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THE LIBRARY
192 P94
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SIX BOOKS OF PROCLUS, ...
ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO,
TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK »
TO WHICH
A SEVENTH BOOK IS ADDED,
IN ORDER TO SUPPLY THE DEFICIENCY OP ANOTHER BOOK ON THIS SUBJECT,
WHICH « « «R!TTEV BY VKOCIA'S, ULT MSCE KMT.
i
ALSO, A TRANSLATION FROM THE CREEK OF
PROCLUS' ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.
A TRANSLATION OF THE TREATISE OF PROCLUS,
£>n protMDcncc ano jTate;
A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE, ENTITLED,
TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE;
AND
A TRANSLATION OF EXTRACTS FROM HIS TREATISE
ON THE SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL;
As preserved in the Bibliotheca Gr. of Fabricius.
BY THOMAS TAYLOR.
A>£ «rr»v, «m, run tij tyyiKa
Tlierc are, there are, though laugh the w offer roar,
Jove and the God*, who mortal ills survey.
axnif nvt Jmi to Wit, xau xujmi rsXXix. Corinlh. 1. Cap, 8. v. i.
At there be Gods many, and Lord* :
TWO VOLUMES.
VOL I.
LONDON :
PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR,
By A. J. I'afpy, Tooket Court, Chancery Lane.
AND SOLD BY MESSRS. LAW AND Co.; LONGMAN AND Co.; BALDWIN AND Co.;
AND ALL OTHER BOOKSELLERS.
1816.
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Q'7
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TO
I
WILLIAM MEREDITH, ESQUIRE,
WHO WITH A FIRMNESS AND MUNIFICENCE,
UNPARALLELED IN MODERN TIMES,
HAS PATRONIZED
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE,
AND ITS ENGLISH PROMULGATOR ;
AS AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NO COMMON ESTEEM FOR HIS CHARACTER,
AND A TRIBUTE OF THE WARMEST GRATITUDE FOR HIS PATRONAGE,
THIS WORK IS DEDICATED
BY THE TRANSLATOR,
THOMAS TAYLOR.
i
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INTRODUCTION.
I rejoice iu the opportunity which U afforded me of presenting the truly philosophic reader, in
the present work, with a treasure of Grecian theology ; of a theology, which was first mystically
and symbolically promulgated by Orpheus, afterwards disseminated enigmatically through images
by Pythagoras, and in the last place scientifically unfolded by Plato and his genuine disciples. The
peculiarity indeed, of this theology is, that it is no less scientific than sublime j and (bat by a geo-
metrical scries of reasoning originating from the moat self-evident trutlw, it developes all the deified
progressions from the ineffable principle of things, and accurately exhibit* to our view all the links
of that golden chain of which deity is the one extreme, and body the other.
That also which >. most admirable and laudable in this theology is, that it produces in the mind
properly prepared for iu reception the most pure, holy, venerable, and exalted conceptions of the
great cause of all. For it celebrates this immense principle as something superior even to being
itself; as exempt from the whole of things, of which it is nevertheless ineffably the source, and does
not therefore think fit to connumerate it with any triad, or order of beings. Indeed, it even apologises
for attempting to give an appropriate name to this principle, which is in reality in enable, and
ascribes the attempt to the imbecility of human nature, which striving intently to behold it, gives
the appellation of the most simple of its conceptions to that which is beyond ail knowledge and all
conception. Hence it denominates it the one, and the good,- by the former of these names indica-
ting its transcendent simplicity, and by the latter its subsistence as the object of desire to all beings.
For all things desire good. At the same time however, it asserts that these appellations are in reality
nothing more than the parturitions of the soul which standing as it were in the vestibules of the
Prod. Vol. I. 6
INTRODUCTION.
adytum of deity, announce nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but only indicate her spontaneous
tendencies towards it, and belong rather to the immediate offspring of the first God, than to the first
iuelf.
Hence, as the result of this most venerable conception of the supreme, when it ventures not
only to denominate the ineffable, but also to assert something of its relation to other things, it con-
sider* this as pre-eminently its peculiarity, that it is the principle of principles ; it being necessary
that the characteristic property of principle, after the same manner as other things, should not begin
from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which is the principle of
all principles. Conformably to this, Proclus, in the second book of this work' says, with match-
leas magnificence of dictiou :" Let us as it were celebrate the first God, not as establishing the
earth and the heavens, nor as giving subsistence to souls, and the generation of all animals j for be
produced these indeed, but among the last of things ; but prior to these, let us celebrate him as
unfolding into light the whole intelligible and intellectual genus of Gods, together with all the
supermundane and mundane divinities as the God of all Gods, the unity of all unities,
and beyond the first adyta,1 — as more inefieble than all silence, and more unknown than all
essence,— as holy among the holies, and concealed in the intelligible Gods."
The scientific reasoning from which this dogma is deduced is the followiug : As the principle of
all things is the one, it is necessary that the progression of beings should be continued, and that no
vacuum should intervene either in incorporeal or corporeal natures. It is also necessary that every
thing which has a natural progression should proceed through similitude. In consequence of this,
it is likewise necessary that every producing principle should generate a number of the same order
with itself, vut. nature, a natural number; toul, one that is psychical (i. c. belonging to soul); and
uittUtti, an intellectual number. For if whatever possesses a power of generating, generates simi-
lars prior to dissimilar*, every cause must deliver its own form and characteristic peculiarity to its
progeny ; and before it generates that which gives subsistence to progressions far distant and
separate from its nature, it must constitute things proximate to itself according to essence, and con-
joined with it through similitude. It is therefore necessary from these premise,, since there is one
unity the principle of the universe, that this unity should produce from itself, prior to every thing
else, a multitude of natures characterized by unity, and a number the most of all things allied to
its cause ; and these natures are no other than the Gods.
According to this theology tlierefore, from the immense principle of principles, in which all
' P. 190. . * L e. The highest order of intelUgibks.
INTRODUCTION. li
thing? causally subsist, absorbed in supcreaseotial light, and involved in unfathomable depths, a
beauteous progeny of principles proceed, aU largely partaking of the ineffable, all stamped with the
occult characters of deity, all possessing an overflowing fulness of good. From these dazzling sum*
mils, these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations, being, life, intellect, soul, uature, ami body
depend ; monads suspended from uniliet, deified natures proceeding from deities. Each of these
monads too, is the leader of a series which extends from itself to the last of thing*, and which while
it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and returns to its leader. And all these principles
aVid all their progeny are finally centered and rooted by their summits in the first great all-compre-
hending one. Thus all beings proceed from, and are comprehended in the first being; aU intel-
lects emanate from one first intellect ; all souls from one first soul ; all natures blossom from one
first nature ; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous body of the world. And lastly, all
these great monads are comprehended in the first one, from which both they and all their depending
•cries are unfolded into light. Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of
monads, the principle of principles, the God of Gods, one and all things, and yet one prior to all.
Hence this first one is truly the unity of unities, the monad of
monads, the principle of principles, the God of Gods, one and all things, and yet one prior to all.
No objections of any weight, no arguments but such as are sophistical, can be urged against this
most sublime theory which is so congenial to the unperverted conceptions of the human mind, that
it can only be treated with ridicule and contempt in degraded, barren, and barbarous ages. Igno-
rance and priestcraft, however, have hitherto conspired to defame those inestimable works,' in
which this and many other grand and important dogmas can alone be found ; and the theology of
the Greeks has been attacked with all the insane fury of ecclesiastical ?eal, and all the jmbecd flashes
of mistaken wit, by men whose conceptions on the subject, tike those of a man between sleeping
and waking, have been turbid and wild, phantattic and confuted, prtpotterotu aud tain.
Indeed, that after the great incomprehensible cause of all, a divine multitude subsists, co-operating
with this cause in the production and government of the universe, has always been, and is still admitted
by all nations, and all religions, however much they may differ in thoir opinions respecting the nature
of the subordinate deities, and die veneration which is to be paid to them by man ; and however
barbarous the conceptions of some nations ou this subject may be when compared with those of
others. Hence, says the elegant Maxim us Tyrius, " You will see one according taw and assertion
in all the earth, that there is one God, the king and father of all things, and many Gods, sons of God,
ruling together with him. This the Greek says, and the Barbarian says, the inhabitant of the Continent,
' Via. the present and other works of Protlus, together with those of Plolious, Porphyry, Jambluihus,
Syruaus, Ammonius, Damascrus,01ympu>dorus, and Simplicms.
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I K TnODUCTIO N.
and he who dwells near the sea, the wise and the unwise. And if you proceed as far as to the utmost
shores of the ocean, there also there arc Gods, rising very near to some, and setting very near to
others." ' This dogma, too, is so far from being opposed by either the Old or New Testament, that
it is admitted by both, though it forbids the religious veneration of the inferior deities, and enjoins
the worship of one God alone, whose portion is Jacob, and Israel the line of his inheritance. The
following testimonies will, I doubt not, convince the liberal reader of the truth of (In, assertion.
The
following testimonies will, I doubt not, convince the liberal reader of the truth of (In, assertion.
In tl»e first place it appears from the 3fid chapter of Deuteronomy, v. 8. in the Septuagint
version, that " the divition of the nations teas made according to the number of the angels of
Cod," and not according to the number of the children of Israel, as the present Hebrew text
asserts. This reading was adopted by the most celebrated fathers of the Christian church, such as,
among tlie Greeks, Origen, Basil, and Chrysostom, and among the Latins, Jerom aud Gregory.
That litis too, is the genuine reading, is evident from the 4th chapter of the same book and the I9tb
verse, in which it is said, " Awl lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and wbeu thou sent the
sun and the moon, and the stars, even all the host of heaven, sbouldsl be driven to worship them,
and serve them, which the Lord % God hath divided unto all nations under the whole heaven."
Here it is said that the stars are divided to all the natioas, which is equivalent to saying that the
nations were divided according to the number of the stars ; the Jewish legislator at the same time,
considering his own nation as an exception, and as being under the government of the God of Israel
alone. For iu the following verse it is added, " But the Lord liath taken you (i. e. the Jews), and
brought you forth out of the iron furnace, even out of Egypt, to be unto him a people of inheri-
tance, as ye are to this day." By the angels of God therefore (in Deuteron. 32. v. 8.) ihe stars arc
signified ; and these in the same book (chapter 17- v. 3.) arc cxprr-stly called Gods; " And hath
gone and served other Gods, and worshipped them, either the tun or moon, or any of the host of
heaven, which I have not commanded.'" I u the 3d chapter also, and llic l24lh verse, it is implied
in tlie question which is there asked, that the God of the Jews is superior to all the celestial and
terrestrial Gods : " For what God is there in heaven, or in earth, that cau do according to thy
works, and according to thy might r" As the attention of the Jews was solely confined to the
worship of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, they but little regarded the powers whom they
conceived to be subordinate to this God, and considering all of them as merely the messengers of
their God, they gave them the general appellation of angel* ; though as we shall shortly prove from
t
t mt n»i»it f*« «* rd, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my
footstool." If therefore the heavens are the throne, and the sun the tabernacle of deity, they must
evidently be deified. For nothing can come into immediate contact with divinity without being
divine. Hence, says Siroplicius,' " That it is connascent with the human soul to think the celes-
tial bodies are divine, is especially evident from (hose, (the Jews) who look to these bodies through
preconception* about divine natures. For tbey also say that the heavens are the habitation of God,
and the throne of God, and are alone sufficient to reveal the glory and excellence of God to those
«tho are worthy ; than which assertions what can be more venerable ?"
• In his eommeBUry on the second book of Ari»UiuV«. treaiKc On the Hovn v
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IHTBODOCMOM.
Indeed, that lb* heavens are not the inanimate throne and residence of deity, is also evident from
the assertion in the 19th Psalm, " That the heavens declare the glory of God." For R. Moses,
a very learned Jew, says/ " that the word utphar, to declare or set forth, is never attributed to
is no other than that of those blessed intelligences, who govern the stars, and dispose them into such
letters as Cod has ordained ; declaring unto us men by means of this writing, what events we are
to expect. And hence, this same writing is called by all the ancients cktlab kamtlachim, that is to
say, the writing of the angeli."
The Gods therefore, which were distributed to all the nations but the Jews, were the sun and
moon, and the other celestial bodies, yet not so far as they are bodies, but so far as they are ani-
mated beings. Hence the Hebrew prophets never leprobate and prohibit the worship of the stars
as things which neither see, nor hear, nor understand, as they do the worship of statues. Thus in
Deuteron. iv. and 28. " And there ye shall serve Gods the work of men's hands, wood and stone,
which neither see nor hear, nor eat, nor smell." And the Psalmist, " They have a mouth but
apeak not, &c.« These, and wany other things of the like kind arc said by the prophet, of the
Jews against the worship of images and statues, but never of the sun and moon, and the other
stars. But when they blame the worship of the heavenly bodies, they assign as the cause
(hat the people of Israel are not attributed to them as other nations are, in consequence of
being the inheritance of the God that brought them out of the land of Egypt, and out of the house
of bondage. This is evident from the before cited passage in the 4th chapter of Deuteronomy, in
which it is said that the stars are divided unto ail nations under the whole heaven but the Jews.
This is evident from the before cited passage in the 4th chapter of Deuteronomy, in
which it is said that the stars are divided unto ail nations under the whole heaven but the Jews.
Indeed, as the emperor Julian* justly observes, " unless a certain ethnarchic God presides over
every nation, and under this God there is an angel, a daemon, and a peculiar genus of souls, sub-
arises, — unless this is admitted, let it be shown by any other how this difference is produced. For
it is not sufficient to say, " God said, and it was done," but it is requisite that the natures of
things which are produced should accord with the mandates of divinity. But I will explain more
clearly what I mean. God, for instance, commanded that fire should tend upward, and earthly
masses downward ; is it not therefore requisite, in order that the mandate of God may be aceom-
« See Gaflarcl-s Unheard-*! CuriosiUes, p. 391. » A pud Cyril.
IITTiOBUCtroH. XT
plished, that die formed should be light, and the latter heavy t Thus also in a similar manner in
other things, tllus too, m' divine concerns. But the reasori of (his is, because the human race is frail
and corruptible. Hence also, the works oP man are corruptible and mutable, and subject to all-various
revolutions, But God being eternal, it is also fit that his mandates should be eternal. And being
such, they are either the natures of things, or conformable to the natures of things. For how can
nature contend with the mandate of divinity } How can it fall off from this concord ? If, there-
fore, as he ordered that there should be a confusion of tongues, and that they should not accord
i other, so likewise he ordered that the political concerns of nations should be dis-
l; he has not only effected this by his mandate, but has rendered us naturally adapted to this
dissonance. For to effect this, it would he requisite, in the first place, that the natures of those
should be different, whose political concerns among nations are to be different. This, indeed, is
seen in bodies, li an> one directs his attention to the Germans and Scythians, ami considers how
much the bodies of these differ from those of the Lybi&ru and Ethiopians. Is this therefore, a
respect to the celestial bodies f "
Julian adds, " Moses, however, though he knew the truth of this, concealed it ; nor doea he
ascribe the confusion of tongues to God alone. For he says, that not only God descended, nor one
alone with him, but many, though he does not say who they were. But it is very evident, that he
conceived those who descended with God to be similar to him. If, therefore, not the Lord only,
but those who were with him contributed to this confusion of tongues, they may justly be
lh R C ft U 8 ^ - S of llllA '
But it is very evident, that he
conceived those who descended with God to be similar to him. If, therefore, not the Lord only,
but those who were with him contributed to this confusion of tongues, they may justly be
lh R C ft U 8 ^ - S of llllA '
In short, that the heavens and the celestial bodies are animated by certain divine souls, was not
only the opinion of the ancient poets and philosophers, but also of the mo?l celebrated fathers of
the church, and the most learned and acute of the schoolmen. Thus for instance, this is asserted
by Jerom in his exposition of the 6th verse of the first chapter of Ecclesiastes. And by Origen in
his book On Principles, who says that the heavenly bodies must be animated, because they are said
to receive the mandates of God, which is only consentaneous to a rational nature. This too is
inserted by Eusebius in his Theological Solutions, and by Augustine in bis Enchiridion. Among
the schoolmen too, this was the opinion of Albert us Magnus in his book De quatuor Coteqiuwis ;
of Thomas Aquinas in his treatise De Spiritualibus Creaturis; and of Johannes Scotus Super
Sccundo Sententiarum. To these likewise may be added, the most learned Cardinal Nicolaos
i indeed strenuously contends for the truth of this f»Uua; reran estlcstia
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I KTtOOVCTION. ixi
•
also a roc ei red iMm of «he Pythagoreans and Platonic*, (bat there is no chasm in nature, bat a
chain or >cal« of beings rising bj gentle uninterrupted gradations from the lowest to the highest,
each nature being informed and perfected by the participation of a higher. Aa air becomei
igneous, ao the purest fire becomes animal, and the animal soul become* intellectual, which is to be
understood, not of la* change of «m nature iato another, but of the connection of differ eot natures,
each lower nature being, according to those philosophers, aa it were, a receptacle or object for the
next above tt to reside and act m.
u It is also the doctrine of Platonic philosophers, that intellect is the very life of living things,
die first principle and esemplar of all, from whence, by different degrees, are derived the inferior
classes of life ; fir* the rational, then Ike sensitive, after that the vegetable, but so a* m the rational
animal there is still somewhat intellectual, again in the sensitive there is somewhat rational, and in
the vegetable somewhat sensitive, and lastly in mixed bodies, as metals aud mineral*, somewhat of
vegetation. By 'which means the whole is thought to be more perfectly connected. Which doe-
trine implies that all the faculties, instincts, and motions of inferior beings, in their several
By 'which means the whole is thought to be more perfectly connected. Which doe-
trine implies that all the faculties, instincts, and motions of inferior beings, in their several
" Both Stoics and Platonics held the world to be alive, though sometimes it be mentioned as a
sentient animal, sometimes as a plant or vegetable. Hut in this, notwithstanding what has been
surmised by some learned men, there stem) to be no atheism. For to long a* the world it sup-
posed to be quickened by elementary fire or spirit, which it itself animated by son/, and directed
by understanding, it follows that all pmrtt thereof originally depend upon, and may be reduced
unto, the tame indivisible stem or principle, to wit, a tupreme mind; which it the concurrent
doctrine of Pulkaporeans Platonics and Stoici "
*^n^n*n * _J 9 *> S } • u"
Compare now the Newtonian with this theory, that the heavenly bodies are vitalized bv their
informing souls, that their orderly morion is the result of this vitality, and that the planets move
harmonically round the sun, not as if urged by a centripetal force, but from an animated tendency
to the principle and fountain of their right, and from a desire of partaking as largely as possible of
his influence and power, in the former theory all the celestial morions are the effect of violence,
in the latter they are all natural. Hie former is attended with insuperable difficulties, the biter,
when the principle on which it is founded is admitted, with none. And the former is unscientific
and merely hypothetical ; but the latter is the progeny of the most accurate science, and is founded
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1 XTKODfCTION.
I have said diat I should prove from the testimony of the Apostle Paul, that the Jews were not
consistent in confounding angels properly so called with Gods. And this appears to me to be evident ,
in the first place from the following passage in Hebrews ii. v.S.mvru nwpjn asmjf/rssvcu rtoftuma;
?"!,"«» ••"'i **f « f"I « ♦«uwft»«r to fStoropom ytynmsu. This in the English version is erro-
neously rendered; " Tliroogh faith we understand, that the worlds were framed by the word of
God, so that things which are seen, were not made of things which do appear." I say this is erro-
neously translated, because in the first place, the world* is evidently a forced interpretation of
«(»v«{ ; and even admitting it is not, leaves the passage very ambiguous, from the uncertainty to
what worlds Paul alludes. If we adopt agei, which is the general sense of the word in the New
Testament, we shall indeed avoid a forced and ambiguous interpretation, but we shall rentier the
meaning of the Apostle trifling in the extreme. For as he his elsewhere said, « that all things
were framed by the word of God," what particular faith does it require to believe, that by the
same word he framed the ages ?
For as he his elsewhere said, « that all things
were framed by the word of God," what particular faith does it require to believe, that by the
same word he framed the ages ?
In the second place, from the definition of faith, given in the first verse of this chapter, that it is
« the evidence of things not teen," it is clear, that Paul is speaking in this passage of something
invisible. Since then eumac is neither worlds nor ages, what shall we say it is ? I answer, the
(tones of the Valentinians. And agreeably to this, the whole passage should be translated as
follows : " 13v faith we understand, that the stones were framed bv the word of God, in order that
things which are seen, might be generated from such as do not appear (i. e. from things invisible)."
Every one who is much conversant with Greek authors, must certainly be convinced that «; t»
means m order that ; and Bishop Pearson translates as I have done the latter part of this verse.
Now we learn from the second book of In-nxus against the heretics, that according to the
Valentinians, all created things are the images of the (tones, resident m the pleroma, or fulness of
deity. And does it not clearly follow from the above version, that according to. Paul too, the
icoues arc the exemplars of visible or created things i To which we may add, that this sense of
the passage clearly accords with the assertion that " faith is the evidence of things not seen." For
here the things which do not appear are the aones; these, according to the Valentinians, subsisting
in deity. So that from our version, Paul might say with great propriety, that " we understand by
faith, that the (tones were framed by the word of God, in order that things which are seen, might be
generated from such as do not appear," for this naturally follows from his definition of faith.
1 farther add, that among these tones of the Valentinians were wuj, fU»s, cr/ys, «A,«.-«,
INTRODUCTION. XXlii
i. e. intellect, a profundity, rilence, truth, and witdon, which as Gale well observe* in his note* ou
lamblichua de Mysteriis, &c. prove their dogmas to be of Chaldak origin. For these words per-
petually occur in the fragments of the Chaldaic oracles. And the middle of die Chaldean intelli-
gible triad is denominated «*» «eon,' i. e. eternity, aud is also perfectly conformable to the
theology of Plato, at is very satisfactorily shown by Proclus in the third book of the following
work. According to the Chaldeans therefore, the a-ones are Gods ; and considered as the exem-
plars of the risible universe, they are analogous to the ideas of Plato, which also are Gods, as is
evident from the Parmenides of that philosopher.1 According to Paul too, as die teones are the
i of the visible world, they must be beings of a much higher order than angels, and con-
be Gods ; productive power being one of the great characteristics of a
Again, m the Epistle to the Ephesiaiis, chap. i. v. 21. Paul says that God has exalted Christ
« for »»»/»«» every principality, and power, and might, and dominion," mftan s-arq; agW **»
i Suwumsw «" wgtvnrrtf. And in the 6th chapter and 12th verse be conjoins with princi-
powera, the rulers of the world, i. e. the seven planets, «-po( to; ufxaf, tqo; t«$ #fow-
'jet t*{ xtsaftQxqttTogai. Augustut' c oof esses that he is ignorant what the difference is
between those four words, (principality, power, might, and dominion,) in which the Aposde Paul
seems to comprehend all the celestial society. " Quid inter se distent quatuor Ula vocabula,
quibua univcraam ipsam caelestem societatem videtur Apostolus esse complexus, dicant qui poasunt,
Trallianos) speaks of the angelic orders, the diversities of archangels and armies, the differences of
the orders characterised by might and dominion, of thrones and powers, the magnificence of the
etonet* and the transcendency of Cherubim and Seraphim," tuu yoy ryes eu xaS' o, ri &tS§fuu, xai
Uirau.ai vofir r» treufana, xjxi toj ayytKtn.au T«{"5> »« t«j rauv agyayytA** not OTftmsv rfoMwyo;,
■ Proelos begins the ilxth book of die following werk with o Wring that he hat celebrated in the preceding book the
bebdanadlc «m at the intellect sal Godj, The »> IMTIODDCTIOW.
The opinion of Grotius' therefore, is highly probable, that the Jews obtained the names of
Powers, Dominations, and Principalities, from their Babylonic captivity; ami Gale in his notes on
Iamblichos* says, that certain passages of Zoroaster and Ostanes cited by the author of Arithm.
Theolog. confirm this opinion of Grotius- Indeed, the appellation of aftpu principle*, which are
the first of the four powers mentioned by Paul, was given by the D« My»t. ». «*6.
: .Hm my Collection of tbt*« Or»de» in th« old Montldy Mag»»D*.
« The SyuKlK. fo™ tht secoed triad of Uw mUUir.,bW, aad at UM sum USM iataOectusI trdei of God..
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INTRODUCTION.
Co the Epb«i»ft.,he could not find nn> thing more magnificent lu say of Christ, than that he
is raised even above them, it follows that ihey must be Gods, since they are superior to the angelic
order. It is remarkable too, that he courtages height and depth (vfout »** fia6a;) with |
ties and powers ; and is one of the *o«« a« curdiug to the Valentinians.
It is remarkable too, that he courtages height and depth (vfout »** fia6a;) with |
ties and powers ; and is one of the *o«« a« curdiug to the Valentinians.
In the first Epistle to the Corinthians likewise, chap. viii. v. j. Pmil t xprrs*ly assert* that tier*
is a divine multitude. For be says, « Though there be that arc called ( W», whether in heaven or
in earth, fas there l>e Gods many uud Lord, many ;)" i„ the pu.cuthcsi, of which verse, it i» incon-
trovertibly evident that he adn.its the existence of a plurality of Gods, though as weU as the
heathens he believed that . ue Coa only m supreme and the father of all things. Nor am I singu-
lar in asserting that this wa, admitted by Paul. For the Pwido-Dionysius the Arcopagile in the
second oliapterof his treatise O., the Divi::e Name* observe! concerning what is here said by Paul
a* follows : « Again, from the deife ev^y of God, by which «vry thing according to its »bili:y
become, dciform, many Gods are generate □ : in consequence of which there appears and ia said to
be a separation and multiplication of ihe one [spireme] God. Nc\eilhelc?s, God himself, who is
the chief deity, and is supereiiehlially die suprcm-, is >till one G mI, remaining impartible w the
Gods distributed from him, united to iiimsdf, unmiugleH witli th* many, and void of multitude."
And he afterwards adds, " mat litis was in a transcendent manner understood by Paul, who was
the leader both of him and hli preceptor, to divine illumination," in the above cited verse. And,
« that in divine natures, unions vanquish and precede separations, and yet nevertheless tbey are'
united, after the separation wliich does not in proceeding depart fioru the one, and is unical."1 Pad
therefore, according to this Dionysiu*, considered the Gods, conformably to Plato and the best of
his disciples, as deiform processions from the one, and which at the same time that they have a dis-
tinct subsistence from, are profoundly united to their great producing cause. Dionysius also
employs tlie very same expression which Proclus continually uses when speaking of the separation
of the Gods from iheir source ; for he says -bat the divine multitude rsv „„, i. e. doe,
not depart from, but abides in the on. Hence Proclus in the fifth book of his MS Commentary
Oo the Parmenides of Plato, speaking of tlie divine unities says, " Whichever among these you
assume, it is the same with ihe others, because all of them are in each other, and are rooted in tht
• IUU. rn ,( um rw M» Jw r.w„.,f *,„ fu. urn. «, Tw ^ ,
rr>; — «x^«r.:. „vt. „.,,*,.e „»,„{ , ,„>K %fua „, „„ „t T„ 4llM , '
»t. rx, K.. r-f nr. tw. .. „.„,; l„^rmn «..,„,,„ w ,r«T.a.:.„, v.. «... w„, ,,t.,
S«i-». *U7. .V TW „H ...»^T,r„ „. *«,.#,».
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Ufi miKODUCTlOlt.
urn. «, Tw ^ ,
rr>; — «x^«r.:. „vt. „.,,*,.e „»,„{ , ,„>K %fua „, „„ „t T„ 4llM , '
»t. rx, K.. r-f nr. tw. .. „.„,; l„^rmn «..,„,,„ w ,r«T.a.:.„, v.. «... w„, ,,t.,
S«i-». *U7. .V TW „H ...»^T,r„ „. *«,.#,».
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Ufi miKODUCTlOlt.
Mr. For u 1mm by their •ummiu (i. a. tbeir rooU) we fixed in lb* earth, and through the* are
earthly, after the wine manner al*o divine nature* are rooted by their aumaiu m the one, and each
of then ia a unity aad one, through uncoofuaed union with the one ittdf." H* ya* m, rwrm km-
fiji, tv camp rmi aXXtuc Aop£«n«, turn wturai hi n «AAaAjuf ttrt, xcu m^orreu rueru Kmtang
yaq ra hvlpa Taif Montn K»gw$«jf mSgvrrai Tp yy, xcu i«ti yima x«t" txuraf, Toy sutov Tpoiroy imu t» ftia
nu «vrwy rv«f «m, am r», Si« ran t» ** awtiyxuro*
Thia Dioayaiui, who certainly lived posterior to Proclus, became he continually borrow* from
kia worki, barbaroutly confounding that scientific arrangement of theae deiform pioceesions
from I he -one, which is so admirably unfolded by Proctus in the following work, classes
i\vem a* follows, like first order, according to him, conaist* of Seraphim, Cherubim, and
Thrones. The second of the divine essence* characterized by dominion, might, and power.
Ami tba third of Principalities, Archangels, end Angels. Hence he haa transferred the character-
ise* of the iotclIigibU triad of Goda to Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones. For symmetry,
train, aad beastly, which characterize this triad, are raid by Plato in the Phikbua to subsist
ia the veetibule of the good ; (eri u*» tcij t fin vty&ZwMH yt>«^«f Jt»/«t«t, turn? nmn um.,wMMf» *•» rv »|«rx«»'. D« CoUatt. Mitrarch.
c.ip. 7.
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IrfTBODtfCTlOH. Xivii
■
nmn um.,wMMf» *•» rv »|«rx«»'. D« CoUatt. Mitrarch.
c.ip. 7.
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IrfTBODtfCTlOH. Xivii
■
Vestiges therefor* of the theology of Plato nay be seen both i. the Jewish u
tad in a similar manner, a resemblance m the religions of all other nations to it might be easily
pointed out, and it* universality be clearly demonstrated. Omitting however, • discussion of this
kind for the preterit, I (hall farther observe respecting this theology, that the deification of dead
men, and the worshipping men at Gods form no part of it when it ia eooaidered according to it*
getrume purity. Numerous instances of the truth of thu might be adduced, but I shall mennon for
thu purpose, as unexceptionable witnesses, the writings of Plato, the Golden Pythagoric wees/
and the treatise of Plutarch On Isis and Osixi*. All the works of Plato indeed, evmce the truth
of this position, but this is particularly manifest from his Laws. The Gulden verses order, that the
immortal Gods be honoured first as (hey are disposed by law ; afterwards the illastrious Heroes),
under which appellation, the author of the verses comprehends also angels and daemon* property v
to called : and in the last place the terrestrial damons, i. e. such good men as transcend in virtue the
But to honour the Gods as they are disposed by taw, is, as Hieroele* observe*,
i they are arranged by their fabricator and father j and this ia to honour them a*
beings superior to man. Hence, to honour inert, however excellent they may be, as Gods, is not to
honour the Gods according to the rank in which they are placed by their Creator, for it is con-
founding the divine with the human nature, and is thus acting directly contrary to the Pythagorie
• " Diogenes Laertius says of Pythagoras, Tkat he charged kit ditcipUt net to grot equal drgreu of honour I* Ms
iiodt and heroes. Herodotus (in Euterpe) says of the Greeks, Thai they worthtpptd Ucrtvlu two meyt, mimjs
imnurtal dcxty and to they HfriSrtJ to Mik : ami another at a Hero, and to they celebrated hit memory. Isoerata*
Herodotus (in Euterpe) says of the Greeks, Thai they worthtpptd Ucrtvlu two meyt, mimjs
imnurtal dcxty and to they HfriSrtJ to Mik : ami another at a Hero, and to they celebrated hit memory. Isoerata*
(Enoom. Helen.) distinguishes between the honours of heroes and Gods, when he speaks of Menelaus
and Helena. But the distinction is no where more fully expressed than in the Greek inscription upon
she statue of RegUla, wife to Herodes Atticu*. as Salmasiua thinks, which was set up in his temple
at Triopium, and taken from tha statue itself by Sirroondus; where it is said, That tka had ntUhar tka
konour of a mortal, nor ytt that which vat proper to the Goth : n>i turn •»»*• f the family ; between which honour and tkat of deities, the/ shewed the difference by th? distance of
time between them, and tho preference given to the other. But wherein soever the differmca lay, that there w
n mttincliun acknowledged among them spears by this passage of Valerius in his excellent oration extant in
i>iouyaius llalicainass. Antiq Roiu. lit>. 11. p. 694. I call, says Ua,the Godt toaUxtt,mhou tem/>letand oitareamr
■amUy hat, uurthipped a ilk conmnn tocrifcet; and next after them, J eoil tka Ganii of our natation, to whom
. e give lHT.r{ f^ij, the tetond honenrt nest to the Gods, as Celsus calls those w^ tka duo
honmri that belong to the lower damom. From which we take notice, that the Heathens did not confound all
'"'greet of' divina wonkip, giving to the lowest object the same which they supposed to be due to the calnttai
deities, or the supreme Gad. So tnat if the distinction of divine worship will excuse from Idolatry, the Heathens
were not to blame for iL" See StilttngHeefs answer to a book entitled Catholic* bo Idolater*, p. 510,8 18,&c.
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xnv'di INTRODUCTION.
precept. Plutarch too in his above-mentioned treatise most forcibly and clearly shows the impiety
of worshipping men as Gods, as is evident from die following extract :
510,8 18,&c.
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xnv'di INTRODUCTION.
precept. Plutarch too in his above-mentioned treatise most forcibly and clearly shows the impiety
of worshipping men as Gods, as is evident from die following extract :
" Those therefore, wbo tliink that things of this kind [i. e. fabulous stories of the Gods as if they
were men] are but so many commemorations of the actions and disasters of kings and tyrants, who
through transcendency in virtue or power, inscribed die title of divinity on their renown, and after-
wards fell into great calamities and misfortunes, these employ the most easy method indeed of
eluding the story, and not badly transfer things of evil report, from the Gods to men ; and they
are assisted in so doing by the narrations themselves. For the Egyptians relate, that Hermes was
as to his body, with one arm longer than the other; that Typhon was in his complexion red; but
Orus white, and Osiris black, as if they had been by uature men. Farther still, lliey also call
Otiria a commander, and Canopus a pilot, from whom they say the star of that name was denomi-
nated. The ship likewise, which the Greeks call Argo, being the image of die ark of Osiris, and
which therefore in honour of it is become a constellation, they make to ride not far from Orion and
the Dog ; of which they consider the one as sacred to Orus, but the other to Isis.
" I fear, however, that this [according to the proverb] would be to move things immoveable, and
to declare war, not ouly, as Simouides says, against a great length of time, but also against many
nations and families of mankind wbo are under the influence of divine inspiration through piety to
these Gods; and would not in any respect fall short of transferring from heaven to earth, such grta!
and venerable names, and of thereby shaking and dissolving that worship and belief, which has been
implanted in almost all men from their very birth, would be opening great doors to the tribe o#
atheists, who convert divine into human concerns; and would likewise afford a large license to the
impostures of Eucuicrus of Messina, who devised certain memoirs of an incredible and fictitious
' mythology,* and thereby spread every kind of atheism through the globe, by inscribing all the
received God», tvithout any discrimination, by the names of generals, naval-captain*, and kingt,
who lived iu remote perituh of time. He further adds, that they arc recorded in golden characters,
in a certain country called Panchoa, at which neither any llarburian or Grecian ever arrived,
except Euemcnis alone, who, as it beems, sailed to the Pnnchuaus and Tiiphyllians, that neither
have, nor ever bad a being. Ami though the gnat actions of Semiramis are celebrated by the
Assyrians, and those of Scs-jstris in Egypt ; and though the Phrygians even to the present time, call
Ami though the gnat actions of Semiramis are celebrated by the
Assyrians, and those of Scs-jstris in Egypt ; and though the Phrygians even to the present time, call
' B .Hi Arnobius therefore- and Mimrci-.:* Felix wtrc very- unfortunate in .;i:e:;-g this impov.or to prove that
ir.e4.i r:;«i Cem«, « .Mlnxii Fc«:«;»
O.-is-i.i, J>. 3j0. 8vo. r*i'W'-, KH'j.
INTRODUCTION.
tltoir ancient king*, whom some call Masdes, was a brave and powerful man ; and farther atill,
though Cyrus among the Persians, and Alexander atnon^ the Macedonians, proceeded in their vic-
tories, almost at far as to the boundaries of the earth, yet they ouly retain the name of good king*,
and arc remembered as such, [and not as God*.]
" But if certain persons, inflated by ostentation, as Plato soys, having their soul at one and the
same lime inflamed with youth and ignorance, have insolently assumed the appellulion of Gods, and
had temples erected in their honour, yet this opinion of them flourished but for a short time, and
afterwards they were charged with vanity and arrogance, in conjunction with impiety and lawless
con luct j and thus,
Like smoke they flew away with swift-pae'd fate.
And being dragged from temples and altars like fugitive slave*, they have now nothing left
them, but their monuments and tombs. Hence Arttigonus the elder said to one llermodotus, who
had celebrated him in his poems us the offspring of the sun ami a God, 'he who empties my
close-stool-pan knows no such thing of me.' Very properly also, did I.) sip pus the sculptor blame
Apelles the painter, for drawing the picture of Alexander with a lliunder-bolt in his hand, whereas
he had represented him with a spear, the glory of which, as being true and proper, no time would
take away."
In another part of the same work also, he admirably reprobates the impiety of making the Gods
to be things inanimate, which was very common with Latin writers of the Augustan age, and of the
ages that accompanied the decliue and fall of the Roman empire. But what he says on this sub-
ject is as follows :
" In the s-ccond plac*. which is of still greater consc-nuence, men should be careful, and very
much afraid, lest before they are aware, they tear in pieces and dissolve divine natures, into blast*
of wind, streams of water, semination*, t arings of land, accidents of the earth, and mutations of
the season*, us those do « ho male Bacchus to be vt ine, ami Vulcan flame. Cleanlhes also some-
where says, that Persephoue or Proserpine is the spirit or air that pasttt through ($tf«/*n»r) the
fruits of the earth, and is then tlaitt, (4cnv5firvc>'.) Aud a certain poet says of reapers,
Then when the youth the limb* of Ceres cut.
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INTRODUCTION.
Cleanlhes also some-
where says, that Persephoue or Proserpine is the spirit or air that pasttt through ($tf«/*n»r) the
fruits of the earth, and is then tlaitt, (4cnv5firvc>'.) Aud a certain poet says of reapers,
Then when the youth the limb* of Ceres cut.
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INTRODUCTION.
For the*; men do not m any respect differ from those who conceive the tail*, the cable*, and the
anchor of a ship, to be the pilot, the yarn and the web to be the weaver, and the bowl,1 or the
mead, or the ptisan, to be the physician. But they also produce dire and atheistical opinions, by
•firing the names of Gods to natures and things deprived of sense and Soul, and that are necessarily
destroyed by men, who are in want of and use them. For it is not portable to conceive that these
things are Gods; since, neither can any thing be a God to men, which is deprived of soul, or is
subject to human power. From these things however, we are led to conceive those beings to be
Gods, who both use them and impart them to us, and snpply them perpetually and without ceasing.
Nor do we conceive that the Gods who bestow these, aie different in different countries, nor that
some of them are peculiar to the Barbarians, but others to the Grecians, nor that some are
southern, and others northern ; but as the sun and moon, the heavens, the land, end the $e«, are
common to all men, yet are differently denominated by different nations; so the one reason that
preside over all nations, have different appellations and honours assigned them according to law by
different countries. Of those also that have been consecrated to their service, some employ
obscure, but others clearer symbols, not without danger thus conducting our inteDectual concep-
tions to the apprehension of divine natures. For some, deviating from the true meaning of these
symbols, have entirely slipt into superstition ; and others again flying from superstition as a quag-
mire, have unaware fallcu upon atheism as on a precipice. Heucc, in order to avoid these danger*,
it is especially necessary that resuming the reasoning of Philosophy as our guide to mystic know-
ledge, we should conceive piously of every thing that is said or done in religion ; lot that, as
Theodorus said, while he extended his arguments with his right hand, some of his auditors received
them with their left, so we should fall into dangerous errors, by receiving what the laws have vvr'l
instituted about sacrifices and festivals in a manner different from their original intention."
The Emperor Julian, as well as Plutarch appears to have been perfectly aware of this confusion
in the religion of the Heathens arising from the dedication of men, and in the fragments of his
treatise against the Christians, preserved by Cyril, he speaks of it as follows : " If any one. wishes
to consider the truth respecting you [Christians,] he will find that your impiety is composed of the
Judaic audacity, and the indolence and cuii/mion of the Ileathtnt. For deriving from both, not
that which is most beautiful, but the worst, you have fabricated a web of evils. Willi tl..
Hebrew* ndeed, there are accurate and venerable laws pertaining to religion, ami inuuiiieral.lv
precepts which require a in-jst holy life and deliberate choice. But ulnvn the Jewish legislator
forbids the serving all the Gods, and eisjoius the worship of one alone, whose portion is Jacob, and
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IKT ft«»«C*IOH. Uli
Israel ttwlim of k» nafc*ritsmce, end not only say* tkos, but also omits to odd, I think, yea
not revise the Cod., the detestable wickedness and Mdacity of those in after times, wiping to take
•way all religious reverence from (be mukitude, (bought that not to worship should be followed by
blaspheming the Gods. Thia you hare alone tl>e»ce derived ; bat there ia no srtnihivtde in any
ihiug else between you bik! them. Hence, from the innovation of the Hebrews, you bare seized
blasphemy toward* the venerable Goda; but from our religion you hare coat tuidt reverence to
tvx'rtf nature more excellent thou man, and the iov€ of paternal tHetttsstes -
them. Hence, from the innovation of the Hebrews, you bare seized
blasphemy toward* the venerable Goda; but from our religion you hare coat tuidt reverence to
tvx'rtf nature more excellent thou man, and the iov€ of paternal tHetttsstes -
" So great au apprehension indeed, rays Dr. Stillingfleet,' had the Heathen? of ihe Mceaarty of
appropriate acts of divine worihip, that some of them have chosen to die, rather than to give them
to what they did not believe to be God. We have a remarkable rtorv to this purpose in Arrian
and Curtius* concerning CaUiathenes. Alexander arriving at that degree of vanity, as to desire
to have divine worship given him, and the matter being started out of design among the courtiers,
either by Anaxarchua, aa Arrian, or Cleo the Sicilian, as Curtius says ; and the way of doing it
proposed, viz. by incense and prostration; CaOUtheaea vehemently opposed it, at that which
would confound' the difference of human and divine worship, which had been preserved inviolable
among them. The worship of the Gods had been kept up in temples, with altars, and images, and
sacrifices, and hymns, and prostrations, and such like ; but it it by no meant fitting, says he, for
U4 to confound thete things, either by lifting up nun to the honours of the Gods, or depressing the
Gods to the honours of men. For neither would Alexander suffer any man to usurp his royal dig-
nity by the votes of men ; how much more justly may the Gods disdain for any man to take their
houonra to himself. And it appears by Plutarch,1 that the Greeka thought it a mean and base
thing for any of them, when sent on an embassy to the kings of Persia, to prostrate themselves
before them, because this was only allowed among them in divine adoration. Therefore, says he,
when Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent to Arlax erics, Pelopidas did nothing unworthy, but
Ismeniaa let fall bis ring to the ground, and stooping for that was nought to make his adoration ;
which was altogether as good a shift as Use Jesuits advising the crucifix to be held in the Mandarin*'
hands while they made their adoration* in the Heathen temples in China.
" Conon* also refused to make his adoration, ns n disgrace to his city; and Isocrates' accuses
' Answer to Catholics no Idolaters Lond. 1876. p. tit.
1 Arrian.de Exped. Alex. I. 4. et Curt. lib. 8.
• Viu Aruxen. /Elian. Var. hist. lib. 1. c. tl.
♦ Justin, lib. 6.
> Paaegyr.
:
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IXTROBUCTIO M.
1876. p. tit.
1 Arrian.de Exped. Alex. I. 4. et Curt. lib. 8.
• Viu Aruxen. /Elian. Var. hist. lib. 1. c. tl.
♦ Justin, lib. 6.
> Paaegyr.
:
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IXTROBUCTIO M.
the Persians for doing it* because hertin they shewed, that they despised the Gods rather than men,
by prostituting their honours to their princes. Herodotus* mentions Sperchius and Brdis, who
could not with the greatest violence bo brought to give adoration to Xerxes, because it was against
the lavs of their country to give divhie honour to men.' And Valerius Maximus* says, the Jthe-
. mans put Timagorat to death for doing it ; so strong an apprehension had possessed them, that
. the manner of worship which the) used to their Gods, should be preserved sacred and inviolable."
The philosopher Sallusl also in his treatise On the (Jods and the World says, " It is not unreasona-
ble to suppose that impiety is a species of punishment, and that those who bave had a knowledge
of the Gods, and yet despised ineni, will in another life be deprived of this knowledge. And it is
requisite to make the punisliment of those who have honoured their kings as Gods to consist in
being expelled from the Gods."'
And it is
requisite to make the punisliment of those who have honoured their kings as Gods to consist in
being expelled from the Gods."'
When the ineffable transcendency of the first God, whith was considered as the grand principle
in the Heathen theology, by iu most ancient promulgators Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, was
forgotten, this oblivion was doubtless the principal cause of dead men being deified by the Pagans.
Had they properly directed their attention to this tram cendency they would have perceived it to be
so immense as to surpass eternity, infinity, self-subsistence, and even essence itself, and that these
in reality belong to those veiu-rable natures which are as it were first unfolded into light from the
unfathomable depihsof that truly mystic unknown, about which all kuowledgc is refunded into
ignorance. For as Simplicius justly observes, " It is requisite that he who ascends to the princi-
ple of things should investigate whether it is possible there cau be any thing better than the sup-
posed principle : and if something more excellent is found, the same enquiry should again be
made respecting that, till we arrive at the highest conceptions, Uian which we have no longer any
more venerable. Nor should we stop in our asceiit till we find this to be the case. For then- is
no occasion to fear that our progression will be through an unsubstantial void, by conceiving some-
thing about the first principles which is greater and more transcendent than their nature. For it is
not possible for our conceptions to take such a mighty leap as to equal, and much less to pass
beyond the dignity of the first principles of things." He adds, '« This therefore is oue and the best
extension [of the soul] to [ihe highest] God, and is as much as possible irreprel.enrille ; viz. to
know firmly, lliat by ascribing to him the n,o.-t venerable excellencies we can couceive, and the
mmt holy and primary names and things, we ascribe nothing to hi.n which is suitable to bis dignity.
' r.ib.T.
' l.:h. 6 Cap. 3.
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INTRODUCTION.
xixiii
It is sufficient however, to procure our pardon [for the attempt,] that we can attribute to him
superior.'" If it is not possible therefore to form any idea, equal to tbe dignity of the
: progeny of the ineffable, i. e. of the first principle* of things, how much less can our
conceptions reach that thrice unknown darkuess, in the reverential language of the Egyptians,1
which is even beyond these? Had the Heathens therefore considered as they ought this trans-
cendency of the supreme God, they would never have presumed to equalize the human with the
divine nature, and consequently would never have worshipped men aa'Gods. Their theology,
however, is not to be accused as the cause of this impiety, but their forgetfolness of the sub-
of its dogmas, and tbe confusion with which this oblivion wa
r
i
Their theology,
however, is not to be accused as the cause of this impiety, but their forgetfolness of the sub-
of its dogmas, and tbe confusion with which this oblivion wa
r
i
lu the last place, I wish to adduce a few respectable testimonies to prove that statues were not
considered nor worshipped by any of the intelligent Heathens as Gods, but as the resemblance* of
the Gods, as auxiliaries to tbe recollection of a divine nature, and tbe means of procuring its assist-
ance and favour. For this purpose, I shall first present the reader with what the philosopher
Sallust says concerning sacrifices and the honours which were paid to the divinities, in his golden
treatise On the Gods and the World. " The honours, says he, which we pay to the Gods are per-
formed for the sake of our advantage ; and since the providence of the Gods is every where
extended, a certain habitude or fitness is all that is requisite in order to receive their beneficent
communications. But all habitude is produced through imitation and simiUtude. He
imitate the heavens, but altars die earth ; statues resemble life, and on this account
to animals; prayers imitate that which is intellectual; but characters superior ineffable power* ;
herbs and stones resemble matter ; and animals which are sacrificed the irrational life of oar souls.
But from all these nothing happens to the Gods beyond what they already possess ; for what acces-
sion can be made to a divine nature ? But • conjunction with our souls and the Gods is by these
" I think however, it will be proper to add a few things concerning sacrifices. And in the first
■ Kat xf rn l¥' ni "fX*! »»fimmrm ^v>'», »• Ivwit "w *> *f*m m s/mitunt «fX'r "f* ,l,f**ft ■»«•»
fittir, live *' "C T*r lmt*f n ■wriSnw^n «{uw urn., it vur I* wrfif-K, n pvtn iXn. nuixw WfTi/w. Siniplic. in Epiet.
Enchir. p. 307. Lond. 1670. 8vo.
1 Of the first principle, says Dam&scius (in M. S. «f» "fx4") the Egyptians said nothing, but celebrated it a*
a darkness beyond all intellectual conception, a thrice unknown darkness, »^nt«/x" mim—n; nan; v*f «•#«
SM|m>, gn*rtv «y»o»9r>f, T»t{ ravrt**i4SfA«^ifT':.
Proc. Vol. 1. e
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IMtV
INTRODUCTION.
S. «f» "fx4") the Egyptians said nothing, but celebrated it a*
a darkness beyond all intellectual conception, a thrice unknown darkness, »^nt«/x" mim—n; nan; v*f «•#«
SM|m>, gn*rtv «y»o»9r>f, T»t{ ravrt**i4SfA«^ifT':.
Proc. Vol. 1. e
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IMtV
INTRODUCTION.
place, fince we pones* every thing from the Gods, ami it U but just to offer the first fruits of gifts
to the givers ; hence, of our possession* we offer the first fruitit through consecrated gifts ; of our
bodies through ornaments ; and of our life through sacrifices. Besides, without sacrifices, prayers
are words only ; but accompanied with sacrifices they become animated words ; the words indeed
corroborating life, but life animating the words. Add too, that the felicity of every thing is its
proper perfection ; but the proper perfection of every thing consists in a conjunction widi its cause.
And on this account we pray that we may be conjoined with the Gods. Sbce therefore life pri-
marily subsists in the Gods, and there is also a certain human life, but the latter desires to be
united to the former, a medrum is required ; for natures much distant from each other cannot be
conjoined without a medium. And it is necessary that the medium should be similar to the con-
necteri natures. Life therefore must necessarily be the medium of life ; and hence men of the
present day that are happy, and all the ancirnts, have sacrificed animals. And this indeed not rashly,
but in a manner accommodated to every God, with many other ceremonies respecting the cultiva-
tion of divinity.'"
In the next place, the elegant Maximum Tyrius admirably observes concerning the worship of
statues ' as follows : " It appears to me that as external discourse has no need, in order to its com-
position, of certain Phoenician, or Ionian, or Attic, or Assyrian, or Egyptian characters, but human
imbecility devised these marls, in which inserting its dulness, it recovers from them its memory ;
in like manner a divine nature has no need of statues or altars ; but human nature being very imbe-
cile, aud as uiucb distant from divinity as earth from heaven, devised these symbols, in which it
inserted the names and the renown of the Gods. Those, therefore, whose memory is robust, and
who are able, by directly extending their soul to heaven, to meet with divinity, have, perhaps,* uo
need of statues. This race is, however, rare among men, and in a whole nation you will not find
one who recollects divinity, and who is not in want of this kind of assistance, which resembles that
devised by writing masters for hoys, who give them obscure marks as copies ; by m riling over
• See chap. 15 and 16, of my translation of this excellent work.
* See Vol. t of my translation of his Dissertations, Disserlat. 38, the title of which i«, " Whether statues
should be d«dicatcd to the Gods."
15 and 16, of my translation of this excellent work.
* See Vol. t of my translation of his Dissertations, Disserlat. 38, the title of which i«, " Whether statues
should be d«dicatcd to the Gods."
» The philosopher hidoru* was a man of this description, as we are informed by Damnum? in the extracts
front his life preserved by Photius. For he says of him i ™ .*•>*,, ,i, „• ,vtw( Tlw>.
TW?i»T»Kf trrmt ; tjvn Jiipw aTr^yTf Mat Tot***" tat r*f ti »X>.ff * aytatrn; t/tt • ifttf j xai rtm rturt $a^i„, tvaetr u mufw
inf.- i.»n» imlsmm, mi m** nit, \. e. " He was not willing to adore statues, hut approached to
the God. themselves, w ho aie inwardly concealed not in adyta, but in the occult itscllj whatever it may be of alt-
perfect ignorance. Uow therefore 10 them being such did he approach ? Through vehement love, this also
being occult. And what else indeed, could conduct him to them than a love which is also unknown f What
my meaning i§ those who have experienced this love know ; but it is impossible to reveal it by words «"1 >*
no less difficult to understand what it is."
Di
INTRODUCTION.
«hicb, their hand being guided by that of the matter, they become, through memory, accustomed
to the art. It appear* to me therefore, that legislator* devised these statues for men, as if fur a
certain kind of boys, as tokens of the honour which should be paid to divinity, und a certain
duction as it were and path to rcaiiuiscctice.
He then observes, " Unit with respect to the Barbarian*, all of them in like manner admit the
subsistence of divinity, but different nations among these adopt different symbols." After which lie
adds, " O many and all-various statue* ! of which some are fashioned by art, and other* are
embraced through indigcoce : some arc honoured through utility, ami others are venerated through
the astonishment which they excite ; some arc considered as divine tlirough their magnitude, and
others are celebrated for their beauty ! There is not indeed any nice of men, neither Barbarian nor
Grecian, neither maritime nor continental, neither living a iwstonil life, nor dwelling in cities, which
can endure t<> be without some symbols of the hononr of the Gods. How, therefore, dial! any one
discuss the question whether it is proper that statues of the Gods should be fabricated or not ? For
if we were to give laws to other men recently sprung from the earth, aud dwelling beyond our
boundaries and our air, or who were fashioned by a certain Prometheus, ignorant of life, and law,
and reason, it might perhaps demand consideration, whether this race should be permitted to adore
tlicse spontaneous statues alone, which are not fashioned from ivory or gold, aud which are neither
" Of statues however, there is neither one law, nor one mode, nor one art, nor one matter. For
the Greeks think it Jit to honour the Gods from things the most beautiful in the earth, from a pure
matter, the human form, and accurate art : and their opinion is not irrational who fashion statues in
the human resemblance. For if the human soul is most near and most similar to divinity, it is not
reasonable to suppose that divinity would invest that which is most similar to himself with a most
deformed body, but rather with one which would be an easy vehicle to immortal souls, light, and
adapted to motion. for this alone, of all the bodies on the earth, raises its summit on high, is
magnificent, superb, and full of symmetry, neither astonishing through its magnitude, nor terrible
through its strength, nor moved with difficulty through its weight, nor slippery through its smooth-
ness, nor repercussivc through its hardness, nor groveling through its coldness, nor precipitate
through its beat, nor inclined to swim through its laxity, nor feeding on raw flesh through its fero-
city, nor on grass through its imbecility ; but is harmomcally composed for its proper works, and
is dreadful to timid animals, but mild to such as arc brave. It ia also adapted to walk by nature,
but winged by reason, capable of swimming by art, feeds on com and fruits, and cultivates the
earth, is of a good colour, stands firm, has a pleasing countenance, and a graceful beard. In the
resemblance of such a body, die Greeks think fit to honour the Gods."
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INTBOBUCTION.
oaks nor cedars, nor rivers, nor bird*, but the rising sun, (be splendid moon, the variegated heaven,
the earth itself and the air, all fire and all water ; or shall we constrain these men also to the nec ea-
sily of honouring wood, or stones or images ? If, however, this is the common law of all men, let
bola a* well as their names.
" For divinity indeed, the father and fabricator of a)i things, is more ancient than the sun and the
heavens, more excellent than time and eternity, and every flowing nature, and is a legislator with*
out law, ineffable by voice, and invisible by the eyes. Not being able, however, to comprehend his
Not being able, however, to comprehend his
silver, to plants and rivers, to the summits of mountains, and to streams of water ; desiring indeed
to understand his nature, hut tlu-ough imbecility calling him by the names of such things as appear
to us to be beautiful. And in thus acting, we are affected in the same manner as lovers, who are
delighted with surveying the images of the objects of their love, and with recollecting the lyre, the
dart, and the seat of these, the circus in which they ran, and every thing in short, whkh excites tho
memory of the beloved object. What then remains for me to investigate and determine respecting
statues f only to admit the subsistence of deity. But if the art of Phidias excite* the Greeks to the
recollection of divinity, honour to animals the Egyptians, a river others, and fire others, I do not
condemn the dissonance : let them ouly know, let them only love, let them only be mindful of the
object they adore."
With respect to the worship of animals, Plutarch apologizes for it in the following excellent man-
ner in hi, treatise On Isis and Osiris.
" It now remains that we should speak of the utility of these animals to man, and of their sym-
bolical meaning ; some of them partaking of one of these only, hut many of them of both. It is
e\idcnl therefore tlifit tilt El^yptiHns worsliijir/jcti tlic ox^ tlic she*?^] sod tlic ic b DC Uikk 00 j OD 3fcCC OUf) t
of their use and benefit, as the Letnnians did larks, for discovering the eggs of caterpillars and
breaking them ; and the Thessalians storks, because, as their land produced abundance of ser-
pents, the storks destroyed all of tbem as soon as they appeared. Hence also ibey enacted a law,
that whoever killed a stork should be banished. But the Egyptians honoured the asp, the weezle,
and the beetle, in consequence of observing in them certain dark resemblances of the power of the
Gods, like that of the sun in drops of water. For at present, many believe and assert that the
weezle engenders by the ear, and brings forth by the mouth, being thus an image of the generation
of reason, [or the productive principle of things.] But the genus of beetles has no female; and
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INTRODUCTION.
XII VII
For at present, many believe and assert that the
weezle engenders by the ear, and brings forth by the mouth, being thus an image of the generation
of reason, [or the productive principle of things.] But the genus of beetles has no female; and
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INTRODUCTION.
XII VII
all the males emit their sperm into a spherical piece of earth, which they roll about thrusting it
backwards with their hind feet, while they themselves move forward ; just as the sun appears to
revolve in a direction contrary to that of the heavens, in coasequence of moving from west to east.
They also assimilated the asp to a star, is being esempt from old age, and performing its motions
1 by organs with agility and ease Nor was the crocodile honoured by them without a
> ; but is said to have been considered by them as • resemblance of divinity, as being
the only animal that is without a tongue. For the divine reason is unindigent of voice, and proceed-
ing through a silent path, and accompanied with ' justice, conducts mortal affairs according to it.
They also say it is the only animal living in water mat has the sight of its eyes covered with a thin
film which descends from his forehead so thjt he sees without beinsr seen which
r with the first God. But in whatever place the female crocodile may lay her
eggs, this may with certainty be concluded to be the boundary of the increase of the Nile. For
not being able to lay their eggs in the water, and fearing to lay them far from it, they have such an
accurate pre-sensation of futurity, that though they enjoy the benefit of the river in its access, during
the time of their laying and hatching, yet they preserve their eggs dry and untouched by the water.
Tbey also lay sixty eggs, are the same number of days in hatching them, and those that are the
*em, live just so many years ; which number ia the first of the measures
" Moreover, of those animals that were honoured for both reasons, we have before spoken of the
dog. But the ibis, killing indeed all deadly reptiles, was the first that taught men the use of medi-
cal evacuation, in consequence of observing that she is after this manner washed and purified by
herself. Those priests also, that are most attentive to the laws of sacred rites, when they coose-
crate water for lustration, fetch it from that place where the ibis had been drinking ; for ahe will
neither drink nor come near unwholesome or infected water ; b t with the distance of her feet from
each other, and her bill she makes an equilateral triangle. Farther still, the variety and mixture of
her black wings about die white represents the moon when she is gibbous.
Farther still, the variety and mixture of
her black wings about die white represents the moon when she is gibbous.
" We ought not, however, to wonder if the Egyptians love such slender similitudes, since the
Greeks also, both in their pictures and statues, employ many such like resemblances of the Gods.
Thus in Crete, there was a statue of Jupiter without ears. For it is fit that he who is the ruler
and lord of all things, should bear no one.* Phidias also placed a dragon by the statue of
• Instead of «» I read
* i. e. Should be perfectly impartial.
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INTRODUCTION.
Thus in Crete, there was a statue of Jupiter without ears. For it is fit that he who is the ruler
and lord of all things, should bear no one.* Phidias also placed a dragon by the statue of
• Instead of «» I read
* i. e. Should be perfectly impartial.
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INTRODUCTION.
Minerva, and a snail by that of Venus at Elis, to show that virgins require a guard, and that keep*
ing at home and silence become married women. But the trident of Neptune is a symbol of the
third region of the world, which the sea possesses, having an arrangement after the heavens and the
air. Hence also, they thus denominated Amphitritc and the Tritons. The Pythagoreans likewise
adorned numbers and figures with the appellations of the Gods. For they called the equilateral
triangle Minerva Coryphagenes, or begotten from the summit, and Tritogeneia, because it is divided
by three perpendiculars drawn from tbe three angles. But they called die one Apollo, being per-
•uaded to this by the obvious meaning of the word Apollo [which signifies a privation of multi-
tude] and bv the simplicity of the monad.' Hie duad they denominated strife and audacity ; and
the triad justice. For since injuring and being injured are two extremes subsisting according to
excess and defect, justice through equality has a situation in the middle. But what is called the
tctractys, being the number 36, was, as is reported, their greatest oath, and was denominated the
world. For this number is formed from tbe composition of the four first even, and the four first
odd numbers, collected into one sum.1 If therefore the most approved of the philosophers did not
think it proper to neglect or despise any occult signification of a divine nature when" they perceived
it even in things which are inanimate and incorporeal, it appears to me, that they in a still greater
degree venerated those peculiarities depending on manners which they saw in such natures as had
sense, aud were endued with soul, with passion, and ethical habits. We must embrace therefore, not
those who honor these kings, but those who reverence divinity through these, as through most clear
mirrors, and which are produced by nature, in a becoming manner, conceiving them to be the instru-
ments or the art of the God by whom all things arc perpetually adorned. But we ought to think that no
inanimate being cau be more excellent than one that is animated, nor an insensible than a sensitive
being, not even though some one should collect together all the gold and emeralds in the universe. For
tlie divinity is not ingeuerated either in colours, or figures, or smoothness; but such things as neither
ever did, nor are naturally adapted to participate of life, have an allotment more ignoble than that of
dead bodies. But the nature which lives and sees, and has the principle of motion from itself, and a
knowledge of tilings appropriate and foreign to its being, has certainly derived an efflux and portion
of that wisdom, which, as Heraclitus says, considers how both itself, aud the universe is governed.
