy yjjvaavot yovotot tjtfitflot rui, whereas it ought to be,

1 qs tear ot Ovaanji to) \uvaioi ijeptbotTO.

Iliad, lib. li. 443.

BOOK III.]

TIM/EL'S OF PLATO.

117

Iliad, lib. li. 443.

BOOK III.]

TIM/EL'S OF PLATO.

117

similar. For the interweaving exhibits the presence of the soul in the world, through similitude. For all communion of essences, powers, and energies, sub¬ sists from this. But the circularly covering the universe as with a veil, as it signi¬ fies transcendency', represents to us, how the soul incommensurable to the world, an throng h its incommensurability, is imparticipable. For that which is incommensurable, is certainly dissimilar to that to which it is incommensurable. Perhaps however both have both. For to be interwoven, is the province of things, which are partly similar, and partly dissimilar. And to circularly cover as with a veil, togf tlirr with the inseparable, exhibits intellectual comprehension, which is secondarily present to the universe. For through this comprehension, the universe imitates intellect, of which it becomes ' the first resemblance. Hence it is present with the universe, in a s -parate manner, and illuminates all things, without* being itself converted to the illuminated natures, or receiving habitude, or co-ordination vv ith them. For these things are foreign to the whole soul [or to the soul which ranks as a whole]. Because however body proceeds together with the soul, hut not the soul together with body ; and the soul by its infinite power, com¬ prehends the world ; by its non-possession of interval, all interval; by its impart¬ ible nature, every tiling partible; and by its simplicity,that which is composite;— hence, the fabrication of body is suspended from the generation of the soul, but not vice versa. The essence of the soul therefore, is tin* lender, as bring more allied to intellect, and body is suspended from the soul, as from its cause. Is there then any reason why we should endure to admit such an interweaving, as some adduce, who conceive the soul to he present with body, through partible powers, cntelccheid and inseparable lives? By no means. For everv distribution of tins kind, is secon¬ dary to the one soul [of the universe]. Since in us also, tbe cntcUcheia animates the body iu one way, but the separate soul m another; the former indeed, being divided about the corporeal masses; but the latter being established in itself, and imparlihly present everywhere, and containing partible lives, by its own impart¬ ible powers. But if it be requisite to speak in a manner becoming the dignity of the whole soul of tbe universe, tbe interweaving is an unmingled union of tbe body with the soul, and a communion, connected comprehension, and vivification of tbe soul, proceeding from the Demiurgus, and lielng again converted to him. For as we must not understand tbe “ circularly covering as with a veil" either ac-

* For yo-o/jo iji' litre, it is obviously necessary to read ytrcfitv or.

* Ov« is omitted here, in the original.

For as we must not understand tbe “ circularly covering as with a veil" either ac-

* For yo-o/jo iji' litre, it is obviously necessary to read ytrcfitv or.

* Ov« is omitted here, in the original.

1 The cause by which the animal is ri tatty moved, is tbe rational soul, but tbe cause by which the animal thus moved, is defined or bounded, is called by Aristotle tnttlechti*. See my IranjUtKlp of bis treatise On the Soul

148

PItOCLUS ON T1IE

[book hi

companies with interval, or locally, lmt as signify in" that the soul is on all sides similarly exempt from the body, and by Immii" thus exempt uniformly compre¬ hend*. it; thus also, we must not understand the " being interwoven^ as accompa¬ nied with contact, but as manifesting the animation which jw-rvades through all things, and the union of all things with it. Tor the soul tilling all thiugs with itse!t r and connectedly containing all things, contains, prior’ toother things, itself in purity, and converts the world to itself, lb nee, by a much greater pri¬ ority, it is itself converted to itself. On this account, Tinneus adds, that it is itself com <d veil in itself in order that he may indicate the difference between the soul, and the body of the universe, which is indeed convolved, yit notin itst If, hut in the whole of place which it occupies. For tliis is convolved locally, but the soul vitally and intellectually, understanding itself, and finding itself to be all things. For it is the plenitude of wholes, ami contains the images of all things, which intellectually perceiving, it is said to revolve in itselt ; the revolu¬ tion indicating the intellectual and at the same time apucatastatic ; but its rcvolv- in?> in itself, the peculiarity of self motion. For the universe also revolves, but is moved b\ another [l. e. by soul .

For the universe also revolves, but is moved b\ another [l. e. by soul .

Ib re, therefore, we have a solilMoii of that which was investigated by Us. For We inquired, looking to the whole of the psychognuy, where Plato lias delivered to us tin* gnostic pi cnliarity of the soul, m tlie same manner as lie h.is tin? essen¬ tial and tin vital peculiarities; the former indeed through the triple mixture; but the latter through the motion in the same. Through the circular conversion therefore, of the soul to itself, the Deimiirgus effected its gnostic peculiarity, ami which Plato in wiiat is now said, more clearly manifests. Fur in order to show how the soul knows all things, lie says, that it revolves in itselt, and thus re- volvm* r be ,r all to live a wise and iiitcllci tiial hie. Ilcnce, it Is inline.liatt ly evident, that the conversion to itself, is the knowledge of itself, ami of every tiling in, prior to, ami proceeding troin itself. Fur all knowledge is a conversion to the object of knowledge, and an alliance and adaptation to it. .lnd on this account also, truth is an agreement of that which knows tilth the thing known. Since however, con¬ version or regression is two-fold, the one r* turning as to the good, but the other as to being, hence the vital conversion of all things is directed to the good, but the gnostic to biiug. Hence loo, the forint r win n converted, is said to have the good, but the latter to have being. 1 he appri /tension of truth also, is the comprihension of bung, whether existing in that by which it is apprehended, or prior to, or posterior to it. This therefore, as 1 have said, becomes evident to us from these tilings.

‘ Far w,,cf ru> o\\u. ill tills plate, rtatf tuv uWv*.

HOOK III ]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

14 !)

This therefore, as 1 have said, becomes evident to us from these tilings.

‘ Far w,,cf ru> o\\u. ill tills plate, rtatf tuv uWv*.

HOOK III ]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

14 !)

Sinn* however, in the souls ol' partial animals reason at one time energizes intellectually, and is converted to itself, but not immediately from the first genera¬ tion [of the animal); lor in animals the progression is from the imjierfert to the perfect, and n mmi'-renee is after oblivion; on this account IMalo savs, that the .soul gave ri^e to the divine conimeneement of a wise life, beginning from on high, and from the first of its energies. For it has some energies, which are divine anil separate, but others, which are motive of the universe. It likewise always has the more perfect, prior to those that ar< secondary. For proceeding from the Dejniurgus, and beginning to energize, it commences from those energies that are more divine; and through these moves the secondary, viz. the intellectual ami the doxastic energies. This beginning however ts entirely divine. But that which commences from things imperfect, is evidently material, [For in the (foils, the more perfect energies prerode those that are subordinate;'] but vice versa in material natures. For generation begins from things imperfect, and proceeds to the perfect. The human soul then fore, though tl soviet hues energizes divinely, yet it ends m this energy , being satisfied at first to energize conformably to right opinion, after (his scientifically, and thin divinely, exciting 1 the one of itself, which is more excellent than Us intelUct. Hut a divine soul, has this for its first energy, and on account of this, moves all the secondary gnostic powers of itself, and always the subordinate through the superior powers, lly a inurh greater priority therefore, did the soul of the universe give rise to the divine commencement of a \\i*c life, energizing first according toils divine part [or the one of its essence], but after¬ wards supemally according to its dianoi tic part, moving this, and c ausing it to bo deit’orm. Unceasing energy however is the consequence of tins. For that which is gem-rated, -and that which exerts a divine energy in time, is naturally adapted to proceed from the imperfect to the perfect. But that which begins from the most perfect and divine energies, neither at any time ceases from this energy, nor ranks among things which have a temporal subsistence. If therefore tho soul of the universe gave rise to a divine commencement of energy, it energizes incessantly, and always, and with invariable sameness. For that which receives the perfection of itself in time, begins from the imperfect, and not from a divine commencement. From tins also, again it follows, that the life of a divine soul is wise. For if the life of this soul is unceasing, it is defined by intellect and wisdom.

For that which receives the perfection of itself in time, begins from the imperfect, and not from a divine commencement. From tins also, again it follows, that the life of a divine soul is wise. For if the life of this soul is unceasing, it is defined by intellect and wisdom.

' * The words swtlmi the brackets arc omitted in the original, but are inserted from the veniou of Thomacus. Hence in the original, after the words v wi tvvXoi ten*, it is requisite to add, tat yvp rv ii (kett, ai tvfftytttu rrXticrrpai irpoijyovn-ai ryy Karat'rrerfp+i*

* For tyr/putra here, it is necessary to read tyttprjoaea.

150

PROCLUS ON THE

[book III.

For we must admit one of three 1 things, either that the life of it is always wise, or always destitute of wisdom, which it is not lawful to say, or that it is at one time wise, but at another time unwise. It remains therefore, that a wise life in a divine soul, in consequence of being incessant, never 1 fails.

It remains therefore, that a wise life in a divine soul, in consequence of being incessant, never 1 fails.

In another respect ako, wisdom is adapted to this soul, because it participates of divine wisdom; but life, because it evolves the impartiality of the intellectual life, and has an extension in its energies, and transition in its motions, l or lift' (dioi) is most adapted to the soul. For if at any time, till', word is used in speak¬ ing of intellect, as in the Fhile bus there is said to be a certain (j2ioy) life of intellect, it signifies the jieeuliarity of the life. 1 Ur the word fiiog manifests these two things, viz. the peculiar form of each life , and the evolution of the choice from which it has its pro¬ gression. It is properly therefore asserted of souls; tor in these there is an evolu¬ tion [of choice]. .Sometimes also it 1-. asserted of intellect, and then it indicates to Us the peculiarity of the life of intellect. It may be said however, that all these particulars, are inherent in all divine souls, viz. to commence a divine beginning, to energize incessantly, and to possess a wis*- life. In vvliat respot t then tore, does tht' soul of the universe transcend other divine souls? Plato tin n foreseeing this, adds, “ through the a hole of time f For all souls indeed, energize transitively, ami have different periods, greati r or less. But the soul which ranks as a whole, alone receives the first and the one inti rval of time, and the whole and first mea¬ sure, which comprehends the periods of other souls. For as of dilferent divine bodies, there are dilferent periods, but the jwriod of a div iue generated 1 nature con¬ tains in itself all of them, comprehending apocatastatically, many Saturnian, many .Solar, and many Lunar periods ; and all time exists in the one period of the uni¬ verse; after the same manner also other divine souls, have their apocatastatie periods in more partial times. Since however, the intelligible breadth is bounded, but the apoeatastasis is dilferent to different souls, to some being shorter, and to others longer, because the object of intellection to them, i> more or less excellent; and since the apoeatastasis of the universe, has for its measure, the whole extension of time, and the whole evolution of it, than which there is no greater, except by the again and again ; for thus time is infinite; and of those beings that in¬ tellectually perceive according to one form, the soul of the universe is the first

1 Instead of wot here, it is requisite to read rpiuy.

* ,M< is oimtled in llie original.

1 i. e. Of die body of the whole world. For the epithet a dmnr grnrrnted natvrf, is priinarilv ap¬ plicable to this; though it also signifies esery body, which is moved perpetually and circularly, whether in the heavens, or undfr the moon.

DOOK Ml.]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

151

1 i. e. Of die body of the whole world. For the epithet a dmnr grnrrnted natvrf, is priinarilv ap¬ plicable to this; though it also signifies esery body, which is moved perpetually and circularly, whether in the heavens, or undfr the moon.

DOOK Ml.]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

151

participant of time; this being tin* case, it is necessary that this soul, should receive the Mimic form and measure* of time. I fence it is necessary, that the soul of the universe alone should energize through the whole of time, hut other souls according to a part of this whole, conformably to which their apocatastasis is defined ; [in the same manner as may 1>C seen to he the case in other forms. For w hateier participates of a certain form, primarily* is seen to receive the whole of it.] Supermundane souls therefore , if there are such, though they perceive intellectually with transition (for ex cry snul understands after this manner, according to which also, intellect and soul dijjir) ;/<t they apprehend more than one object of intellection. For as they arc nearer to intellect, which intellectually perceives all things at once, it is necessary that they should at once understand more than one thing. But the soul of the universe, is the first which intellectually perceives one dyed only at once, u'hich makes it to he mundane. In this respect therefore, all mundane differ from supermundane souls. Hence, the soul of the universe, understanding one thing at once, has its apocatastasis according to the whole of time, which compre¬ hends the period of the divinely generated nature. And according to the former indeed, it is inferior to supermundane ; hut according to the latter, it transcends all mundane souls, l’or all these have their npoeatastatic periods in some part of the whole of time; 1 hut the soul of the universe, intellectually perceiving the one intelligible world,* and running as it were round it, completes its period m the whole of time. For it i* necessary, being the soul of the world, that its mundane [intellect] should evolve the whole intelligible world, and that on this account it should make the intellective apocatastasis of its mundane period, according to the perfect number, conformably to which it makes the whole corporeal period. For this universe, imitates the invisible period of the mundane soul, through its own proper circulation, and makes its apocatastasis locally In conjunction with the apocatastasis of the soul, which is accomplished intellectively. And this is tin 1 illustrious peculiarity of the mundane soul, which Plato unfolds in what lie now says to those who are able to apprehend his moaning. After this manner therefore, his words are to be understood.

‘ The words rai o\oe moron rov prrpov, are omitted in ihe original, but are supplied from the version

of Thomaus.

After this manner therefore, his words are to be understood.

‘ The words rai o\oe moron rov prrpov, are omitted in ihe original, but are supplied from the version

of Thomaus.

1 The words within the brackets, are also omitted in the original, and are added from (he version of Thoma;us, except the word primarily, rpwrwi, which u not in his sersion, but ought to be inserted.

1 In the original «»• ptpn rov trot, t* -y Tam yjx>* y, which is evident!} erroneous ; but ought to be conformably to the version of Thomrcus, and the above translation, tv nn rov nXo* ypovov ptptt.

* 1 have here also followed the version of Thomaeua. For the original is, i j it rvtpa, rov <n>i rov/iov

room.

152

PROCLUS ON TI1E

[book 111.

* 1 have here also followed the version of Thomaeua. For the original is, i j it rvtpa, rov <n>i rov/iov

room.

152

PROCLUS ON TI1E

[book 111.

Again however, it must l>e investigated, what it is which produces in the sou! a transitive motion, and an intelligence not fixed like that of intellect, and also time instead of eternity? In answer to which.it must lx? said, that as th»* sou! has a partible essence, so likewise it lias a life not one, hut co-ilivided with its essence, and this is also the case with its intelligence. For the soul instead of being essence, is esseiitialhzed, instead of life, is vitalhzed, and instead of intellect, is inti llrctiiallized ; participating of these primarily, in consequence of their bring prior to the soul. In inti llect therefore, the essence is one, and the life is one, ami the intelligence of essence is impartible, in the same manner as the essence, and being adapted to it, like a point to a point, has no transition. The intelligence of the soul however, is not impartible alone, but as we have said, is also partible, and not having suflicieiil strength to l>e adapted to the impartible, but distributing itself about the impartibility ofintel- ]n t, u alwavs applies another and another part of itsi If to intellect which is fixed, in order that it mav wholly apprehend that whieh is established prior to tin? whole of itself. After this manner therefore, it produces a transition of energy, that whieh is partible in it, evolving itselt about the impartible, and tog» (her with the transition, it generates time. Its transition liowi vrr is efh-eted in .1 two-fold wav, eitln r by being evolved about the one, ami according to all the paits of itself ha\ ing the one; for into as many p irts as it is divided in so many ways the esst utial, the same, and the difler* lit are contained in it. Applying itselt there¬ for*; to the one, by eat li of its parts, and frequently coming into contact with it, it introduces transition to its intellection, 111 order that the who e of it may 1 lit*T lectually pereeive that which is prior to it. Hut in another way, its transition is effected, by each part of it energizing about all things. Tor every part of it has these three, viz. essence, the same, and the dillert ut. IS'ot In inj; adapted theic- fore to the whole of each, it wholly applies itself to eat h, so far as it partit ipatos of each; to essence indeed, through that w hich is partia l) a thing ol this kind, and to other tilings after a similar manner. 1 hits therefim we solve the tlouht.

IS'ot In inj; adapted theic- fore to the whole of each, it wholly applies itself to eat h, so far as it partit ipatos of each; to essence indeed, through that w hich is partia l) a thing ol this kind, and to other tilings after a similar manner. 1 hits therefim we solve the tlouht.

In addition to this also, it may he inquired l,ow Plato not having yet delivered to us the generation of time, now says that the soul lives through the whole of tune? To this inquiry likewise it must be said, that hr delivers the geneiation of that time, of which the animal nature of tin world participates. Tor he says, that the father oil beholding tin* universe moving and living, constituted time, for the purpose of measuring the motion in it. Sine* tin refore. this life, and this motion to the universe which has a Imdy, is adventitious, so likewise, time is imparted by its generator, from whom it has life and motion through soul. Hut the soul also lias these from the fatln r, I mean life, and tin* motion which ts

BOOK in.]

TIMiEUS OF PLATO.

153

according to time. Since however, it has something self-suhsistcnt, it co-intro- dure> something to tlit* progression of itself into existence from its generator. As the Detniiirgiis therelore, moves tiie mmiI, and it is also self-motive, after the same manner, tin? soul likewise is the cause to itself of being moved according to time. Hence before the Detniurgus gave to this universe time, the soul is said to be moved through the w hole of time. For thus it gi\cs subsistence in conjunction with the Demiurgus to animal time, just as in conjunction with him, it constitutes the life, according to which* motion subsists. It also governs according to nature, that w hich lives and is moved through it, and has not as it were, a casual inspection of it, imparting nothing to that which it governs. Concerning time however, we shall again speak.

It also governs according to nature, that w hich lives and is moved through it, and has not as it were, a casual inspection of it, imparting nothing to that which it governs. Concerning time however, we shall again speak.

But from these things, thus much may be summarily collected, that the soul of the universe, moves indeed the universe, establishing in the middle of it guardian powers, tilling the whole of it with vivification, and intellectually containing it externally ; imitating in this respect its cause which generates three principalities of Cods, \i/. the guardian, the vivitic, and the demiurgic. The soul, however, by a much greater priority moves itself dhinely, beginning from its first energies; and on this account moves both itself ami the universe incessantly. Hence like¬ wise it conducts itself, and all heaven wisely. Again, the soul making the one extension of time the measure of its proper period, convolves the universe with invariable sameness. For the universe accomplishes its apocatastasis in conjunc¬ tion with the apoc-atastasis of the soul. For it does not accomplish this prior to the apocatastasis of the soul; since the same things taki place again and again in tin* world,* and generated natures are produced according to the intellections of the soul ; nor posti rior to it, in order that this restitution to its pristine state may not be without a cause. For what else but the period of the soul will comprehend the w hole of it. If, however, we assert these things rightly, again the soul will have that which is divim* from the one being, the unceasing from eternity, wis¬ dom from intellect, and all things from the one cause of all.»

“Ami the body of the universe indeed, was generated visible; but the soul is invisible, participating of the rational energy and harmony, and pertaining to intelligibles anti perpetual beings, being generated by the best of causes, the best of generated natures.”

• Tor knff ir lirrr, it n tircr««ary to read r >ilf tjv.

* Inarnd of r » ifi; *uXi» <r ry to<7/ity, in tin* jti ice in the original, it i* nece»»ary to read, trniif iraXiv ini iraXir 1 1 ry irooyjy.

' The version of I.conicus Thomxui ends here.

Tim. Plot. Vol. II.

U

154

PROCLUS ON TIIR

[BOOK III-

* Inarnd of r » ifi; *uXi» <r ry to<7/ity, in tin* jti ice in the original, it i* nece»»ary to read, trniif iraXiv ini iraXir 1 1 ry irooyjy.

' The version of I.conicus Thomxui ends here.

Tim. Plot. Vol. II.

U

154

PROCLUS ON TIIR

[BOOK III-

Since Plato gives to the soul afterwards, all such tiling as he Iteforc gave to the !*o<lv, viz. essence, harmony, figure, powers, ami motion, and conjoins both to the completion of one animal; in order that you may not ignorantly suppose that hoily ami soul are of a similar dignity, being ileceiveil by homonymous appella¬ tions, he concisely reminds us of the dilli retire between the two, and does not .sujiertluously say, that body i- visible, but the soul invisible; and shows that body is the object of opinion, because it is sensible and generated, but that the s«,ul is linbegotten, as with reference to the body, but generated, as vv ith reference to intellec t, Tor it belongs at one and the same time to eternal beings, and gene¬ rated natures, but is tin- !u>t of the former; since time lias now a place in it. And that indeed, which is primarily eternal bung, is in both respects eternal, viz both according to essence, and according to eiieigy. 1 or it lias not an i u< i ;y different from its essence. lint that vvhirli is generated, is in both respects generated, always hecomiug to be, and always energizing, as being in genera¬ tion according to time. The soul, however, ill a certain lespri t partieipates of eternity, and ill a certain respn-t of generation; hut it energizes temporally. And the extremes indeed, ji r eternal beings and generated natures, are in one wav only pi rprtual, the one . ternally, but tin- ollii r temporally. Ihit tin* medium between the two, is perpetual in a twofold re>peet, as bring Inform, d, and on this account, of an ambiguous nature; not only aeeording to the partible and uupar- tiljle, and according to its two nr. h s, hut also according to |n rp« tual being, and that xxlilt'll is generated lienee it belongs to eternal beings, ami is the In st of generated natures, being produced by tlie best ot causes. And again you s. r, the differi me of the soul with reference to body l'or l’lato had In lore called Imdy the most In-antifiil of generated natur. s; but now lie calls the soul the In st of things generated, lint it is i oinmoii <o both to have In i n generated by the most excellent cause. The soul howevi r, as being nearer to its maker, is the hat; but body, ns being more remote from him, is indeed most beautiful , yet not the best. Tortlie must beautiful, is secondary to the best, in the same manner as beauty to the go ml .

The soul howevi r, as being nearer to its maker, is the hat; but body, ns being more remote from him, is indeed most beautiful , yet not the best. Tortlie must beautiful, is secondary to the best, in the same manner as beauty to the go ml .

In what is h. re said, however, Plato may seem to call the Duniurgtis the best of intelligible and eternal beings, in the same manner as lie calls the soul the In st of generated natures; ami thus to hear witness to those who make one (iod prior to the world. 1 But if some one should thus understand the words, by inverting them, yet at the same time it is evident from analogy, that we must not [dace in-

1 l'rotlu* ill what he litre alludes to the Chriilians.

BOOK III.]

TIM.T'US OF PLATO.

l.V»

1 But if some one should thus understand the words, by inverting them, yet at the same time it is evident from analogy, that we must not [dace in-

1 l'rotlu* ill what he litre alludes to the Chriilians.

BOOK III.]

TIM.T'US OF PLATO.

l.V»

telligible and eternal beings, as farms' in the Demiurgus, hut other essences pos¬ terior to him, if soul has the same ratio to all generated natures, that the Demiur¬ gus has to eternal beings. And must either make him look to things posterior to him, though in Ins speech to the junior Gods, when he commits to them the fabrication of mortal natures, he orders them to imitate his power about their generation, lie does not, therefore, fabricate immortal animals, b\ imitating things posterior to him. but things entirely prior to him, m the same manner a.s he wishes the junior finds to fabricate mortal natures by imitating him. Or if we avoid this inconvenience, we must admit that there are many intelligible Gods, though they are posterior to the Demiurgus, which those above alluded to. will not grant Will it not therefore be better to assert, either that the soul is said by Plato, to belong to int« lligibles and < ternal beings, as being the best of ge¬ nerate!] natures, and as truly both impartible and partible, in ennsei|uence of its middle subsistence between the two ; or that because he says it participates of rational energy and harmony, it In longs to [or primarily partieipali s of] int« lligi¬ bles and perpetual beings? For the harmony which is in it is generated, not being harmony' itself, but harmonized. And its rational energy is not eternal being, but has generation, as subsisting according to tune, anil being transitive, llow therefore does tin soul participate of the rational energy and harmony ? And how does it happen, that harmony and the rational energy, arc not primarily in the soul, but a< cording to partii ipation 1 I answi r, because these have a prior subsistence ill the Demiurgus. For he produces the .Muses, and A/nusagctcs [or the leader of the Muses, Apolloj, ami also the Mercurial series. lienee the ra¬ tional d< miurgie energy and harmony, subsist in him primarily; the former being Mercurial, but the latter Apolhmiaral. And the soul being filled from these, partieipali - of the rational t nergy, and of harmony. And if it lx* requisite to speak clearly, what appears to me to be tlie case, harmony must be conceived to have a three¬ fold subsistence; so as to be, either harmony itself, or that which is first harmonized; Leing a thing <j this kind according to the whole of itself; or that a hich is secondarily harmonized, and in a certain refect participates of harmony. And the first of these must be assigned to intellect; the second to soul; and the third to body. The rational likewise, or reasoning cm rgy, Inis a three-fold subsistence; the first lieing prim¬ ordial, the second according to participation; and the third according to re¬ presentation or resemblance. For there is aKo a certain vestige of the rational energy, in some irrational animals. Me likewise understand essence, figure, and power, in a three-fold respect. For essence, according to its primary subsistence.

For there is aKo a certain vestige of the rational energy, in some irrational animals. Me likewise understand essence, figure, and power, in a three-fold respect. For essence, according to its primary subsistence.

* For «« v »i hire, it u neccsrary to read «• itj.

156

l’HOCLUS ON TI1K

[dock mi.

ami the first figure, ami the first power, are in intelligibles. But that which partici¬ pates in a certain respect of all these is the corporeal nature, l or there is also something [i. c. matter] which is unfigured, unessential, ami powerless. 1 he soul, however, has each of these according to participation ; but wholly participates of them according to the whole of itself. For it is wholly corroborated, is wholly i.nestcd with figure, ami wholly ’ ess. ntialli/ed. For the unfigurcd in it, does not precede the figured ; nor the powerless, power; nor the unessential, essence : since if tliev did, it would not at all ditler from material bodies. The soul therefore, participates'of the reasoning energy, „f harmony, figure and power, and wholly participates of each of these ; but body participates of them partially. \gain also, from these things, the middle nature of the soul presents its. If to the view, and it is also , \ file lit that IMato very properly says, that it w as generated by the best of causes, the first and he-t of gene rate it natures, and that it is invisible, but the first participant of intelligible harmony.

“ Since therefore the soul was mingled from these three, viz. from the nature of same and ditferent, and from essence, and was distributed into parts, and bound according to analogy, itself at the same time returning bv a circular energy to itself; hence, when it touches on a certain thing possessing a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible, it then speaks concerning it, being moved through the whole of itself.”

We divide the energies of the soul in a twofold way, the first of which is into the motive and gnostic energies ; for both these are adapted to the soul, as the da-moniaeal Aristotle also says. Of the motive energies however, we find some inherent in the soul itself; others, proc eeding into the universe; and others, sub¬ sisting between both these. Fur those indeed whic h extend through the whole- world, from the middle to the extremity of the univi r>e, are mundane alone. But those which convolve the soul, are alone separate. And those that circularly cover the universe as with a veil, are separate and at the same tittle inseparable, abiding and proceeding about the universe. But of the gnostic energies, some pertain to the first of things ; others, to those of a middle nature ; and others, to the last of tilings. For the soul knows itself, and the natures prior to, and posterior to itsc If; since it is the image of things prior, hut the paradigm of things posterior to itself, lienee perceiving itself, and evolving itself, it knows all things, not at all departing from its own proper power. For it is not proper that it should recur

1 For fictvt in this place it is necessary to read o\wi.

nnoK in.]

TIM T.US OF PLATO.

167

lo anv other place, in order to perceive beings, but that it should intellectually see itself. Fnough therefore, has In en said concerning the motive energies of the soul. But here, audio what follows, be speaks concerning its gnostic energies. And that the soul indeed knows lieings, and especially the soul of the universe, is evident; since we see that they are also apprehended by our soul. If however it knows, it remains to be considered how it knows, and after what manner it knows intelligihles, and after what manner scnsibles, whether bv the same, or by dillercnt powers, and whether by looking to itself, and the reasons it contains, or by being extended to the objects of knowledge themselves, just as the sight to that which is visible, and which is external to it.

In short therefore, Plato denominates these gnostic motions of the soul, con¬ tacts with the objects of knowledge; indicating by this, the immediate nature of their apprehension, and their impartible communion with the things known. If, however, eai h knowledge is a contact, the soul will come into contact with hotli intelligihles and scnsibles. according to an appropriate application of itself to them, yet not so as to apprehend both by the same projecting enemy. For it dors not come into contact with scnsibles, through its application of itself to intelligihles, nor with intelligihles through its application to scnsibles. Both these however, vi/.. to tom b and not to touch, arc the pi culiaritics of the liberated Gods, as we learn from tin* Parmenides. IIenee, we before rightly asserted, that the soul ac¬ cording lo the gnostic enemies which it possesses essentially, and through which it knows tilings prior and posterior to itself, is assimilated to those Gods. As PI ito therefore, in what be now sii'-, sp* ahs concerning tin si* energies, be first wishes to remind us of w hat lias bi*eu before said, the mention of w hich is nut siipeiihioiis, but contributes to what follows. I'or from these and those, the discussion will have an appropriate explication. The particulars however, of which lie had before spoken were, concerning the essence, concerning the har¬ mony, concerning the form, and concerning the powers of the soul. Hence Plato recapitulating say s, that the soul is entirely mingled from three parts, essence, same, and dillereiit. And it has been shown what the mixture is, and that it is vivific. For the uniform cause of souls, constitutes the soul in conjunction with the Dnniurgus. Ii has likewise lieen show n how the triad pertains to the soul, and from what genera, and that it is from the middle genera. The soul also, was divided by the duple intervals according to the geomi trie middle, and was again bound through the remaining middles. For he called them bonds. A circular motion likewise, was given to it, through the circles, which comprehend its har¬ mony, and its form. For in the harmony, the distribution into parts preceded the analogy, and in the form, the division preceded the contact. That which

158

PROCLUS ON THR

[BOOK III.

remains however, is in each. For the colligation has a representation of the solu¬ tion; since binding pertains to things which are loosened. The distribution also of the colligation is analogous. For analogy, as we have liefore ohserved, is the most l»eautiful of honds. And tin* soul is divided Titannicallv, hut is adapted harmonically, and is mingled vivitieally. I other still therefore, in the third place, it is divided into those powi rs in it, according to which it returns bv a cir¬ cular energy to itself. For tin* twofold circles an* the powers of it. Hence these things I icing premised, that which follows must he demonstrated.

I other still therefore, in the third place, it is divided into those powi rs in it, according to which it returns bv a cir¬ cular energy to itself. For tin* twofold circles an* the powers of it. Hence these things I icing premised, that which follows must he demonstrated.

Since therefore the soul consists of three parts, essence, same and dillerent, and has these genera, as m< dia between impartible and partible n itures, it knows both through them, l or it is the image of the former, but the paradigm of the lat¬ ter. lienee as Hmp« dot les says,

Watii In Hater, carlli liv eaillilv sight,

I .tlu l divine He M-e biillur’s light;

1 ire Hi r '|>ii mini \vc disu in In lire ;

\ ievv love by love, by >-11111 conleiilioii dire.

After the same manner, we also s ty, that the soul by its essence, knows all the essences from which it is derm-d, and all those which it essentially precedes. But by its sameness, it know s the sameness subsisting in all intelligible, intellec¬ tual, and sensible natures. And by its dilli relict', the ddh reiice which proceeds through all things. .Since likewise it is essentially harmonized, it knows through its own proper harmony, both intelligible and sensible harnionv. .Since lot), it has inti llectual powers, through these it knows power wherevt r it exists. From what has lit en betore said tin retore, the discussion of the gnostic energies of the soul is remh red manliest. I or the soul, Iroiu the things w hich it possesses essen¬ tially, knows both the paradigms, and the images of them. And through the reasons which the Deiniurgus imparled to it, it intellectually perceives both the natures that are prior, and those that are posterior to itself. For returning by a circular energy to itself, it conies into contact, as Timaiis savs, with both im¬ partible and partible essences; and entering into itself, finds itself to be the rea¬ son of all things. For all knowh dge derives its completion through a similitude of that which knows to the thing known. And similitude is completed |>v the communion of one lorm. Hence, there is one reason in that w hich know s and the thing known, and being the same, it conjoins these to each other. Since how¬ ever, the reasons in gnostic essences are different, 1 according to the tneustm s and diminutions u! the essences, on this account knowledge receives an all-various

* for fia^Lywj litre, road fuiyopuc and lor yrwirrurqt shortly after, read yiuicniui.

BOOK 111.]

TIM/KUS OF PLATO.

169

difference. For intellectual knowledge is imparlililc and eternal, because the reasons in it of things ;u* of this kind. Hut. psychical knowledge is evolved, and subsists in discursive energies ; because the reasons of the soul, through which it knows things, have an « volved nature.

169

difference. For intellectual knowledge is imparlililc and eternal, because the reasons in it of things ;u* of this kind. Hut. psychical knowledge is evolved, and subsists in discursive energies ; because the reasons of the soul, through which it knows things, have an « volved nature.

Farther still, intellectual knowledge is uniform, lweaiise the reasons in it sub¬ sist inonadicallv, for they are prinionlial. Hut the psychical knowledge is bi- forined ; because the reasons also have a twofold subsistence, the dianoetic sul»- sisling in one way but the doxastic in another. Knowledge therefore is both one and twofold, according to the essential division of reasons. For if one of the circles knows the intelligible, but the other the sensible essence, what is it which say s that these are dillerent from each other, and that the former is a paradigm, but the latter an image? For it is not possible for that which has not a know h dgo of both, to speak concerning the difference of them, as we may learn in the Thea-fetus, Hence, as it iv there said, that the nature which knows visibles anil audibh-s, the former through the sight, and the latter through the hearing, and says that these are different from each other, ought to know both ; so this reason which is different from the two circles, speaking through all the soul, some filings concerning inlelligibh-s, but others concerning sensible?, and being common to both the circles, i«., as I should say, the energy of the essential part of the soul. For so far as the soul is one essence, according to this, it has this one gnostic energy, w hich Plato rails reason. Hence also, we simply call the whole soul rational. This reason therefore is the one knowledge of the soul, which through the circle o! the same knows the impartible, but through the circle of the tiilh rent the dissipated essence. For though both the circles have a sub¬ sistence between the impartible and the partible essence, yet the circle of t he same participates in a greater degree of the impartible, but tin-circle of the different of the partible essence. And this is the one essential reason, as the essence is one, prior to the same and the different. The life of it likewise, is the self-motion, which exists m the two circles; hut the knowledge of it is transitive, this also being common to both the circles. And on this account, the soul is not only Informed, but also uniform. 'Finis much therefore, has been said, for the sake of the eompn Ik iision of the whole dogma.

And on this account, the soul is not only Informed, but also uniform. 'Finis much therefore, has been said, for the sake of the eompn Ik iision of the whole dogma.

Descending lmwevcr to particulars, it must be observed, that Plato says the soul consists of three parts, and that it is mingled from these; through the mix¬ ture indeed, indicating the union of the congregated parts ; but through the num¬ ber, their timningled purity. For they would not remain three , unless they pre¬ served tiieir proper essence unconfused. It must also be observed, that shaking of partible natures, lie says, “ j vhen the soul touches on a certain thing having a dis¬ sipated essence .” For the word to have (to t* yap r^ov) jvertams to tilings vv Inch

160

PROCLUS ON THE

[BOOK III.

possess the essential anil l>eing, adventitiously, ami the subject of which is unes¬ sential anil non-l>eiiig. And the word (to tivos) a certain thing, is most adapted to things which in some way or other are partible, and endued with interval. Farther still, to touch is appropriately asserted, because the soul proximately pre¬ sides over sensibles, and is suspended from intrlligibles \ the contact manifesting a knowledge which is clear , immediate, and established according to a dtjinite Jn ijcctivn towards the object of Inunt ledge. “ -•!.* a contact, says some one ot the Gods. Put concerning impartible essences, l'iato was satisfied with alone saying, ‘ and rchen on that which is impartible .” For the simple and the uniform are the pecti- liauties of the impartible essence alone. .Moreover, tv speak, appropriately sig¬ nifies the psvehical inti llig< nee. F'ur the soul is reason, but tv speak is the euergy (f vEftT'Ua)' of reason, in the same manner as to perceive intellectually, is the enemy of intellect, and to germinate, of nature. For the energies ol essences, are parunvinoiisly deiiominateil will the essences themselves.

F'ur the soul is reason, but tv speak is the euergy (f vEftT'Ua)' of reason, in the same manner as to perceive intellectually, is the enemy of intellect, and to germinate, of nature. For the energies ol essences, are parunvinoiisly deiiominateil will the essences themselves.

Me uni'll! not however to be ignorant of vvliat Porphyry relates concerning the words tt speak*, and it ends (jizi too ?.£ysi, nai hryei); and that he met with one interpreter, Amelins,* who instead ot “ it speaks bung moved, reads, “ it ends being mored;" though it is difficult to adapt this reading to the soul, which is moved incessantly, as vve have before observed. Porphyry adds, lh.it he said to Ame¬ lins, it speaks should be adopted, and not it ends, and that Ann bus w as very much hurt at this emendation], hut that he afterwards found one Socrates who reads \r t yu as well as Amelins. It must the.i fore, be written by us, “ it speaks being moved through the whole if itself, and not *• ,t ends being moved,' as that Socrates and Amelins wrote, according to the narration of Porphyry. For to speak, is the essential 1 enemy of reason. I he soul then fere, being reason, and a rational intellect, speaks and sees intellectually through the whole of itself, (vv hen it comes into contact with a partible, or an impartible essence,) what that is whit h i> the object of its perception, because it is itself both impartible and partible. And if indeed, the genera in it, were alone divided from e.u h other, tin* whole soul would not from essence possessing knowledge, have a know ledge of essence. Hut it the genera, were entirely corrupted, there would not be a definite knowledge of beings,

1 As mij/io, »s we learn from Simplicius, is the boundary of motion, just a* to mr tfir now is the boundary of lime, so rn/>yi)/ia is the boumlary of energy. Thus loo totjfta is the boundary of or intellectual perception, and utoUiifju of uiadijnti, or sensible perception. \.id as ataO>)^a bi lug the terinination of sensible perception, is an impression of il in the se: »» am, that winch is analogous to this must lie conceivid In lake place litmiq/ju, rifpyijpu, and mijua.

* \fit\wi is umilted in the original.

* Tor oi/fTifciJou here, it is necessary to read oejiw^ijr.

BOOK III.]

TIM/EUS or PLATO.

101

* \fit\wi is umilted in the original.

* Tor oi/fTifciJou here, it is necessary to read oejiw^ijr.

BOOK III.]

TIM/EUS or PLATO.

101

nor would it l*o possible to say, that essence is one thin", hut sameness another. •Sineo however, the middle genera arc* mingled with each other, vet not so as jo he confounded, the soul understands earli thin" delinilely, and as Plato says, tlir gh the whole of itself. Hut if it sjieaks, lieiug mo\ed through the whole of itself, it is evident that it is one ami not one; that it has a knowledge common to the extremes, and vet dill'ering from them; and that as one, it wholly speaks about all things, and not wholly, as not l»eing [entirely] one. The circle of the same likewise, in the knowledge of iutelligiblcs, knows sensible* as from paradigms; and the circle of the different knows intelligible*, as from images. For each having perfectly the object of its knowledge, necessarily sees that one is the para¬ digm of the other, Imt the other the image ; or not knowing that the one is a para¬ digm, or that the other is an image, it will not know in a self-perfect manner. Knowing however, that the one is a paradigm, it knows that of which it is the paradigm, and knowing that the other is an image, it knows that of which it is the image. Very properly therefore, is it said that the soul speaks of ail things, through the w hole of itself. And thus much concerning the things themselves.

•Since however, some erroneously read it etuis, and not tt sptaks through the whole of itself, we have said Porphyry relates, and that Amelius thus reading, was not aide to unfold the meaning of the words of Plato, thus much must he added, that to read it speaks being moved, is attended with h ss ddliculty, Imt that we may also read it ends; the word signifying one apprehension from

many conceptions, of things knowahle, arriving at the peculiar and definite intui¬ tion of each; in order that the meaning of the whole may he, the soul being moved, ends at the knowledge of each thing [with which it conics into contact]. For the end of being moved is to cease to lie moved, the soul never ceasing to be moved, and always arriving at a certain intelligence. Aristotle also, perceiving this to he the case in the heavens, says that they are always moved in the end.

“ It also asserts what that is with which any thing is the same, from what it is different, to what it is especially related, and in what respect, and how it subsists ; and when any thing of this kind happens either to be , or to sujfcr y both in things which are generated, with reference to each, and also with reference to such as possess an eternal sameness of being."

There arc three interpretations of the proposed words, all w hich an' reasonable. And it is requisite to exhibit the jmwer of each. For the first interpretation makes the whole to be one sentence; but the second makes it to be two sentences, dividing the words as we do ; and the third makes tt to be three, fonn- Tim. Plat. Vol. II. X

PROCLUS ON THIS

[BOOK III.

1C2

ins the division according to each of the colon. The first interpretation also, is as"follo\VH: “ When the soul touches on a certain thing which has a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible;' lu re the interpretation making a small stop, i. v. a comma] it adduces the rot of the words, viz. “ it saps being moved through the whole of itself , what that is ruth which am/ thing is the same, ^r." l or Plato asserts, that the soul says all these things, heiug moved through the whole of itself, both of the impartible and the partible essence, coming into contact in both, with sameness ami dilli-reiiee, habitudes and qualities, actions and passions. For all these are analogously in intclligibles and seiisibles. lint the second inter¬ pretation makes one sentence to be that which we haw; before uu iitionc-d, \u. “ It hen the soul touches on a certain thing which has a dissipated essence, and when on that which is impartible. And the second sentence to be, It also eissei ts bang mated, what that is with which tun/ thing is the same, from what ills different, to uhat it is related, in u hat respect, and how it subsists, $c.” 1 bis interpretation however,

differs from the former. In-cause it separates what is said about essence irom what is said about things pertaining to essence. And the third interpretation makes a rapid division ol the colons, l or it makes one division to lie l lat which we have before mentioned ; the second, “ It also inserts what that is a ith uhiih amj thing is the same, and from what it is dijferent and the third, all that follows. As we have said then fore, the words have a threefold interpretation. \\ e should direct our altt ntion howevt r, especially to the things thenisi Ives.

As we have said then fore, the words have a threefold interpretation. \\ e should direct our altt ntion howevt r, especially to the things thenisi Ives.

That sameness, then, and dilli-reiiee are in intclligibles, is evident. Hut how are relation, situation, quality, vv hen, and passion there 1 1 or these are well known to exist m seiisibles, but iiow do they subsist ill intclligibles ? INlav it not be said, that the genera of being manifestly subsist in intclligibles, because they are pro¬ perly Ijciugs ? \ on mav also assume* that relation, situation, \(.. may be su v< yt il analogously in intclligibles; relation indeed, if you are w illing, according to the paternal and maternal, ami also the similar and dissimilar, the equal and urn qual, only you must not assume unessential habitudes, but such as are adapted to in¬ telligible essences. For the most principal habitude is there, where tlu-re is a more abundant communion, and all things subsist primarily, lienee Plato says, “ and to what it is especially related." Hut the in a cei tain respect (oxr,) subsists in intclligibles, so far as each of them is not wholly the one, but altera certain man¬ ner jrj: for the one is simply one. And again, the same which is there, is also different, but is not simply ditlerent; since if it were, dillcrenee ' would be no other than sameness. The like also takes place in the rest. All things

• For tn/w rrju/i litre, it is obviously neiessaiy to read rrrpcrijf.

BOOk III.]

TlNLT.rs OP PLATO.

therefore, says ho, air* all, anil each is one according to essence, hut all tilings according to participation. And this is what the in a certain respect is in intelli-

i

All things

• For tn/w rrju/i litre, it is obviously neiessaiy to read rrrpcrijf.

BOOk III.]

TlNLT.rs OP PLATO.

therefore, says ho, air* all, anil each is one according to essence, hut all tilings according to participation. And this is what the in a certain respect is in intelli-

i

Again. tin* In nr it subsists, is there according to the differences of participations. For many things participate differently of the same jicculiarity. Tims for instance, permanency paiticipatcs of sammess, and motion also participates of it, yet not after the same manner, hut the former more, and the latter less. In the orders of forms likewise, intelligible* participate in one way o (the one, or of essence, hut intellectuals in another w ay, and of these some differently from others, according to the measures of the essence of each. Hence the how it subsists is there. Hut the xchen i> there, either according to the operations of intelligible* on sublunary natures ; for these sometimes participate of them, and they become sometimes parlicipahle by certain things; or it is there, according to the intellections them¬ selves of the soul. For the soul applying itself at different times to different forms, at one time, intellectually perceives these, hut at another those. And eternal being sometimes accedes to it, in the same manner as sometimes the intel¬ ligible. Each thing likewise i- there, r nth rcjcrcncc to each, so far as all things are in ear h other, and proceed through each other, and all things are allied ami adapt¬ ed to all ; or so far as they are suspended from a certain one, or so far as one is cause, hut another the thing caused ; or so far as in some wav or other they sul>- sist dilli rently. Ami to suffer is there, so far as they are filled from each other, and all things impart to all their own peculiarities. For Plato frerpientlv mani¬ fest spartii ipation by the word suffering, as we may learn in the Snphista. For he there says, that uhole is the sufficing one [or that which is passive to the om], hut is not the one itself, Irecause it participates of the one. These things therefore, are in intelligible* and in sensible*, because both in the latter and m the former, it happens that each exists and suffers with reference to each. Plato therefore, [as I have said,] is accustomed to indicate participations by sufficing, and as we have said, to call every thing which participates, that which suffers the thing' of which it participates.

Plato therefore, [as I have said,] is accustomed to indicate participations by sufficing, and as we have said, to call every thing which participates, that which suffers the thing' of which it participates.

In short, the soul of the universe speaks through the whole of itself according to one knowledge, both of generated natures, and of those which possess an eter¬ nal sameness of being, and asserts of each what that is with which it is the same, ami from which it is different, and how each subsists according to existence, or ac¬ tion, or passion. For both among real beings, and generated natures, one tiling in a greater degree suffers from another, and one thing in a greater degree acts on

* For miw litre, it it rcijuiMte to rcavl »ti»ov.

104

PROCEUS ON THE

[BOOK III.

another; all which the soul intellectually perceiving, asserts some indeed through the circle of the same, but others through the circle of the different, Tor it ante¬ cedently comprehends all sensibles, anil their actions and passions. For since the universe is one animal, it is copassive with itself, so that all generated natures are parts of the life of the universe, as of one drama. Just as if a tragic poet should compose a drama, in which the gods and heroes, and other persons, are introduced, and in which also he assigns to su< li of the players as are willing the utterance of heroic or certain other speeches ; the poet himself in the meantime comprehending the one cause of all that is said. It is requisite therefore, to con¬ ceive a thing ot this kind in the whole soul of the universe. For giving subsistence to all the life of the world, which is one and v arious, like a many headed animal speakingwith all its heads, and uttering partly (irecian and partly Barbaric lan¬ guage, this soul comprehends the causes ot all generated natures; and knows particulais by universals, accidents by essences, and parts by wholes. But it knows all things simply according to its divine part. For a (Jod so tar as a(»od knows things partial, and preternatural, and in short all things, even though you should adduce matter itself. For every thing, whatever it may lie is one, so fur as it is h um the one. The knowledge therefore of all things simply and immedi¬ ately, is div ine.

“ Hut reason becoming true according to same, and also being conver¬ sant with different, and revolving about same without speech and sound, m that which is moved by it."

The knowledge therefore of all things simply and immedi¬ ately, is div ine.

“ Hut reason becoming true according to same, and also being conver¬ sant with different, and revolving about same without speech and sound, m that which is moved by it."

Atticus by raison here, understands the attentive power of the soul; but Por¬ phyry, the cliarioti-er, moving the twofold horses; and lamblichus the whole soul. For the soul movesthe whole of itself, and through the whole of itself is the reason of beings. And all the interpretations indeed, appear to exhibit the meaning of Plato, but that of Porphyry i-' mon concordant, both with what is here and else¬ where said. For this reason which is now assumed, is neither that which is essential, nor that which subsists in energy, but that which is as d>** one power of the essence of souls, according to which also the soul is one, just as it is Informed according to sameness and dillcrence. Or why were there not three circles, one according to each of the elements which are three, lint two only, unless there is one essence in both } 'Flic power therefore of this one essence, is ibis reason, which is neither i ssence itself, nor the energy from essence having the third order. Hence this reason Ix-ing one, knows according to the same. I pV it does not sometimes know the intelligible, and sometimes the sensible, like our reason, winch is not able to apprehend both according to the same. This reason

hook in.] TIM.IX'S OF PLATO. 105

Hence this reason Ix-ing one, knows according to the same. I pV it does not sometimes know the intelligible, and sometimes the sensible, like our reason, winch is not able to apprehend both according to the same. This reason

hook in.] TIM.IX'S OF PLATO. 105

therefore, knows at once both same and different about the intelligible, and about the sensible essence, not being true, like intellect, but becoming true about both, on account of the transitive nature of its knowledge of both. So that the words according lo same, signify the difference between the knowledge of a divine soul, ami our knowledge; but the word becoming signifies the difference between psychical and intellectual knowledge. This reason therefore, knows inlclligibles and sensibles, by coming into contact with intelligible and sensible sameness and difference; but it passes through the whole soul, here indeed, moving the circle of the same, but tin re, the cin le of the different; and by the one surveying in¬ telligible*, but by the other sensible*. In this respect likewise, it adumbrates the whole Demiurgus, concerning whom it is said, [by the Chaldean Oracles] “ by in¬ tellect he possesses intelligible*, but he introduces sense to the worlds.” For thus also the psychical reason, b< ing borne along in the soul so as to move both itself and the w hole soul, about intelligible and sensible sameness and difference, at one time produces opinions and persuasions, but at another, intellect and science, becoming indeed, and not being true, in the same manner as intcllci t itself. For in¬ tellect i* really true, and i* true according to same ; either a* at once know ing both beings and generated natures, or as always being such, and not sometimes, like the reason ofpartinl souls. For tin* i* not always invariably true, h< ing fill* d with error and ignorance through generation. Or this reason is becoming to be true, as being transitive in it* twofold knowledg ■; but is true according to same, as always comprehending the a hole form of each object of knowledge, and not conformably to our reason, evolving t m h of the forms which it beholds, but surveying at once the whole of • very thing which it sees. For we meeting with a different part of the same thing, do not see aeeording to same, but we perceive each thing partially. Or it mav be said, that this reason is according to same, when conversant with sameness and difference. Incoming simply after the same manner true, both about the intelligi¬ ble and the sensible, a* knowing both at once, so far as same, and so fir a* dif¬ ferent, that it may see and tell that the one lias it> progression from the other.

Incoming simply after the same manner true, both about the intelligi¬ ble and the sensible, a* knowing both at once, so far as same, and so fir a* dif¬ ferent, that it may see and tell that the one lias it> progression from the other.

lo be therefore, according to same, manifests that tins reason is gnostic, according to one projecting energy, both of that which is truly different, and that which is truly same. For possessing at once a transitive know ledge of these, tins reason is becoming to be true, anti of wInch the energy is to speak of that which is truly same, and of that w hich is truly different, in the intelligible, 1 and in the sensible nature. For the work of this reason is to see in what intelligible^ differ from sensibles. For it is necessary that there should lie a certain thing

1 There is uu omission here in llie original of row cr ry rotjry.

HMi

I'ROCMIS ON tin:

[nuOK in.

which is gnostic of both, in order that it may sav intelligible ■ are one thing, but sensible another. But “ it is borne alum' m that which is moved by it," as proceed¬ ing into the twofold circles, and turning both itself and them. For the bit ion manifests the progression from one knowledge, ditided into a twofold knowledge. This reason itself however, is a uniform knowledge [or a knowledge hating tin: form ot the one], both ot liitelhgibles and seiisibles. dr it may be said, that it speaks in tin* soil!, because the intelligible is one thing and the sensible another' or that it knows 1 both, being prior to both the circles, which know intelligibles and seiisihles m a divided manner. I or since the soul is both a monad ami a duad, according to one knowledge, it unitedly comprehends intelligibles and setisibles ; and again, it comprehends some things according to the circle of the Siime, but others, according to the « ircle ot tin* diffti cut. As therclore, ill essence, the monadic precedes tin Informed, and this is also the case m harmony, in torm, and in powers, thus also in gnostic energii s, the one reason is the primary leader of distributed knowledge. These things howeier, have been frequently repeated hv me, through the ainbiguitv in which the interpreters aie mvulved in explaining them.

These things howeier, have been frequently repeated hv me, through the ainbiguitv in which the interpreters aie mvulved in explaining them.

Plato therefore, indicating these particulars, says that reason itself becoming true is borne along [i. e. re\ol\esj about both the intelligible and the sensible, in that w hich is moved by it, i. e. in each of the circles. But it is borne along with¬ out sjiecch and sound, l'or inward reason is not at all in want of either ot these; but thev are requisite to that reason wl icli proceeds through the mouth. So that it is just as if lie had said, that this reason has a motion more perfect than every 1 energy which proceeds externally , loir sound and yoice are assumed as symbols of sensible motions. Inward reason therefore, as being the charioteer, and moving in its course each of the circles, produces in ih a twofold kuoyy ledge, yvluch Plato delivers in yyhat follows. But if yye read, as \ye find it y\ritten in the most accu¬ rate manuscripts, in that which is nun til by itst/J, and not, in that which is min ed by it, viz. by reason, this will manifest the vvhole soul, signifying it from its definition. For the tiling defined, is in a certain respect the same vuth the definition of it. Jteason therefore, being borne* along in the soul; for it is the soul which is moved by itself; at one time knows the same and different of sensibh s, but at anotlii r, of intelligibles. And it seems that same and different especially characterize know¬ ledge, in the same manner as motion and p< rinanency characterize life*. Hence

* I\>r uno/rci in litis it t> nc< i-ssarv lo read imjru.

1 1 or iila here, read ttbui.

J 1 s»r irnffae in tlio |il.ue, it is olniotiilv neeejsary lo rea l iraoiji.

hook in.]

TIM Til'S OF lM,\TO.

Hi7

also, Plato particularly makes mention of these, because all knowledge has an nlliance to them.

“ When it is conversant with a sensible nature, and the circle of the (afferent proceeding with rectitude, enunciates uhat it perceives to the whole soul; then stable and true opinions and belief arc produced.”

“ When it is conversant with a sensible nature, and the circle of the (afferent proceeding with rectitude, enunciates uhat it perceives to the whole soul; then stable and true opinions and belief arc produced.”

In what is here said, Plato sjieaks about the knowledge of sensible*, and how the reason in the soul of the universe generates tlnn knowledge, \ i/. bv moving tlie circle of the different, and the reasons in it which preside over the orderly distri¬ bution of whole*, ami I y preserving tlu^ circle m a state of undeviating rectitude. For rectitude manifests n^/it ojuuinu, as Poiphyry interprets, and lamhlielms ailmits. It likewise manifests tlie untamed ami the non-verging in provideutial energies. For unwearied, and rapidly-nmv ing power, are adapted to intelligence ; hut tlie indexible, and the uiiinelined, to provident e and prolitic energies. And to the impaitihle essem e indeed, purity 1 of int< lligenee, i> adapted ; hut to the partible essence, umleliled energy. Porphyry then-lore, considers the circle which is moved witn rectitude to be impartible; but that which is not accurately a circle, but in a certain respect participates of a right line, to be partible, For the knowledge of seiisihles lends to external*, and is attain reflected to the soul itself. Hence, that w Inch is not accurately a circle in the soul, is neither a right line alone, stu h as is the know h dge of sense, nor a riri le, such as is the know ledge of diauoia. lamhlielms however, rejects all this, as pertaining to human, and not to divine knowledge. When therefore, the charioteer moves tlie circle of the different, lint this remaining umlev kiting and eonverted to itself, excites the reasons of sen-ihles, and announces to the whole soul the quality of each sensible object ; (since the whole soul knows according to this, every tiling si iisihle; for tin* circle of the same when it beholds intelligible*, knows also seiisihles as from cause, hut the circle of the differtnt knows them immediately, and as it were in a eo-ordinate manner)—when tins is the case, then stable and true opinions and lieiii-f, arc generated m it. For the more divine soul judiciously approving, or rather, im¬ parting by illumination, a more intellectual energy to the doxastie circle, this cir¬ cle possesses with purity its own proper life, and the knowledge in it is rendered stable, antecedently comprehending in itself in a stable manner things that are locally moved, hut such as arc flowing and contingent, faithfully and stably.

* For kn(kifioTtjT»t here, it is necessary to read «n0op jtij»

PROCI.US ON T1IF

[ROOK III.

urn

For opinion indeed, it the energy and knowledge of the Jams tic soul ; but faith is the stable a n dundeviating judgment of opinion. Ami thus much concerning this par¬ ticular.

* For kn(kifioTtjT»t here, it is necessary to read «n0op jtij»

PROCI.US ON T1IF

[ROOK III.

urn

For opinion indeed, it the energy and knowledge of the Jams tic soul ; but faith is the stable a n dundeviating judgment of opinion. Ami thus much concerning this par¬ ticular.

It deserves to lx* investigated however, how the circle of the different is, as has lictMi said, gnostic of every thing sensible, anil the circle ot the same, is gnostic of intelligible*, as will lie said. For though by dividing the motive powers from each other, one of the ciri les is tin* < anse of motion to the right hand, lint the other of motion to the left, vet the gnostic povw rs must not he separated after the same manner, hut it must he admitted that they have a knowledge of setisihles or intelligible*. Mav it not therefore he said, that the vital motions pertain to progressions, hut the gnostic to regressions ? And the circle of the same, indeed, as lieing proximate to int» Iligihhs, proceeding from thence, is by proceeding moved vitally, forms hv its progression the first period, and through it moves the whole world, l’or the less principal follow the more principal periods. The assettioii of Aristotle also is true, that generation is moved according to both ; possessing the invariable from the motion to the right hand, hut tlit variable from the circulation to the left hand. The circle of tin same then lore, is converted to the intelligible; and on this account is gnostic ot intelligihles. lienee it is neces¬ sary that everv vvhere conversion or regression should follow permanency. But the circle of the different, abiding in the circle ot the same ; for it is proximately comprehended in this, just as this is by intellect; proceeds through vital motion, to the second thing, vv huh is moved hv it, I mean to the second circulation;' and through this also moves generation, just as tin* cir< le ot the same, through the iner- ratic spin re, moves the universe, lb ing converted hnvvi ver, or returning through knowledge, it is converted to the vital motion ot the circle of the same which is proximately above it. But returning to it through know ledge, it is gnostieally converted to that which the vital motion of the circle ot the same administers vitally And thus it obtains a knowledge of the whole world, conjoining the regression of itself to this circ le of sameness, which abides prior to it. Thus too, the one circle becomes gnostic of inti lligiblcs, hut the other of sensible*. I'or it the latter moves the period of the different, it is necessary that it should know this period and also the things of vvliit h it is the leader, and what being a medium it follows; just as it is necessary that the circle of the same, if it moves the universe, should know to vv hat lieing assimilated, it lives this life. So that to the one of these circles the regression is through a part to the whole; hut to the other,

So that to the one of these circles the regression is through a part to the whole; hut to the other,

* viz. The tiriuldhon of 1 tie [ibnilarv spheres.

BOOK III.]

TIM/ELIS OF PLATO

i «at

through a whole to another whole. * Ami thus much has been said by us in answer to this inquiry, which demands profound consideration.

It is not proper therefore, to think th.it the soul of the universe receives the knowledge of sensibles externally, or that it is m want of organs to the apprehen¬ sion of them. For these things pertain to partial souls. But we ought to con¬ ceive, that being converted to itself, it has tin* reasons of sensibles, produced in energy from itself. Hence also, Plato accurately says, that the circle of the ilitli rent energizes about that which is sensible, but not towards the sensible essence, in order that he might indicate the causal comprehension of sensibles in the reasons of the soul, but not a knowledge co-ordinate with sensibles, ami firmly established in them. And thus much concerning the tilings themselves. The words however, “ enunciates to the xiholc soul,' arc concordant with the words, “ it speaks, being moved through the whole <f itsilf." But they indicate, that the circle of the different, proxiinately comes into contact with sensibles; and that through this the w hole soul obtains a knowledge of them. The word aorov how¬ ever [i. e. of i/] may, as Porphyry also has observed, be multifariously inter¬ preted, but ought rather to l>e attributed to reason. For opinions, and the belief of the circle proceeding with rectitude, and enunciating sensibles, are the progeny of reason. For opinions and lielief are in the doxastic part of the soul indeed, but pertain to reason, so far as they are moved, excited, and contained by it. And thus much concerning the co-arrangement of reason with the circle of the different. But in the next place, Plato speaks of its co-arrangement with the circle of the same, adding as follows :

“ But when again, it is conversant with the logistic * power, and the circle of the same revolving with facility indicates its pereeptions, then intellect and science are necessarily produced.”

Plato entirely opposes 1 the rational to the sensible, the revolving with facility to the straight or right, the is to the generated, indication to enunciation, intellect to opinion, and science to faith. The logistic however, is not that which reasons, as some one may suppose, hut the intelligible itself. For this he opposes to the sensible, because reasoning there is more divine than in the soul, as we have

1 i t. The repression of the circle of the some, is through the world to it* paradigm: each of these being a vholr, but the former a sensible, and the latter an intelligible tc/wle.

* lor Xfiyuor litre, it is necessary to read \cynmmy.

* Instead of nrrftiprcr 10 tbit place, read aereOijser.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II.

Y

170

PROCLUS ON THE

* lor Xfiyuor litre, it is necessary to read \cynmmy.

* Instead of nrrftiprcr 10 tbit place, read aereOijser.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II.

Y

170

PROCLUS ON THE

[book 11).

frequently observed, ant! in intelligible* always subsists in energy. Ami it seems that he thus denominates the rational the logistic, just as lie afterwards calls the sensible the sensitive. Tor tin sensible is motive of sense, ami the intelligible of the reasoning of the soul. Hence the logistic’ will lie that which is compre¬ hended by the reasoning of the soul; and this antecedently comprehending cause, is liomonyniously to reasoning called logistic. But he cal w the intellectual voluble, as having the unimpeded in transition, and also the circular, and the flourishing, likewise perfection in intellections, the energizing about divinity, the boniform, ami the revolving about tin* intelligible as a centre, “ hastening to conjoin yourself to the centre of resounding light,' says some one of the Hods. Hie word being likewise signifies that wlm h is tilled with truly existing Wings and is united to them. But the word indicates signifies, to untold as it were into light, to teach, and to product* from that which is arcane, hart her still, by intellect here, niu.-t be understood the intellect which is ai cording to habit. For intellect has a threefold subsistence ; the Jirst indeed, being divine, such as is tin demiurgic intellect; but the second, being that which is participated by soul, and is essential and se-U'-perfect; and the Hind, that which subsists according to habit, and on account of which tin* soul is intellectual. And science is tin* tir>t knowledge which is filla.-d from inlclligibh ■>, ami exists with an unincliiiing, non-verging, and immu¬ table energy. But it differs from intellect, * so lar as the latter i* surveyed in the simple projections alone of the soul. For through it the soul at once intellec¬ tually jierceivcs the whole of each object of intellection; since the at-once- cullected in energit s, is the peculiarity ot intellect. But science is surveyed in the knowledge from cause. For this is the peculiarity of science as is also the composition and division of forms. For it is evident, that having a knowledge of beings, it also know*, which among them have the order of causes, and which of effects. But all know ledge of this kind is called science, just as the simple appre¬ hension oj each object of intellection is called intelligence. And such is our expla¬ nation.

But all know ledge of this kind is called science, just as the simple appre¬ hension oj each object of intellection is called intelligence. And such is our expla¬ nation.

landilichus however, conceives this intellect to lie more ancient than soul, supernally containing, and giving perfection to it. He also contends against those, who either immediately conjoin the soul to all-pcrfrcl intellect, (tor it is necessary that the transition should not 1 h* immediate from exempt natures to participants, but that there should he middle essences co-arraiiged with the things that participate) or who suppose intellect to he a habit of the soul, lor it is ne-

* litre also fur X. -/<». », read XoytaTtKuy.

1 Non is omitted here iu the original.

ROOK 111.]

TIM.LUS or PLATO.

171

-/<». », read XoytaTtKuy.

1 Non is omitted here iu the original.

ROOK 111.]

TIM.LUS or PLATO.

171

cessary that prior to lliat which is in another, that should exist which i-< in itscit. Ami this indeed, is rightly asserted with refen lire to things; hut it is more con¬ sonant to the words of Plato, to survey this intellect as a habit in the soul itself. For TnnuMis s.ivs it is produced from the energy of the circle of the same. But that intellect which the 1)< miur^us constituted, must Ik; said to he above soul, when he placed analogously soul in body, and intellect in soul. For it is evident that this 1 ut* llect is more ancient than soul, just as soul, according to Timauis, is more ancient than body. The intellect however, which is now mentioned, being the elfect of the motion of reason about the inti iligible, through the circle of the same; for he says it is produced, in ronsiTjurncc of that circle revolving with faci¬ lity about that which is apprehended by the reasoning power; will not be more ancient than the soul, but a certain habit of it, in the same manner as science. II* nee also, he says, that it is in genera ted in the soul, in the same manner as science, opinion, and faith. From all that has been said therefore, this one thing may be summarily collected, that xihcn reason is conversant with the intelligible, and the circle of the same unfolds through its intellectual energy, the nature of beings to reason, then intellect and science are produced in the soul. And this indeed, must necessarily be the case. For a perfection adapted to such energies, is consubsis- tent w ith them. \\ hat then, some one may sav, is reason at one time conversant w ith intelligibles, but at another with sensibles ? By no means is this the case with the total soul [or soul of the universe], hut it is always on high, ami is always directed to intelligibles. it likewise abides and is established there, and provi¬ dentially attends to sensibles, with an untamed energy; and through the facility of the motion of the circle of th• same, the rectitude of the circle of the different is permanent. But the words when, is generated, and the like, manifest differences of power. For the energy is not every where similarly according to all the powers: for this is the peculiarity of d vine intelligibles, on account of the simplicity of their essence. But according to the energy of the circle of the same, reason is more conversant with intelligibles than with sensibles; anti from the energy of the circle of the different, is more conversant with sensibles than with intelligibles. It is requisite also not to overlook this, that Timncus says, u the circle <f the different proceeding xcith rectitude looking in so saying to the circles of a partial soul, of which, when in a fallen condition he asserts, that the circle of the same is fettered, and the circle of the different distorted. For in saying this he opposes rectitude to distortion, and to the being fettered facility of motion,' which signifies the unincumbered; just as rectitude there, indicates a lation undistorted by inferior

For in saying this he opposes rectitude to distortion, and to the being fettered facility of motion,' which signifies the unincumbered; just as rectitude there, indicates a lation undistorted by inferior

* For arpoyop in thu place, it i» obviously necessary to read tvrpoyov.

172 PKOCLUS ON THE [book hi-

obji'ctK, and an irreprehensible judgment; no that lit* celebrates appropriately eac h of the circles.

“ Whoever therefore asserts, that this is ever ingencrated in any other being than soul, asserts every thing rather than the truth."

What does he intend to signify by the word this? Is it intellect and science? If so, he does not mean the circle of the diff erent. Or rather does he not speak of the twofold conjunctions, [intellect and science,] 1 opinion and faith? For intellect and science are om* of the conjunctions, and opinion and faith are the second. Hut through these lie* comprehends every soul. Fiery thing therefore, which is the recipient of intellect and science, opinion and faith,’ is soul. For all these knowledges are rational and transitin'. Ami because indeed, they are ra¬ tional, they are exempt from the irrational powers ; hut because they are transitive, they are subordinate to intellectual know ledge. For if science and intellect are in intelligible*, y< t they are not inyencrated in tin in, as he say* they are in the soul. For sciences in the soul subsist according to participation; since they participate of science itself, the soul being essentiullizcd according to participation. For the middle proceed from the first genera, and are similarly harmonized ; since the harmony ill the soul is from harmony it-elf. The soul likewise possesses figure, similarly to the fir^t genera, f or intellectual figure is comprehensive of all¬ various figures. The soul also possesses powers after the same manner. For intellectual and intelligible powers are prior to it. It likewise receives motion from the genera of lw-ing, and knowledge from the demiurgic intelligence, where also jM.-rmanency is unfolded into light. Fur all Limn ledge is a certain permanency and comprehension oj the thing kmnen, and an apt coiijunction with it. 'Flu* motion therefore of the soul participates of the w hole psychical know ledge, so far as it knows its, If,’ and looking to itself moves ; and knowledge participates of motion st) far as it is transitive. Peculiarly however, the motive » nergy is defined accord¬ ing* to motion; but the gnostic, according to permanency. And the circle of the different is rath, r motive than gnostic, but the cir, le of the same is rather gnostic than motive; because permanency pertains to sameness, but motion to diflerence. In the circle of the different however, there is knowledge, and in the circle o (the

1 The words yovy ami are omtlUt! wi this place in the original.

1 For tut, uf here, read Tiirrtui.

■* I or faery here, it is obviously necessary to read tuerrjy.

In the circle of the different however, there is knowledge, and in the circle o (the

1 The words yovy ami are omtlUt! wi this place in the original.

1 For tut, uf here, read Tiirrtui.

■* I or faery here, it is obviously necessary to read tuerrjy.

* Instead of pera ri/e *,» ijoty ui this place. It is requisite to read iura rije yiyrjcrty

hook in,]

TIM/KUS OF PLATO.

173

same, motion; just as in the latter then* is sameness, and in the former difference. But the whole soul participates through the whole of itself of the genera of Iieing. As far therefore, as to these particulars, the psychogony obtains its completion, being divided into the l>«loro-inentioncd heads, l’or the hypostasis, harmony, figure, powers and energies of the soul, have l>ecn discussed.••• 1

Since however the soul i> a multitude, and the first of composite natures; but it is composed, not of infinites, but of things numbered, and these not without co-arrangemi nt, but harmonized ; this being the case, numl>ers and harmony were very properly assumed in the generation of it. Since too, it comprehends the principles of all analogy, ami all harmony, in consequence of being the soul of the world, no analogy is omitted [in the composition of it], ltecause however, it was constituted by divinity, tin more divine of the genera was assumed, viz. the diatonic : for it is cnlheastic. And at first indeed, liecause essence, same, and different were assumed, that whole of the soul which is prior to parts, was con¬ stituted; but now, through the psychogony, the whole which is in the parts. For tlu* Demiurgus divides, and unites the parts through analogies. But through the circles, the wholeness in each of the parts, is delivered. It must likewise lx* assumed, that the Demiurgus in the Tima*us, energizes in conjunction with all the demiurgic fouls. For lie cuts into seven parts Titaunically ; unites Apollo- niacally; product s body, and invests it vv ith figure, as containing in himself \ ulcan; and bounds the measures of ascents and descents, and inscribes the laws of Fate, as possessing Necessity, in the psychogony also, it is necessary to refer what has Ixen said, to the essence ol the soul, or to the tilings which are administered by it, or rather to both. For the natures contained in the world, are under the dominion of the powers which are essentially inherent in the soul. It is likewise requisite to investigate what the middles are, vv hat the multiple, siqierparticular and superpartient ratios are, what the Iciinma is, and what the seven parts are; and why the diagram proceeds to a quadruple diapason, and the dia|»cnte, and tone.

It is likewise requisite to investigate what the middles are, vv hat the multiple, siqierparticular and superpartient ratios are, what the Iciinma is, and what the seven parts are; and why the diagram proceeds to a quadruple diapason, and the dia|»cnte, and tone.

' Of tl ic three middles also, the geometrical, arithmetical, and musical, the solid analogy which is composed from the three is the equality of Themis, from whom ♦•very order is derived. But the three middles proceed from the three daughters of Themis, viz. Funomia, Dice, and Irene; the arithmetical from Irene, which surpasses and is surpassed by the i-qual; which also we employ in the tune of peace in contracts, and through which the elements are quiescent; but the geo¬ metrical from Eunomi.i which likewise Fiato denominates the judgment of

* There i» uufortunately an hiatus here in the original.

t74

PROCLUS OS THE TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

[book 111.

Jupiter, and through which the w orld is adorned w ith geometrical analogies; and the harmonic from Dice, through which greater things have a greater, hut less a less ratio. Since therefore, the geometrical middle comprehends the other two, as has heen demonstrated, the essence of the soul is adorned by the geometric middle, the soul 1 m mg the same through the w hole of itself, and every where both partible and impartible. But it is adorned according to the arithmetical middle, because the common powers in it, which recur from the impartible to the partible, or from things partible to the impartible, espially surpass and are surpassed by tilings entirely partible and impartible. And by the harmonic middle,' because of the powers that are m it, some are in a greater degree- separated from their pro¬ ducing causes, and lia\e a greater transcendency, but others a less. And again, the sameness of forms subsists every where appropriately thiough the whole world, corporeally and vitally, in a plant, in an animal, ami in a stone; because the whole world is adorned with geometrical proportion. But the arithmetical middle presents itself to the\iew in the sublunary elements, which it equalizes according to powers. And the harmonic middle is seen in the world, according to the [celestial] .spheres, their motions, and their intervals. For Ptolemy demon¬ strates, that their intervals are in harmonic proportion.

• IinUa.l of tj It Qji/iuno) ptaonji ui this place, it is requisite to read rjj it lypiuy pceorijn.

BOOK IV.

“ But when the generating father understood that this generated statue or resemblance of the perpetual Gods, moved and li\cd,’ he was delighted and exhilarated, and in consequence of this delight, considered how he might fabricate it still more similar to its paradigm. Hence, as that is an eternal animal* he endeavoured also to render this universe such,’ to the utmost of his ability.”

Hence, as that is an eternal animal* he endeavoured also to render this universe such,’ to the utmost of his ability.”

The one Demsurgus, who also fabricates wholes, generates collectively anil at once, according to sameness, and converts, perfec ts and assimilates his fabrications to their paradigms; win thcr one and the same essence effects this, and one and the same generative, n calling, perfective and assimilative power, as is assorted by some * of the ancients, or diflcront powers, as appeared to lie the rase to certain others. For there is no small dissension, and as it were opposition, 1 m- tween these mi n. There are likew ise some, who uniting, are at the same time unw illing to ad¬ mit that the one is without the efficacy of multitude; and there are others who, though tin y divide, yet cannot endure to say, that the niiinhi i of powers is unco- ordinated and mutilated, but they willingly admit and demonstrate that these powers afe comprehended in iheir proper monad, and are united and preserved by it. II< nee it happens, that some assert that these powers are a tetradic mo¬ nad, but others again, that tin v are an united tetrad, or as they love to call it, a monadized tetrad. It is ev ident Imvvi ver, that the Deminrgus here mentioned being

1 1 iif wr.nl* rr aiTn .ai ;.i, »rc omitted in ibe teit of L’roclus.

* I'or cw]v lirrc, mid evo ».

1 The word rmnvri y is also omitted ill llie text of t’roi lu».

* Instead of kaQvtciv ia tbu place, it is necessary to read naOuwrp rornr.

170

PROCMJS ON tiii:

[nook iv.

one, inKcrf* in the junior Demiurgi posterior to him, nt one nnd the same time an assimilative power when he orders them to imitate his power about their gene¬ ration; a generative power, wlien he orders them to produce and generate ani¬ mals in common ; and an analysing power, when he commands them to receive hack again the parts that wore borrowed from the whole elements, the substances composed from them being dissolved, and to recall them to then wholes. And after all these, he inserts in them a guardian power, in consequence of which, he immediately constitutes the governors of the world, guardians ot the numbers of time, and earth the guardian of day and night.

And after all these, he inserts in them a guardian power, in consequence of which, he immediately constitutes the governors of the world, guardians ot the numbers of time, and earth the guardian of day and night.

The Demiiirgiis then-fore, as I began to say, by w bom all tilings wi re produeed, generated them consubsistent w ith himself, and assimilated, and pcrfeeted, ami convert* <1 them to himst If; tin ir order not being confounded by the at-oiicc-col- leclcd evolution, as it wire, of all things into light, but In mg in a much greater de- «iec guarded and connected. Fur he neither deprives inferior natures of the pro- vidential care of more excellent b* mgs; nor more perfect natures of the dominion pertaining to them o\er such as are more imperfi et. l or be does not comprehend one of these prior in time to tin other; nor do either secondary natures remain destitute of the inspection of prov idi-nee, nor such as are more am lent, sluggish and improlifu:; as if the furnu-r did not yet receive the providential cm rgies of the latt< r. W e however, not Ik mg able to understand, and unit li less to * xplain the beiiefici-nl energy of the father of wholes from eternity, about the world, must Ik* satisfied w ith perceiving and speaking of him, as at onetime generating, at another adorning, at another |x rfectiiig, and at another assimilating, vv hieli also the words of the philosopher now previously suffering, are prepared to operate upon us. For the world now participates of motion and life, according to the doctrine of the father.' For soul that dvv* 11s together with it, preserves to itself the different kind* of its own peculiar knowledge, according to which it knows both intelligibles and mundane natures. Hut motion and life, which do not flourish in ils« If alone, it also imparts to all the bulk of the body of the universe. And on this verv account either alone or esjrecially, the fabric of the world being comph tely I ishion* d a resemblance of the intelligible CJods, the D* Miiiurgus was in a still greater degree delighted ami crhiliinitcd, and ill consequence of this delight and exhilaration, caused it to possess a greater and more perfect similitude to intelligibles. Hence also, lie considered bow lie .might make it as it were perpetual. For the intelligible is properly, and primarily perpetual, but that is secondarily perpetual which is co-ex- tended with the progression and evolution of time. For the n'er is twofold, the

* For <ra>rct ill till* |>Uer t It i« iifa'Viv lo rod wnr,w>i.

BOOK t\ .]

TIM,EL’S OF PLATU

177

For the intelligible is properly, and primarily perpetual, but that is secondarily perpetual which is co-ex- tended with the progression and evolution of time. For the n'er is twofold, the

* For <ra>rct ill till* |>Uer t It i« iifa'Viv lo rod wnr,w>i.

BOOK t\ .]

TIM,EL’S OF PLATU

177

ono bring eternal, but the other temporal. Why therefore, after .ill llio before-men tioncd benefits, does Plato introduce this eighth <ritt of the Deuiiurgits * lie-cause it is tlio greatest and most pork-el, and transfers the image to the highest sinnli- tmlo to its paradigm. Hut it is necessary til it lie who onee exhibits tin* grnera- tion of wholes in words, should pass from things more imperfect, to surli as are more jiorfeet. Tor ronforniahly to this very tiling, things w hich subsist per sc or essentially, and those which are ingenrrated in others, are, as it wore, opposed to each other ; because in things wlit* h are cst ihlished in tlicinst Ives, ami which in no respect whatever pertain to others, it is necessary to s iv that tin- more ve¬ nerable ot these rank as leadf rs, through which the final, the demiurgic, and the other causes coiise<pient to these, present themselves to tin* view. Hut in things which arc participated by others, such as are more imperfect occur, which liecome as it were subjects to more perfect natures, and show themselves to lx* of pos¬ terior origin. Such therefore, is the whole" design of the words before us.

It follows m the next place, th.it we should show through what causes, and from the possession of what nature, tin- I )cmiurgiis of wholes constituted time ill conjunct ion with the soul and the universe; and also what the good is imparted by it, and on account of which it w as produced. It is likewise r-peciallv requisite that we should show this, because many, even of the friends of Plato, apprehend time to lie a certain obscure form, and nothing more than that who h is iiiimhi red of motions; nut considering, that ofthe ten gifts which thefather imparts to the world, each of the following is entirely greater than each of the gifts that precedes it. If there¬ fore, having now animated the world, and rendered it a hles-ed («od, lie after¬ ward^ imparts time to it, it is evident that time vviil he* superior to soul, and to the possession of a blessi d lile on account of soul, and that a life which is defined according to time will live periodically. Hence time* w ill not be a thing of such a kind as the multitude say it is, hut wall have an essence more divine than that ot souls, and psychical good. This then-fore, we shall again more fully en- foi ce.