Hence the divinity is not worse represented in these animals, than in the workmanships of copper
and stone, which in a similar manner suffer corruption ami decay, hut arc naturally deprived of all
sense and consciousness. This then I consider as the best defence that cau be given of the adora-
tion of animals by the Egyptians.
This then I consider as the best defence that cau be given of the adora-
tion of animals by the Egyptians.
■ Instead of J'tm*™i as in the original, which is nooscim, it is necetsary to r*aJ, as in the above
translation ««>*t^ti tic pWo:.
1 For»+4+6+8=l«0; and 1+S+S+7=1«; and 20+16=30.
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I INTRODUCTION.
uiii
With respect however to the sacred vestments, those of Iais are of various hue* ; for her power
is about matter, which becomes and receives all things, as light and darkness, day and night, fire
and water, life and death, beginning and end ; but those of Osiris are without a shade and have no
variety of colours, but have one only which is simple and luciform. Hence when the latter have
been once used, they are laid aside and preserved ; for the intelligible is invisible and intangible.
But the vestments of Isis are used frequently. For sensible things being in daily use and at hand,
present us with many developements and views of their different mutations : but the intellectual
perception of that which is intelligible, genuine, and holy, luminously darting through the soul like
a coruscation, is attended with a simultaneous contact and vision of its object. Hence Plato and
Aristotle call this part of philosophy epoplic or intuitive, indicating that those who have through
the exercise of the reasoning power, soared beyond these doxastic, mingled and all- various natures,
raise themselves to that first, simple, and immaterial principle, and passing into contact with the
pure truth which subsists about it, they consider themselves as having at length obtained the end
of philosophy.' And that which the present devoted and veiled priests obscurely manifest with
great reverence and caution is that this God is the ruler and prince of the dead, and is not different
from that divinity who is called by the Greeks Hades and Pluto, the truth of which assertion not
being understood, disturbs the multitude, who suspeet that the truly sacred and holy Osiris dwell*
in and under the earth, where the bodies of those are concealed who appear to have obtained an
end of their being. But he indeed himself is at the remotest distance from the earth, unstained,
unpolluted, and pure from every essence that receives corruption and death. The souls of men
however, being here encompassed with bodies and passiuu*, cannot participate of divinity except
as of an obscure dream by intellectual contact through philosophy. But when they are liberated
from the body, and pans into the invisible, impassive, and pure region, this God is then their leader
and king, from whom they depend, insatiably beholding him, and desiring to survey that beauty
which cannot be expressed or uttered by men ; and which lsis, as the ancient discourse evinces,
always loving, pursuing, and enjoying fills such things in these lower regions as participate of gene,
ration with every thing beautiful and good."
And lastly, the Emperor Julian, in a fragment of an Oration or Epistle on the duties of a priest,
has the following remarks on religiously venerating statues : " Statues and altars, and the preser-
vation of unextinguished fire, and in short, all such particulars, have been established by our fathers
as symbols of the preseuce of the Gods; not that tee should believe that thete tymboU art
Gods, but that through thete we should vorthip the God$. For since we are connected with body,
* For T-Xf •xi.M
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xl INTRODUCTION.
it is alio Decenary that our worship of the God* should be performed in a corporeal manner; but
they are incorporeal. And they indeed have exhibited to us aa the first of statues, that which
ranks as the second genus of Gods from the first, and which circularly revolves round the whole of
heaven.1 Since, however, a corporeal worship cannot even be paid to these, because they are
naturally unindigenl, a third kind of statues was devised on the earth, by the worship of which we
render the Gods propitious to us. For as those who reverence the images or kings, who are not
in want of any such reverence, at the same time attract to themselves their benevolence ; thus also
those who venerate the statues of the Gods, who are not in want of any thing, persuade the Gods
by this veneration to assist and be favourable to them. For alacrity in the performance of tilings
T in our power is a document of true sanctity ; and it is very evident that he who accomplishes the
former, will in a greater degree possess the latter. But he who despises things in his power, and
i pretends to desire impossibilities, evidently does not pursue the latter, and overlooks the
For though divinity is not in want of any thing, it does not follow that on this account
; is to be offered to him. For neither is he in want of celebration through the ministry of
words. What then I (Is it therefore reasonable that he should be deprived of this ? By no means.
Neither therefore is he to be deprived of the honour which is paid him through works; which
honour has been legally established, not for three, or for three thousand years, but in all preceding
ages, among all natiotis of the earth.
By no means.
Neither therefore is he to be deprived of the honour which is paid him through works; which
honour has been legally established, not for three, or for three thousand years, but in all preceding
ages, among all natiotis of the earth.
" But [the Galilssans will say,] O ! you who hai
whom, though according to you tbey are formless and unfigured, you have fashioned in a corporeal
resemblance, it is not fit that honour should be paid to divinity through such works. How, then,
do not we [heathens] consider as wood and stones thaw statues which are fashioned by the hands
of men* O more stupid than even stones themselves ! Do you fancy that all men are to be
drawn by the nose at you are drawn by execrable dwmont, so as to think that the artificial resem-
blances of the Gods are the Gods themselves* Looking therefore to the resemblances of the
Gods, we do not think them to be either stones or wood ; for neither do we think that the Gods
are these resemblances; since neither do we say that royal images are wood, or stone, or brass, nor
that tbey are the kings themselves, but the images of kings. Whoever, therefore, loves his king,
beholds with pleasure the image of his king ; whoever loves his child is delighted with his image ;
loves his father surveys bis image with delight* Hence also, he who is a lover of
at bodies the celestial orbs, which in const quence of participating a divine life from the
corporeal powers from which they are suspend*
* Dt. Sullingteet quotes this part of the extract, in his i
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INTRODUCTION.
divinity gladly surveys the statues and image* of the Gods; at the i
with a holy dread the Gods who invisibly behold hint.'
The Catholics have employed arguments similar to these, in defence of the reverence which they
pay to the images of their saints. Indeed, it is the doctrine of the Church of England,* that the
Indeed, it is the doctrine of the Church of England,* that the
1 " Dio Chrysostome (says Dr. Stillingfleet in the before-cited work, p. 414) at large debates the case
images, in bis Olympic Oration; wherein he first show*, thmt all me a have a natural apprehension of one
supreme God the father of all things; and that this Cod was represented by the statue made by Phidias of
Jupiter Olympius, for so he said *«f' r mnpnt btfert n-aom ire note art; and then describe* him to be the ting,
ruler, and father of all, both Gods and men. This image be calls the roost blessed, the most excellent, the most
beautiful, the most beloved image of God. He says there are four ways of comiug to the knowledge of God, by
nature, by the instructions of the poets, by the laws, and by images; but neither poets, nor lawgivers, nor arti-
ficers were the best interpreters of the deity, but only the philosophers who both understood and explained the
divine nature most truly and perfectly. After this, he supposes Phidias to be called to account for making such
an image of God, as unworthy of him; when Iphitus, Lycurgus, and the old Eleans, made none at all of him, as
being out of the power of man to express his nature. To this Phidias replies, that no man can express miud and
understanding by figures, or colours, and therefore they are forced to By to that in which the soul inhabits, and
from thence they attribute the *«»t of wisdom and reason to God, having nothing better to represent him by.
And by that means joining power and art together, they endeavour by something which may be seen and painted,
to represent that which is invisible and inexpressible. But it may be said, we had better then have no image or
representation of him at all. No, says be ; for mankind doth not love to worship God at a distauce, but to come
near and feel him, and with assurance to sacrifice to him and crown him. Like children newly i
their parents, who put out their hands towards them in their dreams as if they were still present; so do i
of the sense of God's goodness and their relation to him, love to have him represented as present with them, and
so to converse with him. Thence have come all the 'representations of God among the barbaruus nations, in
mountains, and trees, and stones."
Thence have come all the 'representations of God among the barbaruus nations, in
mountains, and trees, and stones."
The same conceptions also about statues are entertained by the Brachmans in Benares on the Ganges. For
Monsieur Bernier when he was at their university, and was discoursing with one of the most learned men among
tbem, proposed to him the question about the adoration of their idols, and reproaching him with it as a thing
very unreasonable, received from him this remarkable answer : " We nave indeed in our temples many different
statues, as those of Brahma, Mahadeo, Genick, and Gavani, who are some of the chief and most perfect Deutas
(or Deities) ; and we have also many others of less perfection, to whom we pay great honour, prostrating our-
selves before them, and presenting them flowers, rice, oylcs, saffron, and the like, with much ceremony. But
we do not believe these statues to be Brahma or Becben, Arc. themselves, but only their images
lions, and we only give them that honour ou account of the beings they represent. They are in our
because it is necessary in order to pray well, to have something before our eyes that may fix the mind. And
when we pray, il is not the statue we pray to, but be that is represented by it." The Brahmans have also ano-
ther way of defending their worship of statues, of which the same author gives the following account: " That
God, or that sovereign being whom they call Achar (immutable) has produced or drawn out of his own substance,
not only souls, but also whatever is material and corporeal in the universe, so that all things in the world are
but one and the same thing with God himself, as all numbers are bat one and the same unity repeated.'' Ber-
nier Metnoires, tome 3. p. 171. 178'
From this Utter extract it appears that the Brachmans as well as the ancient Egyptian*, believe that the
supreme principle is all things. According to the best of the Platonists likewise, this principle is olitkingt prior
to ait. For by being tie one, it is oil Miagi after the most umpU manner, 1. e. so as to transcend i
» See its Homilies, tome «. p. 40.
Proc. Vol. I. /
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INTRODUCTION.
According to the best of the Platonists likewise, this principle is olitkingt prior
to ait. For by being tie one, it is oil Miagi after the most umpU manner, 1. e. so as to transcend i
» See its Homilies, tome «. p. 40.
Proc. Vol. I. /
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INTRODUCTION.
Catholic* form the game opinions of the saints whose images they worship as the Heathens did of
their Gods ; and employ the same outward rites in honouring their images, as the Heathens did
in the religious veneration of their statues. Thus as the Heathens had their luttlar Gods, such as
were Belus to the Babylonians and Assyrians, Osiris and lsis to the Egyptians, aad Vulcan to
the Leronians, thus also the Catholics attribute the defence of certain countries to certain saints.
Have not the saints also to whom the safeguard of particular cities is committed, the same office
as the Dii Provides of the Heathens.' Such as were at Delphi, Apollo; at Athens, Minerva;
at Carthage, Juno ; and at Rome, Quirinus. And do not the saints to whom churches arc built
and altars erected correspond to the Dii Palrooi of the Heathens ? Such as were in the Capitol,
Jupiter, in the temple at Paphos, Venus, in the temple of Ephesus, Diana. Are not likewise, our
Lady of Walsingham, our Lady of Ipswich, otir Lady of Wilsdon, and the like, imitations of Diana
Agrotera, Diana Coripbca, Diana Ephesia, Venus Cypria, Veuus Paphia, Venus Gnidin, and the
like ? The Catholics too, have substituted for the marine deities Neptune, Triton, Xereus, Castor
and Pollux, Venus, 8tc. Saint Christopher, Saint Clement, and others, and especially our Lady,
as she is called by them, to whom seamen sing Ave Maris stella. Neither has the fire escaped
their imitation of the Pagans. For instead of Vulcan and Vesta, the respective guardians of tire
according to the Heathens, the Catholics have substituted Saint Agatha, ou the day of whose nati-
vity they make letters for the purpose of extinguishing lire. Every artificer likewise and profession
has a special saint in the place of a presiding God. Thus scholars have Saint Nicholas and Saint
Gregory; painters Saint Luke; nor are soldiers in want of a saint corresponding to Mars, nor lovers
of one who is a substitute for Venus.
Every artificer likewise and profession
has a special saint in the place of a presiding God. Thus scholars have Saint Nicholas and Saint
Gregory; painters Saint Luke; nor are soldiers in want of a saint corresponding to Mars, nor lovers
of one who is a substitute for Venus.
All diseases too haTc their special saints instead of Gods, who arc invoked as possessing a healing
power. Thus the venereal disease has Saint Roche ; the falling sickness Saint Cornelius, the tooth-
ach Saint Apollin, &c. Beasts and cattle also have their presiding saints : for Saint Loy (says the
Homily) is the horse-leach, and Saint Antony the swineherd, &c. The Homily adds,' " that in
many points the Papists exceed the Gentiles in idolatry, and particularly in honouring and wor-
shipping the relics and bones of saints, which prove that they be mortal men and dead, and there-
fore no Gods to be worshipped, which the Gentiles would never confess of their Gods for very
shame." And after enumerating many ridiculous practices of the Catholics in reference to these
relics, the Homily concludes with observing, " that they are not only more wicked than the Gen-
tile idolaters, but also no wiser than asses, horses, and mules, which have no understanding."
In the wcond place the Homilies shew* that the rites and ceremonies of the Papists in honour
' Tome a. p. 54. 1 p- *9-
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INTRODUCTION, xkfii
ing and worshipping their images or saints, are the same with the rites of the Pagans. " This,
say (hey, is evident in their pilgrimages to visit images which had more holiness and virtue in them
than others. In their candle-religion, burning incense, offering up gold to images, hanging up
crutches, chairs, and ships, legs, arms, and whole men and women of war, before images, as though
by Ihem, or saints (as they say) lliey were delivered from lameness, sickness, captivity, or shipwreck."
In spreading abroad after the manner of the Heathens, the miracles that have accompanied, images.
" Such an image was sent from heaven, like the Palladium, or Diana of the Epbesians. Such an
image was brought by angels. Such a one came itself far from the east to the west, as Dame
Fortune Bed to Rome. Some images though they were hard and stony, yet for tender-heart and
pity wept. Some spake more monstrously than ever did Balaam's ass, who had life and breath
in him. Such a cripple came and saluted this saint of oak, and by and by he was made whole,
and here hangeth his crutch. Such a one in a tempest vowed to Saint Christopher, and scaped, and
behold here is bis ship of war. Such a one, by Saint Leonard's help, brake out of prison, and see
where his fetters bang. And infinite thousands more miracles by like, or more shameless lies were
reported."
Such a one in a tempest vowed to Saint Christopher, and scaped, and
behold here is bis ship of war. Such a one, by Saint Leonard's help, brake out of prison, and see
where his fetters bang. And infinite thousands more miracles by like, or more shameless lies were
reported."
After all this, I appeal to every intelligent reader, whether the religion of the Heathens, accord-
ing to its genuine purity as delineated in this Introduction, and as professed and promulgated by
the best and wisest men of antiquity, is not infinitely preferable to that of the Catholics ? And
whether it is not more holy to reverence beings the immediate progeny of the ineffable principle of
all things, and which are eternally centered and rooted in him ; and to believe that in reverencing
these, we at the same time reverence the ineffable, because they partake of his nature, and that
through these as media we become united with him,' than to reverence men, and the images of
men, many of whom when living, were the disgrace of human nature? The Church of England a»
we sec prefers the Pagans to the Pap 11 is , and 1 trust that every other sect of Protestant Christians
will unanimously subscribe to her decision. And thus much in defence of the theology of Plato,
and the religious worship of the Heathens.
It now remains that I should speak of the following work, of its author, and the translation. The
work itself then is a scientific development of the deifonn processions from the meltable principle
' The ineffable principle of things, as is demonstrated in tbe Elements of Theology io this work, is beyond
self-subsistence. Hence the first ineffable eroluliou from him consists of self-subsistcnt natures. As we
therefore are only the dregs of the rational tialure, many media arc necessary to conjoin us with a yrimiple so
hnmeoscly exalted above us. And these media are the golden chain of powers that have deified summits, or
(hat have the ineffable united with the citable.
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xllV INTKODUCTION.
of things, and this, as k appears to me id (he greatest perfection possible to mm. For the reason-
ing ia every where consummately accurate, and deduced from eelf-evident priiiciplei ; and the
conclusions are the result of what Plato powerfully call* geometrical neceaaitiei. To the reader
of thia work indeed, who haa not been properly disciplined io Eleatic and Academic studies, and
who haa not a genius naturally adapted to such abetruae speculations, it will doubtless appear to
be perfectly unintelligible, and in the language of critical cant, nothing but jargon and revery.
Thia, however, ia what Plato the great bierophant of this theology predicted would be the caae, if
ever it was unfolded to the multitude at large. " For a$ it appears to me,^iayi he, there art
££0^C£^£f ^^GfiifltfafM ^pA^^A 6f tOJl4Wsw^,rl WlO^t r^^s^l^We^Otf^J fA^US t^9£9£ *
to perceive them."'
Thia, however, ia what Plato the great bierophant of this theology predicted would be the caae, if
ever it was unfolded to the multitude at large. " For a$ it appears to me,^iayi he, there art
££0^C£^£f ^^GfiifltfafM ^pA^^A 6f tOJl4Wsw^,rl WlO^t r^^s^l^We^Otf^J fA^US t^9£9£ *
to perceive them."'
In his seventh epistle also he oWrves a* follows : " Thus much, however, I shall &ay respecting
all thoae who either have written or shall write, affirming that they know those thinga which are
the objects of my study (whether they have heard them from me or from others, or whether they
have discovered them themselves) thnt they have not heard any thing about these things conform-
able to my opinion : for I never have written nor ever shall write about them.1 For a thing of ibis
kind cannot be expressed by words like other discipline*, but by long familiarity, and living in
conjunction with the thing itself, a light* as it were leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled
in the soul, and there itself nourish itself." And shortly after he adds ; " But if it appeared to me
that the particulars of which I am speaking could be sufficiently communicated to the multitude
by writing or speech, what could we accomplish more beautiful in life than to impart a mighty
benefit to mankind, and lead an intelligible nature into light, ao as to be obvious to all men i I
think, however, that an attempt of this kind would only be beneficial to a few, who from some
small veatigea previously demonstrated are themselves able to discover these abstruse particulars.
But with respect to the rest of manund, some it will fill with a contempt by no means elegant, and
others with a lofty and arrogant hope that they shall now learn certain venerable things."4
Km nttvtamtomf*. Epist. 9.
* Plato means by this, that he has never written perspicuously about imuUigMa or true being; toe proper
objects of intellect.
' This light is a thing of a very different kind from that which is produced by the evidence arising from
truths perceptible by the multitude, as those who have experienced it well know.
mnn:, m\Xm, «>•' wc mptnc «itk, twnut in wti am y th» tt im ntn ymrnr font yuf nimj*f irr», «( a>x» l*M>*lx*n, «>J.' a mxx« rvm jniunc
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INTRODUCTION.
mnn:, m\Xm, «>•' wc mptnc «itk, twnut in wti am y th» tt im ntn ymrnr font yuf nimj*f irr», «( a>x» l*M>*lx*n, «>J.' a mxx« rvm jniunc
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INTRODUCTION.
The prediction of Plato therefore, has been but too truly fulfilled in the fate which baj attended
the writing! of the best of bis disciples, among whom Proclut certainly maintains the most distin-
guished rank. This indeed, these disciples well knew would be the case ; but perceiving that the
hand of Barbaric and despotic power was about to dettroy the school* of the philosophers, and
foreseeing that dreadful naht of ifuorancc and folly which succeeded so nefarious an undertaking
they benevolently disclosed in as luminous a manner as the subject would permit, toe arcana of
their master's doctrines, thereby, as Plato expresses it, giving assistance to Philosophy, and also
preserving it as a paternal and immortal inheritance, to the latest posterity. Proclus in the first
book of this work has enumerated the requisites which a student of it ought to possess ; and it is
most certain that be who does not possess them, will never fathom the depths of this theology, or
perceive his mind irradiated with that admirable light, mentioned by Plato in the foregoing
extract, and which is only to be seen by that eye of the soul which is better worth saving than tea
thousand corporeal eyes.
With respect to the diction of Proclus in this work, its general character is that of purity,
clearness, copiousness, and magnificence ; so that even the fastidious critic, who considers every
Greek writer as partially barbarous who lived after the fall of the
ever unwillingly, be forced to acknowledge that Proclus is a splendid exception. The i
Kepler, whose decision on this subject, outweighs in my opinion, that of a sown of mo
critics, after having made a long extract from the commentaries of Proclus on Euclid, gives the
following animated encomium of his diction. " O ratio fluit ipsi torrcntis instar, ripas bundans, et
gurgitesque occulta ns, dum mci
it." i. e. " His language flows like a torrent, i
hiding the dark fords and whirlpools of doubts, while his mind full of the majesty of things of such
a magnitude, struggles in the straits of language, and the conclusion never satisfying him, exceeds
by the copia of words, the simplicity of the propositions." If we omit what Kepler here says
about the struggle of the mind of Proclus, and his never being satisfied with the conclusion, the
rest of bis eulogy is equally applicable to the style of the present work, so far as it is possible for
i to be combined with the rigid accuracy of geometrical i
9tf rt »fayp> *vr«, »i wu rv{ i« rp""» *' "•»"•£ *f* ■>« rir" " «F fiv, V
ra; T« arfftmtri fuym rr*4**> *■» * vn attfmt wynpM, m mxuf wit Wf
um \tyifxmt ayafa, h pi r-nt "mi Jnani minftn mtm 1m> paf> llCs>l 0U2 110 lOO^CT a^^ dcUOIHittea1 sjC^sI wWlCUl 0£ a bttsi ^rYa*adl OU|j^ ll t Flat.}] CP
to be called wisdom, or something still more venerable than this. The ;
gizing according to this virtue, easily comprehended all the theology of the Greeks and
and that which is adumbrated in mythological fictions, aud brought it into light, to those who are
willing and able to understand it. He explained likewise every thing in a mora enthusiastic man-
ner, and brought the different theologies to an harmonious agreement. At the same time also,
investigating the writings of the ancients, whatever he found in them genuine, he judiciously
adopted ; but if he found any thing of a spurious nature, this, he entirely rejected as erroneous.
He also strenuously subverted by a diligent examination such doctrines as were contrary to truth.
In his associations too with others, he employed no less force and perspicuity. For he was a man
laborious beyond measure ; as, in one day, he gave five, and sometimes more lectures, and wrote
■ Socrates in the Phardo of Plato, Orphically calls the multitude thyrsus-bearers as living TilannicaMy. For
tbe thyrsus, says Olymjriodorn*, (in MS. comment in Pliasd.) is a symbol uf material and partible fabrication, on
account of its divulaed continuity, whence also it is a Titannic plant. " For it is txteaded, says he, before Bac-
chus, instead of his paternal sceptre, and through this they call him into a partial nature. He adds, " Besides
the Titans are thyrsus-bearers; and Prometheus concealed fire in a read, whether by this we an to understand
that he draws down celestial light into generation, or impels soul into body, or calls forth divine illumination, the
whole of which is l
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INTRODUCTION.
as many as seven hundred verse*. Betides this, he went to other philosophers, and spent the
evening in conversation with them. And all these employments he executed in such a manner as
not to neglect his nocturnal and vigilant piety to the Gods, and assiduously supplicating the huh
when rising, when at his meridian altitude, and when he sets."
M annus farther observes of this most extraordinary man, " that be did not seem to be without
divine inspiration. For words similar to the most white and thick-tailing snow ' proceeded from his
wise mouth, his eyes appeared to be filled with a fulgid splendor, and the rest of his face to partici-
pate of divine illumination. Hence Rufinus, a man illustrious in the Republic, and who was also
.1 man of veracity, and in other respects venerable, happening to be present with him when he was
lecturing, perceived that his bead was surrounded with a light. And when Proclus had finished
his lecture, Rufinus rising, adored him, and testified by an oath the truth of the divine vision which
tie had seen."
And when Proclus had finished
his lecture, Rufinus rising, adored him, and testified by an oath the truth of the divine vision which
tie had seen."
Marians also informs us, "that Proclus being purified in an orderly manner by the Chaldean puri-
fications, was an inspector of the lucid Heratic visions, as he himself somewhere mentions in one
of his writing*. By opportunely moving Likewise a certain Hecatic spharula,* he procured shower*
of rain, and freed Athens from an unseasonable heat. Besides tins, by certain phylactcria or
charms, he stopt an earthquake, and had made trial of the divining energy of the tripod, having
been instructed by certain verses respecting its failure. For when he was in his fortieth year, be
appeared in a dream to utter the following verses :
High abo?e a-ther there with radiance bright,
A pure immortal splendor wings its flight ; 1
Whose beams divine with vivUI force aspire,
And leap resounding from a fount of hre.
* Alluding to the beautiful description given of Ulysses in the third book of the Iliad, v. n. which is thus
elegantly paraphrased by Pope.
But when he speaks what elocution flows!
8oft as the fleeces of descending snows
The copious accents fall with easy art :
Melting they fall and sink into the heart.
* Nicephorus in bis commentary on Synesius de Insomniis, p. 3da. informs us that the Heratic orb is a golden
sphere, which has a sspphire'stooe inclosed in its middle part, and through its whole extremity characters, aod
various figures. He adds, that turning this sphere round, the Chaldeans perform invocations which they call
Ijnga:. Thus too, according to Suidas, the magician Julian of Chalda-a, and Arnuphis the Egyptian brought
down showers of rain, by a magical power. And by an artifice of this kind, Empedvcles was accustomed to
restrain the fury of the winds; on which account tie was called t>»«Ji»if«,-( mu erptlltr of wind.
* This signifies that the divine splendor which is the cause of the prophetic energy, would leave the earth,
in consequence of the then Misting inaptitude of persons, places, and instruments, to receive it.
Proc. Vol. I. g
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I INTRODUCTION.
And io the beginning of his fortj-secoud year he appeared to himself to pronounce with a loud
Lo ! on my soul a sacred Arc descends,
Whose vivid power the intellect estends ;
From whence far beaming thro' dull body's night,
It soars to xthcr deck'd with starry light ;
And with soft murmurs thru' tbeaiura round.
The lucid regions of tlie Gods resound.
•
Besides, he clearly perceived that tie belonged to the Mercurial series ; and was persuaded from \
dream, that he possessed the soul of Nicomachus the Pythagorean."'
The lucid regions of tlie Gods resound.
•
Besides, he clearly perceived that tie belonged to the Mercurial series ; and was persuaded from \
dream, that he possessed the soul of Nicomachus the Pythagorean."'
In the last place, M annua adds, " that the lovers of more elegant studies may be able to conjec-
ture from the position of the stars under which he was bom, that the condition of his life, was by
no means among the but or middle, but among the first orders, we have thought lit to expose in
this place the following scheme of his nativity."
0 16° «6* «
> 17 29 n
■ No opinion is more celebrated, than that of the metempsychosis of Pythagoras ; but perhaps no doctrine is
more generally mistaken. By most of the present day it is exploded as ridiculous ; and the few who retain some
veneration for its founder, endeavour to destroy the literal, and to confine it to an allegorical meaning. By some
of the ancients this mutation was limited to similar bodies; t*> that thry conceived the human soul might trans-
migrate into various human bodies, but not into those of brutes. And this was the opinion of Hicroclcs, as may
be seen in his Commentary on the Golden Verses. But why may not the Iti'inan soul l>ecome connected with
subordinate, as w ell as wiili superior lives, by a tendency of inclination ? Do not similars love to be united; aod
is there not in all kinds of life something similar and common ? Hence when the affections of the soul verge to
a baser nature, whilf connected with a human body, these affections on the dissolution of such a body, become
envelo|>cd as it were, in a brutal nature, and the rational eye, in this case, clouded with perturbations, is oppressed
bv the irrational entries of the bmlc, and surveys nothing but the dark phantasms of a degraded imagination.
But this doctrine is viudica'ed by Proclus with his usual acutenes*,ui his admirable Commentaries on the Tima-us,
lib. s. p. 3»9, aslollowsi " It is tiMial, says he, to enquire bow human souls can descend into brute animals.
And some indeed, think that there are certain similitudes of men to brutes, which they call savage lives : for they
by no means think it possible that the rational essence can become the soul of a savage animal. On the contrary,
others allow it may be sent into brute;, because all souls are of one and the same kind; so that they may become
wolves and panthers, and ichneumons. But true reason indeed, asserts that the human soul may be lodged in
brutes, yet in such a manner, as that it may obtain its own proper life, and that the degraded soui may, as it
were, be canied above it, and be bound to the baser nature by a propensity aod similitude of affection. And that
tins is tl.c only mode of insinuation, we have proved by a multitude of arguments, in our Commentaries on the
rim drtis. If however, it lie requisite to take notice, that this is the opinion of I'lato, we add that in his Republic
he *;iys, that the it is evident ,„., Pfoc|ua M
wrmen seventh book,- as ,ome chapters of it are mere «id to be e.tan, in that library. These
I have endeavoured, bu, without success, to obtain. The want of this seventh book by Produs,
wi oubtless be considered by all the friends of Greek literature, and particularly by all who are
lovers of the doctrme, of Plato, a, a loss of „o common magnitude. It is, however, a fortunate
crcumstancc, that in the composition of the seventh book I have been able to supply the deficiency
ansmg from the want of that which was written by Proclus, in . great measure from other works
of Proclu, himself, and particularly from his very elegant and scientific commentaries on the
IWus of Plato. So that I trust the loss is in some measure supplied ; though 1 am sensible,
very madequately, could i, be compared with the book which was written by a man of such gigantic
So that I trust the loss is in some measure supplied ; though 1 am sensible,
very madequately, could i, be compared with the book which was written by a man of such gigantic
him whtUhB4!.,hCe,!d0fthte «mbwkofthi»^My.. «Uia« divine™*™ will I* accuracy discoid bv
Zl are ~ 1 T I luT "J*""' P0Wm" ™S' Wer'» ■otdMebyhim in any onsoflbe »u book,
Hat are extant ; which shows that another book is warning. T
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u.
1NTBODUCTIOV.
powers of mind as Proclus, and who had also sources of informatiou ou the subject, which at the
present period, it is impossible to obtain.
A translation of the Elements of Theology is added in order to render the treatise On the
Theology of Plato, more complete, and to assist the reader who wishes to penetrate the depths of
that most abstruse and sublime work; for the former elucidates, and is elucidated by the Utter.
In translating the treatise of Proclus On Providence and Fate, I had great difficulties to encoun-
ter, as the original Greek is lost, and nothing but a Latin translation, which Fabricius observes, is
all but barbaroia, remains. If the reader compares that translation with mine, he will at once
acknowledge the truth of my remark. Indeed, that translation is in some parts so barbarous, that
nothiug but an intimate acquaintance with the writings of Proclus, and the philosophy of Plato
could enable any one to render them intelligible in another language. The same observation is
partially applicable to the translation of the Extracts from two other treatises of Proclus.
The Greek text of Proclus abounds with errors, so that the emendations which I have made,
and the deficiencies which 1 have supplied in this volume, amount to more than four hundred.
And the Latio translation of Portus is so very faulty, as to be almost beyond example bad.
Having discovered this to be the case, and having in so many places corrected the original, I
scarcely think that any of my critical enemies will be hardy enough to say, that any part of this
volume was translated from the Latin, where the Greek could be obtained. As I am conscious
however, that in what is now offered to the public, I had no other view man to benefit those who
are capable of being benefited by such sublime speculations; that wishing well to all mankind, and
" particularly to iny country, I have laboured to disseminate the philosophy and theology of Plato, as
highly favourable to the interests of piety and good government, and most hostile to lawless conduct
and revolutionary principles; and that I have done my best to deserve the esteem of the wise and
worthy part of mankind, 1 am wholly unconcerned as to the reception it may meet with from the
malevolent, though I wish for the approbation of the candid critics of the day. For in all my labours
I have invariably observed the following Pythagoric precept : " Do those things which you judge
to be beautiful, though m doing them you should be without renown ; for the rabble is a bad judge
For in all my labours
I have invariably observed the following Pythagoric precept : " Do those things which you judge
to be beautiful, though m doing them you should be without renown ; for the rabble is a bad judge
of a good thing."'
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CONTENTS
or
THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
The Preface, in which the scope of the treatise is unfolded, together with die praise of Plato him-
self, and of those that received the philosophy from him.
CHAPTER U.
What the mode of the discussion is in the present treatise, and what preparation of the auditors of
it is previously necessary.
CHAPTER III.
What a tneologist is according to Plato, whence he begins, as far as to what hypostases be ascends,
and according to what power of the soul be particularly energizes.
CHAPTER IV.
The theological types or forms according to all which Plato disposes the doctriuc concerning the
Gods.
CHAPTER V.
What the dialogues are from which the theology of Plato may especially be assumed ; and to what
orders of Goda each of these dialogues refers us.
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lit
CONTENT*.
CHAPTER VI.
collecting the Platonic tlicologv from many dialogue*, in consequence of it*
" into minute parts.
CHAPTEK VII.
A solution of the before ineiitiooed objection, referring to one dialogue, the Parmeuides, the
whole truth concerning the Gods according to Plato.
CHAPTER VIII.
numeration of the different opinion* concerning the Parmenides, aud a division of the objec-
tion, to then,.
CHAPTER IX.
A confutation of those who assert that the Parmenides is a logical dialogue, and who admit that the
i in it is argumentative, proceeding through subjects of opinion.
CHAPTER X.
How far they are right who assert that the hypotheses of the Parmenides are concerning the princi-
plea of things, and what is to be added to what they say from the doctrine of our preceptor
[Syrianus.]
CHAPTER XI.
Many demonstrations concerning the conclusions of the second hypothesis, and of the divuiou of
it according to the divine orders.
CHAPTER XII.
The intention of the hypotheses, demonstrating their connexion with each other, and their coascut
with the things themselves.'
CHAPTER XIII.
What the common rules concerning the Gods are, which Plato delivers in die Laws. And also
concerning the hyparxis of the Gods, their providence, and their immutable perfection.
CHAPTER XIV.
How the hyparxis of the Gods is delivered in the Laws, and through what
recurs to the truly existing Gods. How the providence of die Gods is
the Laws, aud what the mode of their providence is according to Plato.*
1 The 15th chapter also is nut marked in the original ; aud ia comprehended in my translation in the Uth
ter. Perhaps it should begin at the word*, " If tlierefore the Gods produce all things," in p. 40.
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f
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XV.
Through what argument* in the tune treatise [the Law*] it is demonstrated that the Godi provide
[for all things,] immutably.
CHAPTER XVI.
What the axioms are concerning the Gods which are delivered in the Republic, and what order
they have with respect to each other.
CHAPTER XVII.
What the goodness of the Gods u, and how they are said to be the causes of all good ; and that
evil according to every hypostasis is itself adorned and arranged by the Gods.
CHAFFER XVIII.
What the immutability is of the Gods ; where also it is shown what their self-sufficiency, and firm
impassivity are ; and how we are to understand their possessing an invariable sameness of
CHAPTER XLX.
What the simplicity is of the Gods ; and how that which is simple in them appears to be various
in secondary natures.
CHAPTER XX.
What the truth is m the Gods ; and whence falsehood is introduced in the participations of the
Gods by secondary natures.
CHAPTER XXI.
From tbe axioms in the Phsedrus concerning every tiling divine [it follows] that every thing divine
is beautiful, wise, and good.
CHAPTER XXII.
A discussion of the dogmas concerning the goodness [of the Gods,] and an investigation of the
elements of the good in the Philebus.
CHAPTER XXIII.
What the wisdom of the Gods is, and what elements of it may be assumed from Plato.
CHAPTER XXIV.
nd tbe elements of it, as delivered by Plato.
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l«i CONT1NTI.
CHAPTER XXV.
Whit the triad is which is conjoined with the good, the wise, and the beautiful, and what auxili-
aries to the theory of it, Plato affords us.'
CHAPTER XXVI.
Concerning the axioms delivered in the Pruedo,* respecting an invisible nature. What the divine
nature is. What the immortal, and the intelligible > are ; and what order these possess with
CHAPTER XXVII.
What the uniform and indissoluble are, and how sameness of subsistence [and the unbegotteu are]
to be assumed in divine natures.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
How paternal, and bow maternal causes arc to be assumed in the Gods.
CHAPTER XXIX.
Concerning divine names, and the rectitude of them as delivered in the Cratjlu*.
CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
A method leading to the superessential principle of all things, according to the intellectual concep-
tion of the one and multitude.
CHAPTER II.
A second method unfolding the hypostasis of the one, aod demonstrating it to be exempt from all
corporeal and incorporeal essences.
• Such is the tide of this chapter in the Greek, which is obviously erroneous. For the proper title is, « What
that is which unites us to tktgood ; and that it is divine faith." What is said indeed in the Greek to be the con-
tents of this, belong to the preceding chapter.
» For " f^'fr it is necessary to read nfthnt.
Mn the Greek r. f-wnfc, tk* uniform, but it should evidently be »• »*t», Ike intclligMe,
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CONTENTS.
Ivu
CHAPTER III.
Many arguments in confirmation of the Mine thing, and evincing the irreprehensible hypothesis of
the one.
CHAPTER IV.
A confutation of those who say that the first principle is not according to Plato above intellect, ami
demonstrations from the Republic, the Sophists, the Philebus, and the Parmcnidci, of the
superessential hypostasis' of the one.
CHAPTER V.
What the modes are of ascent to the one according to Plato ; and that the modes are two, through
analogy, and through negations. Likewise, where Plato treats of each of these, and through
what cause.
CHAPTER VI.
By what, and by how many names Plato unfolds the ineffable principle, and why he unfolds it by
such and by so main names. And how these names accord with the modes of ascent to it.
CHAPTER VII.
What the assertions are in the Republic concerning the first principle, through its analogy to the
sun ; where also it is shown, how it is celebrated as the good, and as the most splendid of
being. How the sun is the offspring of the good; and that according to each order of
divine natures, there is a monad analogous to the first principle. And how the first principle
is the cause of all beings, and is itself prior to power and energy.
CHAPTER VIII.
What Plato in his Epistle to Dionysius says the first king is. And admonitions, that the first God
is discussed in that Epistle.
CHAPTER IX.
What the three conceptions arc which arc delivered [in that Epistle] concerning the first king. How
all things are about him. How all things are for his sake. How he is the cause of all
beautiful things. What the order is of these conceptions. And from what hypotheses they
CHAPTER X.
How in the first hypothesis of the Parmenidcs, Plato delivers the doctrine concerning ike one,
employing for this purpose negations. And on what account the negations are such and so
many.
' For ym>.n«tl read nim»^.
Proc. Vol. I. A
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CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XI.
How it is nereiiary to eotwr on the theory concerning the one, through negations. And what dis-
position of the soul is most adapted to discussions of th
CHAPTER XII.
A celebration of the one, demonstrating through negative conclusions that it U exempt from all the
orders of beings, according to the order delivered in the
CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
That after the discussion in common of the one principle of things, it is requisite to treat of the
divine orders, and to show how many they are, and how they are divided from each other.
CHAPTER II.
That the multitude of unities according to which the Gods have their hypostasis, subsists after
the one.
CHAPTER III.
How many the particulars are which ought to be demonstrated previous to the discovery of the
! of the divine orders, and an uninterrupted narration of the doctrine of these.
CHAPTER IV.
That all the unities are participate. And that there is only one truly su|ieressenlial one ; but that
all the other unities are participated by essences.'
CHAPTER V.
That the participations of the unities which are nearer to the one, proceed into moi
tases ; but the participations of those that are remote from the one, proceed into more
posite hypostases.
1 These four chapters are comprehended in one in my translation, as they are not marked in the Greek; and
I bad not divided them, when this work »u sent to the press, as I have done the chapters of the other books,
in wukh there is a similar defect in the ordinal.
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CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VI.
What the natures are which participate of the divine unities, and what the order of them is with res-
pect to each other. And that being indeed, is the most ancient of these ; life, the second;
intellect, the third; soul, the fourth ; and body, the last. And that there aie also as many
CHAPTER VII.
A resumption of the doctrine concerning the one, and a discussion of the biformod principles pos-
CHAPTER VIII.
What the two principles are of all things posterior to the one ; how Socrates the Philebus calls
them bound and infinity ; and of what things they are the causes* to beings.'
CHAPTER IX.
What the third thing is which is produced from the two principles. Why Socrates in the Philebus
calls it that which it mixed. That it is nothing else than that which is primarily being.*
And how this proceeds from the two principles, and from the one.
CHAPTER X.
How from image* also, it may be inferred, that the first thing which subsists from bound and infi-
nity is being. How this may be demonstrated. And how bound and infinity are twofold ;
one order of these subsisting in being, but the other existing prior to being.'
CHAPTER XI.
What the triad is, which Socrates in the Philebus says is inherent in erery thing that is mixed *
CHAPTER XII.
Concerning the first intelligible triad in common ; and how the second triad proceeds analogous to
this.*
* For mntmt, it is necessary to read mtmu.
> The seventh and eighth chapters form the third in my translation.
* For w, it is necrssary to read •».
> The seventh and eighth chapters form the third in my translation.
* For w, it is necrssary to read •».
» And die ninth and tenth an the fourth and fifth chapters in my translation.
' This is the sixth chapter in my translation.
' It appears from this account of the contents of the twelfth chapter, that a -considerable part of it is wanting
in the original ; because nothing is said in it about the manner in which the second triad proceeds tualogou* to
the firrt.
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CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XIII.
What the second intelligible triad is. A more accurate account of it, as subsisting from that
predominates, from that which is participated, and from that which characterizes the mixture.
CHAPTER XIV.
What the third iutclligible triad is ; what that is which predominates, and is participated in this.
And at the end, a discourse in common concerning die distinction of the three triads.
CHAPTER XV.
How the intelligible triads are delivered in the Timeus. And
itself, [evincing] that it has the third order in intelligible*.
CHAPTER XVI.
Many demonstrations that eternity subsists according to the middle order of intelligible*.
CHAPTER XVII.
That the one in which eternity abides is the summit of intelligibles.
CHAPTER XVIH.
all the intelligible orders in common, according to the doctrine of Timarus. And a
of the peculiarities m the i
CHAPTER XIX.
intelligible forms, and the doctrine unfolding the peculiarity of them. How likewise
they are four, and from what causes they i
CHAPTER XX.
That also from what is said in the Sophista, it is possible to discover die three intelligible orders;
viz. in that part of the Sophista, in which it is shown what the one being, what whole, and
what ail are.
CHAPTER XXI.
A summary account of .what has been said concerning the intelligible triads. And admonitions
from Plato that it is possible to divide them into father, power, an
CHAPTER XXII.
How in the Phxdrus it is said that every thing divine is beautiful, wise, and good. What triple
i of these Plato delivers. And how from these it is possible to accede to the
I separation of the intelligible triads.
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CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXIII.
How Parmenides delivers the multitude of Gods in the second hypothesis. And how we should
about each order of them, employing for this purpose the conclusions of that
CHAPTER XXIV.
What the first intelligible triad is according to Parmcuidcs. Whence be begins, and how far he
proceeds, teaching concerning it.
CHAPTER XXV.
What the second intelligible triad is. How it is delivered by Parmenides in
triad prior to it. And how far be produces the discourse concerning it.
And bow Parmenides unfolds it throngh the third conclusion.
CHAPTER XXVII.
the three conclusions in common, through which the three orders of intelligible* are
characterized. And how through these it is possible to dissolve the most difficult of theolo-
gical doubts.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
A celebration of the intelligible Gods, unfolding at the same time tite union of intelligible!) themselves
with the good, and their exempt hyparais.
CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
What the peculiarity is of the intelligible and intellectual Gods. How they illuminate imparticipa-
bleliie, and are in continuity with the intelligible Gods.
CHAPTER II.
How the intelligible and intellectual Gods subsist from the intelligible Gods. And how they roni-
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CONTENT
CHAPTER III.
What the division is of the intelligible and intellectual God. according to triad*. And what the dif-
ference is of these triads with respect to the intelligible triads.
CHAPTER IV.
How Socrates in the Phssdra* leads us to this order of Gods.
CHAPTER V.
That it U not proper to understand the Heaven, and celestial circulation [celebrated in the Ph*-
drus] as pertaining to sensibles ; and many admonitions from the Platonic words themselves,
that these are to be referred to the first order of Heaven.
CHAPTER VI.
That the supercelestial place is not simply intelligible ; but demonstrations from what is delivered
about it [in the Phcdrus,] that it is allotted an intelligible order at in intellectuals.
CHAPTER VII.
That the subcclestial arch is the boundary of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, evinced from the
peculiarities of it.
CHAPTER VIII.
Why Plato characterizes this order of Gods from the middle which it contains, and deliver* the
CHAPTER IX.
That Plato delivers tbe same mode of ascent to the intelligible, as is delivered by initiators into the
CHAPTER X.
What the supercelestial place is. How it proceeds from the first intelligible*. How it is supreme
in intellectual*. And how Plato demonstrates its prolific power.
CHAPTER XI.
How Plato has indicated the unknown peculiarity of the summit of intelfigibles and intellectuals,
and why he celebrates it at one and the same time affirmatively and negatively.
CHAPTER XII.
What the negations are of the supercelestial place. That they are produced from the divine orders.
What kind of negations also designate the uncoloured, what, the unfigured, and what, the pri,
valiou of contact.
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CONTENTS. luii
CHAPTER XHf.
What the things are which Plato affirm* of the s upercelcstial place, and from
liarities, he ascribes to it affirmative sign*.
CHAPTER XIV.
What the three deities of the virtues, viz. science, temperance, and jujticf, are in the supercelestial
place ; what order the; have with respect to each other ; and what perfection each of them
imparts to the Gods.
CHAPTER XV.
What the plain of Truth, and what the meadow- are. What the unical form of intelligible nutri-
ment is. What the twofold nutriment of the Gods Lt which is distributed from this intelligible
food.
CHAPTER XVI.
Many admonitions that the supercelestial place is triadic. And what the signs are of the three
hypostases in it.
CHAPTER XVII.
Who Adrastia is. What the sacred law of Adrastia is. That she ranks in the supercelestial place.
And on what account she does so.
CHAPTER XVIII.
A summary account of what is said about the sup
CHAPTER XIX.
Demonstrations that the connected! jr -containing order is in the intelligible and intellectual Gods.
And that it is necessary there should be three connective causes of wholes.
CHAPTER XX.
That according to Plato the celestial circulation is the same
CHAPTER XXI.
How we may obtain auxiliaries from what is said by Plato of the triadic division in the connective
deity. And why he especially venerates the union b tb
CHAPTER XXII.
What the theology in the Cratylus is concerning Heaven. And how it is possible to collect from it
by a reasoning process the middle of the intelligible and intellectual Gods.
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Ixiv CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Thai the most diviiiel) -inspired of the interpreter* have defined the subceleslial arch to be a certain
liar order. And that our preceptor has unfolded it in the most perfect manner.
CHAPTER XXIV.
Many admonitions that the peculiarity of the subcelestial arch is perfective, from whit Plato ba«
; it, and from the souls that are elevated to it.
CHAPTER XXV.
What the triadic division is of the perfective order, which Plato has delivered in the subcelestial
arch.
CHAPTER XXVI.
What the elevation is of souls separate from bodies to the intelligible and intellectual triads.
What the most blessed tthtt is. What mueas, and cpopteia are. What the entire, simple,
and unmoved visions are. And what the end is of all this elevation.
CHAPTER XXVII.
How Plato unfolds in the Pannenides, from rotelligibles the intelligible and intellectual orders.
i is common, and that which is different are, in the theology », should be marked «*. *», anrt «*. ^. It will be found also Uiat
ehspter lojiy is wantiug.
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CONTENTS.
CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK VI.
CHAPTER L
That the ruling order of God* is in continuity with the intellectual God*. And that the division
.and principles may be
How the ruling Gods proceed. And that the supermundane peculiarity pertain* to these God*
CHAPTER HI.
What tie peculiarity is of the ruling Gods. That the aantnilaUve i. especially characteristic of
them. And how the causes of assimi
how to .Unintelligible paradigm.
CHAPTER IV.
What the powers are of the assimilative Gods. What their energies,
imparted by them to the world, and to all mundane natures.
CHAPTER V.
What the divisions are of the assimilative Gods. And that the greatest part of the discourse about
i middle orders in them.
CHAPTER VI.
Many demonstrations, that both according to Plato and other theologists, there is ont
CHAPTER VII.
That Jupiter is twofold ; one indeed, being prior to the three sons of Saturn, [but the
one of them.] And bow the three proceed from Saturn, and the one Jupiter.
CHAPTER V1U.
That according to Plato also, the demiurgic monad subsists prior to the three sons of
Demonstrations of this from what is said in the Politicus, and in the Laws.
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CONTBWT*. Uxi
CHAPTER IX.
More manifest admonitions of the game things from what is said in the Gorgias, nod in the
Cratyius.
CHAPTER X.
Who the three demiurp are, and what order they have with reference to each other.
CHAPTER XI.
What the rivific triad is among the ruling Gods. And whence we may derive
i of Plato concerning the union and division of this triad.
CHAPTER XII.
What the cottvertrve triad of the ruling Gods is; and what die monad which it contains. In which
also, the union of Apollo with the sun is demonstrated ; and it is shewn, how from what is
wid about Apollo we may be led to the theory of the solar orders.
CHAPTER XIII.
What the undented order is of the ruling Gods. And how from the writings of Plato conceptions
about it may be obtained.
CHAPTER XIV.
How Parmcnidcs forms his conclusions about the ruling Gods, in continuity with the demiurgic
order. And that he characterizes the whole order of them, through similitude and dis-
CHAPTER XV.
Wlut the supermundane and at die same time mundane genus of Gods is. And how through their
own medium they preserve the continuity of the Gods that proceed from the demiargus.
CHAPTER XVI.
How die liberated Gods are characterized. And how from their liberated peculiarity they are
: from the- universe, and arc co-arranged with the mundane Gods.
CHAPTER XVII.
Wliat the common power*, and what the common energies are of the liberated Gods, according
with the essence that has been dehSeied of them.
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bsii CONTENT
CHAPTER XVIII.
Concerning the twelve leaders or ruler* mentioned in the Phasdrus, and that they have a liberated
Man; and clearer demonstrations that the great leader Jupiter, and all the dodecad of leaden,
are liberated.
CHAPTER XX.
An explanation from precedaueous causes whence the number of the dodecad in the liberated
Gods is derived.
CHAPTER XXI.
What the division of the liberated leaders is into two monads and one decad. And what the one
division of them is.
CHAPTER XXII.
The theology concerning each of the twelve Gods, unfolding the peculiarities of them from the
subjects of their government.
CHAPTER XXIII.
ing the mother of the Fates mentioned in the Republic. Likewise concerning the triad of
the Fates. What orders they have with reference to each other. What powers of them are
delivered through divine symbols. What their energies are. And how Plato ■
the liberated peculiarity.
CHAPTER XXIV.
now Pannenides forms his conclusions concerning the liberated Gods immediately after the
milatiTe Gods. And how he characterizes the order of them by touching and not touching
CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS OF BOOK VII.
CHAPTER I.
On the mundane Gods in general,— the source of their progression, — their orders, powers, ami
spheres.
CHAPTER II.
On the division, and allotments of the mundane Gods.
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COKTKHTS. llini
CHAPTER nr.
That (he mundane do not differ from the supermundane Gods in habitudes to bodies, &c. — That
the providence of the Gods is not circumscribed by place.— That h pervade* all things, and
like the light of die sun, fills whatever is capable of receiving it.
CHAPTER IV.
After what manner the visible celestial orbs are Gods.— That a celestial body is eminently allied
to the incorporeal essence of die Gods.— That the visible are connected with tire intelligible
Gods. — And that the perfectly iurorporcal are united to the sensible Gods, through the
essence of each being characterized by the one.
CHAPTER V.
The nature of the mundane Gods unfolded from the speech of the Demiurgus to them, in the
Timcus. — And what the whole conception of the speech is according to Proclus.
CHAPTER VI.
What the demiurgus effects in the multitude of mundane Gods by the first words of his speech*—
That the words of the Demiurgus are addressed to the composite from soul and animal, via.
to the animal which is divine and partakes of a soul. — The meaning of the words, " Of
whom [ am the demiurgus and father," 8cc.
CHAPTER VII.
The meaning of the words unfolded in the speech of the Demiurgus, " Every thing therefore which
is bound is dissoluble, but to be willing to dissolve that which is beautifully harmonized and
well composed, is the province of an ill nature."
CHAPTER VIII.
The following part of the speech of the Demiurgus to the mundane Gods unfolded.— The differ'
ence between the primarily and secondarily immortal, and the primarily and secondarily
mdissoluble.-And that the mundane Gods are neither primarily immortal, nor primarily
indissoluble.
The following part of the speech of the Demiurgus to the mundane Gods unfolded.— The differ'
ence between the primarily and secondarily immortal, and the primarily and secondarily
mdissoluble.-And that the mundane Gods are neither primarily immortal, nor primarily
indissoluble.
CHAPTER IX.
That part of the speech of the Demiurgus uufolded, in which be says to the mundane God.«,
«' Learn now therefore what I say to you indicating my desire."
CHAPTER X.
The developetneat of the remaining part of the speech of the Demiurgus.
Proc. Vol. I. k
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txiiv CONTIXTI.
CHAPTER XI.
Who the junior God* are, and why they are thus called.
CHAPTER XII.
Farther important particulars respecting the fabrication of the mundane Gods, collected from the
Timseus, and unfolded.
CHAPTER XIII.
Continuation of the deYelopement of these particulars.
CHAPTER XIV.
The peculiarities of the celestial Gods separately discussed.— Why the one sphere of the fixed stars
cotuprcheuds a multitude of stars, but each of the planetary spheres convolves only one star.
—And that in each of the planetary spheres, there is a number of satellites, analogous to the
choir of the fixed stars, subsisting with proper circulations of their own.
CHAPTER XV.
The nature of the Moon, Mercury, Venus, and the Sun unfolded.
CHAPTER XVI.
Extract from the Oration of the Emperor Julian to the Sovereign Sun.
CHAPTER XVII.
Extract from the MS. Scholia of Proclus on the Cratylus of Plato concerning Apollo, in which
the principal powers of the God are unfolded.
CHAPTER XVIII.
The nature of ihc Muses unfolded from the above MS. Scholia.
CHAPTER XIX.
The nature of Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, unfolded. The manner in which ea«-h of the seven plane-
tary divinities becomes an animal, and in suspended from a more divine soul ; and what kind
of perfection it affords to the universe.
CHAPTER XX.
That all the celestial Gods nre beneficent, and after a similar manner the causes of good.— And that
the participation of them, and the mixture of material with immaterial influences, become the
causes of tbe abundant difference in secondary natures.
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CONTMNTS. lllT
CHAPTER XXI.
Tlie nature of Minerva unfolded from the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeu*. — The spear
and shield with which this Goddess, in the statues of her, ia represented aa armed,
CHAPTER XXII.
The nature of the great mundane divinity, the earth, unfolded from Proclus on the Timams of
Plato.
CHAPTER XXIII.
The manner in which the earth is said to bo the most ancient, and the first of the Gods within the
s, explained.
CHAPTER XXIV.
On the essence of the sublunary deities.-What Plato says of them in the Timwis unfolded.
CHAPTER XXIV.
On the essence of the sublunary deities.-What Plato says of them in the Timwis unfolded.
CHAPTER XXV.
Where the sublunary Gods are to be arranged.— And the meaning of the subsequent words of Plato
developed.
CHAPTER XXVI.
The nature of the sublunary Gods more fully unfolded.— On the dscmoniacal order.— And that
about each of the fabricators of generation, there ia a co-ordinate angelical, demoniacal, sod
beroical multitude, which retains die appellation of its producing monad.
CHAPTER XXVII.
What Pythagoras says in the Sacred Ditcours*. — What the Orphic traditions are concerning
Phanes, Night, Heaven, Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus — That Plato begins the Theogony of
the sublunary Gods from Heaven and Earth, and not from Phanes and Night.— And whv he
does so.
CHAPTER XXVIH.
On die two principles Heaven and Earth. — What each of them is ; and particularly concerning the
power of Heaven.
CHAPTER XXIX.
The wb«le theory of Earth unfolded— And also the theory of Ocean and Tethys That the causes
i are in the intellectual Gods, and likewise in the sensible i
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Uxvi CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXX.
The theory of Phorcjs, Saturn, and Rhea, unfolded.
CHAPTER XXXf.
The nature of the sublunary Jupiter aud Juno unfolded. — And why Plato comprehends in this
ennead, viz- Heaven aud Earth, Ocean aud Tetfays, Phorcys, Saturn, Rhea, Jupiter, and Juno,
the Gods who are the fabricators of generation.
CHAPTER XXXII.
Why Plato denominates the sublunary deities, " such as become apparent when they please."—
General observations respecting the Gods that govern generation.
CHAPTER XX XI 1 1.
On the summit, or monad of all the mundane Gods, Bacchus.— And on the mundane soul which is
the immediate participant of the Bacchic iutellect.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
How the mundane Gods arc characterized in the Parmenides of Plalo.
CHAPTER XXXV.
A developement of what Plato says m the Pha*driu, about Boreas and Orkhya, the Centaurs,
Chimaras, Gorgons, Pegasuses, Typbons, Acbelous, and die Nymulis.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
The meaning of Plato unfolded, in what lie says about Pan, Tartarus, Prometheus,
the Syrens.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
A developement of Plato's theological conceptions respecting Nature, Fate, aod Fortune.
CHAPTER XXXVIH.
What Time, Day and Night, Month and Year are, so far as tbey are deities, according to the
theology of Plato.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
A discmsion of the order of divioe souls, who are deified by always participating of the Gods.
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COMTIHTI. IWVS
CHAPTER XL.
A derelopement of the Rata re of Love, from the MS. Commentary of Proclus on the FurX Alcj-
CHAPTER XLI.
of the same subject.
CHAPTER XLII.
The nature of demon* more fully disclosed.— An extract from the MS. Commentary of Prod us
on the First Alcibiades, on this subject.
CHAPTER XL1H.
On the daemons who are allotted the superintendence of mankind.
CHAPTER XUV.
On the daemon of Socrates.— The peculiarily^of this daemon ; and that it belonged to the Apolio-
niacal series.
CHAPTER XLV.
Important information concerning daemons from the MS. Scholia of Prod us on the Cralylus of
Plato. — And also from the MS. Commentary of Olympiodorus on the Pluedo of Plato.
CHAPTER XLVI.
The nature of those human souls that are of an heroic characteristic unfolded. —What Plato says of
these souls in the Cratylus.— His meaning elucidated from the MS. Scholia of Proclua on
that dialogue.
CHAPTER XLVII.
How the triple genera that are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, are indicated in the Parma*
nidea of Plato.
CHAPTER XLVIH.
■ ■ *
An elucidation from Proclus of what Plato says in the Tinwus, in celebration of the divinity of die
World, ao far as the whole of it is a God.
CHAPTER XLIX.
A further elucidation from Proclus of the same subject
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lliriii COMIIKTI.
CHAPTER L.
Tfae atoning of the words of Plato, " And casing circle to revolve in a circle, he established
heaven (i. e. the world) one, only, solitary nature," unfolded from Proclus.
CHAPTER hi.
Whit Plato says in the Timreus about the name of the World,— with the elucidations of Proclus.
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hui*
An explanation of certain terms which are unusual, or have a meaning dif-
ferent from their common acceptation, and which there was a necessity of
introducing in the translation of this work.
Composite, fft/vtrrsc. 1 have used the word composite iiutcad of compounded, became the
Utter rather denotes the mingling than the contiguous union of one thing with another, which the
former, through its derivation from the Latin word compositui, solely denotes.
Demihrcus op wholes, &]/M«»fys; raw t*jm. The artificer of the universe is thus denomi-
nated, because be produces the universe so far as it is a whole, and likewise all the wholes it con-
tains, by his own immediate energy ; other subordinate powers co-operating with him iu the pro-
duction of parts. Hence he produces the universe totally and at once.
Dksire, twtfo/ua. Is an irrational appetite solely directed to external objecU, and to the
gratification arising from the possession of them.
Diaxoia, hemm, from whence dionottic,\* the discursive energy of reason; (Swfofcxi) too Xsyw
tvipyn*) or according to its most accurate signification, it is that power of the soul which reasons
scientifically, deriving the principles of iu reasoning from intellect, or the power which sees truth
intuitively.
Do x a stic, formed from !*£«, opinio*, is the last of the gnostic powers of the rational soul ; and
knows thai a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or why it is. The knowledge of the fan,
or a-Ay a thing is, being the province of dianoia.
CJn est, £«ef. This word, iu its more ample signification in the Greek, tleuolrs a »t ranger, but
properly implies one »lip receives another, or is himself received at an entertainment. In the dia-
logue of Plato therefore, (and consequently in this work of Pioclus when he cites the dialogues in
which this word occurs) wherever one of the speakers is introduced as a £•»»$, I have translated this
word gutit, as being more conformable to the genius of Plato's dialogues, which may be justly
called rich mental banquets, and consequently the speakers in them may be considered as so many
guests. Hence in thcTimaus, the persons of that dialogue are expressly spoken of as guests from
having been feasted with discourse.
Hvpabxis, vwaebi. The first principle, or foundation as it were, of the esseuce of a thing.
Hence, also, it is the summit of essence.
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Ixxx
Impahticipadle, «p»J#xTOf. Oi>e tiling i* said to be imparticipable with respect to another,
to which it i« superior, when it is not consubsistent with it.