Hence time* w ill not be a thing of such a kind as the multitude say it is, hut wall have an essence more divine than that ot souls, and psychical good. This then-fore, we shall again more fully en- foi ce.

We must say however, directing our attention to the words of Plato, that the IJe-iniurgus intellectually perceives the Irte, and motion, and order of the universe, and its possession of form, not in so doing looking to the world itself. Tor nei¬ ther in short, is the world intelligible according to the whole of itself; but is rather according to its bulk, tiie object of opinion in conjunction with irrational sense. INor does the Demiiirgus in his intellections tend to external objects; but

' I I>r xaaay here, read rn<Tn.

liiMe.nl of v*<(>r'fxjy att tnj o yporot, it is necessary to read vwrprtftor or *17 « t,

Tim. Plat. Vol. II. t

i7a

PKOCLLS ON THE

[kook IV.

every intellect* is converted to itself. Hence, Iiecause he intellectually perceives himself, and contains in himself the generative, and prov idential cause of wholes; hy lieholding himself, he surveys both the essence and the jK-rfection of lus own progeny. But Plato says, that the world was generated the statue or resemblance of the perjtetual Gods ; not that it is the imaye of the mundane Gods; for he docs not alone speak about the corporeal-Jurmcd nature oj the universe , hut also about the ani¬ mated ami intellectual animal, ‘a huh comprehends in it*cl/ the mundane Gods ; hut he says this, because it is the resemblance of'the intelligible Gods, l'or it it Jilted uith deity /non them, and the progressions of the mundane Gods into it, arc, as it were, cer¬ tain rivers and illuminations of the intelligible Gods. The world also, receives these pmgrosioiis, not 011 U according to its celestial part, Imt according to the whole of itself. 1 or in the air, in the earth, and in tin sea, there are advents uf tin- tenes- tri.d, aipiatir, and aerial Cuds. I’lie world thercfiire, i- Idled with deity accord¬ ing to the whole of itself, and oil this account is w holly a resemblance of the intelligible (Jods ; not indeed, ree« in ini; tin* inti lligible < bids themselves ; for nei¬ ther do statues receive the exempt essences of the total Cods; Imt being filly adorned, it receives the illuminations derived from thence to secondary orders, to whii h it has a eoiunu nsurate subsistence.

That by the perpetual however, be means all the intelligible Gods , and not the (bids that are in the world, he n mh is e\id« nt by immediately adding, “ Hence as that is an eternal animal," viz. the intelligible [or animal itsi lfj. lint w ho the intelligible (bids are, may be assumed from di\isiou. Tor it must either bt: ad¬ mitted that they are prior to animal itself; or in animal itself, Ik mg the monads as it were of the four ideas which are there; or posterior to animal itself. It would lie ridiculous therefore, to arrange them prior to animal itself; for they would then comprehend ctemitv, to wlm h he has not yet said the universe is assi¬ milated. But it is impossible to arrange them in animat itself. ]’or how could Plato call the universe, the statue or r» semblance of tliO-'C Coils, to which he had not yet according to the order of the discourse, assimilated the pleuitudc-s of tin universe , Tor lie does this afterwards, when he produces the partial plenitudes of the universe. So that he would not have said, that the universe was now gene¬ rated the resemblance of tlie.se Cods, but since it will be. It remains therefore, that the perpetual Gods, are all those posterior to animal itself, which subsist between the intelligible paradigm and the Oemiurgiis. Tor the Demiurgus ren¬ dered the universe similar to all these, so far as each of them comprehends the form of the wholeness of the world. This then is demonstrated.

1 Nih is omitted in the original in this (dacr.

book IV ]

TIM.KL'S Ol PLATO.

17 ;»

Tor the Demiurgus ren¬ dered the universe similar to all these, so far as each of them comprehends the form of the wholeness of the world. This then is demonstrated.

1 Nih is omitted in the original in this (dacr.

book IV ]

TIM.KL'S Ol PLATO.

17 ;»

Hence the world is the statue of the intelligible (jnds, when it is assumed in c»>n- jiinctiou w ith soul and intellect, and the deity w hich accedes to it. But it is a statue in motion, and full of life,' and deity ; fashioned from all things w ithin itself; pre¬ serving all things, and filled w ith an at-once-cullected abundance of all good from the father. It likewise peculiarly receives from nature motion, more than any thing else; hut from soul, motion and life ; and from intellect, intelligence ami life, and the receptacle of the mundane Hods. From the mundane Gods however, it receives that which remains, viz. the being fashioned in perfection, the most true statue, or rosemhlanre, ol the intelligible find". And again, from this it is evident, that Plato establishes the Dcimurgus conformably to the most consummate of the ini¬ tiators into the mysteries. For he exhibits him as the .statuary of (he uorld,just us before he represented him the maker of divine names, and the enune tutor of divine char act i rs , through which he garc petfu turn to the soul. For these things are effected by those that are It lest iF in reality, trim give completion to statues, through characters and vital nanus, and render them liviinj and mining. With great propriety there¬ fore, was the father of wholes delighted with his fabrication, and being exhilarated with it, endeavoured to render it still more similar to its paradigm. li e w a* de¬ lighted with, and admired however, not that which proceeded from, and through him was completely effected a thing of this kind, lmt with his own power, which caused the universe, from being moved in a confused and disordi rly manta r, to l*ecome orderly, animated, endued w ith intellect, and tie me. Ami as by know¬ ing himself, he knows the world. so by admiring his own demiurgic power, he makes his fabrication to he admirable, ami the true statue or resemblance of the perpetual fouls. For in a certain respect , the universe is said to be a statue «?»,«,«) from divinity being delighted with it (va« ro ayctXXs<r5ai rov bsiv ff otjti «). He was delighted however, and exulted, not rejoicing in a thing situated extern.dlv ; for how being intellect can he look outwardly ; hut his delight was produced from lx mg filled with his own bouiform will, and from his beneficent power proceed¬ ing to the uueuvying and exuberant communication and supply of more perfect goods. This al>o Plato suilieiently indicates, by saying that the Demiurgus in conscrpience of being delighted, endeavoured to render the universe still more

1 For Cwt; here, it is obviously nccessarv lo read fuoji.

This al>o Plato suilieiently indicates, by saying that the Demiurgus in conscrpience of being delighted, endeavoured to render the universe still more

1 For Cwt; here, it is obviously nccessarv lo read fuoji.

1 For rrX*i>rut here, read riNr-rrm. 'I hr tctriUr were imlulorv into the my Meries, an<l were theur~ gifts, or capable of performing divine operation'. Tins thrurgi/, ill whieh these initiators were deeply •lulled, formed the fast part of the sacerdotal science. See an interesting account of it, from a very rare Greek MS. of Psellus, On Ijeemont according lo the Dogmas of tkt Grceki, in the Notea to my Pausamas, Yol. 3. p. 32*.

180

l»ROCIA!S ON 'I'llli

[ ROOk IV.

similar to its paradigm. For he was primarily delighted indeed, through the inward intellection of himself, comprehending and Iwnevolentlv receiving the intelligible universe, with a simple, unimpeded, and collected embrace, through permanence in, and a perfec t union with it. But he was delighted secondarily, ,f ,t !m* lawful so to speak, on account of the aptitude of the natures which receive

the supplv of good, externally proceeding trom him.

\„,l here you .., how Plain deliver* the three causes of the participation

of .o.o.l; proceeding into this world from the father. One indeed, and the first, is that which proceeds from the /.«ur of the • th elive cause. For it is the /). miur^us who now generates time; through his nvv„ u.ienvy.ng and prolific abundance desiring to till all things with tiiM, middle, and last goods. But tin second cause, is that wl.i, h iris, s from the aptitude of the receiv ing thing. For the communicator of good is then .h light, d. win n that whirl, receives .«, is aptly dispoM.l to its reception. And the third rat.*.-. that which proceeds from the symm ,n h and as ,t r, e c<>n>p» at,on and symphony of both p„u cr and apt dude 1 or on acrount of this, though the < mds always extend to all things good co-ordinate to their essences, v rt it is not alw ays received by all of us ; because we are not adapted to Us reception, and lrav, not always a subsistence commensurate to Us pow.r If however, we wish that divinity should rejoice u, us,* as he ,s naturally !h.p„M d to rejoice, and he delighted on our account, though he alvv ays possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, we must render ourselves adapted to the ■ ti. „ Of the good which is extended by him ; in order that thcg.lt ot d,vanity, mav not vv ill. respect to us he iiicllicacious, though In is not nnpeded l,y any thmg. These things therefore it .s the business of another d.s. i.ssioi, to survey more

fully. .

Nmv liowrvor, l.-t us l.ow .iwrso lire,.non mor.- Mm.lurlo Us para-

, 1 ,..,,, h It,.- linra.iim of tin,.-. JSnna. the paru.l.a-.n 1l.rroti.rr is pr.-

rn-trilv ,'I.TU ,1. if llio so.i.ihlo wnrhl ili.l r- < < •> "eoii.lary I" n» U is

,. vi ,|o'„l to i vory.. tin,I itwonhl ho in a loss .1. eroo assini.'nlo...II.-

JSnna. the paru.l.a-.n 1l.rroti.rr is pr.-

rn-trilv ,'I.TU ,1. if llio so.i.ihlo wnrhl ili.l r- < < •> "eoii.lary I" n» U is

,. vi ,|o'„l to i vory.. tin,I itwonhl ho in a loss .1. eroo assini.'nlo...II.-

„il,lo. \ml ,t ilkoois, IS ,11,1 ilillioull porooiio, III,.l llio .Iiituro which has Us

'moral. m mulati...,, if It "oro sopanitoil from timo. wmil.l !«• so l.ir from

.por,a t...il, that I. woul.l no. la- possil.lo for ,t to romai.i for a momoiu.

Ill nro, a oorlain |aTpoluily moos.uy ... Ilia, which is lo he ... a-till greater

• InUea.l of cro^au iu 1»„> place, ,1 » nectary to f-ail ceara V ,.

, lf | f w „|, rrimf l,o luiuluct .Humi.uUo.o, for iI«k arealvvavs cite.,d-d, after ll.e

„.a.r.br.aosr, a. lW.ioh.ias JMoil, . an »...ialilc a™ »lo,n.,.cr.

. 1 ,.., .r mi or .lie pad. .hid. hr |..,|n,nalli ■» ns, hr ... lo hr Jrh 5 h.rd. In.

<Kligtit indicalini: our paper reception of tlm K'“.it.

H*iOK I V j

TIM.l-IL'S «>1 PI, \ lo.

in i

degree assimilated to the intelligible. But to that which is perpetual indeed, yet has not the perpetuity at once present with it, in the same manner as the intelli¬ gible, the whole extension of time is necessary. Moreover, he who considers the nature of time, will more clearly know' how time not only contributes to the perpetuity of the whole world, and to the great parts of the world, hut also to the perfection and felicity of each of them, and comprehends all these at once; which in the course of the interpretation we shall endeavour to manifest, by investigating the plep.litudes of time.

“ The nature indeed of animal itself was eternal, and this it is impos¬ sible to adapt perfectly to that wliicn is generated. lienee lie formed the design of producing a certain moveable * image 1 of eternity ;* and in consequence of this, while he was adorning the universe, lie made this eternal image proceeding according to number, of eternity abiding in one, and which we denominate time.”

'That animal itself is the plenitude of the multitude of intelligible animals, and that it possesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, is a thing frequently and fully asserted, and i-- not considered as at all dubious by the Platon it philosophers. But what eternity is, and the moveable time which imitates it, are tilings perfectly difficult to understand, and to explain sufficiently to others. At the same time however, if i> requisite to narrate the mole elegant opinions of the ancients about it, and to add, n we are able, anv thing which may contribute to the elucidation, and distinct consideration of the things to he discussed.

At the same time however, if i> requisite to narrate the mole elegant opinions of the ancients about it, and to add, n we are able, anv thing which may contribute to the elucidation, and distinct consideration of the things to he discussed.

The multitude therefore, have a conception and co-sensation of time, in conse¬ quence of looking to the suhlun try and celestial motions, and are of opinion that time i> something pertaining to motion, such for instance as the inimlx r, or exten¬ sion ot motion, or something else of the like kind. But the more excellent ot these, proceeding to the consideration * of eternity, and perceiving that there is not simply motion, hut a perpetual and orderly motion in the universe, and which circulates with inv aruifile sameness,—conceived from hence, that this invariable sameness, was inherent in moveable natures, from a certain other cause, and imt

1 I or «<r,r.n here, it is requisite to read narrat.

’ lor oiirroi here, rout •ro,;r,;>.

* And for oiw read nso m

* Tor niwi'n likewise, it m iieeessarv to read mwim.

Instead of rfiranr in this |dare, it w requisite to read irifraor

IMfOC'LL-S ON Tilt

[book it.

i«-i

from themselves. This cause therefore, will cither lx.» immoveable, or moved. And if indeed, it is moved at a certain time only, how will it be the cause of that which always is invariably the same ? Hut if it is moved always, this perpetuity of its mo¬ tion must again he derived from something else, and either 1 tins will be the case ad infinitum, or there will l*e something immoveable, which is the cause of perpe¬ tual motion, to things which are always moved. And the energy ol this being immoveable, is no longer according to time, but is eternal. For the jveculiarity of tilings winch subsist accord mg to time, is to be always m generation, or becoming to It, but of eternal natures, to exist always. For common conception opines, that etc mity is denominated from (.listing always, just as it thinks that time derives its ap[M‘llation !rom dancing [jt agx rr ( v y'wn%»~\ be ing a measured motion, and which has its cxMt nee in generation. On tins account, it appears to me that the multi¬ tude assumed the fust conception ot time, but the wise ot eternity, hy tin* funner directing the ir attention to tin- nature which is always moved, and the latter to the nature* which isalwavs stable. It must now howeve r be* shown vv hat each of these i-, and m a manner most eouformahle to the doctrine ol IMato.

It must now howeve r be* shown vv hat each of these i-, and m a manner most eouformahle to the doctrine ol IMato.

Aristotle inch e*d, admitting time* to lie the* numbe r of motion, asserts that it is c o, not according to that which numb* rs, but according to that whic h is numbered. Hence, he very properly inepiires what that is which muuls rs it, it time is that which is numlx reel. For the se are* relatives, and tin* one e xisting, the other also exists. He solves the itupiiry however weakly, by saying that it is a certain soul w'hich numbers time.* lmr it is lie e e-ssary, that prior to pe rpetual number, tlie re* should lie a perpetual nume rator, in order that lie* may always produce, that which is generated always existing. Admitting these lore time* to lie the* number of motion, lie also *,un that eternity is intelligible, deriving its app< lketion from exist¬ ing always, and possessing and comprehending the whole ot time. Hence also lie says, the existence and life of all things are suspended from this, of some things more obscurely, hut of others more clearly. It is necessary however at present, that we should particularly see what eternity and tune* are* according to Plato, anil that we should not admit the* image eif time to !r* time alone, nor eternity to be simply a certain intelligible (Jod, but in the first place show, in what order of the

* For ft tw urripvy in tin) place, it is necessary to read >) »*■' uxetpiy.

’ In defence of Vristotle however, il ruav be said, that when lit assert) that II i) a certain soul which numbers time, lie tines not speak of tune according to its hrsf subsistence, hut llie tune which is parti¬ cipated bv material natures, and of which, tlie multitude, as i’rotrlus observes. Lave a conce ption, dint co-seiisalion.

lllHIK |\.]

TIM/El S OF PLATO

Ift3

intelligible* it sulisiste. For this is t specially the peculiarity of the science of Plato.

Lave a conce ption, dint co-seiisalion.

lllHIK |\.]

TIM/El S OF PLATO

Ift3

intelligible* it sulisiste. For this is t specially the peculiarity of the science of Plato.

It is manifest then to every' one, that eternity is more venerable, primordial, and as it were more stable than animal itself, though animal itself is the most beautiful, and most perfect of intelligible animals, as Plato lias Indore said. For if the eternal is said to be, and is eternal as participating [of eternity.] but eternity is not said to participate of animal itself, nor to receoe its appellation from it, it is evident that the former is secondary, but the latter more simple and more primary. For eternity neither participates of animal itself, liecause it is not an animal; for neither is time a visible animal; nor is it any other animal. For it has been demonstrated that animal itself is niily-ljcgnttcn and eternal, because eternity is more excellent. For the eternal is neither that which eternity is, nor is more excellent than eternity. lint as we all say that the participant of intellect, and the animated, are posterior to intel¬ lect and soul, so likewise the eternal is secondary to eternity'. W hat then some one may say% will eternity l>c f if it is more venerable than animal itself, which is said to be the most beautiful of intrliigibles, -and iu every respect perfet t 1 May it not he said, that it is especially most beautiful, in consequence of receiv¬ ing the summit of beauty, on account of excessive participation, but that it does not receive the summit of the good ; for it is not said to be most excellent. So that it may be subordinate to that which is ihe best. To which may lie added, that it is not simply the most beautiful of all inlelligibles, but of intelligible animals. Hence eternity* is no animal, but if it is life, it is infinite lif*. In the next place, it is not necessary that what is in every respect perfect should be the first. For the perfect has all things, so that it has things first, middle, and last. But that which is above this division \vill he super-perfect. Hence nothing prevents eternity from being superior to the animal which is the most Ireautiful of all intelligible animals, and is in every respect jtcrfect, if eternity is most excellent and super-perfect. Fartlu r si ill, animal itself lias not* an arrangement prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. On tins account therefore, l’lato says, “ F«r to that "a Inch ts the most bcautijul of intelligibles anil in even/ respect perfect .” But eternity is prior to the multitude of intelligible animals. For these are eternal; but eternal natures participate of eternity, which is not co¬ arranged with the multitude of them, and lias rather an arrangement contrary to them. For it unites multitude, and is said to abide in one, as Itcing void of mul-

1 There u an omiMion in the onpnal iu llui place of o m«r. ’ O* m omitted here in the original.

For it unites multitude, and is said to abide in one, as Itcing void of mul-

1 There u an omiMion in the onpnal iu llui place of o m«r. ’ O* m omitted here in the original.

lMtm ix’s on Tin-:

[book iv.

1114

,i,Animal itself however, comprehends all such animals as are intelligible ; on hit'll account also, it ts in want of eternity, in order that it may parti* ipate through it, of union, containing power, and a firm and immutable life. lienee too. lie that it is eternal, yet does not add, that it has multitude in its, If, hut r^ieaks of it in tin- singular numher ; signifying that union is especially present „iti, ,t from eternity, so that the whole essence of intelligible animals shines forth .is one nature, on account ol eternity.

If therefore, these things are rightly asserted, eternity will not In- one certain

If therefore, these things are rightly asserted, eternity will not In- one certain

", nus of lieing, as some think it is, such lor iiist me,* as ,*ssenee, or |H inianency, or sameness, lor all these are parts of animal itself; and ea. h of them has that to which it is as it were opposed. Thus for ills! mce, t sseiice is opposed to non- 1 M*iiitr, to pennant in \, motion, and to sameness, ilith reiie. But to eternity nothing is opposed. All these then lore, are similarly it, rual, vu. sameness, dif- fereiiee, pel uianeiiev and motion. i his however, would not lie the case, if eternity was one of these. F»r uuitimi and p. rinaueni y are not similarly eternal with eteruitv. But all intelligible* are similarly perpetual and cleinal beings. Fteruitv therefore is not opposed to any one, , itlu r ol these or ol the things posterior to it. For time, which may s, i in to subsist dissimilarly with reference in it, m the first plaei is not convolved about the same things as eternity, but about thing* which do not receive eoiuievioii from eternity. In the in vt pbae, it in an image, and not the opposition ot it, as we have already ohscived, and shall demon-irate. .Neither therefore, will eternity be one genus of being, nor the whole collection ol the g, uera ot it. I-»*r again multitude l». mg in tt, it would Im in want of the union of that which abides in one. But eteruitv is that vvlrnli abides 111 one. So tli.it it would both abide, and not abide in on< , It woe d abide indeed, as , ternitv, and a- tin cause ot union to beings. But it would not abide, as consisting of multitude. In addition to all that has Ims n said hktvvisi, it is intellect vvliuh consists ot 1 th»s, genera, ami perceives then i oiismimiation. The conception however, of intellect, |n dilfeieiit from that of eternity, just as the conception ol soul, is diliennt Iroiu that ol tune, lor the t'lia gv of nihlltil, is wlraiiMtiic in/t lh'j,i hit, hut of . In nth/, imjmrtihtc JitrJu tutf i/. And alter this man¬ ner indeed, the things are distinguished from i nch other. But those who mingle all things into the same, and assert that tin re is only one inti Heel between soul and the guinl, arc compelled to acknowledge that intellect and eternity aie the same.

\\ hat then will eternity be, if it is neithi r one of the genera ol being, nor cou- 1 The w nils niuvrurm t, appear to lie Mauling in thi* place in I hi" original.

JIKOK 1 \ .1

TiM.ia;s or n. vro.

ius

\\ hat then will eternity be, if it is neithi r one of the genera ol being, nor cou- 1 The w nils niuvrurm t, appear to lie Mauling in thi* place in I hi" original.

JIKOK 1 \ .1

TiM.ia;s or n. vro.

ius

sNts of all the five', mikt all these .|ir eternal, ami • temity' is above these I V\ e reply, ulial rUe* ran it b ■ than tin- compo-ln-iisiem 1 of tin; intelligible unities ? Hut 1 mean hy tin* unit h*^. tin* uh is of iutrlli^ihlr annuals, ami tin- jjcnmi of all these* intrlli'^ihl* 1 idea**. Tin* om* comprehension therefore; of llu-sr, ami of tin* summit of their multitude, ami tin* cause of tin* immiitahlr pi rinam nry of all of tin in is rtrrnitv, not »■ \i~tintr in thr multitmlr of intelli^ibh.-s, nor rollrrtnl from them ; hut hritiLT pre-si at with thrill exempt ly, disposing ami as it werr forming thrui hy it si-If, ami making this vrry tiling to hr at thr sanir tiun* a whole*. J or thr ill I- varions iilra of intrlli^ihlrs is not produced iiunirdialrly aftrr the "ood, which is entirely without anv rrpic-c-ntalion of multitmlr, hut thrrr arr rrrtain intermediate unturrs, which arr imirrd morr united than all perfect multitude, hut « \hihit the parturii , ncy and representation of thr progeny of wholes, and of e-onnrete ally ~e-on- tainiuir power in tlu-msrli« s. Tin- numher however and nature ol these, the < iods know divim lv, hut the mv-lie- tradition of the Parmenides teaches us in a human manner, and philosi phicallv, to which we refer tin* ri ader for the accurate discus¬ sion of these particulars. Hut now we shall demonstrate through tin* words thrmsi hes of the philosopher, that e ternity i> alioM* all pertret animal, and tint it is proximate l\ almte* it. lor I realise animal itself is said to lie eternal, it will In* secondary to * tern it v. iiut In cause there is no eternal nature prior to it, it will In pro\imat« ii posterior to eteruitv. Y\ In ner there¬ fore, is tins ci ide nt * \\ e ri ply, hei nnsr in itln r is there an\ tiling temporal prior to [linn j the linage ot eternity, hut the world priuiarilv participates of time, and animal itsi It, <»I et« mity. 1 or it as eteruitv is to time, so is animal its* If to

Y\ In ner there¬ fore, is tins ci ide nt * \\ e ri ply, hei nnsr in itln r is there an\ tiling temporal prior to [linn j the linage ot eternity, hut the world priuiarilv participates of time, and animal itsi It, <»I et« mity. 1 or it as eteruitv is to time, so is animal its* If to

the world, llit'ii alternately, a* ^etimctriciuiis would sav, ns ete rnity is to animal itsi It, so is tune t<► tin* world, ihit time is fust participated hy* the world ; for it had no existence* what.wer. prior to the orderly distribution of the uuiierse. Htcrnily therefore-, is first participated hy animal itself. It like-wise, time is not the sensible- animal whic h e-ompreln nels m itsi || all either sensible animals [i. e. if it is m»t the uniiersej; fur it is generate d together with it; hut tiiat which is jrene*- rate-d with it is not that with which it is generated ; it this In; tin* case, licitIn-r will eternity In- tin- int< lliuihle animal, llmcc neither will il lie- an animal, lest tin re should he two [all comprehending] iute-lli^ihle animals. For it has lie-i-n he*- fon; demonstrated hy Plato, that animal itself is onlv begotten. So that m short, e'termty will not he an animal. J ; or it it were, it would either he an animal elitlc- rent from, or the same with animal itself. It is not however, possible to assert

1 For mwiot lien- it i« ncr«-»<:ir\ to r<-a*l

1 The tvnril rrpiryj oinilUil in-ri- mi tin- original, bill from wli.it fellows, tallur tins word, or mrni -ir fwrrn nr rivTit ought cviiiently to In; iii«rrlril.

Tun. rial. \ ol. II. 2 A

JHH

I'HOCLl’S ON THE

[liOOK IV.

cither of these, as n<; have shown ; pirtly indeed, beeause animal it*>flf »->* only be- potion, ami part I v liecattse linn-, ami ilia! vvhit li is t, ni|>oial, an* not the sanic. Hut if it is participated, and does not participate o! intelligible animal, it will Ik a < *od prior to animal itself, ni(< Hii^ililc imh ed, lml not yet an animal ; since animal itself also is a (hill. \ml tins l>< cause the w m id likew i*e is a (hid. [’or that wliicli is partic i pa ted tlnre, Imt dm s not p trticipate of a p irticipati d nature, is cn- tiri lv more tot d.

\ml tins l>< cause the w m id likew i*e is a (hid. [’or that wliicli is partic i pa ted tlnre, Imt dm s not p trticipate of a p irticipati d nature, is cn- tiri lv more tot d.

It is e\ ideiit lioweier, tliil I In- participation is not eipial in liotli. I'm da iw«i- viuHioH and ttMott of inti l/ig tblen, u /iii It HtiU t iiipluifiiig Ut < till [Hirtu ‘Jniluiii, i.v ilif/cixnl from t/uit of miim/’/c iiiihtn s. I( appears therefore, that tin order nl eternity, is mi- penor to that ol animal its, If, and is provimati !v sU|H iior, and that it is the cause to iutelligibh s of an i ii \ a rial ih ■ sameness ol siib'ishuee. I leiice some mu may cun- sidi r it as the same with Jn I'nui/h /a i/. I his how • ur, is a » o-ordinated cause, and lather imp alls a sameness ot subsistence about i lier^V. Ihit i trrin/if Is .in exempt t aiise. It also appi ais, that < leimlv is lh< » ompn hei|s|oii ami union ol many in¬ telligible unities. I (i m i ills said h\ I lie |' bald a ail j Ol aeles to In Jiithei-begotten huh l, b< « aiise it illuiniuati s all things w it Ii unit) inn buhl. ** I ol - this alone, [says tlii’Oracle] bv plucking abundantly from th< strength ol the lather, the (lower ol intellect is enabled l»v nit* lied ion 1 to impart a paternal intellect to all the fountains and principles; together with intellectual eiiei gv, and a |m rpetual permanency, according to an imsluggish revolution I’or In urn lull ol paternal deity, which the < bade calls the (lower ol inti Ih i t, it illuminates all tliinus with int< licet, and with intellectual perception invariably tin - same, and also with tin* ability ul revol¬ ving and * nergi/ing hi an amatory mailm r, about tin* pi inciple ol all things. 1 liese tliinns however, 1 , volvo in the inaccessible recesses ol the reasoning power.

.Vnain however, on all sides investigating the roneeplioiis of (In- philosoplu-r about eternity, let Us consider vvliat is meant by etcrmtij abiding in one. l or we ask ill what one? Is it in the "vud, as appeared to In- tin- case, to the must theo¬ logical of the interpret rs ? ltut the good, does not ev, n abide in itsell, on account of its simplicitv, as we mav learn in the first hypothesis ol the Parmenides, and as he admits. .Much less therefore, cun any thing else abide in it. Pur in short, no¬ thin:; is in it,'nothin;; subsists together with it, on account ut its Ising exempt from a co-ordination with any thin" whatever. To which may Im* added, that it is not usual to call it cithei "nod, or one, but the garni, and the one, in order that we mav form a conception of its monadic transcendency, vyhich is beyond

1 for ro nm ln-ri-, ir.nl ry i i.rii.

1 All things .ire coiupn litiiili il h> l/o nut, lint u< lliing Milnnls fircuhtirty iu it. Ami I he comprr- liiioiuii dull tilings tiv it, ii m.limit; ninie I lino llic intflahle uuiuu which it imparts to all ihingc, ainl liuoiigli which all tilings latolnt bounded hy it

tinoii i\.]

1 All things .ire coiupn litiiili il h> l/o nut, lint u< lliing Milnnls fircuhtirty iu it. Ami I he comprr- liiioiuii dull tilings tiv it, ii m.limit; ninie I lino llic intflahle uuiuu which it imparts to all ihingc, ainl liuoiigli which all tilings latolnt bounded hy it

tinoii i\.]

TIM.FIS or PLATO.

187

every known nature. .Now however, eternity is not said to abide in the one, lint m uric ; so tli.it it does not abide in the gwtl. J)oo>. therefore, tin* abiding of eter¬ nity in one, signify tlio united nature as it w* re fit’ it, ami the abidim: of it in it" ow n one; and manili ^t that it is one multitude 1 < >r, in short, does it indicate the nmulx-r ot that w hich does not proceed, in order that it may lie the cause of union to tii* multitude f»f intelli^ihles * This imh'ed, we also sav is true, in tinier that it may impart to itself tin stuhlo, and the whole, prior to eternal natures. For tins i> to uhuk in one ; \i/. to have the whole at once present, and the same im¬ mutable hyparxis. Fvery divine nature therefore, lu pins its eniT^v from itself; so that eternity will establish itself in one, and connectedly contain itself after the sain*' manner, prior to eternal beings. Hence it is not In-in::, as Stralo the physiologist says, which is the cause of permanency, 1 but eternitv. And it is tin; cause of a permanency,* n*it always in veneration, or becoming to In*, but which immutably exists in one, as TimaMis s.ivs.

Hence it is not In-in::, as Stralo the physiologist says, which is the cause of permanency, 1 but eternitv. And it is tin; cause of a permanency,* n*it always in veneration, or becoming to In*, but which immutably exists in one, as TimaMis s.ivs.

It however, eternity exhibits a duad, ihuuirh we frerpienlly endeavour to con¬ ceal it; for the ei/unys is conjoined to firing according to the same, and eternity rtimy is, that trhich alzcnys is (r, «** mv); it appi'ars that it will have the monad of beinv prior to itself, and tin* on* beinir; and that it will abide in tln> one, as our preceptor also thought concerning it; in order that it may be our prior to tin; duad, as not departin'.: from unity. And the duad iud* * d, mitered* ntlv * xhihilinv mill t it lid* in itself, is unit* <1 to t h« • on*- b* in:;, in which eternitv abides ; but the mult it ud** ol mt< llivil.les is united to cl* rnity its* If, w Inch com])reheuds «*x* mptly anil unirally, all the summits of them. For that the cone* ptiou of tin- one beiii" and ot eternity dilh-r, isrvid*-nt. For tn he a/wm/s, and In be simply, are entirely dill* rent. Il therefore, a certain tiling nlu ay* is, this thin:: also /*,- but not vice versa, if a certain tiling *'?, it hk* wis*- ahrays is. II cure to ciist i-» more total and aeneric, than to exist nhniys. \ud on this acroimt likewise, it is nearer to the cause of all bein-s, of till* unities 111 111 in-s, and of neration and matter. 'Flics*; thre«* things thcretore, an* successiv*;; vi/.. the one lieiirj, as the monad of Ix-inin*; eternity as a tluad, having tin* n'zcays in conjunction with existence; and the elirnal, which participates both of existence, and tin* alvvavs, and is not primarily perpe- tu.il beni" ok*- < termty. And tin* on** bein^ 111 * 1 * -* - * I, *> ah>ne the cause of exist¬ ence to all things of whatever kind they may I**-, whether they r\i-t trulv, or not truly, lint eternity is the cause of permanency in existence. Strain therefore, oii”Ut rather to have asserted this, and not to have d* lined h**iit£ to lie the per-

1 lor in tin- jtlac-c, it ij nci-*s«ary l<> r*.*«J finjioiq*.

* Her*- I*)** l"*r *'iairiait iia/iotv*.

PHOCLIS ON TIIK

[rook iv.

I Mi

iiianeurv * ot lieintrs; as In* writes in his treatise Concerning Being, thus transfer¬ ring the peculiarity' of eternity to hein*'. For neither in generated natures, is it tlie same tiling to lie generated, and to remain generated. Hut the peculiarity of generation i' for that which has it to exhibit another and another [condition of sub¬ sistence]; and the peculiarity of generation remaining, or being permanent, is time in which ireneratiou exists. And what time is in generation, that eternity is in essence Cnneerniiur the developeinenl however, ot that mighty «li\ init v eternity abiding in one, let thus inueli sullice.

And what time is in generation, that eternity is in essence Cnneerniiur the developeinenl however, ot that mighty «li\ init v eternity abiding in one, let thus inueli sullice.

Hut why does l*lato say, “ the nature of animal itstlf teas eternal, and not i», thoii”h to eternity the uu.c is more adapted than the past tunc? lie employs therefore, else where this form of diction, as win a lie says of the Deiniur^us v\ ho is always <_;ood, “ he was good signifying that he is not this Irom time, but tint lie always w;i> mi ; and that in ilinnc naturis, tin uuh arc anteceilenl/i/ u\snmctl ami co-asKunml \,ith the beginning*, prior la all r i tension. \t present how ever, I lie w ord XI it* is mole oppurtiili'l v Used, I nr sun e Plato adonis the iiiuyeise according to ln polhesis > hut prior to the adorning, inti lligibles existed, though not in time, yet in dignity, and also such tilings as subsist together with mb lligibles on this account he says, “// ua.\. Hut again by employing tin word hang * (.vex u , lie assists the imbecility ol the iinjnrfat Veili I'm lit aUo makes it to be essential, Iklld no less so tli ill the prcMiit. lie likewise, adapts to eternity what he says com crime.; it ; to its perfection indeed, through the word w.is; and to its esseii- tial lieing, by eo-mtrodui ing the word hang. And thus mm li concerning the lit. tie words whuh Plato employ s.)

Why however, was it not possible perleetlv to adapt the eternal to the geiic- rati d ? Is it not because every tiling generab d, may be said to have its exish nee in mutation ; but that which is perfectly eternal, is immutable and imhcgnttcn { r J'hese natures therefore In mg opposed to each other, it some one should v intently' endeavour to connect the perleetlv eternal with that vvliu h is generated, lie would not make it immutable, and would destroy its nature. Is then eternity present with that which is sensible, alb r a certain manner, and not * lit it« ly 1 Hut how is it possible we should not acknowledge this' I’m that vv liieli participates of (he image of eternity, [larticipates also m a certain respect of eternity ; though not m such a way as that which participates of it iminediately. And in short superior causes always adorn the dominion of such as are subordinate, so that eternity

1 A ml lure aKo , rtad tiafitttjt.

1 Tin* tutnl) ol n.Uu »iic, fitv »u*p tuv Cu/ov vv'Tu aiwHt i, ill Mliii’l), iis IVotlih

tlie iui|Mil<<t Mil* ci’/yttm, KiH, is !>\ tlu; |>arlu.ij»lc ovau t bang.

hook i\.]

TfM/F.l S or 1*1, \TO.

lfio

1 Tin* tutnl) ol n.Uu »iic, fitv »u*p tuv Cu/ov vv'Tu aiwHt i, ill Mliii’l), iis IVotlih

tlie iui|Mil<<t Mil* ci’/yttm, KiH, is !>\ tlu; |>arlu.ij»lc ovau t bang.

hook i\.]

TfM/F.l S or 1*1, \TO.

lfio

bk* wi-i', is in ;i roil.tin respect present witli tin* natures that arr adorn* <1 l»y time. I-or arronlin^ to mir all perle* I lioiinilary indri'd, it is present willi inti lli^ililrs alonr ; Imt il is likewise capable nt Iwiiu; present with iiiiindaiir 11 1 niic^ multitude llouslv. according to divided perfections and drlinitr measures of life, and especially nrrurdnur to the essences ol tin* celestial souls. The world itself alsi» receives « h rnitv, not a> it e; ami on this arronnt iirilhrr is it said to hr «trrnal ; hut as lar a*- il is ahlr. it rrr« nrs its nnpartihlr prrsrnri* and illumination. This tli i n ton*, is thr trails* rmh-nt "ond in rtrrnitv of a divine cause and comprehen- sion. Ilrtire it roinpn'hrnds partible issnirrs, and such as am as it were contrary to its own nature, armrdiiiu to thr concatenation of cause. And thus much tor this p.*ilieular.

This tli i n ton*, is thr trails* rmh-nt "ond in rtrrnitv of a divine cause and comprehen- sion. Ilrtire it roinpn'hrnds partible issnirrs, and such as am as it were contrary to its own nature, armrdiiiu to thr concatenation of cause. And thus much tor this p.*ilieular.

1 hit how is tune said to In* the linage of eternity ? Is it because eternitv indeed abides in one, hut tun r proceeds according to number ? This however, rather shows tin* dissimilitude than the similitude of them. 1 or I’lato nearly opposes ad things [pertaiuiin; to eternity and time] to all, m/. proceeding, to abiding ; accord¬ ing to number, to one ; the image, to the thing itself. It is hotter therefore to sav, that divinity produced these two, I mean eternity and time, as the measures of I icings, tli** former of mleliijihle hut the latter of mundane beings. As therefore, the world is said to h«* (hi* intake of tin* intelligible, thus also tin* mundane nn'asure is deiioininated tin* imaue of the intelligible measure. Kli-ruity howexer, is indeed a measure as unity, hut tune as numher. l or each measures, the former things v. hu h lierome one, hut the latter such as are iiumhi r«*d. \ud the former measures the jtennanenci/ of beings, hut the latter tin* extension' of gene¬ rated natures. The apparent oppositions however, ol the two, do not exhibit dissimilitude of measures, but indicate that secondary an* produced hx more venerable and ancient natures. I'or progression is from permanency, and nuiu- Ix r from unitv. Hut is not time on this account the inlaid* of eternity, because it is efl'ertive of the perfection of mundane natures, just as eternity is the contain* r and iriiardian of beings ? Fur as things which arc unable In lixe according to intelhct, arc brought under the order of Fate, lest by /lying J'rom dixinity, they should become perfectly disorderly, thus also things which proceed f-oni eternity, and are not able to participate of a stable perfection, which is at once whole, and always the same end indeed under the dominion of lime, but are excited by it to their own* appropriate cneriries, by w Inch they are enabled to receive the end adapted to them, through certain apocatastatic periods.

1 I'nr irfijirurnn*' lirr**, rr.nl inunraTii*.

* Jnstc.nl uf ravroir lirrr, it u necessary to rta*l nirrvr

100

PROCLl S ON THE

[book IV*.

1 I'nr irfijirurnn*' lirr**, rr.nl inunraTii*.

* Jnstc.nl uf ravroir lirrr, it u necessary to rta*l nirrvr

100

PROCLl S ON THE

[book IV*.