Intellectual projection. The immediate energy of intellect is thus denorniniled,
because it is an intuitive perception, or an immediate darting forth, as it were, to its proper object,
the intelligible.
Monad, ftora,-, in divine natures is that which contains distinct, but at the same time pro-
foundly-united multitude, and which produces a multitude exquisitely allied to itself. But in lite
ncnsible universe, the first monad is (he world itself, which comprehends in itself all the multitude of
which it is the cause (in conjunction with the cause of all). The second monad is the iuerratic
sphere. In the third place, the spheres of the pluncts succeed, each of w hicb is also a monad, com-
prehending an appropriate multitude. And in the fourth and last place are the spheres of the
elements, which are in a similar manner monads. All these mounds likewise are denominated
•^onrrtf, wholenesses, and have a perpetual subsistence.
Permanency, rratrif. The proper word for rest, in Greek, is qpifiia. And Simplicity justly
observes, that not every a-rowij is ljftfuo, but that only which is after motion, 'litis word is
employed by Plato in the Sophista, to express one of the five genera of being, viz. essence, perma-
nency, (orairi;), motion, sameness, and difference ; in which place it evidently does not signify rest.
PriANTAfcT, or Imagination, ^amairia, is, /a4;pivri»i| voijvi;, i. e. a Jigured intelligence, because
all the perceptions of this power are intcard, and not external, like those of sense, and are accom-
panied with figure.
Psychical, ^ux*xef, i. c. pertaining to soul, in the same manner as fuvmec, physical, is some-
thing pertaining to nature.
e. a Jigured intelligence, because
all the perceptions of this power are intcard, and not external, like those of sense, and are accom-
panied with figure.
Psychical, ^ux*xef, i. c. pertaining to soul, in the same manner as fuvmec, physical, is some-
thing pertaining to nature.
Reason, Aoy»r. This word in Platonic writers signifies either that inward discursive energy
called reasoning ; or a certain productive and seminal principle ; or that which is indicative and
definitive of a tiling. Hence Knyot or reasons in the soul, are, gnoslically producing principles.
Unical, man;, that whkh is characterized by unity.
Uniform twxiJijj. This word when it occurs in Proclus, and other Platonic writers, signifies
that which has the form of the one, and not as ii> Johnson, that which keeps its tcnour, or is similar
to itself.
PROCLUS,
THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR,
ON
Cije Cfjeolosp of $lato.
BOOK I.
CHAPTER I.
o PERICLES, to me the dearest of friends, I am of opinion that the
whole philosophy of Plato was at first unfolded into light through the
beneficent will of superior natures, exhibiting the intellect concealed in
them, and the truth subsisting together with beings, to souls conversant
with generation (so far as it is lawful for thein to participate of such
supernatural and mighty good); and again, that afterwards having received
its perfection, returning as it were into itself, and becoming unapparent to
many who professed to philosophize, and who earnestly desired to engage
in the investigation of true being, it again advanced into light. But I
particularly think that the mystic doctrine respecting divine, concerns,
which is purely established on a sacred foundation, and which perpetually
subsists with the gods themselves, became thence apparent to such as are
Proc. Vol. I. A
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2
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
capable of enjoying it for a time, through one man,' whom I should not
err in calling the primary leader and hierophant of those true mysteries,
into which souls separated from terrestrial places are initiated, and of
those entire and stable visions, which those participate who genuinely
embrace a happy and blessed life. But this philosophy shone forth at
first from him so venerably and arcanely, as if established in sacred
temples, and within their adyta, and being unknown to many who have
entered into these holy places, in certain orderly periods of time, proceeded
as much as was possible for it into light, through certain true priests,
and who embraced a life corresponding to the tradition of such mystic
concerns. It appears likewise to me, that the whole place became
splendid, and that illuminations of divine spectacles every where
presented themselves to the view.
It appears likewise to me, that the whole place became
splendid, and that illuminations of divine spectacles every where
presented themselves to the view.
These interpreters of the epopteia (or mystic speculations) of Plato, who
have unfolded to us all-sacred narrations of divine concerns, and who
were allotted a nature similar to their leader, I should determine to be
the Egyptian Plotinus, and those who received the theory from him, I
mean Amelius and Porphyry, together with those in the third place who
were produced like virile statues from these, viz.: Jamblichus and
Theodoras, and any others, who after these, following this divine choir,
have energized about the doctrines of Plato with a divinely-inspired
mind. From these, he* who, after the gods, has been our leader to every
thing beautiful and good, receiving in an undented manner the most
genuine and pure light of truth in the bosom of his soul, made us a
partaker of all the rest of Plato's philosophy, communicated to us that
arcane information which he had received from those more ancient than
himself, and caused us, in conjunction with him, to be divinely agitated
about the mystic truth of divine concerns.
To this man, therefore, should we undertake to return thanks adequate
to the benefits which we have received from him j the whole of time
would not be sufficient. But if it is necessary, not only' that we should
have received from others the transcendant good of the Platonic
' Meaning Plato. * Meaning his preceptor Syrian us. ' The word jmwv is omitted in the original.
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CHAP. II.
OF PMTO
3
But if it is necessary, not only' that we should
have received from others the transcendant good of the Platonic
' Meaning Plato. * Meaning his preceptor Syrian us. ' The word jmwv is omitted in the original.
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CHAP. II.
OF PMTO
3
philosophy, but that we should leave to posterity monuments of those
blessed spectacles of which we have been spectators, and emulators to
the utmost of our ability, under a leader the most perfect of the present
time, and who arrived at the summit of philosophy ; perhaps we shall
act properly in invoking the gods, that they will enkindle the light of
truth in our soul, and in supplicating the attendants and ministers of
better natures to direct our intellect and lead it to the all-perfect, divine,
and elevated, end of the Platonic theory. For I think that every where
he who participates in the least degree of intelligence, will begin his
undertakings from the Gods, and especially in explications respecting
the Gods : for we can no otherwise be able to understand a divine nature
than by being perfected through the light of the Gods ; nor divulge it to
others unless governed by them* and exempt from multiform opinions,
and the variety which subsists in words, preserving at the same time the
interpretation of divine names. Knowing therefore this, and complying
with the exhortation of the Platonic Timteus, we in the first place establish
the Gods as leaders of the doctrine respecting themselves. But may
they in consequence of hearing our prayers be propitious to us, and
benignantly approaching, guide the intellect of our soul, and lead it about
the Vesta of Plato, and to the arduous sublimities of this speculation ;
where, when arrived, we shall receive all the truth concerning them, and
shall obtain the best end of our parturient conceptions of divine concerns,
desiring to know something respecting them, inquiring about them of
others, and, at the same time, as far as we are able, exploring them
ourselves.
CHAPTER II.
Akd thus much by way of preface. But it is necessary that I should
unfold the mode of the proposed doctrine, what it is requisite to expect
it will be, and define ihe preparatives which a hearer of it ought to
possess ; that being properly adapted, he may approach, not to our
discourses, but to the intellectually-elevated and deific philosophy of
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4 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
Plato. For it is proper that convenient aptitudes of auditors should be
proposed according to the forms of discourses, just as in the mysteries,
those who are skilful in concerns of this kind, previously prepare
receptacles for the Gods, and neither always use the same inanimate
particulars, nor other animals, nor men, in order to procure the presence
of the divinities ; but that alone out of each of these which is naturally
capable of participating divine illumination, is by them introduced to the
proposed mystic rites.
The present discourse, therefore, will first of all be divided by me into
three parts. In the beginning, considering all those common conceptions
concerning the Gods, which Plato summarily delivers, together with the
power and dignity every where of theological axioms ; but in the middle
of this work, speculating the total orders of the Gods, enumerating their
peculiarities, defining their progressions after the manner of Plato, and
referring every thing to the hypotheses of theologists ; and, in the end,
speaking concerning the Gods which are in different places celebrated in
the Platonic writings, whether they are supermundane or mundane, and
referring the theory respecting them to the total genera of the divine
orders.
In every part of this work, likewise, we shall prefer the clear, distinct,
and simple, to the contraries of these. And such things as are delivered
through symbols, we shall transfer to a clear doctrine concerning them ;
but such as are delivered through images, we shall transmit to their
exemplars. Such things too as are written in a more affirmative way,
we shall examine by causal reasonings ; but such as arc composed through
demonstrations, we shall investigate ; and besides this, explain the mode
of truth which they contain, and render it known to the hearers. And
of things enigmatically proposed, we shall elsewhere discover perspicuity,
not from foreign hypotheses, but from the most genuine writings of Plato.
But with respect to the things which immediately occur to the hearers,
of these we shall contemplate the consent with things themselves. And
from all these particulars, one perfect form of the Platonic theology will
present itself to our view, together with its truth which pervades through
the whole of divine intellections, and the one intellect which generated all
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CliAP. II. OF PLATO. 5
■
the beauty of this theology, and the mystic evolution of this theory.
Such, therefore, as I have said, will be my present treatise.
II. OF PLATO. 5
■
the beauty of this theology, and the mystic evolution of this theory.
Such, therefore, as I have said, will be my present treatise.
But the auditor of the proposed dogmas is supposed to be adorned
with the moral virtues, and to be one who has bound by the reason of
virtue all the illiberal and inharmonious motions of the soul, and
harmonized them to the one form of intellectual prudence : for, as
Socrates says, it is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure.
But every vicious man is perfectly impure ; and the contrary character
is pure. He must likewise have been exercised in all the logical methods,
and have contemplated many irreprehensible conceptions about analyses,
and many about divisions, the contraries to these, agreeably, as it appears
to me, to the exhortation of Parmenides to Socrates. For prior to such a
contest in arguments, the knowledge of the divine genera, and of the truth
established in them, is difficult and impervious. But in the third place,
he must not be unskilled in physics. For he who has been conversant
with the multiform opinions of physiologists, and has after a manner
explored in images the causes of beings, will more easily advance
to the nature of separate and primary essences. An auditor therefore
of the present work, as I have said, must sot be ignorant of the truth
contained in the phenomena, nor unacquainted with the paths of erudition,
and the disciplines which they contain ; for through these we obtain a
more immaterial knowledge of a divine essence. But all these must be
bound logether in the leader intellect. Being likewise a partaker of the
dialectic of Plato, meditating those immaterial energies which arc separate
from corporeal powers, and desiring to contemplate by intelligence* in
conjunction with reason [true] beings, our auditor must genuinely apply
himself to the interpretation of divine and blessed dogmas, and fill his
soul, according to the Oracle, with profound love; since, as Plato
somewhere observes, for the apprehension of this theory, a better assistant
than love cannot be obtained.
He must likewise be exercised in the truth which pervades through all
things, and must excite his intelligible eye to real and perfect truth. He
••
* Instead of tws >"t* Aoyw, iU» necessary to read, vo^w prr* Xayov.
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6 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
He must likewise be exercised in the truth which pervades through all
things, and must excite his intelligible eye to real and perfect truth. He
••
* Instead of tws >"t* Aoyw, iU» necessary to read, vo^w prr* Xayov.
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6 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
must establish himself in a firm, immovable, and safe kind of divine
knowledge, and must be persuaded not to admire any thing else, nor even
to direct his attention to other things, but must hasten to divine light
with an intrepid reasoning energy, and with the power of an unwearied
life ; and in short, must propose to himself such a kind of energy and
rest as it becomes him to possess who intends to be such a coryphaeus as
Socrates describes in the Theaetetus. Such then is the magnitude of our
hypothesis, and such the mode of the discourses about it. Before,
however, I enter on the narration of the things proposed, I wish to speak
about theology itself, its different modes, and what theological forms
Plato approves, and what he rejects ; that these being previously known,
we may more easily learn in what follows, the auxiliaries of the demon-
strations themselves.
CHAPTER III.
All, therefore, that have ever touched upon theology, liave called
things first, according to nature, Gods ; and have said that the theological
science is conversant about these. And some, indeed, have considered a
corporeal essence, as that alone which has any existence, and have placed
in a secondary rank with respect to essence, all the genera of incorporeal
natures, considering the principles of things as having a corporeal form,
and evincing that the habit in us by which we know these, is corporeal.
But others, suspending indeed all bodies from incorporeal natures, and
defining the first hyparxis1 to be in soul, and the powers of soul, call (as
it appears to me) the best of souls, Gods ; and denominate the science
which proceeds as far as to these, and which knows these, theology.
But such as produce the multitude of souls from another more ancient
principle, and establish intellect as the leader of wholes, these assert that
the best end is a union of the soul with intellect, and consider the
intellectual form of life as the most honourable of all things. They
■ Hrparxis, it the summit of any nature, or blossom, as it were, of Its essence.
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CHAP. III.
OF PLATO.
7
doubtless too consider theology, and the discussion of intellectual essence,
as one and the same. All these, therefore, as I have said, call the first
and most self-sufficient principles of things, Gods, and the science
respecting these, theology.
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CHAP. III.
OF PLATO.
7
doubtless too consider theology, and the discussion of intellectual essence,
as one and the same. All these, therefore, as I have said, call the first
and most self-sufficient principles of things, Gods, and the science
respecting these, theology.
The divine narration however, of Plato alone, despises all corporeal
natures, with reference to principles. Because, indeed, every thing divisible
and endued with interval, is naturally unable either to produce or preserve
itself, but possesses its being, energy, and passivity through soul, and the
motions which soul contains. But Plato demonstrates that the psychical
essence [i.e. the essence pertaining to soul] is more ancient than bodies, but
is suspended from an intellectual hypostasis. For every thing which is moved
according to time, though it may be self-moved, is indeed of a more ruling
nature than things moved by others, but is posterior to an eternal motion.
He shows, therefore, as we have said, that intellect is the father and cause
of bodies and souls, and that all things both subsist and energize about
it, which are allotted a life conversant with transitions und evolutions.
Plato, however, proceeds to another principle entirely exempt from
intellect, more incorporeal and ineffable, and from which all things, even
though you should speak of such as ore last, have necessarily a subsistence.
For all things are not naturally disposed to participate of soul, but such
things only as are allotted in themselves a more clear or obscure life.
Nor are all things able to enjoy intellect and being, but such only as
subsist according to form. But it is necessary that the principle of all
things should be participated by all things, if it does not desert any thing,
since it is the cause of all things which in any respect are said to have a
subsistence. Plato having divinely discovered this first principle of
wholes, which is more excellent than intellect, and is concealed in
inaccessible recesses ; and having exhibited these three causes and monads,
and evinced them to be above bodies, I mean soul, the first intellect, and
a union above intellect, produces from these as monads, their proper
numbers ; one multitude indeed being uniform,' but the second intellectual,
and the third psychical. For every monad is the leader of a multitude
* Wherever this word occurs in this translation, it signifies that which is characterized by unity.
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8 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
For every monad is the leader of a multitude
* Wherever this word occurs in this translation, it signifies that which is characterized by unity.
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8 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
coordinate to itself. But as Plato connects bodies with souls, so likewise
he connects souls with intellectual forms, and these again with the unities
of beings. But he converts all things to one ira participate unity. And
having run back us far as to this unity, he considers himself as having
obtained the highest end of the theory of wholes ; and that this is the
truth' respecting the Gods, which is conversant with the unities of beings,
and which delivers their progressions and peculiarities, the contact of
beings with them, and the orders of forms which are suspended from these
unical' hypostases.
But he teaches us that the theory respecting intellect, and the forms
and the genera revolving about intellect, is posterior to the science which
is conversant with the Gods themselves. Likewise that the intellectual
theory apprehends intelligibles, and the forms which are capable of being
known by the soul through the projecting energy of intellect ; but that
the theological science transcending this, is conversant with arcane and
ineffable hyparxes, and pursues their separation from each other, and
their unfolding into light from one cause of all : whence, I am of opinion,
that the intellectual peculiarity of the soul is capable of apprehending
intellectual forms, and the difference which subsists in them, but that
the summit, and, as they say, dower of intellect and hyparxis, is conjoined
with the unities of beings, and through these, with the occult union of all
the divine unities. For as we contain many gnostic powers, through
this alone we are naturally capable of being conjoined with and
participating this occult union. For the genus of the Gods cannot be
apprehended by sense, because it is exempt from all bodies ; nor by
opinion and dianoia,' for these are divisible and come into contact with
multiform concerns ; nor by intelligence in conjunction with reason, for
knowledge of this kind belongs to true beings; but the hyparxis of the
Gods rides on beings, and is defined according to the union itself of
wholes. It remains, therefore, if it be admitted that a divine nature can
be ,in any respect known, that it must be apprehended by the hyparxis
of the soul, and through this, as far as it is possible, be known. For wo
* i. e. Of the nature of the one.
* i. e. The ducursire energy of reason, or the power of the soul that reasons scientifically,
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II
CHAP. Ji. OF PLATO. 9
say that every where things similar can be known by the similar ; viz.
the sensible by sense, the doxastic' by opinion, the dianoetic by dianoia,
and the intelligible by intellect So that the most unical nature must be
known by the one, and th«: ineffable by that which is ineffable.
OF PLATO. 9
say that every where things similar can be known by the similar ; viz.
the sensible by sense, the doxastic' by opinion, the dianoetic by dianoia,
and the intelligible by intellect So that the most unical nature must be
known by the one, and th«: ineffable by that which is ineffable.
Indeed, Socrates in the [First] Alcibiades rightly observes, that the soul
entering into herself will behold all other things, and deity itself. For
verging to her own union, and to the centre of all life, laying aside mul-
titude, and the variety of the all manifold powers which she contains, she
ascends to the high .«.„(, it is necwaaiy to read «*««,.
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CHAP. V.
OF PLATO.
15
all the Platonic dialogues, and in all of them conceptions of the first
philosophy, venerable, clear, and snpernatural, are disseminated, in
some indeed, more obscurely, but in others more conspicuously ; con*
ceptions which excite those that are in any respect able to participate of
them, to the immaterial and separate essence of the Gods. And, as in
each part of the universe, and in nature herself, the demiurgus of all
that the world contains, established resemblances of the unknown
hyparxis of the Gods, that all things might be converted to a divine na-
ture, through their alliance with it, in like manner I am of opinion, that
the divine intellect of Plato weaves conceptions about the Gods in all
his writings, and leaves nothing deprived of the mention of divinity, that
from the whole of them, a reminiscence of wholes may be obtained, and
imparted to the genuine lovers of divine concerns.
If however, it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogues out
of many, which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about the
gods, I should not err in ranking among this number, the Phsedo and
Phedrus, the Banquet, and the Philebus, and together with these, the
Sophista and Politicus, the Cratylus and the Timaeus. For all these are
full through the whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science
of Plato. But I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in
the Gorgias, and that in the Protagoras ; likewise the assertions about
the providence of the Gods in the Laws, and such things as are delivered
about the Fates, or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the
universe, in the tenth book of the Republic. Again, you may, if you
please, place in the third rank those Epistles, through which we may be
able to arrive at the science about divine natures. For in these, mention
is made of the three kings ; and very many other divine dogmas worthy
the Platonic theory are delivered. It is necessary therefore, looking to
these, to explore in these each order of the Gods.
Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one
good, and the two first principles of things, together with the triad*
which is unfolded into light from these. For you will find all these
' rpm&>( is omitted in the origin*].
Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one
good, and the two first principles of things, together with the triad*
which is unfolded into light from these. For you will find all these
' rpm&>( is omitted in the origin*].
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!6 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
distinctly delivered to us by Plato in that dialogue. But from the Ti-
njaeus, you may obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration
about the demiurgic monad: and the most full truth about the mundane
Gods. But from the Phaedrus, [you may acquire a scientific knowledge
of] all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and of the liberated orders
of Gods, which are proximately established above the celestial circula-
tions. From the Politicus, you may obtain the theory of the fabrica-
tion in the heavens, of the uneven periods of the universe, and of the
intellectual causes of those periods. But from the Sophista, the whole
sublunary generation, and the peculiarity of the Gods who are allotted
the sublunary region, and preside over its generations and corruptions.
But with respect to each of the Gods, we may obtain many conceptions
adapted to sacred concerns from the Banquet, many from the Cratylus,
and many from the Phsedo. For in each of these dialogues, more or
less mention is made of divine names, from which it is easy for those
who are exercised in divine concerns to discover by a reasoning process
the peculiarities of each.
It is necessary however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords
with Platonic principles, and the mystic traditions of theologists. For
all the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic tradition of Or-
pheus ; Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the orgies of
the Gods, but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science
of the divinities from the Pythagoric and Orphic writings. For in the
Philebus referring the theory about the two species of principles [bound
and infinity] to the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the
Gods, and truly blessed. Philolaus therefore, the Pythagorean, has left
us in writing many admirable conceptions about these principles, cele-
brating their common progression into beings, and their separate fabri-
cation of things. But in the Timjeus, Plato endeavouring to teach us •
about the sublunary Gods, and their order, flies to theologists, calls
them the sons of the Gods, and makes them the fathers of the truth
about those divinities. And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublu-
nary Gods proceeding from wholes, according to the progression deli-
vered by them of the intellectual kings. Again, in the Cratylus he fol-
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CHAP. VI. OF PLATO. yj
And lastly, he delivers the orders of the sublu-
nary Gods proceeding from wholes, according to the progression deli-
vered by them of the intellectual kings. Again, in the Cratylus he fol-
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CHAP. VI. OF PLATO. yj
lows the traditions of theologtsts, respecting the order of the divine pro-
cessions. But in the Gorgias, he adopts the Homeric dogma, respect-
ing the triadic hypostasis of the demiurgi. And in short, he every
where discourses concerning the Gods agreeably to the principles of
theologists ; rejecting indeed, the tragical part of mythological fiction,
but establislung first hypotheses in common with the authors of fables.
CHAFrER VI.
Perhaps, however, some one may here object to as, that we do not in
a proper manner exhibit the every where dispersed theology of Plato, and'
that we endeavour to heap together different particulars from different dia-
logues, as if we were studious of collecting together many things into one
mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain.
For if this were the case, we might refer different dogmas to different
treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a preccdaneoos doc*
trine concerning the Gods,' nor will there be any dialogue which presents
us with an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and their
co-ordination with eacH other. But we shall be similar to those who "en-
deavour to obtain a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior
to parts, and to weave together the perfect from things imperfect; when,'
on the contrary, the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its genera-
tion in the perfect. For the Timseus, for instance, will teach us the theory
of the intelligible genera; and the Phaedrus appears to present us
with a methodical account of the first intellectual orders. But where will'
he the coordination of intellectuals to intelligibles ? And what will be the
generation of second from first natures ? In short, after what manner the
progression of the divine orders takes place from the one principle of all
things, and how in the generations of the Gods, the orders between
the one, and .all-perfect number, are -filled up, we 'shall be unable to'
evince.
Farther still, it may be said, where- will -be the venerableness of your
Troc. Vol. I. C
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IB
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
Farther still, it may be said, where- will -be the venerableness of your
Troc. Vol. I. C
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IB
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
boasted science about divine natures ? For it is absurd to call these dog*
mas which are collected from many places Platonic ; and which, as yoo
acknowledge, are introduced from foreign names to the philosophy of
Plato ; nor are you able to evince one whole entire truth about divine na-
tures. Perhaps, indeed, they will say, certain persons, junior to Plato,
hare delivered in their writings, and left to their disciples, one perfect
form of theology. You, therefore, are able to produce one entire theory
about nature from the Timoeus ; but from the Republic, or Laws, the most
beautiful dogmas about manners, and which tend to one form of philoso-
phy. Alone, therefore, neglecting the treatise of Plato, which contains
all the good of the first philosophy, and which may be called the summit
of the whole theory, you will be deprived of the most perfect knowledge
of beings, unless you are so much infatuated, as to boast on account of
fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things of this kind abounds with
much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative. Besides, things of
this kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic dialogues ; as
the fable in the Protagoras, which is inserted for the sake of the politic
science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like manner, the fable
in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; but in the Gorgias,
for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous narrations
with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the fables, but
for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only exercise the in-
tellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, bat that the divine,
part of the soul may more perfectly receive the knowledge of beings,
through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. For, from other dis-
courses, we appear similar to those who are compelled to the reception
of truth ; but from fables we suffer in an ineffable manner, and call forth
our un perverted conceptions, venerating the mystic information which
they contain.
Hence, as it appears to me, Timoeus with great propriety thinks it fit
that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of fa-
bles as the sons of the Gods,' and subscribe to their always generating
• tmhm, m omitted is tbt original.
Di
CHAP. VI.
OP PLATO.
Hence, as it appears to me, Timoeus with great propriety thinks it fit
that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of fa-
bles as the sons of the Gods,' and subscribe to their always generating
• tmhm, m omitted is tbt original.
Di
CHAP. VI.
OP PLATO.
secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak with-
out demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative, but
entheastic, and was invented by the ancients, not through necessity, but
for the sake of persuasion, not regarding mere discipline, but sympathy
with things themselves. But if you are willing to speculate not only the,
causes of rabies, but of other theological dogmas, you will find that some
of them nre scattered in the Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical,' and
others for the sake of physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato
discourses concerning bound and the infinite, for the sake of pleasure and
a life according to intellect For I think the latter are species of the for-
mer. In the Timams, the discourse about the intelligible Gods, is assum-.
ed for the sake of the proposed physiology. On which account it is every
where necessary that images should be known from paradigms; but
that the paradigms of material things should be immaterial, of sen-
sibles, intelligible, and that the paradigms of physical forms should be
separate.
But again in the Phaedrus, Plato celebrates the supcrcclcstial place,
the subcelestial profundity, and every genus under this, for the sake of
amatory mania : the manner in which the reminiscence of souls takes
place, and the passage to these from hence. But every where, as I may
say, the leading end is either physical or political, while the conceptions
about divine natures take place, either for the sake of invention or per-
fection. How, therefore, can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable
and supernatural* and worthy to be studied beyond every thing, when it is
neither able to evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which
is.precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is
violent and not sppntaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an ad-
ventitious order, as in a drama ? And such are the objections which may
be urged against our design.
• For fuAtam, k U aetmrj to read, ra nhnm*.
OH THE THEOLOGY
UOOK I.
CHAPTER VII.
And such are the objections which may
be urged against our design.
• For fuAtam, k U aetmrj to read, ra nhnm*.
OH THE THEOLOGY
UOOK I.
CHAPTER VII.
I, hoveteb, to an objection of this kind, shall make a just and per-
spicuous reply. I say then, that Plato every where discourses about the
Gods agreeably to ancient rumour, and to the nature of things. And
sometimes indeed, for the sake of the cause of the things proposed, he
reduces them to the principles of the dogmas ; and thence, as from a
watch. tower, contemplates the nature of the thing proposed. But some-
times he establishes the theological science as the leading end. For in the
Phaedrus his subject respects intelligible beauty, and the participation of
beauty pervading from thence through all things; and in the Banquet it
respects the amatory order.
But if it be necessary to survey in one Platonic dialogue, the all-per-
fect, whole, and connected, extending as far as to the com pleat number
of theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be
apparent to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we have
entered on such like arguments, and affirm against our opponents, that
the Parmenides, and the mystic conceptions it contains, will accomplish
all you desire. For in this dialogue all the divine genera proceed in-
order from the first cause, and evince their mutual connexion and de-
pendence on each other. And those which are highest indeed, connate
with the one, and of a primary nature, are allotted a unica), occult and
simple form of hyparxis ; but such as are last, are multiplied, are distri-
buted into many parts, and are exuberant in number, but inferior in
power to such as are of a higher order ; and such as are middle, accord-
ing to a convenient proportion, are more composite than their causes,
but more simple than their.proper progeny. And in short, all the axioms
of the theologic science, appear in perfection in this dialogue, and all the
divine orders are exhibited subsisting in connexion. So that this is no-
thing else than the. celebraled; generation of the Gods and the procession
of every kind of being from the ineffable and unknown cause of wholes.
The Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato, the whole
and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the before men-
tioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the Gods,
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CHAP. VIII.
OF PLATO.
The Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the lovers of Plato, the whole
and perfect light of the theological science. But after this, the before men-
tioned dialogues distribute parts of the mystic discipline about the Gods,
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CHAP. VIII.
OF PLATO.
and all of them, as I may say, participate of divine wisdom, and excite
our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine nature. And it is ne-
cessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline to these dialogue*,
and these again to the one and all-perfect theory of the Parmenides. For
thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more imperfect from the
perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons assimilated to
things, of which, according to the Platonic Timacus, they are interpreters,
Such then is our answer to the objection which may be urged against us ;
and thus we refer the Platonic theory to the Parmenides ; just as the*
Timams is acknowledged by all who are in the least degree intelligent, to'
contain the whole science about nature.
■
- - -
CHAPTER VIII.
I appear, however, by these means, to have excited for myself a two-
fold contest against those who attempt to investigate the writings of
Plato ; and I see two sorts of persons, who will oppose what has been
said. One of these does not think proper to explore any other design in the
Parmenides, than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce in
this dialogue a croud of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are foreign
from its intention. But the other sort, who are more venerable than
these, and lovers of forms assert, that one of the hypotheses is about the
first God, another about the second God, and the whole of an intellec-
tual nature, and a third, about the natures posterior to this, whether
they are the more excellent genera, or souls, or any other kind of beings.
For the investigation of these particulars does not pertain to the present
discourse.
These, therefore, distribute three of the hypotheses after this manner.
But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the multitude of
Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the supermundane and
mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division, or busily explore
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12 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the multitude of
Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the supermundane and
mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division, or busily explore
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12 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
them. For according to them, though Plato in the second hypothesis*
treats about intellectual beings, yet the nature of intellect is one, simple
and indivisible. Against both these therefore, must be contend, who
entertains that opinion of the Parmenides, which we have before men*
tioned. The contest however against these is not equal. But those
who make the Parmenides a logical exercise, are again attacked by those,
who embrace the divine mode of interpretation. And those who do upt,
unfold the multitude of beings, and the orders of divine natures, are in-
deed, as Homer says, is every respect venerable and skilful menj but
yet for the sake of the Platonic philosophy, we must doubt against them,'
following in this our leader to the most holy and mystic truth. It is
proper likewise to relate as far as contributes to our purpose, what ap-
pears to us to be the truth respecting the hypotheses of the Parmenides \
for thus perhaps by a reasoning process, we may embrace the whole the-
ology of Plato.
CHAPTER IX.
, Ijr the first place then, let us consider those, who draw down the
design of this dialogue from the truth of things to a logical exercise, and
see whether they can possibly accord with the writings of Plato. It is
therefore evident to every one, that Parmenides proposes to himself to
deliver in reality the dialectic method, and that with this view he curso-
rily assumes it in a similar manner in each of the things which have a
real being, as, in sameness, difference, similitude, dissimilitude, motion,
and permanency, &c. ; exhorting at the same time, those who desire to
discover the nature of each of these in an orderly method, to this exercise,
as to a great contest. He likewise asserts that it was by no means an easy
undertaking to him who was so much advanced in years, assimilates him-
self to the Ibycean horse, and presents us with every argument to prove
that this method is a serious undertaking, and not a contest consisting in
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CHAP. IX. OP PLATO. S3
IX. OP PLATO. S3
mere words. How therefore, is it possible, that we can refer to empty
arguments those conceptions ' about which the great Parmenides, evin-
cing that they require much serious discussion, composed this discourse ?
How likewise is it reasonable to suppose that an aged man would busy
himself with mere verbal contests, and that he who loved to speculate
the truth of things, would bestow so much study on this method,— he
who considered every thing else, as having no real existence, and who
ascended to the high watch-tower of being itself? Indeed, he who ad-
mits this must suppose that Parmenides is satirized by Plato in this dia-
logue, by thus representing him drawn down to juvenile contests, from
the most intellectual visions of the soul.
But if you are willing, let us consider in addition to the above, what
***rmenidei ^ onuses, and on what subject engaging to speak, he entered
on thb discussiOw- Wp., it potthen about being according to his doc-
trine, and the unity of all beiugsTtj WlUtliwwiondjnp; himself, his design
was concealed from the vulgar, while he exhorts us to conSP^ipPMfc
tude of beings into one undivided union ? If, therefore, this is the one
being, or that which is the highest, and which is perfectly established
above the reasons conversant with opinion, is it not absurd to confound
dogmas about intelligibles with doxastic arguments? Tor indeed, such a
form of discourse is not adapted to the hypothesis about true beings, nor
does the intellection of unapparent and separate causes harmonise with
dialectic exercises; but these differ from each other, so far as intellect is
established above opinion, as Timaeus informs us, and not Timaeus only,
but likewise the daemoniacal Aristotle, who, discoursing on a power of
this kind, exhorts us to make our investigations, ueitber about things
perfectly unapparent to us, nor about such as are more known.
It is far therefore from being the case, that Parmenides, who places
the science of beings above that which appears to be truth to those who
rank sense before intellect, should introduce doxastic knowledge to an
intellective nature, since a knowledge of this kind is dubious, various,
and unstable ; or that he- should speculate true being with this doxastie
■ For nurrcXoi, it if uecxttuj to read rr resM*» *** • wu^Vt «« t ^-Xl '/*"**
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4C OS THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
proximity to intellect. And intellect possessing its life in eternity, always
subsisting essentially in energy/ and fixing all its stable intellection at
once in intellect, is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. For
it has two-fold energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others
as being inebriated with nectar. And elsewhere he observes, that this in-
tellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a god ; in the
same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul, is intellect; and
as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul.
And elsewhere he observes, that this in-
tellect, by that which is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a god ; in the
same manner as soul, by its summit which is above soul, is intellect; and
as body, by the power which is prior to body, is soul.
All things therefore, as we have said, are suspended from the one through
intellect and soul as media. And intellect indeed has the form of unity ;
but soul has the form of intellect ; and the body of the world is vital.
But every thing is conjoined with that which is prior to itself. And of
the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate, but the other in
a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And divinity, indeed*
is prior to intellect, being primarily carried in an intellectual nature ; but
intellect is most divine, as being deified prior to other things ; and soul is
divine, so far as it requires an intellectual medium. But the body which
participates of a soul of ttxis kind, so far as body indeed, is also itself
divine ; for the illumination of divine* light pervades supernally as far as
to the last dependencies ; yet it is not simply divine; but soul, by looking
to intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.
My reasoning is also the same about each of the whole spheres, and
about the bodies they contain. For all these imitate the whole heaven,
since these likewise have a perpetual allotment; and with respect to the
sublunary elements, they have not entirely an essential mutation, but they
abide in the universe according to their wholenesses, and contain in them-
selves partial animals. For every wholeness has posterior to itself more
partial essences. As, therefore, in the heavens, the number of the stars
proceeds together with the whole spheres, and as in the earth the multi-
tude of partial terrestrial animals subsists together with their wholeness,
thus also it appears to me to be necessary that in the wholes which have
• For atxt ivtgytta, read, etfi cur mgytia.
* The sense requires lliat f.MU should be here wpplied.
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CHAP. XIII.
OF PLATO.
an intermediate subsistence, each element should be filled up with appro-
priate numbers. For how in the extremes can wholes which subsist prior
to parts, be arranged together with parts, unless there is the same analogy
of them in the intermediate natures ?
XIII.
OF PLATO.
an intermediate subsistence, each element should be filled up with appro-
priate numbers. For how in the extremes can wholes which subsist prior
to parts, be arranged together with parts, unless there is the same analogy
of them in the intermediate natures ?
But if each of the spheres is an animal, and is always established after
the same manner, and gives completion to the universe, as possessing life
indeed, it will always primarily participate of soul, but as preserving its
own order immutable in the world, it will be comprehended by intellect,
and as one and a whole, and the leader and ruler of its proper parts, it
will be illuminated by divine union. Not only the universe, therefore,
but each also of its perpetual parts is animated and endued with in-
tellect, and as much as possible is similar to the universe.' For each
of these parts is a universe with respect to its kindred multitude. In
short, there is indeed one corporeal-formed wholeness of the universe,
but there arc many others under this, depending on this one ; there is one
soul of the universe, and after this, other souls, together with this dispos-
ing in an orderly manner the whole parts of the universe with undefiled
purity ; one intellect, and an intellectual number under this, participated
by these souls ; and one god who connectedly contains at once all mun-
dane and supermundane1 natures, and a multitude of other gods, who
distribute intellectual essences, and the souls suspended from these, and
all the parts of the world. For it is not to be supposed that each of the
productions of nature is generative of things similar to itself, but that
wholes and the first of mundane beings should not in a much greater
degree extend in themselves the paradigm of a generation of this kind.
For the similar is more allied, and more naturally adapted to the reason
of cause than the dissimilar, in the same manner as the same than the
different, and bound than the infinite. These things, however, we shall
accurately survey in what follows. But we shall now direct our attention
to the second of the things demonstrated in the Laws, viz. that the Gods
providentially attend at once to wholes and parts, and shall summarily
' Instead of tftam fu] xmra. luittftn, it is necessary to read k%% xora fc/vapir rtf veam tfvm», ts both,
the sense of the whole sentence and the version of Portus require.
' It seems requisite to supply here the word uxi'jx$&fmt> sii in ill© trails mi ion.
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OH THE THEOLOGY
BOOK L
discuss the irreprehensible conception of Plato -about the providence of
the Gods.
CHAPTER XIV.
' It seems requisite to supply here the word uxi'jx$&fmt> sii in ill© trails mi ion.
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43
OH THE THEOLOGY
BOOK L
discuss the irreprehensible conception of Plato -about the providence of
the Gods.
CHAPTER XIV.
Fhom what has "been said, therefore, it is evident to every one, that the
Gods being the causes of all motion, some of them are essential and
vivific, according to a self-motive, self-vital, and self-energetic power. But
others of them are intellectual, and excite by their very being all secon-
dary* natures to the perfection of life, according to the fountain and
principle of all second and third progressions of motion. And others are
unical, or characterized by unity, deifying by participation all the whole
genera of themselves, according to a primary, all-perfect, and unknown
power of energy, and who are the leaders of one kind of motion, but
are not the principle of another. But again others supply to secondary
natures motion according to place or quality, but arc essentially the
causes of motion to themselves. For every thing which is the cause of
essence to other things is much prior to this the cause to itself of its own
proper energies and perfection. Farther still, that which is self-motive is
again the principle of motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to
every thing in the world, and not local motion only and the other kinds
of motion, but the progression into being is from soul, and by a much
greater priority from an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the life
of self-motive natures and precedes according to cause all temporal energy.
And in a still greater degree do motion, being, and life proceed from a
unical hy pant is, which connectedly contains intellect and soul, is the
source of total good, and proceeds as far as to the last of things. For of
life iudecd, not all the parts of the world are capable of participating, nor
of intellect and a gnostic power ; but of the one all things participate, as far
• For bvrffw read fevnga.
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CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 49
For of
life iudecd, not all the parts of the world are capable of participating, nor
of intellect and a gnostic power ; but of the one all things participate, as far
• For bvrffw read fevnga.
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CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 49
as to matter itself, both wholes and parts, things which subsist according to
nature, and the contraries to these ; and there is not any thing which is de-
prived of a cause of this kind, nor can any thing ever participate of being,
if it is deprived of the one. If, therefore, the Gods produce all things, and
contain all things, in the unknown comprehensions of themselves, how is
it possible there should not be a providence of all things iu these compre-
hensions, pervading supernally as far as to the most partial natures ? For
it is every where fit that offspring should enjoy the providential care of
their causes. But all alter-motive are the progeny of self-motive natures.
And things which subsist in time, cither in the whole of time, or in a part
of it, are the effects of eternal natures ; because that which always is, is the
cause of that which sometimes exists. And divine and unical genera, as they
give subsistence to all multiplied natures, precede them in existence. In
short, there is no essence, or multitude of powers, which is not allotted iu
generation from the one. It is necessary, therefore, that all these should be
partakers of the providence of preceding causes, being vivified indeed from
the psychical gods, and circulating according to temporal periods ; and
participating of sameness and at the same time a stable condition of forms
from the intellectual gods ;' but receiving into themselves the presence of
union, of measure, and of the distribution of good from the first Gods.
It is necessary, therefore, either that the Gods should know that a provi-
dential care of their own offspring is natural to them, and should not only
give subsistence to secondary beings, and supply them with life, essence
and union, but also previously comprehend in themselves the primary
cause of the goods they contain, or, which it is not lawful to assert, that
being Gods, they are igooraut of what is proper and fit.
For what ignorance can there be of beautiful things, with those who
are the causes of beauty, or of things good, with those who are allotted
an hyparxis defined by the nature of the goodf But if they are
ignorant, neither do souls govern the universe according to intellect,
nor are intellects carried in souls as in a vehicle, nor prior to these do the
unities of the Gods contractedly comprehend in themselves all know-
1 It is necessary here to »udt>1t the words, ex ru> vhcm; $r*v.
Proc. Vol.1. G
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50
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
Proc. Vol.1. G
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50
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
ledge, which we have acknowledged they do through the former demonstra-
tions. If, therefore, they are not deprived of knowledge, being the fathers,
leaders and governors of every thing in the world, and' to them as being,
such a providential care of the things governed by, and following them,
and generated by them, pertains, whether shall we say that they knowing
the law which is according to nature, accomplish this law, or that through
imbecility they arc depri\ed of a providential attention to their possessions
or progeny, for it is of no consequence as to the present discussion which
of these two appellations you are willing to adopt? For if through want
of power they neglect the superintendence of wholes, what is the cause of
this want of power ? For they do not move things externally, nor are other
tilings indeed the causes of essence, but they assume the government of
the things they have produced, but they rule over all things as if from the
stern of a ship, themselves supplying being* themselves containing the
measures of life, and themselves distributing to things their respective
energies.
W hether also, are they unable to provide at once for all things, or they
do not leave each of the parts destitute of their providential care ? And
if they are not curators of every thing in the world, whether do they pro-
videntially superintend greater things, but neglect such as are less ? Or
do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take care of the greater ?
For if we deprive them of a providential attention to all things similarly y
through the want of power, how, while we attribute to them a greater
thing, viz. the production of all things, can we refuse to grant that which
is naturally consequent to this, a providential attention to their produc-
tions ? For it is the province of the power which produces a greater thing,
to dispose in a becoming manner that which is less. But if they are
curators of less tilings, and neglect such as are greater, how can this mode
of providence be right? For that which is more allied, and more similar
to any thing, is more appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the
participation of the good which that thing confers on it. If, however*
the Gods think that the first of mundane natures deserve their providen-
tial care, and that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable
■ »«• is omitted in the original.
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CHAP. XIV.
OF PT.ATO.
51
If, however*
the Gods think that the first of mundane natures deserve their providen-
tial care, and that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable
■ »«• is omitted in the original.
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CHAP. XIV.
OF PT.ATO.
51
to extend their regard to the last of things, what is it which can restrain
the presence of the Gods from pervading to all things ? What is it which
can impede their unenvying and exuberant energy ? How can those who
are capable of effecting greater things, be unable to govern such as are less?
Or how can those who produce the essence even of the smallest things, not
be tlie lords of the perfection of them, through a privation of power? For
all these things are hostile to our natural conceptions. It remains, there-
fore, that the Gods must know what is fit and appropriate, and that they
must possess a power adapted to the perfection of their own nature, and
to the government of the whole of things. But if they know that which
is according to nature, and this to those who are the generating causes of
all things is to take care of all things, and an exuberance of power, — if
this be the case, they are not deprived of a providential attention of this
kind. Whether, also, together with what has been said, is there a will of
providence in them ? Or is this alone wanting both to their knowledge
and power? And on this account are things deprived' of their providential
care ? For if indeed knowing what is fit for themselves, and being able to
accomplish what they know, they are unwilling to provide for their own
offspring, they will be indigent of goodness, their unenvying exuberance
will perish, and we shall do nothing else than abolish the hyparxis ac-
cording to which they are essentialised. For the very being of the Gods
is defined by the good, and in this they have their subsistence. But to
provide for things of a subject nature, is to confer on them a certain
good. How, therefore, can we deprive the Gods of providence, without
at the same time depriving them of goodness? And how if we subvert
their goodness is it possible, that we should not also ignorantly subvert
their hyparxis which we established by the former demonstrations ? Hence
it is necessary to admit as a thing consequent to the very being of the
Gods that they are good according to every virtue. And again, it is con-
sequent to this that they do not withdraw themselves from a providential
attention to secondary natures, either through indolence, or imbecility,
or ignorance. But to this I think it is also consequent that there is with
* For oTjagqrM it is requisite to read, xaj w*t«k
52
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying
and exuberant will. From which it appears that they provide for the
trhole of things, and omit nothing which is requisite to the supply of
good.
them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power, and unenvying
and exuberant will. From which it appears that they provide for the
trhole of things, and omit nothing which is requisite to the supply of
good.
Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence
about secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that
this is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established re-
mote from mortal difficulty. For their blessedness is not willing to be de-
filed with the difficulty of administration, since even the life of good men
is accompanied with facility, and is void of molestation and pain. But
all labours and molestation arise from the impediments of matter. If;
however, it be requisite to define the mode of the providence of the Gods,
it must be admitted that it is spontaneous, unpolluted, immaterial, and
ineffable. For the Gods do not govern all things either by investigating
what is fit, or exploring the good of every thing by ambiguous reasonings,
or by looking externally, and following their effects as men do in the pro*
vidence which they exert on their own affairs ; but pre-assuming in them-
selves the measures of the whole of things, and producing the essence of
every thing from themselves, and also looking to themselves, they lead
and perfect all things in a silent path, by their very being, and fill them
with good. Neither, likewise, do they produce in a manner similar to
nature, energizing only by their very being, unaccompanied with deli-
berate choice, nor energizing in a manner similar to partial souls in con-
junction with will, are they deprived of production according to essence ;
but they contract both these into one union, and they will indeed such
things as they are able to effect by their very being, but by their very
essence being capable of and producing all things, they contain the cause
of production in their unenvying and exuberant will. By what busy
energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with the punishment of what
Ixion, is the providence either of whole souls, or of intellectual essences,
or of the Gods themselves accomplished, unless it should be said, that to
impart good in any respect is laborious to the Gods ? But that which is
according to nature is not laborious to any thing. For neither is it labo-
rious to fire to impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor in short to
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CHAP. XIV. OP PLATO. ^
But that which is
according to nature is not laborious to any thing. For neither is it labo-
rious to fire to impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate, nor in short to
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CHAP. XIV. OP PLATO. ^
bodies to energize according to their own proper powers. And prior to
bodies, neither is it laborious to natures to nourish, or generate, or increase.
For these are the works of natures. Nor again, prior to these, is it labo-
rious to souls. For these indeed produce many energies from deliberate
choice, many from their very being, and are the causes of many motions
by alone being present. So that if indeed the communication of good is
according to nature to the Gods, providence also is according to nature.
And these things we must say are accomplished by the Gods with facility,
and by their very being alone. But if these things are not according to
nature, neither will the Gods be naturally good. For the good is the sup-
plier of good ; just as life is the source of another life, and intellect is the
source of intellectual illumination. And every tiling which has a primary
subsistence in each nature is generative of that which has a secondary
subsistence.
That however, which is especially the illustrious prerogative of the
Platonic theology, I should say is this, that according to it, neither is the
exempt essence of the Gods converted to secondary natures, through a pro-
vidential care for things subordinate, nor is their providential presence with
all things diminished through their transcending the whole of things with
undefiled purity, but at the same time it assigns to them a separate subsist*
ence, and the being unmingled with every subordinate nature, and also
the beipg extended to all things, and the taking care of and adorning their
own progeny. For the manner in which they pervade through all things is
not corporeal, as that of light is through the air, nor is it divisible about
bodies, in the same manner as in nature, nor converted to subordinate
natures, in the same manner as that of a partial soul, but it is separate
from body, and without conversion to it, is immaterial, unmingled, unre-
strained, uniform, primary and exempt. In short, such a mode of the
providence of the Gods as this, must at present be conceived. For it is
evident that it will be appropriate according to each order of the Gods.
For soul indeed, is said to provide for secondary natures in one way, and
intellect in another. But the providence ot divinity who is prior to intel-
lect is exerted according to a transcendency both of intellect and soul.
And of the Gods themselves, the providence of the sublunary is different
from that of the celestial divinities. Of the Gods also who are beyond the
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world, there are many orders, and the mode of providence is different
according to each.
CHAPTER XV.
Of the Gods also who are beyond the
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world, there are many orders, and the mode of providence is different
according to each.
CHAPTER XV.
The third problem after these we shall connect with the former, and
survey how we are to assume the unpervertible in the Gods, who perform
all things according to justice, and who do not in the smallest degree
subvert its boundary, or its undeviating rectitude, in their providential
attention to all other things, and in the mutations of human affairs. I
think therefore, that this is apparent to every one, that every where that
which governs according to nature, and payB all possible attention to the
fehcity of the governed, after this manner becomes the leader of that which
it governs, and directs it to that which is best. For neither has the pilot
who rules over the sailors and the ship any other precedaneous end than
the safety of those that sail in the ship, and of the ship itself, nor does
the physician who is the curator of the diseased, endeavour to do all things
for the sake of any thing else than the health of the subjects of his care,
whether it be requisite to cut them, or administer to them a purgative
medicine. Nor would the general of an army or a guardian say that they
look to any other end, than the one to the liberty of those that are guarded,
and the other to the liberty of the soldiers. Nor will any other to whom
it belongs to be the leader or curator of certain persons, endeavour to
subvert the good of those that follow him, which it is his business to pro-
cure, and with a view to which he disposes in a becoming manner every
thing belonging to those whom he governs. If therefore we grant that the
Gods are the leaders of the whole of things, and that their providence ex-
tends to all things, since they are good, and possess every virtue, how is
it possible they should neglect the felicity of the objects of their provi-
dential care? Or how can they be inferior to other leaders in the provi-
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CHAP. XV.
GF PLATO.
65
dence of subordinate natures? Since the Gods indeed always look to
that which is better, and establish this as the end of all their government,
but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than
virtue, in consequence of being perverted by the gifts of the depraved.
65
dence of subordinate natures? Since the Gods indeed always look to
that which is better, and establish this as the end of all their government,
but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than
virtue, in consequence of being perverted by the gifts of the depraved.
And universally, whether you arc willing to call the Gods leaders, or
rulers, or guardians, or fathers, a divine nature will appear to be in want
of no one of such names. For all things that are venerable and honor-
able subsist in them primarily. And on this account indeed, here also
some things are naturally more venerable and honorable than others,
because they exhibit an ultimate resemblance of the Gods. But what
occasion is there to speak further on this subject ? For I think that we
hear from those who are wise in divine concerns paternal, guardian, ruling
and peeonian powers celebrated. How is it possible therefore that the
images of the Gods which subsist according to nature, regarding the end
which is adapted to them, should providentially attend to the order of
the things which they govern, but that the Gods themselves with whom
there is the whole of good, true and real virtue, and a blameless life, should
not direct their government to the virtue and vice of men ? And how
can it be admitted, on this supposition, that tbey exhibit virtue victorious
in the universe, and vice vanquished? Will they not also thus corrupt
the measures of justice by the worship paid to them by the depraved,
subvert the boundary of undeviating science, and cause the gifts of vice to
appear more honorable than the pursuits of virtue ? For this mode of
providence is neither advantageous to these leaders, nor to those that
follow them. For to those who have become wicked, there will be no
liberation from guilt, since they will always endeavour to anticipate justice,
and pervert the measures of desert. But it will be necessary, which it is
not lawful to assert, that the Gods should regard as their final end the
vice of the subjects of their providence, neglect their true salvation, and
consequently be alone the causes of adumbrant good. This universe also
«tnd the whole world will be filled with disorder and incurable perturbation,
depravity remaining in it, and being replete with that discord which exists
in badly governed cities. Though is it not perfectly impossible that parts
ON THE THEOLOCY
BOOK I.
should be governed according to nature in a greater degree than wholes,
human than divine concerns, and images than primary causes P
Though is it not perfectly impossible that parts
ON THE THEOLOCY
BOOK I.
should be governed according to nature in a greater degree than wholes,
human than divine concerns, and images than primary causes P
Hence if men properly attend to the welfare of men in governing them,
honoring some, but disgracing others, and every where giving a proper
direction to the works of vice by the measures of virtue, it is much more
necessary that the Gods should be the immutable governors of the whole
of things. For men are allotted this virtue through similitude to the Gods.
But if we acknowledge that men who corrupt the safety and well-being
of those whom they govern, imitate in a greater degree the providence of
the Gods, we shall ignorantly at one and the same time entirely subvert
die truth concerning the Gods, and the transcendency of virtue. For this
I think is evident to every one, that what is more similar to the Gods is
more happy than those things that are deprived of them ' through dissimi-
litude aud diversity. So that if among men indeed, the uncorrupted and
un deviating form of providence is honorable, it must undoubtedly be in a
much greater degree honorable with the Gods. But if with them, mortal
gifts are more venerable than the divine measures of justice, with men
also earth-born gifts will be more honorable than Olympian goods, and the
blandishments of vice than the works of virtue. With a view therefore to
the most perfect felicity, Plato in the Laws delivers to us through these
demonstrations, the hvparxis of the Gods, their providential care extend-
ing to all things, and their immutable energy ; which things, indeed, are
common to all the Gods, but are most principal and first according to
nature in the doctrine pertaining to them. For this triad appears to per-
vade as far as to the most partial natures in the divine orders, originating
supernally from the occult genera of Gods. For a uniform hyparxis, a
power which providentially takes care of all secondary natures, and an
undeviating and immutable intellect, are in all the Gods that are prior to
and in the world.
' For mm* it ii necemry to re*d mrrm
CHAP. XV!
OF PLATO.
57
CHAPTER XVI.
For a uniform hyparxis, a
power which providentially takes care of all secondary natures, and an
undeviating and immutable intellect, are in all the Gods that are prior to
and in the world.
' For mm* it ii necemry to re*d mrrm
CHAP. XV!
OF PLATO.
57
CHAPTER XVI.
Ac a ix, from another principle we may be able to apprehend the theo-
logical demonstrations in the Republic. For these are common to all the
divine orders, similarly extend to all the discussion about the Gods, and
unfold to us truth in uninterrupted connexion with what has been before
said. In the second book of the Republic therefore, Socrates describes
certain theological types for mythological poets, and exhorts his pupils to
purify themselves from those tragic disciplines, which some do not refuse
to introduce to a divine nature, concealing in these as in veils the arcane
mysteries concerning the Gods. Socrates therefore, as I have said, nar-
rating the types and laws of divine fables, which afford this apparent
meaning, and the inward concealed scope, which regards as its end the
beautiful and the natural in the fictions about the Gods, — in the first
place indeed, thinks fit to evince, according to our un perverted concep-
tion about the Gods and their goodness, that they are the suppliers of all
good, but the causes of no evil to any being at any time. In the second
place, he says that they are essentially immutable, and that they neither
have various forms, deceiving and fascinating, nor are the authors of the
greatest evil lying, in deeds or in words, or of error and folly. These
therefore being two laws, the former has two conclusions, viz. that the
Gods are not the causes of evils, and that they are the causes of all good*
The second law also in a similar manner has two other conclusions ; and
these are, that every divine nature is immutable, and is established pure
from falsehood and artificial variety. All the things demonstrated there-
fore, depend on these three common conceptions about a divine nature,
viz. on the conceptions about its goodness, immutability and truth. For
the first and ineffable fountain of good is with the Gods ; together with
eternity, which is the cause of a power that has an invariable sameness of
subsistence : and the first intellect which is beings themselves, and the
truth which is in real beings.
Proc.
Vol. L
11
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.38
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I
CHAPfER XVII.
Proc.
Vol. L
11
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.38
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I
CHAPfER XVII.
That therefore, which has the hyparxis of itself, and the whole of its
essence defined in the good, and which by its very being produces all things,
must necessarily be productive of every good, but of no evil. For if there
was any thing primarily good, which is not God, perhaps some one might
say that divinity is indeed a cause of good, but that he does not impart to
beings every good. If, however, not only every God is good, but that
which is primarily boniforra and beneficent is God, (for that which is pri-
marily good will not be the second after the Gods, because every where,
things which have a secondary subsistence, receive the peculiarity of their
hyparxis from those that subsist primarily)— this being the case, it is per-
fectly necessary that divinity should be the cause of good, and of all such
goods as proceed into secondary descents, as far as to the last of things,
lor as the power which is the cause of life, gives subsistence to all life, as
the power which is the cause of knowledge, produces all knowledge, as the
power which is the cause of beauty, produces every thing beautiful, as well
tl>e beauty which is in words, as that which is in the phenomena, and thus
every primary cause produces all similars from itself and binds to itself the
one hypostasis of things which subsist according to one form,— after the same
manner I think the first and most principal good, and uniform hyparxis, es-
tablishes in and about itself, the causes and comprehensions of all goods at
once. Nor is there any thing good which does not possess this power from
it, nor beneficent which being converted to it, does not participate of this
cause. For all goods are from thence produced, perfected and preserved ;
and the one series and order of universal good, depends on that fountain.
Through the same cause of hyparxis therefore, the Gods are the suppliers
of all good, and of no evil. For that which is primarily good, gives subsist-
ence to every good from itself, and is not the cause of an allotment con-
trary to itself; since that which is productive of life, is not the cause of
the privation of life, and that which is the source of beauty is exempt
from the nature of that which is void of beauty and is deformed, and from
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CHAP. XVII. OF PLATO. 5g
the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes good, it is
not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny ; but the na-
ture of goods proceeds from thence undefiled, unmingled and uniform.
XVII. OF PLATO. 5g
the causes of this. Hence, of that which primarily constitutes good, it is
not lawful to assert that it is the cause of contrary progeny ; but the na-
ture of goods proceeds from thence undefiled, unmingled and uniform.
And the divine cause indeed of goods is established eternally in itself,
extending to all secondary natures, an unenvying and exuberant partici-
pation of good. Of its participants, however, some preserve the partici-
pation with incorruptible purity, receiving their proper good in undented
bosoms, and thus through an abundance of power possess inevitably an al-
lotment of goods adapted to them. But those natures which are arranged
in the last of the whole of things, entirely indeed enjoy according to their
nature the goodness of the Gods ; for it is not possible that things perfectly
destitute of good should either have a being, or subsist at first ; but re-
ceiving an efflux of this kind, they neither preserve the gift which pervades
to them, pure and unmingled, nor do they retain their proper good stably,
and with invariable sameness, but becoming imbecil, partial and material,
and filled with the privation of vitality of their subject, they exhibit to
order indeed, the privation of order, to reason irrationality, and to virtue,
the contrary to it, vice. And with respect indeed to the natures which
rank as wholes,' each of these is exempt from a perversion of this kind,
things more perfect in them always having dominion according to nature.
But partial natures through a diminution of power always diverging 1 into
multitude, division and interval, obscure indeed the participation of good,
but substitute the contrary in the mixture with good, and which is van.
quished by the combination. For neither here is it lawful for evil to subsist /
unmingled, and perfectly destitute of good ; but though some particular
thing may be evil to a part, yet it is entirely good to the whole and to the
universe. For the universe is always happy, and always consists of perfect
parts, and which subsist according to nature. But that which is preter-
natural is always evil to partial natures, and deformity, privation of sym-
metry, perversion, and a resemblance of subsistence are in these. For
that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted to itself, and departs from
its proper perfection, but to the universe it is incorruptible and inde-
structible.
' For aM«n it is necessary to read o\x*.
1 For rfifiaiKirrst read txfbuwna.
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CO ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
And every thing which is deprived of good, so fur indeed- as pertains
to itself, and its own subsistence, is deprived of it through imbecility of na-
\ turc ; but it is good to the whole, and so far as it is a part of the universe'
For it is not possible that either a privation of life, or deformity and im-
y moderation, or in short privation can be inserted in the universe ; but its
whole number is always perfect, being held together by the goodness of
wholes. And life is every where present, together with existence, and the
being perfect, so far as each thing gives completion to the whole. Di.
vinity therefore, as we have said, is the cause 1 of good ; but the shadowy
subsistence of evil does not subsist from power, but from the imbecility
of the natures which receive the illuminations of the Gods. Nor is evil
in wholes, but in partial natures, nor yet in all these. For the first of
partial natures and partial intellectual genera are eternally boniform.
But the media among these, and which energize according to time, con-
necting the participation of the good with temporal mutation and motion,
are incapable of preserving the gift of the Gods immoveable, uniform and
simple; by their variety obscuring* the simplicity of this gift, by their
multiform its uniform nature, and by their commixture its purity and
incorruptibility. For they do not consist of incorruptible first generar
v.ox have they a simple essence, nor uniform powers, but such as arc
composed of the contraries to these, as Socrates somewhere says in the
Phaedrus. And the last of partial natures and which are also materia), in
a much greater degree pervert their proper good. For they are mingled
with a privation of life, and have a subsistence resembling that of an
image, since it is replete with much of non-entity, consists of things hostile
I to each other, and of circumstances which are mutable and dispersed
through the whole of time, so that they never cease to evince in every thing
that they are given up to corruption, privation of symmetry, deformity,
and all-various mutations, being not only extended in their energies, like the
natures prior to them, but being replete both in their powers and energies
with that which is preternatural, and with material imbecility. For things
which become situated in a foreign place, by co-introducing whole together
• It is necessary here to supply the word «ru».
' For .afWTMuatyvra it U requisite to read mftnmtfirr*.
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chap. xvir.
OF PLATO.
6l
For things
which become situated in a foreign place, by co-introducing whole together
• It is necessary here to supply the word «ru».
' For .afWTMuatyvra it U requisite to read mftnmtfirr*.
Digitized by Google
chap. xvir.
OF PLATO.
6l
with form, rule over the subject nature ; but again receding to that which
is partial, from their proper wholeness, and participating of partibHity, im-
becility, war and the division which is the source of generation, they
are necessarily all-variously changed. Neither, therefore, is every being
perfectly good ; for there would not be the corruption and generation of
bodies, nor the purification and punishment of soak. Nor is there any
evil in wholes : for the world would not be a blessed god, if the most
principal parts of which it consists were imperfect. Nor are the Gods
the causes of evils, in the same manner as they are of goods ; but evil
originates from the imbecility of the recipients of good, and a subsistence
in the last of things. Nor is the evil which has a shadowy subsistence in
partial natures unmingled with good. But this participates of it in a
certain respect, by its very existence being detained by good. Nor in
short, is it possible for evil which is perfectly destitute of all good to have
a subsistence. For evil itself is even beyond that which m no respect
whatever has an existence, just as the good itself fa beyond that which is
perfectly being. Nor is the evil which is in partial natures left in a dis-
ordered state, but even this is made subservient to good purposes by the
Gods, and on this account justice purifies souls from depravity. But
another order of gods purifies from the depravity which is in bodies.