It is also well that Plato rails the production of time, tlie conception or contri- rnnce, (iviwh*,) of the Demiurgus. For to impart to beings which are not naturally eternal, an adventitious and temporal perpetuity, and also to confer jH rlection on things imperfect, and a circular apoi atasta>is, on things which proceed m a riuht line, does not appear t> fall fir short of invention and contrivance. Hence, in what follows, he savs that divinity contrived the pm ration of tin; parts o< time, lint how is the im iue of elt rnity said to he moveable? 1 Is it * because all ot it is moved and the whole is in motion? Or is not this impossible 1 l ot nothin- is moved according to the whole of itself, nor is this the case, even with sm h things as are essentially < handed : for the subject of these remains. Much more tliere- foie, will things which are moved according to the other motions, remain accord¬ ing to essence, win ther thev arc mcr« used, or changed m quality, oi hx ally moved. I'or it they did not remain accord111*4; to something, their motion like¬ wise would vanish, together with them: tor al motion is in a certain tiuii4. Nothing therefore, as wi have said, is wholly moved, and this is especially the case with perpetual natures, which uuulil to be established in their pmpei pnuci- ples, and to rein 1 i 11 in tin nisi Ives, it tin \ are to lie i ontinually preserved. Hut it is particularly requisite, that the iiua-e ot eternity should have .1 perpetual sameness of silbsistem e, and stability; so that it is impossible that time should lie linneable accnrdlic; to the whole ot lts» It, sine*’ it is not possible till this to h* the case vv ith anv tiling else. It is necessarily requisite therefore, that, something of it should remain ; since every tiling which is moved, is moved in consequence of hav mu soim thins; ot its« If vv hit'll remains. Hem e the monad of tune remains suspended from tin- I), luiui^iis. Hut bcim; lull ot measuring pow. r, and wishing to measure the motions of tin psychical 1 essenci*, and the exisleiu e, 1 in rules and passions of the plivsii d and corporeal essence, it proc eeds according to number. Time therefore abiding by its impartible and inward energy, proceeds according to numlH-r by its external energy and which is participated by the natures which it measures; vi/. it proceeds ac< online to a certain mli llectual number, or rather according to the first number, which I’armeiiides would sav, bcint; analogous to the one t'C n", presides over the intellectual, III the same Ill.liilU r as that does over t'n* intelligible orders. It proceeds therefore, nooordiiii; to that hiiiiiIh r. Hence also, it distributes an appropriate tin isinc to eai h * ol the mumlaiu* lorms.

It proceeds therefore, nooordiiii; to that hiiiiiIh r. Hence also, it distributes an appropriate tin isinc to eai h * ol the mumlaiu* lorms.

You may likewise sav still more proximatelv, that true time proceeds aceord-

1 I or til 1 irt) In rr, ri ;ul tu ipi/i 1 1 Inn- o .111 i»uii."inli lure 111 I lie ori”in.il, ol ij.

* I nr li*i«’, rr.nl /»

4 I10tr.nl ot tomri/. ill llio |>l.ire, it o nrnsvin to nail toerri/.

KOOK IV.]

TIM IT S OF PLATO.

191

imr to tnio number, jiai tirijintinu 1 of tin* numbers of it, anil Ik ini; it-*df intellectual numliiT, which Socrates speaks of, ami obscurely signifies, when hr says, that swiftness it"i 11* and slow ni ilsclt an* ni true uuuilur, hy whuh tin* things mea¬ sured hv lime, illlli r. In-iiiir mov ed innri 1 iltly. nr inorr slow ly 11< nee also 'I nn.rus dm s not * s|ii m k ninrli ahont tins niinihrr Imt njsr Sorratrs on 1 hi* pr« ri-iliiivt day had perleetlv onloldi'd it, hut ahont that which proreeds Iroin it. l'or that Items* 1 tml\ r.xisiin^ iiiunhi*r, lir says ////.v proceeds arrordiii^ to nunihi-r. It proa ids tln ii Ion*, aeeordiiur to intelligible iiiiiiiImt, hy which it ntnuhrrs its |iartiri|innts, just as, vice versa, the time which is in sensible*, proceeds according to that wliiili nunihers. In ilsclt' that which is minihered, and stdl posscssini; tlie

It proa ids tln ii Ion*, aeeordiiur to intelligible iiiiiiiImt, hy which it ntnuhrrs its |iartiri|innts, just as, vice versa, the time which is in sensible*, proceeds according to that wliiili nunihers. In ilsclt' that which is minihered, and stdl posscssini; tlie

linage of essential time, through whii h all things are nmnhered bv un iter or less uiiuiIk rs of their life. .So that an o\ lives for this, hut man for tiiat length of time, hut the sun is n stun d to its pristine state in one, and the moon in another period of time, ami other things accomplish their periods according to other measures, rune therefore, is the measure of motions, not as that hy which vve measure ; lor this the eonei pi ion aliout tune rlln (s, and not time itself, hut as proiluelive, and defi¬ nitive ol the < \is|i ner of tin life, and « vi ry other motion of things m tune, and as measuring them and assimilating tlx m aei ordm*^ to paradigms, l’or as it rt fi rs itself to the similitude ol eternity, which comprehends paradiipuatii causes, thus also it refers the things wliirli are perfected hy itself, and wlm h arc convolved m a circle, to the more venerable imitation of eternal principles. ] low tin re lore, heiiu; sueli and so meat a (iod, will it he tin measure of motion, or hi short of lien*'ration, 1 as it appeared to some that it is, who neither perceived tin* power of it, nor its d* miurme 4 pr« >ence with all things 1 W hen also, they' say that it is rather the cans** of corruption, than of generation, and of oblivion than pre>or- vation, and of these according to accident, and not essentially, they very much resemble those that are asleep, and who are unable to collect hy a reasoning: pro- i ess w hat the benefits are eonft i red hy and through time on the soul and the body, on all heaven through the whole of itself, and on all generation. 7'heurgists likcxcise confirm a hat ttv have asserted, adicn they say, that time is a God, and deliver to us the discipline of it, by uhich u'c arc enabled to excite tl to become visible; and 'a lien also, thay ccU bratc il ns older and younger, and as a circularly revolt big and eternal God, not only as the image of eternity, but as eternally receiving it. They

1 l’or ;ifrn/ifyr-n lirrr, read )nrt\n*~n.

1 C)c o niuiUi-ii Ik rc in tlie «>ri"in;»l

1 Instead of ui ignwi in 11ns |ilace, it is olmoudy necessary to read yti-cffrwi.

* For roi* ttifHcvpymmt here, read rij»fr// 440 vpy««i/».

ii)*»

lMIOCLUS ON rm:

[book IV.

They

1 l’or ;ifrn/ifyr-n lirrr, read )nrt\n*~n.

1 C)c o niuiUi-ii Ik rc in tlie «>ri"in;»l

1 Instead of ui ignwi in 11ns |ilace, it is olmoudy necessary to read yti-cffrwi.

* For roi* ttifHcvpymmt here, read rij»fr// 440 vpy««i/».

ii)*»

lMIOCLUS ON rm:

[book IV.

likewise add, that it intellectually perceives the whole number of all the natures that are moved in the world, according to which it convolves and restores to their pristine state all moving substances, by swifter or slower periods. And besides this they assert that it is infinite in power, l'or to circulate again and again, [without emQ is the pro¬ vince nj injinite power. Together with these things likewise, they say that it is oj a spiral form, as measuring according to one power, both things that arc moved in a right hue, and those that are nun id in a circle; just as a spiral hue uniformly [or according to one form j comprehends the right ami the circular line.

W e must not therefore, accede to tin opinion of those, \» lio consider time as Miltxistin^ in lilt re t ‘oneeptious, or who make it to lie a certain accident. .Nor must wt* assent to those win* art* more reneraltle than these, anti who approaching la in r to tin* p«*riilaril\ of the things tlu-m-i lu-s, >av that time is 41-111*1 ated from tin total soul t nt r*4i/iii*4 transit nt l\, <n from it 1 in 141/1114 t:olh*t tnel\ anti w it hoi. t transition, and lUt iMimu I*} tinii*, tin* t t h-stial circulations anil tin* periods of other stud*' ;—nt*t 1 veil to these must wt* a»« nt. llniii4h tInan- not ut\ nmott from tin truth. l'or in tin* first plai t I'lato, with whom wt- all desire to at t ortl alioul tliviiif concerns, sav> ol tin 1 leiniui^iis, that In* constituted time, tin world I>fiii4 now arraii4< tl l*oth affording to soul, and affording to hotly, and tlitl not produce it within tin* stud, as lie did tin* harnimiu* ratios ; nor dot s In* ripieseiit doinitr lashioniii4 tinn* in tin* soul, 111 tin satin* ttiauin r .is hr '.n - that In fabri¬ cated tin* forport al formed naturt* within it ; Imt having spokfii t out*« 1111114 tin* fs^fiiff, haruiotn, powt*r, motions, and tin* all-rarioiis hiiowhd4i* ot tin* so ul afti r all tln-st*, in order to 4m peilei lion hoth to soul ami hotly. In* 41*in-rated tin* tssfiift* of time, as 4uardih4, tin a*~ 11111114, ami a-'imii. 111114 all tin >f to tln-ir para¬ digmatic principles. l or what atl\aut.141* would mundain* natures derm* from possi-ssinjr * d I t h 1114s In-a ill ill ill v, if tln*\ did Hot pi 1 p< l nail \ remain f <h from imitating after a certain manner, the idea o| the pai.itl 14111, hut not as nnieh as possihle e\ oil iii4 tin* whole ol it, ami purlihly reft *111114: unpaitihli* inlillitlion ? On tin si act mints then lore, the philosoplu 1 places on r the prti^ression til time, a demiur4ie, anti not a psychical eaiisr.

On tin si act mints then lore, the philosoplu 1 places on r the prti^ression til time, a demiur4ie, anti not a psychical eaiisr.

In the next place, looking It* thin*4s theuisi Ires, \ou may say that it soul 41*111*- rateil time, it would not so participate <*| it, as to In* perfected l*v it. l-'t.r that tin* soul is perfected In lime, anti measured according It* Us energies, is nt*t immamft-st ; sint e erei \ tiling wliieli dors not rccche eolh*eti\t*lv, now, ajnl at once, the whole t«f energy, retpiin-s time, in null 1 to its pn li rtimi and apoealas- tasis, through w hieli evert tliiii4 eolh ets tin* appn.priate 401*1!, w hieh it is ine:t- pahle of rtfeirin4 iinpartihly, and without time. lienee, as wt* have In tori* ohsericd, eternity and time, are the liu-asiires of tin* permanency anti perfection

nook iv ]

TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

11*3

of beings; the former being the one and unmultiplied comprehension of the intel¬ ligible unities, hut tin: latter being the boundary and demiurgic measure of the perpetuity, or of !lit* more or less permanency of the things which proceeil from intelligihles. If, therefore, the soul, after the same manner as intellect and the Gods, apprehended every object of its knowledge by one projecting energy, and by an eiieriry always the same, understanding intransitively, it might, perhaps, have generated time, but it would not have Im* en in want of time to its perfection. But since it understands, or perceives intellectually, with transition, and apnea- tislalically, and one soul requires the whole of time, but another a certain part* of it, in order to the possession of intellectual anil genesiurgic lives; and if, in short, no cause is in want of its offspring to the |M*rfection of its* U ; if this lie the case, soul would thus Im* both jierfoet and imjierfeet, prior to constituting that which is secondary to itself. It would Im* perfect indeed, in order that it might generate; since nothing imperfect is generative of anoth**r tiling. And it would also be imjM*rfect, Incause it would never participate of that which c.iih-s it to Ik* perfect. And it is altogether absurd to say, that causes are in want ol the things which proceed front them. let this, therefore, be considered by you as the greatest argument, that tun* is not the progeny of soul, but that it is first partici¬ pated by soul.

And it is altogether absurd to say, that causes are in want ol the things which proceed front them. let this, therefore, be considered by you as the greatest argument, that tun* is not the progeny of soul, but that it is first partici¬ pated by soul.

Alter this, however, it is requisite to understand, that inanimate natures also participate of time, and that they do not then alone participate of it when they rise into existence, m the same maimer as they do, of form and habit; but even vvliiui they appear to Im* deprived of all life, they tlu 11 participate of time, and not in such a way as they are said to live, because they are cn-arraiigrd with wholes, and are ro-passive with the universe. lair they peculiarly and essentially partici¬ pate of a certain time, and this so far as they are inanimate, and are always m a perishing condition till their perfect corruption. I'or time is every w here present. And the architect indeed, is able to say for bow buitr a time a wall will endure, and the weaver can tell tlu extent of tin* duration of a shirt, or m short of a gar¬ ment. 1 In a similar iiianiu r aUo, every artist can say wliat will lx* the duration of bis own work; tlioii^b In* cannot speak so definitely as concerning the pro¬ ductions of nature. But the prophet speaks about tlu* duration of all*things, as being able to survey tin* temporal interval distributed to tilings from the universe. In addition to these things also, since the psychical and corporeal mutations, motions and rests, and in short all such mundane natures, as are opposed to

* For fivfur* litre, rra*i finpinv.

1 For mrdi|r«i here, it o imtnan to read toOijroi.

2 B

Tim. l*lat.

Vol. 11.

1‘KOCLUS ON Till-:

[OOOK IV.

11*4

each other, arc measured hy time, it is necessary that time should lie exempt from all these. For that which Ih-iii^ one anil the same, is participated hy many tilings, and these dissimilars, and always pre-suhsists hy itself, must he in an exempt manner participated hy them. And "till more hem:' in all things, it is every where impartihle, so that it is everv where one Ihiii^, impartihle according to minder, and jx i uhar to no one ol the tilings which are said to subsist accord¬ ing to it ; w Inch Aristotle also peri ci\ mi; lie show s that in partihle ' natures, there is somethin;; incorporeal and impartible, which is every where the same ; assum¬ ing * tills to l>e tin null' or an instant.

I ■’art her still, if time w i rt not an essence hut an accident, it would not thus exhibit a demiurgic power, * so as to make some things to he perpetually gene¬ rated, hut oilers of a longer or shorter duration, according as their nature is stronger, or weaker; and to distiilml* to all things an appropriate measure of duration aiuou^ beings. It however, it is a demiurgic essence, it will neither he the whole soul [of (lie universe] nor a part ol soul. For tin* conception of soul is dither* nt fi*1111 that ol linn , and « ach is the * ails*- ot dill* rent, and not 4 ot the same things. For soul imparts life, and moves all things, ileiicetlu world also, as it approaches to soul, is tilled with life, and parti* ipates of motion. I 5 ut tune w hich 1 excites demiurgic edi cts to their perfection, and to the measure of them hv wholes, and which is the supplier of a certain p**rp* luity, f ' will not lie subor¬ dinate to soul, since soul likewise parti* ipates of it ; and though not essentially, vet according to its transitive energies. For tin- soul *»t the ilniverse is saul to * n« rm/.e incessantly, and to hv*: wisely through the whole **t tune. It remains therefore that time is an essence, and is not secondary to soul. After all how¬ ever, it must he considered, that if etermly w as the oli'sprui" of intellect, or a certain intellectual power, it w mild In* reipiisile to sav that time is somethin*; of tins kind pertaining to soul. But it * t* rnity is ih«* cm nipt measure of the multi¬ tude ot int* IIi"ihles, and tin eompn hi-nsion ot the perpetuity and perleetion of all things, how is it possihh that tim* also should not have this ratio to soul, and the ps\ chical order ; dillirin- from tin m in the s.ou*- w ay, as all pro* ceding (lite r from abiding causes f JUr eternity exhibits a greater transcendency than lime,

■ Tin- wool [itfnarun it oiltilli >1 III I In uii"liul.

Imliail nt \u /14 ii licit , it it i('*|Ui>iic t«> lent

J 1 t»r tini 4 i j n/u» In it, nail iNiu/.ii.

* Oi it (iiintliil tit le in tin

! t lilii'uitc it (jiuiilt-il iii tint jtl.uc in I tic ttrigiual.

L lei n iiu litre, it it lint tv.irt lit nail u.t ttrijrii.

nnoK i\.]

T1 M/ELS Ol 1'LATO.

195

* Oi it (iiintliil tit le in tin

! t lilii'uitc it (jiuiilt-il iii tint jtl.uc in I tic ttrigiual.

L lei n iiu litre, it it lint tv.irt lit nail u.t ttrijrii.

nnoK i\.]

T1 M/ELS Ol 1'LATO.

195

v illi respect to the tilings that nr* measure*! l»y it For the former comprehends exempt ly, both the essences :uiil the unities of in tell igihles ; I ml the latter dm s not measure lh< essences of th* first souls 1 asr.itli. r subsisting eo-nrdinatel\ with them, and being gem-rated together with them. As some i’l.ilonMs likewise s;iv, time does m*t nn asme the inti lh < tn.il energies nf the lir*-t miuU ; though 1*1.it<* <|< .trly says, that tlx '.mil of the universe leads a divine and wise life through the whole of time. Intelligihles also, an-more united to eternity than iiiundane nature* to time; and the union of them is so great, that some nf the more contemplative phi¬ losophers hav<* apprehended eternity to lie nothing else than the one and total intellect \vhirh comprehends all other intellects]. But no one of the more wise is willing to admit that time is the same with the things that are in tune, on ac¬ count of the "real separation and difference between them.

But no one of the more wise is willing to admit that time is the same with the things that are in tune, on ac¬ count of the "real separation and difference between them.

\\ hat then will time he, if it is neither something belonging to motion, nor a concomitant ol the psy chical energy, nor in short, the progeny of soul, nor as some innovating in divine concerns sav, who conceive time to 1 h.' the psychical circle of the <Iif/rrf'iit, hut rtiTnity th<‘ psychical circle of the smne? l'or 1 have heard that Theodoras philosophized things of this kind, lie however, who nidi avours to correct this opinion, will never admit that these parts <»f the soul are the same as eternity ami time; hut lie will grant that tin* circle of tin different verges to t< tuporal, lint the circle of the same, to eternal natures. Since tin refore, mt do not approve any one of these opinions, w hat will time he ? For it is not perhaps sullicient to sav, that it is the measim of mundane natures, nor tor-nu¬ merate the benefits of w hich it is the cause, lmt the peeuliarifv of it is to lx* ajv- prehended to the utmost of our power. Shall we therefore say, that the essence of it being most excellent, perfective of soul and present with all things, is an intellect not alone abiding, hut also moving; abiding indeed, according to the inward energy, by which it is trul\ eternal; lmt moved, according to the exter¬ nally proceeding energy, according to which it bound* all transition. For eternity possessing permanency, both according to its inward energy, and according to that which it exerts towards eternal natures, time adumbrates it, according to one of these, hut becomes separated from it according to the cither, in ronserpicucc of abiding and lieing moved. Hence it will he something at once intelligible and generated, and something at once partible and impartible. At the same time, however, we admit all these things in tin; psychical essence, and we are no otherwise able perfectly to apprehend this middle nature, than by employing after a certain manner opposites in surveying it. A\ by therefore is it wonderful,

* |. e. of »uperiuuiHlaut touts.

196

PHOCLUS ON THK

[tOOK IV.

A\ by therefore is it wonderful,

* |. e. of »uperiuuiHlaut touts.

196

PHOCLUS ON THK

[tOOK IV.

if we perceiving the nature of time, to l>e partly immoveable and partly moved, or rather not we, hut prior to us the philosopher, he should exhibit the intellectual monad of it abiding in sameness, through its being eternal, but should indicate that energy of it which has an exte rnal tendency, and is partic ipated by soul, and the whole world, through its l>eing moved. For we must not imagine that this etc*nial [of time] inertly signifies that it is the image of eternity. For what should ha\e hindered him from directly saying, tli.it time is the inir,"c of eternity, and not that it i the* curtail image of it ! Jhit he wished to manifest this ve ry thing, that time has an eternal nature, yet that it is not eternal in such away as animal itself. For animal itself is e ternal liotli in essence and in ein-rgy. Hut time by its inward energy indeed, is eternal, hut hy its externally proceeding gift, is moveable*. He no* the urgists also call it eternal, and 1'lato w ry properly denominates it not eternal onlv.' For one* thing inch-eel is alone* and e sse ntially moveable, and is alone the cause of motion, according to the* participants of it, and such a tiling as tins is soul. It alone therefore, mem s its. If, and other things. Hut anothe r thing is alone* immove- ahle, prese-ri mg itselt iiiimutahle, and being the cause- to other things ot an iuvunable same ne ss of siihsistenre, and to things that are moved on account ot soul. lAnd tins thing is intellect ] lb ne e* it is ucce-ssury that the* medium In twe eu these two which are extreme s, viz. be-tween that whic h is immem tide both in essence* and energy, and that which is mem aide* both according to it> own nature and ai> coreling to what it imparts to other things, should Iwtlial which is at once im¬ moveable* and moved ; immoveable* indeed esse ntially, but moved ill its partici¬ pants. And a thing of this kind is time. For it there is that which is in its participants as number in that which is numbere d,’ what will that lx* which subsists according to muidH-riiig it ? It is alisurel, tin re-fore*, to say that it is a par¬ tial soul wlue h thus subsists. For that which in this soul iimidx rs time is of pos¬ terior origin, as is that whic h in us numbers the.* Ungers. Hence this is not effected by him who makes the* five* finge rs, hut by him who numU-is so many 1 that are produced bv nature. W e however, investigate the cause of lime lie mg that which is numbered. Time therefore* is that which remaining immoveable, by itself rvedv.s that which is mimlx-red.

W e however, investigate the cause of lime lie mg that which is numbered. Time therefore* is that which remaining immoveable, by itself rvedv.s that which is mimlx-red.

In short, if v isilde time i« move-able*, lint e*ve*ry thing w hit:h is moveable is move¬ able, being a certain other thing; tor not motion, hut that which is moved, is moveable*; ills necessary that there should he time which subsists by itself, in orde-r that there mav Ik* moveahh* time. No far the refore*, a> it is truly tune*, and

1 For lit-rr, it in necessary C> ira.l nv /Jon**.

• Instead I,f to It. III this [li lt e, it is necessary to reaef, y. re ry a^V^c.-y apiQpat.

* i’or ToacvTi* here, it is necessary to read toowtcm.

BOOK IV.]

tim.tajs OF PLATO.

197

so far as it is in itself, it is immoveable but so far as it is in its participants it is moveable, anil together with them, unfolds itself into tlirm. I lencc limi; is eter¬ nal indeed, anil a inonatl, anil a centre essentially, anil according to tin- energy wliicli abides in it. At the same time however, it is continued, and manlier, and a circle, accordin'; to its proovding and participated energy. It is, therefore, a certain proceeding intellect, established indeed in eternity, ami on tins eueuunt also is said to lu eternal. For it icould not otherwise contribute to the more perfect assimila¬ tion of mundane nature s to their paradigms, unless it icas itself previously exempt font than. Hat it proceeds, and flows abundantly into the things, which are guarded by it. U ’hence also l think, the most consummate of theurgists celebrate it as a (red, as Julian in the seventh book of his treatise On the Zones, and venerate it bij those names through which it is unfolded into light in its participants, causing some things to be more ancient, but others to be more recent, and convolving all things m a circle. l : or it would l>c ridii uloiis since it is the linage of eternity, that it should alone lie this temporal image which sulisists in things that are numbered. For how is it possible that a tiling of this kind which is in a subject, should Ik? the image of so great a deity as eternity ! Fsjx’cially since it rather appears to he in a subject [than is so in reality], and is itself an accident of that which is an accident.

For how is it possible that a tiling of this kind which is in a subject, should Ik? the image of so great a deity as eternity ! Fsjx’cially since it rather appears to he in a subject [than is so in reality], and is itself an accident of that which is an accident.

If, however, intellect is secondary to eternity, hut soul is the resemblance of intellect, how is it possible that time w hich is the linage of eternity, should not be somethin:; more excellent, and more essential than soul ? For as inti licet is to soul, so will eternity he to time. And alternately, as time is to soul,* so is eter¬ nity to intellect. 1 And time does not participate of soul, 4 as neither does etc rnity of intellect; but vice versa. Time therefore having a certain intellectual nature, convolves its participants, both other things and souls, according to number. For time indeed is eti mal, not only in essence, but also m its inward energy, in which it is always the same. Hut by.the energy according to which alone it is partii ipated by external natures, it is moveable, co-extending toge¬ ther with, and adapting to them, its gift. Fiery soul, however, is moved tian- sitivcly, both according to its inward energies, and also its external energies, through w hich it moves hollies. And it appears to me, that it was thus denominated time, hj those who perceived that this was its nature; and who wished b} tins appellation to say, that it is a certain dance,* and as it were a dancing intellect

■ Tor inr runur in tliis pl.icc, it is nrcrssarj to read nunpur.

* Instead of -rpn v"X'/‘ here, it is necessary to read ir/wt gv\rjr.

1 Here alio for eoe, il is necessary to read »po« »ocr.

* Instead of tai /j trtx'nro vw’ utnti in tins place it u requisite to rrad, os • • XP* r ®* mtrr V*._

* For her., read jpe®**

108

RROCLUS ON THE

[book IV,

(*ai «*or ^o/jfuovra vouv). Put by a co-division, tln*y named it for the sake of con¬ cealment time. Perhaps, likew ise, they gave it this appellation because it at once abides, and proceeds with a measured motion; and by one part of itself abides, but by the other proceeds; as if it were hall intellect, and half saltant. Hence by a composition of both the parts, they signified the admirable and demiurgic nature of this God. It apftears likewise, that as the Demiurges being intellectual, began from intellect to adorn the universe, so time being supermundane, liegan from soul to perfect it. Fur that time is not only mundane, but by a much greater priority supermundane, is cud. lit; since as eternity is to animal itself, -o is time to this world, which is animated and endued with intellect, and is wholly the image of animal itself, in the same manner as time is of eternity.

Fur that time is not only mundane, but by a much greater priority supermundane, is cud. lit; since as eternity is to animal itself, -o is time to this world, which is animated and endued with intellect, and is wholly the image of animal itself, in the same manner as time is of eternity.

If therefore time is, it both abides and proceeds m measured motion. And through its abiding, the harmonious dances are infinite, and apocatastalic. For lieing the first intellect that dances about the w hole fabrication of things, mi far indeed as it subsists invariably the same, and is essentially intellect, it is said to be eternal ; but so far as it dances, it convolves souls, and natures, and bodies in a eirc !c; and in short, is periodu ally restored to its pristine state. I or the world is moved indeed, as participating of soul ; but it is moved in an orderly manner, because it participates of intellect. For thus also Plato s.u-. in the l-aws, “ that the soul receiving a divine intellect, governs :< ith latitude ami uisdoin. And the world is moved periodically, by the motion of it from the same to the same; m consequence of which, it may be .said to imitate the permanency of intellect in sameness, through the imitation ol ett rmtv bv time. And this it is, to make the world more similar to its paradigm vvInch abides in one ; viz. to be convolved periodu illy to one and the same thing, through the cir< illation according to time. From all these particulars likewise, you leave all the causes of time according to Plato. For the Demiurgiis indeed, is the effective cause of time; eternity is the paradigm of it ; and the end (or the final cause] of it, is the circumduction to one thing of the natun s that are moved, according to periods. For that which does not abide in one, aspires after the circumduction to one ; desiring through this to obtain the am, whii h is the same with the good. For that there should not be one c« rtain progression of things in a right line, so as to form a line as it were, infinite both ways, but that the progression should 1m* definite ami circumscribed, d Hiring about the father ot wholes, and the monad of time, evolving all the strength of fabrication, and again returning to its pristine condition, and effecting this fre¬ quently , or rather infinitely, that which is consentaneous to reason requires, i! it is fit to call what is necessary reasonable. I’or whenc e do the participants ot time denve the power of Ireing restored to their pristine condition, unless that

HOOK IV.]

TIM.T'.L’S OF PLATO.

1 !# 1 >

it is fit to call what is necessary reasonable. I’or whenc e do the participants ot time denve the power of Ireing restored to their pristine condition, unless that

HOOK IV.]

TIM.T'.L’S OF PLATO.

1 !# 1 >

whuh they participate bail this power ami peculiarity of motion ? In addition also, to tin: reasuiiablenrss of tins, the explanation of tho name alone hears witness to its 1 rut ft. with which likewise, the* demonstrations of the most sagacious legislators accord, and the* worels of Plato himself who says, that time m these things imitating eternity, and circulating according to numher, was now ^ ne- rated. For time circulating the Jirst of moveable natures, according to an energy proceeding to externals, and returning to its pristine state, after all the evolution oj its power, thus also restores the periods of other natures to their pristine condition. And it convolves indeeel, through the* whole* e»f ifsolt which pro< e*»*els, the soul wlneii is the lirst participant of it; hut through certain parts of itself, it convolves other souls and nature’s, the ce h.-stial circulations, and in the last place*, all generation. For m emiseepience of tune circulating, all tilings are* convolved in a circle. Of the circulations howeve*r, some are* shorter, hut others longer.

For m emiseepience of tune circulating, all tilings are* convolved in a circle. Of the circulations howeve*r, some are* shorter, hut others longer.

For again, if the* Drmiiirgiis himself, made time to lie the* moveable intake of eternity, and gave* subsistence: to it, accordin'; to his mt< lleetion about eternity, it is ne cessary that the* moveable nature* o| time should he* circular, and proce*e*el with a dancing [or measured] motion; in order that it may neither depart from eternity, and may evolve* the intellec tion eiftlie father about it. For, in short, tho moveable nature* of time being e»imprehensi\e of all motions, ought to he hounded much prior to the* things which are measured b\ it. j or not tin* privation of measure, hut the first measure*, measures beings ; as neitlier <h»es infinity give hound to tiling", hut this i* the* province of the tir-t hound. lint time is moved, neither ac¬ cording to soul, nor according; to nature, nor according to the* e orporcal-lormed and v isibie* essenci.*; tor thus the* motionso| it w mild he partible*,and not rompre he nsive* of wholes. IJe*si<les tin** al>o, they would participate of the anomalous, either more: or less,and would he themselves in want of time*. For the motions according to soul, nature ami body, are all of them surveveil m time, and not in progression like those* which measure vvholes, hut in a certain epiality of life, or lation, or passion. I he* motion of time however, is a pure* progression, without ditlereure, impe*rcep- tihle, uuhreiken. 1 orderlv, 1 eipial. similar and the* Name. For it is exempt both from eepiahh* and unerpiahh motions, and is similarly present with both, not being changed in quality, by the ablation in the*ir motions, hut remaining the same separate* from all iiieepinhihty ; being efficacious of whole* motions according to nature, and measuring them, and restoring them to the ir pristine state. It likewise subsi-ts uuminghd with the nature’s that are measured by it, conformably

1 For o^nXoirrn liere*, re*a«l aicXatrroi.

* instead of arorroi in this place*, it is oicosirj to read cvracrot.

*00

PROCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

to the peculiarity of intellectual en**rgy; but proceeds transitively and self- motively. And in this respect, it pertains to the psychical order, but is inherent in the tilings which are defined and perfected by it in a way conformable to the nature of a primordial cause. It is not however, allied in all respects to any one being. For it is necessary that the measure of wholes should be in a certain respect similar and allied to all things, but should not be the same with any one of the natures w hich it measures.

It is not however, allied in all respects to any one being. For it is necessary that the measure of wholes should be in a certain respect similar and allied to all things, but should not be the same with any one of the natures w hich it measures.

The motion therefore of time proceeds, evolving and dividing impartible and abiding power, and partihl v unfolding it into light. For just as a certain numl»er 1 receives divisible all the form* of the monad, ami converts, and circularly leads them to itself; thus also, the motion of time, proceeding according to the mea¬ sures in the temporal monad, conjoins the end to the beginning, and this infi¬ nitely ; having indeed itself a divine order, yet not an arranged, as the philoso¬ pher lamMichus also says, hut an arranging order, nor an order which follows precedanrous natures, but which is the primary leader of things which are jx*r- fectlv effected. At the same time however, it is measured by nothing that lias interval, l or it would be ridiculous to say, that things which have a more ancient nature and dignity, are measured by such as are of post* nor origin. But the motion of time is alone measured by the temporal monad, which the progres¬ sion of time is said to evolve, and by a much greater priority, by the Deminrgns, and eternity itself, of which it is said to lx* the image, and with reference to which it is made to be moveable. With reference to eternity therefore, which is perfectly immoveable, time is said to lx* moveable; just as if some one should sav, that soul, as with relation to intellect, in partible about bodies. iSot that it is this alone, but that when compared with intellect, it may appear to lx* a thing of this kind ; though it is impartible, with reference to the partible < sseiice. Thus also time, though it is naturally eternal, y»t is said to Ik- moveable, as with ref* n nee to eternity itself. On account of the order lihevvi e of it, and the continuity in its progression, it is by no means proper to think that the prior and posterior in it are such as some apprehend them to lx*. For it must not 1 m> d* finitely surveyed, cither alone according to the mutations of motions, as in the < * lesti d motions ; nor in the evolutions of lives, as in the soul ; nor according to the gradual progres¬ sions of corporeal generations, as in nature; nor according to any tiling else of the like kind : (for these an* the peculiarities of the orders posterior* to it) but it must be* surveyed according to a precedency of causes, and connexion in the continuity

• i. e. The «t Cl ad.

* Instead of jut vrmv here, it is necessary to read pur

BOOK IV.]

TIMXl'S OF PLATO.

201

of its progeny, and accord in;; to a primordial energy, and a power etlicacious uf all-various motions.

e. The «t Cl ad.

* Instead of jut vrmv here, it is necessary to read pur

BOOK IV.]

TIMXl'S OF PLATO.

201

of its progeny, and accord in;; to a primordial energy, and a power etlicacious uf all-various motions.

Time therefore is moveable, uot by itself, [or essentially'], but according to the partici¬ pation of it which is apparent in motions, and by a Inch motions arc measured and defined' Just as if some one should say, that the soul is divisible about bodies, so far as there is a Certain divisible participation of it about bodies, of which the soul compre¬ hends the cause. For thus also time is moveable, as possessing the cause of the energy proceeding from it, and which is partibly seen in motions, and is cc-divided together mth them. 1I< ■nee, as motions become temporal through participation, so like¬ wise lime is moveable, through being participated by motions ; to which physio¬ logists only looking, think that lime is that w hich is numbered of motion, not In’ing able to perceive the cause of tin*.

In the first place then fore, it must Ini said, th it n< ither does the universe alone subsist in motion, but it is necessary that something of it should entirely remain, m order that this being permanent, it may be moved. It is demonstrated therefore, in the Thea-tetus, that it is impossible for an} tiling to be entirely moved in all respects. Hence it is necessary that something should remain prior to the time which is in participation, ami subsets in motion, in consocpicncc of being co- extended with motion. And that this indeed, should be inedicacious is impos¬ sible. Hut if it is etlicacious, and is moved, it w ill again be in want of another thnig, which may measure its motion. If lane ever, it energizes immoveabhj, this will be (he true peculiarity of time. In the second place, we are persuaded from common conceptions, that the Seasons are Goddesses, and that Month is a God, both which we worship in temples. We likewise say, that Day and Night are divinities, of whom also we possess invocations, imparted by the Gods them¬ selves. Much more therefore, is it necessary that time itself should he a God, since it is comprehensive of .Month, and the Seasons, of l)«iv and Night. In the third place, it time is something unmhered ; but it is necessary that prior to that which is numbered, that which numbers should exist, so that prior to that which is nunilMTod in capacity, there should be that which numbers in capacity, ami that which nmnlicrs in energy, prior to th.it which is numbered in energy ; if this Ik* the case, that is time m reality, which is the number itself, of all periods, and which numbers each of them. In the fourth place, whatever participates of soul, participates also ot time, but not vice versa: for inanimate natures participate ot time. It must be admitted therefore, that time is beyond soul, lint soul is prior

In the fourth place, whatever participates of soul, participates also ot time, but not vice versa: for inanimate natures participate ot time. It must be admitted therefore, that time is beyond soul, lint soul is prior

1 For ^crHowni' aett opyiiovoav in tins |>Iucc, reaii fitrpovrray aut rtftzoviray.

Tim. Plat. You II.

2 C

OQ2 PROCLUS ON THE [book nr.

to its participants, itself by itself. Much more therefore is time itself by itself beyond the participants of time.

Tim. Plat. You II.

2 C

OQ2 PROCLUS ON THE [book nr.

to its participants, itself by itself. Much more therefore is time itself by itself beyond the participants of time.

How then will a tiling of this kind 1 m* the image of eternity? For attain it must Im* discussed, on account of the difficulty with which tin* knowledge of the things is attended. Because, says the divine Iamblichus, it exhibits the infinity of eternity, (which is now being, is at once all, abides in the now, and is the unmea¬ sured measure of intelligibles,) in a circular evolution, in continuity, and in that which is successive; and also in separating iM'ginnings, midilles, and ends, and not deserting any one of the things comprehended by it. And as it is not simply moveable, but is moveable as with reference to eternity, so neither is it simply an image, but the whole of this may 1 m justly said to be the image of i ternity. For being a true essence, and in short, measuring, comprehending, and restoring motions to their pristine state, it is at the same time said to be an eternal image. It apptars also, that it is the Jirst of images, l or all perfect intellect is not pro- )H-rlv said to Ik* the image of the first cause*. For what can be assimilated to that which is entirely w ithout form ? But time will be the first participant of intellect and an impartible nature between all perfect intellect, and sensibles. And m short, if it is necessary that image should belong to things which participate ; for it wishes to preserve the form of anotli* r more ancient and venerable nature, from which it receives the peculiarity of its idea; it is requisite, tit it image should neither be in the liist essences; (for they being first, do not participate, but rather, they are participated by other things, not being ingenerated in their participants, But after another manner, being converted to themselves;) nor in sensibles alone. For middle also participate of first natures, and not sensibles alone, which' are a similated to first, through the representations of middle natures. Time there¬ fore, is said to be the image of eternity, and the whole world, of animal itself, according to soul, and according to body, lienee, if as Porphyry, and some other Platonists thought, sensibles alone participate of truly-existing beings, vve must investigate images in them alone. But if, as Amelins writes, and prior to Amelins, ISumenius, there is also participation in intelligibles, there will likewise be images in them. If however according to the divine Plato, images are neither in the first of beings, nor in sensibles alone, Iamblit bus, who nearly surpasses all philosophers in all things, will in these also be victorious, by exhorting us to survey participations, in the middle, and in the last of 1 m ings. And thus much may sutlice at present concerning eternity, and the image of eternity , w hich is at

‘ "A is oiDilti-il in llie original.

HOOK IV.]

And thus much may sutlice at present concerning eternity, and the image of eternity , w hich is at

‘ "A is oiDilti-il in llie original.

HOOK IV.]

TIM XUS OF PLATO.

203

once moveable, anti always subsists with invariable sameness, anil which proceed¬ ing according to intellectual forms, the father of wholes established in his fabrica¬ tions; as they were not able to sustain the all-perfect measure of eternity. Let us therefore, now turn to the investigation of the following words.

“ Me likewise contrived the generation of days and nights, and months and years, which had no subsistence prior to the universe, but which were constituted together with it. Jiut all these are parts of time,' and t\as and will he, were generated species of time.”

That prior to the generation of the universe (but 1 now speak of the universe, as surveyed in conjunction with soul, and the whole life ol the world; there w,»s »n impartible essence abiding in eternity, in the same manner as eternity abides in one, and that it was no part of proceeding and participated time, is perfectly manifest. But what day and night, and month and year are, and how these indeed, are parts of time, but was and trill be are said to be species, and not parts of time, will require a more abundant discussion, and a more profound considera¬ tion. If therefore, we should say that day is air illuminated by tin- sun, in the first place, we shall speak of something which takes place in the day, and not that which day is. For when we say a long, and a short day, we do not predi¬ cate an increase or diminution of the air. In the next place, it is dillicolt to devise how this will be a part of time. But if we should say that day is the temporal interval, according to which the sun proceeds from cast to west, we shall perhaps avoid indeed the former objections, but we shall fall into more impervious difficulties. For if we survey the interval itself without habitude to the sun, and say that it is day, it will appear to be dubious, how the same interval Im ing every where according to the same, day is not every where. But if we survey it in connexion with the solar motion, and this merely so, day will always lie in the heavens, and there will not he night. And how is it possible that a part of time should not he every where. For it is here clearly said, that night, day, and month, are parts of time. If however, we do not merely connect the interval with the circulation of the sun, but say that day is the motion of the sun from cast to west, and night the motion of it from west to east, the universe will neither have days nor nights, which are said to he parts of time. And it is also evident that neither will they have months, nor years. We conceive however that time both according to the

1 I he worth, rovra £c trarra /itpai ire through the fault of the tnnicnlxn omitted id the

text of 1'roclus.

PROCLUS ON THE

[book it.

204

And it is also evident that neither will they have months, nor years. We conceive however that time both according to the

1 I he worth, rovra £c trarra /itpai ire through the fault of the tnnicnlxn omitted id the

text of 1'roclus.

PROCLUS ON THE

[book it.