All things however are converted as much as possible to the goodness of
the Gods. And wholes indeed remain in their proper boundaries, and
also the perfect and beneficent genera of beings. But more partial and
imperfect natures are adorned and arranged in a becoming manner,
become subservient to the completion of wholes, are called upward to the
beautiful, are changed, and in every way enjoy the participation of the
good, so far as this can. be accomplished by them.
For there cannot be a greater good to each of these, than what the Gods
impart according to measures to their progeny : but all things, each sepa-
rately, and all in common, receive such a portion of good, as it is pos-
sible for them to participate. But if some things are filled with greater,
and others with less goods, the power of the recipients, and the measures
of the distribution must be assigned as the cause of this. For different
things are adapted to different beings according to their nature. But the
62
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
But if some things are filled with greater,
and others with less goods, the power of the recipients, and the measures
of the distribution must be assigned as the cause of this. For different
things are adapted to different beings according to their nature. But the
62
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
Gods always extend good, in the same manner as the sun always emits
light- For a different thing receives this light differently according to its
/ order, and receives the greatest portion of light it is capable of receiving.
For all things are led according to justice, and good is not absent from any
thing, but is present to every thing, according to an appropriate boundary
of participation. And as the Athenian guest says, all things are in a
good condition, and are arranged by the Gods. Let no one therefore sav,
that there are precedaneous productive principles of evil in nature, or in-
tellectual paradigms of evils, in the same, manner as there are of goods,
o or that there is a malific soul, or an evil-producing cause in the Gods, nor
x r let him introduce sedition and eternal war against the first good. For all
these are foreign from the science of Plato, and being more remote from
the truth wander into barbaric folly, and gigantic mythology. Nor if
certain persqns speaking obscurely in arcane narrations, devise things of ,
this kind, shall we make any alteration in the apparent apparatus of what
they indicate. But the truth indeed of those things is to be investigated,
and in the mean time, the science of Plato must be genuinely received in
the pure bosoms of the soul, and must be preserved undefiled and un-
mingled with contrary opinions.
CHAPTER XVIII.
In the next place, let us survey the immutability and simplicity of the
Gods, what the nature of each of them is, and how both these appear to
be adapted to the hyparxis of the Gods, according to the narration of
Plato. The Gods, therefore, are exempt from the whole of things. But
filling these, as we have said, with good, they are themselves perfectly good ;
each of them according to his proper order possesses that which is most
excellent ; and The whole genus of the Gods is at once allotted predomi-
nance according to an exuberance of good. But here again, we must
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CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO- 6s
But here again, we must
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CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO- 6s
oppose those who interpret in a divisible manner that which is most excel-
lent in the Gods, and who say, that if the first cause is roost excellent,
that which is posterior to the first is not so. For it is necessary, say
they, that what is produced should be inferior to that by which it is pro-
duced. And this indeed is rightly asserted by them. For it is necessary
in the Gods, to preserve the order of causes unconfused, and to define
separately their second and third progressions. But together with a pro-
gression of this kind, and with ' the unfolding into light of things secon-
dary from those that are first, that which is most excellent must also be
surveyed in each of the Gods. For each of the Gods in his own charac-
teristic peculiarity is allotted a transcendency which is primary and per-
fectly good. One of them indeed, that we may speak of something
known, is allotted this transcendency, and is most excellent as possessing
a prophetic power, another as demiurgic, but another as a perfector of
works. And Timfeus indicating this to us, continually calls the first de-
miurgus the best of causes. For the world, says he, is the most beautiful
of generated natures, and its artificer is the best of causes ; though the
intelligible paradigm, and which is the most beautiful of intelligibles is prior
to the demiurgus. But this is most beautiful and at the same time most
excellent, as the demiurgic paradigm ; and the maker and at the same
time father of the universe is most excellent, as a demiurgic God. In the
Republic also, Socrates speaking of the Gods, very properly observes,
that each of them being as much as possible most beautiful and most
excellent, remains always with a simplicity of subsistence in his own form.
For each of them being allotted that which is first and the summit in his
own series, does not depart from his own order, but contains the blessed-
ness and felicity of his own proper power. And neither does he exchange
his present for a worse order ; for it is not lawful for that which possesses
all virtue to be changed into a worse condition ; nor does he pass into a
better order. For where can there be any thing better than that which is
most excellent? But this is present with each of the divinities according
to his own order, as wc have said, and also with every genus of the Gods.
■ For to it it netewary to read tj.
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(J4 ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
For where can there be any thing better than that which is
most excellent? But this is present with each of the divinities according
to his own order, as wc have said, and also with every genus of the Gods.
■ For to it it netewary to read tj.
Digitized by Google
(J4 ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK I.
It is necessary therefore that every divine nature should he established
immutably, abiding in its own accustomed manner. Hence from these
things the selfcsufficiency, undefiled purity, and invariable sameness of sub'
sistence of the Gods is apparent For if they are nol changed to a more
excellent condition of being, as possessing that which is best in their own
nature, they are sufficient to themselves, and are not in want of any good.
Aod if they are not at any time changed to a worse condition, they re-
main undefiled, established in their own transcendencies. If also they
guard the perfection of themselves immutably, they subsist always with
invariable sameness. What the self-sufficiency therefore of the Gods is,
what their immutability, and what tlieir sameness of subsistence, we shall
in the next place consider.
The world then is said to be self-sufficient, because its subsistence is per-
fect from things perfect, and a whole from wholes ; and because it is filled
with all appropriate goods from iU generating father. But a perfection
and self-sufficiency of this kind is partible, and is said to consist of many
tilings coalescing in one, and is filled from separate causes according to
participation. The order of divine souls also, is said to be self-sufficient,
as being full of appropriate virtues, and always preserving the measure of
its own blessedness without indigence. But here likewise the self-suffi-
ciency is in want of powers. For these souls have not their intellections
directed to the same intelligibles ; but they energize according to time,
and obtain the complete perfection of their contemplation in whole periods
of time. The self-sufficiency therefore of divine souls, and the whole-
perfection of their life is not at once present. Again, the intellectual
world is said to be self-sufficient, as having its whole good established in
eternity, comprehending at once its whole blessedness, and being indigent
of nothing, because all life and all intelligence are present with it, and
nothing is deficient, nor does it desire any thing as absent. But this, in-
deed, is sufficient to itself in its own order, yet it falls short of tho self-
sufficiency of the Gods. For every intellect is boniform, yet is not good-
ness itself, nor primarily good ; but each of the Gods is a unity, hy-
parxis and goodness. The peculiarity however of hyparxis changes the
progression of the goodness of each. For one divinity is a perfcetwe
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CHAP. XVIII.
OF PLATO.
The peculiarity however of hyparxis changes the
progression of the goodness of each. For one divinity is a perfcetwe
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CHAP. XVIII.
OF PLATO.
goodness, another is a goodness connective of the whole of things, and
another is a collective goodness. But each is simply a goodness sufficient
to itself. Or it may be said, that each is a goodness possessing the self-
sufficient and the all-perfect, neither according to participation, nor illumi-
nation, but by being that very thing which it is. For intellect is sufficient
to itself by 'participation, and soul by illumination, but this universe, ac-
cording to a similitude to a divine nature. The Gods themselves, however,
are self-sufficient through and by themselves, filling themselves, or rather
subsisting as the plenitudes of all good.
But with respect to the immutability of the Gods, of what kind shall
we say it is ? Is it such as that of a [naturally} circulating body ? For
neither is this adapted to receive any thing from inferior natures, nor is
it filled with the mutation arising from generation, and the disorder which
occurs in the sublunary regions. For the nature of the celestial bodies is
immaterial and immutable. But this indeed is great and venerable, as in
corporeal hypostases, yet it is inferior to the nature of the Gods. For
every body possesses both its being, and its perpetual immutability from
other precedaneous causes. But neither is the impassive and the immu-
table in the Gods such as the immutability of souk. For these commu-
nicate in a certain respect with bodies, and are the media of an impartible
essence, and of an essence divided about bodies. Nor again is the im-
mutability of intellectual essences equivalent to that of the Gods. For
intellect is immutable, impassive, and umuingled with secondary natures,
on account of its union with the Gods. And so far iodeed as it is uniform,
it is a thing of this kind ; but so far as h is manifold, it has something
which is more excellent, and something which is subordinate, m itself.
But the Gods alone having established their onions according to-this trans-
cendency of beings, are immutable dominations, are primary and impassive.
For there is nothing in them which is not one and byparxis. lint as fire
abolishes every thing which is foreign to it and of a contrary power, as
light expels all darkness, and as lightning proceeds through all things with-
out defilement, thus also the unities of the Gods unite all multitude, and
abolish every thing which tends to dispersion and all-perfect division. But
they deify every thing which participates of them, receiving nothing from
Froc. Vol. I. I
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66 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
their participants, and do not ' diminish their owu proper union by the
participation.
But
they deify every thing which participates of them, receiving nothing from
Froc. Vol. I. I
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66 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
their participants, and do not ' diminish their owu proper union by the
participation.
Hence also the Gods being present every where, arc similarly exempt
from all things, and containing all things are vanquished by no one of the
things they contain ; but they are unminglod with all things and unde-
filed. In the third place, this world indeed is said to subsist with inva-
riable sameness, so far as it is allotted an order in itself which is always
preserved indissoluble. At the same time however, since it possesses a
corporeal form, it is not destitute of mutation, as the Elean guest observes.
The psychical order likewise is said to obtain an essence always established
iu sameness ; and this is rightly said. For it is entirely impassive accord-
ing to essence; but it has energies extended into time, and as Socrates
says in the Pbaedrus, at different times it understands different intelligibles,
and in its progressions about intellect comes into contact with different
forms. Besides these also, much-honored intellect is said both to subsist
and to understand with invariable and perpetual sameness, establishing at
once in eternity its essence, powers, and energies. Through the multitude
however of its intellections, and through the variety of intelligible species
and genera, there is not only an invariable sameness, but also a difference v
of subsistence in intellect. For difference there is consubsistent with
sameness. And there is not only a wandering of corporeal motions, and
of the psychical periods, but likewise of intellect itself, so far as it pro-
duces the intelligence of itself into multitude; and evolves the intelligible.
For soul indeed evolves intellect, but intellect the intelligible, as Plotinus
somewhere rightly observes, when speaking of the intelligible subjections.
For such are the wanderings of intellect and which it is lawful for it to make.
If therefore we should say that a perpetual sameness of subsistence is pri-
marily in the Gods alone, and is especially inherent in them, we shall not
deviate from the truth, and we shall accord with Plato, who says in tlie
Politicus, that an eternally invariable sameness of subsistence alone per-
tains to the most divine of all things. The Gods, therefore, bind to them-
selves the causes of a sameness of this kind, and guard with immutable
' nx is omitted in the original.
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CHAP. XIX. OF PLATO. ^
it is necewarj to read ry om.
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86
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK 1.
Gods; from which also tl»e participation of immortality and eternal same-
ness is derived to other things. The uniform, therefore, pertains to the
same thing as the divine ; but the indissoluble to the same thing as the
immortal ; and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we
must refer to the intelligible.
The uniform, therefore, pertains to the
same thing as the divine ; but the indissoluble to the same thing as the
immortal ; and that which has an invariable sameness of subsistence we
must refer to the intelligible.
And do you not see how these are severally after a manner co-adapted
to each other? For the first of tliesc, through the first unity which is par-
ticipated by being is, as it is fit it should be, uniform. For if a God sub-
sists according to the one, that which is divine will doubtless be uniform.
But that which through one cause of life is immortal, is also similarly in-
dissoluble. For life is the bond of dissoluble natures ; which also Timaeus
indicating to us, opposes the dissoluble to the immortal: " for you are not
immortal, says the demiurgus, yet you shall never be dissolved, nor be
subject ' to the fataJity of death." Every thing mortal, therefore, is dis-
soluble ; but the immortal is indissoluble. That, however, which has a
renovated immortality is for the same reason neither indissoluble, nor
mortal. For being in the middle of both it is neither of the extremes, ac-
cording to each opposition. But the third of these being established ac-
cording to the plenitude of whole intelligible^ subsists at once and is in-
variably the same. For tlie intelligible is the cause of sameness and of
eternal permanency; and intellect through this is entirely eternal. These
triads, therefore, proceed from the first and most principal causes, in the
same manner as we demonstrated of the before-mentioned triads. But
these things, indeed, we shall consider hereafter.
These things, therefore, being discussed, let us direct our attention to
the uobegottcn in divine natures, and unfold what we assert it to be. For
we say that all [true] being is without generation, and Socrates demon-
strates in the Phajdrus, that souls are unbegotten. Prior to these, also,
the Gods themselves are established above generations and a subsistence
according to time. How, therefore, shall we define the unbegotten when
applied to a divine nature, and according to what reason ? Is it because
divinity is exempt from all generation, uot only from that which subsists
' For yw-vif read tw£kt9«.
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CHAP. XXVII.
OF PLATO.
87
How, therefore, shall we define the unbegotten when
applied to a divine nature, and according to what reason ? Is it because
divinity is exempt from all generation, uot only from that which subsists
' For yw-vif read tw£kt9«.
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CHAP. XXVII.
OF PLATO.
87
in the parts of time, such as wc assert the generation of material natures
to be, nor from that only which is extended into the whole of time, such
as Timseus demonstrates the generation of the celestial bodies to be, but
also from the psychical generation ? Since Timseus denominates this to
be unbegotten according to time, but to be the best of generated natures.
And in short, a divine nature is exempt from all division and essential
separation. For the progression of the Gods is always according to a
union of secondary natures, which are uniformly established in the natures
prior to them, the things producing containing in themselves the things
produced. The indivisible, therefore, the unscparated and the united are-
in reality unbegotten. So that if certain generations of the Gods are
spoken of by Plato in fabulous figments, as m the fable of Diotima, the
• generation of Venus is celebrated, and of Love at the birth of Venus, it is-
necessary not to be ignorant after what manner things of this kind are as-
serted, and that they are composed for the sake of symbolical indication v
and tliat fables for the sake of concealment call the ineffable unfolding into
light through causes, generatioti. For in the Orphic writings, indeed, the
first cause is on this account denominated Time ; since again, for another'
reason, it is thus denominated, in order that a subsistence according to
cause may be the same as a subsistence according to time. And the pro-
gression of the Gods from the liest of causes is properly denominated ge-
neration according to time. To Plato, therefore, mythologizing, it is
adapted to devise things of this kind conformably to theologists; but
when lie is discoursing dialectically, and investigating and unfolding
divine natures intellectually and not mystically, it is then adapted to him
to celebrate the unbegotten essence of the Gods. For the Gods primarily
establish in themselves the paradigm of non-generation. But an intellec-
tual nature is in a secondary degree unbegotten, and after this the psy-
chical essence. And in bodies there is an ultimate resemblance of unbe-
gotten power; which some posterior to Plato perceiving, have indefinitely
shown that the whole heaven is unbegotten. The Gods, therefore, arc
unl>egotten. But there is an order in them of first, middle, and last pro-
gressions, and a transcendency and subjection of powers. There are also
in them uniform comprehensions of causes ; but multiform progenies of
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88 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
The Gods, therefore, arc
unl>egotten. But there is an order in them of first, middle, and last pro-
gressions, and a transcendency and subjection of powers. There are also
in them uniform comprehensions of causes ; but multiform progenies of
Digitized by Google
88 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK I.
things caused. And all things, indeed, are consubsistent in each other ;
but the mode of subsistence is various. For some things as replenishing
subsist prior to secondary natures ; but others, as being 61led aspire after
more perfect natures, and participating of their power become generative
of things posterior to themselves, and perfective of their hyparxis.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Looking to these things, therefore, we may unfold what is said of pa- •
ternal causes, and of the prolific powers of mothers in fables. For every
where, we may suppose that the cause of a more excellent and more uni-
form nature is paternal ;* but we may say that the cause of a more sub-
ordinate and partial nature pre-exists in the order of a mother. For with
the Gods a father is analogous to the monad, and the cause of bound ;
but a mother, to the duad, and to the infinite power which is generative
of beings. The paternal cause, however, is with Plato uniform, and is es-
tablished in a more elevated order than the natures which proceed from
it, and subsists prior to its progeny in the allotment of the desirable.
Again, the maternal cause has the form of the duad ; and at one time
presents itself to the view in fables as more excellent than its progeny,
but at another time as essentially subordinate to it ; as in the Banquet,
Plato calls Poverty the mother of Love. And this is not only the case in
fabulous figments, but also in the philosophic theory of beings, as is evi-
dent in the Timaeus. For there Plato calls being the father, but matter
the mother and nurse of generation. The powers, therefore, which are
prolific and perfective of secondary natures, and the suppliers of life and
causes of separation are mothers, being established above the natures
produced by them. But the powers which receive the natures that pro-
• »rfwr is onytted in the original.
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CHAP. XXtX. OF JfLATO. 8g
But the powers which receive the natures that pro-
• »rfwr is onytted in the original.
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CHAP. XXtX. OF JfLATO. 8g
ceed into light, which multiply their energies, and extend even the subor-
dinate allotment of the progeny, are also themselves called mothers.
Again, however, the progeny of such like causes, at one time indeed, pro-
ceed according to union from their proper principles, and are filled from
both the paternal and maternal cause ; but at another time they contain
the bond of them, being arranged in the middle, conveying the gifts of
the fathers to the maternal bosoms, and converting the receptacles of them
to the completions of primary causes. But of the natures which subsist
from twofold preexisting principles, some arc assimilated to the paternal
cause ; and such like genera of Gods are productive, defensive, and com-
prehensive. For to produce, to contain, and to defend, pertain to the
cause of bound. But others are assimilated to the maternal cause, and
arc prolific, and vivific, and the suppliers of motion, of the multiplication
of powers, of variety and progressions. For all these are the progeny of
infinity and the first multitude.
CHAPTER XXIX.'
Thus much therefore may suffice concerning the unbegotten hyparxis
of the Gods. It now remains, I think, to speak of divine names. For
Socrates in the Cratylus thinks fit to unfold in a remarkable degree the
rectitude of names in divine natures. And Parmenides indeed, in the
first hypothesis, as he denies of the one every thing else that is known,
and all knowledge, so likewise he denies of it name and language. But
in the second hypothesis, besides all other things he shows that this one
may be spoken of and ' that it has a name. In short therefore, it must
be admitted that the first, most principal and truly divine names are es-
tablished in the Gods themselves. But it must be said that the second
names, which are the imitations of the first, and which subsist intellectu-
' ** it omitted in the original.
Proc. Vol. I. M
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90
ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO.
BOOK I.
But it must be said that the second
names, which are the imitations of the first, and which subsist intellectu-
' ** it omitted in the original.
Proc. Vol. I. M
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90
ON THE THEOLOGY OF PLATO.
BOOK I.
ally, are erf" a demoniacal allotment. And again, we may say that those
names which are the third from the truth, which are logically devised, and
which receive the ultimate resemblance of divine natures, are unfolded
by scienti6c men, at one time energizing divinely, and at another intel-
lectually, and generating moving images of their inward spectacles. For
as the demiurgic intellect establishes resemblances about matter of the
first forms contained in himself, and produces temporal images of things
eternal, divisible images of things indivisible, and adumbrated images as
it were of true beings, — after the same manner I think the science that is
with us representing intellectual production, fabricates resemblances of
other things, and also of the Gods themselves, representing that which is
void of composition in them, through composition ; that which is simple,
through variety ; and that which is united, through multitude ; and thus
fashioning names, ultimately exhibits images of divine natures. For it
generates every name as if it were a statue of the Gods. And as the
theurgic art through certain symbols calls forth the exuberant and unenvy-
ing goodness of the Gods into the illumination of artificial statues, thus
also the intellectual science of divine concerns, by the compositions and
divisions of sounds, unfolds the occult essence of the Gods. Very pro-
perly therefore, does Socrates in the Pbilebus say, that on account of his
reverence of the Gods, he is agitated with the greatest fear respecting
their names. For it is necessary to venerate even the ultimate echos of
the Gods, and venerating these to become established in the first para-
digms of them. And thus much concerning divine names, which at pre*
sent may be sufficient for the purpose of understanding the theology of
Plato. For wc shall accurately discuss them when we speak of partial
powers.
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BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
And thus much concerning divine names, which at pre*
sent may be sufficient for the purpose of understanding the theology of
Plato. For wc shall accurately discuss them when we speak of partial
powers.
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BOOK II.
CHAPTER I.
The most proper beginning however of the theory proposed by us is
that from which we may be able to discover the first cause ' of all beings.
For being impelled from this in a becoming manner, and having our con-
ceptions purified respecting it, we shall with greater facility be able to dis-
tinguish other things. About these things therefore we must speak from
the beginning as follows : It is necessary that all beings, and all the
natures of beings should either be many only, there being no one in them,
neither in each, nor in all of them ; or that they should be one only, there
being no multitude, but all things being compelled into one and the same
power of existence ; or it is necessary that they should be both one and
many, and that being should be one in order that neither multitude itself
by itself may vanquish beings, nor that we may be forced to bring together
into the same thing all things and their contraries at once. These things
therefore being three, which of them shall we chuse ? And to which of
the above mentioned assertions shall we give our suffrage. It is necessary
therefore severally to discuss the absurdities which attend these positions,
and thus to survey after what manner the truth subsists.
♦
* For ewr.«r it u Decenary to read arnca.
ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK If.
If then beings are many, and in such a manner many, as we have men-
tioned from the Ijcginning, so that the one is not any where to be found,
many absurdities will hap|>en to be the result, or rather all the nature of
beings will at once from the first be destroyed, as there will immediately
be nothing which is capable of participating the one. For it must be
admitted that every being is either one certain thing, or nothing. And
that indeed which is a certain being, is also one ; but that which is not
even one being, has not any existence whatever. Hence, if many things
have a subsistence, each of the many is something or a certain one. But
if each of them is nothing, or not even one thing, neither is it possible for
the many to exist ; for the many are many so far as each individual of the
multitude exists. If, therefore, the many alone have a subsistence, and
the one in no respect is, neither will the many exist. For things which
are in no respect one have not any existence whatever. But if the one is
not, by a much greater priority neither have the many an existence.
For it necessarily follows that none of the things from which the many
consist will have a subsistence.
For things which
are in no respect one have not any existence whatever. But if the one is
not, by a much greater priority neither have the many an existence.
For it necessarily follows that none of the things from which the many
consist will have a subsistence.
Farther still, if the many aloue have a subsistence (as has been said) art
things will be infinitely infinite ; and if you receive any one of the in-
finites whatever, this also will be immediately infinite. And with respect
to the things from which this consists and which are infinite, each of these
likewise will be infinite. For let something of the many be assumed*
which we say is not one, this therefore will be multitude according to its
own nature, since it belongs to beings, but is not nothing. If however it
is multitude, this also will consist of many things, and will be many.
And if you assume something of these manys, this will immediately appear
to you not to be one, but many. There will likewise be immediately the
same reasoning in these, and in a similar manner each, (because we falsely
speak of each) will be multitude in energy. And each, as I may say,
will be infinite, or rather will be infinitely infinite. For there is nothing
which will not be something of this kind ; since a part is many, and in a
similar manner the part of a part ; and this to infinity. For multitude
proceeding will never stop, nor infinity, in consequence of being deprived
of the nature of the one. To make beings however, to be infinitely infinite,
is impossible both with respect to truth, and to the thing proposed by us.
Digitized by Google
CHAP. I.
OF PLATO
For if being is infinitely infinite, being can neither be known, nor disco-
vered ; since the infinite is entirely incomprehensible and unknown. If
also being is infinitely infinite, there will be something more infinite than
the infinite. But if that something is more infinite, this will be less infinite.
That, however, which is less infinite, since it is not perfectly infinite, will
evidently be finite, so far as it falls short of the nature of the infinite. If,
therefore, there is something which is itself according to multitude more
infinite than that which is infinite in multitude there will be something
more than the infinite, and the infinite will be less, yet not according to
multitude. This however is impossible. Hence there is not the infinitely
infinite.
This however is impossible. Hence there is not the infinitely
infinite.
Again therefore, according to this hypothesis, the same things will be
according to the same, similar and disimilar. For if all the manys are
not one, and each thing according to all things is not one, that which is
not one will evidently suffer the same passion in consequence of the pri-
vation of the one. All things therefore being deprived of the one, after
the same manner, they will on this account subsist similarly with respect
to caeh other. But things which subsist similarly, so far as they thus sub-
sist, are evidently similar to each other. Hence the many will be similar
to each other, so far as they are deprived of the one. They will likewise
according to this privation of the one be perfectly dissimilar. For it is
necessary that things which are similar should suffer the same passion ;
so that things which do not suffer any thing that is the same, will not be
similar. But things which suffer any thing that is the same, suffer also
one thing. Hence things which arc deprived of every one, will not suffer
any thing that is the same. The many therefore will be similar and dis-
similar according to the same. But this is impossible. Hence it is im-
)K>ssible for the many to exist which are in no respect one.
Moreover, tl>e many will be the same with and different from each other
according to the same. For if all things are similarly deprived of the
one, so far indeed as all of them are similarly deprived they Mill be the
same according to this privation; since things which subsist after the
same manner according to habit are the same, and also things which are
after the same manner deprived according to privation. Bu t so far in
94
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK II.
Bu t so far in
94
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK II.
short, as each of them is deprived of every one, so far the many will be
different from each other. For if the one in the many is the same, that
which is in no respect one, will in no respect be the same. The many
therefore will be the same and not the same with each other. But if they
are the same and not the same it is evident that they are different from
each other. For that which is the same and not the same, so far as it is
not the same, is not the same, by nothing else thau the different. Farther
still therefore, these many will be moveable and immoveable, if the one
is not. For if each of them is not one, they will be immoveable accord-
ing to the privation of the one. For if that which is not one should be
changed, each of them would have the one ; since privations being changed,
entirely lead into habits the things that are changed. It is necessary
however that what is not one should remain immoveable according to
the privation of the one, though this very thing is itself impossible, viz.
that the many should stand still. For every thing which stands still is in
something which is the same, via. it is either in the same form, or in the
same place. But every thing which is in the same, is in one thing which
is the same. For the same in which it is, is one thing. Every thing
therefore which stands still is in one thing. The many, however, do
not participate of the one. But it is perfectly impossible that things
which do not participate of the one, should be in one certain thing. And
things which are not in one thing cannot stand still, since things which
stand still are entirely in one and the same thing. It is impossible there-
fore, that the many should stand still, and remain immoveable. It has
been demonstrated however, that the many must necessarily stand im-
moveable. The same things therefore, and the same passion, (I mean
the privation of the habit of the one,) are moveable and immoveable.
For things immoveable, and things which stand still, so far as they are
unstable, so far they must necessarily appear to be moveable.
Moreover, there is no number of beings if the one in no respect is; but
all things and each thing will be not one. For the particle of number,
the monad, is one, and every number itself is one. For if there are five
monads, there is also the pentad ; and if three monads, the triad. But
the triad itself is a certain unity, and so is the pentad. So that if there
is no one, there will neither be any part, nor the whole of numbers. For
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CHAP. I
OF PLATO.
95
how can there be any number the one not existing ? For the one is the
principle of numbers. But the principle not existing, neither is it pos-
sible that the things which proceed from this principle should exist.
Hence the one not existing, neither will there be any number.
I
OF PLATO.
95
how can there be any number the one not existing ? For the one is the
principle of numbers. But the principle not existing, neither is it pos-
sible that the things which proceed from this principle should exist.
Hence the one not existing, neither will there be any number.
Again, therefore, neither will there be any knowledge of beings if the
one is not. For it will not be possible either to speak or think of any
being. For each thing itself, and every thing of which we can speak, and
in which we impress the nature of the one, will have no existence, because
neither does the one exist. Hence neither will there be any discourse nor
any knowledge. For discourse is one thing consisting of many things,
if it is perfect. And knowledge then exists, when that which knows be-
comes one with that which is known. .But union not existing, there will
at tin; same time be no knowledge of things, and it will be impossible to
speak about things which we know. To which we may add, that the in-
explicable in the several infinites, will necessarily always fly from the
bound of knowledge. For immediately each apparent infinite which he
who possesses knowledge desires to understand, will escape the gnostic
power hastening to come into contact with, and adhere to it, since it in
incapable either of contact or adhesion. If, therefore, the many alone
have an existence, the one having no subsistence whatever, so many ab-
surdities, and a still greater number must necessarily happen to those who
adopt such an hypothesis.
But if the one which is the one itself alone has a subsistence, and there
is nothing else (for if there were there would not only be one but many
things ; since one and another thing are more than one, and are not one
thing only) if this be the case, there will neither be among all things either
% whole, or that which has parts. For every thing which has parts is many,
and every whole has parts. But the one is in no respect many. Neither
therefore will there be a whole, nor that which has parts. Farther still,
neither is it possible that there should be a beginning, or end of any thing.
For that which has a beginning, a middle, and an end, is divisible. But the
one is not divisible, because neither has it any parts. Hence, neither has it a
beginning, nor a middle,nor an end. Again, if the one alone has a subsist-
ence, no being will have figure. For every thing which has figure is either
rectilinear or circular, or mixt from these. But if indeed it is rectilinear,
g6 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
it will have for its parts, the middle, and the extremes. If it is circular,
there will be one thing in it as a middle, but other things as extremes, to
which the middle extends. And if it is mixed from the right and circular
line, it will consfst of many things, and wHl not be one.
it will have for its parts, the middle, and the extremes. If it is circular,
there will be one thing in it as a middle, but other things as extremes, to
which the middle extends. And if it is mixed from the right and circular
line, it will consfst of many things, and wHl not be one.
Moreover, neither will any being be in itself, nor in another thing. For
that which is in another thing is different from that in which it is. Bui
the one alone existing and nothing else (for it will by no means be in
another thing) there will be no being which is in another thing. Hut
that which is in itself will at the same time comprehend and be compre-
hended ; and in this, to comprehend will not be the same thing as to be
comprehended ; nor will there be tlie same * definition of both. There
will therefore be two things, and no longer the one alone. Again, neither
will any being be moved. For being moved indeed, it must necessarily
be changed. But being changed it must be in another thing. If the one
however alone has an existence, it is not possible for any thing to appear
to be in something else. I^ence it is not possible for any being to be
changed. But every .thing which stands still is necessarily in the same
thing. And that which is in the same is in a certain same thing. The
one however is in no same thing. For that which is in a certain thing,
is either in itself, or in something else. But it has been demonstrated,
that it is neither in itself, nor in another. Hence neither is it in a certain
same thing. Neither therefore does any being stand still.
Moreover, it is impossible for any thing to be the same with, or different
from any thing. For if there is nothing besides the one itself, there is not
any thing which will be either the same with, or different from another
thing. For there will not be any other being. And the one itself will
not be different from itself ; for it would be many and not one. Nor will
it be the same with itself. For this thing which is same is in another,
and same is not the one itself. For the one is simply one, because it is
not many. But that which is same is the same with another thing.
Again, neither is it possible for any thing to be similar or dissimilar to any
thing. For every thing similar suffers a certain same passion ; but every
'* For wT>i it 1» neceWarj to read
Digitized by Google
CHAP. I.
OF PLATO.
97
thing dissimilar a certain different passion. The one, however, "cannot suf-
fer any thing, nor can this he the case with any thing else besides the one ;
since no tiling else has any existence whatever, if the one alone has a sub-
sistence.
I.
OF PLATO.
97
thing dissimilar a certain different passion. The one, however, "cannot suf-
fer any thing, nor can this he the case with any thing else besides the one ;
since no tiling else has any existence whatever, if the one alone has a sub-
sistence.
Farther still, in addition to these things we say that neither is it possible
for any thing to be touched, nor to be separate, if there is nothing else
besides the one. For how can things which have no existence be separate,
or conic into contact with any thing? But neither can the one either be
separate from itself, or touch itself. For it would thus be passive to the
being touched, and the being separate. But the one suffers no other tlung
besides itself. It is likewise requisite that no one thing should either be
equal or unequal to any thing. For that which is equal to another thing,
is said to be so with reference to another thing. And the like may be
said of that which is unequal. Another thing, however, has no existence,
if the one alone has a subsistence. But neither can the one be equal or
unequal to itself. For if unequal, there will be one thing in it as greater,
but another as less ; so that it will be two things and not one. And if
the one is equal to itself, the one will measure itself. This however is im-
possible. For the one will measure and be measured by itself, so that it
will not be the one itself. Neither therefore will there be any equality
or inequality in beings. If however these things are impossible, neither
can any being come into contact with another, and be separate, nor be
similar or dissimilar, nor be same or different, nor again, stand still, or be
moved, or in short be in any thing, or have figure, or be a whole, or have
parts, if the om alone has a subsistence which is void of multitude, and
is without all these things. Neither however, i3 it possible for the many
alone to have a subsistence, as was before demonstrated. And hence it
is necessary that every being should be both many and one.
If this however is the case, either the many must participate of the one,
or the one of the many, or both must participate of each other, or neither
of each other; but the many indeed must, be separate, and the one must
also be separate, in order that the many and the one may subsist, as reason
evinces. If, therefore, neither the one participates of the many, nor the
many of the one, the same absurdities will ensue as we brought together in
Proc. Vol. I. N
93
ON THE 'IDEOLOGY
HOOK II.
If, therefore, neither the one participates of the many, nor the
many of the one, the same absurdities will ensue as we brought together in
Proc. Vol. I. N
93
ON THE 'IDEOLOGY
HOOK II.
the hypothesis of the many alone having a subsistence. For again there
will be the many separate from the one. For if the one subsists by itself,
and the many do not in any respect participate of the one, the many will be
infinitely infinite, they will be similar and dissimilar, same and different,
moved and stable, and there will neither be any number nor any know-
ledge of the many. For the absence of the one compels all thc»e conse-
quences to be apparent in the many. It is impossible therefore, that
neither the many should participate of the one, nor the one of the many.
If however, the one participates of the many, and the many of the one,
and both these are in each other, itis necessary that there should be another
nature besides these, which is neither one nor many. For both these being
mingled in each other, it is necessary that there should be a cause of their
mixture which conjoins multitude to the one, and the one to multitude.
For it is necessary that every thing that is mingled, should have a cause of
the mixture. For in short, if the one and multitude participate of each
other, neither the one is the cause of essence to multitude, nor multitude to
the one, but a certain third thing is the cause of essence to both, and
which is prior to these. For what will that be which makes this to be
multitude, and that to be one ? And what is the cause of this communica-
tion and association with each other, the one so far as it is one never having
any communication with the many ? For the many so far as many, and
the one so far as one arc different from each other. And so far as neither
is from neither, they have no sympathy with each other. What therefore
is it which collects these into one, since they fly from and are unmingled
with each other? For being thus discordant with each other, they cannot
desire each other, or if they did their congress must be fortuitous. For
if this should happen to be the case, there was a time when these were
separate from each other, since now also they subsist together casually.
It is however impossible for the many to subsist separate from the one.
The mixture therefore is not casual. But neither is the mixture from the.
many, if neither the one is the cause of the many, nor the many of the one.
What, therefore is this more excellent thing [which is the cause of the
mixture?] For it is either one, or not one. But if indeed, it is the one
itself, we must again inquire concerning this, whether it participates of
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CHAP. I. OF PLATO. 99
What, therefore is this more excellent thing [which is the cause of the
mixture?] For it is either one, or not one. But if indeed, it is the one
itself, we must again inquire concerning this, whether it participates of
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CHAP. I. OF PLATO. 99
multitude or of nothing. For if this participates, it is evident tbat some
other thing prior to this, will for the same reason present itself to the view,
and this will be the case to infinity. But if a thing of this kind is entirely
roid of multitude, again that which was asserted at first will not be true,
viz. that the many do not participate of the one, nor the one of the many.
I mean however that which is the most principal and primarily one. But
there is indeed a certain one in the many, and there is also the imparticipa-
blc one, and which is simply one, and nothing else. If however that which
is prior to both, is not ' one, it is necessary that this not one should be
more excellent than the one. All things however arc, and are gene-
rated what they are, through the one. And together with the one indeed
every being is preserved ; but separate from the one proceeds to the cor-
ruption of itself. The mixture also of the one and multitude, which the
non-one affords to beings, is communion and union. The one* therefore,
and that which is not one, ' are the cause of nothing else to beings than
of their being one. If however the one is the cause of a thing of this kind,
that which is not one will not be the cause of that which is more excellent
[than union.] But it is every where necessary that what is more excel-
lent should be the cause to beings of another more excellent thing, accor-
ding to its own power. For thus it will be more excellent as being more
good, and as the cause from its own nature of a greater and more excel-
lent good to those things to which a less good is the cause of less good-
ness. From these things therefore it is necessary, that the many should
participate of the one, that the one should be unmingled with multitude,
and that nothing should be better than the one, but that this should also be
the cause of being to the many. For every thing which is deprived of
the one, flies immediately into nothing, aud to its own corruption. But that
which is not mauy, is dot at one and the same time not many and nothing.
For to the one that which is nothing, or not one, is opposed, and to the
many that which is not many is opposed. If, therefore, the one and the
' Ou% is omitted in the original.
* Instead of to or it is necessary to read to «.
' The » in the original which immediately precedes o«x n seems to be superfluous, and
is therefore omitted in the translation.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK II.
many are not the same, the not being many will not be the same with
nothing. From thus considering the affair therefore, it appears that the
one is beyond multitude, and is the cause of being to the many.
CHAPTER II.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK II.
many are not the same, the not being many will not be the same with
nothing. From thus considering the affair therefore, it appears that the
one is beyond multitude, and is the cause of being to the many.
CHAPTER II.
It is necessary however, that discussing the same subject after another
manner, we should again see if we can in a certain respect follow what
has been said, and refer it to the same end. It is necessary therefore, that
there should either be one principle, or many principles ; or rather, we
should begin from hence. And if there are many principles, they must
either possess sympathy with each other, or they must be divulscd from
each other, and they must be either finite or infinite. But if there is one
principle, this must either be not essence, or essence. And if it is essence,
this must either be corporeal or incorporeal. And if incorporeal, it must
cither be separate from, or inseparable from bodies. And if separate, it
must either be moveable or immoveable. But if it is not essence, it must
either be inferior to all essence, or participated by essence, or imparticipable.
If therefore there are many principles, and which have no sympathy with
each other, no being will originate from them [conjointly,] nor will they be
common to all things, but each will produce by itself. For what commu-
nication can there be between things which are naturally foreign, or tvhat
co-operation between things which are entirely of* a different kind? In
addition also to these things, there will be the many which do not partici-
pate of the one. For if there is a certain one common in all of them, they
will not be perfectly separated essentially from each other. If therefore
they are different, and there is nothing which is the same about them, they
are alone many and by no means one. But if there are many principles,
and which possess sympathy with each other, they will have something
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CHAP. II.
OF PLATO.
101
common, which leads all of them to sympathy, and similarly unfolds all
of them to the view. For we call those things sympathetic, which happen
to be passive to the same thing. But similars are entirely similar from
participating one form and one nature. If however this be the case, it
is necessary that that all [or universal] which is every where, and in all
the principles, should be of a more principal nature than the many. This
therefore gives them the power to generate sympathy with each other, and
affords them communion according to nature.
If however this be the case, it
is necessary that that all [or universal] which is every where, and in all
the principles, should be of a more principal nature than the many. This
therefore gives them the power to generate sympathy with each other, and
affords them communion according to nature.
Again, if there are indeed infinite principles, either the things which
proceed from them are infinite, and there will thus be the infinite twice,
or they are finite, and thus all the principles will not be principles. For
things finite in number, will entirely proceed from finite principles. The
principles therefore are in vain infinite. To which may be added, that in-
finity makes both the principles to be unknown, and the things which
proceed from them. For the principles being unknown, it is necessary
that the things which proceed from them should be unknown ; since we
then think that we know any thing when we know the causes and the first
principles of it. But if the principles are finite, it is evident that there
will be a certain number of them : for we say that number, is a definite
multitude. If however, there is a number of the principles, it is necessary
that there should be a cause of the whole number of them. For every
number is from one ; and this, viz. the one is the principle of numbers.
This therefore will be the principle of principles, and the cause of finite
multitude, since number itself is one, and the end in the many is one, and
it bounds the many by that which is one. But the principle being one,
and this being essence, it is necessary if this is admitted to be cither cor
porcal or incorporeal, that it must be acknowledged to be the principle of
other things.
If therefore, body is the cause of the generation of beings, it is neces-
sary indeed, that it should be divisible and have parts. For every body
is in its own nature divisible ; since every magnitude is a certain whole
and that which is a whole consists of parts. These parts therefore, (but
I mean each of them) must either severally participate a certain one, or
not participate it. If therefore they do not participate it, they wdl be
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK. If.
These parts therefore, (but
I mean each of them) must either severally participate a certain one, or
not participate it. If therefore they do not participate it, they wdl be
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK. If.
many alone, and by no means one. Hence, neither will that which con-
sists from them be a whole. For there being no one, that which consists
of all of them will not be one. But if each of the parts participates of
something of this kind, and there is something which is the same in all
of them, a thing of this kind must necessarily be incorporeal, and impar-
tible according to its own nature. For if this also is itself corporeal, it is
either wholly in each of the parts, or not wholly. If therefore, it is in-
deed wholly in each, it will itself be separated from itself. For the parts
in which it is are separate from each other. But if it is not wholly in
each of the parts, this also will be divisible, aud will have parts after the
same manner as the above mentioned parts ; and there will again be the
same inquiry concerning these, viz. whether in these also there is something
common, or nothing ; since if there is nothing common, we shall place
the many separate from the one.
Let us however consider the whole ; for every body is a whole, and has
parts. What therefore will that be which is connective of the parts, since
they are many ? For it is necessary to say either that the whole is
unific of the parts, or the parts of the whole, or that some third thing
prior to both, which is neither a whole, nor has any part, connects and
unites the whole with its parts, and the parts with the whole. But if the
whole indeed is connective of the parts, the whole will be incorporeal and
impartible. For if it is a body, this also will be partible, and will be in-
digent of a nature which is capable of connecting the parts ; and this
will be the case to infinity. But if the parts are connective of the whole,
how can the many be connective of 'Ac one ; and things divided, of that
which consists from them? For on the contrary, it is necessary that the
one should have the power of uniting the many, and not the many of uni-
ting the one. And if that which connects both, is neither a whole nor
has parts, it will be perfectly impartible. But being impartible, itis also
necessarily without interval. For every thing which has interval has
parts, and is divisible. But being without interval it is incorporeal ;
for every body possesses interval.
Farther still, it is necessary that the principle should be perpetual ; for
every being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted that the
principle of beings is perpetual or corruptible. But if we should grant that
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CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 103
Farther still, it is necessary that the principle should be perpetual ; for
every being is perpetual or corruptible. Hence it must be admitted that the
principle of beings is perpetual or corruptible. But if we should grant that
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CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 103
this may be corrupted, there will be no beiug incorruptible. For the princi-
ple being destroyed, it will neither be itself generated from any tiling, nor
will another thing be generated from it. For it can neither be able to ge-
nerate itself (since it is not, if it is not perpetual) nor can another
thing be abje to generate it, if it is the principle of all things. But if it
is incorruptible, it will have the power of not being corrupted, and this*
power will be infinite, in order that it may exist to infinity through the
whole of time. For every finite power of existence pertains naturally to
that which is corruptible. But an infinite power pertains to perpetual
natures, the existence of which continues to infinity. This infinite there-
fore, I mean the infinite according to power, is either impartible or partible.
But if it is partible indeed, there will be the infinite in a finite body. For
the principle is finite ; since if it were infinite, there will be nothing else
besides itself. But if it is impartible, the power of infinitely existing
will be incorporeal. And the principle of beings is incorporeal,' so far
as it is this power through which the subject of it always is. That it is
impossible therefore, the principle of beings can be corporeal is from these
things evident.
If however it is incorporeal, it must either be separate, or inseparable
from bodies. But if inseparable indeed, it will have all its energies in
bodies, and subsisting about them. For that is inseparable from body
which is not any where naturally adapted to energize except in and with
bodies. But if the principle is a thing of this kind, it is evidently ne-
cessary that none of the things which subsist according to it should be
more powerful, or possess greater authority than the principle of all beings.
If however, nothing is more excellent in bodies than the power which
subsists in and energizes about bodies, and a corporeal essence, there will
not any where be intellect and the power which energizes according to in-
tellect. For every such like motion, [i, e. energy] proceeds from a power,
which is entirely in its energies independent of body. But it neither was,
nor is lawful for generated natures to surpass the power of their causes.
For every thing which is in the things begotten is from primary natures,
' The words aavyjrtoi i it is necessary to read n.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK II.
But it neither was,
nor is lawful for generated natures to surpass the power of their causes.
For every thing which is in the things begotten is from primary natures,
' The words aavyjrtoi i it is necessary to read n.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK II.
itself. Every being, therefore, being infinite, and consisting of infinites,
will render all things infinitely infinite, and there will neither be a know-
ledge of any being, nor any evolution of powers. For the power of the
infinite is perfectly uuknown, and incomprehensible, by those natures to
whom it is infinite.
But if things are infinite in a descending progression, whether is each
of them infinite always proceeding most downward, in the same manner
as we say all things do, or is each whole indeed finite, but the beings
which arc produced from these are infinite? For if every being according
to the beginning of itself is definite, but according to its end is infinite,
there will neither be in parts nor in wholes, a conversion of beings to their
proper principle, nor will that which is second in order ever have a sub-
sistence so as to be assimilated to the extremity of a pre-existent order;
though as we frequently say, the summits of inferiors are conjoined with
the boundaries of superiors. For where there is no last, by what contriv-
ance can such a similitude of progression as this, and such a mutual cohe-
rence of beings be left, according to which secondary things are always
conjoined to the natures prior to them ? But if all things alone ha\e an
infinity of this kind, each being bounded by that which is posterior to it-
self, wholes will be subordinate to parts, and the parts of beings will be
naturally more perfect [than wholes.] For wholes, indeed, will be without
conversion to the principle prior to themselves; but parts will be con-
verted to it after their progression. By how much the more, however,
every being hastens to conjunction with that which is more perfect than
itself, by so much the more must it necessarily excel, as it appears to me.
And if this whole proceeding to infinity is not couvolvcd to the summit of
itself, and circularly converted and perfected according to such a conver-
sion [it will not desire its proper good.] If, however, we admit that there
is an infinity both ways these things must necessarily happen.
In addition to these things, also, there will be no common object of
desire to all beings, nor any union nor sympathy of them. For things
which are perfectly infinite have not that which is first in them ; but not
having a first, we shall not be able to say what is the common end of
beings, and why some things are more excellent, but others are allotted a
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CHAP. III.
OF PLATO.
Ill
For things
which are perfectly infinite have not that which is first in them ; but not
having a first, we shall not be able to say what is the common end of
beings, and why some things are more excellent, but others are allotted a
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CHAP. III.
OF PLATO.
Ill
subordinate nature. For we call one thing better and another less excel*
lent, from proximity to that which is best, just as we define the more and
the less hot from communion with that which is hot in the first degree.
And in short, we form a judgment of the more and the less from a refer-
ence to that which is a maximum. It is necessary, therefore, that the
boundary in beings should be that which is first and that which is last. •
But if, indeed, these are from each other, the same thing will be older
and younger, cause and at the same time the thing caused, and each thing
will be first and last. For it makes no difference, whether these are from
each other, or the things which subsist between these. For the extremes
being indifferent, how is it possible that a mutation according to essence
should intervene? But if the one is from the other, whether is the first
derived from the last, as some say, who generate things more excellent
from things subordinate, and things more perfect from such as are more
imperfect? In this case, however, must not that which is allotted the
power of generating and producing the perfect, by a much greater priority
perfect and adorn itself by its present power? And how is it possible
that leaving itself to be of an inferior allotment it should definitely assign
a more excellent order to another thing? For every thing aspires after its
proper perfection, and simply desires good ; though not every thing is
able to participate of a thing of this kind. If, therefore, it has the power
of producing this most perfect thing, that which is last will energize on
account of itself prior to other things, and the whole of good, and all per-
fection, will be first established in itself.
But if that which is last is produced from that which is first, and the
most imperfect from that which is most perfect, whether, is each of them
one, or is this one, but that not one ? If, however, that which is first, or
that which is last, is not one, neither of them will be first or last. For, as
there will be multitude in each, each of them will have the better and the
worse ; and neither will that which is best be unmingled with that which
is inferior to it, nor that which is the most obscure of all things according
to being, have so great a subjection entirely deprived of a more perfect
nature; but there will be something more extreme than that which is last,
and something more perfect than tlis^t which is first. For every where,
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H2 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
For every where,
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H2 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
that which is best if it receives another addition through that which is in-
ferior will be more perfect than that which docs not abide in the best,
[through not receiving this very addition.] If, therefore, we rightly assert
these things, the one is the principle of all things, and the last of beings is
one. For it is necessary, I think, that the end of the progression of beings
• should be assimilated to the principle, and that as far as to this, the power
of the first should proceed.
Summarily, therefore, recapitulating what we have said, it is necessary
either that the first principle should be one, or that there should be alone
many' first principles, or one containing multitude in itself, or many par-
ticipating of one. But if there are many first principles only, there will
not be one thing from them. For what will make one and a whole, if
there are many principles, and there is nothing which produces one ? For
it is certainly necessary that things posterior to the principles should be
assimilated to them. Either, therefore, there will not be the one in any
being, or it will not be from these principles ; *o that each of the things
which in any respect whatever have a subsistence will be divided multi-
tude alone. And again each of the parts of any being will be a tiling of
this kind, and we shall in no way whatever stop, dividing into minute
parts essence and existence. For all things will be many, and the one
will be no where in the universality of things, nor will either wholes or
parts be apparent..
But if it is necessary, indeed, that there should be many principles, and
that they should participate of the one, the one will be co-ordinated in the
many. Again, however, it is necessary, that the unco-ordinated should
every where be more ancient than the co-ordinated, and the exempt than
the participated. For how is the one in each of the many except from
one principle which co-arranges the multitude, and converts it to itself ac-
cording to the communion of the one? Again, if the first one were multi-
plied, the one will be passive ; for at the same time it will be one and not
one, and will not be that which is one [only.] It is necessary, however,
in each genus of things, that there should be that which is unminglcd with
' in, which are multitude only without any participation of the one.
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CHAP. IV.
OF PLATO.
113
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CHAP. IV.
OF PLATO.
113
an inferior nature, in order that there may be that which is mingled, in
the same manner as we say respecting forms. For from the equal itself,
things which are equal in these sublunary realms, appear indeed as equal,
though they are filled with a contrary nature ; and from that which is
primarily being, that which is mingled with non-being is derived, and
which presents itself to the view as being. And in short every where th6
simple unmingled subsistence of each thing precedes those things which
through remission are mingled with the privations of themselves. The one
therefore is by itself exempt from all multitude ; and that which is one,
and at the same time not one, is not the first one, but is suspended ' from
that which is primarily one ; through the principle, indeed, participating
of the one, but through the diminution arising from multitude, now mani-
festly exhibiting in itself the cause of separation.
CHAPTER IV.
•
That the one therefore is the principle of all things, and the first cause,
and that all other things are posterior to the one, is I think evident from
what has been said. I am astonished however at all the other interpre-
ters of Plato, who admit the existence of the intellectual kingdom, but do
not venerate the ineffable transcendency of the one, and its hyparxis
which surpasses the whole of things. I particularly, however, wonder
that tliis should have been the case with Origen, who was a partaker of
the same erudition with Plotinus. For Origen ends in intellect and
the first being, but omits the one which is beyond every intellect and every
being. And if indeed he omits it, as something which is better than all
knowledge, language and intellectual perception, we must say that he is
neither discordant with Plato, nor with the nature of things. But if he
1 For c£]pi|T«i it U necessary to read ffcymrraj. The punctuation also of the text in this place,
tnust be altered agreeably to the translation.
Proc. Vol. I. P
114
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK If.
omits it because the one is perfectly unhyparctic, and without any sub-
sistence, and because intellect is the best of things, and that which is
primarily being is the same as that which is primarily one, we cannot as-
sent to him in asserting these things, nor will Plato admit him, and con-
numerate him with his familiars. For I think that a dogma of this kind
is remote from the philosophy of Plato, and is full of Peripatetic innova-
tion. If you are willing, however, we will adduce some arguments against
this dogma, and against all others who are the patrons of this opinion, and
we will strenuously contend for the doctrine of Plato, and show that ac-
cording to him the first cause is beyond intellect, and is exempt from all
beings, as Plotinus and Porphyry, and all those who have received the
philosophy of these men, conceive him to assert. *
*
We. shall begin, therefore, from the Republic ; for here Socrates clearly
shows that the good is established above being, and the whole intellectual
order, following the analogy of the first goodness to the sun. For if, as
the sovereign sun is to generation, to every thing visible, and to all visive
natures according to the power generative of light, so it is necessary the
good should be with reference to intellect and intelligibles, according to a
cause productive of truth, — if this be the case, we must say that the sun is
exempt at one and the same time from visive and visible natures, and
must admit that the good transcends the natures which are always intel-
lective, and also those which are eternally intelligible. It is better, how-
ever, to hear the Platonic words themselves: " You may say that the sun
not only imparts the power of being seen to visible natures, but also that
he is the cause of their generation, increase, and nutriment, not being him-
self generation. Certainly. We may say, therefore, that things which are
known, have not only this from the good that they are known, but like-
wise that their being and essence are thence derived, whilst the good itself
is not essence, but beyond essence, transcending it both in dignity and in
power." Through all these things, therefore, it is evident how the good
and the first principle are defined by Plato to be expanded above not only
the intellectual, but also the intelligible extent, and essence itself, accord-
ing to union, in the same manner as it is inferred the sun surpasses all
visible natures, and perfects and generates all things by his light. How,
CHAP. IV.
OF PLATO.
115
How,
CHAP. IV.
OF PLATO.
115
therefore, following Plato, can we admit that intellect is the best of things,
and the cause of all things ? How can we assert that being itself* and
essence are the same with the principle which is the leader of all the di-
vine progressions ? For essence and intellect are said to subsist primarily
from the good, to have their hyparxis about the good, to be filled with the
light of truth proceeding from thence, and to obtain the participation
which is adapted to them from the union of this light, which is more di-
vine than intellect itself and essence, as being primarily suspended from
the good, and affording in beings a similitude to that which is first For
the light which is emitted from the sun causes every thing visible to be
solar-form. And the participation of the light of truth renders that which
is intelligible boniform and divine. Intellect, therefore, is a god through
a light which is more ancient than intellectual light and intellect itself,
and that which is intelligible and at the same time intellectual participates
of a divine hyparxis through a plenitude of this light being appropriately
imparted to it.* And in short, every divine nature is that which it is said
to be, on account of this light, and is through it united to the cause of all
beings. By no means, therefore, is the first good to be considered as the
same with intellect, nor must it be admitted that the intelligible is more
ancient than all the hyparxis of the whole of things, since it is even sub-
ordinate to the light proceeding from the good, and being perfected by
this light, is conjoined according to its own order with the good itself. For
we must not say that the intelligible is united to the first after the same
manner as the light [of truth ;] but the latter through continuity with the
good is established in it without a medium ; while the former, through this
light, participates of a vicinity to the good ; since in sensibles also, the
solar light is primarily connascent with the circulation of the sun, ascends
as far as to the centre of the whole sphere, and subsists on all sides about
it. But all sensible natures through this obtain a similitude to the sun,
each of them according to its own nature being filled with solar-form illu-
mination. These things, therefore, will be sufficient to recall into the
1 For wno to i, it is necessary to read aim to or.
* This sentence is very erroneous in the original, m will be evident from comparing it with the
above translation.
110
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK IT.
memory of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of
Plato on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary
to the exempt transcendency of the one.
110
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK IT.
memory of those who love the contemplation of truth, the conceptions of
Plato on this subject, and to evince that the order of intellect is secondary
to the exempt transcendency of the one.
If, however, it is requisite to evince the same thing through many testi-
monies, let us survey what the Elean guest in the Sophista determines
concerning these things. He says, therefore, it is necessary that the mul-
titude of all beings, whether they are contraries or not, should be sus-
pended from the one being, [i. e. from being characterized by the one ;]
but that the one being itself should be suspended from the one. For when
we call the hot or the cold, or permanency or motion, being, we do not
denominate each of these as the same with being itself. For if perma-
nency were being itself, motion would not be being ; or, if motion were
such like being, permanency would not participate of the appellation of
being. But it is evident that being accedes to permanency, to motion,
and to every multitude of beings from one thing which is primarily being.
This very thing, therefore, which is the cause of essence to all things, and
which is participated by all other things, is a participant of this one, and
on this account, as it is being alone,' so also it is primarily being.' It is,
however, being itself indeed, and is not allotted to &e, from participation ;
but it is one according to participation, and on this account it is passive to
the one. But it is being* primarily. If, therefore, Plato gives to the one
a subsistence beyond being, in the same manner as that which is first in
wholes is supposed by him to transcend beings, how is it possible that
being should not be posterior to the owe, since it participates of it, and on
this account is denominated one ?
Moreover, Socrates in the Philebus clearly demonstrates the same thing
to those who arc able to know wholes from parts, viz. that intellect has
not the same order as the first cause of all. Investigating, therefore, the
good of the human soul and its end, of which participating in every re-
spect sufficiently it will reap the fruits of a felicity adapted to its nature,
he -in the first place removes pleasure from an end of this kind, and after
this intellect, because neither is this replete with all the elements of the
• For it it is necessary to read «».
* Here also o» must be substituted for n.
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CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. ll7
r
* Here also o» must be substituted for n.
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CHAP. IV. OF PLATO. ll7
r
good. If, therefore, the intellect which is in us is an image of the first in-
tellect, and the good of the whole of our life is not to be defined accord-
ing to this alone, is it not necessary that in wholes also, the cause of good
must be established above intellectual perfection ? For if that which is
primarily good subsisted according to total intellect, in us also and all
other [intellectual natures,] self-sufficiency and appropriate good would
be present through the participation of intellect. Our intellect, indeed, is
disjoined from the good, and is indigent, and on this account requires
pleasure in order to the attainment of human perfection. But a divine
intellect always participates of the good, and on this account is divine.
For it is boniform through the participation of good ; but divine, as
being suspended from the first deity. It is the same reasoning, therefore,
which infers that the good is exempt from the first intellect, and which
defines felicity to consist not in intelligence only, but in the all-perfect
presence of the gootl. For the intellectual form of energy is itself by it-
self defective with respect to blessedness. And why is it requisite to be
prolix? For Parmenides teaches us most clearly the difference of the one
from essence and being, and shows that the one is exempt from all other
things and from essence ; for this he evinces of the one at the end of the
first hypothesis. But how is it possible that the cause of essence, and
which is exempt from it through supreme transcendency, should not also
be beyond the intellectual order? For intellect is essence. But if in in-
tellect there is permanency and motion, and Parmenides demonstrates
that the one transcends both these, does he not immediately bring us to
the ineffable cause of all things, which is prior to every intellect? And if
every intellect is converted to itself, and is in itself, but the one is demon-
strated to be neither in itself, nor in another, how can we any longer con-
sider intellect as the same with the first cause of all ? In what respect,
also, will the one which is prior to being differ from the one being, which
is the subject of the second hypothesis, if intellect is the best of things,
and the first principle of all ? For the one being participates of the one ;
but that which participates is secondary to that which is participated.
That the one, however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect
and essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory.
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CHAPTER V.
That the one, however, is according to Plato more ancient than intellect
and essence, is through what has been said recalled to our memory.
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CHAPTER V.
Ik the next place, if the one is neither intelligible nor intellectual, nor
in short participates of the power of being, let us survey what will be the
modes of leading us to it, and through what intellectual conceptions
Plato unfolds as far as he is able, to his familiars, the ineffable and un-
known transcendency of the first. I say then, that at one time he unfolds
it through analogy, and the similitude of secondary natures ; but at an-
other time he demonstrates itg exempt transcendency, and its separation
from the whole of things, through negations. For in the Republic, indeed,
he indicates the ineffable peculiarity and hyparxis of the good, through
analogy to the sun ; but in the Parmenides, he demonstrates the differ-
ence of the one with respect to all things posterior to it through negations.
But he appears to me through one of these modes to unfold the progres-
sion from the first cause of all other things, and prior to other things, of
the divine orders. For on this account the first cause is exempt from all
the natures produced by it, because every where cause is established
above its effects ; and on this account the first is nothing of all things,
because all things proceed from him. For he is the principle of all things,
both of beings, and at the same time of non-beings. But again, accord-
ing to the other of these modes, he adumbrates the conversion to the first
of the things which have proceeded from it. For in each order of beings,
through similitude to it there is a monad analogous to the good, which has
the same relation to the whole series conjoined with it, that the good has
to all the orders of the Gods. The cause, however, of this similitude is
entirely the conversion of the whole of things to the good. These, there-
fore, proceed from thence and are converted to it. And the progression
indeed of all things demonstrates to us the ascent to the first through ne?
gations ; but the conversion of all things demonstrates this to us through
analogies. Let not, however, any one considering these negations to be
such things as privations despise such a mode of discussion, nor defining
Di.
CHAP. V. OF PLATO. 1 19
gations ; but the conversion of all things demonstrates this to us through
analogies. Let not, however, any one considering these negations to be
such things as privations despise such a mode of discussion, nor defining
Di.