204

whole of itself w hich abides, and according to every part of its progression, is pre¬ sent to die whole world. For one and the same now is every where the same. It is necessary therefore, that day, and such other things as we say are parts of time, dioiild he every where the same, though they are participated partibly and with dis¬ persion by sensible fabrications; to which also some looking, adopt the more usual rather than the more accurate signification of names.

lienee, as our father [SyrianusJ philosophizes, these things are not asserted for ihe purpose of subverting the phenomena: for Timaus says what is usually said by the multitude, lint our father ref. rring tliese, as he is accustomed to do, to more principal hv post uses says, that da 1 /and night are demiurgic measures oftime,cx- L 1 ling and convoking all the visit le and invisible life and motion , and orderly distribution oj the inerratic spin re. Fur these are the true parts of time, are essentially present leith all things, and Comprehend the primordial cause ufapparent dap and flight , each oj which are different in visible time. And Tima-us also looking to this, reminds us how lime was generated together with the unitcr>e. Hence he says in the plural num¬ ber da\s ami nights, as likewise months anti years. These therefore, are obvious to all men. Tor the invisible cans* s of tin se, have a uniform subsistence prior to tilings multiplied,and circulating to infinity. 1 be immoveable causes of these like¬ wise subsist prior to tilings that are moved, and the intellectual causes ol them pi r to -« iwhl. s. Sin h, then fore, must day and night lie conceived to be according to tin ir first subsistence. But it must he said, that month is that a Inch convolves the lunar sphere, and e~cery termination of the circulation about the zodiac, being truly a divine temporal measun . - I ml year is that a hich pt rfe cts and contains the v hole middle fa¬ brication, according to tehich the sun is seen possessing the greatest pouer, and measur¬ ing all things together u ilh time. For neither is day, nor night, nor month, nor much Uss year Without the sun, nor any thing else pertaining to the v or Id. And I do not say this, vith reference to the visible fabrication alone, for of these measures the visible sun is the cause; but in the invisible and superior Jnbn- cution, the more true sun measures all things together with time, being in nahty time of time, according to the oracle oj the Gods concerning it. I or that I Into m t only knew these visible parts of time, hut also the divine parts homonymous to these, is evident from what he says in the t* nth honk ofllie I/aws. 1 or he flu re -hows, that the seasons and months are divine in conjunction with all the other mundane] (bids, in conseipience of Inning divine lives and divine intellects pre -ul.ng over them in the same manner as the universe. Hut it is not wonderful, it he now rath. 1 >p. ak- about the visible parts of time, because his design at pres, nt physiologize. I, l tluse therefore be the parts of time, of which sonic are adapted to the fixed >tai-, but others to the stars that revolve about the poles <•

TOOK IV.]

TIM/F.l'S OF PLATO.

‘20A

the zodiac, am] otlirrs to other (iods, ortho attendants of the Gods, or to mortal animals or to the more elevated or more low parts of the universe.

‘20A

the zodiac, am] otlirrs to other (iods, ortho attendants of the Gods, or to mortal animals or to the more elevated or more low parts of the universe.

Plato however, says that wits and will In are species, and not parts of time, in the same manner as days and nights, and months and years. For divine orders whii h giv e eoinplelion to the whole series of time, preside over the latter. Hence, lie calls them parts of time. Hut was and willin', are entirely surveyed according to each of these. And hems', they are certain species, as not having a ]>eenliar matter; I mean, a diurnal, or nocturnal, or some otln r such like matter. If however, these are species of time, which was generated together with the uni¬ verse, av/v had no existence prior to the generation of the universe. But if was had no existence prior to it, neither had motion ; for in all motion, there are wax and a ill be, because there are prior and posterior. If however, motion was not prior to the universe, neither was disorderly motion. Hence Athens and lus fol¬ lowers speak in vain, when they say, that time was prior to the generation of the world, hut not an arranged time. For where there is time, there are also the past and the future. Ami where these are, there the wax, and the will Ac entirely subsist. Moreover, the rr<w and the u ill Ac, are species of time generated by the Demiurgns. Hence also Plato calls them generated. Neither therefore was there a certain time prior to the fabrication of things. It is necessary therefore, that the nuich- crlebraled disorderly motion of Athens and his followers, either, it it existed, should not lie in time, or that there should not he in short, a certain lime when it was produced. It is necessary however, motion existing, that there should he a time in which it was generated : one part of it. havin': the past,’another the present, and another the future. *1 If uce.it is not possible that tin re should have Ikm-ii motion prior to tin* generation of time ; since neither could there have been disorderly lime. For disorderly tune would have the reus and the will he; the former of which would be the past, hut the latter tin* future. Or, if it alone hail the is, without tin s«*, it would have been < lernily, and not time, and disorderly motion would lx* eternal which is impossible. For Aristotle has sutlii u ntiy di moiistrated, that all motion is in time, both tnat which is disorderly, and that which is orderly, each entirely having the.prior, and the posterior ; in order that the motion may lie that which it is said to lx*, and may not be permanency instead of motion. But that the was and then ill Ac, were not prior to the fabrication of things, Plato clearly teaches us, as I have Ix-fnre observed by say ing that as davs and nights were generated as parts, so the Teas ami the will he, were generated as sjieries of time. They how¬ ever say, that the disorderly motion was unliegotten. Hence, if there was then

They how¬ ever say, that the disorderly motion was unliegotten. Hence, if there was then

• 1 I'or irjK*X0<>r her**, it is ncccssrry lo read rnp(\0nr.

200

PROCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

a certain time, it was unbcgotten ; ko that the was and the will be, were tmbegot- ten. The kw and the will be therefore, were not prior to the generation of the world, hut wen* simultaneous with the world ; time being oue and the same, and Is mg the numlier both of disorderly and of orderly motions, and existing without difference. This therefore, is demonstrated through these methods as a co¬ rollary .

If however, you wish to suney these as species of time, in the nay in which they appeared to be so to our preceptor, assume for me a perfect period, and an entire progression of time, one part having now become the past, but another the future, and behold the was, and the will be as species of time. I'or if we do not thus, but partibly understand the words of l*lato, the venerable and entire idea of time, will not lie manifested to us, according to eat h of these species, but that w hich hap(tens to some of the things that art in generation, anti mutation. Unless indeed, the uas indicates the perfective order of time, but the will be, that order of it u huh unfolds into If/it, just as the ts, indicates its connectedly containing order. For time unfolds things which as yet are not, connectedly contains such as are present, and pt ejects such as are past, and introduces an appropriate end to their periods. And thus much conct ruing tin* parts and the species of time.

For time unfolds things which as yet are not, connectedly contains such as are present, and pt ejects such as are past, and introduces an appropriate end to their periods. And thus much conct ruing tin* parts and the species of time.

With respect however, to the word contrived, though we have before observed that time is in reality tin: work of divine anti demiurgic contrivance, by which natures that are changed remain through the whole, and partake of perfection, perpetuity, defence, measure and compreln iision; vet it may In* said, do not divine natures measure themselves,' and especially do not those that revolve in the hea¬ vens, define their own motions? This indeed, we must most readily admit. I or material and corruptible natures have their existence, and tin* extent of their du¬ ration from other tilings; but divine natures have these, both from primordial causes and themselves. lienee Plato, when lie begins to speak about tin; times that are unfolded into light in the heavens, says “ that the stars were generated for the *ake of co-operating in the production of time and again, “ that they were gene¬ rated us instruments of time and in the third place, “ that they were produced for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers oj time.' In vvliat is ben* s.iitl however, the term co-operating shows that time indeed existed prior to the stars, hut that it is unfolded into light about the world through these. For time hem-' m them, is unfolded through their motion. Hut the term instruments again afier another manner, ill a certain respect, indicates the same thing; viz. that tin- whole of time was produced, both that which abides, and that which proceeds,

' I'or tavro here, read caeru.

BOOK IV.]

T1M/EUS Or PLATO.

■207

l»y the father and maker of all tilings, for the purpose of measuring mundane natures; but that the bodies which revolve in the heavens, are partial measures, and are comprehended in the one time; each in an especial manner, more organ¬ ically producing in conjunction with time, such things as are appropriate in it. For in short, all the second fabrication has this relation to the one and impartible production of things. For each of the bodies that revolve in the heavens, is said especially to contribute to the measure of itself. Thus for instance, tin sun though , it contributes to all things, on account of its ruling dignity, yd it particularly contri¬ butes to the year, '.chick it constitutes in conjunction xi ith the Demiurgus , and the whole of time, as the peculiar measure of itself. llut the moon contributes to month ; and the incrratic sphere, to day and night. The mode also of operation tn the re<t of the heavenly bodies, is evident; though neither night, nor much less day, is without the sun, nor year without the inerratic sphere, and the zodiac. At the same lime however, some measures are more adapted to some of these, than to others.

The mode also of operation tn the re<t of the heavenly bodies, is evident; though neither night, nor much less day, is without the sun, nor year without the inerratic sphere, and the zodiac. At the same lime however, some measures are more adapted to some of these, than to others.

The stars also may 1m? said to be the instruments of time, in consequence of time possessing an effective dignity, with reference to and through them, and adorning generation as it were through instruments. 11 y which also it is evident, that time is not only that which is participated, and is the number of motion, since the governors of the world have the order of instruments w ith reference to it; i hut likewise, that it is an inv isihle (iod, energizing eternally about all motions, and the whole period of the world, but using for instruments these divinilit s, as more partial measures of itself. Hut the assertion, that the stars were generated, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers of time, clearly shows that the onetime proceeds from the Demiurgus, and his will; and that remaining one, and a whole, and without difference, it becomes through the motion of these stars, multitudinous according to number, and that each of the measures adapted to it, is as it were cut and divided from the whnleof lime, which is always the guardian of each, through its equable and orderly motion. In reality however, the celestial (iods, are rather guarded by the numbers of time, and obtain through these, the distinction ot the periods w hich they make, and of their restitutions to their pristine state: but at the same time, since we endeavour to collect the truth pertaining to invisible from visible natures, we infer that the numliers of time are guarded, through the circulation of the stars.

With these things however, not only Plato as. we have before observed, but theurgists likewise accord. For they celebrate time as a mundane (bid, eternal, boundless, young and old, and of a spiral form. And besides tins also, as having its essence in eternity, as abiding always the saute, and as possessing

208

PHOCLUS ON THE

[book lr.

we have before observed, but theurgists likewise accord. For they celebrate time as a mundane (bid, eternal, boundless, young and old, and of a spiral form. And besides tins also, as having its essence in eternity, as abiding always the saute, and as possessing

208

PHOCLUS ON THE

[book lr.

infinite power. For how could it otherwise comprehend the infinity of apparent time, and circularly lead all things to lla ir former condition, and renovate them, and also recall things which become old through it, to their proper measure, as being at once comprehensive both of things that are moved in a circle, and ac¬ cording to a right line. For n spiral is a thing ot this hind; and lienee, as I have liefore observed, time is celebrated by theurgists, as having a spiral term. For they not only celebrate time as a (Joel, but likewise day and night, and month and year, are considered by them as (iods. 1 or ot things which e in id.ite peipctually, it is entirely necessary, that there should bean immoveable cause; and adiflerent cause of things specifically dillcTciit. On this account theivlore, they have deli¬ vered to us, congresses, invocations, and telestic sacred laws. It is necessary likewise, not to survey all these particulars superficially, but to venerate them as divine, invisible, and immoveable causes, prior to these moveable natures which arc* apparent to all men; Plato hiiilst If in the I.a\vs, bearing t< stimoiiy, as we have said, to the truth of this, by speaking of these causes as Ooels. I nr frum the Cm ret /. v we receive the sacred rites uj Month, and h e learn that by the 1 hry gians Month is celebrated as Sabazius, and also in the middle mysteries oj Sabazius. For that which the y first bela id to Im* the measurer of a perpetual circulation, they apprehended to In* a (Jod, and tins they honoured, through the mysteries, ami all- sacred worship; in the same manner as they also honoured tin.* seasons, lor they were able to perceive [the divinity of] these, trorn their eflects ; though not similarly the divinity of the year. For nan indeed, who were divinely wise, have like wise celebrated this ; but it was not e asy f<»r all me n t*> know uni worship it, on account of the ditlicully of understanding the perieed which is measured by it. This also is the* c.tse* with the whole of time, e*n account of tla* ignorance ot the one pe riod e»f all things ; so that the* investigation of this whole-, as existing, and as a (Jod, is attended with ex\reine diflieulty ; though if an immoveable cause precedes jK*r|K.*tual motion, it is necessary that prior to pe rpe tuity itse lf, there should exist that which unite dly defines the whole* ot it, and which numbers it, perjM tuity itself being that which is nuiube reel.

“ 'I’hcse things however, through oblivion, are not tightly translated hv us to an eternal essence. For vve say that it ui', and will be, though in real i tv, to tins the term it is, alone pertains.

“ 'I’hcse things however, through oblivion, are not tightly translated hv us to an eternal essence. For vve say that it ui', and will be, though in real i tv, to tins the term it is, alone pertains.

In the first place, it de se rves to he* remarked, that Plato again considers the eternal as the same with tlm intelligible essence; in order that we may more clearly be i»ersuaded, that when he asseited the world was generated the statue

kook it.]

TIM,LI S OF PLATO

209

In the first place, it de se rves to he* remarked, that Plato again considers the eternal as the same with tlm intelligible essence; in order that we may more clearly be i»ersuaded, that when he asseited the world was generated the statue

kook it.]

TIM,LI S OF PLATO

209

of lli** eternal Gods, lu* mmnl by the eternal, tin- intelligible Gods. In the in \i place, it must he observed, that in cnn-eipirnce of perceiving llial men conceive and assort nolliin^ '.iiic about tin*"*.* particulars, lie liimself recur* to Inn* conn p- tions «»t’ tin* thin"*, at tin* same time purifying tin* use of words, tlimiiub which the teacher ' necessarily produces recollection in tin* minds of tin* well-dFposcd. W hat is now said tliercfore, in conseipieiire of the mildness 1 of IMato’s maimers, docs not seem to accuse severely the assertion* of mankind. For the expression not rightly, since it is common both to the accuser and the accused, is not accus¬ tomed to brine: with it trreat disgrace. The words of the text howi\er, have a sharp* and percus*i\e power. For with respect to those things which the ])» mini bus imparti'd to tin* last of In inas, in conseipience of their incapacity of receiving a more \enerable comprehension, if men endeavour to adapt these to tlie essences which abide in eternity, they enira^e in a certain "i^anlic war, de¬ faming the will and power * of the Deiiiiur^us, and in realitv, hastening to hurl rocks and oaks against the heavens. Why then fore, are not the was and the trillin' , adapted to ilitelli”ih|es ? lb-cause the fiiea»urc of intelligible.* is firm and immoveable, and < nu*i * the tilings vvhii h are mea»ured by it to be i \i mpt liom all mutation, lint why does the it is, in reality alone pertain to tin ill ? Ilecause that whieh they are, they always are, not losing, nor ren-ivin” anv ihintr, neither according to i »ein*e, nor acrordintr to life, imr aeeordin^ to intelligence, nor much more icconlm- to union. Shall r re say therefore , that < f tin sc thru, tin teas the is, and the ill hr, the t i/t ern s da not pertain to intelligihle.s, Inti the wieldU alone ‘ Or is this In/ no naans the ease ? F»r nut /nr does the is, which is co-an tinged with the was, and the rail he, pertain t» intelligibles; hut that whole is ere mpt from all these, has tm representation a hat ever <J time, and is defined according to the eternal measure * itself, must he attributed to the Gods, and to intclligiblcx. Jar as with re sped to the always, one was eternal, but the other temporal, so HUwisc, the is, is twofold, the one being eultipte.il to truly existing bungs, but the other to mundane things. When there - fort , he says, that to this /// reality, the term, it is, alone pertains, by transferring the word alone, we shall Juul what t.s said to be more scientific. For it w ill then be, to this, (he alone is pertains; viz. the is, which is by itself exempt from a co-arreingcment with tin species of time.

For it w ill then be, to this, (he alone is pertains; viz. the is, which is by itself exempt from a co-arreingcment with tin species of time.

l'i>r .VuuifiXuni- I ere, il if ncrcfjarv to re .id ielnnenKor.

1 Imti ol i>l rTiij<.mi> in tins jilarr, n-.ul cticucko'.

’ I or iV' /i'i i» lien-, ri .id <V>y"i.ii.

U ;ij>|n.Trs tome lh.il llie word l fion/in is w.miiug licrc m the original,

Tim, Plat. \ ol. II. 2 1)

210

PROCLUS ON TUP

[BOOK IV.

Hmv came men therefore, to err in »o gr‘*at a cl egret* in this respect, anti to attribute to tin* intelligible Coils tilings wliicli tlo not at all jR*rtain to them 1 The whole cause indeed, is the oblivion of divine natures, on account of the ilcfhixion of our wings, our lapse, and our communion with mortal bodies, lit nee Plato also says, “ that these things through oblivion, ate not rightly trunsflrrcd h\j us to an < ternalvssun c." Tin urgists however, are not thus afh < tetl; for it is not lawful for them to be so. Hut they celebrate time iUelt as a CJod, and as we h ut said, thev denominate one time zonic, but another azonie, which measures the pi riod of the third of the ethereal worlds. They likew ise celebrate a certain arch angelic time, in tin middle of the ethereal worlds ; and another ruling time, whii h presides over the first of those worlds. And alter all these, tin y speak of another font d time, wlm h is the leader of the etnpy it an world, and conducts, and d< lines its period, proceeding from the fontal Coddess I Khea] In rsi It, w ho genc- i s all life, and all motion. For she produces Initial time, and causes it to preside over all moveable natures, and to measure the periods of all things, as far as to the last of beings. 1’or these also are measured according to periods. In things likewise, which are perfectly corruptible, 1 Plato teaches us, that every thing which lives is generated Irom that whu h is dead, and every thing which is d< id from that which is living; and that there is a period of all things, and an apm alastasis of generated natures, and not alone ol such as are incorruptible. For the inilividual which was generated from non being according to a certain pt rioil, ih parts into non hi mg [again], since motion Irom the same to the same, is a |MTiod

For the inilividual which was generated from non being according to a certain pt rioil, ih parts into non hi mg [again], since motion Irom the same to the same, is a |MTiod

Time therefore, measures all things, and defines the periods of all things, as far as to the last ol beings. And the Demiurgus added this to moveable natures, in order that tin \ might unit ite the continued permaiu m y of intellect in i ternity * itsi If, through the periodical progression Irom tin* same to the same, whu h tune i,,:p.tits to all moveable beings. Flic multitude however, Ireipiently confound the nature of things, not distinguishing between what is adapted to truly-existing 1m ui-s, and to such as are gem rat. d. Hut in a partii ular manner, the ignorance concerning eternity and time, produces this din* contusion, and illegality. I lie* similitude of the things likewise, operati s something. 1 or last are not separat. d from liist natures, but are suspended from, and proceed according to them, and become invested with the form of images. It is also a dire thing, for those who

* l or here, it is ueces->arv In n ail irufipOanrut .

1 1 us trail of utu»' iu tins plate, it is oliviou-lv necessary to nail mwo.

hook iv.]

TIM,-EUS OF PLATO.

‘211

have not a scientific knowledge of similitudes, to reason falsely, and transfer some things to others, to he persuaded to associate with images as if lliev were para¬ digms, and to think that a primordial essence is nothin}; else than its \ isilile intake. Perceiving therefore, annul; sensihles, the mixture ot being with non I wing, and the domination of being in a certain respect, when we say that a thing i<, hut of non-being in a certain respect, when we assert concerning it, that it was, or tli.it it i dll be, we timister these to the eternal order of real lieiugs, where nothing is past, nor any tiling will he future, nor in short, will Is changed, and where there is no progression of time, nor representation of lwing according to privation; hut where there is true essence, and truly-existing being, an invariahie sameness of subsistence, the all m the now, and the ends subsistin'.; at once, not as ditlerent in dith rent things, hut as the same with their subjects. For in things m which as I may say, the whole ot the liyparxis consists of lieauty and goodness, w< 11 belli:; does not difli-r from existence.

“ Hut tin uns, and the nil/ he, a.c adapted to be asserted of veneration proceedin'; in time, for these arc motions. It ts not however, lit, that the nature w hich always subsists with invariable sameness, innnoveablv, should become through time, either older, or younger, or should formerly' have been generated, or he now generated, or altogether w ill be hereafter; or should receive any such things as generation adapts to the natures that arc borne along in the sensible region. Hut these are generated species of time imitating eternity, and circulating according to number.”

Hut these are generated species of time imitating eternity, and circulating according to number.”

Tin •sc three things, savs l’lato, pertain, on account of time, to generation; one, the tens and the will be ; the second, to bieomc younger and older; and lh<‘ third, to hah bei n g < nerntid Jornn r/i /, or to In now generat'd, or to be hen af ti r. f It t hi m i , the divine lainhlirlms says that time prod i tees the fii -t in the realm'- of gem ration, as proceeding from real heing ; hut the second, a* being impelled from life; and tiie third, as being siopr uded from the mt< llectual ordi r. Hut these things In mg asserted w ith great wisdom, in the first plaee lie impures, it it is nuoe prop* r to survey t!u in as three, and not as two, understanding by the expression in have been genetttfed formerly, the younger or older, and also by the expressions, to be non- generated, and to be "hereaf ter ; ill order that it may not only he erroneous to adapt any thing n| this kind to the finds according to the Ijeing generated, hut also aeeordnig to all the parts of time, and generation. In the next place, recurring to the loginning of the whole of what JL'lalo now says, it must l>e const-

PROCLUS ON TIIH

[noon iv.

* 21‘2

In the next place, recurring to the loginning of the whole of what JL'lalo now says, it must l>e const-

PROCLUS ON TIIH

[noon iv.

* 21‘2

(li-rcil, w lu-thor wr can rightly assert the two alone of veneration, I mean the teas, and the u ill be, or that also, which is as it were tlu middle of them, the is ; which is not now named, because the ctcviuil is pertains to intr lligibles, lest the homonymy should a-aiu produce disturbance in what is said. Moreover, it iseiid. lit to every one, that each linage participates in a c« rtain r» sped ol its paradigm, but that tin* whole world, in an especial manner participates of the intelligible. So that :f truly-» \istimr bein -4 is in the intelligible, bring will al-o after a certain manner, exist in the sensible world. 7/ic is however, is not con-numerated with the tens, and the will be, 1m < ause that which is properly is, is not among sensibles, and 1*. cause it has a secondary subsist, nee from the int< Hi"ibh*, so that it is more adapted to it [than to sensibles], and because the design was to show what tin p- culiarities an- of« h h of the natun s, and not n the one parti. ipat. s of a certain thing lioin tlu other, though tin was, and t/n will k are rather characterized by non-b, in- than by b. mi" ; 1 the former, by the no baiter, but the hitler, by the not pit. Do seiisi- bles therefore, after a cei tain manner entirely participate of hem- ' Dr may we Hot '.iv that they are not deiiomiliati d according to a dell. ctioii liom it, but through the iloininalion in them of mm Im in- tin y are only adapt, d to generation, but by no means p< rtain to truly-existing beings ! 11. sid, s, the monad, or the is, is more allied to eternity, and intelligible*, but the duad of the was and the will Li, to g, in ration and time. This puhowever, and strength «/ Umporal energy is gnat, that it cu-arrangt s Unit which nu lunger is uith beings, and that a hu h is nut pit :,///; things that are present. I»r all these beeonie continual according to time, and tin punnt through tune is dismissed to the :. as, s» as not even that to be hurried away to t/mi hit h in tn> tisjnvt whatever crisis, but on account of tunc, isaJUt a let tan titamu r co-arranged , ith beings.

I»r all these beeonie continual according to time, and tin punnt through tune is dismissed to the :. as, s» as not even that to be hurried away to t/mi hit h in tn> tisjnvt whatever crisis, but on account of tunc, isaJUt a let tan titamu r co-arranged , ith beings.

II..w tin n fore, in Generated natun s, can the was, and the will be, be filly said to 1 m- speeies of tune ' May wt not say, that the species of time arc one thin"; for temporal progressions alone, and the mienals which measure wholes, are mure simple; but tlie things which are arranged in the natures generated in time, another f I-’or time was, and the war was, are not the same thin-; as neither is tin downward of plan-, the same as tin-downward of tin-earth. Hut the lonnei is simple and one, hut tin latter- rumposit. and twofold. Ami the one eonipre- hends, but the ..tiler is t oiiipn luiuleil. Hills also ill tin was, the t< mporal indeerl, comprehends and measures, and is simple, but th .t wl.ieli is assumed in the -ell. ration win. h is in linn , is eoinpreh. Tided, and uu astir, d, and p irtieipat. s ot time, but is mil time. 'I’hat all -.-aeration bow ever, is compi.-li.-nd.-d by time, just is lime Its, || is by u.t. tli"iDl« s, is ev id. lit. And time Is said to proceed from intelli-ibles according to number, as making Us progression according to the

HOOK I\.]

TIM.Ill'S or PLATO.

•213

forms anil measures llial an- in them. Hut gem ration is saiil to proceed in tilin', as bring nirasiiri <1 anil |n lireI**i 1 by limr. Again, time, on account of its imitation ot eternity, is saiil to circulate (ju^l as the heaven on account ot its imitation of intellect, i> saiil to In- of a spherical form) anil to have as sjn cics the has, ami the uill be, ami sm h tilings as arc allied to tlicsc ; anil i» is evnli nt that these are simple, and the primary leaders of the natures that arc home along in Generation, l or that which has the measures of all Gen, ration in itself, inserts the images and impressions of them, in the things which proceed according to it. (ieneration then fore, loses its vigour, and on this account requires the renovating aid of time. It also is imperfect at first, and is m want of time, to make it more perfect, and older. Dut the intelligible is always perfect, and always flourishing, and always has an invariable sameness of subsistence ; whence also something which is older subsists there.

Hut Jove was horn tlie first, and likewise that which is younger,

IK bo august, iur them the nectar pours.

Dut the intelligible is always perfect, and always flourishing, and always has an invariable sameness of subsistence ; whence also something which is older subsists there.

Hut Jove was horn tlie first, and likewise that which is younger,

IK bo august, iur them the nectar pours.

Yet these are not present with them through time. This also is very accurately aihh d by Plato, that it is not lit the mb lligibie should become e ither older or younger through time, nor in short, that the unbegotten should be generated, or hate been generated, or will he generated. And in one word, generation indeed, though it i» not essence, y, t participates of essence ; but it is by no mi ans lawful that essence should be filled with generation. Hence, neither is it right to intro¬ duce to truly-existing beings, things which are adapted to generation through time.

“ And m addition to these things also, we assert that a tiling which tax generated, is generated ; that what subsists in becoming to be, is gene¬ rated ; that what will he, is to he ; and that ww-bcing is non-being : no one of w liicli assertions is accurate. Perhaps however, a perfect discussion ol these things, is not adapted to the present discourse."

Previously to tins, Plato lihunutl the custom of the (Irecks, for introducing to Iruly-exi-ling In ings words adapted to tilings in generation ; but now lie arcuses the multitude ot eo-;uiauging with generation, that which is adapted to iutclligi- bles. For their illegality, is either twofold, or is entirely one and great. For when they say that a tiling which u as generated, is generated, and that will be, is to l>e, they erroneously adapt the peculiarity of eternal essences, to generated

214

I’ROCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

For their illegality, is either twofold, or is entirely one and great. For when they say that a tiling which u as generated, is generated, and that will be, is to l>e, they erroneously adapt the peculiarity of eternal essences, to generated

214

I’ROCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

natures. Fur this is, pertains to siq>erie)r divine lieings; just as to l>e generated, or sidisist in Irecotnmg to lie, pertains to sensihles. They likewise erroneously confound the parts of time, and subvert the order which is in it, bv making the turn', or the present time, the same as the past. Rut when they say, that what subsists in Itccomin" to be, is, tin y fill into the former error alone. Though this however, is an error of the greatest c<niseijuence, yet, if it be lawful so to speak, it is a still greater error to say that mm-lieing is, For if generation is a medium 1*1 we e n non-being and Iwing, it is a less error, to introduce the pecu¬ liarities o! he-ing to generation, than to mm-licing. One apologv however, *or these things, may he made eonforniablv to nature. For in consequence of non-being participating in ge ne ration of being, in the same manner as every tiling temporal ap|»ears to participate of eternitv, it is usual to refer these to e lernity and truly-existiii” being, w!m h are e\i nipt from all iutiTva! and distribu¬ tion into parts. And again, it i» usual to preserve mil detain generation, which is borne along in motion, and e\i-ts in time. It is not at all wonderful tin refore, it tit **11 wishing to detain union" beings, that which has alreadv been generated, should say th.it it is generated ; and aUu being willing to eo arrange witli things ill cMstence, that wliieh is not \el generated, tin v should sav, it is to be gene¬ rated. For through tins,- two things, non-being is iuaeeitaiii respect able to arcade to, and be co-airanged with brings; vi/ through the pailic*ipulicm of being, and through the? present temporal interval, both which may appear to intrudin' existence. And hence indeed, the frequent m.- of tin se words in this sense was assumed. Nevertheless tin* transposition of tliis perturbation has not any tiling las Plato sa\s] accurate and scientific, by which he sigmlie as far as is adapted to the present speculation, which is more physical, that a more abundant investi¬ gation of these things, pertains to another discussion, which, as most of the inter¬ preters think, is logical. I’m* in logical discussions, it is usual to inquire whethe r non-being is the ohjcct of opinion. As lauihlieliiis says however, and 1 am per¬ suaded, it is theological I or in the Sophi-ta, muc h is said about all-various non being, and likewise in tin Parmenides, the speculation of which, Tuna-iis alsoevinees to be appropriate. Now however, as he separates and distinguishes things from each other, vi/., into that which isalwavs bring, and that which is generated and perishes, into invade and paradigm, the eternal and the temporal, thus also, he wishes to give; appellations adapted to eaeli of these, so as neither to transfer things whic h pertain to generation through time, to more simple and divine essence's, nor to mingle the traiisci ncleiit goods uf more excellent natures, with things which arc home along in motion and imitation. Rut he refers to more appropriate opportunities, the* more* profound investigation <»f these particulars. For this was usual both with Plato himself, and prior to Plato, with the Pytha-

Rut he refers to more appropriate opportunities, the* more* profound investigation <»f these particulars. For this was usual both with Plato himself, and prior to Plato, with the Pytha-

nooK iv.]

TIM.ITS or PLATO.

215

goreans. Aristotle also, «specially emulating this custom, discusses philosophi¬ cal prolilems in a wav adapti d t«» tin: design of his treatise.

“ Time therefore, was generated together with the universe, in order that being generated together with it, it may also be dissolved together with it, it ever a certain dissolution of it should take place, it was also generated according to the paradigm of an eternal nature, in order that it might, as much as possible, be similar to it. Tor the paradigm of it indeed, is through all eternity [real] bemg. Hut the universe forever through the w hole of time, was generated, is, and will be.”

Plato says that time was generated together with the universe, now animated, and endued with intellect; because the world lirst participates of time, accord¬ ing to soul, and the eorporeal-formed nature, But the w ords, “ that being gene¬ rated tnzethci with it, it vnn/ also be dissolved together r nth it, if ever a certain disso¬ lution of it should tahe place, clearly show that the universe is unliogotteli and in¬ corruptible. For if it was generated, it was generated in time. Hut if it was generated tog. tin r with lime, it was not generated in lime. Tor neither wa> time generated in time, lest there should he linn prior to time. If therefore, the uni¬ verse was generated together w ith time, it was not generated, [according to the usual acceptation of the word.J Tor it is necessary that every thing which was generated, should he posterior to tune The universe however is by no means posterior to time. Again, if every thing which is dissolved, is dissolved at a certain time, hut time cannot In: dissolved in a part of itself, time cannot ever he dissolved ; so that neither can tin* universe. Tor it is indissoluble, as long as time is indissoluble, besides, time is indissoluble through a simplicity of nature ; unless some one is willing to denominate the progression of it, and its return to the I)< miurgu-s which are motions contrary to each other, the genera¬ tion and .dissolution of it. Thus also the universe, has dissolution and g« in ration according to cause. Just tin refore, as if some one being willing that the revolu¬ tions ot the circle ot the different, should he odd in number, should say that the heptad is co-existent with them, in order that if ever the heptad should liecome an even numlH r, they also may Imtoiiic even, signil'v ing by this, that the circula¬ tions will not fall into the even uurulH-r; thus likewise, we must now conceive resjMM ting the all-various indissolubility of the world and time, m consequence of time having an indissoluble nature.

One cans** therefore, of time having lx*en generated together with the universe, is that the universe may be indissoluble and j»eq»etual. But a second cause is.

PROCUS ox Tun

[book iv.

‘2 Hi

that it may l>e most similar to its parad..,.a. For Plato says that the universe itself, is most similar to its paradigm. I low therefore, does the universe become more similar to animal itself through time ! Because, says he, as intelli^ihles re- eeive all the power of eternity, which now uniti s, ami connectedly contains tin m at once, collectively, and imieally,—thus also tlie world, sustains all tin* measured motion of time partil>1 \, and in a divided manner, through which also it was, and is, and will 1m*, not havim; the three in the whole of time, hut each in a portion ol time. It receives however, ear'll of the three in the whole of time, on account of the past and the future period, and because Im iiii; of the nature of things ge¬ nerated, it has the perfect in generation according to every part of time. And it exists indeed, or w, because in tin* whole of the present circulation of time, it par¬ ticipates of heiii£. But it -will be, because tin* measured motions of tin* whole of time, will never cease, and the fir* illations conjoin, and assimilate time to intel¬ ligible causes. If however, the universe i xists for ever through the whole* of time, and is, and was, and will he, it is, and will he in tin* time to come, in couseijiiciicc of being incorruptible. Hein e it vv as generated in all the past time, as being un- liegotteii. Tor il is similarly pn -cut witliall turn according to each of these.* < >r if this is not admitted it no longer w ill be lien afti r mlimtil v, or vv as gem rated from iiilinit\ Xml thos» are ridiculous 1 who say that the world was once gene¬ rated, and that it will at a c« rt.un time i rase to he, sim e Plato ascriU s to it tin* whole of time, on account of holh *th« past and the future.] And you s**c, that he now attribute* the three paits ot time to it, a id does not refuse to ascribe 1 m in" to if. Hence it is evident, that vv Inn before he attributes the is to an eter¬ nal nature, and not to generation, the is there, is exempt from all temporal i \t« n- sinn, and bring established according to tin-eternal itself, pertains to inti-lligibles; since he grants that the whole o \ the ~ua$ and the mil he, are for e\» r present with sensihles, according to the participation of truly-existing being.

How therefore, if the nature of time, as the divine laiiihlichtis savs, and as I ain persuaded, is a medium between eternity and the universe, of the latter of which it i- the leader, and is assimilated to the former,—Iiovv, if this be tin* i ase, was time constituted for the s;ike of the iinivi rse ? lor how was that which is com¬ prehensive and peilidivv, and which in a greater degree assimilates the linage to its paradigm,—how vv as this generated for the sake of that vvhiehis compre¬ hended and assimilated ? Fur thus things which subsist for the sake of sotne-

1 i i Xu or lm_’ In the i nil, the if, .mil the mil be.

I'luitio lie ii .i 11 m li > in siitli 1 1 tin' am nut ( lirivliaio, as I'mlravoiirril t» prove, Iroiu tin* aiillioritv of 1'latn, tli.il die world was pioducid at a ecrl.iiu lime, ami will at a ceilam time lie destroyed.

::ooK Iv.J

ri.M .1.1 s ol 1‘l.MO.

•_ 17

I'luitio lie ii .i 11 m li > in siitli 1 1 tin' am nut ( lirivliaio, as I'mlravoiirril t» prove, Iroiu tin* aiillioritv of 1'latn, tli.il die world was pioducid at a ecrl.iiu lime, ami will at a ceilam time lie destroyed.

::ooK Iv.J

ri.M .1.1 s ol 1‘l.MO.

•_ 17

tbiim else, will hr iikhv venerable (li.m mils, and more excellent nalurrs will make a pnmiV'Moii to beings, lor tin* sake nl limits subordinate. Nothing of tills kind however, i< to In* found in 11 1«' arrangements of l’lalo. For neither was time geueialid, for the sake ol tin* universe alone, 1101 was die universe roii-lilnl- ed for dn- sake of lime alone, hut eaeli was emistitiited for the sake of itself, and of die oilier, and for the sake ol hnlli. lor in order that all die I ahriea- 1 ion of things mmht have perlertiun, siirh was tin* universe, and sneh was time (oiisinuniati 1 v prodneed. Moreover, it happens that each greatlv contributes t i the assimilation ol < ieh toils properparadmm. l or lime would not imitate eternity without tin-existence of the universe; tor after w hat manlier would it pro- ( ei-d, or what is there among heiims, that it would ever measure, or connect, or perfect ’ nor would the universe, w ithout the existence of time, imitate as niueh as possible, tiie all-perfect and eternal nature of animal itself. Karh then-fore w as generated, not for the sake ol itself alone, nor lor die sake ol die oilier alone, htil for the sake of all the fahrieation of things, m ordi r that each might hecouie most perfect, and most similar to its paradigm, or rather, each was generated for the sake of goodness, and the fatlu-r of w holes, on aecount ol w hich also the pro- < 1 11< lion of thnms possesses perleetion. Hut each being generated that which it is w illi reference to the other, each contributes greatlv to the permanency, order and good condition of all mundane natures. And thus mncli INatn philosophiz¬ es concerning time, which is the one and whole measure of all things, and which is moved and proeeetls Ironi the Dcmimgus alone, and its proper monad. Ihit in what follows. In* dismisses die time winch is unfolded in the |iea\eiis, and is as it were eo-iiivided with the various lations of the stars, which would not have subsisted without the revolution ot the eiri le o ( /he siiihc, and tin circle oilhcdif¬ ferent, about the invisible and one time, which cuts oil from itself, unfolds into light, and always preserves a measure adapted to eaeli of these circles. In whit fol- lovvs also, in order that this sei omlarv tone might pun red into the visible world, and he universally known through the partial measures el io* If, which it imparts, and that it might lie more flistnluiled, lie constitutes (lie planets, annum w hich the sun and moon are enumerated. From all which vve may inter, what "rent dignity is allotted by (In* philosopher, or rather by the Dominions himself ot wholes, to the lime which is first and one.

From all which vve may inter, what "rent dignity is allotted by (In* philosopher, or rather by the Dominions himself ot wholes, to the lime which is first and one.

“ From this reason therefore, and from sneh a disc nrsive energy of divinity about the generation of time, in order that time might he vene¬ rated, he prodneed the sun and moon, and the oilier five stars, which have the appellation of planets, for the purpose of distinguishing and guarding the numbers ol time."

Ttfn. Flat.

Vol. II,

2L

PROCLUS ON THE

[BOOK IV.

218

Flat.

Vol. II,

2L

PROCLUS ON THE

[BOOK IV.

218

The fabrication of tiling, as we have frequently olrserved, l>eing twofold ; the one invisible, one and wimple, suj>er-mundaue and total; but the other visible, multitudinous and multiform, distributed into parts' in the world; and bavin" twofold energies, the one primordial, immoveable, and intellectual; but the other secondary, proceeding with motion, and revolting about intellect; and the one being exempt from effects, but the other being cu arranged with them; this being the ciis*, a twofold time also proceeds to beings. .And the one indeed is super¬ mundane, but th** other mundane. The one also both abidt s, and at the same time proceeds; but the other is borne along in motion. That also which is participated is twofold, the one subsisting according to simple partic ipation, but the othe r in the [H-riods of the celestial stars, which produce mouth* and days, and nights and years. Such therefore being the difference of times, Plato having deliver* d tin* conceptions, about the one and simple essence ot time, is now about to dismiss the variety of the time, which is participated partible, and to which the theory of the planets contributes. Fur through tin* motion of these dancing round the sun, the time vvhii h is known to us is completely cflected ; introducing this as a ninth gift to the world. In order however, that from the introduction jt^-lf, you m iv leave an indication of the inferiority of this time to that which is sup< r-mundaiie, he savs that it was < oiislituted Ay the discursive energy of divinity ; and further still, that it distinguishes and guards the numbers of time , through the motion of the stars. To both likewise, we must direct our attention, viz. to the distinction of the malty temporal measures after the one [super-mundane] time; , m l to the defence and preservation of the same measures perpetually, for the sake of which he says, the stars were generated. And tin Deiiiiiirgu* indeed, produced the form* r time, looking to eternity, and « m-rgi/.iiig according to one simple intelligence ; but In produced the second time, as Plato says, from reason, and a discursive energy ; fx«» Aiotvc<a>] indicating by this, the divisible nature of dianoia, 1 and its distribution into multitude from one intelligence. J or a divine intellect is one tiling, and divine reason another ; the former being unit* d, hut the latter multiplied ; and the former comprehending wholes, hut the latter dividing union into multitude; the former also, abiding in itself, but tin* latter unfolding itself into light. Hence, the secondary lime, if it is iuiivcr*allv apparent, is very projM-rly said to proceed from the demiurgic reason, which receives as it were its progression from intellect ; reason indeed, manifesting the* cause, but dunwm, the

* 1 or ntfnCo^€njt lure, rt ad /nine

Hence, the secondary lime, if it is iuiivcr*allv apparent, is very projM-rly said to proceed from the demiurgic reason, which receives as it were its progression from intellect ; reason indeed, manifesting the* cause, but dunwm, the

* 1 or ntfnCo^€njt lure, rt ad /nine

* Utanoia, as lias Ixm In-lure observed, when ascribed to the Dennurgus, indicates a distributive cause of tilings, or a cause, as Procluj expresses it, winch divides union into multitude.

BOOk 1\.]

TIM.LLS OT PLATO.

2I!>

knowledge in I hi' Dcmiurgus, which is of a Informed nature. Truly-existing time also, [or I hi' lir>t time] which is the inimher of all the jvcriods ia the universe, is mir tiling; hut the time which llmvs from this, and proceeds accord¬ ing to aiimhi r, i> another.

Tart In r still, truly -existing time compreheads all measures uniformly, accordin'; to which also the periods hoth of souls and bodies are accomplished, and the one measure of the whole apocataslasis. Tor tin re is a period of that which is divinely generated, which a perfect number eumpn hemls, as .Socrates says in the Repub¬ lic. Rat secondary time distinguishes and guards the measures in souls and corporeal natures. Tor it distributes measures adapted to each of these. And by this indeed, it divides the umcal power of the first time, but guards the measure pertaining to each soul, and each corporeal nature. Conformably to this likewise it makes apocatastases. Tor there is one measure of the solar period, another of the lunar, and another of the period of the meteors. Tor in th« ’se also, there is a certain circle, adumbrating the celestial circle. Of dill* rent animals likewise, there is a different period. Tor of these there are periods, and measures of life, as also the da-mouiacal Aristotle says. Such therefore aie the conclusions which may he now assumed from these things, concerning the dilSi-r* lire of these times.

Of dill* rent animals likewise, there is a different period. Tor of these there are periods, and measures of life, as also the da-mouiacal Aristotle says. Such therefore aie the conclusions which may he now assumed from these things, concerning the dilSi-r* lire of these times.

it appears likewise, that Tiato does not in vain say, “ in order (hat lime might be gnu ruled, hut fur the purpose of manifesting, that invisible time was antece¬ dent, being a whole, and one, and an inti Ue< tuul number, prior to the time which is p uImpaled, and vvhn h proceeds according to number. Tverv thing then fore, which is generated, is prior to its generation, invisibly established in its cause. Hence generation signifies a progression into participants, according to which time untidils into light diflereut forms, 1 primarily and scrnndarilv. It likewise signifies that time proceeds 1 mm more total to more partial natures, as far as to the last of things, as tor instance, animals and plants. To us however, the whole of time becomes known from partial but orderly measures. Tor the whole is dillicull to lie known, and that which is disordi rly cannot In come the measure of other things. Rut since, as we have said, the period of the plain ts, and particularly the solar circle, contributes to the generation of secondary tune, or rather, to the comprehension of the many measures contained in it, through which I icing differ¬ ent, as for instance months and years, we are accustomed to measure the whole of time,—hence, Plato says, that the sun and moon, and the live planets, were first generated by the Deiniurgus, though each of the fixed stars likewise, being

1 For ttfrj here, it u necessary to read td*r.

PllOCI.l S ON Till

[nook lv.

*220

PllOCI.l S ON Till

[nook lv.

*220

spherical, performs its period about it*. o\\ u centre, accordin'.; to a certain temporal measure. To Us however, 1 1 it-so measures an* not known, as those of tin; planets ale, arronlint; to uhieli thev make their periods about tin* /oiliar. For in tlio ti \cil •'t.ir>, «i do mil know tin- periods ol tin in about tin* ir proper re litres, l’lato ilien ton , >|M-aks concernin'.; the plain t-, and says they w« re generated, m order that tbex liliulit eo-o|ierate III the piodiietiull ol \i**lble time; Uldoldill'4; a dillerelit nn aMire of dilli n lit timin'-, the >1111 In inn alluded ,1 primordial and ruling dignity, and particularly aceiirdilii; to the "t uelatioli ol time. llem'i*, be is called lime ot time In llicolo-i't-, as imfnldiii:; into Ii" 1 11 tin- lust time ; and tin* period of tin- mm-oiis is accoinpli-'bi d accordin'.; to biin. lint the moon lias tin* second older, a> pro\imati !y nn»\in*_f, in< rcasiii"', and duniiiisbiu^, *•'< r\ tiling in lifiicra- lioii, l*\ licr powers. 1 It nee, as the miii is said to change lus foriie e\ 1 ry bour, and in c;ii li m^h ol tin /odiat so die moon < bailees ber I01111 every day ; so lli.it as tbc tin (ilo^ist sa\s, >ln- midi 1401 s as many t liaii^i s in a month as tin- miii hi 1 n tr. Hut tin- other plaints bv their various umtioiis, tonneet in a regular series, tin tliv ei sity ol geiu ration I 01 dilleivut 1 lh i is lot low inn 11 tin* aporatas- t.i'is ot dilli n lit plain ts, whit li aeeordmu to dillen lit lm .I'lin s, lining tin ir own li\ 1 -s to » pi mnl.

'son e howt ver, the plain ts revolve with ulie t onimiied, • ipiable, and uneeasin^' motion,but tin* order «U tin m, and tin 1 ipi ibihtv and saniein ss ot 11 it n motions, an* t item, on aeeonnt ot tin ir apparently advancing, ret eilin^, and breuniiiu; sta- lionarv, 1*11 this account, I Mato sa\ s, tin y have tin* appi 1 kill on ot planets. lienee, von ni.iv assume, that it is (lie stars, and not tin* spin n-s in w hit It the stars ail v a nee and li et th , that sutler "in h tilings .is, these, anil whit h ale iiiovi d upward and downward, antecedently containin'.; e t rderly paia lrjuiis, the al!-\arioiis distil-

lienee, von ni.iv assume, that it is (lie stars, and not tin* spin n-s in w hit It the stars ail v a nee and li et th , that sutler "in h tilings .is, these, anil whit h ale iiiovi d upward and downward, antecedently containin'.; e t rderly paia lrjuiis, the al!-\arioiis distil-

• i ills j, vv 1II 1-s|>l.i 1 Hi d li\ I.until » Inis He M\ ill 111-, |> 1 1 ai lulliiw ': " >iiuv eveiv put •<! lln* In. mil', niul 111 iv 'Il’ii nl 1 to /othae, iniv 11 K—I1.1I uni loll lihi-wi-e, every lime ji i ordiii. 1*1 vvlneli I lie vt or lit is linn eil, am) iim I hill*; 1 oiil.iimtl in I lie w holes ol I In iiiiioisi-, leuni pmv rh ill 1 ending Irnm I lie situ, some of w lm li .ire emu pi 11 .lied volli I lie sc limits ll.iinv I' 1 tmt olln rs ti nisi eil I 1 0111- luivlure, tin ■ v 1nl10l11.il iniiile nl signth*. ilmll indicates 11 ,1 —, l*y ;i"eillilg lli.it I tie Mill u ilit ei'il.eil according In I lie signs ol lln /« ili.u , ami lh.it i v 1 \ hour hi changis Ins I inn. \l I lie same lime how - ml, it imlu.ills Ills 111111111 1 .■ 1 1 le, 'l.ilile, lm ir-tailnig, ami al mu e-eidh i led lorni.miu.ilioii ol yniil In the vvliule Wnfhl. tint suite the n i ipieiils ol I In lluput lllih* "ill “I tile < ini Bit- V arinusly aliei leil towards li, .uni teeeivi- niiillilorni power. Ironi tin miii, .11 cording In llieir pti uliar liiiilinli-, — In in 1 the svinholu.il 1 loeli me e. iiiees through I he mull In le ol the "ills that I lie ( mil i> one, a ml e vlidnls Ills one powtr, tlimii.'li iniiltlloiiti pour 1 s. limit' .il.n il -j\>, that lie is nlie and I lie same, hut that llit \ui"l- 1 nilts nl his lorin, and his 1 niili"iiralli>ii', must lie ;n! iiiit li-il lo 1 vet 111 I he recipients. * hi this account, it asserts, ihat In is di-ingcd evirv hour, according to tin sign of the /odiat , 111 eoii'Oipitiuc ot these being variously changed about the (joil, acturtliug lo the many modes lay which they receive him.

f.<>k M.; tim i.i:s cu i* la ic> j-21

<1< rlv motions ol tin- Niililiiiuiry region. \ i/. the motions there tii.tl at* upward ami downward, la I Hid and In-Inn*. I’nr a*- Plain says in tin* Laws, those mu against divinity. nlm dan* In aMTilM- w audi riii^ r in tin celestial (iods, in consc ipnnee of nnt know mg tin ir order, tin ir harmonious dance, and tin* «|■ al>ilitv nf their ino- tinn. I'nr in* <|ti diililv is alone apparent in them, ihrouuh tin* lalinn and enutrarv circulation nt tin ir evolving circle *>. whether oil account nl i pic y< les, and eccen¬ trics, nr from other causes. I’nr all tin In pntheses liavo not tin* saiin* 1 probability, lint snnu* nt fin ‘in indeed, an* remote I'rnin tin* simplicity* nf divine natures, and other- an* as it wnv mechanical contrivances, devised by llm inndi*rns, tn ar- ount for tin umtinn nf tin* eeh »tial mbs. \nd it seems 11 Kit I *1 ito in tin* Republic,

\nd it seems 11 Kit I *1 ito in tin* Republic,

I»y making tin* whirls concentric, and in these tin* snrn circles, and mentioning "these alone, and imt epirvrh's. ascribes tn tin* stars themselves inequahilitv, and tins pns«.i-'»Miii* > arrangement and nrdt i I'm* this im <|ii:iliililv returns In its pristine stain, in nrdi-i lv pm inds nf linn’, in consequence of tin* planets In in:; nn*dia between t lilies that an* moved with a umtinn perfectly equable, and llmsr that are moved anomalously in every respeel. I'nr tln-v an* allotted a motion which is cquahlv anomalous, <»r aunmahfiislv eijiiahh*.

I inn* tin n Inn*, i- imfnldi d into li”lit. and makes its progn ssimi into the uni¬ verse, thrmigh all th* celestial orbs, and not only through the plain ts, hut likewise through the li\< d star*. (Main however, espreially mak< s nn ntmn of the plain Is, ill the gem ration nl time, heeaiiso tin v di/h r from the ii\i d stars in tin \ari< l\ nf tln ir period-. and Irom-uiilmtarY natures, m their motions lieing alwav > invaria¬ bly the same; thi* former nt w hieh, tin* distinetinn of maiiv temporal measures muni tests, and In latter, the perpetual prc« rv at inn of the same periods, and a pi - catastases. | nr it i- necessary to survey the same tilings, the mnltilude of mea¬ sures always r« maiuiug. I In se therefore, have all orderly arrangement, alter tin* one measure n| the \\ hole period. \nd the one monad indeed itself of linn*, is t jierteel and culm mini her. But from this, and in each circulation, there is an apprnpri ite nn as me, Saturnian, or .loi ian. or Lunar, iei < i\in g its peculiarity from the soul, and motive deity, which is m eac h ol the spheres. For one iitimher pertains to th** sun, aiiniher to a horse, and another to a plant. But tin mundane mmiher is common to all ot tln*m. On this account also we say, that th- re is the same lime every where, i or the world has one life, in tin* same manner as it has oar nature*, and one intellect. If however it has one Tan;, it will also have "in* 3c„>. But it this he tin* case, it will likewise Iiave one temporal measure. And «as each ol the parts m it lives according to total nature, so likewise, il is

* F*»r utrai, read cut®.

222

PROCIA S ON T!IR

[book IV.

If however it has one Tan;, it will also have "in* 3c„>. But it this he tin* case, it will likewise Iiave one temporal measure. And «as each ol the parts m it lives according to total nature, so likewise, il is

* F*»r utrai, read cut®.

222

PROCIA S ON T!IR

[book IV.

measured according to total time. And this is the common measure of all tilings, lint after this monad tin ro is a triad, tin -.unnuut of wliirli is tin* measure of tin* first circulation ; l»ut tint middle, of all tin* circle ol tin- di/li rent. I'or of all the planets, as of one animal, there is one lile, ( ie<> *•>) one period, and one upucatasta- tir time. And the thnd, or the i.rircmiti/, i> the measure ol the eircul slum whieh takes place in generation. For on ,u count ol (Ins, the mutations of the • h iiimi's the tralisumtalious ol moti-able natures, and regeneration, are again allotted an 1 1 vposlasis. AI lei this triad how e\ er, tune proceeds, acco id mg to other and other iiumln-r.s, measuring wholes, and distinguishing all things hy appropriate measures. 1 fiese things tin rcl'ore, we shall ag tin i on it I* r.

It ought not limn act to he unnoticed, th.it Plain ha\iug giteii subsistence to wlioh s, and not \< t nicntiom d partial annuals, < oiislituti s the planets, hut after¬ wards the fixed .stars, lit the generation ol partial animats. For w hat are called the planets, are it>siiitni'uiur.x, or gnti rum's n| the world, and are allotted a total powi r. \nd as the iuerralii sp| l( o has a nuinhi i ot si irry animals, so likewise each of tin planets is tin leaih i ol a multitude ot .mmials, oi ot ceitaili other things of this kind Hence also limn thi> the doubt may he sotted, how tin one sphere |of the fixed slats) coinpi' bends a multitude ol stars; hut with respect to the many spheres ot the pi on ts, i nh convoltcs one star. For •• must he said that tin re i. c. in tin I’m d stars] the spin n is a monad, hi mg one, comprehending m ilsi It an appropuate multitude, and is siillieieut to the eompiela tisiou of the multitude, this la mg tin fust multitude, lhit m tin planets, that whu ll is the leader is twofold, the oin* being the sphel’i , (in w liicll the plain I is carried] lint the other,* u h < »l tin 1 cosmucralors, being a monad co-arrangetl with mult it in It-. Fur subordinate n iturt s ret pure a greater number of leaders, ami the multitude in each is imisible, on account ot the subordination. And in the sublunary region, there is a still greater number of orders, which are the leaders ot the genera in each ot the eleiut ills, as we may learn from the 1 heo- guny which has been transmitted to us. Ia t these things therefore, he admitted as « \ ith lit.

And in the sublunary region, there is a still greater number of orders, which are the leaders ot the genera in each ot the eleiut ills, as we may learn from the 1 heo- guny which has been transmitted to us. Ia t these things therefore, he admitted as « \ ith lit.

lint thus much deseno. to be considered in what is said about the gem ration of tune, that if turn is posterior to soul, how is soul uuui d according to time * anil if it is prior to soul, how is it said to he generated 1 For I 'Into has said that soul is the best of generated natures. Hut if time is co-ordinate w ith soul, how is if tli.it l it inil\ IS lint co-ordinate with, hut prior fn, intellect ? Ami it must be said

* Tin* sphere it a leader, a eo-arranged monad, and a ukulcutn; but ratb of the cosuiucrator» is a leader, and a luou.id, but is not a wiioli iiess.

KOOK IV .1

TIM i:us OF PLATO.

223

ia answer to this, that lime is indeed prior to soul, as eternity is prior to intellect; but that soul i> tin* host of generated n itures, which arc essentially generated, and not onlv according to their being present with secomlary natures, lint also have a generation according to their inward energy, and an essence divisible into a multitude of parts, such as Plato himself has delivered tons. lint time being, as we have demonstrated, essentially an eternal intellect, is participated in a •reiterated manner, not at once wholly, nor imnmvenhly, like the intellects prior to it, but moveable. Whence also as intellect, it perfects the soul, and is gene¬ rated according to participations; flowing abundantly into its participants, and making generations to 1m* as things numbered. Thus therefore, in consequence of entirely running together with the nuinlwrs of generations, 1 it may be shown to lx* generated. Hence too, proceeding according to numlM-r, it is said to l>e moveable; but not to be number, as the time is, which is prior to things numbered. For these reasons therefore, Plato here calls time eternal, because it is eternal according to its inward energy, the whole of which it possesses at once present. Hut m the Laws he says, that the soul i> indeed indestructible, yet not eternal because it is not allotted an immutable inward energy.

“ Hut the divinity having made the bodies of these stars, placed them, being seven in number, in the seven circulations, formed by the periodic motion of the circle of the different."

“ Hut the divinity having made the bodies of these stars, placed them, being seven in number, in the seven circulations, formed by the periodic motion of the circle of the different."

That Plato <h nominates the sun and moon, and the other I've stars, as ani¬ mals endued with soul and intellect, is manifest from his adding in what is now said, that the divinity made the bodies of each of them, in consequence of the stars themselves being intellectual and vital. For he does not sav, that he made the bo- dies themselves, * but the bodies of them. It must be said therefore, that the cir¬ culations of them are epicycles, or evolving circles, or the whole spheres, in which each of the stars is placed. Or it must lie said, that they an* no one of these, but as the divine Iainblichus apprehends, the circulations signify the intel¬ lectual souls of the planets. For as before, the divinity fashioned the w hole bulk of the world w ithin the soul, so now likewise, he places the seven bodies in the seven intellectual souls, at the same tune causing souls and intellects to preside over these bodies. 5>iuce however, much prior to this, Plato represented the

1 Instead of rot/ (kniait trvt rtSpn/tmrn tnvrui apiOfiOy m I hi3 }>UtC, it »]>J to H*C to be OCCCtHTJ lO read, rc<» (nn wr ovttKcpafiorTa -n» rmit a, lO/uctf.

* For amjtf here, it is accessary to read aira.

PROCI.US ON Til!.

n o o k ! '

221

jx-riod of tin* circle of the different in tin* whole soul, us presidio- over those seven tin i„,. bodies, lie very prop.-rly adds, < ivmmdm- us of what had l*-«*n helore sui<l, “/// the seven circulations formed btf th, jari.dic motmn iff tin circlt of tin dtf- 'final in the Me seal." Ami a-ain lu- m o.if.-sls tin., I.y sp.-ahm- m tin- ^in-'tthir lor this nr, I.* is mnln ul< il, tlum-li it is -aid to liav.* In-rii cut. Ami it dors not lose its unity »»> tin- division of it into '. \«-:i envies.

|»,. r i, ;i p, bow ever, it will In- heller to s,>, ll.:.t tin 1 Vmmr-us , -laMished the

hodi. s oi tin-roMiiormtors, in tin-poui rs ol tin- win.:.-soul, but not yet m their

pro|H-r Minis nor in tln ir spln-r.-s. For tin- 'voids, form. <1 by tin* p. no.lu- mo¬ tion of tin- circle of tin* diHerent,'' niniiif.-si tliut tins «U'> n<»t l>\ its motion

s oi tin-roMiiormtors, in tin-poui rs ol tin- win.:.-soul, but not yet m their

pro|H-r Minis nor in tln ir spln-r.-s. For tin- 'voids, form. <1 by tin* p. no.lu- mo¬ tion of tin- circle of tin* diHerent,'' niniiif.-si tliut tins «U'> n<»t l>\ its motion

cireimiv.ihe tins,- bodies. lot tins cirri. Inin- om-, and diiul.-ilmlos.-ven parts, pio< o ils round tin- li\« > ot tln-s. divine bodies. I’m t.irtln-r on lM.ito '.in, tliut tin fixed stars an- placed in tin- wisdom of intellect, which is tin- soul of tin- ,-in-l.- of thcsanie. For that is most powerful and excellent to winch the D« 1111 - lll4ll s iinparl. il power. Hut tin- wisdom of this U an intellectual life. d'lms therefor. In- now p!ans tin- sev. n hod., s u. the seven circles of the "Imle soul. \nd a-uin, it "ill thnni-J. lh.-s.- tliin-s b. - vid.nl, how tin- sm.pli.-it> ot th. sou! is preserved, a> with n fi-r. in. to tin- .-orp-u.-al pmods. I or tin .me.nvleot the Slime animates accoidm- to oiu- union, hotli tin- in. rrali.- sphere, and th. sta-s .1 contains. And in a similar manner . a. h ot tin- s,-v. u plan, ts, art nrdm- to .un¬ common pow.-r, animates both tin- spin i. s,' and the stars they contain. >"W tin rt fon , 1‘lat.. speaks ot tin- soul whi. li is common to lli.-ui; hut shortly alter h.* also .1. livers the soul p« ruliar to ea« h, win n he >avs, ■ that hem- hound with animat. .1 bonds th.-> h. came animals." For then they are no lon-. r animated as parts, hut as animals, throu-h tln ir proper souls.

“ And tin moon indeed, lie; placed in the First cite illation about the earth; lint the sun, in the second above the earth ; and the star caller! I noth r/ and that which is sacred to Mercury, in circulations proceeding with a swiftness equal to that of the* sun, to which at the same time they are allotted a contrary power. Hence the Sun, Iateih r, and Mercury, mutmdlv comprehend, and are comprehended by each other.

Not only from what is In n said, it is , ml. nt what order Spin-lies t;iv«- to th.

I In liic iiliuiiul kuru h'tttfin /mif tm r«.‘ mI.m Ii i-* " 'h * 4 *

rrroiicoio. t ri.nl lin n (••ii-, inslia.l of t!n», <■; earn /..<** *■*" ‘■“•'C* -"X 1 T< “ n 'i‘ a, t i

* i. c. \ «nu».

BOOK IV,]

TIM/HUS OI' PLATO,

22.>

planets according to Plato, hut a I so from what is written in the Repuhlic. For he arranges the Moon after the Sun;* since there is a certain most abundant communion of these divinities in the visible production of things. For the one has the order of father, hut the other of mother. Jlnth the intelligible and intel¬ lectual causes of them likewise are united to each other, ami are unfolded into light from one cause. For the same Goddess produced -— the nudity Sun, and splendid Moon

For the one has the order of father, hut the other of mother. Jlnth the intelligible and intel¬ lectual causes of them likewise are united to each other, ami are unfolded into light from one cause. For the same Goddess produced -— the nudity Sun, and splendid Moon

fas Orpheus says]. Pi rhaps likewise the [Chalda an] Oracles teach us this, since they every where arrange the Moon after the Sun, and the air after the Moon, both when they deliver the order of them from above, and when from lieneath. For they say, "Tin* a-therial course, the immense impulse of the Moon, ami the aerial streams." And again, “ O a-ther, Sun, spirit of the Moon, and ye leaders of the air." And elsewhere, “ Of the solar circles, 1 the lunar ratllings, and the aerial bosoms." And afterwards, “ The portion of'.ether, of the Sun, of the rivers of the Moon, and of the air In another place likewise they say, “The broad air, the lunar course, and the jieipetual pole of the Sun " Perhaps therefore, as I have said, it is possible to be |>ersuadeil from the Oracles, that the Sun is immedi¬ ately prior to the Moon, as the Moon is prior to the air, all heaven having the order of fire; which also was the opinion of Plato,* who after the celestial arranges the a’therial idea, in what he shortly after says about the four ideas [in animal itself]. Unless therefore, it is not necessary that the Sun should lie imme¬ diately above the Moon, on account of the analogy to a-ther: for neither is anther immediately above the Sun. So that again, this analogy will not suffer the Sun to he arranged immediately above the Moon. ^Nevertheless ancient rumor gives this cmh r to the Sun. For Aristotle was of this opinion, and likewise Fudoxus and Ins followers. If however, some adopting the hypotheses of mathe¬ maticians, should think tit to arrange the Sun in the middle of the seven planets, who collects and binds the triads on each side of him, it must be observed* that there is not any stability in w hat they say from the mathematics. For to say, that Venus and Mercury would l>e obscured, if they were after the Sun, in the same manner as the Moon is sometimes by the Sun, is confuted by showing that when they are in conjunction with the Sun according to longitude, they entirely

1 In.trail of tov yap ijXiof rarrti per* atXrjvrjv in this place, it is obviously necessary to read, ti)v ynp or\rjvrjr rarrtt ptra rj\toy.

1 For ijXicuou re here, it is ncrev&ary to read rjXtarw rc ihXm*.

* Instead of o rm FlXarwe two in this place, read o rat IlAarwvi torn.

* For nrocar here, it is requisite to read nrrwear.

Tim. Plat. Vo l. II. 2 F

226

PROCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

1 For ijXicuou re here, it is ncrev&ary to read rjXtarw rc ihXm*.

* Instead of o rm FlXarwe two in this place, read o rat IlAarwvi torn.

* For nrocar here, it is requisite to read nrrwear.

Tim. Plat. Vo l. II. 2 F

226

PROCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

differ according to latitude. And this is the cause of their not being obscured. As it does not, however, necessarily follow that the Sun has a middle position among tlie planets, mathematicians cannot procure that credibility through demonstrations that it has, which they are accustomed to obtain about most things.

Ptolemy therefore says, in his Synto.iis,' that it is tit in conformity to good and probable reasoning, to place the Sun in the middle of the seven planets, in order that of the five planets prior to him, there may In* those that are perfectly sepa¬ rated from him ; and alter him, those that are m conjunction w ilh him, and precede, or att-nd him like satellites, lint in his 11y potlieses, 1 he does not very much contend for the truth ot this, nor infer it from the int. r\als of the planets, neither in that work, nor in his Si/ntmis. Much alt* ntion theretorc, is not to be paid to mathematicians, when tin s reason tnun probability. Put the tln uigist tlcaily t>a\s, * l that the Deiuiurgus sus|»en»leil six zones, and for the seventh hurled into the middle the fire of the Sun f and it is not lawful to disbelieve in what he bays. Plato however, looking to the abundant communion, and coiinascent profession of the Sun and .Moon from tin: same cause, and also their ingress into" the world, delivers them to us as conjoined. IS'or was he the author of this hypothesis of the Moon subsisting immediately after the Nun, but Anax¬ agoras, .is Kiuleiuus relates, was the first th.it vvasot this opinion.

Again, tins also is a subject ol inquiry, on what account the Sun, Venus and Mercury, revolve w'ilh equal celerity. Ami some indeed, say from tin* mathe¬ matics, that the epicycles of these three -l trs are conjoined, and that then- centres are in one right line. As therefore, there is one apocatastasis of the motion of one right line, thus also the epicycles oi these planets make the same apocatastasis; and of the epicycles themselves, the extremes are less, but the middle epicycle is greater; so that both the equable and anomalous motions of them, are in the same ratio. But the interpreters of Plato, Por¬ phyry and Thedorus, who investigate tin-cause of this, refer the principle of the equality and inequality of the course of these planets to their lives. 1 ur accord¬ ing to them, the inequality or < quality of their swiftness, is either from their intel¬ lects tending directly through many media to essence, and ending in the same

* The whole title ol this work is, MeyuXr, r-)» Aorpoio/uru, or Til K hRl AT CONSTRU CTION

of Astronomy ft> the \r.iluans, it was tailed I he /Umagtit

* i. e. Iu his wuik ell titled YWtrvu fwf I lVu.w^o^i, or The Hypothesis of the I’lanlts.

e. Iu his wuik ell titled YWtrvu fwf I lVu.w^o^i, or The Hypothesis of the I’lanlts.

This work illustrated by Jo. Hainbridgr, with a Latm version, and mathematical figures. Loud.

1 G .’ 0 . Uo.

1 i. r The C baldtan Julian.

BOOK I \ .]

TIMiEIJS OF PLATO.

227

tiling, though through different media ; or from tlie tendency of tliem to another and another thing. For the sun Irving essence, proceeds to intellect through life; Venus, being intellect, proceeds through life to an intellect [different froniitself]; and .Mercury being life, proceeds also to intellect; though the intellect in which the three terminate, is in the first essential, hut in the second intellectual, and in the third Utah Hence also they are moved with equal celerity, and though they appear to leave, and precede each other, yet they end in the same thing. .Saturn, however, Jupiter, and Mars, may he considered as differing indignity, and on this account, not of equal celerity ; though their not moving with the same celerity may also arise from not revolving through equal media. Thus for instance, if Saturn being essence, should immediately proceed to essence, but Jupiter should proceed to it through intellect alone, and Mars through both intellect and life; the first indeed will proceed without a medium to essence, hut the second through one equality, and the third through two. And thus, they will not move with equal celerity. For of the planets, the first triad is elevated to essence; but the second, to intellect; and the Moon, to life, which comprehends in itself all gene¬ ration, and proceeds as far as to the last recesses of the earth. These thing# therefore, arc said by Porphyry and Theodoras, in conformity to their ow n hypo¬ theses; asserting that all these are every where, vi/.. essence, life, and intellect, and that each of the Gods partic ipale of these three, but that a different peculia¬ rity predominates in difii rent, divinities, and also that the energy is different of different Gods, and that the elevation is through different media. 1

essence, life, and intellect, and that each of the Gods partic ipale of these three, but that a different peculia¬ rity predominates in difii rent, divinities, and also that the energy is different of different Gods, and that the elevation is through different media. 1

1 he divine Jamhlichus however, neither admits the introduction of epicycles, as Ireing mechanical, and for* ign from tin* meaning of Plato ; nor the conception arising front life [essence and intellect] as vainly employing such like disjunctions, ingressions, egressions, and complications, as in a dream, and in no resjtect conformable to Plato. For where doe s Plato assert, that the elevation to essence is through life, intellect, and essence * M here also, does he arrange Saturn according to essence, but Jupiter according to intellect, and Mars according to life? Rejecting therefore' tlio-.e assertions, lie delivers a more simple theory, and says that the Moon first is arranged in the place 1 about the earth, as having the relation of nature and a mother to generation. For all things are convolved by licr, are co-increased when she increases, and are diminished when she is dimi¬ nished. But that the Sun is [the next] above the Moon, Irecause it evidently fills the Moon with powers,and has the relation of a father to generation. But above

* Instead of it uWmv (ntnjv here, read ft f..U*i |Kwr.

* Instead of cm ror yn r ko yor here, it u necessary to read cm roe wtpt yv y rower.

22n

IMtOCLUS ON THE

[book iv.

the Sun nre Venus and Mercury, these planets lieing solar, and fabricating in conjunction with the Sun, and also contributing together with him to the infec¬ tion of w holes. Hence their course is equally swi,t t!,at of tl,e S ‘ ,n * 311,1 revolve about him, as communicating with him in the production of things. They are however, contrary to him ; not only according to the lation in their epicy cles, as we have 1 m- fore observed, and a> mathematicians say ; nor so far as the one is the cause of the evolution into light of things concealed, but the other is the cause of concealment, as astrologers strenuously assert, For they are so on these accounts, and abo on account ol the divine power its* If,’ who h we have before mentioned. Tor there is a certain admirable and transeendant power of the Sun; and on this account it is of itself incommensurate. But the powers of \ entis and Mercury impart by illumination symmetry, and good temperament, and in consequence of always revolving in conjunction with the "miii render the s..lar motion harmoni¬ ous, l-'or both are the causes of communion ; Mercury !m mg < oiiimoii m diurnal and nocturnal productions, and possessing both a masculine and feminine power; and \ finis possessing a binding power, and which co-adapts things that are s. pa- r.ited from each other.

pa- r.ited from each other.

You in ly also s.*\, that Im cause the Sun neither uses ablations, nor additions of motions, nor becomes stationary, but Mercury and Venus, employ advancing and receding motions, and are at times stationary, they are allotted according to npjiearanco, powers contrary to the Sun, and not so tar as tin v proceed analo¬ gous to the first three mon ids, which are in the vestibules of the good, as we have U-fore observed. For the Sun, as w* learn in the Republic, gives subsistence to light, will! li is the image of truth But \ mils is the cause of beauty to general* *1 natures, which is the imitation of intelligible beauty. And Mercury is tin. cause of symmetry to all things, subsisting as reason to things in generation, lor all symmetry proceeds according to one ratio, and according to number, of which this < iod is the giver. Those monads then-fore, subsisting analogously to, and in conjunction with cadi other, these planets very properly desire to he with each other, and revolve together. On this account also, they comprehend and are comprehended, through producing and co-operating with each other in demiurgic works. But if at one time they are moved swifter, ami at another slower, and when one* is moved swifter the others are not, nor when on* is moved slower, the r*>t are also slower in tln ir motions; it this 1 m- the case, those that are moved swifter, are very properly said to comprehend those that are moved slower, and

J For qitoi here, read avnj>.

1 Instead of i>« §T€fjoi here, il i» rfcjuuilc to rend o €rcpo%.

HOOK IV.]

TIM.EUS OF l’LATO.

22U

1 Instead of i>« §T€fjoi here, il i» rfcjuuilc to rend o €rcpo%.

HOOK IV.]

TIM.EUS OF l’LATO.

22U

vice versa, tlie latter are said to hr comprehended hy the former. And there is one period indeed, of all things ; Imt the parts <>j tin* periods differing in sw iltness and slowness, cause some of these at one time and some at another, to comprehend and l>e coinpri bended hy each other, according to different parts of their periods. Hence, through these things, and trom what has liecn before said, we mav collect, that according to I’lato, the motion of the inerratir sphere is one and equable, 1 hut that tiie motions of the seven planets are in themselves equable, hut with reference to each other anomalous ; except that three of them are equally swift in their course. For before he produced the seven planets, he said that their cir¬ cles were equally swift. But that the motion of each of them is equable, Socrates in the Republic manifests, when he says, that a Syren presides over the eight circles, uttering one voice in one tone ; so that an equable motion is common to them. The seven stars however are moved about their own centres, and also through the depth of their spheres. And both the other four planets, and the three, comprehend, and are comprehended hy each other, on account of the inequality of their jwculiar motions. For if as spheres they were cquablv moved, they would never at any time stiller tin*-, hut they would alwavs he similarly separated Iroin each other. 1 lus therefore, I’lato also says, that thev proceed through tin* heavens, having mutations m tinir motions.

Hence, above this triad, which is thus harmonious, in consequence of \ rims uniting, and leading to communion the .Mercurial production, which is of a remitted nature, and the solar fabrication w hieh possesses intensity of povvi r. there is another triad, consisting of Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars. \nd Saturn and Mars indeed, are the extremes, and are contrary to each otln r, si far as the one is the cause of connexion, hut tin* other of division; and the one of cold, hut the other of Ik at. But Jupiter is arranged in the middle, and leads the demiurgic productions of Saturn and Mars into an excellent temperament. If however, \ou wish to survey the* middle arrangement of the Sun, after another manner, conceive two pentads on each side of him, la*ncath the Moon, and the tetractys of the* elements ; m order that you may understand the etherial nature to have something different from what is properly called air, or that you may also comprehend with it the nature of sublunary lire, which co-admiuisters the natures of all the elements, moves all tilings, and excites their productions. For whatever is destitute of lire is dead, refrigeration Wing contrary to life. But above the Sun are the governors of the

For whatever is destitute of lire is dead, refrigeration Wing contrary to life. But above the Sun are the governors of the

* Ik the original hrre, there is nothing more linn gumyayvfitv o-i tara 11 larwrn i) fiia *a i n^iaXiy, but the sense requires lint we should read, conformably lu ibe above translation, ovrayayufitr *r« mam I IXarwra, *j rtf • avXarcti mirtfou, fita *a< o/iaAi).

230

PROC1.US ON THE

[■OOK IV.

whole ofgenemtion, li:i> in^ all of them in common, what neither the Sun, nor the Moon have, \iz. advancing and receding motions; through which the nature of sublunary substance is all-variously changed, by additions and ablations, accessions and remissions of jiroduetive powers, of hie, and ot the whole ot their essence. Hut the Sun is entirely extended from the middle. Anil of the Gods indeed prior to him, he perfects the production*; but excites, resuscitates, and variously changes the powers that are posterior to him. lit net the t biologist calls him the guardian of the universe, and leaves about him, demiurgic, undefiled, elevating , perfective, and many other eat hart ie and separating txneeraccording to which, revolving perpetually, he adorns the universe.

“ lint with respect to the other stars, it anyone should think fit to investigate the causes, through which the Demiurgus established all ot them, the labour would be greater than that of the discourse itself, for the sake of which they were introduced. These things therefore, may perhaps hereafter be discussed by us at our leisure, in such a way as they deserve.”

Uy the Other stars it is evident that Plato means Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. Cut the word established, exhibits to us their jierpelual and incorruptible fabrica¬ tion. If however, as we find in some copies, you read they established,' this read¬ ing will a fibril von an indication, that the universe was generated and adorned by the Dennurgus, and by other causes. Tor a little lx fore, Plato said that the diwmty distributed in an orderly manner the seven bodies, ami the period of the circle of the different ; and in addition to this the peculiar souls of the stars, which he denominated circulations. Cut these are said [according to this read¬ ing] to have Iw en established by all the causes, in conjunction with which the Dennurgus fabricated them severally, making the whole world a statue, and establishing in it the statues of the partial («ods. It is here however necessary to call to mind, what we are accustomed to say concerning the order ot all mun¬ dane natures; viz. that the inerratic sphere is the cause to all things of ail invariable sameness of subsistence; but that of the triad under it, Saturn, Jupiter, and Mars, the first is the cause of connexion, the second of symmetry, and the third of separation. Anti again, the Moon indeed is a monad, the cause of ail generation and corruption ; hut the elements in generation, form a triad under

1 lu tbe original ro.

HOOK IV .]

Anti again, the Moon indeed is a monad, the cause of ail generation and corruption ; hut the elements in generation, form a triad under

1 lu tbe original ro.

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this monad. The media between this triad of planets and tin* Moon, are the planets that revolve with evpial celerity. And tin* Sun indeed unfolds truth into light, as we have frequently said. But Venus unfolds hcautv ; and Mercurv, the symmetry of reasons, according to the analogy ' of the monads in the vestibules of the good. If you are w illing also, y on may say, that of the beneficent planets, the Moon is the cause to mortals of nature, lieing herself tin? visible statue of fontal nature. But the Sun is the Demiurgus of every tiling sensible, in consequence of being the cause of sight and visibility. Mercury is the cause of the motions of the phantasy : for of the phantastic essence itself, so far as sense and phantasy are one, the Sun is the producing cause. But \ enus is the cause of epithy metic appetites; and Mars of the irascible motions which an* according to nature. Of all vital powers however, Jupiter is the common cause; but of all gnostic powers Saturn. Tor all the irrational forms are divided into these. The causes therefore of these, are antecedently comprehended in celestial natures.

Of all vital powers however, Jupiter is the common cause; but of all gnostic powers Saturn. Tor all the irrational forms are divided into these. The causes therefore of these, are antecedently comprehended in celestial natures.

Some one however, may reasonably doubt from what has been said, where Plato constitutes the soul of the inerratic sphere, In ing afraid lest he should make the soul of the world t>* be the same with the soul of tint sphere; as Aristotle did afterwards. For we have tlx peculiar souls of the stars, through the lielbre inf illumed circulations, and a little farther on, Plato speaks concerning them. For lie says, th.it hi mg hound with animated bonds, they became animals. May we not say tber« lore, that as be plaees in the whole soul ot the universe, twofold circles, and twofold circulations, lie gives subsistence together with them to two¬ fold souls, that fit the inerratic sphere, and that of the whole planetary sphere, as one circulation? And again, assuming in the virile of the tiijf'crcnt, seven circles, he had fog« tlier with them mm ii souls, carried as in vehicles in the seven spheres. For tip* animation just now delivered was not of tin* spin res themselves. Hence in what he said ol the iiierr.itir sphere, he made mention of the animation of the stars, omitting the animation of the w hole spheres, as being comprehended in the circles ot the whole soul. For on account ol the form of diM us-umi usual with the ancients, he omits the subtile elaboration ot various animation. For universal animation is one thing; tb.it which is posh rior to this, and is universal partial animation, is another; partial universal animation is another; and the last of all, is partial animation. According to all the forms of animation like¬ wise, the whole world and the parts of it are animated. May it not be said also, that Timaus having on the preceding day heard Socrates suhtiiy discussing these animations, conceived that the peculiar elaboration of them would Lie supeilluous.