CHAP. V. OF PLATO. 1 19
the sameness in words analogously, and words in habitudes, endeavour to
calumniate this anagogic progression to the first principle. For negations,
as it appears to me, extend a triple peculiarity in things. And at one
time, indeed, being more primogenial than affirmations, they are procrea-
tive and perfective of the generation of them. But at another time, they
are allotted an order co-ordinate to affirmations, and negation is then in
no respect more venerable than affirmation. And again, at another time,
they are allotted an order subordinate to affirmations, and are nothing else
than the privations of them. For with respect to non-being itself, with
which there is also a negation of beings, at one time considering it as be-
yond being, we say that it is the cause and the supplier of beings ; but at
another time we evince that it is equivalent to being ; just as I think, the
Elean guest demonstrates [in the Sophista] that non-being is in no respect
less, if it be lawful so to speak, than being ; and at another time we leave
it as a privation of, and indigent of being. For indeed, according to this
mode, we call every generation, and matter itself, non-being.
Analogies, however, are assumed for the purpose alone of indicating the
similitude of secondary natures to the first principle. And neither any
reason, nor habitude, nor communion of this principle with things pos-
terior to it, becomes apparent from these. For its exempt nature is not
of such a kind as is beheld in the second and third orders of beings ; but
the good transcends the whole of things in a much greater degree than
intellect surpasses the natures posterior to itself, whether it be the demi-
urgic intellect, or the intellect of the whole world, or some other intellect
from among the number of those that are called divine. Every intellect
however, and every god, is allotted a transcendency with respect to subor-
dinate natures, and those things of which it is the cause, inferior to that
which the first principle has to every being ; for this principle similarly
transcends all things, and not some in a greater, but others in a less de-
gree ; since thus we should introduce a greater and less habitude of it to
secondary natures. It is necessary, however, to preserve it without habi-
tude to all things, and similarly exempt from the whole of things. But
of other natures, some are indeed nearer, and others are more remote
from it. For each thing proceeds from it, since it produces all things
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But
of other natures, some are indeed nearer, and others are more remote
from it. For each thing proceeds from it, since it produces all things
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130 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK. II.
according to one cause. And different things are indeed converted to it
in a different manner, this principle in the mean time, receiving no habi-
tude or communion with things posterior to itself.
CHAPTER VI.
Tiie mode of demonstration, therefore, pertaining to the one is, as
we have said, twofold. For again, Plato delivers to us twofold names
of the ineffable cause. In the Republic indeed he calls it the good, and
demonstrates it to be the fountain of the truth which unites intellect
and intelligibles. But in the Parmenides, he denominates such a prin-
ciple as this the one, and shows that it gives subsistence to the divine
unities. Again therefore, of these names, the one is the image of the
progression of the whole of things, but the other of their conversion.
For because indeed all things derive their subsistence and proceed from
the first principle, on this account referring the one to it, we demonstrate
that it is the cause of all multitude and every progression. For whence
is multitude unfolded into light except from the one* But because
again the progressions from it are naturally converted to it, and de-
sire its ineffable and incomprehensible hyparxis, we denominate it the
good. For what else is that which converts all things, and which is ex-
tended to all beings as the object of desire, but the good f For all other
things subsist distrihutedly, and are to some beings honourable, but to
others not. And every thing which in any respect whatever is said to
have a subsistence aspires after some things, and avoids others. But Me
good is the common object of desire to all beings, and all things accord-
ing to their nature verge and are extended to this. The tendency however
of desiring natures is every where to the appropriate object of desire.
The good therefore converts, but the one gives subsistence to all secondary
natures. Let not, however, any one suppose that the ineffable can on this.
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CHAP. VI- OF PLATO. 12!
account be named, or that the cause of all union is doubled. For here
indeed we transfer to it names, looking to that which is posterior to it, and
to the progressions from, or the circular conversions to it. Because, in-
deed, multitude subsists from it, we ascribe to it the appellation of the
one ; but because all things even as far as to things that have the most
obscure existence, are converted to it, we denominate it the good.
Because, in-
deed, multitude subsists from it, we ascribe to it the appellation of the
one ; but because all things even as far as to things that have the most
obscure existence, are converted to it, we denominate it the good.
We endeavour therefore to know the unknown nature of the first prin-
ciple, through the things which proceed from, and are converted to it ;
and we also attempt through the same things to give a name to that which
is ineffable. This principle, however, is neither known by beings, nor is
efiable by any one of all things ; but being exempt from all knowledge,
and all language, and subsisting as incomprehensible, it produces from
itself according to one cause all knowledge, every thing that is known,
all words, and whatever can be comprehended by speech. But its
uuical nature, and which transcends all division, shines forth to the view
dyadically in the natures posterior to it, or rather triad ically. For
all things abide in, proceed from, and are converted to the one. For at
one and the same time, they are united to it, are in subjection to its union
which is exempt from the whole of things, and desire the participation of
it. And union indeed imparts a stable transcendency to all secondary
natures, and which subsists in unproceeding conjunction with the cause
of them. But subjection defines the progression of beings, and their se-
paration from the imparticipable and first unity. \nd desire-perfects the
conversion of the subsisting natures, and their circular tendency to the
ineffable. First natures therefore, being always entirely united, [to the
ineffable] some more remotely, but others more proximately, and receiv-
ing through this union their hyparxis, and their portion of good, we en-
deavour to manifest through names the progression and conversion of the
whole of things. But with respect to their stable comprehension, if it
be lawful so to speak, in the first, and their union with the ineffable, this
as being incomprehensible, and not to be apprehended by knowledge,
those who were wise in divine concerns were unable to indicate it by
words. But as the ineffable is primarily concealed in inaccessible places,
and isexemptfrom all beings, thus also the union of all things with it isoc-
Proc. Vol. I. Q
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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But as the ineffable is primarily concealed in inaccessible places,
and isexemptfrom all beings, thus also the union of all things with it isoc-
Proc. Vol. I. Q
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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cult, ineffable, and unknown to all beings. For every being is united to it,
neither by intellectual injection, [or projection] nor the energy of essence ;
since things which are destitute of knowledge are united to the first, and
things deprived of all energy, participate according to their order of a
conjunction with it. That which is unknown therefore in beings according
to their union with the first, wc neither endeavour to know, nor to ma-
nifest by names, but being more able to look to their progression and
conversion, we ascribe indeed to the first two names, which we derive as
resemblances from secondary natures. We also define two modes of
ascent to the first, conjoining that mode which is through analogy with
the appellation of the good, but that which is through negations with the
appellation of the one ; which Plato also indicating, in the Republic in-
deed calls the first the good, and at the same time makes a regression to it
through analogy ; but in the Parmenides establishing it as the one Uaelf, he
unfolds the transcendency of it which is exempt from beings, through
negative conclusions. According to both these modes therefore, the first
principle transcends both gnostic powers, and the parts of speech ; but
all other things afford us the cause of knowledge and of appellation.
And the first principle indeed unically gives subsistence to all the unions
and hyparxes of secondary natures ; but the things posterior to this
cause participate of it in'a divided manner. These also, as we have before
observed, become multiplied by abiding, proceeding and returning ; but the
one is at once perfectly exempt from all the prolific progressions, conver-
tive powers, and uniform hypostases in beings. What the modes there-
fore are of the doctrine about the first, and through what names Plato en-
deavours to indicate it, and whence the names and the modes of this indica-
tion which is unknown to all things are derived, is, I think, through what
has been said sufficiently manifest.
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CHAP. VII. OF PLATO. m
CHAPTER VII.
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CHAP. VII. OF PLATO. m
CHAPTER VII.
It, however, it be requisite to survey each of the dogmas about it
which are scattered in the writings of Plato, and to reduce them to one
science of theology, let us consider, if you are willing, prior to other
things, what Socrates demonstrates in the 6th book of the Republic,
conformably to the before mentioned mode, and how through analogy
he teaches us the wonderful transcendency of the good with respect to
all beings, and the summits of the whole of things. In the first place
therefore, he distinguishes beings from each other, and establishing some
of them to he intelligibles, but others sensibles, he defines science by the
knowledge of beings. But he conjoins sense with sensibles, and giving a
twofold division to all things, he places one exempt monad over intelli-
gible multitude, and a second monad over sensible multitude, according
to a similitude to the former monad. Of these monads also, he shows
that the one is generative of intelligible light, but the other of sensible
light. And he evinces that by the intelligible light indeed, all intelligibles
are deifomi, and boniform, according to participation from the first God ;
but that by the sensible light, according to the perfection derived from the
sun, all sensible natures are solarform, and similar to their one monad. In
addition also to what has been said, he suspends the second monad from
that which reigns in the intelligible. And thus he extends all things, both
the first and the last of beings, I mean intelligibles and sensibles, to the
good. Such a mode of reduction to the first as this, appears to me to
be most excellent, and especially adapted to theology ; viz. to congregate
all the Gods in the world into one union, and suspend them from their
proximate monad ; but to refer the supermundane Gods to the intellec-
tual kingdom ; to suspend the intellectual Gods from intelligible union ;
and to refer the intelligible Gods themselves, and all beings through these,
to that which is first. For as the monad of mundane natures is super-
mundane, as the monad of supermundane natures is intellectual, and of
intellectual natures intelligible, thus also it is necessary that first intelli-
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124 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
For as the monad of mundane natures is super-
mundane, as the monad of supermundane natures is intellectual, and of
intellectual natures intelligible, thus also it is necessary that first intelli-
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gibles should be suspended from the monad which is above intelligible*
and perfected by it, and being filled with deity, should illuminate secon-
dary natures with intelligible light. But it is necessary that intellectual
natures which derive the enjoyment of their being from intelligibles, but
of good and a uniform hyparxis from the first cause, should connect su-
permundane natures by intellectual light. And that the genera of the
Gods prior to the world, through receiving a pure intellect from the in-
tellectual Gods, but intelligible light from the intelligible Gods, and a
unical light from the father of the whole of things, should send into this
apparent world the illumination of the light which they possess. On this
account, the sun being the summit of mundane natures, and proceeding
from the etherial profundities, imparts to visible natures supernatural
perfection, and causes these as much as possible to be similar to the su-
pcrcelestial worlds. These things therefore we shall afterwards mpre
abundantly discuss.
The present discourse, however, suspends all things after the above
mentioned manner from the good, and the first unity. "For if indeed the
sun connects every thing sensible, but the good produces and perfects
every thing intelligible, and of these, the second monad [i. e. the sun]
is denominated the offspring of the good, and on this account causes
that which is sensible to be splendid, and adorns and fills it with good,
because it imitates the primogeuial cause of itself, — if this be the case,
all things will thus participate of the good, and will be extended to this
one principle, intelligibles indeed, and the most divine of beings without
a.medium, but sensibles through their monad [the sun.]
Again therefore, and after another manner, Plato narrates to us in this
extract from the Republic the analysis to the first principle. For he sus-
pends all the multitudes in the world from the intelligible monads, as for
instance, all beautiful things from the beautiful itself, all good things from
the good, and all equal things from the equal itself. And again, he con-
siders some things as intelligibles, but others as sensibles ; but the sum-
mits of them ait; uniformly established in intelligibles. Again, from these
intelligible forms he thinks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a
greater degree the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends
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CHAP. VII.
OF PLATO.
125
Again, from these
intelligible forms he thinks fit to ascend still higher, and venerating in a
greater degree the goodness which is beyond intelligibles, he apprehends
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CHAP. VII.
OF PLATO.
125
that nil intelligibles, and the monads which they contain, subsist and are
perfected through it. For as we refer the sensible multitude to a monad
- uncoordinated with sensibles, and we think that through this monad the
multitude of sensibles derives its subsistence, so it is necessary to refer the
intelligible multitude to another cause which is not connumerated with in-
telligibles, and from which they are allotted their essence and their divine
hyparxis.
IiCt not, however, any one fancy that Plato admits there is the same
order of the good in intelligible forms, as there is prior to intelligibles.
But the good indeed, which is coordinated with the beautiful, must be
considered as essential, and as one of the forms which are in intelligibles.
For the first good, which by conjoining the article with the noun we
are accustomed to call royals* or the good, is admitted to be something
superessential, and more excellent than all beings both in dignity and
power ; since Socrates also, when discussing the beautiful and the good,
calls the one the beautiful itself and the other the good itself, and thus
says he we must denominate all the things which we then very properly
considered as many. Again, particularly considering each thing as being
one, we denominate each thing that which it is, and thus Socrates leading
us from sensible tilings that arc beautiful and good, and in short from
things that are participated, subsist in other things, and are multiplied,
to the superessential unities of intelligibles and the first essences, from
these again, he transfers us to the exempt cause of every thing beautiful
and good. For in forms, the beautiful itself is the leader of many beau-
tiful things, and the good itself of many goods, and each form alone gives
subsistence to things similar to itself. But the first good is not only the
cause of what is good, but similarly of things beautiful, as Plato else-
where says ; and " all things are for its sake, and it is the cause of every
thing beautiful."
For again, in addition to what has been said, the good which is in
forms is intelligible and known, as Socrates himself teaches; but the
good prior to forms is beyond beings, and is established above all know-
ledge. And the former is the source of essential perfection ; but (he
latter is the supplier, of good to the Gods so far as they arc Gods, and is
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And the former is the source of essential perfection ; but (he
latter is the supplier, of good to the Gods so far as they arc Gods, and is
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generative of goods which are prior to essences. We must not therefore
apprehend that when Socrates calls the first principle the good, from the
name of idea, that he dkectly calls it the intelligible goodness ; but though
the first principle is superior to all language and appellation, we permit
Socrates to call it the cause of every thing beautiful and good, transfer-
ring through the things which are proximately filled by it, appellations
to it. For this I think Socrates indicating asserts in all that he says
about the good, that it is beyond knowledge and things that are known,
and likewise beyond essence and being, according to its analogy to the
,un. And after a certain admirable manner be presents us with an epi-
tome of the negations of the one in the Parmeaides. For the assertion
that the good is neither truth, nor essence, nor intellect, nor science, at one
and the same time separates it from the supereaseotial unities, and every
s of the Gods, and from the intellectual and intelligible orders, and
from every psychical subsistence. But these axe the first things, and
through the first hypothesis of the Parmenides, these are taken away from
the principle of the whole of things.
Moreover, neither when he celebrates the good the leader of the divine
orders as the most splendid of being, does he denominate it most splendid
as participating of light. For the first light proceeds from it to intelligi-
bles and intellect, but he gives it this appellation as the cause of the light
which is every where diffused, and as the fountain of every intelligible, or
intellectual, or mundane deity. For this light is nothing else than the
narticipation of a divine hyparxis. For as all things become boniform
through participating of the good, and are filled with the illuminat.on pro.
ceeding from thence, thus also the natures which are pnmanly beings are
deiform • and as it is said, intelligible and intellectual essences become
divine through the participation. of deity. Looking therefore to all that
has been said, we shall preserve the exempt transcendency of the good
with reference to all beings and the divine orders Bu aga.n ,n each
order of beings, we must grant that there is a monad analogous to it, not
onlv in sensibles, as Plato says the sun is, but likewise in supermundane
natures and in the genera of Gods arranged from the good prior to these.
For it is evident that the natures which are nearer to the first cause and
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OF PLATO.
For it is evident that the natures which are nearer to the first cause and
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CHAP. VII.
OF PLATO.
which participate of it in a greater degree, possess a greater similitude to it.
And as that is the cause of all beings, so these establish monads which are
the leaders of more partial orders. And Plato indeed arranges the multi-
tudes under the monads ; but extends all the monads to the exempt prin-
ciple of the whole of things, and establishes them uniformly about it. It
is necessary therefore that the theological science should be unfolded con-
formably to the divine orders, and that our conceptions about it should
be transcendent, and unmingled and unconnected with other things. And
we should survey indeed all secondary natures, subsisting according to
and perfected about it ; but we should establish it as transcending all the
monads in beings, according to one excess of simplicity, and as unitfclly
arranged prior to the whole orders [of Gods.] Pot as the Gods themselves
enact the order Which is in them, thus also it is necessary that the truth
concerning them, the precedancoUs causes of beings, and the second artd
third progeny of these should be definitely distinguished.
This, therefore, is the one truth concerning the first principle, and which
possesses one reason remarkably conformable to the Platonic hypothesis,
viz. that this principle subsists prior to the whole orders in the Gods, that
it gives subsistence to the boniform essence of the Gods, that it is the
fountain of superessential goodness, and that all things posterior to it being
extended towards it, are filled with good, after an ineffable manner are
united to it, and subsist uniformly about it. For its unical nature is not
Uftprolific, but it is by so much the more generative of other things, as it
pre-eftablishes a union exempt from the things which have a subsistence-
Nor does its fecundity tend to multitude and division ; but it abides with
undented purity concealed in inaccessible places. For in the natures also
which are posterior to it, we every where see that what is perfect desires
to generate, and that what is full hastens to impart to other things its
plenitude. In a much greater degree therefore it is necessary that the
nature which contains in one all perfections, and which is not a certain
good, but good itself, and super-full, (if it be lawful so to speak) should
be generative of the Whole of things, and give subsistence to them ; pro-
ducing all things by being exempt from all things, and by beitig imparti-
cipable, similarly generating the first and the last of beings.
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You must not, however, suppose that tlus generation and progression
is emitted in consequence of the good either being moved, or multiplied,
or possessing a generative power, or energizing; since all these are secon-
dary to the singleness of the first. For whether the good is moved, it will
not be the good; since the good itself, and which is nothing else, if it were
moved would depart from goodness. How, therefore, can that which is
the source of goodness to beings, produce other things when deprived of
good ? Or whether the good is multiplied through imbecility, there will
be a progression of the whole of things through a diminution, but not
through an abundance of goodness. For that which in generating departs
from its proper transcendency, hastens to adorn inferior natures, not
through prolific perfection, but through a diminution and want of its own
power. But if the good produces all things by employing power, there
will be a diminution of goodness about it. For it will be two things and
not one, viz. it will be good and power. And if indeed it is in want of
power, that which is primarily good will be indigent. But if to be the
good ittelf is sufficient to the perfection of the things produced, and to
the plenitude of all things, why do we assume power as an addition? For
additions in the Gods are ablations of transcendent unions. Let the good
therefore alone be prior to power, and prior to energy. For all energy is
the progeny of power. Neither, therefore, does the good energizing give
subsistence to all things through energy, nor being in want of power docs
it fill all thiugs with powers, nor being multiplied do all things participate
of good, nor being moved do all beings' enjoy the first principle. For
the good precedes all powers, and all energies, and every multitude and
motion ; since each of these is referred to the good as to its end. The good
therefore is the most final of all ends, and the centre of all desirable na-
tures. All desirable natures, indeed, impart an end to secondary beings ;
but that which pre-subsisls uncircumscribed by all things is the first
good.
' For tmtix rufevr*, I read wmrrm t« sit*.
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CHAPTER V11L
All desirable natures, indeed, impart an end to secondary beings ;
but that which pre-subsisls uncircumscribed by all things is the first
good.
' For tmtix rufevr*, I read wmrrm t« sit*.
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129
CHAPTER V11L
After these things, however, let us direct our attention to the concep-
tions about the first principle in the epistle [of Plato] to Dionysius, and
survey the manner in which he considers its ineffable and immense tran-
scendency. But perhaps some one may be indignant with us for rashly
drawing to our own hypotheses the assertions of Plato, and may say that
the three kings of which he speaks are all of them intellectual Gods ; but
that Plato docs not think fit to co-arrange or connumerate the good with
secondary natures. For such a connumeration ought not to be considered
as adapted to the exempt transcendency of the good with respect to other
things, nor in short, must it be said that the good contributes as the first
with reference to another second or third cause to the completion of a
triad in conjunction with other natures ; but that it in a greater degree
precedes every triad and every number, than the intelligible precede the
intellectual Gods. How, therefore, can we connumerate with other kings
the good which is at once exempt from all the divine numbers, and co-
arrange one as the first [king,] another as the second, and another as the
third ? Some one may also adduce many other things, indicating the
transcendency of the first principle with respect to every thing divine.
Such a one, however, in thus interpreting the words of Plato will remark-
ably accord with us who assert the good to be im participate, to transcend
all the intelligible and intellectual genera, and to be established above all
the divine monads.
That Plato, indeed, admits the first God to be the king of all things,
and says that all things arc for his sake, and that he is the cause of all
beautiful things, does not I think require much proof to those who consi-
der his words by themselves apart from their own conjectures, by intro-
ducing which they violently endeavour to accord with Plato. But that
we do not assert these things connumeratiug [the first God with secondary
Proc. Vol. I. R
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1
jgQ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II,
But that
we do not assert these things connumeratiug [the first God with secondary
Proc. Vol. I. R
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1
jgQ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II,
natures,] Plato himself manifests, neither calling the first king the first,,
but alone the king of all things, nor asserting that some things are about
him, as he says that second things are about that which is second, and
third things about that which is third, but* he says, in short, that alt
things are about him. And to the other kings, indeed, he introduces
number and a divided kingdom ; but to the king of all things he neither
attributes a part of number, nor a distribution of dominion opposite to-
that of the others. Such a mode of words, therefore, neither connumerates
the king of all things with the other kings* nor co-arranges him as the
leader of a triad with the second and third power. For of a triad ic divi-
sion the first monad, indeed, is the leader of first orders, and which are
co-ordinate with itself ; but the second of second ; and the third of third
orders. If, however, some one should apprehend that the first monad is-
the leader of all things, so as to comprehend at once both second and
third allotments ; yet the cause which subsists according to comprehen-
sion is different from that which similarly pervades to all things. And to
the king of all things, indeed, all things are subject according to one reaV
son and one order ; but to the first of the triad, things first are subjected
according to the same order ; and it is necessary that things second and
third should be subservient according to their communion with the remain-
ing kings. Does not, therefore, what is here said by Plato remarkably
celebrate the exempt nature of the first cause, and his un-coordinatioa
with the other kingdoms of the Gods ? Since he says that this cause si-
milarly reigtis over all things, that all things subsist about biro, and that
for his sake essence and energy are inherent in all things.
If also Socrates in the Republic clearly' teaches that the sun reigns
over the world analogous to the good, let no one dare to accuse this ana-
logy as connumerating the good with the king of mundane natures. For
unless* together with the similitude of secondary causes to the first
principles, we think fit to preserve that exempt dominion [of the first
1 For x )( aiXffTi^r»{ I read T^t ««Xvn]ra.
3 For tw liov, it is necessary to read tmf 9»«r.
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CHAP. IX.
OF PLATO.
all things subsist This part therefore is posterior to the otW, and is
woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Pla-
tonic doctrine.
3 For tw liov, it is necessary to read tmf 9»«r.
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CHAP. IX.
OF PLATO.
all things subsist This part therefore is posterior to the otW, and is
woven together with the order of things, and the progression of the Pla-
tonic doctrine.
Again, the third part asserts him to be productive of all beautiful things,
and thus adds to him a species of cause 1 inferior to the final. Whence
also Plotmus, I think, does not hesitate to call the first God the fountain
of the beautiful. It is necessary therefore to attribute that which is best
to the best of all things, that he may be the cause of all, and in reality
prior to cause. But this is the good. This too, which is an admirable
circumstance, may be seen in the words of Plato, that the first of these
three divine dogmas, neither presumes to say any thing about the good,
and this ineffable nature, nor does it permit us to refer any species of
eause to it. But the second dogma leaves indeed the good ineffable, as it
Is fit it should, but from the habitude of things- posterior to it, enables us
to collect the final cause : for it does not refuse to call it that for the sake
of which all things subsist. But when it asserts that all things are for the
sake of the goodr it excites in us the conception of the communion andi
co-ordination of that which is the object of desire with the desiring na-
tures. And the third dogma evinces that the good is the cause of alh
beautiful things. But this to say something concerning it, and to add
to the simplicity of the first cause, and- not to abide in the conceptions of
the end, but to conjoin with it the producing principle of things second.
And it appears to me that Plato here indicates the natures which are
proximately unfolded into light after the first. Pork is not possible to say
any thing concerning it except at one time being impelled to this from'
all things, and at another from the best of things : for it is the cause of
hyparxis to all things, and unfolds its own separate union through the
peculiarities of these. We ascribe to it therefore the one and the good,
from the donation which pervades to all things from it. For of those'
things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that
which is established prior to all these. But the about which (™ npi «,) the
' For muty it u ocewwry to rtad «ur» famit is necessary to read m{
Proc. Vol. i. T
146 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
For of those'
things of which all participate, we say there is no other cause than that
which is established prior to all these. But the about which (™ npi «,) the
' For muty it u ocewwry to rtad «ur» famit is necessary to read m{
Proc. Vol. i. T
146 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK II.
the second or third progressions in the divine orders, but also that it sub-
sists prior to the intelligible unities themselves, and this in a manner con-
formable to the simplicity of their occult nature, and not through a variety
of words, but through intellectual projection alone. For intelligibles are
naturally adapted to be known by intellect. This therefore, Parmenides
also evinces in reality, relinquishing logical methods, but energizing ac-
cording to intellect, and asserting that the one is above essence, and being
characterized by the one. For this assertion was not collected from the
preceding conclusions. For the discourse about the first Gods them-
selves would be without demonstration, if it derived its credibility from
things subordinate. At the same time therefore, Parmenides contends
that all knowledge, and all the instruments of knowledge, fall short of the
transcendency of the one, and beautifully end in the ineffable of that
God who is bevond all tlii lij^s. For after scientific energies, and intellec-
tual projections, a union with the unknown follows, to which also Par-
menides referring the whole of his discussion, concludes the first hypo-
thesis, suspending indeed all the divine genera from the onef but evincing
that the one is unically exempt from all things, subsisting without the
participation of intelligibles and sensible*, and in an ineffable manner
giving subsistence to the participated monads. Hence also, the one is
said to be beyond that one which is conjoined with essence, and at the
same time to be beyond every participated multitude of unities.
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BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
Hence also, the one is
said to be beyond that one which is conjoined with essence, and at the
same time to be beyond every participated multitude of unities.
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BOOK III.
CHAPTER I.
Such therefore is the theology with Plato concerning the first God, as
it appears to me, and so great is the transcendency which it is allotted
with respect to all other discussions of divine concerns ; at one and the
same time venerably preserving the ineffable union of this God exempt
from the whole of things, uncircumscribed by all gnostic com prehensions,
and apart from all beings ; and unfolding the anagogic paths to him, per-
fecting that parturient desire which souls always possess of the father, and
progenitor of all things, and enkindling that torch in them, by which they
are especially conjoined with the unknown transcendency of the one. But
after this imparticipable, ineffable, and truly superessential cause, which
is separated from all essence, power and energy, the discussion of the
Gods immediately follows. For to what other thing prior to the unities
is it lawful to be conjoined with the one, or what else can be more united
to the unical God than the multitude of Gods ? Concerning these there-
fore, we shall in the next place unfold the inartificial theory of Plato, in-
voking the Gods themselves to enkindle in us the light of truth. I wish
however prior to entering on the particulars of this theory, to convince
the reader, and to make it evident to him through demonstration, that
there are necessarily as many orders of the Gods, as the Parmenides of
Plato unfolds to us in the second hypothesis.
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148 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
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148 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
This therefore is I think prior to all other things apparent to those whose
conceptions are not perverted, that every where, but especially in the
divine orders, second progressions, are completed through the similitude
of these to their proper principles. For nature and intellect, and every
generative cause, are naturally adapted to produce and conjoin to them-
selves things similar, prior to such as as are dissimilar to themselves. For
if it is necessary that the progression of beings should be continued, and
that no vacuum should intervene either in incorporeal natures, or in
bodies, it is necessary that every thing which proceeds naturally should
proceed through similitude. For it is by no means lawful that the thing
caused should be the same with its cause ; since a remission and deficiency
of the union of the producing cause generates secondary natures. For
again, if that which is second were the same as that which is first, each
would be similarly the same, and one would not be cause, but the other
the thing caused. If however, the one by its very being, or essentially,
lias an exuberance of productive power, but the other falls short of the
power that produced it, these are naturally separated from each other, and
the generative cause precedes in excellence the thing generated, and there
is not a sameness of things which so greatly differ. But if that which is
second is not the same with that which is first, if indeed it is different
only, they will not be conjoined to each other, nor will the one participate
of the other. For contact and participation, are indeed a communion of
things conjoined, and a sympathy of participants with the natures they
participate. But if it is at the same time the same with and different
from that which is first, if indeed the sameness is indigent, and vanquished
by the power which is contrary to it, the one will no longer be the leader
of the progression of beings, nor will every generative cause subsist prior
to things of a secondary nature, in the order of the good. For the one
is not the cause of division, but of friendship. And the good converts
generated natures to their causes. But the conversion and friendship of
things secondary to such as are primary is through similitude, but not
through a dissimilar nature. If therefore the one is the cause of the whole
of things, and if the good is in an exempt manner desirable to all things,
it will every where give subsistence to the progeny of precedaneous causes,
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CHAP. 1. OF PLATO. I49
through similitude, in order that progression may be according to the one,
and that the conversion of things which have proceeded may be to the
good. For without similitude there will neither be the conversion of things
to their proper principles, nor the generation of efFepts. Let this there-
fore be considered as a thing admitted in this place.
For without similitude there will neither be the conversion of things
to their proper principles, nor the generation of efFepts. Let this there-
fore be considered as a thing admitted in this place.
But the second thing besides this, and which is demonstrated through
this, is, that it is necessary every monad should produce a number co-or-
dinate to itself, nature indeed a natural, but soul a psychical, and intellect
an intellectual number. For if every thing generative generates similars
prior to dissimilar*, as has been before demonstrated, every cause wilt
certainly deliver its own form and peculiarity to its own progeny, and
before it gives subsistence to far distant progressions, and things which
are separated from its nature, it will produce things essentially near to it,
and conjoined with it through similitude. Every monad therefore, gives
subsistence to a multitude indeed, as generating that which is second to
itself, and which divides the powers that presubsist occultly in itself. For
those things which are uniformly and contractedly in the monad, present
themselves to the view separately in the progeny of the monad. And this
indeed the wholeness of nature manifests, since it contains in one the
reasons, [i. e. productive principles] of all things both in the heavens
and in the sublunary region ; but distributes the powers of itself to the
natures which are divided from it about bodies. For the nature of earth,
of fire, and of the moon, possesses from the wholeness of nature its pecu-
liarity and form, and energizes together with this wholeness, and con-
tains its own allottment. This also the monad of the mathematical sci-
ences and of numbers manifests. For this being all things primarily, and
spermatically producing in itself the forms of numbers, distributes dif-
ferent powers to different externally proceeding numbers. For it is not
possible that what is generated, should at once receive all the abundance
of its generator. And it is necessary that the prolific power of every
thing that pre-exists in the cause ' itself should become apparent. The
monad therefore gives subsistence to a multitude about itself, and to
' For airua it U Decenary to read «r /uu»> it U necessary to lead tp>tm.
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156
O.N THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
The
monad therefore gives subsistence to a multitude about itself, and to
' For airua it U Decenary to read «r /uu»> it U necessary to lead tp>tm.
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O.N THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
tures. For visible natures no otherwise become apparent, and known
to the sight, than through the light which is ingenerated in them. All
intelligibles therefore become boniform through the participation of
light, and through this light, every true * being is most similar to the
good. If, therefore, it makes no difference to speak of this light, or of
the one (for this light conjoins intelligibles, and causes them to be one,
as deriving its subsistence from the one) if this be the case, the deity
proceeding from the first is participable, and all the multitude of unities
is participable. And that indeed which is truly supercssential is the one.
But each of the other Gods, according to his proper hyparxis, by which
he is a superessential God, is similar to the first ; but they are participated
by essence and being. According to this reasoning therefore, the Gods
appear to us to be unities, and participable unities, binding indeed all
beings to themselves, but conjoining through themselves to the one which
similarly transcends all things, the natures posterior to themselves.
Since therefore each of the Gods is indeed a unity, but is participated
by some being, whether shall we say that the same being participates of
each of the unities or that the participants of some of the unities are
more, but of others less numerous ? And if this be the case either the par-
ticipants of the superior unities must be more, but of the inferior must
be fewer in number, or vice versa. For it is necessary that there should
be an order of the unities, in the same manner as we see that of numbers
some are nearer to their principle, but others more remote from it. And
that some are more simple, but others more composite, and exceed indeed
in quantity, but suffer a diminution in power. But it is well that we
have mentioned numbers. For if it is necessary to survey the order of
the first monads with respect to each other, and their progression about
beings, from these as images, in these also the monads which are nearer
to the one will be participated by things which arc more simple in essence,
but those which are more remote from it, will be participated by more
composite essences. For thus the participation will be according to the
analogous ; first monads being always participated by the first beings, but
second monads by secondary beings. For again, if the first is exempt
■ oirr xmret tij» owiav tow, it U necessary to read ra pr, yaf *X|ior»» cutix, xcu raw wairaw
"""!«» xarm fovofuv pyuvno*, T« ttrwv i\atr wjg xvtwy ireixiA»Tff« xot« nf» cv»mw ten*.
1 For avTMifarir it if requisite to read j^miW*
158 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
For again, if the first is exempt
■ oirr xmret tij» owiav tow, it U necessary to read ra pr, yaf *X|ior»» cutix, xcu raw wairaw
"""!«» xarm fovofuv pyuvno*, T« ttrwv i\atr wjg xvtwy ireixiA»Tff« xot« nf» cv»mw ten*.
1 For avTMifarir it if requisite to read j^miW*
158 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
ment material vestsmeuts, pour into these a secondary life, and through
these communicate with composite and multiform bodies, and sustain
through this participation another third life.
If, however, you are willing to survey the intellectual orders, some of
these are arranged in the souls which rank as wholes, and in the most
divine of mundane souls, which also they govern in a becoming manner.
But others being arranged in the souls of the more excellent genera, are
proximately participated by the rulers that are in them ; and are parti-
cipated secondarily by more partial essences. But again they arrange
third intellectual orders in partial souls. And according as the power
which they are allotted is diminished, in such proportion is participation
in them more various, and far more composite than the participation of
the natures that, are prior to them. If, therefore, this is the mode of par-
ticipation in all beings, it is certainly necessary that of the Gods also
those that are nearer to the one, should be carried in the more simple parts
of being, but that those which have proceeded to a greater distance
should be carried in the more composite parts of being. For the parti-
cipations of second genera are divided after this manner according to a
similitude to them.
Again therefore, we may summarily say, that after the one principle
of the whole of things, the Gods present themselves to our view as self-
perfect monads, participated by beings.' How many orders therefore
there are of beings we shall afterwards unfold, and show what beings are
allotted a more simple, and what a more various hyparxis. Of all beings
then, the last is that which is corporeal. For this derives its being, and all
its perfection from another more ancient cause, and is neither allotted sim-
plicity nor composition, nor perpetuity, nor incorruptibility from its own
power. For no body is either self-subsistent, or self-begotten ; but every
tiling which is so contracting in one, cause, and that which proceeds from
cause, is incorporeal and impartible. And in short, that which is the
cause of hyparxis to itself, imparts also to itself an infinite power of ex-
• In the original here, about a line and a half is so defectire, that not being able to supply the
deficiency, I hare not attempted to translate it.
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CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 15g
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CHAP. II. OF PLATO. 15g
istence. Tor never deserting itself, it will never cease to be, or depart from
its own subsistence. For every thing that is corrupted, is corrupted through
being separated from the power that supplied it with being. But that
which imparts being to itself, as it is not separated from itself, is allotted
through itself a perpetual essence. No body however, since it is not the
cause of perpetuity to itself, will be perpetual. For every thing which is
perpetual possesses an infinite power. But body being finite is not the
cause of infinite power. For infinite power is incorporeal, because all power
is incorporeal. But this is evident, because greater powers are every
where. But no body is capable of being wholly every where. If there-
fore, no body imparts to itself power, whether the power be infinite or
finite, but that which is self-subsistent imparts to itself the power of being,
and of existing perpetually, no body will be self-subsistent. Whence
therefore is being imparted to bodies, and what is it which is adapted
proximately to supply them with being ? Must wc not say that the cause
of being to bodies primarily is that which by being present renders the
nature of body more perfect than its kindred bodies [when they are de-
prived of it?] This indeed is obvious to every one. For it is the province
of that which imparts perfection to connect also the essence of secondary
natures, since perfection itself is the perfection of essence. What there-
fore is that of which bodies participating, are said to be better than the
bodies which do not participate of it ? Is it not evident that it is soul?
For we say that animated bodies are more perfect than such as are
inanimate. Soul therefore is primarily beyond bodies ; and it must be
admitted that all heaven and every thing corporeal is the vehicle of soul.
Hence, these two orders of beings present themselves to our view ; the one
indeed being corporeal, but the other which is above this, psychical.
With respect to soul itself however, whether is it the same with or dif-
ferent from intellect ? For as the body which participates of soul is per-
fect, thus also the soul is perfect which participates of intellect. And
of the soul indeed, which is able to live according to reason, all things do
not participate : but of intellect and intellectual illumination rational
souls participate, and also such things as partake of any kind of know-
ledge. And soul indeed energizes according to time ; but intellect com-
4
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1
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
And soul indeed energizes according to time ; but intellect com-
4
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1
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
prebends in eternity both its essence, and at the same time its stable energy.
And not every soul indeed is adapted to preserve immutably and without
diminution the perfection of itself ; but every intellect is always perfect,
and possesses a never-failing power of its own blessedness. The intellec-
tual genus therefore is essentially beyond the psychical ; since the former,
neither in whole nor in partial intellects, admits the entrance of the na-
ture of evil ; but the latter being undcfiled in whole souls, departs in
partial souls from its own proper blessedness. What therefore is the first of
beings? Shall we say intellect, or prior to this the extent of life? For
soul indeed is self-vital, supplying itself with life; and intellect is the best
and most perfect, and as we have said, an eternal life. But the life of
intellect is indeed in a certain respect intellectual, and is mingled from
the intellectual and vital peculiarity. It is necessary however, that there
should be life itself. Whether therefore is life or intellect the more ex-
cellent thing? But if gnostic beings only participate of intellect, but
such beings as are destitute of knowledge participate of life, (for we say
that plants live) it is certainly necessary that life should be arranged
above intellect, being the cause of a greater number of effects, and im-
parting by illumination more gifts from itself than intellect. What then ?
Is life the first of beings ? And is to live the same thing as to be f But
this is impossible. For if life is that which is primarily being, and to be
vital is the same thing as to have being, and there is the same definition of
both life and being, every thing which participates of life would also
participate of being, and every thing which participates of existence
would likewise participate of life. For if each is the same thing all
things would similarly participate of being and life. All vital natures
indeed have essence and being ; but there are many beings that are des-
titute of life. Being therefore subsists prior to the first life. For that
which is more universal, and the cause of a greater number of effects, is
nearer to the one, as has been before demonstrated. Soul therefore is
that which is primarily established above bodies; but intellect is beyond
soul life is more ancient than intellect ; and being which is primarily
being is established above all these. Every thing also which participates
' Instead of fas here it is necessary to read .
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CHAP. II OF PLATO. l6l
Every thing also which participates
' Instead of fas here it is necessary to read .
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CHAP. II OF PLATO. l6l
of soul, by a much greater priority participates of intellect; but not every
thing which enjoys intellectual efficiency, is also adapted to participate of
soul. For of soul rational animals only participate ; since we say that
the rational soul is truly soul. For Plato in the Republic says, that the
work of soul is to reason and survey beings. And every soul [i. e. every
rational soul] is immortal, as it is written in the Phaedrus ; the irrational
soul being mortal, according to the demiurgus in the Timaeus. And in
short, it is in many places evident that Plato considers the rational soul
to be truly soul, but 'others to be the images of souls, so far as these also
are intellectual and vital, and together with whole souls produce the lives
that are distributed about bodies. Of intellect however, we not only
admit that rational animals participate, but also such other animals as
possess a gnostic power ; I mean such as possess the phantasy, memory
and sense ; since Socrates also in the Philebus refers all such animals to
the intellectual series. For taking away intellect from the life which is
according to pleasure, he likewise takes away not only the rational life,
but every gnostic . power of the irrational life. For all knowledge is the
progeny of intellect, in the same manner as allreason is an image of soul.
Moreover, all things which participate of intellect, by a much greater
priority participate of life, some things indeed more obscurely, but others
more manifestly. But all living beings do not participate of intellectual
power, since plants indeed are animals, as Timaeus says, but they jieither
participate of sense, or phantasy ; unless some one should say that they
have a co-sensation of what is pleasing and painful. And in short, the
orcctic powers every where are lives, and the images of the whole of life*
and the last productions of life ; but they are of themselves destitute of
intellect and without any participation of the gnostic power. Hence
also, they are of themselves indefinite, and deprived of all knowledge.
Again therefore, all animals indeed receive a portion of being, and
different animals a different portion, according to their respective natures;
but all beings are not similarly able to participate of life ; since we say
that qualities and all passions, and the last of bodies, receive the ultimate
effective energy of being, but we do not also say that they participate of
life. Being therefore is more ancient than life ; life than intellect ; and
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162 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III
Being therefore is more ancient than life ; life than intellect ; and
Proc. Vol. I. X
162 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III
intellect than soul. For it is necessary that the causes of a greater number
of effects being more ancient and according to order more principal,
should preside over causes which are able to produce and adorn fewer
effects. Very properly therefore, does Plato in the Timeeus give subsist-
* ence to soul from intellect, as being secondary to it according to its own
nature. But in the Laws he says that intellect is moved similarly to a
sphere fashioned by a wheel.' For that which is moved, is moved by
participating of life, and is nothing else than real life about motion. And
in the Sophista he exempts being from all the total genera of things, and
from motion. For being, says he, according to its own nature, neither
stands still, nor is moved. But that which neither stands still nor is moved,
is beyond eternal life.
These four causes therefore being prior to a corporeal subsistence, vis.
essence, life, intellect and soul, soul indeed participates of all the causes
prior to itself, being allotted reason from its own peculiarity, but intellect,
life and being, from more ancient causes. Hence it gives subsistence to
things posterior to itself in a fourfold manner. For according to its being
indeed, it produces all things as far as to bodies ; according to its life,
all things which arc said to live, even as far as to plants ; according to
its intellect, all things which possess a gnostic power, even as far as to the
most irrational natures; and according to its reason, the first of the
natures that are able to participate of it.1 But intellect being established
beyond soul, and existing as the plenitude of life and being, adorns all
things in a threefold manner, imparting indeed by illumination the power
of the intellectual peculiarity to all gnostic beings, but supplying the
participation of life to a still greater number, and of being to all those to
whom primary being imparts itself. But life being arranged above intel-
lect, presubsists as the cause of the same things in a twofold respect, vivi-
fying secondary natures indeed, together with intellect, and filling from
itself with the rivers of life, such things as are naturally adapted to live,
but together with being supernally producing essence in all things. But
being itself which is primarily being generates all things by its very exist-
' For flrrsMi; it is necessary to read sv npwic.
* For «urw{ read avnjf.
C
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CHAP. II.
OF PLATO.
163
But
being itself which is primarily being generates all things by its very exist-
' For flrrsMi; it is necessary to read sv npwic.
* For «urw{ read avnjf.
C
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CHAP. II.
OF PLATO.
163
ence, all lives, and intellects and souls, and is uniformly preseot to all
things, and its exempt from the whole of things according to one cause
which gives subsistence to all things. Hence it is the most similar of all
things to the one, and unites the comprehension of beings in itself to the
first principle of the whole of things, through which all beings, and non-
being, wholes and parts, forms and the privations of forms subsist, which
privations do not necessarily participate of being, but it is entirely neces-
sary that they should participate of the one.
These things as it appears to me persuaded the Elcan guest in the So-
phista, when discussing that which is perfectly being, to admit that not
only being is there, but also life, intellect and soul. For if true and real
being is venerable and honorable, intellect is there in the first place, says
be. For it is not lawful for that which is of itself venerable and immate-
rial to be without intellect. But if intellect is in that which is perfectly
being, intellect will entirely be moved. For it is not possible for intellect
ever to subsist, either without motion or permanency. But if intellect is
moved and stands still, there are in being both life and motion. Hence,
from what has been said, three things become apparent, viz. being, life
and intellect. Moreover, soul also in the next place is discovered through
these things. For it is necessary, says lie, that life and intellect which
before were by themselves, should also be in soul. For every soul is a
plenitude of life and intellect, participating of both, which the Elean
guest indicating adds, " Shall we say that both these are inherent in it,
but yet it does not possess these in soul ?" For to possess, as some one
says in a certain place, is secondary to existing. And soul indeed parti-
cipates of each of these according to the peculiarity of itself; but it
mingles the rational form of its own hyparxis, with the intellectual vivific
power. But both intellect and life subsist prior to soul, the former as
being moved and standing still at one and the same time, and the latter as
being motion and permanency. These four monads also, soul, intellect,
life and being are not only mentioned by Plato here, but in many other
places. And as in soul all things subsist according to participation, so in
intellect the things which are prior to it subsist, and in life that which is
prior to life. For we say that life exists, or has a being. Or how could
i*be said to be arranged in being unless it participated of being? We
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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For we say that life exists, or has a being. Or how could
i*be said to be arranged in being unless it participated of being? We
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
likewise say that intellect is and lives. For it is moved, and is a portion
of being. Hence it is the third of the more comprehensive monads.
Prior however to beings which are participated, it is every where neces-
sary that imparticipable causes should subsist, as was before demonstrated,
conformably to the similitude of beings to the one. Being therefore which
is primarily being, is imparticipable ; but life first participates of being,
yet is imparticipable, being exempt from intellect. And intellect is filled
indeed from being and life; but is imparticipable in souls, and in the
natures posterior to itself. Intellect also presides over soul, imparting to
it by illumination the participation of life and being; but being imparti-
cipable subsists prior to bodies. The last order of beings therefore is that
to which bodies are annexed ; celestial bodies indeed primarily, but sub-
lunary bodies with the addition of material [vestments.] This therefore
is the progression of beings, through life, intellect and soul, ending in a
corporeal nature.
If, however, it is necessary that the super essential unities of the Gods
which derive their subsistence from the imparticipable cause ' of all things
should be participated, some of them indeed, by the first orders in beings,
others by the middle, and others by the last orders, as was before demon-
strated, it is evident that some of them deify the imparticipable portion
of being, but that others illuminate life, others intellect, others sou), and
others bodies. And of the last unities indeed, not only bodies participate,
but likewise soul, intellect, life and essence. For intellect in itself is a
plenitude of life and being. But from the unities which are above this
world intellect is suspended, and the psychical power, which preexists in
intellect. From the unities above these, imparticipable and intellectual
intellect is suspended. From those that are beyond these, the first and im-
participable life is suspended. And from the highest unities, the first being
itself, and which is the most divine of beings, is suspended. Hence Par-
menides beginning from the one being, produces from thence the whole
orders of the Gods. These things therefore being previously determined by
us, let us speak concerning the divine dialogues, beginning from on high,
and producing from the one the whole orders of the Gods. Let us also,
' For «tm» it is necemry to read wru*
t
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CHAP. III. OF PLATO. !gA
following Plato, in the first place demonstrate the several orders from
other dialogues, by arguments which cannot be confuted. Afterwards,
let us thus conjoin and assimilate the conclusions of Parraenides to the
divine progressions, adapting the first conclusions to the first, but the last
to the last progressions.
Afterwards,
let us thus conjoin and assimilate the conclusions of Parraenides to the
divine progressions, adapting the first conclusions to the first, but the last
to the last progressions.
CHAPTER III.
Aoaiit therefore, the mystic doctrine concerning the one must be re-
sumed by us, in order that proceeding from the first principle, we may
celebrate the second and third principles of the whole of tilings. Of all
beings therefore, and of the Gods that produce beings, one exempt and
imparticipable cause preexists, — a cause ineffable indeed by all language,
and unknown by all knowledge and incomprehensible, unfolding all
tilings into light from itself, subsisting ineffably prior to, and converting all
things to itself, but existing as the best end of all things. This cause
therefore, which is truly exempt from all causes, and which gives subsist-
ence unically to all the unities of divine natures, and to all the genera of
beings, and their progressions, Socrates in the Republic calls the good,
and through its analogy to the sun reveals its admirable and unknown
transcendency with respect to all intelligibles. But again, Parmenides
denominates it the one. And through negations demonstrates the exempt
and ineffable hyparxis of this one which is the cause of the whole of things.
But the discourse in the epistle to Dionysius proceeding through enigmas,
celebrates it us that about which all things subsist, and as the cause of all
beautiful things. In the Philebus however, Socrates celebrates it as that
which gives subsistence to the whole of things, because it is the cause of
all deity. For all the Gods derive their existence as Gods from the first
God. Whether therefore, it be lawful to denominate it the fountain
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of deity, or the kingdom of beings, or the unity of all unities, or the good-
ness which is generative of truth, or an hyparxis exempt from all these
tilings, and beyond all causes, both the paternal and the generative, let
it be honored by us in silence, and prior to silence by union, and of the
mystic end may it impart by illumination a portion adapted to our souls.
But let us survey with intellect the biformed principles proceeding from
and posterior to it. For what else is it necessary to arrange after the
union of the whole theory, than the duad of principles ? What * the two
principles therefore are of the divine orders after the first principle, we
shall in the next place survey. For conformably to the theology of our
ancestors, Plato also establishes two principles after the one. In the Phi-
lebus therefore, Socrates says, that God gives subsistence to bound and
infinity, and through these mingling all beings, has produced them, the
nature of beings, according to Philolaus subsisting from the connexion
of things bounded, and things infinite. If, therefore, all beings subsist
from these, it is evident that they themselves have a subsistence prior to
beings. And if secondary natures participate of these mingled together,
these will subsist unmingled prior to the whole of things. For the pro-
gression of the divine orders originates, not from things coordinated and
which exist in others, but from things exempt, and which are established
in themselves. As therefore the one is prior to tilings united, and as that
which is passive to the one, has a second order after the imparticipable
union, thus also the two principles of beings, prior to the participation of
and commixture with beings, arc themselves by themselves the causes of
the whole of tilings. For it is necessary that bound should be prior to
things bounded, and infinity prior to infinites, according to the similitude
to the one of things which proceed from it For again, if we should pro-
duce beings immediately after the one, we shall no where find the pecu-
liarity of the one subsisting purely. For neither is being the same with
the one, but it participates of the one, nor in reality is that which is the
first the one ; for, as has been frequently said, it is better than the one,
Where therefore is that which is most properly and entirely one ? Hence
' For Tin* it is neceisary to reail rms.
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CHAP. in. OF PLATO. ^
Hence
' For Tin* it is neceisary to reail rms.
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CHAP. in. OF PLATO. ^
there is a certain one prior to being, which gives subsistence to being,
and is primarily the cause of it ; since that which is prior to it is beyond
union, and is a cause without habitude with respect to all things, and
im participate, being exempt from all things. If however this one is the
cause of being, and constitutes it, there will be a power in it generative
of being. For every thing which produces, produces according to its
own power, which is allotted a subsistence between that which produces
and the things produced, and is of the one the progression and as it were
extension, but of the other is the pre-arranged generative cause. For
being which is produced from these, and which is not the one itself, but
uniform, possesses its progression indeed from the one, through the power
which produces and unfolds it into light from the one; but its occult
union from the hyparxis of the one. This one therefore which subsists
prior to power, and first presubsists from the imparticipable and unknown
cause of the whole of things, Socrates in the Philcbus calls bound, but he
denominates the power of it which is generative of being, infinity. But
he thus speaks in that dialogue, " God we said has exhibited the bound,
and also the infinite of beings."
The first therefore and unical God, is without any addition denominated
by him God ; because each of the second Gods is participated by being,
and has being suspended from its nature. But the first indeed, as being
exempt ' from the whole of beings, is God, defined according to the in-
effable itself, the unical alone, and superessential. But the bound and
the infinite of beings, unfold into light that unknown and imparticipable
cause ; bound indeed, being the cause of stable, uniform, and connective
deity ; but the infinite being the cause of power proceeding to all things
and capable of being multiplied, and in short, being the leader of every
generative distribution. For all union and wholeness, and communion of
beings, and all the divine measures, are suspended* from the first bound.
But all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude, de-
rive their subsistence from this most principal infinity. Hence, when we
' For (floral it it necessary to read rfafmjTiti.
* Here alio it it neceuary for iftpfrai to read fftfnrrat.
168 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
But all division, prolific production, and progression into multitude, de-
rive their subsistence from this most principal infinity. Hence, when we
' For (floral it it necessary to read rfafmjTiti.
* Here alio it it neceuary for iftpfrai to read fftfnrrat.
168 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
say that each of the divine orders abides ' and at the same time proceeds,
we must confess that it stably abides indeed, according to bound, but
proceeds according to infinity, and that at one and the same time it has
unity and multitude, and we must suspend the former from the principle
of bound, but the latter from that of infinity. And in short, of all the
opposition in the divine genera, we must refer that which is the more
excellent to bound, but that which is subordinate to infinity. For from
these two principles all things have their progression into being, even as
far as to the last of things. For eternity itself participates at once of
bound and infinity ; so far indeed, as it is the intelligible measure, it par-
ticipates of bound ; but so far as it is the cause of a never-failing power
of existing, it participates of infinity. And intellect, so far indeed as
it is uniform, and whole, and so far as it is connective of paradigmatical
measures, so far it is the progeny of bound. But again, so far as it pro-
duces all things eternally, and subsists conformably to the whole of eter-
nity, supplying all things with existence at once, and always possessing its
own power undiminished, so far it is the progeny of infinity. And soul
indeed, in consequence of measuring its own life, by restitutions and pe-
riods, and introducing a boundary to its own motions, is referred to the
cause of bound ; but in consequence of having no cessation of motions,
but making the end of one period the beginning of the whole of a second
vital circulation, it is referred to the order of infinity. The whole of this
heaven also, according to the wholeness of itself, its connexion, the order
of its periods, and the mcasores of its restitutions, is bounded. But ac-
cording to its prolific powers, its various evolutions, and the never-failing
revolutions of its orbs, it participates of infinity. Moreover, the whole of
generation, in consequence of all its forms being bounded, and always
permanent after the same manner, and in consequence of its own circle
which imitates the celestial circulation, is similar to bound. But again,
in consequence of the variety of the particulars of which it consists, their
unceasing mutation, and the intervention of the more and the less in the
participations of forms, it is the image of infinity. And in addition to
these things, every natural production, according to its form indeed, is
' furu* U (Knitted in the original.
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CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. 169
And in addition to
these things, every natural production, according to its form indeed, is
' furu* U (Knitted in the original.
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CHAP. IX. OF PLATO. 169
similar to bound, but according to its matter, resembles infinity. For
these are suspended in the last place ' from the two principles posterior
to the one, and as far as to these the progression of their productive power
extends. Each of these also is one, but form is the measure and boun-
dary of matter, and is in a greater degree one. Matter however is all
things in capacity, so far as it derives its subsistence from the first power.
There, however, power is generative of all things. But the power of matter
is imperfect, and is indigent of the hypostasis which is generative ' of all
things according to energy. Very properly therefore is it said by So-
crates that all beings are from bound and infinity, and that these two in-
telligible principles primarily derive their subsistence from God. For
that which congregates both of them, and perfects them, and unfolds it-
self into light through all beings is the one prior to the duad. And union
indeed is derived to all things through that which is first ; but the division
of the two orders of tilings is generated from these primary causes, and
through these is extended to the unknown and ineffable principle. Let
it therefore be manifest through these things, what the two principles of
beings are, which become proximately apparent from the one, according
to the theology of Plato.
CHAPTER IX.
In the next place let us show what the third ' thing is which presents
itself to the view from these principles. It is every where therefore called
that which is mixed, as deriving its subsistence from bound and infinity.
But if bound is the bound of beings, and the infinite is the infinite of
beings, and beings are the things which have a subsistence from both
' For 13^ straw it is necessary to read tv^antf.
• The word ynmrnxq; u omitted in the original.
* TfiTn is onutted in the original.
Proc. Vol. I.
Y
1 70 °N THE THEOLOGY BOOK II!.
• The word ynmrnxq; u omitted in the original.
* TfiTn is onutted in the original.
Proc. Vol. I.
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1 70 °N THE THEOLOGY BOOK II!.
these, as Socrates himself clearly teaches us, it is evident that the first of
things mingled, is the first of beings. This, however, is nothing else than
that which is highest in beings, which is being itself, and nothing else than
being. My meaning is, that this is evident through those things by which
we demonstrate that what is primarily being, is comprehensive of all
things intelligibly, and of life and intellect. For we say that hfe is triadic
vitally, and intellect intellectually ; and also that these three things being
life and intellect are every where. But all things presubsist primarily
and essentially in being. For there essence, life and intellect subsist, and
the summit of beings. Life however is the middle centre of being, which
is denominated and is intelligible life. But intellect is the boundary of
being, and is intelligible intellect. For in the intelligible there is intellect,
and in intellect the intelligible. There however intellect subsists intelli-
gibly, but in intellect, the intelligible subsists intellectually.
And essence indeed is that which is stable in being, and which is woven
together with the first principles, and does not depart from the one. But
life is that which proceeds from the principles, and is connascent with in-
finite power. And intellect is that which converts itself to the principles,
conjoins the end with the beginning, and produces one intelligible circle.
The first of beings therefore is that which is mingled from the first prin-
ciples, and is triple, one thing which it contains subsisting in it essentially,
another vitally, and another intellectually, but all things presubsisting in
it essentially. I mean however by the first of beings essence. For
essence itself is the summit of all beings, and is as it were the monad
of the whole of things. In all things therefore, essence is the first. And
in each thing that which is essential is the most ancient, as deriving its
subsistence from the Vesta of beings. For the intelligible is especially
this. Since intellect indeed is that which is gnostic, life is intelligence,
and being is intelligible. If however every being is mingled, but
essence is being itself, prior to all other things essence is that which sub-
sists as mingled from the two principles proceeding from the one. Hence
Socrates indicating how the mode of generation in the two principles
differs from that of the mixture says, " that God has exhibited bound and
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CHAP. IX.
OF PLATO.
171
Hence
Socrates indicating how the mode of generation in the two principles
differs from that of the mixture says, " that God has exhibited bound and
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CHAP. IX.
OF PLATO.
171
infinity." For they are unities deriving their subsistence from the one, and
as it were luminous patcfactions from the imparticipable and first union.
But with respect to producing a mixture, and mingling through the first
principles, by how much to make is subordinate to the unfolding into light,
and generation to pate/action, by so much is that which is mixed allotted
a progression from tfie one, inferior to that of the two principles.
That which is mixed therefore, is intelligible essence, and subsists pri-
marily from [the first] God, from whom infinity also and bound are de-
rived. But it subsists secondarily from the principles posterior to the
unical God, I mean from bound and infinity. For the fourth cause which
is effective of the mixture is again God himself; since if any other cause
should be admitted besides this, there will no longer be a fourth cause,
but a fifth will be introduced. For the first cause was God, who unfolds
into light the two principles. But after him are the two principles bound
and infinity. And the mixture is the fourth thing. If therefore the
cause of the mixture is different from the first divine cause, this cause
will be the fifth and not the fourth thing, as Socrates says it is. Far-
ther still, in addition to these things, if we say that God is especially
the supplier of union to beings, and the mixture itself of the principles is
a union into the hypostasis of being, God is also certainly the cause of this
primarily. Moreover, Socrates in the Republic clearly evinces that the good
is the cause of being and essence 1o intelligibles, in the same manner as the
sun is to visible natures. Is it not therefore necessary, if that which is mix-
ed is primarily being, to refer it to the first God, and to say that .it receives
its progression from him ? If also the demiurgus in the Timauis, consti-
tutes the essence of the soul itself by itself from an impartible and a par-
tible essence, which is the same thing as to constitute it from bound and
infinity ; for the soul according to bound is similar to the impartible, but
according to infinity, to the partible essence;— if therefore the demiurgus
mingles the essence of the soul from these, and again separately, from
same and different, and if from these being now preexistent, he constitutes
the whole soul, must we not much more say that the first God is the
cause of the first essence ? That which is mixed therefore, proceeds, as
t
172 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
That which is mixed therefore, proceeds, as
t
172 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
we have said, from the first (Jod, and does not subsist from the principles
alone posterior to the one, but proceeds also from these, and is triadic.
And in the first place indeed, it participates from God of ineffable union,
and the whole of its subsistence. But from bound, it receives hyparxis,
and the uniform, and a stable peculiarity. . And from infinity, it receives
power, and the occult power which is in itself, of all things. For in short,
since it is one and not one, the one is inherent in it according to bound,
but the , non-one according to infinity. The mixture however of both
these, and its wholeness, arc derived from the first Cod. That which is
mixed therefore, is a monad, because it participates of the one; and it is
biformed, so far as it proceeds from the two principles ; but it is a triad,
so far as iu every mixture, these three things are necessary according to
Socrates, viz. beauty, truth, and symmetry. Concerning these things
however, we shall speak again.
In what manner, however, essence is that which is first mixed, we shall
now explain. For this is of all things the most difficult to discover, viz.
what that is which is primarily being, as the Elcan guest also somewhere
says ; for it is most dubious how being is not less than non-being. In
what manner therefore essence subsists from bound and infinity must be
shown. For if bound and infiuity are superessential, essence may appear
to have its subsistence from non-essences. How therefore can non-es-
sences produce essence ? Or is not this the case in all other things which
subsist through the mixture of each other ? For that which is produced
from things mingled together, is not the same with things that are not min-
gled. For neitheris soul the same with the genera, from which, bcingmingled
together, the father generated it, nor is a happy life the same with the life
which is according to intellect, or with the life which is according to plea-
sure, nor is the one in bodies the same with its elements. Hence it is not
wonderful, if that which is primarily being, though it is neither bound nor
infinity, subsists from both these, and is mixed, superessential natures them-
selves not being assumed in the mixture of it, but secondary progressions
from thein coalescing into the subsistence of essence. Thus therefore
being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the
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CHAP. IX.
OF PLATO.
173
Thus therefore
being consists of these, as participating of both, possessing indeed the
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CHAP. IX.
OF PLATO.