1 There in an oiuusion in ihc original here of tar’ uvaXayutr.

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PROCI.US ON THE

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Socrates therefore placet! souls which lie railed Syrens, over the eight whirls [or spheres]. And again, he places one soul over the inerratic portion of the world; one, over the whole planetary region ; and one over the whole heaven ; unfolding the peculiar souls of all these, and animating the inerratic sphere in a twofold respect, both as one circle, having a division opposed to that of the seven circles, and as comprehending the multitude ot the fixed stars, and being itself a world universal and at the same time partial. And thus much in answer to tins doubt. But the reason why IMatu makes the discussion of the -tars to 1m- superfluous, is evident. 1 'or the thing proposed by bun was to show what secondary time is, ami how, ami whence it is consummately ellected.

And thus much in answer to tins doubt. But the reason why IMatu makes the discussion of the -tars to 1m- superfluous, is evident. 1 'or the thing proposed by bun was to show what secondary time is, ami how, ami whence it is consummately ellected.

“ When therefore, each ot the natures necessary’ to a joint fabrication of lime, had arrived at a local motion adapted to its condition, and they became animals through the connecting power ot vital bonds, they then learned their prescribed order.

AN liat the animation is of the bodies of the seven cosviocrators, and w hat the order, has been shown through what has been already said. But how each of them is an animal, and is suspended fioin a more divine soul, and what each contributes to the |»erfoctioii of the universe, Plato delivers in these words, to those who are able to perceive his meaning. For each

of them is allotted an appropriate life and motion, l or since the demiur¬ gic sacred law distributes to each of the mortal natures that which is adapt¬ ed to it, what will 5011 say concerning the leaders and rulers of the universe? ]\I us t it not he this, that they p-c« ive from the father that which is adapted to them ami is their good, and that being resplendent with beairty they not only co-operate with the father in the generation of time, hut also lead and govern the whole world ? And how is it possible that thus shaking concerning them, we should not speak rightly ? I 11 addition to these things also, they not only receive from the demiurgic moir.ul the beautiful and the good, hut being self motive, impart these to themselves, and begin from themselves the donation of good ; which Plato indicating, says “ that each of than arrived at a local motion adapted to its condition ,” as defining to itself the measure of the life and order and motion which it is allotted in the universe. Since however, each of them, I mean ear h of the seven bodies, lias a twofold life, the one inseparable, hut the other separable; anti the one intclh dual and established in itself in a leading and ruling manner, but the other distributed about body, which it connectedly contains, and moves ; and since according to the latter, each is an animal, but according to the former

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233

a find;—this being the ease, Plato sepurating both these, ami considering the di¬ vine and intellectual soul, and which do«*s not depart from intelligible*, as nm> tiling, iuit tin 1 animal which is suspended from this, has its life from, and is the intake of it, as another, lie says “ that being bound xrith vital bonds, they became unimals , and baron/ their prescribed order." l or a divine soul learns the demiur¬ gic will, and understands the works of the father. 1 It also co-operates with hint in the production of mundane natures, hy intellectually perceiving him, and being tilled hv him with divine powers, lor it i" not possible for either intellect or soul, to provide for wholes in an e>« nipt manner, in any other way than by the participation of deitv, and through a div inc|y-in>pired life.

Then co-operating therefore, in the production of time, manifests that they are allotted a secondary powi r, in the fabrication of it; the father of them possessing a primordial power. I or he indeed generates the wholeness of time; but they produce, together with him, the parts of which time consists. For the periods of these are the parts of the whole of time; just as they were generated the parts of the world. But the animal bound with vital bonds, is the animated bodv, which has life from the soul allotted to it, according to the demiurgic allotments. For if with us, the animal is different from the man, and the visible Socrates is one thing, but the true Socrates another, much more are the Sun and Jupiter [different from the visible orbs of them] which consist of body and soul. ll« nee Socrates in the Pir.edrus bluim s those, who assert that a div ine animal consists of body and soul. " For ignorantly, and without sufficiently understanding, says he, we feign a (Jod to be an immortal animal, hav ing a soul, and having a body, and these connas- ccnt with each other through the whole of time.” And if it be requisite to speak w hat appears to me to be the truth, the unity which is in each and which is the inef¬ fable participation of the fountain of whole unicul numlw rs, is primarily a find. But secondarHi/ intellect, which contains every thing stably, 1 uniformly, and inflexibly. And in the third place soul, being filled from intellect, and unfolding the one compre¬ hension of it. The first of these also, is truly a < iod ; tin* second is most div ine ; and the third, is likewise divine, but illuminates the animal w ith the peculiarity of deity. According to this also, the animal is divine, lining bound with vital bonds, which you may say arevivitic, demiurgic, and indissoluble bonds, as Ti- mams says farther on. Fur the divine bodies, are wholly bound in souls, and are comprehended by, and established in them. The binding likewise, indicates the stable and immutable comprehension of the bodies in the souls, and the undis-

1 For row rnrroi lure, it is nfifi'arv to read row mrpo.

Fur the divine bodies, are wholly bound in souls, and are comprehended by, and established in them. The binding likewise, indicates the stable and immutable comprehension of the bodies in the souls, and the undis-

1 For row rnrroi lure, it is nfifi'arv to read row mrpo.

* Instead of e£>tr r '7/ i(,b ' > in lius plat c, it is necessary to read mt.

* Tor cft&rvftHt here, it is requisite to read ^on^wi.

'Jtm. Plat. Vol. II. 2 d

234

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[book IV.

joined communion of thorn with souls; Divine bodies however, living such, co¬ operate with the Domiurgus in the production of time, call forth the one and invisible power of time, and afford to it a progression into the world, w hich unfolds into light many temporal measures, lienee through this the whole of tune de¬ rives its completion, imitating the time which consists in mwilnring, since it consists itself in being numbered, and in short becomes what it is from many numbers, in ordr r that it may be similar to that which is truly total time, and is comprehensive of all apocatastalie numbers. 'I he joint fabrication tin rcfore, indicates production proceeding to the end, and a p< rlect energy.

“That according to the oblique latiou of the circle of the different t which moves in subjection to the circle ot the mine, these orbs should by their revolution, partly form a greater, and partly a less circle; and that the orb which formed a less circle should revolve swifter, but that which produced a greater, more slow.”

You may kay that the ohliipu lation of the circle of the different, signifies a lation according to the obliquity of the zodiac. For the motion of the planets is according to the poles of the zodiac, that we tuny speak, mathematically. For Mich ail explanation is not to Ik* despised by those who discourse about the celes¬ tial bodies. Or, according to a more intimate jwreeption of the tiling, you may sa), that this obliquity manifests tin* cause of generation, and the mutation which pre-exists in the n lestial orbs. For generation indeed, participates of difference and varietv from the revolution of the circle of the different [i. e. from the circula¬ tion of the planets]; hut it participates of sameness, and a subsistence which is always the same, from the circle of the mine for tin* inerratic sphere], as Aristotle also says. For if tin* circle of the same alone existed, there would not he mutation and generation, hut all things would Ik* uniform, and being always generated, would remain invariably the same. And if" tin* circle of the different alum* existed, all tilings would he without stability, and would he in continual motion. In order then-fore, that there may he both permanency and motion, and that this vs hole may 1 m*, as it is said, an immutable mutation, and an immoveable motion, tin uni¬ verse has both these circulations. And the variety indeed of geiu ration, b< comes apparent through the circulation of the circle o f the diijerint; hut communion and immutability, through tin cm le of the same. I5ut of these again, tin* one is «fleeted through the < ir< le of sameness of the soul, and the other through the soul s ciri le of difli rence. \lid of tin se also, the one is through intellectual sameness, hut the other through demiurgic difference. And of these last, the one is through intelli-

BOOK IV.]

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giblc bound, but the other through intelligible infinity. After tins manner therefor**, tlie obliquity must Ik? understood.

And of these last, the one is through intelli-

BOOK IV.]

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giblc bound, but the other through intelligible infinity. After tins manner therefor**, tlie obliquity must Ik? understood.

And here you may see what the difli rence is, as delivered by Plato, between the psychical lation of tin- circle of dillerence, and the corporeal. For he calls the former straight, but the latter oblique, l or the former is und* tiled and index¬ ible, but the latter proximal* ly governs tin* variety of generated natures, and has a visible iiusjuability, and a certain position and habitude witii tesjiect to the uni¬ verse. But the revolution of the circle of the different being such, it proceeds' through the circle of the sui/ic , and is governed by it. For it is moved by invisible causes, and by the inerratic sphere itself. Or rather, it receives through it motive powers; and is governed by it, because it is convolved, according to the one, and inerratic motion of it. And this indeed, is said mathematically. But after another manner, you may say that the nature of the same and similar has dominion, in order that the world may be one; that all things may as much as possible be perpetual; ami that the world may imitate animal itself, in which all things have an eternal subsistence. For if the circle of the different had dominion over the circle of the same, there would I»c less of the immutable than of the mutable, in the universe, and the world would not receive all the perpetuity which it is capable of receiving. But in this case, it would lie less similar to animal itself. The lation therefore, of the circle of the different being governed by the lation of the circle of the same, proceeds* within it, circulates through its concavity, and revolves together with it.

“ And with respect to the seven bodies, some of them being slower, but otlicrs sw ifter; those that revolve in a less circle, revolve more swiftly ;* but Saturn revolving in a greater circle, moves more slowly."

Plato says this, looking to the apocatastases of the planets. Hence, he says, that they revolve swifter or slower, and not that they simply proceed swifter, hut revolve slower. For when, as circle is to circle, so is time to time, then the

* Tor ti<ri lien*, it is necessary to read x-poeiirt.

’ Here likewise. for tm, read tpoutn.

1 This portion of the text is omitted in all the printed editions of the Tirowus. The original is as follows: ciictrni ra oera <rwpara, ra fitr (ipabvrrpa o era, ra br (tarrv. ra ptr eXarrw wep<ioi ra cwXor, dnrwpov (Itff Oar-roe) erpinne c b* gpoyot ftnSm wtp iwr ftpabvTtpor. This portion of text, appears also to have been wanting id the Fledicean manuscript from which Fionus made his translation of Plato, for be has not translated it.

IMtOCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

‘2 id

This portion of text, appears also to have been wanting id the Fledicean manuscript from which Fionus made his translation of Plato, for be has not translated it.

IMtOCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

‘2 id

liodie* winch arc movetl are equally swift. For let one circle he double of another, and one time of another, then the "renter circle which is moved in the double line, w ill lie moved [over the same space] in half the time of the less, but the less will be moved in half the time, over the same space. Hence, they are equally swift. For things are equally swift, whit h arc mn\ed o\er the saint; space in the same time. Hut when one circle is to another, in a "renter ratio than one time to another, the motion of the "renter < irt It* is the swifter. For let this | H . so, anti let it he us circle is to < ill le, so is time to a certain time, which will then fore In* less than tin tune from the liisl. lor the same thin" will have a "rt alt r ratio to the less. The greater * ir* le tin n fore, m this less time, which is less than the time from the first, will pass over the same span* as the less circle. I'or it has l»ecii ih inoiistrati d, that it t in 1* is to circle, as time to tune, (lit motion of the less ts equally swill with that of the greater lilt le. Moreover, the motion of the h ss eirele Inmi the first was performed m u less time than the tinio from the first, ileiice the same interval, is passetl over by the one circle in a greatt r, hut hy the other in a less time. The motum therefore of the less circle, is slower than that of the "renter. Again, if the ratio of one circle to another, is less than that of onetime to another, the motion of the greater circle will Ik- slower than that of the 1 « >s. For if you make as circle is to circle, so is time to another time, you will make it tube ton greater time. Fur the panic thing has to the greater a less ratio. So that tin; greater circle will in a "reatt r tunc pass o\er 11 it* same space, than the less circle. It is therefore slower. Hence, these things thus subsisting, 1’lato does not now investigate what the con¬ dition is of the planets with respect to swiftness and slowness; for this requires a more ample consideration; but he adds, that there is a diflerciit apocatastasis of diflerciit plain ts, and of some slow* r, but of others more swill; the swiftness and slowness, being produced, either from the anomalous nature of the motions, or, which is more true, from the stars* Ining all of them moved with equal cele¬ rity, hut ore cueh having to another a greater ratio, than one time to another.

In short, thus much ought to be know n concerning the motion of the stars, that thev have not a rolling motion alone on their spheres. I or this motion is foreign to spherical bodies. Nor do tin v alone remain fixed. For bow would they be a „v longer of a circulating nature! Hut they circulate about tin ir centres, lini- tatui" the universe, according to the opinion of Plato; without being at all in want of the hypotheses employed by astronomers, as I bate In-lure observed. I'or if Plato thinks that the fixed stars are thus movt tl, through an imitation of the

1 i. e. Let what has been before demonstrated be admitted. 1 Fur arfpwv lure, read ocrr^iwi*

hook i* ]

TIM/HUS OF PLATO.

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universe, much more will lie "rant that those stars which are allotted the government of the universe, and a leading dignity, imitate the whole world. These therefore, are moved about their centres; hut the spheres in which they are contained, and which are as it were moving rulers, convolve them either swifter, or slower. Except that Pluto gives to them a more various motion, because they are media ls-tween things that jut treed in a right line, and tilings that by themselves are alone moved in a (irele, and moves each of them about its centre, anti through its proper sphere, so as to become elevated, and near the earth, and to revolve about the northern and southern parts; by which motions they are inferior to the fixed stars, though they are otherwise allotted a liberated dignity and power.

“ But from the lation of the circle of the same, the orbs which compre¬ hend, appear through the circulation of those that move more slowly, to he comprehended. For all the circles of them revolve with a spiral motion, because at one ami the same time they arc moved in two contrary directions; and in consequence of this, the sphere which has the slowest revolution, is nearest to that to which its course is retrograde, and which is the sw iftest of all the spheres."

Circulation, as wo have frequently observed, 1 m ing twofold, one from the cast to the west, hut the other from the west to the east, lie who understands hotii these circulations, w ill know what is the common, and what the peculiar motion of the stars, and which of them are moved swifter, and winch more slow. For he will look to their jMVuliar motions, and will know that those are swifter which are in comerjuentia ; and thus, he will not admit that Saturn is swifter than the Moon, hut he will see that the Moon is more eastern, and that Saturn is comprehended, but the Moon comprehends. But he who fancies, that there is onl\ one simple motion ot all the stars, which is from east to west, when he sees that Saturn and the Moon, are at one time together, hut that .it another time Saturn is more west¬ ern, as Ir.ning moved to a greater extent, w ill say that tin Moon is comprehended by Saturn, n/,. the swifter by the slower. The cause however of this e rror, arises from alone looking to the period of the circle of the same, which possesses much y power and strength, anil not considering the peculiar motions of the planets, nor perceiving that they do not make their transition in nntea dentm , but in coiiM t/ucnlia. l or asserting this also, the Athenian guest or stranger illumes the multitude and those who are ignorant of astronomy. “ For it is disgraceful,” says he, “ if we survey a stadium, and do not know which of the racers runs swifter, anil which

238

PROCLUS ON THE

[book I*.

l or asserting this also, the Athenian guest or stranger illumes the multitude and those who are ignorant of astronomy. “ For it is disgraceful,” says he, “ if we survey a stadium, and do not know which of the racers runs swifter, anil which

238

PROCLUS ON THE

[book I*.

Hlower; am! he must be considered as absurd, who fancies that the swifter is the slower course. But it is much more disgraceful for those who perceive truly Olympic races, not to know the swifter and slower period, through ignorance of astronomy." For the bodies that revolve with the greatest celerity, appear to l>e comprehended by tho^e that revolve more slowly, though they in reality will he wen to comprehend, by those who are able to look to their proper motion. But the latiou of the circle of the same, vanquishing the body which is nearest to it, causes it to appear most rapid in its motion. That however, is nearest to it, which is the b ast distant from it. I or let, if it should so happen, the Moon and Saturn be near tin* Cor la-onis, or heart of the Li m; then the Moon being moved with its jieeuliar motion, will depart from this fixed star; but Saturn for many nights will be su n about the same place. I he astronomer there fore, knows that the M oon departs from this star more rapidly, on account of the motion of the Cor Ltmis in consequentia. But he w ho is ignorant of astronomy, w ill fancy that the Moon and Saturn being moved with the universe towards the same parts, do not make theirapocatastases after the same manner; but that the one, as swifter, arrives at the west before the other ; but tliat the other as slower, arrives at a more western part. This then fore, would be the conclusion according to the opinion of the multitude. This may however, happen to be true, I mean that Saturn is the swifter; if, as we have before ohsi rved, the ratio of the circle of Saturn, to the circle of the Moon, is greater than tin* ratio of the apoeatastasis of one time to that of the other. For the body which is nearer to the sphere of the fixed stars, will be sw ifter, for the before mentioned reasons.

For the body which is nearer to the sphere of the fixed stars, will be sw ifter, for the before mentioned reasons.

But what i> the meaning of the assertion, that the planets “ revolve uith a spiral motion , bet au.se at one and the same time theif are moved m two contrary directions And how are we to admit of contrariety in a circular motion? For each of the planets being moved with two local motions, i* not the cause of the spiral motion ; but this arises from their being moved in the oblique circle [i. e. in the zodiac] towards the equinoctial. Thus, if some one supposes that the Sun is moved with the universe towards the equinoctial, the cause of this will not be a spiral motion, though there is an anti-circulation. IVor must it l>c simply admitted that the motion which is contrary to a circular motion, is another motion [i. e. is a motion of a different kind]. For many beautiful arguments have liecn urged against this opinion. May not therefore the words, moved at the same time m two contrary directions nu-an, that they are not only moved at one and the same time to the east and west, but also that they become both according to breadth, and according to depth, nearer to, or more remote from the earth, and more northern, or more southern ? For these two motions, make a spiral, in conjunction with the lation

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of the universe. The spiral likewise, is adapted to the planets, which are media between the fixed stars, and snhlmiary bodies; the former being moved according to a circle alone, and the latter, in right lines. Just again, as it is natural to the planets being media, to be moved both anomalously and equably, according to length, breadth, and depth ; in order that they may have the paradigms of the natures that are all-variouslv moved posterior to themselves, and may imitate through circulation the uniform subsistence of the natures prior to them. These things then fore, are manifest to every one.

These things then fore, are manifest to every one.

It is however, not at all wonderful, that contrariety should exist in the heavens* prior to the contrarieties in the revolution of the circle of the ihj/cnnt ; since in the genera of being there is said to be a contrariety of sameness and difference, motion and permanency, anil in the principles themselves of these, bound and infinity. For these are contraries, because in the terminations of them, there is a certain contest and dissontion, though they always possess the power of acting in con¬ junction with each other. It is by no means wonderful therefore, that there should also be in the heavens, a contrariety of these motions. For those contraries are not now assumed, which are hostile to, and corruptive of each other; for these are material and partible natures; but simply those, which are effective of con¬ traries, and those which are most distant from each other. For this also is a cer¬ tain mode of contrariety in nature; since, that the apparent motion of the hea¬ venly bodies is one thing, and their true motion another, indicates the pre-suli- sistence there of non-being, and its complication with being. T he figure of the spiral likewise, is no vain, fortuitous thing, but gives completion to the media between bodies that move in right lines, and those th.it are moved in a circle. For the circle alone, as vve have said, is in the inerratic sphere, but the right line in generation. And tbe spiral is in tlie planetary region, as having a co-mixture of the periphery and the right line. The motions also according to breadth and according to depth, are the proximate causes and paradigms of the motions in the sublunary region, viz. of the upward and downward, and the oblique motions. Perhaps likew ise, the theurgist [Julian] in celebrating time as of a spiral form, and as both y oung and old, directed his attention to this, conceiving that the temporal |*eriods, were esjieeially to lie known through the motion of the planets. And thus much concerning these particulars. Put Plato adds in the next place as follow s:

“ And that these circles might possess a certain conspicuous measure of slowness and swiftness with reference to each other, and that the

240

1MIOCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

motion of the eight circulations might be manifest, the divinity enkindled a light, which we now denominate the Sun in the second revolution from the earth, in order that the heaven [i. e. the world] might in the most eminent degree become universally apparent, and that such animals might participate of number as are adapted to its participation, receiving numerical information f rom the circulation of the same and the similar/’

e. the world] might in the most eminent degree become universally apparent, and that such animals might participate of number as are adapted to its participation, receiving numerical information f rom the circulation of the same and the similar/’

Plato lion* delivers the one rilling cause of the generation of visible time. For as the Deminrgus constituted invisible tune, so the Sun produces the time which is visible, and which measures the motion of bodies. For through light, it leads into visibility ever) temporal inlenal, hounds all periods, and exhibits tin* mea¬ sures of the restitutions of things to tin ir pristine state. Deservedly therefore is the Sun a conspicuous m< asure, a> especially unfolding the progression 1 of time according to number, into the universe. For it has a more accurate jieriod than that of the five plain ts, its motions being less anomalous than theirs ; and also than that of the Moon, In always t< miniating at the same point its progressions to the north and the south. Hut if it has a more accurate period, >t is deservedly a measure of measures, ami from itself hounds ’ the periodic measures of the other plain ts, and the swiftness of their motions with reference to each other. It also m a greater degree imitates the perpetual permanency of eternity, l>v always revolving after the same manner. In this way therefore, it differs from the planets.

After another manner likewise, the Sun is a more manifest measure than the measure of the inerratic sphere. I or though this sphere has a certain appropriate measure, a proper inti rval, and one immutable number of its peculiar motion, yet the solar light causes this measure and all the < volution of apparent time to be manifest ami known. lienee Plato says, “ In order that there might be a certain consj'icuous measure For though there is a certain measure in the other planets, vet it is not clear and manifest. Hut the sun unfolds into light both other intelli¬ gible* and time. Von must not however on this account say that the solar light was generated lor the sake of measurement. For how is it possible that wholes should subsist for the sake of parts; governing natures for the sake of the go- virned; ami per|ietual for the sake of corruptible natures ? Hut we should rather "ay that light possessing an evolving power unfolds total time, and calls forth its

* For wffwihir here, il is necessary to rr.nl wpontov.

* For ywpiUtiv here, it is necessary to read cpizti.

BOOK IV.]

TIM.’EL'S OF PLATO.

*211

Hut we should rather "ay that light possessing an evolving power unfolds total time, and calls forth its

* For wffwihir here, il is necessary to rr.nl wpontov.

* For ywpiUtiv here, it is necessary to read cpizti.

BOOK IV.]

TIM.’EL'S OF PLATO.

*211

supermundane monad, and one measure into the measurement of the periods of bodies. And thi> makes time to Ih\ as it were, sensible. Hence it is the light of the Sun which causes every thing that moved to have a clear and manifest measure. And this indeed is its whole good. After wholes, however, it likewise benefits parts in a secondary degree, For it imparts the generation of number ami measure to the natures w hich arc adapted to participate of these. For ir¬ rational beings indeed are destitute of these ; but the genera of daemons, who follow the periods of tie* Hods and men, become partakers of them. The supply of good tin re fore through the solar light, beginning supernally from wholes, descends as far as to parts. And if beginning from visible natures, you are willing to speak of such as are invisible, the light of the Sun gives splendor to the whole world, causes a corporeal-formed nature to be divine, and wholly filled through the whole of itself with life, lint it leads souls through undefded light, imparts to them a pure and elevating power, and governs the world by' its rays. And it likew ise fills souls w ith empyrean fruits. For the order of the Sun is supernally derived from supermundane natures. Hence Plato does not here fabricate the solar light, but says that the Deiniurgus enkindled it, as giving sub¬ sistence irom his own essence to this sphere, and emitting from the solar fountain a life extended into interval, and continually renewed. And this also is asserted by thcologisls concerning the supermundane firmaments.

And this also is asserted by thcologisls concerning the supermundane firmaments.

On this account, it apjvears to me that Plato delivers a twofold generation of the Sun; one indeed, in conjunction with the seven governors of the world, when he fasl.i oris the bodies of them, and insi fts them in their ciiculalious; but 1 the other according to the enkindling of light, through which he imparts to the Sun supermundane power. For it is one thing to generate the bulk of the Sun itself by itself, and another in conjunction with a ruling characteristic, through which the Sun is called the king of every visible nature, and is established analo¬ gous to the one fountain of good. For as this fountain, Iwiug better than the intelligible essence, illuminates both intellect and the intelligible, thus also the sun being better than a visible nature, illuminates both that which is visi¬ ble and sight. But if the Sun is beyond a visible essence, it will have a super¬ mundane nature. For the world is visible and tangible, and lias a body. Hence, we must survey the Sun in a twofold respect; viz. as one of the seven planets, and as the leader of wholes; and as mundane and supermundane, according to the latter of which he splendidly emits a divine light. For in the same manner ■as the good luminously emits truth which deities the intelligible and intellectual orders ; as Phanes in Orpheus sends forth intelligible light which fills with intel¬ ligence all the intellectual Hods; and as Jupiter enkindles an intellectual oml de- Tun. Plat. Vol. II. 2 II

242

PKOCLUS ON THE

[BOOK IV,

miurgic light in all the sup vrtnnndane Gods ; thus also the Sun illuminates every tliiii" visible through this undctiled light. The illuminating cause too is always in an order stqierior to the illuminated natures. Tor neither is the good intelligible, nor Thanes intellectual, nor Jupiter siqicrmmidane. In consequence of this rea¬ soning therefore, the Sun being supermundane emits the fountains of liuht. And accordin" to the most mvstic doctrines, the wholeness of the Sun is in the super¬ mundane orders; for in them there is a solar world, and a total li”lit, as the Chaldean oracles'assert, and which I am persuaded is true. And thus much concernin'; these things.

And accordin" to the most mvstic doctrines, the wholeness of the Sun is in the super¬ mundane orders; for in them there is a solar world, and a total li”lit, as the Chaldean oracles'assert, and which I am persuaded is true. And thus much concernin'; these things.

Jt is nspiisite however to return to the words of the text, and to explain them as follows : The words then, “ in order I hat there might hr a measure,' do not sig- nif\ a devised measure, but that which itself measures and defines corporeal motions, anil Generates visible time. The winds also, “ that the mutton of the eight Circulations might Ire manifest ,” refer to this measure, which passes through, and measures the measures pertaining to the paths of the eight circulations. Tor w e sav that the common apocalastasis ot the i ight rev olutions consists ot so many years. Hut we obtain a knowledge of the solar year through light. Tor through this we know what portion of the /.odiac the Sun occupies, what portion hi: leaves, and to what part of it he procei-ds. lb nee also, we know by the transition ot light, the quantity of the time, m whit h the miii passi s through his proper circle, and jierfurms his revolution, and in how many years all the periods of the eight ciri les are completed Hv this likew ise, we are able to measure the solar period, and the common period ot tin: otln r circulations, which is the same thing as to measure their joint upocatastasis. Hut the words, “ the divinity enkuullcda light , exhibit to us the non-temporal hypostasis of light, proceeding from an invisible* cause, and from the demiurgic essence. Again, the words, “ im order that the heaven , or world might in the most eminent degree become universally apparent, have a cause of tin* following kind. It is necessary that the whole world should as much as possible be tilled with the solar light. Hut the mass of the earth is natu¬ rally dark. Hence, it is requisite that the Sun should lx* nearer to the earth, in order that it may relieve its darkness. Tor that which is nearer illuminates more abundantly. And when that which illuminates is greater than the thing illumi¬ nated, it is able more largely to imparl its light. But the words, “ in the most

' Accenting to ttie Chaldaic dogmas mi < spla u«d by l’scllus, there arc seven corporeal worlds, one empyrean aud the nrsi; after this three ethereal; and then three material worlds, viz. the nierratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region. They also assert that ihere are two »olar worlds; out which is subservient to the ethereal profundity ; the other zoiuic, being one of the »e\eu spheres.

HOOK IT.]

TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

‘243

the nierratic sphere, the seven planetary spheres, and the sublunary region. They also assert that ihere are two »olar worlds; out which is subservient to the ethereal profundity ; the other zoiuic, being one of the »e\eu spheres.

HOOK IT.]

TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

‘243

eminent degree” signify that the Sun illuminates all the world as much as possible. For lie is not able at once to illuminate the whole earth ; but partially, by his cir¬ cular motion. In the least time however, he at once illuminates the whole earth, according to the equinoctial circle. For when he rises anil sets, giving light to more than half the earth, he in this one circulation illuminates the whole earth. But if hv the word heaven, we understand that which is moved in a circle, neither tloes the Sun at once illuminate the whole of this. For there are also shadows there, on account of the obumbrations of the stars and the Moon. Nothing how¬ ever, except the Sun, is free from shadow in the world, as neither is any thing mundane without matter. But supermundane natures alone, are without shadow, and immaterial. Hence the Sun is truly shadow less, and unreceptive of genera¬ tion, all other bodies receiving at different times, different illuminative additions.

\\ hy therefore, it may be said, did not the divinity enkindle a light in the first of the circulations from the earth 1 We reply, because the fulgid splendor of the Sun is of itself incommensurable to'generation. But the Moon being a medium between the two, and first receiving the light of the Sun, makes it to be commen¬ surate to the realms of generation. For the Moon, as Aristotle says, is as it were a less Sun. It is necessary however, that being proximately above generation, it should not be the most splendid ami the most luminous of bodies. For it is not lawful that a tiling of this kind should approximate to that which is obscure and dark, hut that which is secondarily fulgid ; and which has always indeed, its ow n proper light, hut in the participation of a superior light, exhibits mutation, and this in an orderly manner. For that which has arrangement and order, is more excellent than that which is without order; that through this mu¬ tation, it may be tbo paradigm of the very mutable nature, which matter introdu¬ ces to generated tilings; just as the opposition of the earth introduces the priva¬ tion of light. These things how ever, admit of a more ample discussion.

These things how ever, admit of a more ample discussion.

But that the stars, nnd all heaven, receive light from the Sun, may In* easily perceived. For that which is common in many things, exists from one canse, and exists from it in one way as exempt, hut in another as co-arranged ; hut this latter mode of the subsistence of the cause, is that in which it primarily partici¬ pates of that one form. But that primarily participates, in which this form subsists primarily, or' especially. If therefore, light especially subsists in the Sun, this will lie the first light; and from this, the light which is in other things will Ik* derived. And thus much for this particular. We have however shown the

1 For tori bo*, it is obviously necessary to read *. V bat is in this place demonstrated by Proclus, viz. that all mundane light is derived from the Sun, completely subverts the rambling opinion of the modems, that the bud stars arc so many suns.

244

PROCLUS ON THE

[book IV.

meaning of tlie words, “ that the heaven might in the most eminent degree become universally apparent ." For if l»v heaven yon understand that which revolves in a circle, the Sun does not always illuminate the whole of the Moon, but only during the time from the conjunction to the full Hut if you understand by it the whole world, then, as we have said, the Sun only accurately illuminates the whole earth, in one day, when he is in the equinoctial circle, and in rising and setting, is di imetrically opposite to the earth. It remains therefore, to see what the number is which is produced by the lation of the same and the similar, through the ttspective guardianship of day and night. This numlier then, is neither intellectual nor dianuetic, but doxastic, aflordiug a document ol the numlx-rs which pre-exist in forms. For tlu-re are many dilh renees in many tilings of generated numlx rs. And as we know the number ot in\isible time, by' the dianuetic number, so by that which is doxastic, we apprehend the number of visible time.

“ Night therefore, and Day were thus generated, am! on account of these the period of one most wise circulation was effected. And Month was produced, when the Moon having completed her eirele, became in conjunction w ith the Sun. Hut Year when the Sun in revolving had com¬ pleted his circle. A few only of mankind however, understand the periods of the other stars, give names to them, and measure them with relation to each other, regarding the numbers adapted to this purpose ; so that, as I may say, they do not know that time is the wanderings of 1 these bodies, which employ lations infinite in multitude, and admirably diversified.”

Through the generation of light nights and days bad tlicir progression, and the smallest measure of time is divided by these intervals. For the period, says he, of one most wise circulation, i> effected by night ami day; the intellection of the inerratic sphere, or the circle of the same, being the one most wise circulation; but the period of this circle, being the circulation of that sphere. For circulation is an energy and a period. The intellection how¬ ever, is of a more principal nature; but the period is the i fleet ot intellection, imitating circulation. The space therefore of day and night is tins. Hy this however, years and months are measured. For we measure greater by less intervals; just as by years, the whole apocatastatic time of the universe is mea¬ sured. It is likewise requisite to observe, how the peculiarity ot these is a medium between monadic forms, and the forms which subsist in the multitude of

noon iv.]

TIM,HUS OF PLATO.

24 o

individuals. For some forms are indeed in one tiling, yet not always in the same tiling according to numlier, hut in many things. Year however, and Month, are always in one tiling according to numher, on account of the mutual vicissitude of individuals [i. e. of the sun ami moon] in a circle. For one month succeeds another; and one year another; hut each is always one. These things therefore do not reijiiire much discussion.

e. of the sun ami moon] in a circle. For one month succeeds another; and one year another; hut each is always one. These things therefore do not reijiiire much discussion.

Perhaps however some one may douht how Plato savs, that Night and Day formed the period of one most wise circulation. F'or this is the very thing for which Aristotle accuses Plato. \i/.. to call circulation time; though now Plato adds lime to the universe when in motion, as being something different from motion, lint if the. motion of the universe is different from the time of the universe, the motion also of each of the hodu s that are moved in a circle, is dififrint from the periodic time of tin- motion. 'Phis then fore may lie the occasion of doubt in the words before us. llow likewise is the period of the inerralic sphere the swiftest, hut the bodies which are nearer to it are slower according to their apocatastasis than those that are farther from it ? May it not therefore, he proper to sav, in answer to the former douht, that period signifies two things, at one time motion itself, hut at another, the measure and condition of motion; just as a niedimnus and a co/v/r, and each of such like measures, are denominated in a twofold re¬ spect. Hence the period of the inerratic sphere must not now be said to he the motion of it, hut the temporal interval of the motion. May it not also lx* said, that when Plato calls time the wanderings of the heavenly hollies, he means nothing else than that the periods of these are time ? For these are things num¬ bered. Hut time, as they also say, is that which is numbered of motion. It is just therefore as if it should be said, those oxen are a number of such a magnitude. For thus also periods are time, as being a number of a certain magnitude.

Ilut in answer to the second doubt it may i»e said, that Plato assumes the apparent apocatastasis of the inerratic sphere, and w hich makes the space of a day and niadit; since there is another true apocatastasis. For the point which now rises, does not rise according to the same hour with that which follows it, nor do the other points subsist .similarly, all which however contribute to the apocatastasis of the inerratic sphere. For neither do all the points in that sphere, and all the fixed stars, make their apocatastases according to the same jH-riod.

It is necessary however, that they should, if we assume an accurate apocatastasis, which takes place in a great length of lime. For it is evident, that all the stars which are in the inerratic sphere, and are moved by it, and which have habitudes to each other, and to it, subsist differently at different times, and together with these tilings, have at a dilferent time, a different lation towards the centres; and

PROCLUS ON THE

246

[book Mr.

also, that their apocatastases to the same things in every respect, is effected in a very great length of time.

also, that their apocatastases to the same things in every respect, is effected in a very great length of time.

Moreover, some one may also doubt, how Plato calls the measure of the apocatastasis of the lation of the inerratic sphere, Night and Day. For this measure is every where supenially derived, from the one intelligible cause of the universe, and from the first paradigm. But Night and Da} are in the sublunary region. In answer to this doubt, it may lx- said, that the temporal interval which is primarily in the circulation of the inerratic sphere, and the solar light, are effective or Day and Night. From things last therefore, and which are known to tis, the whole measure is defined. For this space of night and day is one thing, and that which is in invisible time, another. The funner also is the image, and ultimate termination of the latt< r. For their are many orders of Night and Day, intelligible, intellectual, supermundane, celestial, and sublunary, as likewise the Orphic theology teaches. Anti some of these indeed, are prior to the fabrication of things ; but others are comprehended in it; and others proceed from it. Some likewise are invisible, but others are visible: since with respect to Month and Year also, those that are invisible aie of one kind, and w hich are niciisiirative, con¬ nective, and perfective of the intellectual and corporeal periods ol the Nun and M oon ; but those that are visible are of another kind, w hich are the termination and measure of the solar revolution. The like also takes place in other Gods. For there is one invisible Saturnian number, anti another visible; and in a similar manner, an invisible and visible Martial, Jovian, and Mercurial number. For the Month itself, and also the Year, winch exist according to each jieriod, living each of them one, anti always the same, are Gods immoveahly defining the measure of motion. For whence have the periods a subsistence always invariably the same, except from a certain immoveable cause ? \\ hence also, is the ditference of

apocatastases derived, except from tilth rent immoveable causes? Anti whence proceeds the unceasing, and the again anti again to infinity, except from the infinite powers winch Month anti ^ t ar t ontuiu?

\\ hence also, is the ditference of

apocatastases derived, except from tilth rent immoveable causes? Anti whence proceeds the unceasing, and the again anti again to infinity, except from the infinite powers winch Month anti ^ t ar t ontuiu?

It must likewise he admitted, that all this temporal series subsist under one first time, which defines tin period of a divinely generated [or perpetually circu¬ lating] nature, anti which is itself true number, as we have before observed. From these invisible periods however, we must conceive the visible to be derived ; and which proceed according to the being numbered, from the invisible, which are able both to number ami generate them; all which, astronomy beautifully teaches, doxastically appn bending the nlnuber of the periodical apocatastases of each. It also makes comparisons of the ratio of the periods to each other ; such for instance as that the Saturnian period is double and one half besides of the Jovian period;

BOOK I*.]

TIM/EUS Or PLATO.

2 47

and in a similar manner in the other planets. For if there are different npncatastas.es of them, they have a different ratio to each other. Sacred rumour nko venerates those invisible periods, and which are the canses of the visible; delivering the divine names of' Night and Day, and ako the causes that constitute, and the invo¬ cations, and self-manifestations of Month and Year. Hence, they are not to be surveyed superficially, but in div ine essences which the laws of sacred institutions, and the oracles of Apollo order us to worship and honour, by statues ami sacri¬ fices, as histories inform us. \\ hen these also are reverenced, mankind are sup¬ plied with the benefits arising from the periods of the Seasons, and of the other divinities in a similar manner; but a preternatural disposition of everv tiling about the earth, is the consequence of the worship of these bring neglected.' Flato likewise in the Laws proclaims that all these are finds, \i/. the Seasons, Years and Months, in the same manner as the Stars and the Sun ; and we do not introduce any thin" new, by thinking it proper to direct our att« ntion to the invi¬ sible powers of these prior to those that are visible. And thus much concerning those particulars.

the Seasons, Years and Months, in the same manner as the Stars and the Sun ; and we do not introduce any thin" new, by thinking it proper to direct our att« ntion to the invi¬ sible powers of these prior to those that are visible. And thus much concerning those particulars.

lad us hour vor return to the text. Plato then, mentions Right before Dav, as conveying an image of invisible and intellectual measures. For common rumour arranges tie* former prior to the latter. Hence we arc accustomed to say the tn/clhnncron [or the space of night and day]; because in the intelligible causes of these, Night subsists prior to Day.* Hut with respect to the words thus, ami on account of these, the won I thus manifests the producing cause of Right and Day, and indicates that it is light in conjunction with the inerratic sphere. And the words, nn account (jthese, manifest the final cause; in order that the nycthcmc- ron may be the conspicuous measure of all the circulations. .Hut lie denominates the one most wise circulation, the revolution of tie* circle of the same, as lining uni¬ form and intellectual, and most allied to the permanency and sameness of mtel-

‘ •' But »f w ill rrrlniuh do whatsoever thing gm-th forth out of our own in>«itli. In luirii incense to tlie rjuecii ol heaven, and In pour mil <1 rink-ollt-mi-gn unto her, a% nr liavr door, nr, and nur father*, our kings, and our prince*, m t lie cities of Judali, and hi the streets of Jerusalem : for Ihcn had ter filmty vj rictuah , and t rtrr writ, and *aic nn rrif. But since we left off to hum intense to the •juern of heaven, and to pour out drink-offering* unto her, uv hair tranlrd all lhtnt*i, and have bceo consumed by the sword and by famine." Jeremiah, thap. xhv. 17, IS.