173
uniform from bound, but the generative, and in short, occult multitude
from infinity. For it is all things occultly, and on this account, is the
cause of all beings ; which also the Elcan guest indicating to us, calls
being the first power, as subsisting according to the participation of the
first power, and participating of hyparxis from bound, and of power
from infinity. Afterwards however, the Elcan guest defines being to be
power, as prolific and generative of all things, and as being all things uni-
formly. For power is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and
of all multitude; occult power indeed being the cause of occult multi-
tude : but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into
light, being the cause of all-perfect multitude. Through this cause there-
fore, I think, that every being, and every essence has connascent powers.
For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound,
but its power from infinity. -And being is nothing else than a monad of
many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this account being is
one many. The many however subsist occultly and without separation
in the first natures ; but with separation in secondary natures. For by
Bow much being is nearer to the one, by so much the more does it conceal
multitude, and is defined according to union alone. It appears to me
also that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things,
produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form ' as ana-
logous to the one, and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter.
And if indeed they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a
certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they ap-
pear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject For
the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound
the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it. But being consists of
both these, as not only standing in the one, but receiving a multitude of
unities and powers which are mingled into one essence.
' For w\tfti in the original it is necessary to read
174
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK If I
CHAPTER X.
But being consists of
both these, as not only standing in the one, but receiving a multitude of
unities and powers which are mingled into one essence.
' For w\tfti in the original it is necessary to read
174
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK If I
CHAPTER X.
That therefore which is primarily being is through these things deno-
minated by Plato that which is mixed. And through the similitude of
it, generation also is mingled from bound and infinity. And the in-
finite indeed in this is imperfect power; but the bound in it is form and
the morphe of this power. On this account we establish this power to be
matter, not possessing existence in energy, and requiring to be bounded
by something else. We no longer however say that it is lawful to call the
power of being matter, since it is generative of energies, produces all
beings from itself, and is prolific of the perfect powers in beings. For the
power of matter being imperfect dissimilarly imitates the power of being;
and becoming multitude in capacity, it expresses the parturition of mul-
titude in the power of being." Moreover, the form of matter imitates
ultimately bound, since it gives limits to matter, and terminates its infi-
nity. But it is multiplied and divided about it. It is also miugled with
the privation of matter, and represents the supreme union of the hyparxis
of being, by its essence always advancing to existence, and always tending
to decay. For those things which subsist in the first natures according to
transcendency, are in such as are last according to deficiency. For that
also which is primarily being is mixed, is exempt from the bound of in-
finite life, and is the cause of it. But that which consists of the last ' of
forms and the first matter, is in its own nature void of life ; since it pos-
sesses life in capacity. For there indeed generative causes subsist prior
to their progeny, and things perfect prior to such as are imperfect. But
here things in capacity are prior to such as are in energy, and concauses
' The punctuation in the latter part of this sentence in the original is erroneous : for instead of
x eing. And the third triad principally subsists
according to the beautiful. For there intelligible multitude, order and
beauty, first shine forth to the view. Hence this being is the most beau-
tiful of all intelligihka. This however will be discussed hereafter. As.
there is a triad therefore, in each of the mixtures, the first indeed, sym-
metry especially comprehends and connects ; the second truth, and the
third beauty. And this induced the divine Iamblichus to say, that Plato
in these three defines the whole of the intelligible fjorder]. For all are
in each, but one of these predominates more in one of the intelligible
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CHAP. XIV.
OF PLATO.
181
And this induced the divine Iamblichus to say, that Plato
in these three defines the whole of the intelligible fjorder]. For all are
in each, but one of these predominates more in one of the intelligible
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CHAP. XIV.
OF PLATO.
181
monads than in another. Moreover, the third triad presents itself to the
view after this. For it is necessary that the extremity of being should
also be deified, and should participate of an intelligible unity. For beings
are not more in number than the unities, as Parmenides says, nor are the
uuities more numerous than beings ; but each progression of being par-
ticipates of the one ; since this universe also, according to each part of
itself, is governed by soul and intellect. By a mnch greater priority
therefore, must the intelligible in its first, middle, and last hypostases,
participate of the intelligible Gods.
CHAPTER XIV,
As the first unity therefore, after the exempt cause of all things, unfolds
into light intelligible being, and the second unity, intelligible life, thus also
the third constitutes about itself, intelligible intellect, and fills it with divine
union, constituting poweras the medium between itself and being, through
which it gives completion to this being, and converts it to itself. In this
therefore, every intelligible multitude shi ncs forth to the view. For the
whole of this being is intelligible intellect, life, and essence. And it is
neither all tilings according to cause, in the same manner as that which is
primarily being, nor docs it cause all things to shine forth, as the second
being does, but it is as it were all things according to energy, and openly.
Hence also, it is the boundary of all intelligiblcs. For since the progres-
sion of beings is accomplished according to similitude, the first being is
most similar to the one ; the second, is parturient with multitude, and is
the origin of separation ; but the third, is now all-perfect, and unfolds
into light in itself, intelligible multitude and form.
Farther still, as the first triad abides occultly in bound, and fixes in
itself every thing that is stable in intelligibles ; but the second abides
182
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK HI.
Farther still, as the first triad abides occultly in bound, and fixes in
itself every thing that is stable in intelligibles ; but the second abides
182
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK HI.
and at the same time proceeds ; so the third, after progression converts
the intelligible end to the beginning, and convolves the order to itself.
For it is every where the province of intellect to convert and converge to
the intelligible. All these likewise are uniform [i. e. have the form of one]
and intelligible, viz. the abiding, the proceeding, and the returning. For
each of these is not asserted after the same manner in intelligibles. And
the' intelligible genus of Gods ' is unical, simple, and occult, conjoining
itself to the one itself which is prior to beings ; and unfolds 1 into light
nothing else than the transcendency of the one. For these three triads,
mystically announce that unknown cause the first and perfectly imparti-
cipable God. The first of them indeed, announcing his ineffable union ;
the second his transcendency, by which he surpasses all powers ; and
the third, his all-perfect generation of beings. For as they are able to
comprehend the principle which surpasses both the union and the
powers of all beings, so they exhibit to secondary natures, his 1 admirable
transcendency ; receiving indeed separately the unical power and domi-
nion of the first God ; but unfolding into light intelligibly the cause which
is prior to intelligibles. For these Gods though they arc allotted a sim-
plicity which is equally exempt from all the divine orders, yet they fall
short of the union of the father. Of this triad therefore, which converts
all intelligibles to the first principle, and convolves the multitude apparent
in itself to the stable union of the whole of things, one thing is bound,
and unity and hyparxis ; another, is infinity and power ; and another is
that which is mixed, essence, life, and intelligible intellect. But the whole
triad subsists according to being, and is the intellect of the first triad.
For the first triad is an intelligible God primarily. But the triad posterior
to it is an intelligible and intellectual God. And the third triad is an in-
tellectual God. These three deities also, and triadic monads, give com-
pletion to the intelligible genera. For they are monads according to their
deities ; since all other things are suspended from the Gods, and also
■ The word* rm> ftn-a in the original immediately before T» nnrn lw ynof, are to be rejected
a» superfluous.
* ,*?«>n. is omitted in the original.
* For txiiwi;, it is necessary to read exuvw.
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CHAR XiV. OF PLATO. J8S
* ,*?«>n. is omitted in the original.
* For txiiwi;, it is necessary to read exuvw.
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CHAR XiV. OF PLATO. J8S
powers and beings. But they are triads according to a separate division.
For bound, infinity, and that which is mixed, have a threefold subsist-
ence ; but in one place indeed, all things are according to bound ; in
another, all things are according to infinity ; and in another, all things
are according to that which is mixed. And in one place, that which is
mixed is essence ; in another, it is intelligible life ; and in another, intel-
ligible intellect. In this last therefore, forms subsist primarily. For the
separation of intelligiblcs, unfolds the order of forms; because form is
being, but is not simply being. Hence that which is primarily being, is
being itself, and is that which is being. But that which is the second
being, is power, proceeding indeed from the first being, and existing as it
were a duad generative of the multitude of beings, but not yet being
multitude. And that which is the third being, is itself the multitude of
beings ; being there existing with separation. For being is the exempt
cause of those things which forms constitute divisibly. And of the things
of which being is productive collectively, of these, forms are the cause in a
way attended with separation. Because forms indeed, are causes produc-
tive of separation in their effects, and also because forms are called the
paradigms of beings. Being however, is the cause of all things posterior
to itself, but is not the paradigm of them. For paradigms are the causes of
things which are separated according to existence, and which have diffe-
rent characters of essence. After the one therefore which is prior to
beings, that which is one-many occultly, and the united subsists. On this
account, it is that which is divided into multitude, and which tends from
the uniform to the splendid. But the last of intelligibles, is that from
which a certain distribution into parts originates, and which is compre-
hensive of intelligible multitude.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
CHAPTER XV.
But the last of intelligibles, is that from
which a certain distribution into parts originates, and which is compre-
hensive of intelligible multitude.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
CHAPTER XV.
Socrates therefore, in the Philebus, affords us such like auxiliaries to
the theory of the intelligible triads. It is requisite however, not only
to abide in these conceptions, but also to demonstrate the theology of
Plato about these triads from other dialogues, and from them to point out
one truth adapted to the things themselves. We shall assume therefore,
what is written in the Timaeus, and shall follow our leader [Syrianus^ who
has unfolded to us the arcane mysteries of these triads, and conjoin with
the end of what has been said the beginning of the following discussion,
in the Timaeus therefore, Plato investigating what the paradigm of the
whole world is, discovers that it is comprehensive of alt intelligible ani-
mals, that it is all-perfect, that it is the most beautiful of intelligible*,
that it is only-begotten, and that it is the intelligible of the demiurgus. He
likewise denominates it animal itself, as being the intelligible paradigm of
every am mal, and of that which is the object of sense. Hence it is ne*.
cessary that this animal itself, because it is all-perfect, and the most beau-
tiful of intelligibles, should be established m the intelligible orders. For
though there is intelligible animal m the demiurgus, yet it is rather intel-
lectual than intelligible, and is not the most beautiful of all intelligibles,
but is second to them in beauty and power. For primary beauty is in
the intelligible Gods. In the demiurgus also, there are not only four
forms of the things contained in the world, but there is all the multitude
of forms. For in him the paradigms of individual forms presubsist. But
animal itself is totally constitutive of all animals by the intelligible tetrad.
The demiurgus likewise is not like animal itself only-begotten among be-
ings, but subsists in conjunction with the vivific cause, together with which
he constitutes the second genera of being, mingling them in the crater or
bowl, in order to the generation of souls. For of the things of which in-
telligible animal is effective and at the same time generative, of these the
demiurgus is allotted the cause in a divided manner, in conjunction with
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CHAP. XV.
OF PLATO.
185
the crater. Hence, as I have said, animal itself is exempt from the de-
mi urgus, and is, asTimseus every where denominates it, intelligible.
XV.
OF PLATO.
185
the crater. Hence, as I have said, animal itself is exempt from the de-
mi urgus, and is, asTimseus every where denominates it, intelligible.
Nevertheless, because forms are first separated in it, and because it is
all-perfect, it subsists in the third order of intelligibles. For neither that
which is primarily, nor that which is secondarily being,1 is all-perfect.
For the former is beyond all separation ; but the latter generates indeed,
and is parturient with intelligibles, but is not yet the multitude of beings.
If therefore neither of these is multitude, how can either of them be all-
perfect multitude ? If however all-perfect multitude shines forth in the
third triad of intelligibles, as wa9 a little before demonstrated, but animal
itself is the first paradigm (for it is comprehensive of all intelligible ani-
mals, is an only-begotten paradigm, and is not conjoined with any other
principle) it is necessary that animal itself should be established accord-
ing to this order. For either there will not be an intelligible paradigm,
(and in this case, how will sensibles be images of intelligibles? or how
will the intelligible Gods be the fathers of the whole of things >) or tf
there is, it is the third in intelligibles. For the natures which are prior
to the triad in intelligibles, are not all-perfect ; since they are exempt
from the division into multitude. But the natures posterior to it are not
only-begotten. For they proceed together with others ; the male indeed,
with the female, and those that are of a demiurgic together with those
that are of a generative characteristic Nor are they the roost beautiful
of intelligibles ; for beauty is in the intelligible. But animal itself is all-
perfect, and at the same time only begotten. The first paradigm of beings
therefore, is arranged in the third triad of intelligibles. Moreover, animal
itself is eternal, as Timeeus himself says. For says he, "the nature of
animal is eternal." And again, in another place he asserts, " that the
paradigm is through all eternity being." If therefore it is eternal, it par-
ticipates of eternity. And if that which participates is every where
secondary to that which is participated, animal itself is secondary to eter-
nity. And if it is through all eternity being, it is filled with the whole
power of eternity. If this however be the case, it subsists proximately
' ro. Intelligible life, or life iuelf, or the fir* life.
Proc. Vol. I. $ A
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186 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes, is arranged
proximately after them.
CHAPTER XVI.
If this however be the case, it subsists proximately
' ro. Intelligible life, or life iuelf, or the fir* life.
Proc. Vol. I. $ A
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186 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK III.
after eternity. For that which enjoys the whole of causes, is arranged
proximately after them.
CHAPTER XVI.
Moreover, if eternity has the same ratio to intelligible animal, which,
time has to that which is sensible, but the universe proximately partici-
pates of time (for time was generated together with the uiyverse) it is
certainly necessary that animal itself should primarily participate of
eternity. Eternity therefore is beyond the first paradigm. For eternity
indeed measures the existence of animal itself : but animal itself is mea-
sured and filled with perpetuity from it. To which may bemadded, that
we assert eternity to be the cause of immortality to all things. Hence
eternity is that which is primarily immortal. For as that which is pri-
marily being is the cause of existence to all things, but that which is
effective of form is itself prior to other forms, so that which is the cause
of perpetuity and immortality, is itself primarily inunortal. The daemo-
niacal Aristotle also rightly- calls eternity immortal and divine, and that
from whence the existence and life of all things are suspended. If how-
ever it is that which is primarily immortal, and not according to partici-
pation, but is as it were immortality and perpetuity, it will be life, pos-
sessing from itself the ever, and exuberantly scattering the power of per-
petuity, and extending it to other things, so far as each is naturally adapt-
ed to receive it. For the immortal is in life, and subsists together with
life. Hence Socrates in the Phredo," after many and beautiful demon-
strations of the psychical immortality, says, " God therefore, my dear
Cebes, and the form itself of life, are much more immortal." Hence, in-
telligible life, and the God who is connective of this life, primarily pos-
sess the immortal, and are the fountain of the whole of perpetuity. But
' For lf*> it U necessary to read tfsuW
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CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 187
this is eternity. Eternity therefore has its subsistence in life, and will
be established in the middle of the intelligible order.
But
' For lf*> it U necessary to read tfsuW
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CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 187
this is eternity. Eternity therefore has its subsistence in life, and will
be established in the middle of the intelligible order.
Farther still, it is necessary to assert that intelligible eternity is one of
these thiee things, viz. that it subsists either according to being, or ac-
cording to life, or according to intelligible intellect. But being, as the
Elean guest says, according to its own nature, neither stands still, nor is
moved. For if being is being to all things, and essence is a thing of
this kind, much more must this be the case with intelligible essence and
that which is primarily being. For they are nothing eke than essence
only. But being unfolds motion and permanency, and the other genera
of beings, in the second and third progressions of itself. The first being
therefore, as we have said, is at one and tlie same time exempt from
motion and permanency. But eternity according to Timeeus abides in
one. Hence also time imitates in its motion the intelligible permanency
of eternity. Eternity therefore does not subsist according to that
which is primarily being, nor yet according to intelligible intellect.' For
neither is soul time, which is moved through the whole of time. And in
short, in divine beings, that which is participated is every where esta-
blished above that which participates. But the eternal participates of
eternity, just as that which is temporal participates of time. Eternity
therefore is prior to intelligible intellect, and posterior to being ; so that
it is established in the middle of the intelligible breadth. And as ani-
mal itself is eternal, so likewise eternity is that which is always being.
For as animal itself participates of eternity, so eternity participates of
being, and is the cause of existence, of perpetual life, and intellection,
and measures the essences, powers and energies of all things.
» It is here necessary to supply «XV ovfc t*» vow tw mpw-
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
CHAPTER XVII.
» It is here necessary to supply «XV ovfc t*» vow tw mpw-
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188
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
CHAPTER XVII.
Stock, however, eternity subsists according to the middle centre of in-
teliigibles, and animal itself according to the extremity of them, and the
most splendid of that which is intelligible, what is that which is the first
of intclligibles, and how is it denominated by Timaeus? He says there-
lore of eternity, that while it abides in one, time proceeds according to
number; and that by motion it adumbrates the permanency of eternity,
but by number, its stable union. What therefore is that one, in which
Timaeus says eternity abides ? For it is necessary either to say that it is
the one of eternity, or the one which transcends all intelligibles, or the
one of the first triad. But if indeed, we say that it is the imparticipable
one, how is it possible that any thing can abide in that which is exempt
from all things; and which neither admits the habitude nor communion
Of secondary natures with itself? For every thing which abides in any
thing, is in a certain respect on all sides comprehended by that in which
we say it abides. It is however perfectly impossible that the first one
should either comprehend any being, or be coarranged with beings. But
if any one should suppose that it is the one of eternity, in which Timaeus
says eternity abides, in this case, eternity will be in itself. It is necessary
however, that it should abide in itself, by having its subsistence in abiding
in that which is prior to itself. For to abide in that which is prior to, is
better than the establishment of things in themselves, in the same manner
as it is more perfect than the collocation of better in less excellent natures.
If therefore eternity abides in itself, to what shall we primarily assign
permanency in that which is prior to itself? For it is necessary that this
being more divine, should have its generation prior to that which is infe-
rior to it. If therefore eternity can neither abide in itself, nor in the one
which is prior to beings, it is evident that abiding in one according to
Timaeus, it is established in the one of the first triad, or rather in the whole
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CHAP. XVIII. OF PLATO. IQQ
of that triad. For, as we have before observed, the first triad is the cause
of stability to all beings, in the same manner as the middle triad is the
cause of their progression, and the third triad of their conversion to their
principle.
CHAPTER XVIII.
XVIII. OF PLATO. IQQ
of that triad. For, as we have before observed, the first triad is the cause
of stability to all beings, in the same manner as the middle triad is the
cause of their progression, and the third triad of their conversion to their
principle.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Again therefore, three orders of intelligibles present themselves to our
view, according to the doctrine of Timaeus, viz. animal itself, eternity,
and the oue. And through this one, and the firm establishment in it,
eternity has fixed the intelligible kingdom. But through eternity, animal
itself defines the boundary of the intelligible Gods, according to a per-
petual and invariable sameness. And animal itself indeed, having pro-
ceeded tetradically, is suspended from the duad in eternity. For eternity
is tlu ever in conjunction with being. But the duad in eternity participates
of the intelligible monad, which Timams on this account denominates
one, as being the monad and principle of all the intelligible breadth. Since
otherwise indeed, he very properly calls the first triad one, in consequence
of its being especially characterized according to bound, denominating
it from bound. But he calls the middle triad dyadically, eternity, con-
necting the names ; because this triad is defined according to intelligible
jiower. And lie denominates the third triad animal itself, transferring the
appellation to the whole of it, from the extremity of the triad. The first
triad therefore is the union ofull the intelligibles, being in a certain respect
coordinated with them. For the union is different from this which is ex-
empt from intelligibles and im participate. It is also the supplier of
stable power. For all things are established on account of it. But eter-
nity is primary being, and is that which is primarily established. Hence,
with respect to the permanency of the whole of things, we say that the
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ON THE THEOLOGY
nooK m.
It is also the supplier of
stable power. For all things are established on account of it. But eter-
nity is primary being, and is that which is primarily established. Hence,
with respect to the permanency of the whole of things, we say that the
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ON THE THEOLOGY
nooK m.
first triad is that on account of which this permanency is effected ; but that
the second triad is that by vrhich it is produced. For the firm establish-
ment of beings is indeed according to this second triad, but is on account
of the first. But the second triad is the proximate measure of all beings,
and is coordinated with the things that are measured. There arc also
at one and the same time in it, bound and infinity ; bound indeed, so far
as it measures intelligibles ; but infinity, so far as it is the cause of perpe-
tuity, and the ever. For according to the oracle, eternity is the cause of
never-failing life, of unwearied power, and unsluggish energy. Neverthe-
less, eternity is more characterised by infinity [than by bound.] For it com-
prehends in itself infinite time. And time indeed has bound and infinity
in a divided manner. For according to its continuity, it is infinite; but
according to the now it is bounded. For the now is a bound. But eter-
nity establishes bound and infinity in the same. For it is a unity and
power. And according to the one indeed, it is bound ; but according to
power infinite ; which time * also demonstrates as from images ; because
the middle triad [of intelligibles] has bound, infinity, and that which is
mixed. For whence is the bound of time derived except from eternal
bound? For the temporal bound also is impartible, in the same manner
as the bound of eternity is one. For the impartible is the image of the one.
Whence likewise is the infinity of the continuity of time derived except
from the power of the infinite ? For the latter is a stable infinity, but the
former an infinity which is moved. And as the latter stands still accord-
ing to the one, so the former is moved according to number. Since
whence i6 the alliance of time with lives, except from the first principle
[of life, eternity ?] But time proceeds through all temporal life.
Again, therefore, from these things it is evident, that eternity subsists
according to the middle of the intelligible Gods. For here there is infi-
nite life, and the cause of all life, intellectual, psychical, and that which
subsists partibly in bodies. But eternity is the father and supplier of in-
finite life; since eternity is also the cause of all immortality and perpe-
tuity. And Flotinus, exhibiting, in a most divinely inspired manner, the
* • xfovo; U omitted in the original.
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chap. xrin.
OF PLATO".
But eternity is the father and supplier of in-
finite life; since eternity is also the cause of all immortality and perpe-
tuity. And Flotinus, exhibiting, in a most divinely inspired manner, the
* • xfovo; U omitted in the original.
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chap. xrin.
OF PLATO".
peculiarity ' of eternity, according to the theology of Plato, defines it to
be infinite life, at once unfolding into light the whole of itself, and its own
being. For establishing its life in the intelligible centre, and through the
one indeed measuring its being, and fixing it in that which is prior to itself,
but through power causing it to be infinite, it unfolds indeed the uniform-
transcendency of the first triad, but defines the termination of the Gods,
and extends from the middle on all sides, and to all the intelligible
breadth. Moreover the third triad is filled indeed with intelligible life,' and
on this account is an intelligible animal, and the first animal. For it pri-
marily participates of the whole nature of this life ; but unfolds into light
in itself the first of forms, to which also the demiurgic intellect extending
itself, constitutes the whole world, and is itself the intelligible universe,
and the apparent world the sensible universe. Hence also, Plato denomi-
nates animal itself all-perfect Or rather, if you are willing we will speak
thus : that in this third triad, there are bound, infinity, and that which kv
mixed, which we have called intelligible intellect. Hence the whole triad
is denominated only-begotten from the father which is in it. For the
cause of bound imparts, that which is uncoordinated with other things,,
and an exempt transcendency. For that which comprehends, says rfi-
inreus, all such animals as are intelligible, will not be the second with
any other ; since again, it would be requisite that there should be ano-
ther animal about it. Hence that which comprehends in one all intelli-
gible animals is a whole. But every where whole is referred ' to bound,
and parts to infinity. So that if on this account animal itself is only-be-
gotten, it will possess this peculiarity according to bound. But again, it
is denominated eternal according to the power of it. For this power
especially pertains to that which is eternal. For eternity is infinite
power abiding in one, and proceeding stably. Animal itself, however, is
all-perfect according to intellect. For that which unfolds in itself all the
intelligible separation of being, is intelligible intellect. And that intel-
' Instead of aTiiozrrra, it U necessary to read itivnpa.
* {anij is omitted in the original.
1 Instead of wpo rtu xtpuras, »ai *?<> ms *mfi*f, it is necessary to read TftS m aru5.
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19^ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK in.
And that intel-
' Instead of aTiiozrrra, it U necessary to read itivnpa.
* {anij is omitted in the original.
1 Instead of wpo rtu xtpuras, »ai *?<> ms *mfi*f, it is necessary to read TftS m aru5.
Digitized by Google
19^ ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK in.
lect, according to the decision of Plato, will be all-perfect, which compre-
hends all intelligibles, and defines the boundary of the intelligible order.
The only-begotten, therefore, the eternal, the all-perfect, bound, infinity,
and that which is mixed, manifest the nature of intelligible animal. On
this account, Timreus also, in these three conclusions, reminds us of the
paradigm, viz. in the conclusion which shews that the universe is only-
begotten, and again, in the generation of time, and in the all-perfect com-
prehension of all animals.
If likewise Timieus says, that animal itself is the most beautiful of all
intelligibles, and that this has the third order in intelligibles, it will not
be wonderful. For it has beeu before asserted by us, that every where
the cause of the best mixture is the triad symmetry, truth, and beauty.
But beauty principally shines forth in the third progression of being, and
exhibits its luminous nature together with intelligible forms, just as truth
shines forth in the second, and symmetry in the first progression of being.
If, however, truth is indeed the first, beauty the second, and symmetry
the third, it is by no means wonderful, that according to order, truth and
beauty should be prior to symmetry ; but that symmetry being more ap-
parent in the first triad than the other two, should . shine forth as the
third in the secondary progressions. For these three subsist occultly in
the first triad. And truth indeed, so far as it is intelligible knowledge, is
in the second triad ; but beauty so far as it is the form of forms is in the
third triad. For that this triad subsists there first, is evident from this,
that truth is primarily in that which is especially being, prior to know-
ledge. But beauty, which pervades as far as to the last of beings, is ne-
cessarily in the first being, from which the last of beings are derived.
And the first symmetry is in that which is primarily mixed. For every
mixture requires symmetry, in order that what is produced from it may
be one certain thing. Though these three things, therefore, presubsist
there, for we assume, as acknowledged universally, that symmetry is
there, and the most beautiful of intelligible animals, as Timaeus says, yet
at present we shall dismiss the further consideration of them, as we have
elsewhere preccdaneously discussed them, and have especially endea-
voured to enforce what we conceive to be the opinion of Plato concern-
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C1IAP. XIX.
OF PLATO.
193
XIX.
OF PLATO.
193
ing their order. For we have spoken of these things in a treatise consist-
ing of one t>ook, in which we demonstrate that truth is co-ordinate to the
philosopher, beauty to the lover, and symmetry to the musician; and
that such as is the order of these lives, such also is the relation of truth,
beauty, and symmetry to each other.
Animal itself, therefore, may with the greatest justice, be called most
beautiful, so far as it is eminently coutained in intelligible beauty. For
beauty is wont to be carried in forms, and is as it were the form of forms,
unfolding that which is occult in the good, causing its loveliness to shine
forth, and attracting to its own splendor the desire which is concealed
about it. And to the good indeed, ail diings possess a silent and arcane
tendency ; but we are excited to the beautiful with astonishment and
motion. For the illumination from it, and its efficacy, acutely pervade
throng!) every soul, and as being the most similar of all things to the good,
it converts every soul that surveys it. The soul also, beholding that
which is arcane shining forth as it were to the view, rejoices in, and ad-
mires that which it sees, and is astonished about it. And as in the most
holy of the mysteries, prior to the mystic spectacles, those that are ini-
tiated, are seized with astonishment, so in intelligibles prior to the partici-
pation of the good, beauty shining forth, astonishes those that behold it,
converts the soul to itself, and being established in the vestibules [of the
good] shows what that is which is in the adyta, and what the transcen-
dency is of occult good. Through these things therefore, let it be appa-
rent whence beauty originates, and how it first shines forth ; and also
that animal itself is the most beautiful of all intelligibles.
CHAPTER XIX.
Since, however, Timazus says that the primary and intelligible para-
digms have their subsistence in intelligible animal, and that all these are
Proc. Voi» I. 2 B
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CHAPTER XIX.
Since, however, Timazus says that the primary and intelligible para-
digms have their subsistence in intelligible animal, and that all these are
Proc. Voi» I. 2 B
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ON THE. THEOLOGY
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four, unfold iug themselves first into light, according to the all-perfect te-
trad,— this being the case, in the first place it deserves to be considered,
that as species or forms present themselves to the view in the intelligible,
it is necessary by a much greater pi iority, that the genera of beings should
pre-subsist in intelligibles. For it is not possible to admit that forms arc
intelligible, but that genera are intellectual only. But as forms exist
intelligibly indeed, according to their first subsistence, but the pleroma,
or plenitude of them shines forth in the intellectual ' gods, and divides
that which is total into more partial decrements, produces the uniform
into multitude, and expands that which is exempt into co-ordinate causes,
thus also the genera of being are occultly and indivisibly in intelligibles,
but are accompanied with separation in intellectuals. And on this ac-
count the first triad indeed has essence for that which is mixed ; but the
second has life, where there was motion and permanency, life both abiding
and proceeding ; and in the third there are sameness and difference.
For the all-perfect multitude indeed, is through intelligible difference,
but the united and that which is comprehensive in common of parts
according to genera, and according to one, is through intelligible same-
ness. And all these subsist intelligibly, essentially, and uniformly in
these triads.
In the first place therefore, this deserves to be inferred by those who
love to survey the nature of things, and it is also fit (hat they should attri-
bute co-ordinate genera to intelligible forms. For it neither was nor will
be lawful for genera to shine forth secondarily * after forms. Hence much
more must it be admitted that genera subsist in the intelligible after the
above-mentioned manner, by those who admit that there are intelligible
forms. In the next place, in addition to these things we must sur-
vey how this tetrad of forms subsists, and how it shines forth in intelli-
gible intellect analogous to the principles. For it is divided into a mo-
nad and triad. For so far as the idea of the celestial gods is arranged
prior to the others, it is defined according to a div ine cause. It appears
* For mr™>s it U neeemry to read myoif .
* For Sttrnps it U nectwary to read htuTtpat-
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CHAP. XIX.
OF PLATO.
193
For so far as the idea of the celestial gods is arranged
prior to the others, it is defined according to a div ine cause. It appears
* For mr™>s it U neeemry to read myoif .
* For Sttrnps it U nectwary to read htuTtpat-
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CHAP. XIX.
OF PLATO.
193
however to me that intelligible intellect returning to the principles of the
whole of thing*, according to the conversion of itself, it becomes the ple-
nitude of forms, and is all things intellectually and at the same time in-
telligibly, comprehending in itself the causes of beings, and being full of
the ineffable and exempt cause of all things, constitutes the monad of the
gods; whence also, Plato I think calls it the idea of the gods. But re-
ceiving the intellectual causes of the three principles posterior to the one, it
exhibits three ideas after this, one of them indeed, being the cause of air-
wandering and volant animals, this cause proceeding analogous to bound.
Hence also it constitutes gods that are uniform, elevating, undefiled,
united to the celestial gods, and which receive measures second in dignity
to theirs, and have the same relation to those gods that govern generation
co-ordinately, as the celestial gods have to these, according to exempt
transcendency. But it exhibits the cause of the aquatic gods, co-ordi-
nate with generative and infinite power, and which produces gods that
are tl>e suppliers of motion and prolific abundance, and that are the in-
spective guardians of life ; since also this water itself which is the object
of sense is under the dominion of effusion, infinite lation and indefinite-
ncss. Hence likewise it is attributed to vivific powers. And intelligible
intellect exhibits the precedancous cause of terrestrial and pedestrious
gods, in a manner adapted to the nature of that which is mixed. It also
generates gods who contain the end of the whole of things, who arc stable,
who subdue the formless nature of matter by the last Ibrms, and fix the
seat of mundaue natures in the one centre of the universe. For deriving
their subsistence from the first Vesta as it were, or seat of brings, they sta-
bly define this mundane seat. Thus therefore forms first unfold them-
selves into light in intelligible intellect, possessing their progression and
order according to the first principles. It is necessary however, in addi-
tion to these things, to infer this in the third place, following Timaeua,
that according to this triad, the multitude of intelligible parts shines
forth, and the whole is divided into an all-perfect order of parts. For
that, says he, of which other iutclligible animals both according to one,
and according to genera are parts, is the first and most beautiful paradigm
of die universe. But if other intelligible animals are parts of this, it is
OS THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
For
that, says he, of which other iutclligible animals both according to one,
and according to genera are parts, is the first and most beautiful paradigm
of die universe. But if other intelligible animals are parts of this, it is
OS THE THEOLOGY
BOOK III.
evident that it is a whole, comprehending in itself the multitude of in-
telligible parts, and that it is connective of all intelligible parts. It must
be inferred therefore that this triad is the first cause of production and
fabrication. For if it contains the primary paradigms of things, it is evi-
dent that the orderly distribution of secondary natures, originates from it.
And if it is an animal constitutive of all animals, every psychical extent,
and all the extent of bodies, have their progression from thence ; and it
will also comprehend the intelligible causes of all the vivific and demiurgic
orders.
CHAPTER XX.
Sue ii conceptions therefore, as these, may be assumed from what is
written in the Timaeus concerning the three intelligible triads, conformably
to what is said of them in the Philebus, surveying in each bound, infinity,
and that which is mixed. If you are willing also, we will show from
what is scattered in the Sophista, that Plato had the same conception as
we have concerning the first principles. The Elean guest therefore, in
that dialogue, doubting against the assertion of Parmenides that the uni-
verse is one, unfolding intelligible multitude, and showing how it is sus-
pended from the one, at first indeed, he argues from the one being [or being
characterized by the one] and reminds us that this is passiveto/Ae one, and
participates of the one, but is not the one itself, nor that which is prima-
rily one. But afterwards, he produces the conception of the distinction
between the imparticipable one and being, from whole. For if the one
being is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has
parts, and that which has parts, is not the one itself, the one being will not
be the same as the one. In the third place therefore, he argues from the
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CHAP. XX.
OF PLATO.
197
For if the one
being is a whole, as Parmenides testifies, but that which is a whole has
parts, and that which has parts, is not the one itself, the one being will not
be the same as the one. In the third place therefore, he argues from the
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CHAP. XX.
OF PLATO.
197
all-perfect. For that which ii perfectly divided, and is connective of
many parts, can never have the same subsistence as that which is entirely
one. And having proceeded thus far he shows that what is void of mul-
titude, is in its own nature exempt from the one being, proceeding in
the demonstration of this through three arguments. And at one time
indeed, he begins from the one being, at another time from whole, and at
another from all. It is better however to hear the words themselves of
Plato. That the one therefore, is not the same with the one being, he proves
through the following words. " But what with respect to those who
assert that the universe is one ? Must we not enquire to the utmost of
our power what they say being is? Certainly. To this question therefore
they may answer : Do you say there is one thing alone ? We do say so.
Or will they not speak in this manner? They will. What then, do you call
being any tiling ? Yes. Do you call it the owe, employing two names
respecting the same thing? Or how do you say ? What will be their an-
swer after this O guest ?' Through this therefore, Plato separating the one
and being from each other, and showing that the conception of the one
is different from that of being, and that these are not the same with each
other, evinces that the most proper and primary one is exempt from the
one being. For the one being does not abide purely in an hyparxis void
of multitude and possessing the form of one. But the one itst/fn exempt
from every addition. For by whatever you may add to it, you will di-
minish its supreme and ineffahle union. Hence it is necessary to arrange
the one prior to the one being, and to suspend the one being from that
which is one alone. For if the one and the one being were the same, and
it made no difference to say one and being (since it' they differed, the one
would a i« r the hist orders, and
should demonstrate that as many questions arc asked, us there are pro-
gressions of the divine orders. .And in the first place, we must deliver
the doctrine of Parmenides concerning the intelligible Gods, of whom we
have proposed to speak ; since Plato speaks about these in many places,
partly indicating, and partly clearly untbldinghis meaning.
It is necessary however, that we should collect into one the elaborate
and synoptical theory about each order, since it would not be proper now
to repeat the exposition which we have given in our commentaries on
that dialogue. But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I
will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following
in so doing thedivine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus]. For wealsa
But assuming each of the conclusions itself by itself, I
will endeavour to refer it to an appropriate order of the Gods, following
in so doing thedivine inspirations of our leader [Syrianus]. For wealsa
• For ff«x«iTi{ it it neccwary to reid xgo^omf.
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208 ON T,*K THEOLOGY BOOK III.
through his assistance have with a divine head pursued these sacred paths
about the theory of the Parmenides, being agitated with a divine fury,
and wakened as from a profound sleep to this arcane mystic discipline.
And thus much concerning the mode of tl»e whole of the conclusions.
But from hence I shall pass to the narration of the things proposed.
The first and im participate one therefore, which preexists beyond the
whole of things, and not only beyond the unities that participate, but also
those that are participated, is celebrated through the first hypothesis,
being demonstrated to be the cause of ull things ineffably, but not being
defined itself in any one of all things, nor having any power or peculiarity
of a kindred nature with the other Gods. But after this [imparticipable
one,] that which is aloae supercssential and surpassing, and unmingled
with all hyparxis, is a unity participated by being, and constituting about
itself the first essence, and by the addition of this participation becoming
more redundant than that which is primarily one. This however is a
superesscntial hyparxis, and the hyparxis of the first intelligible triad.
As there are therefore these two things in the first triad, viz. the one and
being, and the former generates, but the latter is generated, and the former
perfects, but the latter is perfected, it is necessary that the middle of both
should be power, through which and together with which the one con-
stitutes and is perfective of being. For the progression of being from the
me, and its conversion to the one, is through power. For what else con-
joins being to the one, or causes the one to be participated by being
except power? For it is the progression of the one, and its extension to
being. Hence, in all the divine genera powers precede progressions and
generations. This triad therefore, the one, power and being, is the summit
of intelhgibles. The first of these indeed producing ; the third being pro-
duced ; and the second being suspended from the one, but coalescing with
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CHAP. XXtV.
OF PLATO.
209
CHAPTER XXIV.
This triad therefore, the one, power and being, is the summit
of intelhgibles. The first of these indeed producing ; the third being pro-
duced ; and the second being suspended from the one, but coalescing with
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CHAP. XXtV.
OF PLATO.
209
CHAPTER XXIV.
This triad therefore, Parmenides delivers immediately in the beginning
of the second hypothesis, adjoining to the one the most simple participa-
tion of essence. But he calls it the one being, and says that being par-
ticipates of the one, and the one of being. The participation however of
these is different. For the one ' indeed so participates of being, as illumi-
nating and filling, and deifying being ; but being so participates of the
one, as suspended from the one, and deified by it. But the habitude
which is the middle of both, is not with them void of essence. For neither
is the habitude which is among sensibles in no respect being, and much
more is this the case with the habitude which is there. But this habitude
is biformed. For it is of the one, and is connascent with being. For it
is the motion of the one, and its progression into being. Parmenides de-
livers this triad, beginning what he says about it as follows : " See there-
fore from the beginning if the one is. Is it possible then for it to be, and
yet not to participate of essence ? It is not possible." But he ends speaking
about it in the following words : " Will therefore that which is said be
any thing else than this, that the. one participates of essence, when it is
summarily asserted by any one that the one is ? It will not." This there-
fore is the first intelligible triad, the one, being, and the habitude of both,
through which being is of the one and the one of being, in a manner per-
fectly admirable ; Plato indicating through these things, that the father is
the father of intellect, and that intellect is the intellect of the father, anil
that power is concealed between the extremes. For deity is the father
of the triad, and bein*; is the intellect of this deity. Yet it is not intel-
lect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence.
For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says.
• In the original n o», but the true reading is eridemlf r» alone.
Proc. Vol. I. *2 D
*10 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOKIH.
Yet it is not intel-
lect in the same way as we are accustomed to call the intellect of essence.
For every such intellect stands still and is moved, as the Elean guest says.
• In the original n o», but the true reading is eridemlf r» alone.
Proc. Vol. I. *2 D
*10 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOKIH.
But that which is primarily being, neither stands still, nor is moved, as
he also teaches. The first triad therefore is called one being ; since power is
here occultly. For the triad docs not proceed from itself ; but subsists
without separation and uniformly, being primarily defined according
to divine union. Hence, this is the first participation of essence, which
participates of the one through power as the middle, which collects toge-
ther and separates both the one and being. And it is supcressential in-
deed, but is conjoined with essence. We must never think therefore that
all power is the progeny of essence. For the powers of the Gods are su-
peressential, and are consubsistent with the unities themselves of the Gods.
And through this power the Gods are generative of beings. Rightly there-
fore, does poetry every where assert that the Gods are able to do all
things. For essential powers indeed are not capable of effecting all
things ; since they are not constitutive of supcrcssential natures. The
first triad therefore, is through these things unfolded to us by Parinenides.
CHAPTER XXV.
But immediately after this, the second triad is allotted a progression,
which Parmenides characterises by intelligible wholeness, as we have
shown in the Sophista, For the first triad being uniform, and possessing
all things intelligibly and occultly, viz. hyparxis, power and being, so that
power which is the cause of division, subsisting between the one and being,
is concealed, and becomes apparent through the communion of the ex-
tremes with each other,— the second triad proceeds, being characterized by
the first intelligible power, and having the monads in itself distinguished
from each other. For all things being uuited and without distinction in
the first triad, distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being
also and power arc more divided from each other. And that which con-
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CHAP. XXV-
OF PLATO.
211
For all things being uuited and without distinction in
the first triad, distinction and separation shine forth in this triad. Being
also and power arc more divided from each other. And that which con-
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CHAP. XXV-
OF PLATO.
211
sists of these is no longer one being [or being characterized by the one,]
but is a whole, so that it has the one and being in itself as parts. For
above indeed [i. e. in the first triad] all things are prior to parts and
wholeness. But ip this triad there are both parts and a whole, power
unfolding itself into light. For as there is separation here, there are parts
and the w hole consisting of these. The second triad therefore is called
intelligible wholeness. But the parts of it, the one and being, I call the
extremes. And power being here the middle, connects the one and being,
and does not cause them to be one, in the same manner as in the first
triad. Since also it is the middle of both, through its communion indeed
with being, it renders the one one being ; but through its communion with
the vnc, it perfectly causes being to be one. And thus the one being con-
sists of two parts, viz. of being which is characterised by the one, and of
the one which is characterized by being, as Parmenides himself says. He
begins therefore to speak about this triad as follows : " Again therefore,
let us say if the one is what will happen. Consider then if it is not ne-
cessary that this hypothesis should signify the one to be a thing of such a
kind as to have parts f But- he ends in the following words : •* That
which is one therefore is a whole, and has a part."
Through these things therefore Parmenides defines the second order of
intelligible* to be a wholeness. For as existence is derived to all things
from the first triad, so whole from the second, and an nil-perfect division
from the third. This however will be considered by us hereafter. Whole-
ness therefore is triple, being either prior to parts, or consisting of parts,
or .subsisting in a part, according to the doctrine of Plato. For in the
Politico* indeed, he calls genus a whole, but species a part, not that genus
derives its completion from species, but exists prior to it. And in the
Timseus he says that the world is a whole of wholes. And all the world
indeed derives its completion from parts that are wholes ; but each of the
parts is n whole, not as the universe is, but partially. Wholeness there-
fore, being triple as we have said, according to Plato, the unity, and the
intelligible and occult cause of these is now delivered, unically compre-
hending and constituting three wholenesses ; according to the hyparxis
indeed of itself, the wholeness prior to parts ; but according to its power,
x
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the wholeness which is from parts ; and according to its being the whole-
ness which is in a part. For the one is prior to all multitude ; but power
communicates in a certain respect with both the extremes, and compre-
hends in itself the peculiarities of them ; and being in a certain respect
participates of the one. Hence the first of the wholenesses, or that which
is prior to parts is derived from a unical hyparxis. For it is a monad,
and is itself constitutive of parts, and of the multitude which is in them.
But the second wholeness is from power. For it derives its completion
from parts, just as in the power which is collective of the one and being,
the extremes in a certain respect shiue forth to the view. And the third
wholeness is from being. For being is a part, and is the progeny both of
power and the one,' and possesses each of these partially. After the in-
telligible therefore, three wholenesses are divided according to the differ-
ent orders of beings. But the intelligible wholeness comprehends the
three unically, and is the intelligibly connective monad of this triad, every
way extending the powers of itself from the middle of the intelligible
and occult order.
CHAPTER XXVI.
Immediately after this triad we may sec another proceeding, in
which all intelligible multitude shines forth, and which Parmenides indeed
constitutes a wholeness, but a wholeness consisting of many parts. For
after the occult union of the first triad, and the dyadic separation of the
second, the progression of the third is generated, which has indeed its
subsistence from parts, but the parts are many, with the multitude of
which the triad prior to it is parturient. For in this triad there is a unity,
and power, and being. But the one is multiplied, and also being and
' Instead of «vro; it is necessary to read m;.
CHAP. XXVI.
OF PLATO.
213
For in this triad there is a unity,
and power, and being. But the one is multiplied, and also being and
' Instead of «vro; it is necessary to read m;.
CHAP. XXVI.
OF PLATO.
213
power. And thus all the triad indeed is a wholeness; but each of its ex-
tremes, viz. the one and being, as it is multitude conjoined through collec-
tive power, is again divided and multiplied. For this power conjoining
unical multitude to the multitude of beings, of some of these it causes
each through progression to be being characterized by the one, but of
others each according to participation to be the one characterized by be-
ing. For here indeed there are two parts of the wholeness, the one and
being ; but the one participates of being, for it is conjoined with it ; and
being participates of the one. The one of being therefore, is again divid-
ed, so that the one and being generate a second unity conjoined with the
part of being. But being participating of the one, is again separated into
being and the one. For it generates a more partial being suspended from
a more partial unity. And being consists of more partial deified beings,
and is a more specific monad. The cause however of this progression is
power. For power is effective of two things, and is the operator of
multitude. For the one indeed calls forth into multitude, but being con-
verts to the participation of the divine unities. Whence therefore does
Parmenides begin to teach us -concerning this triad? And where docs he
conclude his discourse about it? The beginning, therefore, of what he
says on this subject is as follows : " What then ? Can each of these parts
of the one being, viz. the one and being, desert each other, so that the one
shall not be a part of being, or being shall not be a part of the one t It
cannot be.'" But he ends thus : " Will not, therefore, the one being after
this manner be an infinite multitude ? It seems so."
In the first place, therefore, it is proper to understand the manner of
the progression of the divine genera; and that conformably to the intel-
ligible monad, which we arrange according to the one being, the duad
posterior to it which we call a wholeness [proceeds.] But we say that it
consists of two parts which are separated by power, and that intelligible
multitude presents itself to the view from the monad and the duad. For
when all things are said to be parts of the one being, viz. secondary things,
and such as become apparent through the separating cause of power, then
1 It U necessary to cornet the text here, and to read as follow* : tuw; raw p*pun immpn rov»
raw tow »»$• orr»{ to, ti it x«i ts oy ap* (nroXfnrraim, q to it. ». r. K.
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214
4
secondary things,
and such as become apparent through the separating cause of power, then
1 It U necessary to cornet the text here, and to read as follow* : tuw; raw p*pun immpn rov»
raw tow »»$• orr»{ to, ti it x«i ts oy ap* (nroXfnrraim, q to it. ». r. K.
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214
4
ON the ti]j:olo e suspended from the triads prior
to it. And in the next place, I say, that this triad, according to Parme-
nides, is primogenial. For this first imparts the power of being generated;
and Parmenides calls the multitude which is in it in generation, [i.e. be-
coming to be, or rising into existence^] For he says : " And the part w ill
be generated from two parts at least." And again : " Whatever part is
generated, will always have these parts." And in what follows : •* So
that it is necessary it should always be generated two things, and should
never be* one."' Does not he, therefore, who frequently uses the word ge- •
Deration in teaching concerning the progression of the intelligible multi-
tude, proclaim that the natures prior to this order are more united to each
other? But this order proceeds to a greater extent, unfolds the occult
nature of the triads prior to itself, and is primogenial, unfolding in itself
prolific power.
In addition to these things also, it is necessary to consider the infinity
of multitude, not as those think fit to speak, who assume the infinite in
quantity, but since in the principles of the whole of things, there are
bound and infinity, the former being the cause of the union, but the
latter of the separation of multitude^ Parmenides calls the first and intel-
ligible multitude infinite, because all multitude indeed, according to its
own nature, is infinite, as being the progeny of the first infinity. All in-
telligible multitude, however, is a thing of this kind. For it is the first
multitude, and multitude itself. But multitude itself is the first progeny
of intelligible infinity. Intelligible multitude, therefore, is on this ac-
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CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO. 415
All in-
telligible multitude, however, is a thing of this kind. For it is the first
multitude, and multitude itself. But multitude itself is the first progeny
of intelligible infinity. Intelligible multitude, therefore, is on this ac-
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CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO. 415
count infinite, as unfolding into light the first infinity, and this infinity is
the same with the all-perfect. For that which has proceeded to the all,
and as far as it is requisite an intelligible nature should proceed, through
the power which is generative of the whole of things, is infinite. For it
cannot be comprehended by any other thing. But intelligible multitude
is comprehensive of all intelligible multitude. For if indeed that which
is primarily infinite, was infinite according to quantity, it would be re-
quisite to admit that the intelligible is infinite multitude of this kind. Since,
however, the intelligible is infinite power, it is necessary that the partici-
pant of the primarily infinite, should cause infinity to shine forth accord-
ing to the power which is comprehensive of all prior natures. And if it
be requisite to relate my own opinion, as that which is primarily one is
primarily bound, so that which is primarily- multitude is infinite multitude.
For it receives the whole power of infinity, and producing all unities, and
all beings, as far as to the most individual natures, it possesses never-failing
power. It is, therefore, more total than all multitude, and is an incom-
prehensible infinite. Hence unfolding into light all multitude, it bounds
and measures it by iufinite power, and through wholeness introduces
bound to all things. These tlnngs, therefore, may be assumed from Par-
uienides concerning the third intelligible triad.
CHAFFER XXVII.
Let us in the next place speak in common about all the intelligible
triads. With respect to the first triad, therefore, which is occult, and is
allotted the intelligible summit in intelligibles, Plato at one time proceed-
ing from the union which is in it, and its exempt transcendency with re-
spect to the other triads, denominates it one, as in the Tiinacus. For eter-
nity, says he, abides in one. Hut reason evinces that this one is the first
triad of intelli»ibles. But at another time proceeding from the extremi-
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For eter-
nity, says he, abides in one. Hut reason evinces that this one is the first
triad of intelli»ibles. But at another time proceeding from the extremi-
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ties which arc in it, viz. that which is participated, and that which parti-
cipates, he calls it the one being, considering the power which is compre-
hended in these as ineffable, in consequence of its subsisting uniformly
and occultly. And at another time, he uufolds the whole of it, accord-
ing to the monads which are in it, bound, infinity, and that which is
mixed; bound indeed indicating its divine hyparxis, infinity its generative
power, and that which is mixed, the essence proceeding from this power.
Plato, therefore, as I have said, teaches us through these names the first
intelligible triad ; at one time indeed through one name, but at another
through two names, and at another again through three names, unfolding
it to our view. For there is a triad in it, according to which the whole is
characterized ; and a duad according to which the extremes communicate
with each other ; and a monad which exhibits the ineffable, occult, and
unical nature of the first, through its own monads.
But the second triad after this, Plato denominates in the Timseus in-
deed, eternity ; but in the Parmenides the first wholeness. How these,
however, arc allotted the same peculiarity we may learn by considering
that every thing eternal is indeed a whole; viz. if it is perfectly eternal,
and has the whole of its essence and energy at once present. For every
intellect is a thing of this kind, perfectly establishing at once in itself, the
whole of intellectual perception. It likewise does not possess one part of
being, but is deprived of another part, nor does it partially participate of
energy, but it summarily comprehends the whole of being, and the whole
of intelligence. If, however, in its energies it proceeded according to
time, but had an eternal essence, it would be allotted the whole of the
latter, and this always stably the same, but would possess the former va-
riably, so as to exert different energies at different times. Eternity, there-
fore, is every where the cause of wholeness to the natures to which it is
primarily present. But whole also is every where comprehensive of per-
petuity. For no whole abandons cither its essence or its proper perfec-
tion ; but that which is primarily corrupted and vitiated is a partial na-
ture. For on this account also the whole world is perpetual, viz. because
it is a whole, and this is likewise the case with all that the heavens contain,
and with each of the elements. For every where wholeness is connective
CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO U7
For on this account also the whole world is perpetual, viz. because
it is a whole, and this is likewise the case with all that the heavens contain,
and with each of the elements. For every where wholeness is connective
CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO U7
of subjects. Hence eternity is consubsistent with wholeness, and whole
and eternity are the same. Each also Is a measure, the one of things
eternal, and of all perpetual natures, but the other of parts and of all mul-
titude. Since, however, there are three wholenesses, one indeed being
prior to parts, another subsisting from parts, and another in a part, —
through the wholeness which is prior to parts, eternity measures those
unities of divine natures which are exempt from beings ; but through the
wholeness which derives its subsistence from parts, it measures the unities
that are co-ordinate with beings ; and through the wholeness which is in
a part, it measures all beings and whole essences. For these wholenesses
being parts of the divine unities, they possess partibly what pre-exists
unically in the unities. And, moreover, eternity is nothing else than the
ever shining forth from the unity which is connected with being. But
whole consists of two parts, viz. of the one and being, power existing as
the collector of the parts. According to both these conceptions, there-
fore, the duad pertaining to the middle intelligible triad, unfolds the uni-
form and occult hypostasis of the first triad.
Moreover, in the Timseus, Plato calls the third triad of intelligible?,
animal itself, intelligible, all-perfect, and only-begotten. But in the Par-
menides he denominates it infinite multitude, and a wholeness compre-
hensive of many parts. And in the Sophista he perpetually calh it the
intelligible distributed into many beings. All these assertions, therefore,
arc the progeny of one science, and tend to one intelligible truth. For
when Tim* us calls this triad intelligible animal, he also asserts it to be
all-perfect, and comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts, both ac-
cording to one and according to parts. Hence nnimal itself is according
to this a whole, comprehensive of intelligible animals as its parts. And
Parmenides, when he shows that the one being is all-perfect multitude,
demonstrates that it is consubsistent with this order. For the infinite will
be all-powerful and all-perfect, as wc have before observed, comprehend-
ing in itself an intelligible multitude of parts, which also it generates;
tome of these being more total, but others more partial, and as Tiroaeus
says, both according to one, and according to genera. Farther still, as he
calls animal itself eternal and only-begotten, so Parraenidcs first attri-
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Farther still, as he
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butes the ever and to be generated, to infinite multitude, when he says,
" And thus, according to the same reasoning, whatever part is generated
will always possess these two parts: for the one will always contain being,
and being the one ; so that two things will necessarily always be gene-
rated, and no part will ever l>e one."
Who, therefore, so clearly reminds us of eternal animal, and the primo-
gcnial triad, as Pannenides, first assuming in this order generation and the
ever, and so continually using each of these ? The same thing, therefore,
is both an all-perfect animal, and all-powerful intelligible multitude. For
the first infinity being power, and every intelligible subsisting according
to it, and receiving from it a division into parts, I think it proper to call
it all-powerful ; thus avoiding the appellation of the infinite, which dis-
turbs the multitude. That, however, which in these things is both diffi-
cult to understand, and for which Plato especially deserves to be admired,
we must not omit, but demonstrate to the genuine lovers of truth. For
intelligible animal comprehends four intelligible ideas, according to which
it not only constitutes the genera of Gods, but also the more excellent
kind of beings after the Gods, and also mortal animals themselves ; for
generating it extends the idea of air- wandering, the idea of aquatic, and
the idea of terrestrial animals, from the Gods as far as to mortal animals.
Since animal itself, therefore, comprehends four ideas, and through the
same paradigms produces totally divine, demoniacal and mortal animals,,
this deservedly produces a doubt in those who love the contemplation of
truth, how, the causes being the same, and the same primary paradigms
preexisting, some of the natures which arc constituted are Gods, others
daemons, and others mortal animals. For all these being generated with
reference to one form, how is it possible they should not have the same
form and nature ; since it is requisite that one idea should every where
be generative of things that have a similar form ? For on this account we
admit the hypothesis of ideas, in order that the intelligible genus of Gods
may possess and contain prior to multitude monads productive of similar
natures. This doubt,' therefore, being so difficult, some oue may solve it
logically by saying, that all things which subsist according to one form
■ Instead of mnifu>h it is necessary to read b» after the words tj id rs^rav n .
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This doubt,' therefore, being so difficult, some oue may solve it
logically by saying, that all things which subsist according to one form
■ Instead of mnifu>h it is necessary to read b» after the words tj id rs^rav n .
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demoniacal summit of being which is one, and which adorns secondary
natures. As to the unions, however, of secondary natures, it is not im-
manifest that they approximate to multitude, and to the progression of
the natures placed above them. Nor must you wonder if being w hich is
one is the cause of angels, but the one being of daemons. Fof in one
place, being which is one is a part of the one being, but in another the
one being is a part of being which is one. And here, indeed, the union
is essential, but there essence has the form of the one. For the summit of
being which is one is a thing of this kind. Deservedly, therefore, is intel-
ligible multitude all-powerful, and intelligible animal all-perfect, as being
at once the cause of all things, and this as fur as to the last of things, Plato
all but exclaiming, [in the words of the Ciialdfean Oracle,] " Thence a
fiery whirlwind sweeping along, obscures the flower of fire, leaping at the
same time into the cavities of the worlds." For the divine unities pro-
ceeding gradually, generate the multitude of all mundane natures. This
triad, therefore, is the fountain and cause of all things : and from it all
the life, and all the progression of the Gods, and the genera superior to us,
and of mortal animals subsist. For it produces totally and uniformly all
things, and binds to itself the whole principles of the divisible rivers of
vivification, and the production of forms.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Again, therefore, let us recur from the divided theory of intelligible*
to the all-perfect and one science of them, and let us say to ourselves, that
this intelligible genus of the Gods is unically exempt from all the other di-
vine orders, and is neither called intelligible as known by a partial intel-
lect, nor as comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, nor
yet as^preexisting in all-perfect intellect. For it transcends both total
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For it transcends both total
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and partial intelligible*, and exists prior to all intellectual objects, being
an imparticipable and divine intelligible. Hence, also, it is allotted the
same transcendency with respect to all the intelligible orders, as the one
with respect to every genus of the Gods. For this intelligible is impar-
ticipable, and supernally fills the divine and intellectual orders. For
if every intellect is intelligible to itself, it possesses this property through
the intelligible Gods. For plenitude is derived to all tilings from thence.
And thus the intelligible is at the same time exempt from intellect, exist-
ing itself by itself; and at-tbe same time the intelligible is not external to
intellect. For there is an intelligible which is conjoined with intellect;
the co-ordinate being derived from that which is exempt, the participated
from that which is imparticipable, that which is inherent from that which
is preexistent, and that which is multiplied from that which is uniform.
Intelligible simplicity, therefore, must not be defined to be such as that
which we are accustomed to assert of intelligibles. For in these the we
becomes equal to multitude, and separation to the uniform sameness of
essence. But intelligible simplicity is uniform, without separation and
occult, excelling every divisible form of life, and intellectual multitude.
Hence 1 do not place intelligible simplicity in the order of idea. For this
form b partial, and is subordinate to intelligible union. But I consider
it as the hypai xis of divine natures, and as generative of the whole of the
good which is distributed to all divine natures, and in which the Gods
themselves subsist. For the goodness of the Gods, is neither form nor
habit, but the plenitude of divine self-sufficiency and divine power, ac-
cording to which the Gods fill all things with good. In a much greater
degree, therefore, are the intelligible Gods, because they are united to-
the good, wholly full of superessential goodness, and being established in
this, they contain in it the supreme hyparxis of themselves. Very pro-
perly, therefore, do we say that the intelligible Gods unfold the ineffable
principle of all things, and his admirable transcendency and union; sub-
sisting themselves indeed occultly, but comprehending multitude uni-
formly and unically ; reigning over the whole of things exemptly, and be-
ing uncoordinated with all the other Gods. For as the good illuminates
all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods who are the fa-
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For as the good illuminates
all things with superessential light, and exhibits the Gods who are the fa-
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thers of all things, so likewise the intelligible genus of Gods, according to
a similitude to the good, imparts from itself to all the secondary Gods,
intelligible plenitude. Hence, according to each distribution of the Gods,
there is an appropriate intelligible multitude, just as a monad analogous
to the good exists prior to each of the divine orders. And this monad
indeed is the preexistent leader of union to secondary natures. But in.
telligible multitude is the preexistent source of beauty, self-sufficiency,
power, essence, and all intelligible goods. For the Gods antecedently
and intelligibly comprehend all intellectual natures, and contain in them-
selves all ' things according to supreme union.
• Instead of rm xaf nwwiv, it it requisite to read varra xoJf tvtunv, and then the end of this book
will be co mplete, and not defective is the Latin translatorPortus imagined it was.
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BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
Let the discussion, therefore, of the intelligible Gods, unfolding the
mystic doctrine of Plato concerning them be here terminated by us. But
it entirely follows in the next place, that we should consider after the same
manner the narration concerning the intellectual Gods. Since, however,
of intellectuals some are both intelligible and intellectual, viz. such as ac-
cording to the Oracle perceiving intellectually are at the same time intel-
lectually perceived ; but others are intellectual only; — this being the case,
beginning from those that are intellectual and at the same time intelligi-
ble, we will in the 6rst place determine what pertains to them in common,
from which we shall render the doctrine concerning each order of them
more perspicuous. Again, therefore, let us recal to our memory those
things which we a little before demonstrated, viz. that there are three
total monads which arc entirely beyond the Gods that arc divided accord-
ing to parts, viz. essence, life arid intellect. And these prior to the par-
tial participate of the superessential unities. Essence, however, is exempt
from the rest. Life is allotted the middle order. But intellect converts
the end of this triad to the beginning. -And all these are indeed intelli-
gibly in essence; but intelligibly and intellectually in life; and intellec-
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224 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
•
Life is allotted the middle order. But intellect converts
the end of this triad to the beginning. -And all these are indeed intelli-
gibly in essence; but intelligibly and intellectually in life; and intellec-
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[
224 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
•
tually in intellect. And as secondary natures always participate of the
natures placed above them, but these prior to participation presubsist
themselves by themselves; and as in each order there are these three
things, the cause of abiding, the cause of proceeding, and the cause of con-
version, though intellect is more formalized according to conversion, but
life according to progression, and essence according to permanency ; —
this being the case, it is certainly necessary that the first intellectual Gods
being essentialized according to life should conjoin imparticipable intel-
lect, and the intelligible genus of Gods, and that they should uniformly
connect the various progressions of secondary, but unfold and expand the
stable hyparxis of precedaneous causes. For imparticipable life is a
thing of this kind, circumscribing that which is primarily being and
intellect, and participating indeed of being, but participated by intellect
But tins is the same thing as to assert that intelligence is filled indeed
from the intelligible, but fills intellect from itself. For being is the intel-
ligible, but life is intelligence. And being indeed is characterized ac-
cording to a divine hyparxis; but Kfe according to power ; and intellect
according to intelligible intellect. For as being is to byparxis, so is intel-
lect to being. . And as intelligible power is to each of the extremes, so n
life to the intelligible and to intellect. And as power is generated from
the one and byparxis but constitutes in conjunction with the one the
nature of being, so life proceeds indeed from being, and gives subsistence
to a power different from that which is in being. As also the one itself
which exists prior to being, imparts to being from itself a second unity,
so likewise life being allotted aa hypostasis prior to intellect, generates in-
tellectual life. For true being and the intelligible which precede the rest,
supply both life and intellect with union. Imparticipable life, therefore,
but which participates of the intelligible monads is the second after being,
is generative of imparticipable intellect, and giving completion to this
medium, and containing the bond of intelligibles and intellectuals, is illu-
minated by Gods wlio are allotted a union secondary to the occult sub-
sistence of intelligibles, but preceding according to cause the separation of
intellectual natures. For the unical, indivisible, simple, and primary na-
ture of intelligibles, subsides, through the medium of these Gods* into
■
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CHAP. I.
OF PLATO.
'2-25
For the unical, indivisible, simple, and primary na-
ture of intelligibles, subsides, through the medium of these Gods* into
■
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CHAP. I.
OF PLATO.
'2-25
multitude and separation, and the inexplicable evolution of the divine
orders. Whence also, I think, the Gods who connectedly contain life
which is infinite, being the middle of the intelligible and intellectual
Gods, and carried in the divisions of themselves as in a vehicle, are called
intelligible and at the same time intellectual ; being filled indeed, from the
first intelligibles, but filling the intellectual Gods. For we call the intelligible
Gods intelligible, not as coordinate with intellect. For the intelligible
which is in intellect is one thing, and that which produces the intellectual
Gods another : and we denominate the Gods that subsist according to
life intelligible and at the same time intellectual, not as giving completion
to intellect, nor as being established according to intellectual intelligence,
and imparting to intellect the power of intellectual perception, but to the
intelligible the power of being intellectually perceived, but we give them
this appellation, as deriving their subsistence from the intelligible monads,
but generating all the intellectual hebdomads. And because they are
illuminated indeed with intelligible life, but subsist prior to intellectuals,
according to a generative cause, we think fit to denominate them in com-
mon, connecting their names from the extremes, in the same manner as
they also are allotted a peculiarity collective of wholes in the divine orders.
It is evident, therefore, that they subsist according to this medium, and
that they are proximate to the intelligible Gods, who are both monadic
and triad ic. For the intelligible triads, with reference indeed to the
highest union and which is exempt from all things, are triads ; but with
reference to the divided essence of triads, they are monads, unfolding into
light from themselves total triads. Since intelligibles, therefore, in their
triadic progression, do not depart from a unical hyparxis, the intelligible
and at the same time intellectual Gods subsist triadically, exhibiting in
themselves the separation of the monads, and through divine difference,
proceeding into multitude, and a variety of powers and essences. For
the natures which subsist more remote from the one principle [of all
things,] are more multiplied than the natures which are prior to them
and are diminished indeed in powers, and the comprehensions of second-
* For ( vm$«ij
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CHAP. X.
OF PLATO.
245
For
the natures which subsist more remote from the one principle [of all
things,] are more multiplied than the natures which are prior to them
and are diminished indeed in powers, and the comprehensions of second-
* For ( vm$«ij
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CHAP. X.
OF PLATO.
245
however receives forms alone ; but the mother and nurse of the Gods, not
only receives, but also constitutes and generates secondary natures, together
with the father. Nor does this generative deity produce from herself
into an external place, her progeny, and separate them from Ler own com-
prehension, in the same manner as the natures which generate here,
deliver their offspring into light external to themselves; but she generates,
comprehends and establishes all things in herself. Hence also she is the
place of them, as being a seat which on all sides contains them, and as
by her prolific, and primarily efficient powers, preoccupying and con-
taining in herself, all the progressions, multitude and variety of secondary
natures. For all beings subsist in ihe Gods, and are comprehended and
saved by them. For where can they recede from tlie Gods, and from the
comprehension which is in them? .And how, if they depart from them,
con they remain even for the smallest portion of time? In a particular
manner however the powers which are generative of divine natures, are
said to comprehend their progeny, so far as they are the proximate causes
of them, and constitute their essence with a more abundant division, and
a more particular providence. For paternal causes produce secondary
natures uniformly, exemptly, and without coordination, and comprehend,
but unically their own progeny. And in simplicity indeed, they preoccu-
py the variety of them ; but in union their multitude. It is evident
therefore, from what has been said, that the supercelestial place is intel-
ligible, and after what manner it is intelligible. In addition to these
things also it is evident, how it is feminine ; for place is adapted to the
generative Gods through the above-mentioned causes. And the meadow is
the fountain of a vivific nature, as will be shortly demonstrated. Socrates
likewise assumes all the divine natures that are in this place, to be of this
hind, [viz. to be of the feminine genus] I mean science herself, justice her-
self, temperance herself, truth herself, and Adrastia ; which may especi-
ally be considered as a certain indication, that Plato particularly attri-
butes the feminine to this order, and not only other theologists.
ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
CHAPTER XI.
ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK IV.
CHAPTER XI.
What therefore is the cause through which Plato in the first place ce-
lebrates this deity negatively, analogous to the one t And what are (ha
negations ? For he denominates it, without colour, without figure, and
without contact. And he takes away from it these three hyparxes, colour,
figure, and contact. I say therefore, that this order being the summit of
the intellectual Gods, is unknown and ineffable, according to its peculi-
arity, and is [only] to be known through intelligible impressions. For
being the summit of intellectuals, it conjoins itself with intelligibles. For
how could intellectuals be conjoined with intelligibles, unless they ante-
cedently constituted an intelligible transcendency of themselves ? But
what connexion and communion could be surveyed of the whole orders
of things, unless the extremities of such as are first possessed a certain
similitude to the beginnings of such as are second ? For on account of
this similitude, these are connascent with each other, and all things sub-'
sist according to one scries. As therefore, the end of intelligibles was
intellectual, so likewise the beginning of intellectuals is allotted an in-
telligible hyparxis. And each of these indeed is intelligible ; but the one
is intelligible simply ; and the other is not intelligible without the addi-
tion of the intellectual. These therefore, are consubsistent with each
other. And the one indeed, is the paternal cause of the whole of things,
so far as it is intelligible, and the intellectual which is in it is extended in-
telligibly. But the other is generatively constitutive of the same things,
because it is intellectual, and intelligible good presides in the intellectual
genus. All things therefore, are from both, exeinptly indeed, from the
intellectual of intelligibles, but coordinately, from the intelligible of in-
tellectuals. And both indeed, rejoice in unknown hyparxes; and are
alone, as Plato says, known by intelligible, mystic, and ineffable impres-
sions, iience also he calls the attempt boldness which endeavours to
unfold the arcana concerning them, and to explain by words their un-
known union.
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CHAP. XI. OF PLATO. 24-7
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CHAP. XI. OF PLATO. 24-7
From the end of the intelligible order however, the summit of intel-
lectuals possesses its unknown peculiarity. For so far as it conjoint
itself to the first intelligibles, and is filled with their unical, ineffable, and
paternal hyparxis, so far also it exists in an unknown manner prior to
intellectuals. Hence it is incomprehensible by the natures posterior to it;
but it is known by those prior to it, being super-expanded into a continued
union with them.' It likewise knows the natures prior to itself intelligibly ;
but this does not at all differ from uniform and ineffable knowledge.
For intelligible knowledge is the union, cause, summit, and unknown and
occult hyparxis of all knowledge. Since therefore, the one and united
triad is, if it be lawful so to speak, the intellectual image of the unknown
union of intelligibles, and presides over the same uniform and unknown
power in intellectuals, as its own cause does, hence Plato mystically
unfolds it through negations. For every where that which is highest,
and that which is unknown, are analogous to the unical God. As
therefore, we are taught to celebrate this God through negations, after
the same manner we endeavour to unfold negatively the uniform and
unknown summits of secondary orders. And in short, since Socrates
in the Phtedrus makes the ascent as far as to the supercelestial place,
arranging it analogous to the first, as in this order, and in the ascent of
souls, he celebrates it by negations. For in the Timasus, Plato contends
that the one demiurgus through whom every demiurgic genus of Gods
subsists is ineffable and unknown; and every where that which is highest
has this transcendency with respect to secondary natures. For it imi-
tates the cause which is at once unically exempt from all beings. We
celebrate this cause however, through negations alone, as existing prior
to all things; but we unfold the summits which proceed analogous to it,
affirmatively and at the same time negatively. As participating indeed,
the natures prior to themselves, we celebrate them affirmatively. For
Plato calls the supercelestial place essence which truly is, the plain of
truth, the meadow, and the intelligible place of survey of the Gods, and
he docs not only call it without colour, without figure, and without
1 Fot *vtv, it i* necessary to retd mm*.
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oontadt, thus mingling affirmations with negations. For this order is a
medium between the intelligible Gods and the first intellectual divine
orders, containing the bond of both. And it guards indeed intellectual!/,
according to a uniform and unknown transcendency, but transmits
the plenitudes of intelligibles as far as to the last of things. It likewise
derates all things at once, according to one common union, as fa r as to
the intelligible father, and generates and produces them as far as to matter.
Being therefore established between the unical and the multiplied Gods,
it « unfolded, negatively indeed, through the unknown manner in which
it transcends secondary natures, but affirmatively through its partici-
pation of the first natures. For the first demiurgus is called in the
Timsus fabricator and father, and good, and all such names, so far as he
participates of preexistent causes; but so far as he is the monad of all
fabrication, Plato leaves him unknown and ineffable, exempt from all
the fabricators of things. For he says, " it is difficult to discover him,
and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men." Thus
therefore Plato unfolds the supercelestial place, affirmatively indeed, as
being filled from the first causes, at one time indeed calling it essence*
which truly is, at another the plain of truth, and at another, something
else of this kind; but' so far as it transcends the intellectual Gods, and
•o far as -it is supreme and unical, he celebrates it negatively, in the
same manner as the principle which is exempt from all things.
CHAPTER XII.
It follows therefore, in the next place, that we should consider what
the negations are, and from what orders they are generated. In the
Parmenides then, the negations of the one are produced from all the
• 8. i» omitted in the original, which the vme eridently require, to be inawttA
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CHAP. XII.
OF PLATO.
249
In the
Parmenides then, the negations of the one are produced from all the
• 8. i» omitted in the original, which the vme eridently require, to be inawttA
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CHAP. XII.
OF PLATO.
249
divine orders, because the me is die cause of all of them. And every
thing divine- according to the hypavxis of itself participates of the first
principle ; and the one in consequence of transcending these is in a much
greater degfee exempt from the natures posterior to these. For from
these all things proceed; since they receive partibly the peculiarities of
these. This however iB evident from (he otter hypotheses* in which Che
same conclusions are again1 eircalated, at one time being connected
together negatively, and *t anotlier affirmatively. For what is* there
wlrichr could be able to subsist, unless it was- antecedently comprehended
according Vo cause in wholes ? But in the Pined r us, the things which are
denied of the intelligible summit of air intellectuals are the natures whieb
am proximately established after this summit, vis. the sacred genera; the
connective, tike perfective, and the' paternal of what are" properly called'
intellectuals For this summit being exempt front these, it also,
transcends all the intellectual Gods. For what every genus of the Gods
is to Me one, that the three orders posterior to this* summit, arettr it-
Plato therefore denominates the cctestia* order which connectedly con-
tains wholes, and illuminates them with intelligible light, colour ; because
likewise the apparent beauty of this sensible heaven is resplendent' with;
all various colours, and with light. Hence he calls that heaven intel-
lectual colour, and light For the light proceeding from the good is [in
the orders] above [the heaven] unknown and occult, abiding in- the
adyta of the Gods ; but it shines forth in this order, and from being
unapparent becomes manifest. Hence it is assimilated to colour the
offspring of light.
Farther still, if the heaven is sight beholding the things above, the
intelligible of it may very properly be called colour which is- conjoined1
with the sight. The cause therefore of the intelligibles in the heaven is-
without colour, but is exempt from tfiem ; fbr sensible colour is the
offspri ng of the solar light. But Plato denominates the order which proxi-
mately subsists after the celestial order, and which' we have called- the
subcelestiat arch, figure. For the arch itself is the' name of a figure.
And in short, in this order, Parmenides also places intellectual figure.
But Plato first attributes contact to the summit of intellectuals, as is
Froc. Vol. I. 2 1
250
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK IV.
For the arch itself is the' name of a figure.
And in short, in this order, Parmenides also places intellectual figure.
But Plato first attributes contact to the summit of intellectuals, as is
Froc. Vol. I. 2 1
250
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK IV.
evident from the conclusions of the Parmenides. For in the first hypo-
thesis taking away figure from the one, he uses this as a medium, viz.
that the one does not touch itself. " But the one" says he, " does not
touch itself." And the conclusion is evident. Here therefore contact
first subsists, and subsists according to cause. For of those things of
which the deraiurgus is proximately the cause, the father who is prior to
him is paradigmatically the cause. In this order therefore, contact is
the paradigm of the liberated Gods. Hence these three orders are
successive, viz. colour, figure, and contact. And fromt hese the super,
celestial place is essentially exempt. Hence it is without colour, without
figure, and without contact. Nor does it transcend these three priva.-
tively, but according to causal excellence. For it imparts to colour
from intelligibles the participation of light ; on figure it confers by illu-
mination intellectual bound ; and in contact it supernally inserts union
and continuity, and perfects all things by its power, things which are
touched indeed, through union, those that are figured, through the par-
ticipation of bound, and those that are coloured, through the illumination
of light. But it draws upward, and allures to itself every thing ineffably,
and through intelligible impressions, and fills every thing with unieai
goods.
. If therefore, we assert these things rightly, we must not admit the
interpretHtion of those who are busily occupied in sensible colours, and
contacts, and figures, and who assert that the supercclestia) place is
exempt from these. For these are trifling, and by no means adapted
to that place. For even nature, not only that which exists as a whole*
but that also which \& partial, is exempt from sensible colours, from
apparent figures, and from corporeal contact. What therefore is there
venerable in this, if it is also present to natures themselves? But it is
necessary to extend colours, and figures, and contacts, from on high as
far as to the last of things, and to evince that the supercclestial place, is
similarly exempt from all these. For soul also and intellect participate
of figure; and contact is frequently in incorporeal natures, according to
the communion of first with secondary beings, and it is usual to call
these communications contacts, and to denominate the touchings of
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CHAP. XIII.
OF PLATO.
251
XIII.
OF PLATO.
251
intellectual perceptions adhesions. We should not therefore be carried
from things first to things last, nor compare the highest order of intel-
lectuals with the last of beings, above which both soul and nature are
established. For in so doing we shall err, and shall not attend to Plato,
who exclaims that it is boldness to assert these things concerning it. For
where is the boldness, and what the unknown power transcending our
conceptions, in contemplating the truth of sensible colours, figures, and
contacts. For an hypostasis of this kind is known by physiologists, and
not by the sons of theoiogists. Such therefore is the power possessed by
the negations through which Plato celebrates the supercelestial place.
CHAPTER XIII.
Again then, let us in the next place survey the affirmations, how they
exist according to the participation of the first intclligiblcs themselves.
The supercelestial place therefore, is said to be essence which truly is,
because it participates of that which is primarily being. For to be, and
truly to be are present to all things, as the progeny of the intelligible
essence. For as the one is from the first principle which is prior to
intelligibles, so the nature of being is from intelligibles. For there the
one being subsists, as Parmcnides a little before taught us. But the
supercelestial place is beheld by the governor of the soul, because it is
allotted an intelligible transcendency with respect to the other intel-
lectual Gods. Hence the intelligible good of it is rendered manifest from
its being known by intellect. This intelligible therefore, in the same
manner as that which is truly being, arrives to it from the unical Gods.
For they are primarily and impnrticipably intelligibles, and the first
efficient causes of all intelligibles. These things also concur with each
other, viz. that which is truly being, and the intelligible. For every
552 ON THE THEOLOGY . BOOK IV-
intelligible is truly being, and every thing which is truly being is
intelligible. For intellect is intelligible according to the being which
is in it ; but according to its gnostic power it is intellect. Hence also
every intellect is the supplier of knowledge ; but every intelligible is the
supplier of essence. For that which each is primarily, it imparts by
illumination to tbe secondary orders.
CHAFfER XIV.
Hence also
every intellect is the supplier of knowledge ; but every intelligible is the
supplier of essence. For that which each is primarily, it imparts by
illumination to tbe secondary orders.
CHAFfER XIV.
In tbe third place therefore, the genus of true science is said to be
established about tbe superceleslial place. For these two things ascend
to the contemplation of that essence, viz. intellect the governor of the
soul (but this is a partial intellect established indeed above souls, and
elevating them to their paternal port) and true science which is the
perfection of the soul. This therefore energies about that place, as
transitively revolving in harmonic measures about being. But intellect
contemplates it, as employing simple intellection. Farther still, the
science which is in us is one thing, but that which is in the supercelestial
place another. And the former indeed is true, but the latter is truth
itself. What therefore is it, and whence does it subsist ? It is indeed a
deity which is the fountain of all intellectual knowledge, and the 6rst
efficient cause of undented and stable intelligence.' But it shines forth
in the first triad of intellectuals, because this is perfective of all other
things and likewise of divine souls. For these ascending to this uniform
power of all knowledge, perfect their own knowledge. For each of the
undefined souls, says Socrates, revolving together with Jupiter and tbe
heaven, surveys justice, temperance and science. Hence, these three
fountains are there, being intelligible deities, and the fountains of the
' - «
1 For nM»{ it i* neewsary to read r*y«>i-
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CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 253
Hence, these three
fountains are there, being intelligible deities, and the fountains of the
' - «
1 For nM»{ it i* neewsary to read r*y«>i-
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CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 253
intellectual virtues, and not being, as some think they are, intellectual
forms. For Plato is accustomed to characterize these by the term itself,
as for instance science itself and justice itself; and this Socrates says
somewhere in the Phaedo. But here when he says justice herself,
temperance herself, and science herself, he appears to unfold 10 us certain
self-perfect and intelligible deities, which have a triadic subsistence. And
of these scienee indeed is the monad ; but temperance has the second
order ; and justice the third. And science indeed is the supplier of
undefiled, firm and immutable intelligence ; but temperance imparts to
all the Gods the cause of conversion to themselves ; and justice imparts
to them the cause of the distribution of the whole of good according to
desert. Aud through science indeed, each of the Gods intellectually
pcrceives the natures prior to himself, and is filled with intelligible intel-
ligence ; ' but through temperance he is converted to himself, and enjoys
a second union, and a good coordinate to the conversion to himself ; and
through justice he rules over the natures posterior to himself, in a silent
path, as they say, measures their desert, and supplies a distribution adapted
to each. These three fountains therefore contain all the energies of the
Gods. And science indeed proceeds analogous to the first triad of
intelligibles. And as that triad imparts essence to all things, so this
illuminates the Gods with knowledge. But temperance proceeds
analogous to the second triad of intelligibles. For temperance imitates
the connective and measuring power of that triad ; since it measures the
energies of the Gods, and converts each of them to itself. And justice
proceeds analogous to the third triad of intelligibles. For it also
separates secondary natures according to appropriate desert,* in the
same manner as that triad separates them intelligibly by the first para-
digms.
• Here also it is requisite to adopt the same reading as before, p. 258.
* Instead of xtera tv xyw)x»uc /t«i) is indeed nutriment, but in a divided manner.
• Here also it is requisite to adopt the same reading as before, p. 258.
* Instead of xtera tv xyw)x»uc /t«i) is indeed nutriment, but in a divided manner.
The plain however of truth is the expansion and manifestation of
intelligible light, the evolution of inward reasons, and perfection pro-
ceeding every where. This therefore* is the peculiarity of the third
monad. But fecundity is the peculiarity of the second ; and intelligible
plenitude of the first For all the supercelestial place is indeed illumi-
nated with the light of truth. Hence all the natures that are contained
in it are called true. And Socrates says, " that whatever soul attending
on divinity has beheld any thing of reality shall be free from damage,
till another period takes place." For every thing in that place is truly
being and intelligible, and is full of divine union. In the first monads
however [i. e. in the plain of truth and the meadow,] this intelligible
light subsists contracted ly, and is occultly established as it were in the
adyta ; but in the third monad [viz. in the nourishing cause of the Gods]
it shines forth, and is co-expanded, and is co-divided with the multitude
of" powers. We may therefore from these things survey the differences of
the three monads, in a manner conformable to the Platonic hypotheses.
But if indeed science pertains to the first monad, temperance to the
second, and justice to the third, from these things also the triad will be
perfectly apparent. And does not science* which is stable, and the uni-
form intelligence of wholes, and which at the same time is consubsistent
with intelligibles, pertain to the power which is united to the intelligible .
father, and which does not proceed, nor separate its union from the deity
of that father ? but does not the genus of justice pertain to the power
which is divided, which separates the intellectual genera, leads the
intelligible multitude into order, and imparts by illumination distribution
according to desert ? And does not the genus of temperance pertain to
the power which is the medium of both these, which is converted to
itself, and possesses the common bond of this triad ? For the harmonic,
• Pot turn* I read «rw>, * i. e. Perfection proceeding every where.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK IV.
For the harmonic,
• Pot turn* I read «rw>, * i. e. Perfection proceeding every where.
Proc. Vol. I. 2 K
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK IV.
all the divisions of the world. For what is it which primarily connects
tilings ? If, as some say, the nature of spirit and local motion, body it-
self which is connective of other things will require connexion. For every
body according to its own composition is dissipable and divisible ; which
also the Elean guest indicating to those who make corporeal principles,
says that the essence which is so much celebrated by them, is broken and
dissipated. Body therefore, is not naturally adapted to be connective of
other things, nor even if a power of this kind pertained to bodies, would
spirit be able to afford us this power, because it is always defluous and
dissipated, and diffusing itself beyond that which bounds is wanting in the original, and I have therefore supplied
it in the translation.
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of the odd asmber, but things tliai are less excellent and more various, to
the aalure of the eve* number. For every where indeed,, the odd number
is the leader ot impartible, simple, and unheal goods; bnt the even num-
ber is the cause of divided, various, and generative progressions. And
thus we may see all the orders of beings woven together according to di-
vine number which is moat ancient, intellectual, and exempt irorn all
the dinumerated genera. For it is necessary that number should exist
prior to the things that are numbered, and that prior to things which are
separated there should be the cause of all separation, according to which
the genera of the Gods are divided, and arc distinguished in an orderly
manner by appropriate numbers.
For it is necessary that number should exist
prior to the things that are numbered, and that prior to things which are
separated there should be the cause of all separation, according to which
the genera of the Gods are divided, and arc distinguished in an orderly
manner by appropriate numbers.
If therefore in intellectuals there are divisions, contacts, and separa-
tions of the proceeding natures, and likewise communications of coordi-
nate natures, it is necessary that number should be prior to intellectuals,
which divides and. collects all things intelligibly by the powers of itself.
And if all things subsist occultly, intelligibly, in an unknown manner and
exeraptly in this summit, ' there is a number of them* and a peculiarity
unical and without separation. Number therefore subsists according to
the middle bond of intelligibles and intellectuals, being indeed expanded
above intellectuals through; intelligible goods but subordinate to intelligi-
bles through intellectual separations. And it is assimilated indeed to
intelligibles according to the power which is collective of many things
into union, but to intellectuals according to the power which is generative
of the many from the otic. But from this highest place of survey of the
intellectual Gods, it constitutes the first intellectual numbers themselves
which have, the nature of forms, arc universal, and preside over the whole
of generation and production. It likewise constitutes the second num-
bers, which are supermundane, and vivific, and measure the Gods that
ure in the world. But it constitutes as the third numbers, these celestial
governors of the perpetual circulations, and who convolve all the orbs
according to the intellectual causes of them. And it constitutes as the
last numbers those powers that in the sublunary region connect and
■ It is requisite to supply ia this place n tj eing, of essential numbers.
And it constitutes as the
last numbers those powers that in the sublunary region connect and
■ It is requisite to supply ia this place n tj eing, of essential numbers.
Since however, from this deity which is intelligible, that which is
posterior to it proceeds, it is evidently necessary that the monad, duad,
and triad, should severally have prolific power. These powers therefore;
Parmenides calls once, twice, thrice. For each of these is a power
which is the cause of the above-mentioned essences that produce either
separately, or connectedly. For there with respect to the generations of
them, some of them are entirely peculiar, but others are common to
secondary natures. The progeny therefore of these are, the oddly-odd,
the evenly-even and the evenly-odd.' And of these, the oddly-odd
indeed, as we have before observed, is collective into union of the divine
progressions. But the evenly-even is generative of wholes, and proceeds
as for as to the last of things. The evenly-odd however, is mixed, having
its subsistence from both the even and the odd. Hence we must
establish the first as analogous to bound, but the second as analogous to
power, and the third as analogous to being. And you may see, how
indeed in the first order all things had a primary subsistence, viz. monad,
duad, triad; but how in this order, all things arc secondarily and subordi-
nate^. And the mixture which is the triad, subsisted there indeed in
one way, but here the evenly-odd subsists in another way. For there
the extremes were odd, because they were intelligible; but here the even
is more abundant, and the intelligible summit only is odd. For the
middle of the triad is analogous to power. And there indeed, is the
monad, which has all the forms of odd numbers according to cause, and
the duad is there, which is occultly all the forms of even numbers,
and also the triad, which is number primarily. But here both the odd
and the even number now subsist in a twofold respect, in one place ir*
« t» «{rMff|irra is omitted in the original.
I
CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 293
But here both the odd
and the even number now subsist in a twofold respect, in one place ir*
« t» «{rMff|irra is omitted in the original.
I
CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 293
an unmingled, and in another in a mingled manner. All tilings there-
fore, are here prolifically, but there, paternally and intelligibly. But that
monad docs not proceed from intelligiblcs, but subsists in them in
unprocceding union. Hence, after these, and from these, we may survey
the whole of number subsisting according to a third progression. "For
these things," says Parmenides, " preexisting, no number will be absent."
Every number therefore, is generated through these in the third monad,
and both the one and being become many, difference separating each of
them. And every part indeed of being participates of the one; but
every unity is carried as in a vehicle in a certain portion of being.
Each of these however, is multiplied, intellectually separated, divided
into minute parts, and proceeds to infinity. For as in intelligibles, we
attribute infinite multitude to the third triad, so here, in this triad we
assign infinite number to the third part of the triad. For in short every
where, the infinite is the extremity, as proceeding in an all-perfect
manner, and comprehending indeed all secondary natures, but being
itself participated by none of them. In the first monad therefore, there
were powers, but intelligibly. In the second, there were progressions
and generations, but both intelligibly and intellectually. And in the
third, there was all-powerful number, unfolding the whole of itself into
light; and which also Parmenides denominates infinite. It is likewise
especially manifest that it is not proper to transfer this infinity to
quantity. For how can there be an infinite number, since infinity is
hostile to the nature of number? And how are the parts of the one equal
to the minute parts of being? For in infinites there is not the equal. But
this indeed has been thought worthy of attention by those who were
prior to us*
*
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CHAPTER XXXII.
And how are the parts of the one equal
to the minute parts of being? For in infinites there is not the equal. But
this indeed has been thought worthy of attention by those who were
prior to us*
*
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER XXXII.
The division therefore into three, having been demonstrated by us, we
shall briefly observe, that the one appears to be many according to this
order, the one itself proceeding into a multitude of unities, and being in
a similar manner becoming generated in conjunction with the one. For
those three monads are the intelligible comprehensions of all orders, and
they at once preside over all the progressions from intelligibles, produce
all of them in an exempt manner, and collect them to the intelligible
causes. Since however, Plotinus admits that number is prior to animal
itself, and says that the first being produces from itself number, and that
this is established as a medium between the one being, and animal itself,
but is the basis and place of beings, it is worth while to speak likewise
concisely about this. For if he says that animal itself has intelligible
and occult number, as comprehended in the monad, he speaks rightly,
and accords with Plato. But if he says that animal itself comprehends
number, now separated, or which has a multiform subsistence, and is the
progeny of difference, intelligible multitude is not a thing of this kind.
For there indeed, the one. is being, and being is the one. Hence animal
itself is according to all things perfect. But in number, the one is
separated from being, and being from the one, and each of the parts is no
longer an intelligible whole, as an animal itself. For that is a whole of
wholes; and every where the one was with being in the parts of it, and
animal itself was only-begotten. But number proceeded after the two-
fold coordinations, I mean the monad and duad, the odd and the even
number. How therefore, can we place in animal itself the first number?
If however, some one should say that number exists there, it i8 according
to cause and intelligibly. But it is intellectually separated by diflerence.
And farther still, in addition to these things, if animal itself is surveyed
by some one in the demiurgic order, and he denominates it the plenitude
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CHAP. XXXII.
OF PLATO.
But it is intellectually separated by diflerence.
And farther still, in addition to these things, if animal itself is surveyed
by some one in the demiurgic order, and he denominates it the plenitude
Digitized by Google
CHAP. XXXII.
OF PLATO.
of forms, and the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect, it will thus have
intellectual number, as being arranged near the intellectual end. But if
he should call intelligible animal number, in this case there will be
separation and difference in the Gods, whom we have asserted to be
established above the whole of things, according to supreme union. For
all section and division originate from the intellectual Gods; since here
difference proceeds, adorning things in conjunction with the one and
being. How therefore, does the division of the unities into minute parts,
or the multiform nature of beings pertain to intelligibles? And how can
the multitude of all forms accord with the first animal itself? For the
tetrad was there, divided by the monad and triad, a division of this kind
being adapted to the third order of intelligible forms. For as the one
being is a monad, but eternity is a monad and duad, (for to be is con-
joined with the ever) so animal itself is a monad and triad. Since
however, it comprehends in itself the cause of all number, Timoeus
denominates it the tetrad which is comprehensive of the four first-
effective causes. For the tetrad itself preexists as the fountain of all the
production of forms. But in intelligibles the monad, duad and triad
subsist unically; but in intellectuals in a divided manner.
Difference therefore necessarily generates all these for us with sepa-
ration. For every where, the first of subordinate natures have the peculiar
form of the natures that exist prior to them.' Hence, the first multitudes
proceed indeed from the one, but they are unical, without separation,
and without number, imitating the one principle of the whole of things.
Very properly therefore, does Parmenitles constitute multitude in intelli-
gibles, according to the end [of the intelligible order]; but number in
intellectuals accordiug to the beginning [of the intelligible and at the
same time intellectual order.] And these are conjoined with each other.
Parmcnidcs also pre-establishes unical and intelligible multitude, as the
cause of intellectual numbers. And Timneus shows that animal itself is
only-begotten, because it was monadically the cause of the whole of
• Instead of «««- ff ir.
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things, and not dyadically, nor according to divine difference. That
number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, wc have abundant!/
shown.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
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things, and not dyadically, nor according to divine difference. That
number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, wc have abundant!/
shown.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
But Parmenides begins to speak about it as follows: " Proceed
therefore, and still farther consider this. What? We have said that
the one participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said so.
And on this account the one being appears to be many." But he
completes his discourse about the first monad thus : ** Are not three
things odd, and two even ? How should they not ?' And about the
second monad, as follows : " Hence there will be the evenly-even, and
.the oddly-odd, and the oddly-even, and the evenly-odd." But he
.completes his discourse about the third and all the succeeding triad, as
follows : " The one being therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise
necessary that the one which is distributed by being should be many.
Entirely so." The first triad, therefore, of the intelligible, and at the
same time, intellectual Gods, is through these things unfolded to us by
Plato, and which possesses indeed, according to the first monad the
first powers of numbers, I mean the odd and the even, and is completed
through these principles which were in intelligibies occultly, viz. monad,
duad, triad. But according to the second monad it possesses the second
powers of numbers which subsist from these [i. e. from the first powers].
For the section of the forms of the even number, is allotted a second
order. And the oddly-odd is subordinate to the first odd numbers.
But according to the third monad, it possesses the more partial causes of
divine numbers. Hence also, a separation into minute parts, infinity,
CHAP. XXXIV. OF PLATO. 297
all-perfect division, and unical and essential number are here ; receiving
indeed, the unical and the essential from unity and being, but the sepa-
ration of number from difference. For every where difference is in the
three monads, but it particularly unfolds the multitudes of numbers,
according to the third monad, generates more partial Gods, and divides
being in conjunction with the Gods. For neither is deity in these
imparticipable, because unity is not separate from being, nor is essence
destitute of deity, because neither is being deprived of the one.
For neither is deity in these
imparticipable, because unity is not separate from being, nor is essence
destitute of deity, because neither is being deprived of the one.
Since however, all things are in each of the monads, but unically and
intelligibly in the first, generative!}', and according to the peculiarity of
difference in the second, and intellectually, and according to being in the
third ;— this being the case, Plato when unfolding to us the first monad,
very properly begins from the monad, and proceeds as far as to the triad;
but when teaching about the second, he begins from evenly-even num-
bers, and proceeds as far as to those that are evenly-odd, both which
belong to the nature of the even number. Aud when he adds the third
monad, he begins from being, and recurs through difference to the one*
For having shown that being participates of number, he from hence leads
us round to unical number, employing the mode of conversion in the
conception of this monad.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
If, however, it be requisite to survey the unknown peculiarity of divine
numbers, and how the first order of intelligibles and intellectuals, and
number which subsists according to this order, is the most ancient of all
numbers, in the first place, we should consider the infinity mentioned by
Parmenides, and see whether he does not say that intelligible multitude
is infinite on account of this number, in consequence of its being unknown
Proc. Vol. I. 2 P
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK IV.
and incomprehensible by partial conceptions. For the all-perfect, and
all-powerful peculiarity of divine numbers is exempt from the compre-
hension of partible natures, [such as ours]. They are therefore unknown,
and on this account are said to be inexplicable, and not to be investigated.
For number also in the last of things, and multitude, together with the
known have likewise the unknown. And we are notable to comprehend
the progression of every number iu consequence of being vanquished by
infinity. The incomprehensibility therefore, of this power which is un-
known according to a discursive energy, is comprehended according to
cause, in intelligible numbers and multitudes. For there would not be a
thing of this kind in the last of numbers, unless the unknown preexisted
in intelligible numbers, and unless the former were ultimate imitations of
the exempt incomprehensibility of the latter.
For there would not be a
thing of this kind in the last of numbers, unless the unknown preexisted
in intelligible numbers, and unless the former were ultimate imitations of
the exempt incomprehensibility of the latter.
In the second place, after this, we may also add, that unical numbers
are likewise of themselves unknown. For they are more ancient than
beings, more single than forms, and being generative of, exist prior to the
forms which we call intelligible. But the most venerable of divine ope-
rations manifest this, since they employ numbers, as possessing an ineffa-
ble efficacy, and through these effect the greatest, and most arcane of
works. And prior to these nature ineffably, according to sympathy, im-
parts different powers to different ' things, to some solar, but to others
lunar powers, and renders the productions of these concordant with*
numbers. For in these monadic numbers also, the forms of numbers,,
such as the triad, the pentad, and the heptad, are one thing, but the
unions of the forms another thing. For each of these forms is both one,,
and multitude. Hence form is unknown according to the highest union.
If therefore, monadic number participates of a certain unknown power,
much more must the first number possess this peculiarity unically exempt
from the whole of things. And besides this, we may also assume the
anagogic power of numbers, not only because they define the periods of the
physical restitutions, circumscribing our indefinite lation by appropriate
measures, perfecting us according to these measures, and conjoining us.
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CHAP. XXXIV.
OF PLATO.
299
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CHAP. XXXIV.
OF PLATO.
299
to our first causes, but because likewise, number in a remarkable manner
possesses a certain power of attracting to truth, as Socrates says in the
Republic, leading us to intelligibles from a sensible nature. ' As there*
fore, the last number is allotted this peculiarity, what ought we to say
about the first number? Is it not this, that it unfolds intelligible light,
especially persuades to an establishment in intelligibles, and through its
own order announces to us the uniform power of principles? If there-
fore, we rightly assert these things, we shall in a greater degree admire
Timaeus, who having placed time over the perfections of souls, and the
whole world, through which it would become move similar to animal
itself says, that time proceeds according to number, and by number mea-
sures the existence of total souls. And as in intellectuals, number is
established above the celestial circulation, collecting and causing it to be
one, thus also in sensibles Timaeus says, that time being number measures
the celestial periods, and comprehends in itself the first causes of the per-
fection of the periods. If also, Socrates in the Republic, in the speech of
the Muses, speaks about the one and entire period of the universe, which
he says a perfect number comprehends, does it not through these things
appear that divine number is perfective of wholes, and restores them to
their pristine state, and that it measures all periods? The power likewise
of collecting things imperfect to the perfect, accedes to all things from
number, which elevates souls from things apparent to those that are un*
apparent, illuminates the whole world with the perfection of motion, and
defines to all things measures, and the order of periods. But if not only
a perfect number contains the period of a divine generated 1 nature, but
another second number after this is the lord of better and worse genera-
tions, as the same Socrates says, number will not only restore things to
their pristine state, but will also be of a generative nature. And it is evident
that these things subsist in a divided manner, according to the second and
third periods of numbers; but at once, and contractedly inthefirstof
' Instead of *w*yw> ^t «T« tuj* v^tw on ri|v *i»*ifti)f fun*, it U necetaary to read ira*/»»
rti To)* voijtx* **a ttj; ai«4qn|{ $u i.
" Eyery perpetually circulating body is called by Plato, a divine generated nature.
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numbers, The first number therefore, is generative, mensurative, and
perfective of generated natures.
CHAPTER XXXV.
" Eyery perpetually circulating body is called by Plato, a divine generated nature.
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numbers, The first number therefore, is generative, mensurative, and
perfective of generated natures.
CHAPTER XXXV.
The first order therefore of mtelligiblcs and intellectuals is thus sur-
veyed by Parmenides. But after this the order which possesses the
middle place of intelligibles and intellectuals, and which a little before wc
called connective, presents itself to the view. It is however denominated
in a three-fold respect, viz. one, many, whole, parts, finite, infinite. For
since the separation of unities and beings from number, extends to it, the
one and being, which we have said difference divides, become wholes.
But the thing* proceeding from these, are the parts of these. And
wholeness indeed connectedly contains parts, but these are contained by
their wholeness, in one way indeed, by the one, but in another by being.
For there indeed, I mean in the summit of the intellectual Gods, unity
was the cause of multitude, at the same time being exempt from multi-
tude, and generative of the many. But here unity is coarranged with
multitude. Hence also it is a whole which has reference to many unities
as to parts. Since however, the connective order is triple, one division
of it being intelligible, another intelligible and intellectual, and anotheF
intellectual, the first monad indeed subsists according to the one and the
many ; but the second, according to whole and parts ; and the third, ac-
cording to the finite and the infinite. For where the first triad ends,
there the second has its beginning. Hence, in the triad prior to this>
Parmenides infers that the one is many. And in this triad, he concludes
the same thing together with what remains. There however, the one was
generative of infinites; but here the one is comprehensive of many, the
whole of parts, and the finite of infinites. Hence, there indeed, unity is
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CHAP. XXXV.
OF PLATO.
301
And in this triad, he concludes
the same thing together with what remains. There however, the one was
generative of infinites; but here the one is comprehensive of many, the
whole of parts, and the finite of infinites. Hence, there indeed, unity is
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CHAP. XXXV.
OF PLATO.
301
exempt from the many ; but here it is coarranged with multitude. Hence
also, the first coarrangement generates whole together with parts; but the
subsistence of whole and parts produces the finite and at the same time
infinite. For these are successive to each other, viz. the one, the whole,
the finite, and the things which are as it were in an opposite arrangement
to these, the many, parts, infinites. And the one itself is indeed the prin-
ciple of the rest. But whole has now a habitude Avith respect to parts,
and a representation of the duad, and proceeds into a coarrangement with
reference to the parts. The finite however, is now multitude, participating
of bound and the one, and is as it were a triad. For it is neither bound
alone, as the monad, nor infinite alone, as the duad, but it participates of
bound, which is primarily a triad. Every thing finite therefore, is a
whole, but not every whole is finite. For the infinite is a whole, whether
it is multitude, or magnitude. And every whole indeed, is one, but not
every one is a whole. For that which is without habitude to multitude
is not a whole. The one therefore, is beyond whole ; but whole is beyond
the finite.
After the same manner also, infinite parts are said to be the parts of
that which is finite. For the infinite of itself has no subsistence; by
which also it is evident that the infinite is not in quantity in energy,' but
in capacity. All parts however are not infinite. For according to bound
they are characterized by one of the parts. And again, parts indeed are
many, but the many are not entirely parts. The niauy therefore, arc
prior to parts : and parts are prior to infinites. Hence, as the many are
to the one, so are parts to whole, and so are infinites to the finite. And
these three connectedly-containing monads, give completion to the middle
order of inlelligibles and intellectuals. For unity indeed, is the supplier
of stable and intelligible connection to all the secondary orders. But
wholeness connects the progressions of divine natures, and produces one
habitude of the orderly distribution of wholes. And the finite monad
imparts by illumination to the conversions of second natures, connection
with the natures prior to them. And one of these iudced is analogous*
' iv Tfl mfytix is omitted is the original-
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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And the finite monad
imparts by illumination to the conversions of second natures, connection
with the natures prior to them. And one of these iudced is analogous*
' iv Tfl mfytix is omitted is the original-
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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to the one being, on which account also it is intelligible. But another is
analogous to the third order, in which there wns the one, and the duad
which generates inBnite multitude. Such is the connective triad, which
Parmenidcs exhibits to us through these things. The one therefore, is
one and many, whole and parts, finite and infinite multitude. Let no
one however, be disturbed that Plato calls the one or being infinite mul-
titude. For he calls the one and being when they have proceeded and
are divided, infinite in multitude. For all multitude indeed, is referred
to the intelligible infinity. But divided multitude, and which has pro-
ceeded perfectly, is most signally infinite.
Since therefore, all the primary causes of intellectuals are in this triad,
and all things are disseminated in its bosoms, the first Synocheus indeed,
comprehends these causes as multitude, being himself an intelligible unity,
and the flower as it were of the triad. But the second comprehends
indeed secondarily these causes, but co-arranged and co-multiplied with
them. And the third, together with all-perfect division, connects the
multitude, comprehended in himself. Each of them also is connective,
but one as bounding, another as giving completion to a whole, and ano-
ther as uniting. Plato therefore made, and makes as he proceeds his
demonstrations of the one. For the whole theory is concerning the one.
But it is evident that being is co-divided with the one. For universally,
it has been before observed, that every deity proceeding thence is parti-
cipate, und that every portion of being participates of deity. It is ne-
cessary however, not to stop in the one alone, but to consider the same
peculiarity * as imparted to being in a secondary degree, since Plato also
produces the one itself ' by itself according to the differences of the divine
orders ; which occasions me to wonder at those who think that all the
conclusions of the second hypothesis are concerning intellect, and do not
perceive that Plato omitting being surveys the one itself by itself, as pro-
ceeding and generated, and receiving different peculiarities. For how in
discoursing concerning intellect could he omit being, according to which
intellect has its subsistence, power, and energy. For the one is beyond
' For M&i«ngr*c, h is necessary tofead iSionjTo;.
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CHAP. XXXVI.
OF PLATO.
303
For how in
discoursing concerning intellect could he omit being, according to which
intellect has its subsistence, power, and energy. For the one is beyond
' For M&i«ngr*c, h is necessary tofead iSionjTo;.
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CHAP. XXXVI.
OF PLATO.
303
the nature of intellect; but being gives hyparxis to intellect, and intellect
is nothing else than being. This opinion however of these men may be
confuted by many other arguments. But if the three connective Gods
are divided after the above-mentioned manner, and the intelligible con-
nective deity is one many, but the intelligible and at the same time intel-
lectual deity is whole and parts, and the intellectual is finite and infinite,
each of them is very properly called much. For each of the Synoches
according to his own peculiarity is a multitude. For the first about the
many, receives many Synoches of a more partial nature. The second
receives these according to parts. And the third, according to infinites.
If therefore, there are certain partial Gods who are allotted this peculia-
rity, they are comprehended in this first triad.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
Mo r bo v En, it is easy for every one to sec how these things accord
with what is written in the Phaedrus. For the connective one accords
with the back of the heaven that comprehends these. For the one and
the back are the same, comprehending according to one simplicity the
whole circulation. But whole is the same with the profundity of the
heaven, and with as it were the bulk of it. For the celestial profundity
is a whole extended from the back as far as to the arch. And end is
the same with the arch. This therefore, is evident beyond every thing,
and each of the other conclusions, is to be referred to the same concep-
tions. Hence from what has been said, it may be collected, that these
three things pertain in a remarkable degree to the Synoches, viz. theoney
whole, and the end [or the finite]. For what is so able to connect multi-
tude as the one which is co-arranged with it ? What is so connectedly-
compreheusive of parts as whole ? And how is it possible that the end
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{or bound,] should not be the cause of binding together things which arc
borne along to in6nity. It terminates therefore, their progression, and
brings back their dispersed section to the one essence of connection. And
thus much concerning the connective triad.
CHATTER XXXVII.
{or bound,] should not be the cause of binding together things which arc
borne along to in6nity. It terminates therefore, their progression, and
brings back their dispersed section to the one essence of connection. And
thus much concerning the connective triad.
CHATTER XXXVII.
But the third, as they say, to the saviour, and let us also following
Plato in what remains celebrate the perfective order of the Gods.
Because, therefore, the end of the connective order was the finite, [or the
bounded] the perfective order has extremes. For the end [or bound] is
the extremity. There however indeed the one was said to be the finite,
but here it is said to have an extremity, as receiving according to
participation that which has the power of terminating many things. And
there indeed, the one was end or bound, which also connectedly contains
the infinite ; but here having an extremity, it will also have a middle
and beginning, and will be perfect. For that which receives its com-
pletion from all these, is perfect. Here, therefore, the perfection which
consists of parts is apparent. For the consummation of the parts,
produces the perfect. Moreover, because such a one as this has a
middle and extremes, it will have the figure of a circumference, or it will
be rectilinear, or it will be mixed (jfroui the right and circular line].
For all these require a middle and extremes ; some indeed with sim-
plicity, but others with connexion. Three peculiarities, therefore, again
present themselves to our view ; the first, indeed, being that which we
said was to have extremes ; the second, being according to the perfect ;
and the third, according to figure. And there are also three perfective
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CHAP. XXXVIII. OF PLATO. 305
leaders of wholes ; one indeed being intelligible ; another, intelligible and
intellectual ; and the third, intellectual.
And there are also three perfective
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CHAP. XXXVIII. OF PLATO. 305
leaders of wholes ; one indeed being intelligible ; another, intelligible and
intellectual ; and the third, intellectual.
The intelligible leader, therefore, is said to have extremes, as being
directly arranged under the end of the connective Gods, and in the
boundaries of himself intelligibly comprehending all the intellectual
orders. But the intelligible and intellectual leader, is defined according
to the perfect, comprehending in himself the beginnings, middles, and
ends of beings, and giving completion to the middle bond of the whole
perfective triad. And the intellectual leader proceeds according to
triadic figure, being the cause of bound and divine perfection ; and
imparting termination to things indefinite, but intellectual perfection to
things imperfect. And this triad indeed is produced according to the
connective triad. For the end in them is the cause of the possession of
the extremity. But it is also produced from itself. For that which has
extremes, having become a whole, constitutes the perfect through end
[or bound]. But the perfect comprehending beginnings, middles and
ends, unfolds figure. And thus the perfective triad proceeds supernally,
as far as to the last of things, pervading to all things, and perfecting
both whole and partial causes.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
And do you not see how each of the triads conjoins the summit of
itself with the ends placed above it? For the one many was the end of
the collective and unknown triad ; and the same is the beginning of the
connective triad. The end of the connective triad was the finite; and
this again is the beginning of the perfective triad. For to have extremes
manifests that which consists of ends or bounds. And thus the whole
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middle order is connected with and united to itself, and is truly the bond
of total orders, itself establishing an admirable communion with itself;
but conjoining intellectuals to intelligibles, and convolving them to one
impartible union ; above indeed, having the intelligible and unknown
triad, but in the middle producing the triad which is connective of
progressions, and at the end, the convertive empire, through which it
proximately converts the intellectual to the intelligible Gods.
For on what account does intellect look to itself, and is in itself? Is
it not because it is on all sides finite or bounded, converges to itself, and
convolves its appropriate energies about itself? But why is it perfect,,
and full of intellectual goods ? Is it not because it first participates of
the perfection [of the above mentioned] leaders, and subsists according
to them, possessing a self-perfect essence and intellectual perception?
After what manner likewise, is it Baid to be a sphere, both by Plato,
and other theologiste? Is it not because it is the first participant of
figure, and is intellectually figured according to it? All conversion,
therefore, all perfection, and every intellectual figure, accede to the
intellectual Gods, from the perfective triad. For the intelligible leader
of perfection, gives perfection to the ends and summits and hyparxes of"
wholes. But the intelligible and intellectual leader terminates their
progressions which extend from on high as far as to the last of things.
And the intellectual leader comprehends in his own perfection, the
conversions of all the Gods, and bounds and perfects through figures
their progressions to infinity.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
Looking therefore to this division, we may be able to survey causally
many things which are to be found among other theologiste. For why
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CHAP. XXXIX.
OF PLATO.
307
CHAPTER XXXIX.
Looking therefore to this division, we may be able to survey causally
many things which are to be found among other theologiste. For why
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CHAP. XXXIX.
OF PLATO.
307
is one of the deities of tbe unknown triad carried in the first of the
worlds, but another in the middle breadth, and another in the extremity ?
It is because the first of these was uniform, but the second proceeded
according to difference, and the third, according to the infinite number
of beings. But why of the three connective Gods, is the first empyrean,
the second etheria], and the third material ? It is because the first indeed
subsists according to the one, and connectedly contains the one world.
But the second subsists according to whole, and divides the etherial
world. And the third according to the finite, and rules over material
infinity. But why again, are the Teletarchs co-divided with the
Synoches? Because the first having extremes governs like a charioteer
the wing of fire. But the middle comprehending beginnings, ends and
middles, perfects ether, which is also itself triple. And the third, which
comprehends according to one union, the orbicular, the rectilinear, and the
mixed* figure, perfects unfigured and fbrmlcM matter; giving form indeed
(/^wp«(r«f) to the inerratic sphere, and the first matter, by the orbicular ;
but to the planetary sphere, and the second matter, by the mixed figure.
For the spiral is there. And it gives form to the sublunary region, and
the last matter by the rectilinear. For the motions according to a right
line are in this region. Hence, the first triad is uniformly the cause of
the division of the worlds. But the second has a more abundant
representation of section, and of progression into parts ; yet does not
exhibit to us tbe multitude of the worlds. And the third unfolds the
seven worlds, and the monad together with two triads. So great is the
divine conception of Plato, that from these things we may survey the
causes of what after his time became apparent.
For this, indeed, from what has been said appears to be very admir-
able* that according to each of the triads, the middle is characteristic of
the whole triad. Thus for instance, in the unknown triad, difference
is established as the middle between the one and being. But in the
connective triad whole is the characteristic, which is the middle of
the one, and the finite. And in the perfective triad, the perfect is the
' r* ftixror is omitted in the origitut.
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But in the
connective triad whole is the characteristic, which is the middle of
the one, and the finite. And in the perfective triad, the perfect is the
' r* ftixror is omitted in the origitut.
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characteristic, which is itself established as the middle of that which has
extremes, and of figure. For difference is the feminine itself, and the
prolific nature of the Gods. And whole is itself the form of connected
comprehension, binding together many parts. And the perfect is itself
the good of perfection, possessing a beginning, middle, and end, and
conjoining the end to the beginning, according to the peculiarity of
conversion. Being also nothing else than a perfect governor it is the
cause of the peculiarity of these Gods subsisting every where according
to the middle centres. Hence the whole order of the intelligible, and
at the same lime, intellectual Gods, may be surveyed as having its
subsistence in the middle. For the intelligible Gods, indeed, are
especially defined according to hyparxes and summits ; on which account
also, they are called fathers, and unical Gods. For the one and father
are in them the same. But the intellectual Gods are defined according
to ends or extremities ; and on this account, all of them are denominated
intellects and intellectual. The intelligible, and at the same time,
intellectual Gods, however, being middles, especially present themseLves
to the view according to the middles of the triads.
Farther still, this also may be considered in common about all these
triads, that each according to the end proceeds to infinity. For the
end of the first triad is number ; of the second, the infinite in multitude;
and of the third, the rectilinear, which itself participates of the nature of
the infinite. And of this the cause is, that each of the triads according
to its extremity is curried as in a vehicle in the material worlds, and
comprehends according to one cause the infinity of the natures that are
generated in them. In addition, likewise, to what has been said, we
may survey the order of the triads, from the ends that are in them. For
the end of the first triad, is number : but of the second, the finite and the
infinite; and of the third, the orbicular, the mixed figure, and the
rectilinear. It is evident, therefore, that the first triad is monadic ; but
the second dyadic; and the third triadic. And the first of these indeed
is analogous to the one being ; but the second to the intelligible whole;
and the third, to the all-perfect whole. But that these have this order
with respect to each other, has been before pbserved. In short, there-
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CHAP. XXXIX.
OF PLATO.
And the first of these indeed
is analogous to the one being ; but the second to the intelligible whole;
and the third, to the all-perfect whole. But that these have this order
with respect to each other, has been before pbserved. In short, there-
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CHAP. XXXIX.
OF PLATO.
fore, every intelligible, and at the same time intellectual triad, is according
to its summit indeed conjoined to the intelligible ; but according to its
middle, unfolds its proper power; and according to its termination,
comprehends the infinity of secondary natures. And here we shall end
the doctrine concerning the intelligible and intellectual Gods.
S10 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
BOOK V.
CHAPTER I.
In the next place, let us survey another order of Gods, which is called
intellectual, being indeed conjoined to the orders prior to it, but termi-
nating the total progressions of the Gods, converting them to their
principle, and producing one circle of the primarily-efficient and all-
perfect orders. Let us also extend the intellect that is in us to the
imparticipable and divine intellect, and distinguish the orders and
diminutions of essence that are in it, according to the narration of
Plato.
This intellectual hypostasis therefore of the Gods, is suspended indeed
from more ancient causes, and is filled from them with total goodness
and self-sufficiency. But after these causes, it establishes an illustrious
empire over all secondary natures, binding to its dominion all the partial
progressions of the Gods. And it is denominated indeed intellectual,
because it generates an impartible and divine intellect. But it is filled
from intelligibles, not as from those intelligibles which are co-arranged
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CHAP. I.
OF PLATO.
311
And it is denominated indeed intellectual,
because it generates an impartible and divine intellect. But it is filled
from intelligibles, not as from those intelligibles which are co-arranged
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CHAP. I.
OF PLATO.
311
with intellect, nor as with those which are alone divided from intellect
by the conception of the mind, but as establishing in itself unically all
multitudes, and occultly containing the evolutions of the Cods into light,
and the hyparxes of intelligibles. It is likewise allotted the total intellect
of intellectuals, the variety of beings, and the multiform orders of divine
natures; and it convolves the end of the whole progression* [of the
Gods] to the one intelligible principle. For intellectuals are converted
to intelligibles. And some intellectuals indeed are united and * firmly
established prior to the divided Gods; but others are multiplied and'
through conversion are conjoined to primarily-efficient causes. The
intellectual Gods however proceed from all the Gods prior to them,,
receiving indeed unions from the one that is prior to intelligibles; but
essences from intelligibles; and being allotted lives all-perfect, connective
and generative of divine natures, from the intelligible and at the same
time intellectual Gods; but the intellectual peculiarity from themselves.
They likewise convert to themselves all the divided orders, but establish
themselves in intelligibles, existing wholly through the whole, pure and
unknown knowledges, and fervid lives. Besides these things also, they,
are all-perfect essences, producing all secondary natures through sub-
sisting from themselves, and being neither diminished by their progres-
sion, nor receiving an addition by their progeny; but through their own.
never-failing and infinite powers, being the fathers, causes, and leaders of
all things. Nor are they co-divided with their progeny, nor do they
depart from themselves in their progressions; but at once, and according
to union they govern total multitudes, and all orders, and convolve them,
to the intelligible, and to occult good.
"Whether therefore I may speak of life, it is not proper to think that it
is such a life as we surveyed a little before. For that was impartici*
pable, but this is participated. And that indeed, was generative, but
this is vivific. But it is not immanifest that these differ from each other.
For the vivific cause indeed, is also evidently generative; but the
generative cause is not entirely vivific. For it imparts figure to things
' For nfMiov it it necessary to read »foeio«.
* After km it is necessary to supply m ftn nwrtu km. •
312 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
For the vivific cause indeed, is also evidently generative; but the
generative cause is not entirely vivific. For it imparts figure to things
' For nfMiov it it necessary to read »foeio«.
* After km it is necessary to supply m ftn nwrtu km. •
312 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
unfiguted, bound to things indefinite, and perfection to tilings imperfect.
Or whether I may denominate the cause in intellectuals intelligible, it
must not immediately be conceived to be such an intelligible, as that of
which we have before spoken. For that was imparticipable, and prior
to intellectuals, itself pre-existing by itself, and exempt from wholes; not
being denominated intelligible, as the plenitude of intellect, but as the
prior-cause of it, and the object of desire and love to it, subsisting
uniformly uncoordinated with it. The intelligible however which is now
the subject of consideration, is participated, and co-arranged with
intellect, is multiform, and contains in itself the divided causes of all
things. Or whether we may call the Gods in this order fathers and
fabricators, it must be admitted that this paternal and fabricative
characteristic, is different from the hyparxis of the intelligible' fathers.
For they indeed were generative of whole essences; but these pre-exist
as the causes of divisible emanations, and of definite productions of form.
And they indeed contained in themselves powers fabricative of the divine
progressions; but these separate from themselves prolific causes, and are
not conjoined to them according to union, but according to a commu-
nion subordinate to union. For the marriages which arc celebrated by
fables, and the concordant conjunction of divine natures, arc in the
intellectual Gods. But the demiurgic being mingled with the vivific
effluxions, every genus of the Gods is unfolded into light, both the
supermundane, and the mundane. This, however, will be hereafter
■discussed.
i
' For ntiw, it is necemrr to read »«^t«*.
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CHAP. II.
OF PLATO.
31S
CHAPTER II.
This, however, will be hereafter
■discussed.
i
' For ntiw, it is necemrr to read »«^t«*.
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CHAP. II.
OF PLATO.
31S
CHAPTER II.
Since however, we have, in short, surveyed the peculiarity of the
intellectual Gods, it remains that we should deliver an appropriate theory
concerning the division of them. For the intellectual order is not one
and indivisible, but is allotted progressions more various than those of
the more elevated genera. There will therefore be here also three
fathers, who divide the whole intellectual essence; one indeed, being
arranged according to the intelligible, but another according to life, and
another according to intellect. They also imitate the intelligible fathers,
who divide the intelligible breadth in a threefold manner, and who are
allotted a difference of this kind with respect to each other. For one of
these intellectual fathers proceeds analogous to the first [intelligible]
father, and is intelligible. But another proceeds analogous to the second
[intelligible] father, and binds to himself the whole of intellectual life.
And another proceeds analogous to the third father, and closes the
whole intellectual, in the same manner as he closes the intelligible
order. '
But these fathers being three, and the first indeed, abiding in himself,
but the sccoud proceeding and vivifying all things, and the third glit-
tering with fabricative productions, it is evidently necessary, that other
triple Gods should be conjoined with them; of which, one indeed will
be the source to the first intellectual God, of stable purity ; but another,
of undefiled progression, to the second God; and another of exempt
fabrication, to the third. For in the Gods prior to these, the un defiled
deities were according to cause, through union without separation, and a
sameness collective of powers which are not in want of the communion
of these. But in the intellectual Gods, where there is an all-perfect
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separation, as in total orders, and a greater habitude to secondary
natures, unpolluted deity or power is necessary, which has the ratio of
sameness, and undeviating subsistence, to the paternal cause, and which
is co-divided with the fathers, so that each of the undefiled Gods is
conjoined with a peculiar father.
These two triads therefore have presented themselves to our view, one
indeed, of the intellectual fathers, but the other of the undefiled Gods.
There is however, besides these two, a third other triadic monad, which
is the cause of separation to intellectuals, and which subsists together
with the above mentioned triads. For the fathers indeed are the
suppliers of all essence; but the inflexible Gods, of sameness. But it is
evidently fit that there should be also the cause of separation, and that
this should be one and at the same time triple, separating the intellectual
Gods from the above mentioned orders, from themselves, and from
inferior natures. For why are they the leaders of another order, if they
are not divided from the first orders? Why are they multiplied, and why
do they differ from each other in their kingdoms, unless they are
separated? Why also do they transcend the partial [Gods] unless they
are also separated from these? The cause of separation therefore, will be
for us one and a triple monad. But the paternal and undefiled causes will
be each of them a uniform triad. And what is most paradoxical of all,
the separative cause is more monadic; but the paternal and also the
undefiled cause, are each of them more triadic. For the separative
monad indeed, is the cause of separation to the other monads; but
the others are the sources of communion and union to it Hence each
of these, being separated, becomes triadic; but the separative monad is
monadic, in consequence of being united by these. For all intellectuals
pervade through each other, and are in each other, according to a certain
admirable communion, imitating the union of intelligibles, through being
present and mingled with each other. The sphere also which is there, is
the intellectual order, energizing in and about itself, and proceeding into
itself hebdomatically, being a monad and a hebdomad, the image, if it
be lawful so to speak, of the all-perfect intelligible monad, and unfolding
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CHAP. IL
OF PLATO.