’ In the original the pari winch should iiuuirdiatt !v follow the words i rpo r^t ij/ir/mi at »wro wree- rrj'Tni', p. C(»(i, s$ by a strange confusion, connected with the latter part ol lire eommrntary on the fol¬ lowing text, and begins at the words to ht o vrwi tai im ravra I. si. p. C70. The order of the text likewise, in p. q66, is perverted, the commentary on which beginning at the words eat y rptry I. xxxv. is imperfect.

248

PROCLUS ON THE

[book IT.

si. p. C70. The order of the text likewise, in p. q66, is perverted, the commentary on which beginning at the words eat y rptry I. xxxv. is imperfect.

248

PROCLUS ON THE

[book IT.

lect, and as j>osses:»ing uniformity from the one principle of things; the wisdom of it being derived from intellect, hut its circulation from the psychical jieculiarity. He likew ise asserts time to bo the wanderings of the stars, not as making the mo¬ tion of these to be time, but as conceiving the temporal intervals to be tin? mea¬ sures of motions, i'ur the number of the visible lift oj each of these, it secondary lime . But he calls both the peculiar, and the common time of the motions of each, infinite in multitude. For he co-assumrs the all-various circulations and configu¬ rations of them. And he says that they are admirably diversified, on account of their dances, their oppositions and conjunctions, their harmonious motion, and the order of their apocatustases. For such are the wanderings of tin* celestial bodies, the whole of them being merratically erratic, existing always in the end, and hastening to one end.

“ At the same time however, it is no less possible to conceive, that the perfect number of time will then accomplish a perfect year, when the celerities of all the eight periods being terminated with reference to each other, shall have a summit, as they are measured by the circle of that which subsists according to the same and the similar."

After the demiurgic generation of the spheres, the period of the seven bodies, the animation of them, and the order which the father inserted in them, and also after the vhrious motions of them, the temporal measures of their several periods, and the differences of their apocatastases ; the discussion proceeds to the monad of the temporal multitude, and to the one* number according to which all motion is measured, under which all other measures are comprehended, and according to which all the life of the world, the all-various evolution of bodies, and the whole of the psychical life, are defined, conformably to an all-perfect period. This period however, ought not to be surveyed doxasticallv, by adding myriads to myriads of years. For thus some are accustomed to speak of it, assuming the aeeurate apocatastasis of the Moon, and m a similar manner of the Sun, and then milling the one to the other, and afterwards adding to these, the apocatastases of Mer¬ cury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn ; and in the last place, the apocatastasis of the inerratic sphere, to the one common apocatastasis of the planets. After this manner therefore they sjwak, if the apoeatastatic times compared with each other are primary. But if they arc not primary, then assuming a common mea¬ sure, they see according to what numbers this measures each of the given apoea¬ tastatic times, and by the number according to which it measures the less of these times they multiply the greater, but by the number according to which it measures

HOOK IV.]

TIM.EL'S OF PLATO.

24 :»

the greater, lli«*y multiply the less ; and thus they have from both multiplication,, the common time of the apocatastasis of both, and whirl) also is measured bv both.

24 :»

the greater, lli«*y multiply the less ; and thus they have from both multiplication,, the common time of the apocatastasis of both, and whirl) also is measured bv both.

It is not proper ho wove?* to survey merely and alone after this manner, the whole mundane time, but to survey scientifically by intellect, and the discur¬ sive energies of reason, one number, one evolved powi r, and one perfective pro- givs-ion, extending to all the life of the world; and this proceeding to the end, returning to the beginning, and converging to itself; and on this, account making the measured motion to be circular. For as the monad bounds the infinity of number, and antecedently comprehends the indefiuileness of the duad, thus also time measures the; whole motion, and converts the end of it In the beginning. I b nee also it is called a iiuiuIht, and perfect. Fur a month is a number, and likewise a year, but not a perfect number: for they are parts of other numbi rs. lhit the time of the period of the universe is perfect, because it is not a part of any period, but is a whole, in order that it may imitate derail v. For eternity is primarily a wholeness. It introduces however, to beings at once all its wholeness; but time with extension. For the temporal wholeness is an evolution of the wholeness which abides conglomerated in eternity. The whole mundane time then fore, measures the one life of the universe, according to which all the celerities are terminated of the cch stial and sublunary circles. For in these also, there are periods, which have for the summit of their apocatastasis the lation of the i ircle of the same. 1 or they are reli rreil to this as to tluir principle, because it i-(he mos| simple of all For the apoeatastases are surveyed with reference to the points (l | 'Finis tor instance, all o! them make their apoca-

lastasis about the eipiinoelial point, 1 or about the summer tropic; or though the joint apocatastasis should not lie considered to he according to the same point, hut with i efi reiic«* to the same, when for instance, rising, or culminating. y« t ail of them will have with reference to it, a figure of such a kind. For now the pir-r.it order i- entirely a certain apocatastasis of all the heavenly bodies, yet the configuration is m»t seen about the same, hut with reference to the same point. Once however, it was about the same, and according to one certain point; at which if it should again take place, tin; whole of time will havi an end. One certain apocatastasis likewise, seems to have hern mentioned. Hence it is said, that Cancer i- the horoscope of the world, and this year is called Cynic, or pertaining to the dog, because among the constellations, the splendid star of the Dog rises together with Cancer. It therefore the planets

Hence it is said, that Cancer i- the horoscope of the world, and this year is called Cynic, or pertaining to the dog, because among the constellations, the splendid star of the Dog rises together with Cancer. It therefore the planets

* For ifi^rfiikor here, it it olivioukl) neeestarv to read tmjfit/Htor. It mutt also l>e obteited, that there ire two equinoctial |>ouil», or signs, amt these are Arte* and Libra.

Tim. Plat. Yol. II. 2 I

I'ROCLUS ON THE

[bouk IV.

Sflo

should again meet m the same point of Cancer, thin concurrence will be tine period of the universe. If however, the apocatastasis takes place in Cancer about the equinoctial point, that also which is from the summer tropic, will In- directed towards the summer tropic, and the number of the one will l»e equal to the nundver of the oilier, and the time of the one, to the time of the other. I'm each of them is one period, and is defined hy quantity, on account of the order of the bodies that are moved. And thus much concerning the one time of the universe, which measures all corpore:-! motions ; in the same manner as the world measures psychical, and eternity intellectual lives. It is likewise evident from what has been said, what tins one time is, wlienee it derives its subsistence, and what Ih-ih tit it u fiords to the universe. In addition however, to what Ims heen said, it must he observed, that this [k- rfect mimln-r differs from that mentioned in tin; Republic, which comprehends the [veriod of every divinely gem-rated nature ; since it is of a more partial nature, and is apncatastatic of the eight periods alone. 1'or the other perfect number comprehends the peculiar motions of the fixed stars, and in short, of all the divine genera that are moved in the hea¬ vens, whether visibly or invisibly, and also of the celestial g» nera posterior to the Hods, and of the longer or shorter periods of sublunary natures, together with the periods id' fertility and sterility, lienee likewise, it is the lord of the period of the human race.

“ Conformably therefore to, and for the sake of these things, such of the stars as proceeding through the heavens have revolutions, were ge¬ nerated, in order that this universe might be most similar to perfect and intelligible animal, tliumgh the imitation of an eternal nature. And other forms indeed, were fabricated, us far as to the generation of time, according to the similitude of that to which they were assimilated."

And other forms indeed, were fabricated, us far as to the generation of time, according to the similitude of that to which they were assimilated."

That the world became more perfect through the generation of time, imitating all-perleet animal according to the eternal, and that generation derived its sub¬ sistence through the latiuli of the seven cosmocrators; for from this lation, the variety according to generation, was unfolded into light; is evident from what has been before said. That which remains therefore of Plato’s speculations con¬ cerning time, deserves to he assumed, viz. that time proceeds analogous to soul, lieing at once eternal and generated. Hence as soul belongs to eternal beings, and i> the U st of generated natures ; so likewise time is both eternal and generated ; so far as it is co-mingled with souls and bodies, and so far as it proceeds and

BOOK IV ]

T1M.-EUS OF PLATO.

•251

extends through nil secondary brings. For it is number proceeding and a circle; but itself by itself, is both a monad and a centre. For the Dcmiurgus produced a medium of this kind, between things immoveable, and things that are moved, according to a sihiilitude to himself. For he also is a medium between the abiding and proceeding Gods,' according to an assimilation to the paradigm; because this also is a medium lie tween the intelligible and intellectual Gods,* between eternitv and number, 1 * * * 5 and the eternal ami pcrjntnal (In,Is.* For it participates of eternitv. but it primarily participates, and is the monad of intelligible animals. Hence also, the world being generated perpetual through the whole of time, was perfectly as¬ similated to its paradigm. For as its paradigm received the whole gift of eternitv; since every thing which primarily participates of a certain thing receives the whole of its gilt; thus also the world lives through the whole of time, and lives according to the whole perfect number of it. Hence likewise, it is perpetual. For every thing which is able to receive the whole evolution of time, is indestructible. Ihit the whole *»t time is the perfect number of the apocatastasis of the universe, as we have frcrpu-nlly observed.

Hence likewise, it is perpetual. For every thing which is able to receive the whole evolution of time, is indestructible. Ihit the whole *»t time is the perfect number of the apocatastasis of the universe, as we have frcrpu-nlly observed.

Farther still, this also is to be assumed from what has liern liefore said, that Plato was very far from eonceiv ing time to be a thing of such a kind as the Stoics, and also many of the Peripatetics apprehended it to be. For the former supposed it to be a mere conception of the mind, evanescent, and most proximate to non¬ entity. For time with them, was one of the clearly significant ’ things which they despised, as inefficacious, as having no real being, and existing in mere conceptions alone. Hut the latter assert tli.it it is an accident of motion. We may ask how¬ ever, of what motion? Is it an acrid* nt of continued motion? lint time is every where. And motion is in things which are moved. Is it then an accident of all motion 7 There are therefore many times. And what is the monad of them, and how is time that which is numbered of motion ? For it will truly subsist in habitude, and time will be something relative, and that which numbers not existing, neither will time exist. Plato therefore perceiving that all these assertions are unworthy

1 viz. Tl.r Itcniiurpuv is a medium between ttic intelligible Gods, who arecharailenzed by p ~n am n cy, and 1 lie supermundane Gods, who are characterized by proceeding ; jn»t a* the mundane Gods arc eharactrrizrd by rrgrrt'ion. Sec m\ translation of Prnclus on the Theology ol 1’lato.

1 i. o. Between the intelligible triads of Imiug itself and life itself, and the mlelircliitii order.

1 vi*. Between the nuddir triad of the intelligible order ; for n* this eternity first subsists, and the summit of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order

* i. e. Between the Gods prior to animal itself, sum! all the Gods that subsist between it and the Ur nnurgus.

5 For rv»a^«rar in Ibis place, 1 read inpi^arar.

PKOC1AJS ON THE

[booK IV.

23*2

the theory concerning time, gives to time a subsistence mijhtikiIIv from the intel¬ ligible and intellectual (bxls, it Iwing a supermundane intelh*ct, connectedlv con¬ taining all psychical life, measuring the psychical and corporeal periods, and pcr- fecting the motion of them which proceeds into extension. From this monad likewise, hi* constitutes different times, according to the triad 1 and lieptad,* and produces all these about the one time, which measures the one life of the universe*. He also gives to time so great a power, as to make the world through it more similar to its paradigm. And for ttie sake 1 of the generation of these times, he produces the Sun, and tin* other ivsmucrulurs, as calling forth invisible time, un¬ folding it into light, distributing it into parts, and dividing it, and perpetually convolving it wills invariable >anu in >s.

And for ttie sake 1 of the generation of these times, he produces the Sun, and tin* other ivsmucrulurs, as calling forth invisible time, un¬ folding it into light, distributing it into parts, and dividing it, and perpetually convolving it wills invariable >anu in >s.

Since however, lie says tliat the planets proceeding through the heavens have revolutions, let us see whether lie does not conceive the motion of these to he various: since they move about their own centres, and revolve through the heavens, aeeording to length, breadth, and d< pth, vi/.. through their own spheres, w hit h are parts of the heavens, and give eomph lion to tin* nniver>e. Fur he dot s Hot v.w that they are moved m the heavens, as if they occupied the same place, but tinon*h the heavens, as being moved through arches, and wholly transferred according to place; and in addition to tin-, that they always revolve about their own centres, in order that tin v may have a et rtam mixed motion ; jiM as they are media between the fixed stais, which always occupy the same place, and sublu- liarv natures, which arc not moved about a certain middle. It is now tin ri fore evident, that according to Plato, all the spheres are concentric, and have the same in litre with the universe, Hut the apparent inevitability of the motions of the seven planets, alist s from their it volutions, as they all-variously change their motion, through increasing and diminishing, advancing, being elevated, and aj>- pioxiiuatiug to the earth; and this without the contrivance of epicycles. Fur Plato makes no mention ot these, and nature everv vvhererisjiiire.su medium. The medium however, between all esjuable anil orderly natures, and those that are anomalous and disorderly, is that which is anomalous and orderly ; such as is the form of the motion ot the plain t', which alternately exhibits an iiieijuahility according to a n rtnin order perpt tually the same, ot swiftness and slowness, and ol a revolution to the same tilings, or to contraries. Hut if some have employed certain t piev t ies, or equable et centrics, hypothetically introducing motions, in

* i. i\ Am lo liar past, the (ircicnt, ami live future.

1 I. c. \it elding In the m Vt u Jil.llieIs.

* Instead ife»u, kui iii llns jilace, it u necessary to read onu.

no ok iv.]

TIM/EUS or PLATO.

2.5.1

order that they might he able to discover by the composition of these, tlie numbers of the motions of the epicycles, eccentrics, and of the stars which are moved in them, the conception is lieautiful, and adapted to rational souls, but is foreign from the scojvc of the nature of wholes, to which alone Plato directed his at¬ tention.

“But the universe did not yet comprehend all animals generated within itself, in this respect it still subsisted dissimilarly. Its artificer thcrelore supplied this defect, by impressing it with forms, according to the nature of its paradigm.”

“But the universe did not yet comprehend all animals generated within itself, in this respect it still subsisted dissimilarly. Its artificer thcrelore supplied this defect, by impressing it with forms, according to the nature of its paradigm.”

That always assimilatin'' the world to animal itself, Plato makes mention of it thrice, causing the universe to he only liegotten, rendering it perfectly perpetual, and fabricating it all-perfect, is evidi lit, and is so very properly. For animal itself is characterized by these three things, the ouly-begnttrii, the eternal, and the all perfect. For being allotted the third order in iulclligihles, it lias the oulv-lic- gotten irom the lirst for the summit of this order] according to which the one bang subsists; but the eternal from the second, according to which eternity subsists; and it has the all-perfect from itself. It is necessary however to survey not neg¬ ligently what this all-perfectness i«. Wholeness therefore, as we have frequently observed being triple, and originating supernally from iutelligihles, it is necessary that this world being the image of the most beautiful of intelligihles, should subsist according to each of these vvholcmsses; according to the first indeed, which is prior to parts, according to the second also, which is from parts; and through this according to the remaining wholeness [which is in a pari]. The Dcmiurgus thcrelore, had prior to this adorned the world, according to the lirst form Ol wholeness ; lor lie made it to he an animal possessing soul and intellect, adorning that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and causing it to receive orih r, in consequence of the accession of soul, intellect, and divine union. Hut the discussion proceeding, he likewise gave to it the second wholeness which consists of parts, constituting the twofold circulations, binding tlie elements through analogy. 1 and arranging the circles of the soul, according to the monad, triad, tetrad, and heptud. For of all these the universe consists as of parts ; because these give completion to the universe as the universe [or the all]. And in the words before us, lie gives to it tlie third form of w li.>lem*ss. For it is necessary that each part of it should Irecome a whole, and that it should have all

* Instead of fi aXoyiai in tins it is ubwousl) necessary to read fi araXoytaf

254

EROCLUb ON THE

[book IV.

And in the words before us, lie gives to it tlie third form of w li.>lem*ss. For it is necessary that each part of it should Irecome a whole, and that it should have all

* Instead of fi aXoyiai in tins it is ubwousl) necessary to read fi araXoytaf

254

EROCLUb ON THE

[book IV.

things appropriately in itself; viz. the heavens celestially, the air aerially, and the earth terrestrially. For tins is the whole in a part, and through this, it is in a greater degree assimilated to its paradigm, which is comprehensive of all animals. For that is both a monad and number. And it is necessary that the world should contain all animals in itself, in order that it may liecome jverfeetly similar to the all ness of it* paradigm ; by not only receiving the whole plenitudes of the world, and subsisting' a whole of wholes, hut also comprehending in itself, the partial animals, through which every part of the world derives its completion, and all the divine, demoniacal, and mortal orders. For thus the most perfect similitude of the world to animal itself will be eflected. And this is the tenth gift imparted by the Deiniurgus to the world, and is the greatest of all. e do not however say, that the Deiniurgus brought the world to a similitude of the intelligible, from dissimili¬ tude; for thus the ini|H‘rfect would precede the perfect, in the demiurgic genera¬ tion of things ; hut the order of the discussion delivers the precedency in forms, and a dominion causally antecedent to the s« coud and third goods wliii li ale im¬ parted,* in order that the world may as much as possible lie impressed as by a seal with all the evolved forms of intelligibles. Since therefore, the paradigm was monadic, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals, it is necessary that the world should not be alone only begotten, and a whole of wholes, hut likewise that it should be comprehensive of all sensible animals Here therefore, the dis¬ cussion of vivification proceeds, filling all the parts of the universe with appro¬ priate genera of animals; adorning all the genera with proper numbers; and ge¬ nerating all numbers according to a similitude to the paradigm.

“ Whatever ideas therefore, intellect perceived in that which is animal itself, such and so many it dianoctically conceived it to be necessary for this universe to contain.”

•••••• i And the third wholeness is imparted to the w orld through fabrication,

weaving together parts with wholes, and numbers 4 with monads, and making each part of the universe a world, anti that which is in a part, a whole and all.

* For aftorafitros liere, it is necessary to read vyurra/ecyot.

1 i. e. The order of the discussion, delivers tlie whole prior to parts, before the whole which consists of parts, and this latter, before the whole which is in a part.

* For aftorafitros liere, it is necessary to read vyurra/ecyot.

1 i. e. The order of the discussion, delivers tlie whole prior to parts, before the whole which consists of parts, and this latter, before the whole which is in a part.

1 The beginning of lliis cornraeulary is wanting io the original ; and by an unaccountable error this pari of it that is extant, instead of immediately following the test inp. 27’, is insetted in p. C(i(i, as if ■t belonged to the Commentary on tbe words, “ Night therefore and Day t cert thus gtntr.itrd, ' Sfc.

* For rou uptown here, it is necessary to read rcri npS^ov t

HOOK -V.J

TIM/ELS OF l>LATO

For the world is allotted tins through a similitude to animal itself; because tii at also is an entire monad and number. It is likewise an all-perfect intelligible intellect, and a plenitude of intelligible causes, which it generates so that they may abide eternally in itself, l'or the multitude which abides in its cause is of one kind, and that which proceeds and is distributed into parts, of another. For the Dcmiiirgus himself indeed, constitutes some pen era of Gods in himself, but produces others from himself, into second and third orders. And the father of the Demiurgus [i. e. Saturn] generates some paradigmatic causes of fabrication to abide in himself, but he produces others, as demiurgic causes themselves, that have an arraugi incut prior to wholes. Ilis grandfather also Heaven, retains some causes in himself, but leads others forth 1 into a separation from himself. And theologies manifest these things by mystic appellations, denominating them either concealment, or absorption, or nurture in Fate. Much prior therefore to these, does intelligible intellect the father of w holes, generate some causes in himself, and unfold them into light, but produce others from himself, and constitute the orders of the Gods posterior to him;* containing indeed, uniform, whole, and all- peiTect causes within the comprehension of himself; hut producing into other orders, those whi< h are mulliplit d, and distributed into parts through difference. II nice, since every paternal order constitutes after this manner, this world also, being an imitation of the intelligible orders, and suspended from them, possesses one allncsx prior to partial animals ; but another, deriving its completion from them, and together with ihe former receives the latter, in order that it may be most simi¬ lar to its demiurgic and paradigmatic cause. Such therefore, is the mode in which this takes place.

Such therefore, is the mode in which this takes place.

Hut the words, “ in that which is animal itself ,we have before explained, and shown what animal itself is, according to our opinion. And now also we sav, that of the intelligible breadth, one part is the summit, is united, and occult; but another part, is the power of the summit, and proceeds, and at the same time abides; and another part, unfolds itself into light through energy, and exhibits in itself intelligible multitude. Of these likew ise, the first indeed, is intelligible lieing, the second, is intelligible life, and the third, is intelligible intellect. The first lieing itselt however, cannot he animal itself: for multitude is not there, nor the tetrad of ideas; but through its onlvuess, and iucilahic union, it is denominated «nc by Plato. And in short, animal itself is s.ud to participate of eternity, hut the first

Instead of r-«« it, ri jy atf tnurov ftarptrtr in tins place, ll is ro'pimlc to read row it, rpncnytt ttt cnifm, itatfttmr.

* For r«i« ptlf tnirrvy raltaiy vfiirry/rt rwr Qtw in lliis place, ll i» necessary to read rni fttff «oi tv* f«;«i rwr Otvt,

PROCLLS ON THE

[book IV.

25ti

* For r«i« ptlf tnirrvy raltaiy vfiirry/rt rwr Qtw in lliis place, ll i» necessary to read rni fttff «oi tv* f«;«i rwr Otvt,

PROCLLS ON THE

[book IV.

25ti

Iteing itself, d,>es not participate of any thins, except some one should sav that it participates of the owe, which in every respect is worthy of consideration. For may not that which is above it, he superior even to this ap|>elhiti»ii [the wit]. Ihit hems; itself is primarily that which it is, and not according to participation. Hence, lreins; itself < aiinot he animal itself for the above-mentioned causes. iNor can intelligible life he animal itself. 1 or animal is secondary to life; and is said to Ik* animal through the participation of life. In short, n animal itself was the second, eleruitv would he hem- itself. This however, is impossible. For the one being is one thin- and eternal l>< in- another; the former hem- the monad of l>em", hut the latter a ditad, bavin- the aluinjs rnmplioati d with U in-. Am the former is the cause of existence to all llm.-s, hut the latter of permanency accord i n} r n> existence. If therefore, neither the one h. m- itself is animal itself, nor that which is i.mncdiatrlv posterior to the one brim;; for this is ctcrmly, who li t* mt.-l- li-ihh; power, infinite life, and wholeness itself, according to which earl, of the divinities is at once a whole; it is necessary that the third, [or int. liable intellectJ. should lie animal itself. For it is necessary that animal itself should he alter a certain manner intellect; since the image of it subsists « nt.rely in conjunction with sense. But sense is the image of intellect; so that iu that wlm !. is primarily ani¬ mal, intellect primarily subsists. Hence, if animal itself is second try to hie, it ncccssar.lv exists according to intelligible int. Ih-ct. For he.n- intelligible, and as Plato savs, an animal, the most hcaul.ful of intclligiblcs, and only brgotlc n, it will have this order. For all thin-s after this form are prodm ed in coujum tion with

other thill—s, and fall short til intelli—ihle .illntss.

Animal .1 self then fore, is intelligible intellect, comprehending in itself tl.e intel¬ lectual orders of the Gods, collet tin-, uniting, and pel lectin-them,' anti ht in- the most Ircautiful boundary of intelli-ihles. It also unfolds into light tt, intellec¬ tual natures, the united ami unknow n cause of intelli-ihl. s, exciting Us, ll to uleas and all-various powers, hut producing all the seeoml ortlt rs of the Go,Is. Hence likewise, Orpheus calls it the God Phones, as unfold,ng into l.ght the intelligible unities; anti gives to it various forms, as exhibiting m *^1 raose ot m.el-

s, exciting Us, ll to uleas and all-various powers, hut producing all the seeoml ortlt rs of the Go,Is. Hence likewise, Orpheus calls it the God Phones, as unfold,ng into l.ght the intelligible unities; anti gives to it various forms, as exhibiting m *^1 raose ot m.el-

li-ihle animals, lIeal>o inserts in it multiform ideas, as primarily compn 'ending intt lh-.hle ideas, and calls it the key of ...lelleet, because it hounds every intelli¬ gible essence, and connectedly-contains intellectual hie. 1 rom this *>o "it .»t .4 God therefore, the Dcmiurgus of the universe is suspended, being htmseli, as we have before said, intellect, hut intellectual intellect, and in a particular maim, r t .e cause of intellect. Hence also, lie is said to mv animal ilsell: lor >i 3 ht ^ the

1 Fof uvry line, ft* ad ciurwy.

nooK iv.]

'IIMXL'S OF PLATO.

2> 7

peculiarity of the intellectual Coils. For the theologist rails intelligible intellert eyeless. lie says then-fore, concerning it:

In In* tin n*l fi'ciliujg cycle.*, rapid Love.

nooK iv.]

'IIMXL'S OF PLATO.

2> 7

peculiarity of the intellectual Coils. For the theologist rails intelligible intellert eyeless. lie says then-fore, concerning it:

In In* tin n*l fi'ciliujg cycle.*, rapid Love.

For the houmlary of its energy is the intelligible. But the Demiurgus bring intellect, does not rank among participated intellects; in order that he may Ik? the Demiurgus of wholes, and that he may he aide to look to animal itself. Being however imparticipable, he is truly intellectual intellect* And through simple intelligence indeed, he is united to the intelligible; but through various intellection, he hastens to the generation of secondary natures. Hence his intelligence is denominated vision, as being non-multitudmous, and as shining with intelligible light. But his second energy is called itianoetic, as proceeding through simple intelligence, and advancing to the generation of demiurgic works. And Plato indeed says, that lie looks to animal itself; but Orpheus, that lie leaps to, and absorbs it, through the indication of Night. For through Night, who is intelligible and at the same time intellectual, intellectual intellect is conjoin* d to the intelligible. You must not, however, on this account say, that the Demiurgus looks to that which is external to himself; for this is not lawful for him to do; but that Ireing converted to himself, and to the fountain of ideas w hich is in himself, he is also conjoined to the monad of the all¬ various orders of forms. For intellect is not without the intelligible, 1 and does not subsist separate from it, according to the Oracle. For if vve say, that our soul looking to ilsi-lf knows all things, and things prior to itself are not external to it, how is it possible that the demiurgic intellect should not in a much greater degree, by intellectually perceiving himself survey the intelligible world? For animal itself is also in hint, vet not monadically, but according to a certain divine number. lienee likewise, being himself intellectual, lie is said by tlicologists, ns vve have observed, to absorb that intelligible Ood, in consequence of every intelli¬ gible, the divisions of forms, and tin* intelligible number, being perceived by him. Plato, also, indicating this, denominates the ideas of the Demiurgus, such and so many ; by the former, manifesting the peculiarities of the causes, hut by the latter, the separation of them according to number.

If however these things subsist after this manner, it is not projver to admit, as some do, that there is an infinity of forms in iulelligibles. For the definite is more allied to principles than the indefinite, as Plato also indicates. And first natures are always contracted in quantity, but transcend in power, those that arc pos¬ terior to and proceed from them. Nor must it be said, that those who separate animal itself from the Demiurgus, make the intelligible to be external to intellect.

And first natures are always contracted in quantity, but transcend in power, those that arc pos¬ terior to and proceed from them. Nor must it be said, that those who separate animal itself from the Demiurgus, make the intelligible to be external to intellect.

• Instead of it a i-nijro* in tint place, it I* ucccnary to lead re* rn* alone.

Tim. Plat. Vol. II. ^ K

I*HOCI.US ON T!I!-:

[hook iv.

*2 f >h

For we do not make that which is seen to Ik* posterior to that which sees, in order that it may he external to it, hut we assert that the former is prior to the latter. Hut more divine intelligible* are intellei tually jH-ri-eived by more various natures, as existing in them; since the soul also entering into itself, is said to discover all I icings, and as Socrates savs, 1 (i >d and wisdom. Animal itsi If therefore, is prior to the Dcminrgiis, and is not « \ternal to him. And there indeed, all things, subsist totally, and intelligibly ; hut m the Ibiniurgus, intellei tually, and with division. For hi him the separate causes of the ^iiii and moon pre-exist, and not onh the one idea of the celestial tlods, winch gives subsistence to all the celestial genera. Hence, the [Chaldean] < >nu les say, that the demiurgic « m rgies are borne along like sw arms of lu es, bursting about the bodies of the world. For a div me intellect evolves the total si palatum of them in tin* inti lligible, 1 into all tin* demiurgic multitude. And these observations indeed, arc to be assumed as i moll tries.

For a div me intellect evolves the total si palatum of them in tin* inti lligible, 1 into all tin* demiurgic multitude. And these observations indeed, arc to be assumed as i moll tries.

Jn the in \t place however, it is worth while to relate such opinions of the more ancient inti rpreters, as introduce a more iiom 1 meaning of the words of the text. Amelins therefore from these words, < speci illy constitutes a triad of demiurgic intellects ; calling the fit st that which is, from “ that which is animal but the second that uhich has, from the words “ in that, for the second is not [ideas,] fu\t they cnli r into it ; and the thud that which sees, from the word “ perceived; though Plato savs, that ideas are nt that which is animal, and does not assert, that animal itsi If is one thing, and that in w liicli the ideas of animals are contain¬ ed, another. Hence that which is, is not different from that which has, if the one is that which is animal, but the other that in which ideas subsist. Ag. in, Nume¬ rous arranges the first [find] according to that which is animal, and says that it intellectually sees lor the use of the second; but he arranges the second alter intellect, and savs that if fabricates for the use of the third ; and the third is arranged by him, according to that which energizes diaiioetically. Hut it is evident that these have certain essential diflcivnci*. Such a division, however, is n,it now made bv Plato, in wInch one thing is an inlelh < t perreiv mg intellectually, hut another an intellect energizing diaiioetically. For Plato does not divide energies coiitraiilv to the energizers; since energies proceed Irom those that « ner ,r ize. Ur rather, in divine essence's, energies concur with essences. Hut to •aiceive ilianucticalh/, and to perceive, are at present assmnul as the boundaries of //,(■ energies (svs^yr^L'trn) of the demiurgic intellect. 1 iy no nn aus therefore, ought

* Tins is asserted l>v Socrates in llic 1 ast Mi iliimles.

* 1 of ti ri.i iti in tliii Jilaic, it o in tis.ary to nail o 'j* ioi;ru.

book iv.]

TIM T PS OF I'LA’I O.

‘2 >9

1 iy no nn aus therefore, ought

* Tins is asserted l>v Socrates in llic 1 ast Mi iliimles.

* 1 of ti ri.i iti in tliii Jilaic, it o in tis.ary to nail o 'j* ioi;ru.

book iv.]

TIM T PS OF I'LA’I O.

‘2 >9

these to be contrarilv div ideal in the Demiurgus, since they concur with his hypos¬ tasis. I hose therefore, the diviuc Iaiuhlichiis has sullieieiitl y confuted, adding, that Plato doc* not make such distinctions of di\ine natures, m the Sophi^ta, Pinlehus, and Parmenides, as they speak of, hut separately discusses each of the divine orders which are there mentioned, and divides the hypotheses from each other; separately indeed discussing' the one, separately whole, and successively in a similar manner, circumscribing each hypothesis, he appropriate definitions. We however, for our design is not to confute the opinions of others, remind ourselves, that the tilings proposed to lie considered are, what the one in¬ telligible paradigm is, who the whole Pemiurgiis is, and what the union is of both. I,et us therefore see, how, in what follows, the multitude of paradigms, and the many fabrications of things, are delivered.

“ lint these ideas are four ; one indeed, being the genus of the celestial Clods; another of winged, and air-wandering animals; the third, being the aquatic species; and the fourth, the pedestrinus and terrene.”

As in the d. miurgie intelligence itself, a monad is the leader of the inti Ih-clual multitude, and as in the paradigm, uiiical form has a subsistence prior to nntnher, thus also discourse, which is the interpreter of divine concerns, adumbrating the nature of the things of which it is the messenger, first assumes the whole object of know ledge colli etively, and according to an enthusiastic conception ; hut after¬ wards unfolds that which was conglomerated, and develops the* one intellection, through words. It also divides that which is united, according to this nature of the things, at one lime, explaining their union, but at another, their separation. I ; or it is not naturally adapted, nor is it possible for it, to comprehend both of tlies,* at once. r I he discourse of Plato also, being thus afleeted, first in a divinely inspired manner, unfolds into light the w hole nuinher of intelligible ideas, and alter wards, distr$tinli-s into parts, tin* progressions which this number contains, for there the intelligible multitude shines forth, win re there are the first monads ot ideas. And that this indeed is the custom of Plato, we have before .shown in many instances, as in, “ it uas generated," “ he was good," “ one" and in all the before-mentioned examples.

Betaking curselves however, from words to things, let us consider in the first place, what the tetrad itself of ideas is, and whence this uuinlter is derived ; ami in the next place, what the four ideas are, and how they subsist in animal itself, whether the all-perfectness of it derives its completion through them, or whether

200

PROCLUS ON Til F.

[boom IV.

they Biibsiat in some oilier way. For hy proceed..- in an orderly manner throng, tliese s|*eculations, we filial! discover the divinely-inspired conception of Plato. It is necessary therefore, a-ain to recur to the before-mentioned demonstrations, in which we said, that the first, united, and most simple intelligible essence of the Gods, proceeding s.qiernally from the unity of unities, but according to a certain mode, ineffable, and incomprehensible by all things; one thin- * is first, occult, and paternal; another is second, 1 and is the one power of wholes, and an uncir- euu.soiibcd measure; and a third Hun-' proceeds into ener-y, and all-various powers, and is at once both paternal and effective. 'Hie first of these also, is a monad, because it is the summit of all the int.-lli-ible breadth, and the fountain and cai. ,e of divine numbers, lint the second is a duad : for it abides and pro¬ ceeds. as in the intelligible -.-m.-a, and has the cl■«#■ complicated with ban-. I l.at however, which is now investigated [is the third], and is the te trad, which receives all the oeenlt cause of the monad, and unfolds into li-l.t m its* If.,is m.proe.vd.n- power. For such thin-s as are in the monad, primarily, m.ieally, and with an nnp.oceedi.i-suhsistence, these the tetrad exhibits distrihutedlv, and now se¬ parated accord...- to mnnher, and a production into sec ondary natures. Since however, the third has indeed an order adapted to. hut also entirely participates of the causes prior to itself, it is not only a t.tracl, hut as a monad it is -.eater than this, and is allotted a paternal transc endency ; and as a eluad, it is effective and prolific. So far the re fore, as it is call* d animal itself, it is the monad of the nature? of all animals, vital, intellectual, and corporeal But so far as it is com¬ prehensive at once of the male and female, it is a duad. I or these are appmprt- ate lv in all the orde rs of animals, in one way in the (ioels, in anothe r in d.cinons, mid in another in mortals. And it is necessary that the* first unities of these, should have a primordial subsistence, m the- one comprehension of animal itself. But so far as it constitutes from this duad, the four ide as of animals in itself, it is a te trad. For conformably to these ideas, the fourfold fabrication proceeds, and the first effective cause of wholes, is a tetrad. Plato therefore, teachin- this tetradic povv.-r of the paradi-m, savs that the most uuical ide as of mundane na¬ tures are four, and are comprehended in one idea animal itself. For the re, animal itse lf is one idea ; hut the- male and the female are a duad.

If you are willing also, you will have -ene-ra and specie s, in the division of Plato. For he calls the two ideas, the intellectual, and the air-wanderin-, -eiier.t,

• i. e. '1 lie one being itself, the summit of the intelligible- order.

If you are willing also, you will have -ene-ra and specie s, in the division of Plato. For he calls the two ideas, the intellectual, and the air-wanderin-, -eiier.t,

• i. e. '1 lie one being itself, the summit of the intelligible- order.

1 i. e. Intelligible life, ill velneli eternity subsists.

* i c. Animal itself, or intelligible intellect, the end of the intelligible order.

HOOK IV.]

TlMvKUS Ol- i’LATU.

-Itil

Imt the remaining two, species, as being subordinate to tin* former two. But animal itself is also a tetrad. And as far as to this, intelligible forms extend. After this however, ideas proceed according to different numbers. For tliere is an appropriate number of them in each order; and the less numl»er, is comprehen¬ sive of more total i<b as ; but the more multitudinous number, of such as are more partial. For diviner natures are more contracted in quantity, but have a tran¬ scendent power. The forms also of secondary natures are more multiplied than those that are prior to them ; intellectuals than intelligihles, supermundane than intellectual natures, and mundane than supermundane natures. Mundane forms therefore, are those which ha\e proceeded to an ultimate distribution ; just as intelligible forms receive the highest union. For all progression diminishes power, but increases multitude. Hence, ifTiin rus had discussed a certain in¬ tellectual order, he would have mentioned another number, such as the hebdo- rnadic or decadic. But since he is speaking of the intelligible cause of ideas, w hich comprehends all intelligible animals, he says that the first ideas are four. For the tetrad is there, w hich proceeds from the intelligible monad, and fills the demiurgic decad. For as the 1’ythngoric hymn says, “ Divine number proceeds from the occult profundities of the undecaying monad, till it arrives at the divine tetrad, which produced the mother of all things, the universal recipient, ancient, and venerable, placing a boundary about all things, immutahle, and unwearied, [ami which both the immortal finds, and earth-born m< n, denominate the sacred decad.1 1 And tbo hymn indeed, calls the uniform and occult cause of the one being, the undentying monad, and the m cult ],rnj iui<tiln.\ of the wound; Imt the evolution into light of intelligible multitude, which the duad, the medium between the monad ami the tetrad, unfolds, the dnine it trad. And the world itself, which receives tho images of all the divine numb< r*, supcrnally imparted to it, it deno¬ minates Mr eVrut/. For the above words may be thus understood, by directing our attention to the fabrication ol" the world. And thus much concerning the tetrad itself.

And the world itself, which receives tho images of all the divine numb< r*, supcrnally imparted to it, it deno¬ minates Mr eVrut/. For the above words may be thus understood, by directing our attention to the fabrication ol" the world. And thus much concerning the tetrad itself.

In the next place, let us show what the four ideas are, and to w hat kind of tilings they give suh.xisteure. lair some of the interpreters differ from others in their opinion on this subject; some indeed asserting, that the progression of these ideas, is mto Gods, and the mortal genera, especially directing their atten¬ tion to the [literal meaning of the] words of Flato; but others looking to things, say that the progression is mto the Gods, and the genera superior to us ; Ivecause

’ Tlie v'ords within the brackets, arc supplied from the Commentary of Syria d ns on Aristotle Metaphysics. The original is, AOararoi rt 0cm, sac yrjyertttt ai0pwrti.

i!G2

PHOCLUS ON THK

[book IV

these genera subsist prior to mortals, and it is necessary that the Petmurgii3 should not product* mortal, iinniedialely from divine natures. Others main, conjoining hot!, these opinions, and following what is written in the Fpiuoinis, assert that Gods subsist in the heavens, theuions m the air, demigods in water, and men, and other mortals, in earth. Such however being the ilillerence ot opinion among the interpreters, we admire indeed, the lovers ot things, but shall endeavour to follow our leader [Svnanus]. We sav therefore, that the celestial genus ul (.oils, is comprehensive ot all the celestial genera, whether they are divine, or align ie, or da-moniacal. The air-wandering genus comprehends all the natures that are arranged in thi* air, whether thev he Gods that are allotted the air, or daemons that follow these, or mortal animals that live in the air. The aquatic is comprehensive of all the genera that are allotted the water, and of all that are nourished in water. And the pedestrmus comprehends all the genera that preside over the parts of the earth, and all the animals that are constituted and generated in the earth. For the D. niiiirgus is entirely th** cause of all mundane natures, and Un¬ common lather of all of them; generating indeed, divine, and du-iiiomaeal natures, by and through himself alone ; but delivering mortal natures to the junior Gods, as the \ are able to generate these by a proximate energy. And t n pa¬ radigm is not the cause of some, and not of other animals, but it possesses the most total causes of all animals. For again, it it was the causi »f the divitn and diemonical genera, but bv no means, ot the mortal genera, m tais Usi, mortals not being generated, the universe would be imperfect, as not containing all the genera of animals. For it is similar to its paradigm, and all-pcifect, through imitating the tour ideas ot animal lKell.