315
its occult union, through progression and separation. This first pro-
gression therefore of the intellectual Gods, which is separated by us into
a heptad, we have perfectly celebrated.
IL
OF PLATO.
315
its occult union, through progression and separation. This first pro-
gression therefore of the intellectual Gods, which is separated by us into
a heptad, we have perfectly celebrated.
Other secondary seven hebdomads, however, are to be considered
under this, which produce as' far as to the last of things, the monads of
this heptad. For each monad is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad
conjoined with it, and extends this hebdomad from on high, from the
summit of Olympus, as far as to the last, and terrestrial orders. I say,
for instance, the first paternal monad, indeed, constitutes seven such
monads. But the second again constitutes seven vivific monads. And
the third, seven demiurgic monads. Each likewise of the un defiled
monads constitutes a number equal to that produced by the fathers.
And the monad of separation constitutes seven [separative monads].
For all these causes proceed in conjunction with each other. And aa
the first triad of the fathers subsists together with the uudefiled triad,,
and the divisive monad, after the same manner also, the second triads
are allotted seven coordinate undefiled triads, and separative monads*
Whence, therefore, does so great a number of intellectual Gods present
itself to our view ? It is evident, indeed, from what has been said. For
the first hebdomad, indeed, the cause of the second hebdomads, and
which has the relation of a monad to them, and which u little before wc
denominated an intellectual sphere, subsists according to the intelligible
breadth, imitating the paternal nature of it through the paternal triad ;
but the eternity of its power, through undefiled sameness; and the
multitude shining forth in its extremities, through the monad which is
divisive of wholes. The remaining hebdomads, however, which are
derived from this, proceed according to the intelligible and intellectual
genera. For each monad, conformably to the summits of those genera,
constitutes a monad co-arranged with the multitude proceeding from it ;
since every summit is uniform [i. e. has the form of the onc,J as we
have before demonstrated. But according to the middle and third
progressions of those genera, each monad generates two triads. For
the separation of them was apparent in the middle and ultimate
progressions, as we have before observed. As, therefore, the intelligible*
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But according to the middle and third
progressions of those genera, each monad generates two triads. For
the separation of them was apparent in the middle and ultimate
progressions, as we have before observed. As, therefore, the intelligible*
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and at the same time, intellectual genera, prodaccd the intelligible
breadth, which is of a unical nature, into a triad ic multitude, after the
same manner also the intellectual monads call forth the intelligible, and
at the same time intellectual triads, into intellectual hebdomads. And
they constitute indeed the monads which are coarranged with the
hebdomads, according to the summits of the triads ; but the two triads,
according to the second and third decrements of those triads. Hence
every hebdomad has the first monad indeed intelligible ; but the second
after this, and which is triad ic, intelligible and intellectual; and the
third triad, which is the next in order, intellectual. All these likewise
subsist as in intellectuals. For they are characterized according to the
peculiarity of the constitutive monad.
In short, the intellectual powers proceed according to the intelligible
orders ; but they constitute these seven hebdomads according to the first
intellectual orders. For it is indeed necessary that exempt causes should
he assimilated to the intelligible Gods ; but that co-arranged causes, and
which proceed every where, should be assimilated to the intelligible, and
at the same time, intellectual Gods ; since these also are the first that
divide the worlds triadically, and pervade as far as to the last of things,
connectedly containing and perfecting all things. But the intelligible
Gods contain the causes of wholes uniformly, and occultly. You may
also say, that the intelligible Gods produce all things uniformly ; for
numbers subsist in them monadically. But the intelligible and intel-
lectual Gods produce all things triadically. For the monads in these are
divided according to number. And what the monad was in the former,
that number is in the latter. And the intellectual Gods produce all
things hebdomad ically. For they evolve the intelligible, and at the
same time, intellectual triads, into intellectual hebdomads, and expand
their contracted powers into intellectual variety ; since they define
multitude itself and variety by numbers which are nearest to the monad.
For the numbers of the partial are different from the numbers of the
total orders in the Gods. And the whole of this intellectual number is
indeed more expanded than the natures prior to it, and is divided into
more various progressions, yet it docs not desert its alliance with the
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CHAP. III. OF PLATO. 317
And the whole of this intellectual number is
indeed more expanded than the natures prior to it, and is divided into
more various progressions, yet it docs not desert its alliance with the
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CHAP. III. OF PLATO. 317
monad. For hebdomad ic multitude has an abundant affinity with the
nature of the monad ; since it is measured according to it, and primarily
subsists from it. And the Pythagoreans, when they denominate the
heptad light according to intellect, evidently admit its hyparxis to be
intellectual, and on this account suspended from the monad. For the
unical, which light manifests, is inherent from this in all the divine
numbers. And thus much concerning the division of these intellectual
Gods.
CHAPTER III.
It follows in the next place, that we should adapt the theory of Plato
to this order, and show that he does not dissent from any of the theological
dogmas concerning it. Since, therefore, we have demonstrated, that the
celestial order, which wc find in the Cratylus perfectly celebrated,
possesses the middle bond of the intellectual, and at the same time,
intelligible Gods, but that under this another order of Gods is imme-
diately arranged, as Socrates shows in the Pheedrus, called the subce-
lestial arch, and which we have considered as not divided from the
heaven, — this being the case, what order is it which divides itself from
the kingdom of the heaven, but is the leader of the intellectual order of
the Gods, and is primarily the supplier of intellect, according to the
doctrine of Plato, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, except that which
the mighty Saturn comprehends ? For he calls this God the first and
most pure intellect. This God, therefore, is the summit of a divine
intellect, and, as he says, the purest part of it ; separating himself indeed
from the celestial order, but reigning over all the intellectual Gods ;
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because he is full of intellect, but of a pure intellect, and is a God
extended to the summit of the iutellectual hypostasis. Hence also, he
is the father of the mighty Jupiter, and is simply father. For Ue who is
tlie father of the father of all things, is evidently allotted in a much
greater degree the paternal dignity. Saturn, therefore, is the first
intellect; but the mighty Jupiter is also an intellect, containing, as
Socrates says in the Philebus, a royal soul, and a royal intellect.
For Ue who is
tlie father of the father of all things, is evidently allotted in a much
greater degree the paternal dignity. Saturn, therefore, is the first
intellect; but the mighty Jupiter is also an intellect, containing, as
Socrates says in the Philebus, a royal soul, and a royal intellect.
And these Gods are two intellects, and intellectual fathers ; the one*
indeed, being intellectual ; but the other intelligible, iu intellectuals.
For the Saturn ian bonds which Socrates mentions in the Cratylus, are
unific of the intelligence of Jupiter about the intelligible of his father*
and fill the Jovian intellect with the all-perfect intelligence of the
Saturnian intellect. And this I think is likewise evident from the
analogy of souls to Pluto. For as he binds souls about himself, filling
them with wisdom and intelligence, thus also Saturn being the object of
desire and love to Jupiter, contains him in himself by indissoluble bonds..
And these things Socrates indicates in the Cratylus, jesting, and at the
same time being serious in what he says. The object of desire therefore*
and the intelligible to Jupiter, is Saturn. But the mighty Jupiter
himself is a divine and demiurgic intellect. Hence, it is necessary that
there should be a third other intellectual cause, generative of life. For
Jupiter indeed is the cause of life, as Socrates says, but intellectually-
and secondarily. But we say that life is every where arranged prior to
intellect. Hence, we roust say that the queen Rhea, being the mother
of Jupiter, but subordinate to the father Saturn, gives completion to this
middle, existing as a vivific world, and establishing in herself the causes
of the whole of life. These three paternal orders, therefore, have
appeared to us in intellectuals : one of them indeed subsisting according
to the intelligible power of intellectuals;' but another according to
divine and intellectual life; and another according to intellectual
intellect. For we celebrate the middle deity, herself by herself, as the
mother of the demiurgus, and of wholes. When, however, we survey
' It appears from the version of Porta*, that the words o pr» tuna rr/t yoynjv twafui rm ntfm,
are omitted in the original. Indeed, the sense requires that they should be inserted.
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CHAP. III.
OF PLATO.
319
her together with the extremes, we denominate her a paternal cause,
as being comprehended in the fathers ; and as generating some things
together with Saturn, but others in conjunction with Jupiter.
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CHAP. III.
OF PLATO.
319
her together with the extremes, we denominate her a paternal cause,
as being comprehended in the fathers ; and as generating some things
together with Saturn, but others in conjunction with Jupiter.
Moreover, Plato following Orpheus, calls the inflexible and undefiled
triad of the intellectual Gods Curetic, as is evident from what the Athe*
nian guest sajs in the Laws, celebrating the armed sports of the Curetes,
and their rythmical dance. For Orpheus represents the Curetes who are
three, as the guards of Jupiter. And the sacred laws of the Cretans,
and all the Grecian theology, refer a pure and undefiled life and energy
to this order. For ro x«p«* to koron, indicates nothing else than the pure
and incorruptible. Hence, we hare before said, that the mighty Saturn,
as being essentially united to the cause of undefiled purity, is a pure
intellect. The paternal Gods therefore are three, and the undefined Gods
also are three, Hence it remains that we should survey the seventh
monad.
If, therefore, we consider the fabulous elections, both the Saturn ian
and the Celestial, of which Plato makes mention, and thinks that such
like narrations should always be concealed in silence, that the arcane truth
of them should be surveyed, and that they are indicative of mystic con-
ceptions, because these things are not fit for young men to hear,— [if we
consider these] we may obtain from them what the separative deity is,
who accomplishes the divisions, and segregates the Saturnian genera
indeed from the Celestial, and the Jovian from the Saturnian, and who
separates the whole intellectual order from the natures prior and posterior
to it, disjoins the different causes in it from each other, and always im-
parts to secondary natures, secondary measures of dominion. And let
not any one be disturbed, or oppose me on hearing these things. How
therefore does Plato reject exertions* bonds, and the tragical apparatus
of fables ? For he thinks that all such particulars will be condemned by
the multitude and the stupid, through ignorance of the arcana they con-
tain ; but that they will exhibit to the wise certain admirable opinions.
Hence, he indeed does not admit such a mode of fiction, but thinks it
proper to be persuaded by the ancients who were the offspring of the
Gods, and to investigate their arcane conceptions. As therefore he
320 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
Hence, he indeed does not admit such a mode of fiction, but thinks it
proper to be persuaded by the ancients who were the offspring of the
Gods, and to investigate their arcane conceptions. As therefore he
320 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
rejects the Saturnian fables, when they are narrated to Euthyprhon, aud
the auditors of the Republic, yet at the same time admits them in the
Cratylus, placing about the mighty Saturn and Pluto, other secondary
bonds, — thus also, I think he forbids exections to be introduced to those
who know only the apparent meaning of what is said, and does not admit
that there is illegal conduct in the Gods, nnd nefarious aggressions of
children against their parents, but he opposes, and confutes as much as
possible such like opinions. He assents however to their being narrated
to those who arc able to penetrate into the mystic truth, and investigate
the concealed meaning of fables, and admits the separation of wholes,
whether [mythologists] are willing to denominate them exections for the
purpose of concealment, or in whatever other way they may think fit to
call them. For bonds and exections are symbols of communion and se-
paration, and each is the progeny of the same divine mythology. Nor is
there any occasion to wonder, if from these things we endeavour to confirm
the opinion of Plato; but it is requisite to know how the philosophy of
Plato admits all such particulars, and how it rejects them, and in what
manner he apprehends they may be the causes of the greatest evils, and
of an impious life to those that hear them. The seven intellectual Gods,
therefore, will through these, conceptions appear to have been thought
worthy of being mentioned by Plato.
CHAPTER IV.
It is, however, 1 think, necessary syllogistically to collect the progres-
sion of them according to hebdomads, from images. The demiurgus
therefore, [in the Timaeus] fabricates the soul of the universe an image or
all the divine orders, in the same manner as he fabricates this sensible
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CHAP. IV.
OF PLATO.
The demiurgus
therefore, [in the Timaeus] fabricates the soul of the universe an image or
all the divine orders, in the same manner as he fabricates this sensible
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CHAP. IV.
OF PLATO.
world an image of intelligibles. And in the first ' place indeed, he consti-
tutes the whole essence of the soul, and afterwards divides it into numbers,
binds it by harmonies, and adorns it with figures, I mean the rectilinear and
the circular. After this also, he divides it into one circle and seven circles.
Whence therefore, arc this monad and hebdomad derived, except from
the intellectual Gods? For figure, number, and true being, are prior to
them. And as in the fabrication of the soul, after the subsistence of the
psychical figure, the division of the circles according to the monad and
hebdomad follows, thus also in the Gods, after intellectual and intelligible
figure, the intellectual breadth, and that sphere of the Gods succeed.
The multitude therefore of the seven hebdomads subsist from the divine
intellectual hebdomad entering into itself. And on this account, the
demiurgus thus divides the circles in the soul, because he, and every
intellectual order, produce an intellectual hebdomad from each monad.
I do not however assert, and now contend, that the seven circles are
allotted an hyparxis similar to the seven Gods that proceed from the
demiurgus, but that the demiurgus dividing the soul according to circles,
introduces number to the sections from the intellectual Gods, I mean the
monadic and the hebdomadic number. For the monad indeed subsists
according to the circle of sameness, but the division, according to the
circle of difference. Shorly after however, it will appear that same and
different belong to the demiurgic order.
Farther still, after the division of the circles, the demiurgus assumes some
things which are symbols of the assimilative, and others which are sym-
bols of the liberated Gods, and through these, he refers the soul to these
orders of the Gods. If therefore figure is prior to the intellectual Gods,
but the similar and dissimilar are posterior to them, it is evidently neces-
sary that the monadic and at the same time hebdomadic, should be
referred to this order, and that the progression from the monad to the
hebdomad should pertain to this order. Each therefore of the seven
intellectual Gods, is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad, as we may
' For Tjaornt, it is necessary to read nprnra;. It was also requisite to alter the punctuation in
the preceding sentence.
Pioc. Vol. I. 2 S
ON THE THEOLOGY
HOOK V.
Each therefore of the seven
intellectual Gods, is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad, as we may
' For Tjaornt, it is necessary to read nprnra;. It was also requisite to alter the punctuation in
the preceding sentence.
Pioc. Vol. I. 2 S
ON THE THEOLOGY
HOOK V.
learn from images. There however indeed, the hebdomad is one, and
allied to itself. But in souls, the circles differ from each other, according
to the divine peculiarities. For they receive number in such a manner
as to preserve the proper nature which they are allotted, connectedly
containing mundane natures, and convolving the apparent by their own
circles. And thus much concerning these particulars, which afford argu-
ments that are not obscure of the arrangement of them by Plato.
CHAPTER V.
Again however, making another beginning, let us speak about each
f_of the intellectual Gods,] as much as is sufficient to the present theology.
Let Saturn therefore, the first king of the intellectual Gods, be now cele-
brated by us, who according to Socrates in the Cratylus illuminates the
pure and incorruptible nature of intellect, and establishing his own all-
perfect power in his own summit of intellectuals, abides in, and at the
same time proceeds from his father f_HeavenJ. He likewise divides the
intellectual government from the connective, and establishes the tran-
scendency of the other intellectual Gods in connexion with his own;
but comprehends in himself the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect,
and the plenitude of beings. Hence the Saturnian bonds, mystically,
and obscurely signify the comprehension of this intelligible, and a union
with it. For the intelligible is comprehended in intellect.
As therefore, the intelligible is indeed exempt from intellect, but intel-
lect is said to comprehend it, thus also Jupiter is said to bind his father.
And in placing bonds about his father, he at the same time binds himself
[to him}. For a bond is the comprehension of the things that are bound.
But the truth is as follows : Saturn is indeed an all-perfect intellect ; and
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CHAP. V. OF PLATO. 333
And in placing bonds about his father, he at the same time binds himself
[to him}. For a bond is the comprehension of the things that are bound.
But the truth is as follows : Saturn is indeed an all-perfect intellect ; and
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CHAP. V. OF PLATO. 333
the mighty Jupiter is likewise an intellect. Each therefore being an
intellect, each is also evidently an intelligible- For every intellect is'
converted to itself ; but being converted to it energizes towards itself.
Energizing however towards itself, and not towards externals, it is intel-
ligible and at the same time intellectual ; being indeed intellectual, so
far as it intellectually perceives, but intelligible, so far as it is intellectu-
ally perceived. Hence also the Jovian intellect is to itself intellect, and
to itself intelligible. And in a similar manner the Saturnian intellect is
to itself intelligible, and to itself intellect. But Jupiter indeed is more
intellect, and Saturn is more intelligible. For the latter is established
according to the intellectual summit, but the former according to the
intellectual end. And the one indeed is the object of desire, but the
other desires. And the one fills, hut the other is filled.
Saturn therefore being intellect and intelligible, Jupiter also is in the
second place intellect and intelligible. The intellectual however of Sa-
turn is intelligible ; but the intelligible of Jupiter is intellectual. Jupiter
therefore, being at the same time intellectual and intelligible, intellectu-
ally perceives and comprehends himself, and binds the intelligible in
himself. But binding this in himself, he is said to bind the intelligible
prior to himself, and to comprehend it on all sides. For entering into
himself, he proceeds into the intelligible prior to himself, and by the
intelligible which is in himself, intellectually perceives that which is prior
to himself. And thus the intelligible is not external to intellect For
every intellect possesses that which is in itself without any difference
with respect to itself. But again, it intellectually perceives in itself that
which is prior to itself. For every thing which is external to intellect, is
foreign and adventitious, and pertains to an inferior nature. But that
which is pre-established in the order of cause, and which pre-exists as the
object of desire, is in the desiring natures themselves. For being con-
verted to, and verging to themselves, they discover the causes of them-
selves, and all more ancient natures. And by how much more perfect
and uniform the conversion of the desiring natures is about the objects of
desire, by so much the more are they present with their own desirables.
Hence every intellect, by intellectually perceiving itself, intellectually
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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Hence every intellect, by intellectually perceiving itself, intellectually
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324
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V.
perceives likewise, all the natures prior to itself. And by how much the
more it is united to itself, in a so much greater degree it is established in
the intelligibles prior to itself. For the cause of any being, and which
is the source of essence or of perfection to it, is not external to that
being ; but that which is subordinate to any being, is external to it, and
is not the intelligible. On this account also, each of the divine natures is
unconverted lo that which is inferior to itself, but is converted to itself,
and through itself reverts to that which is more excellent. And the in-
telligible indeed is not inferior to any intellect ; but every intellect ener-
gizing towards itself, and comprehending the intelligibles prior to itself,
intellectually perceives them.
Some intelligibles likewise are such as are conjoined with intellect.
But others are such as are proximately participated by it. And others
are such as it sees more remotely, and which are more exempt from its
nature. On this account, the demiurgic intellect is indeed at the same
time intelligible and intellect, but has the intelligible of his father, which
he binds as the fable says. He sees however animal itself, which is,
according to Timaeus, the most beautiful of all intelligibles, And if the
illustrious Amelius, forming such conceptions as these, said that in-
tellect is threefold, one being that which is, another that which has, and
another that which sees, lie rightly apprehends the conception of Plato,
according to my opinion. For it is necessary that the second intellect
should not only have the intelligible, but that it should be and have the
intelligible; that it should be indeed the intelligible coordinate with
itself, but have the intelligible prior to itself, so far as it participates of it.
And it is necessary that the third intellect should see the intelligible, and
should alsoie and hate it ; that it should see indeed the first intelligible;
but have that which is proximately beyond itself ; and that it should be
the intelligible which is in itself, and which is conjoined with its own in-
telligence, and should be inseparable from it.
If therefore, as we said from the beginning, Jupiter intellectually per-
ceives his father Saturn, Saturn is indeed intelligible, but Jupiter is
intellect; being one intelligible himself, but participating of another.
Hence also Plato does not simply call Saturn intellect, but a pure and
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CHAP. VI.
OF PLATO.
Hence also Plato does not simply call Saturn intellect, but a pure and
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CHAP. VI.
OF PLATO.
incorruptible intellect. For he ' in the intellectual is intelligible. Since
however, he is not simply intelligible, but as in intellectuals, he is
intellect, and is himself paternally so, being both father and intellect, and
having the paternal intellectually. In intelligibles therefore, intellect is
also father ; but in intellectuals father is intellect. Hence Saturn is a
pure, immaterial and perfect intellect, established above fabrication in
the order of the desirable. But possessing such a peculiarity as this, he
is full of all intelligibles intellectually, is as it were exuberant with
intellections, and establishes twofold genera of Gods, some indeed in
himself, but others posterior to himself. And he leads forth, indeed, the
prolific powers of his father Heaven as far as to the last of things ; but
fills the demiurgic order with generative goods.
CHAFFER VI.
Saturn however is the only one of the Gods who is said both to
receive and give the royal dignity with a certain necessity, and as it
were violence, cutting off the genitals of his father, and being himself
castrated by the mighty Jupiter. For he bounds the kingdom of his
father, and is bounded by the God posterior to himself. He is also filled
from the natures placed above him, but fills the whole fabrication [of the
universej'with prolific perfection. But separating himself from his father,
he is exempt from his progeny. Being however one all-perfect intel-
lect, he contains in himself the multitude of total intelligibles. And as
he deifies the intellectual summit, he illuminates all things with intelli-
gible light.
' For t» yaf it ia necessary to read tn*m{ yaq.
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326 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V
CHAPTER VII.
And as
he deifies the intellectual summit, he illuminates all things with intelli-
gible light.
' For t» yaf it ia necessary to read tn*m{ yaq.
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326 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V
CHAPTER VII.
Very properly therefore, has this universe twofold lives, periods, and
convolutions; the one being Saturnian, but the other Jovian, as tl»e
fable in the Politicus says. And according to one of the periods indeed,
it produces all goods spontaneously, and possesses an innoxious and
unwearied life. But according to the other it participates of material
error, and a very mutable nature. For the life in the world beiug
twofold, the one unapparent, and more intellectual, but the other more
physical aud apparent, and the one being defined according to provi-
dence, but the other proceeding in a disorderly manner according to
fate ; — this being the case, the second life indeed, which is multiform,
and perfected through nature, is suspended from the Jovian order ; but
the more simple, intellectual, and unapparent life, is suspended from the
Saturnian order. And these things the Elean guest clearly teaches,
calling one of the circulations Jovian, but the other, Saturnian ; though
Jupiter also is the cause of the unapparent life of the universe, is the
supplier of intellect, and the leader of intellectual perfection ; but he
elevates all things to the kingdom of Saturn, and being a leader in
conjunction with his father, constitutes the whole mundane intellect.
And if it be requisite to speak the truth clearly, each of the periods
indeed, I mean the apparent, and the unapparent, participates of both
these Gods; but the one indeed is more Saturnian, and the other is
perfected under the kingdom of Jupiter.
That the mighty Saturn therefore is allotted a kingdom different from
that of the Gods prior to him, the Elean guest clearly manifests in what
he asserts prior to the fable. For he says, " We have heard from many
respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder." According
to this wise man therefore, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence also
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CHAP. VII.
OF PLATO.
327
For he says, " We have heard from many
respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder." According
to this wise man therefore, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence also
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CHAP. VII.
OF PLATO.
327
he presides over a kingdom different from that of his father. And while
his father connectedly contains the middle centres of the intelligible and
intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the intellectual orders and supplies
all intellectual life, first indeed, to the Gods, but secondarily to the
natures more excellent than ours, and in the last place to partial souk,
when they are able to be extended to the Saturnian place of survey.
For this universe, and all the mundane Gods, always possess this two-
fold life, and imitate the Saturnian intelligence indeed through unapparent
and intellectual energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter, through
a providential attention to secondary natures, and in short, through the
visible fabrication. But partial souls at one time energize intellectually,
and consecrate themselves to Saturn, but at another time after a Jovian
manner, and pay a providential attention to secondary natures, without
restraint. When however they revolve analogous to those" deities
[Saturn and Jupiter] they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and dispose
sensibles in an orderly manner, and live both these lives, in the same
manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For their periods
are twofold ; one being intellectual, but the other providential. Their
paradigms also are twofold ; the Saturnian intellect being the paradigm
of the one, but the Jovian intellect of the other. For the mighty Jupiter
himself has a twofold energy, containing indeed intelligibles in intellect,
but adorning sensibles by demiurgic production.
Since however the circulations are twofold, not only in wholes, but
also in partial souls, the Elean guest says that in the Saturnian period,
the generation of these souls is not from each other, as in men which are
the objects of sensible inspection, nor as the first man with us is alone
earth-begotten, so in partial souls one first soul is the offspring of man,
but all of them are earth-begotten. For they are elevated from ultimate
and terrestrial bodies, and embrace an unapparent,* relinquishing a sen-
sible life. He also says that neither do they verge to old age, and change
from being younger to becoming older ; but on the contrary, they are
' For ,w.wif, it U necessary to read
* For ru*cMvf it is Decenary to read
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V.
He also says that neither do they verge to old age, and change
from being younger to becoming older ; but on the contrary, they are
' For ,w.wif, it U necessary to read
* For ru*cMvf it is Decenary to read
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V.
rendered more vigorous, proceed intellectually in a way contrary to
generation, and as it were, divest themselves of the variety of life with
which in descending they became invested. Hence likewise all the
symbols which are adapted to youth are present with these souls, when
they pass into this condition, such as a privation of hair, and a smooth-
ness of the cheek instead of hoariness and beards. For they lay aside
every thing which adheres to them from generation. But being situated
there with Saturn, and living the life which is there, he says that there
are abundance of fruits from trees, and many other [vegetable] sub-
stances, which the earth spontaneously produces. Being likewise naked,
and without coverlets, they are for the most part fed in the open air ; for
they have a temperament of the seasons which is always the same. But
they make use of soft beds, grass in abundance being produced for them
from the earth. Souls therefore derive these and such like goods from
this mighty God, in the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled
indeed with vivific goods, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes ; but
do not procure for themselves perfection and blessedness, from partial
energies. For doxastic nutriment indeed has divisible and material
conceptions ; but intellectual nutriment has pure, impartible, and native
conceptions, which the spontaneous obscurely signifies.
The production from the earth also signifies the prolific intellect of the
Gods, which imparts to souls by illumination perfection and self-
sufficiency. For on account of the exuberant abundance of good, they
are able to impart an influx of it, according to the measure of felicity
adapted to them. Hence, they are neither covered with garments, as
when they proceeded into generation, nor have they superabundant
additions of life, but they are purified themselves by themselves from all
composition and variety, and extending their intellect to total good, they
participate of it from the intellectual father, being guarded by the
intellectual Gods, and receiving from them the measures of a happy life.
They likewise pass through the whole of their existence with facility, lead
a sleepless and pure life, being established in the generative powers of
intelligibles ; and being filled with intellectual goods, and nourished with
immaterial and divine fonns, they are said to live a life under Saturn,
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CHAP. VIII. OF. PLATO.
329
CHAPTER VIII.
VIII. OF. PLATO.
329
CHAPTER VIII.
Because, therefore, this God is the leader of all intellectual life, and
every intellect as well that which is im participate, as that which is
participate proceeds from this cause, hence it lielongs to this mightj
God to feed in a distributed manner, and to nourish souls. For because
indeed he is intelligible in intellectuals, he nourishes souls, and souls are
called the nurselings of Saturn. But because he does not fill them with
first, and unical intelligibles, but with those that are multiplied by his
own cause of separation, he is said to feed them distributedly, and as it
were in a divided manner. And do you not see how through these
things, this God appears to be coordinate to the first triad of the
intelligible and intellectual Gods ? For as Socrates, in the Phaedrus, say*,
that souls are nourished in the supercelestial place, and in the intelligible
meadow, so the Elean guest asserts that the souls that are fed under
Saturn, are filled with intelligible goods. And it is not at all wonderful
if souls are perfected by both these; intellectually indeed, under the
kingdom of Saturn ; but intelligibly under the order of the first intel-
lectual Gods. For this God himself is nourished by that order. And
on this account he is allotted a leading and primary transcendency in
intellectuals, because they are filled • from that order (^through him] with
occult and unapparent powers. And he is that among the intellectual
fathers, which the order of the first intellectual Gods is in the intelligible
and at the same time intellectual orders. Hence the intelligible every
where becomes nutriment to ascending souls, but the connexion with it
is effected through the second and third Gods.
As therefore, the demiurgic order elevates souls to the Saturnian place
of survey, thus also the Saturnian order elevates them to the subcelestial '
• for wtftuvqamin in this place, it is ueccssirj to toad vwwpman.
rroc. Vol. I. 2 T
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As therefore, the demiurgic order elevates souls to the Saturnian place
of survey, thus also the Saturnian order elevates them to the subcelestial '
• for wtftuvqamin in this place, it is ueccssirj to toad vwwpman.
rroc. Vol. I. 2 T
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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arch. For having made many and blessed discursive energies in the-
kingdom of Saturn, they are again extended from hence to the per-
fective, and from thence to the celestial triad, from which contemplating
the supercelestial place, they arc now ineffably conjoined with the
supreme goods of intelligibles. And after this manner the sectfnd orders
always connect souls with the orders prior to them. Hence also, the
theurgic art imitating the unapparent periods of souls, arranges initiations
in the mysteries of the second Gods, prior to the more sublime mysteries.
And through these, it causes us to pass to the intelligible place of survey.
These things, therefore, Plato indicates concerning the Saturn ian life, and
the polity of souls under Saturn, not in the Polkicus only, but also in
the discourses of the Athenian guest. For in the fourth book of the
Laws he celebrates the life under Saturn, obscurely signifying the
undented nature, the facility, plenitude, and self-sufficiency of that
energy, through fabulous fictions.
CHAPTER IX.
If, however, it be requisite from these things, and from all the mystic
discipline concerning this God, to consider and discuss the orders which
he constitutes in wholes, in the first place, we must direct our attention
to the three kings mentioned in the Goigias, who distributing the
kingdom of Saturn were produced by him, as being allotted in a divided
manner a uniform and impartible* dominion, and over whom he places
.the divine law, which is the cause of distribution according to intellect,
both to the Gods themselves, and to all the natures posterior to the
Gods. In the second place, we must consider th« rulers and kings
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OF PLATO.
331
mentioned in the Laws, who are said to preside over the different
allotments of souls, and who are not men, but daemons of a more divine
and excellent genus, who distribute to souls the measures of good, cut
off their generation-producing lives, restrain their disorderly lation, retain
them in the intelligible, and comprehend them in the kingdom of Saturn.
In the third place, therefore, we must direct our attention to the daemon
Gods, who preside over the parts of the world, and the herds [of souls]
that are in it, as the Elean guest says in the Pnjiticus, and who at oue
time come into contact with the objects of their government, and
distribute to them intellectual, and all unapparent goods, but at another
time withdraw themselves from the physical life of the world, recur to
their own place of survey, and imitate the exempt transcendency of the
demiurgus and father of the universe.
But after these things, wc must survey the twofold circulations of the
mundane Gods, viz. the Saturnian and the Jovian ; for these Gods
always have each of these, as the fable says in the Politicus. For it is
evident that the mutation of the stars and the sun takes place in each of
the revolutions. This period, therefore, being twofold, it is obvious to
every one that the periods are full of Saturnian goods, and participate of
the Saturnian series. And not only the mundane Gods, but likewise ail
the more excellent genera that follow the Gods, energize according to
both these energies, and revolve according to the twofold circulations,
through which souls also sometimes participate of an intellectual life,
and proceed in this path, exchanging for sense intellect as the leader of
their motion and circulation. Saturn, therefore, extends his kingdom
superually from the first Gods, as far as to partial souls, perfects all
things, and fills them with intellectual goods, distributing to different
natures different measures of good. For on account of this, law also
subsists with him, as Socrates says in the Gorgias : " This law therefore
was in the time of Saturn, and always was, and now is, among the
Gods." For law is the distribution of intellect ; but this God is the*
first, most pure, and incorruptible intellect.
If, however, this God is the primary leader of all division, and is the
origin of intellectual separation, it is necessary on this account, that law
S3*
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V.
If, however, this God is the primary leader of all division, and is the
origin of intellectual separation, it is necessary on this account, that law
S3*
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V.
should be with him, which distinguishes the orders of beings, divides
the intellectual genera, and separates all forms according to a well-
ordered progression ; but imparts to all things by illumination the
measure of hyparxis, connecting the order which is in them, preserving
the boundaries of divine distribution immutable, and possessing the same
dignity in the kingdom of Saturn, and in intellectuals, as Adrastia in the-
supercelestial place, and in the intelligible, and at the same time,,
intellectual orders. For from each of them an immutable guard, and the
progression of order to all things are generated. But they differ from
each other, because law indeed divides the one into multitude, defines
the measures of intellectual subsistence, and distributes to every thing an
appropriate good, producing the different measures of beings from the
one [Saturnian] intellect. But Adrastia abiding in the intelligible,,
guards all things uniformly, and preserves total order in a firm unde>
viating manner, exempt from all division. Law, therefore, is a certain'
G od which divides divine forms, and definitely imparts to every thing
that which is adapted to it according to the plenitude proceeding from
one uniform cause ; and it is also co-existent with the Saturnian order,
in which the separations of beings, tmd the all-perfect progression of
forms first subsist. Hence the deinurrgus likewise looking to this
conducts all things according to law, and constitutes mundane provi-
dence an image of the union of the father ; but fate and the fatal laws,
an image of the division according to law. Souls, therefore, live
according to law ; in the Jovian period indeed being governed con-
formably to the laws of Fate; but in the Saturnian period living
according to divine law they are subservient to the multitude [of divine
forms] and are extended to the one cause of all ; and ascending to the
intelligible place of survey, they are subjected to the sacred law of
Adrastia. For this law extends from on high as far as to the last of
things, and defines to souls the measures of whole periods, as Socrates
says in the Pbsedrus. Who therefore this greatest God is, and what the
goods are of which he is the cause to souls, and prior to these, to Gods
and daemons, the loaders of souls, let it, from these things be manifest.
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CHAP. X. OP PLATO. 333
CHAPTER X.
Who therefore this greatest God is, and what the
goods are of which he is the cause to souls, and prior to these, to Gods
and daemons, the loaders of souls, let it, from these things be manifest.
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CHAP. X. OP PLATO. 333
CHAPTER X.
Since Itowever, theologists assert that an exemption from old age
pertains to this order, as the Barbarians say, and Orpheus the theologist
of the Greeks, (for he mystically says that the hairs of the face of Saturn
are always black, and never become hoary) I admire the divinely-inspired
intellect of Plato which unfolds the same things concerning this God to
Uiose who proceed in his steps. For be says that souls in the Saturn-
ian period abandon old age, but return to youth, and remove from them-
selves hoarincss, but have black hair. For he says that the white hairs
of the more elderly become black ; but the cheeks of those that have
beards being rendered smooth, they are restored to the past season [of
youth.] These things indeed are averted by the Elean guest; similar to.
which are the assertions of Orpheus concerning this God.
— under Saturniao Jove
Men liv'd immortal ; moist and fragrant hair
From the pure chin then sprouted, nor wasmiVd
With the white flower that marks hiurni old age ;
But iu ita stead, a florid down appear'd.
In these verses he delivers the similitude of Saturnian souls to this
God. For he says that they remove from the view the old age which
they had acquired from generation and abandon material imbecility; and
that they exert the juvenile and vigorous life of intellect. For it is no
otherwise lawful for them to be assimilated to the God who is exempt
from old age, than through intellectual puberty, and undefiled power.
But the cause of this is, that king Saturn himself is the source of the
unallured Gods, and the inflexible triad. Hence be is, as Socrates
says, a pure intellect. For be is at the same time the intellect of the un^
334 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
defiled order, ranking as a summit, and riding as in a vehicle in the flou-
rishing and vigorous ' Gods that govern wholes. The souk also which are
sent to him, wonderfully advance, in conjunction with intellectual energy,
in vigour, and in a power undeviating, and free from any tendency to
matter. Partial souls therefore, when they change their periods, at one
- time proceed to a more juvenile, and at another, to a more aged condi-
tion. But whole souls always live according to both these periods, and
are conversant with Saturn according to the unapparent period, but go-
vern the universe in conjunction with Jupiter, according to visible pro-
vidence, at once receiving an increase according to both these periods,
and becoming at one and the same time both older and younger. And
this is what Parmenides indicates when he says, that the one proceeding
according to time becomes at once younger and older. These things
Jtrowever, will hereafter be more manifest.
CHAPTER XL
And
this is what Parmenides indicates when he says, that the one proceeding
according to time becomes at once younger and older. These things
Jtrowever, will hereafter be more manifest.
CHAPTER XL
Having therefore brought to an end the information concerning the
king of the intellectual Gods, it evidently follows that we should in the
next place celebrate the queen Rhea. For both Plato and Orpheus assert
that she is the mother of the demiurgus of wholes, but a divinity posterior
to Saturn. Thus therefore, we must speak concerning her. The stable
and united cause of all intellectuals, and the principal and original
monad, abiding in herself, unfolding into light all intellectual multitude,
and again convolving it into herself, and embosoming her progeny, and
the causes of wholes that emerge from her, analysing as it were after
1 For axueuoi, it is neccsiary to read «xp«i»t{.
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CJIAP. XI. •
OF PLATO.
335
division the natures that are divided, and being paternally allotted the
highest kingdom in intellectuals, — this being the case, the vivific Rhea
proceeds as the second from her proper principle, being allotted a ma-
ternal order in the whole paternal orders, and producing the demiurgus
of wholes, prior to other Cods, and the immutable guard of the Gods. For
this Goddess is the middle centre of the paternal intellectual triad, and the
receiving bosom of the generative power which is in Saturn, calling forth
indeed, to the generation of wholes, the causes which abide in him, but
unfolding definitely all the genera of the Gods. And being filled indeed
from the father prior to her with intelligible and prolific power, but filling
the demiurgus and father subsisting from her, with vivific abundance.
Whence also the demiurgus is the cause of life to all things, as containing
in himself the plenitude of intellectual life, and extending to all things
the prolific cause of his mother. For as the middle Goddess multiplies
the uniform powers of Saturn, and produces and causes them to preside
over secondary natures, so the third father, at one and the same time
unfolds, divides, and produces as far as to the last of things, the all*
perfect abundance ot the Saturnian monad, and the dyadic generation
of the mother Rhea, so as not to leave the most material and disorderly
part of the universe destitute of the power of Saturn.
This Goddess therefore,, being the middle of the two fathers, one of
which collects, but the other divides intellectual multitude, and the one
through transcendency desiring to abide and to be established in himself,
but the other hastening to produce, generate and fabricate all things, she
educes indeed into herself, the demiurgic causes of wholes, but imparts
her own proper power to secondary natures, in unen vying abundance.
Hence also Plato assimilates her prolific exuberance to streams, as So-
crates says in the Cratylus, evinces that this Goddess is a certain flux,
and in what he asserts of her obscurely shows nothing else than her fontal
nature, and a power unically comprehensive of the divisible rivers of
life. For the first-effi-ctive flux is fontal ; which also Socrates indicating
in this Goddess, shortly after clearly says that the name of Tethys is the
name of a fountain. Why therefore, is it any longer necessary to doubt
about these things, and to say where does Plato make mention of fontal
336 °N THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
Gods? For he himself denominates the causes of the subsistence of all
the Gods, fontal fluxions. And besides this, if he admits that the mun-
dane soul is the fountain and principle of life, because it proceeds both
from an impartible and partible vivification, how is it possible that he
should not in a much greater degree and more truly call the Goddess
who comprehends in herself all life, fontal?
Concerning names however, it is not, 1 think, at all proper to contend,
but we should survey the orders themselves of the first effective Gods,
and see how Plato following theologists copiously unfolds them to us,
celebrating after the Saturnian monad the kingdom of Rhea, constituting
from these the demiurgus of wholes, and all the multitude of Gods which
is woven together with him. For this Goddess binding together the breadth
of intellectuals, and embosoming total life, emits all the intellectual
powers in herself of the rivers of life ; and by the summit of herself
indeed, is conjoined to the first father, and together with him generates
wholes, and the genera of Gods that abide in him ; but by her extremity
is connascent with fabrication, and according to a kindred conjunction
with fabrication, constitutes all the orders of Gods that are prior to the
world, and that are in the world. Hence there also the causes of the
demiurgi of wholes primarily subsist, and the more partial genera of
lite : aud the union and total deity of all these, is at once exempt from
the plenitudes of herself, and is at once co-arranged with them.
Hence there also the causes of the
demiurgi of wholes primarily subsist, and the more partial genera of
lite : aud the union and total deity of all these, is at once exempt from
the plenitudes of herself, and is at once co-arranged with them.
Thus therefore, she is both uniform and multiform, one and simple,
though being self-perfect, she is a vivific world, proceeding from on high
as far as to the last of things, and as far as to the extremities of the
universe, giving subsistence to the vivific powers of the breadth of life.
Hence also Plato refers the vivific cause of wholes to this Goddess, and
through the last gifts of this divinity, indicates her total energy ; which
primarily indeed fills the whole demiurgus with intellectual and pro-
lific power, but secondarily perfects all the genera of the Gods with the
intellectual fruits of herself. According to a third order also, her total
energy nourishes the souls that are the attendants of the Gods, with the
rivers of divine perfection. And in the last orders, it imparts to mortal
animals the gift of nature. This therefore is, I think, more known than
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CHAP. XL OF PLATO. 337
every thing to those who admit that things divine are beyond the works
of nature.
That however, which it is more fit the lovers of the contemplation of
truth should consider, I say, is this, that Plato divides Ceres from ' the
whole vivific deity, and coarranges her, at one time with Proserpine, at
another with Juno, and at another with the progeny of Jupiter, as we
may learn in the Cratylus. In which dialogue indeed, he co-arranges
Hhea with Saturn, but connects a certain common investigation and
theory about Ceres, Jupiter, and Juno. In the Laws likewise cele-
brating the legislative Goddesses, he refers the whole of a legitimate life
to the union of Ceres arid Proserpine; since according to Orpheus this
middle Goddess being conjoined with Saturn by her summit, is called
Rhea ; but producing Jupiter, and together with Jupiter unfolding the
whole and partial orders of the Gods, she is called Ceres. And all the
order of middle life is comprehensive of the other Titanidse, and likewise
of Ceres. For it preestablished this monad as a middle collective of all
the orders in it, both those that are occult, and those that are divided
about the generative powers of the Goddess. Each of these powers,
however, are triple. And this monad indeed conjoins the superior triad
to Saturn, but weaves the inferior, together with the demiurgic order.
It also evinces that the Cerealian monad being the middle, is coarranged
with, and is at the same time exempt from the demiurgus of wholes. For
in conjunction with the whole order it constitutes, and together with
Jupiter generates Proserpine. And thus we have celebrated the primo-
genial Goddess who is the middle of the fathers.
' «ic ii omitted in the original
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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CHAFFER XII.
And thus we have celebrated the primo-
genial Goddess who is the middle of the fathers.
' «ic ii omitted in the original
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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CHAFFER XII.
Now however, after this Goddess, the detniurgus of wholes is in the
third place to be celebrated, according to the order which he is allotted
in the intellectual Gods, peculiarly unfolding for this purpose all the truth
concerning him. And in the first place, we must remember that it is
necessary the peculiarity of this third father should be demiurgic; and thus
in the next place, following Plato, we must direct our attention to other
particulars [respecting this God]. The first of the intellectual Gods
therefore, who is parturient with multitude, who is the leader aud source
of all separation, and who separates himself from the uniform and first
Gods, but generates the divided principles of wholes, — this God again
converts his progeny to himself, and weaves together these parts with his
own sameness, and exhibits himself as one intelligible world in intellectu-
als, bringing forth in himself, and retaining with himself his own offspring.
But the second of the intellectual deities, is the vivific Goddess, who
brings forth indeed in conjunction with the first intellectual God, occult
multitude, (for she is conjoined to him according to supreme transcen-
dency) but cannot endure to remain in this mode of generating, and in
collecting the separation of wholes into unseparated union. Hence she
separates the third intellect from the [first] father; but produces the
multitude of the Gods, and of intellectual reasons, and fills thedemiurgus
with generative power. If, therefore, the first intellectual God is partu-
rient with the generation of wholes ; but the prolific vivification of the
intellectual orders causes this generation to shine forth ; — it is evident
tliat the intellect of the intellectual fathers, according to his own order,
produces and adorns all things, and calls forth indeed, the occult nature
of his father, into separation and progression, but prepares total vivifica-
tion to send forth the rivers of itself, as far as to the last of things. For it is
every where the peculiarity of intellect to divide and unfold multitude,
the plenitudes of life, and the unions of intelligibles. Intelligible
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CHAP. XII.
OP PLATO.
S3[)
For it is
every where the peculiarity of intellect to divide and unfold multitude,
the plenitudes of life, and the unions of intelligibles. Intelligible
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CHAP. XII.
OP PLATO.
S3[)
intellect however contains multitude uniformly, or according to the form
of one ; for multitude preexists in the intelligible according to cause.
But the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual intellect, has
indeed secondary measures of union, but is exempt from all perfect
separation, abiding in the first principles of wholes. And intellectual
intellect is the source of all division, and of the subsistence of partial
natures ; since it preestablishes in itself all the multitude of forms, and
this not tetradically only, as intelligible intellect, but it possesses one
all-perfect intellectual cause of all forms. It is necessary therefore that
the whole demiurgic principles should pertain to this intellect, that all
the demiurgic Gods should proceed from this one third father, and that
this should be the demiurgus of wholes. For as the first of paradigms
co-subsists in intelligible intellect, and in the third triad and the first
father, so likewise we must place the first demiurgic monad in intel-
lectual intellect, and the third father of the intellectual Gods. For on
this account also the demiurgic is conjoined with the paradigmatic cause,
according to the analogy which each is allotted among ths fathers; one
indeed in intelligibles, but the other in intellectuals. For one is the
boundary of the intelligible, but the other of the intellectual order. But
this is evident from what has been before said.
Farther still, fabrication being fourfold, and one indeed adorning
wholes totally, another adorning wholes but partially, another adorning
parts, but totally, and another weaving parts together with wholes,
partially, — this being the case, it is evident that the cause of wholes
which is the cause of them uniformly and indivisibly, is the most ancient
of all the causes. It is necessary however, that this cause should either
be prior to, or in, or posterior to the intellectual Gods. Where therefore
shell we place it ? For all the parts which are constituted by intellectuals
are more partial than the one and total fabrication. For the division of
wholes into three, and the leaders of divisible production, present them-
selves to the view in these orders. The natures therefore, that are prior
to intellectuals, are defined according to other peculiarities of the Gods,
as was before shown, and in short, they subsist according to union, and
are expanded above the separation of intellectual forms.
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CHAPTER XIII.
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CHAPTER XIII.
It remains therefore that the one demiurgus of wholes must be arranged
in intellectuals. But if indeed, he is the first father, he will be intelligible,
will contain his progeny in himself, and will be the collector of separation.
How therefore, does he divide the worlds? How does he generate the
multitudes of mundane natures? How does he speak to all the junior
demiurgi at once ? For the first father is uncoordinated with the whole
number of mundane natures, and also converts his first progeny to
himself, flying as it were from multitude to union, and hastily with-
drawing himself from all-various separation into intelligible transcen-
dency. But if the one demiurgus of wholes is the vivific order, all things
indeed, will be full of life, on account of the whole demiurgus. And the
cause of souls, according to a probable reason will here become apparent
subsisting prior to multitude. But how will he convert all things to
himself? How is he called demiurgus and father? For the vivific deity,
herself by herself, has a maternal dignity among the Gods, and is the
supplier of progression to all things. But to produce forms, and to
convert, are the illustrious and peculiar good of intellect. Neither
therefore, is the demiurgus of wholes in the supermundane order. For
all the natures there arc partial, and either partially preside over wholes,
or comprehend the productions of parts totally. Nor is he in intellU
gibles. For all the Gods there are fathers ; and no one there is called *
demiurgus and father. But the divine orders antecedently comprehend
all things in a manner perfectly occult and uuical. Not is he in the
intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. For to collect,
connect, and perfect multitudes, is uot the province of the demiurgic
peculiarity. For this is the source of separation, and the production of
forms, glittering with intellectual sections. But the iutclligible and at
the same time intellectual Gods, extend intellectual multitudes to the
1 For itiynrai, H appears to me that we should read i*u $if^rai.
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CHAP. XIV.
OF PLATO.
.'HI
But the iutclligible and at
the same time intellectual Gods, extend intellectual multitudes to the
1 For itiynrai, H appears to me that we should read i*u $if^rai.
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CHAP. XIV.
OF PLATO.
.'HI
union of intelligibles. Nor again, is it possible to admit that the demi-
urgic cause is in the first or second order of intellectuals. For the
summit of intellectuals is imparticipable by mundane natures, and is
rather proposed to them in tbe order of the desirable; but is not
productive of them. Hence, all the Gods in the world are elevated to
the Saturnian place of survey ; but proceed from another secondary
principle, and through it are converted and conjoined to the exempt
kingdom. And the middle centre being vivific, is not defined according
to the paternal characteristic. For the generative very much differs from
the paternal, arid the vivific from the demiurgic genus ; so far, I think,
as the principles of the whole orders, I mean bound and infinity, differ
from each other. For the demiurgic and paternal order is referred to
bound ; but all vivific and generative power, to infinity.
CHAPTER XIV.
I wonder therefore, at those interpreters of Plato, who do not make
one fabrication but many, who assert that there are three demiurgi of
wholes, and pass at one time to the second, and at another to the third
dcraiurgus ; and who divide what is said in the Timaeus, and think fit to
refer some of the assertions to one, but others to another cause. For that
there is a demiurgic triad, and another multitude of Gods characterized
according to the producing cause, I also admit, and think it will be
granted by Plato. It is necessary however in each order prior to the
triad, and prior to every multitude, that there should be a preexistent
monad. For all the orders of the Gods originate from a monad;
because each of the whole orders is assimilated to the whole progression
of the Gods. As therefore the subsistence of the Gods has the cause of
its generation from the imparticipable one, thus also it is necessary that
the perfect orders in the Gods, should have a preexistent monad, and a
first-eflective principle. According to the same reasoning, all the vivific
342
ON THE THEOLOGY
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progressions are suspended from one vivification, and the demiurgic
orders are extended to one fabrication. And it is not proper that there
should be multitude without the monad. For there will neither be
co*arrangement, nor a division of multitude according to intellect, unless
the one and whole preexist. For on this account prior to all the divine
progressions, the order of wholeness subsists, in order that it may compre-
hend parts, and may define them in, and about itself.
For on this account prior to all the divine
progressions, the order of wholeness subsists, in order that it may compre-
hend parts, and may define them in, and about itself.
How therefore neglecting whole in fabrication, can we survey demiurgi
divided according to parts? Though Plato himself thinks with respect to
the paradigm of the universe, that the world should not be assimilated to
any thing which naturally subsists in the form of a part, but to all perfect
animal ; and on this account he demonstrates that the world is only-
begotten, because its paradigm is one. For if it were not one, but many
paradigms, again it would be necessary that there should be another
animal about it, of which it would be a part, and it would be more right
to assert that the world is no longer similar to the many paradigms, but
to that which comprehends them. For it is necessary that the one
paradigm should precede the many, in the same manner as the one good
subsists prior to participated goods, and that the whole world should be
the image of one paradigm prior to many. For whether it is alone the
image of many paradigms, whence will the world be one and a whole ?
And how is it possible it should not be more dishonourable than its parts?
For these indeed, are assimilated to intelligibles, but the whole world is
similar to no one of real beings. Or whether all the world subsists from
a certain intelligible paradigm, if indeed there are many paradigms of one
world, these also will be similar to each other, if they are the causes of
the same image. It is necessary therefore, that sameness should be
communicated to these from one form ; or again, the world will be more
venerable than its paradigms according to union. But if the paradigm is
one, after the same manner also the demiurgic cause is one. For as
there is one image from one paradigm, thus also the progeny being one,
derives its subsistence from one demiurgus and father. For it is
necessary that the paradigmatic cause should either be the same with the
demiurgus, and should be established in him, or that it should be prior to
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CHAP. XIV.
or PLATO.
the demiurgus, as we say it is, or that it should be posterior to the
demiurgus, as some think proper to assert.
XIV.
or PLATO.
the demiurgus, as we say it is, or that it should be posterior to the
demiurgus, as some think proper to assert.
If however, the paradigm and the demiurgus are the same, the demiur-
gus will be one according to Plato. For the paradigm is only-begotten, as
he demonstrates. But if the demiurgus exists prior to the paradigm,
which it is not lawful to assert, but the paradigm is one, much more will
the demiurgus be one. For the causes which are more elevated are
allotted a more uniform hypostasis ; since also the first cause of wholes is
one. And if the paradigmatic cause has indeed the first order in beings,
but the demiurgic cause the second order, and this universe the last
order, being the resemblance of the former, and the progeny of the latter,
how is it possible since the extremes are monadic, the middle multitude
should be without the monad ? For it is necessary that the paradigm
being intelligible, should impart by illumination a greater degree of
union to the universe than the demiurgic cause. And as the paradigm
being only-begotten, comprehends in itself the first paradigms, after the
same manner it is necessary that the demiurgic monad should be compre-
hensive of many demiurgi. For if the world derives its only-begotten
subsistence from the paradigm, but through the demiurgus, the demi-
urgus also is indeed entirely one.
Farther still, I think that those who are the patrons of this opinion
should direct their attention to that assertion of Socrates, that it is every
where fit the many should be comprehended in the one. For on account
of tliis we admit the hypothesis of forms [or ideas], and prior to other
things we preestablish intellectual monads. How therefore are intellec-
tual forms extended to one principle, and how do each of them proceed
from one demiurgic cause, but the whole demiurgic form is multiplied,
and divided prior to the indivisible monad ? For it is necessary that as
all equals, whether they are intellectual, or psychical, or sensible, should
be suspended from one first equality, all beautiful things, from beauty
itself, and the many every where, from primary beings, thus also it is
necessary that the multitude of demiurgi should be suspended from one
fabrication, and should subsist about one demiurgic monad. For how
can it be lawful to leave the one in forms rather than in the Gods ? For
344 OX THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
forms indeed, liavc their hypostasis mingled with multitude ; but the
Gods are defined according to union itself. If therefore all the multi-
tudes of forms arc the progeny of monads, much more are the orders of
the Gods allotted peculiarities which originate from monads, and which
through monads are inherent in multitudes. But if this be the case, it is
necessary that the whole demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude
of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause
of the generation of the universe.
But if this be the case, it is
necessary that the whole demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude
of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause
of the generation of the universe.
Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary the
demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and many.
But if indeed, it is one alone, and the multitude in the world, and the
different order which it contains subsist similarly from one demiurgic
principle, how are mortal and immortal natures the progeny of the same
cause without a medium ? For all the natures that proceed from the one
fabrication are immortal. But if the demiurgic principle is many only,
whence is the common form of hyparxis communicated to the multitude,
if it does not originate from one? For as the final cause is one, viz. the
good, as the paradigmatic cause is one, viz. animal itself, and as the world
is a generated one, thus also after the same manner, the demiurgic cause
is one. But if there are one and many demiurgic principles, whether
does the one principle belong to partial or to total genera? If however, it
belongs indeed to partial genera, how is it extended to the first and
intelligible paradigm? For the supermundane genera subsist about the
intellectual Gods, and according to intellectual paradigms. For being
partial, they entirely assimilate the natures posterior to themselves to
intellectuals, co-ordinately to themselves. Or how will it any longer
preserve the union of total fabrication which produces wholes totally ?
For a thing of this kind pertains to no partial nature ; but it belongs to a
partial principle, to produce parts either totally ' or partially, as we before
observed. But if the demiurgic principle belongs to the total orders, it
is necessary that it should either be intelligible or intellectual, or intelli-
gible and intellectual. If however, it is of an intelligible nature, how is
' c\ix»f b emitted in the original.
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CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 345
If however, it is of an intelligible nature, how is
' c\ix»f b emitted in the original.
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CHAP. XIV. OF PLATO. 345
it divisive of wholes? How is it co-arranged with mundane natures?
How is it said to fashion the universe? How from the genera of being
does it produce soul, and the natures posterior to soul ? For [on this
hypothesis] we must admit that all these are in intelligiblcs, viz. figure,
the genera of being, and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar,
and other things through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the
whole world. But if the demiurgic principle is of an intelligible and at
the same time intellectual nature, how does he produce participated
intellect? How does he separate the multiform orders of souls? How
docs he divide the pai ts, or the circles that are in them ? For that which
is generative of participated intellect, is imparticipable intellect. And
that which has the power of dividing multitude .will not [on this
hypothesis] differ from that which connects the total genera of the
Gods. And in short, the demiurgus of wholes, is called byTiimeus
intellect, and is frequently said to see, to discover, and to reason, but he
is no where denominated by him intelligible and at the same time
intellectual. For the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods,
divide all things triad ically. But the demiurgus, at one time indeed,
divides the world into five parts, and at another divides the circles of the
soul into hebdomads, that he may generate either the celestial spheres,
or the seven parts of the soul. We must say therefore, that he is entirely
secondary to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and
he is the cause of secondary goods to the world. But we must refer to
those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic
intellect however, is an intellectual God, is I think through these things
sufficiently apparent at present.
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BOOK V.
CHAPTER XV.
But we must refer to
those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic
intellect however, is an intellectual God, is I think through these things
sufficiently apparent at present.
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Vol. I.
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BOOK V.
CHAPTER XV.
Bett Plato appears to me to have indicated the peculiarity of this-
God in a remarkable manner, by calling him intellect, and asserting that
he sees intelligible*, but admitting that they are visible to him according
to nature, for that which is truly intellect, and which establishes itself
according to this hypantis, is intellectual intellect. For intelligible intel-
lect also, is indeed simply intelligible, and is of that allotment ; but is
said to be intellect, as being the cause of every intellectual nature.
And the intellect of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual
Gods, has out its own nature un mingled with the intelligible. But intel-
lectual intellect alone, is peculiarly intellect, being allotted the intellec-
tual itself in intellectuals; just as the most principal of inlelligibles, is*
primarily, the first, and the highest intelligible, which wc denominate the
one being, and that which is occultly being. This therefore is that which
is simply intelligible. But that which is simply intellect is intellec-
tual intellect. For the intelligible indeed possesses the summit, but
intellect the end of wholes. And the intermediate natures partly pertain
to the intelligible, and partly to intellect, and the intellectual nature.
And the intelligibles indeed, that are primarily so, possess intellect ac-
cording to cause; but the first of intellectuals have the intelligible
according to participation ; and the natures that are collective of these,
conjoin the intelligible and intellectual peculiarity together. Since,
therefore, Timaeus also calls the demiurgus intellect indefinitely, and
neither denominates him life, nor intelligible, in consequence of his pecu-
liarity being alone intellectual, it is certainly necessary that he should
be established at the end of the intellectual Gods.
For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect as
the Saturnian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure and incor-
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CHAP. XV.
OF PLATO.
S47
For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect as
the Saturnian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure and incor-
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CHAP. XV.
OF PLATO.
S47
ruptible intellect, which manifests his supreme empire in intellectuals,
transcending the whole intellectual Gods. But the dcmiurgus is simply
intellect. As therefore, the simply intelligible is the first of intelligibles,
so that which is simply intellect, is the last of intellectuals. For all
things are in each of the orders. For in intelligibles life and intellect
preexist ; and in the breadth of life, there are similarly life and intellect
And in intellectuals there is each of the rest. But in intelligibles indeed,
being is according to essence, but life and intellect are according to
cause. In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being
and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate natures,
intellect is according to cause, but being is according to participation,
and life according to essence. As therefore, that whjch is most vital
in life is the middle, and as that which is especially intelligible is the
summit in being, so in intellectuals, the extremity is that which is most
intellectual. Hence if there is a certain intellect which is simply intel-
lect, and a perceiving intellect, this is intellectual intellect, which Plato
denominating the demiurgus unfolds to us the most manifest order, which
it is allotted in intellectuals. On this account also, prior to all other
things, the demiurgus constitutes participated intellect, as Timsus says.
For placing intellect in soul, and soul in body, he fashioned the universe.
Energizing therefore, according to his own essence, and producing by his
very being, he constituted the intellect of the universe prior to all other
things. For every participated proceeds from imparticipable intellect.
Hence, as if Plato had said, that the generative cause which gives sub-
sistence to participated intelligible, is that winch is primarily being, so
since the demiurgus first produces intellect from himself, he will be im-
participable and intellectual intellect. From these things therefore, it is
evident what the hyparxis of the demiurgus and father is, and what order
it is allotted in intellectuals according to Timasus.
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CHAPTER XVL
From these things therefore, it is
evident what the hyparxis of the demiurgus and father is, and what order
it is allotted in intellectuals according to Timasus.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V.
CHAPTER XVL
Let us however after another manner syllogistically collect the pecu-
liarity of the dciniurgus, receiving from the Timaeus the principles of the-
arguments on this subject. This therefore is known to every one, that
Timaeus calls the whole demiurgus fabricator and father, in the beginning
of what he says concerning him. For lie says, " It is difficult to discover
the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible
to speak of him to all men." Hence, he does not think fit to call him
either father alone, or fabricator alone, nor again connecting the two,
father and fabricator, but on the contrary, he places the fabricative prior
to the paternal. Now therefore, we must show in the first place, in what
respect fabricator and father differ from each other ; and in the next place,
in addition to this, who the fabricator alone is, and who father and fa-
bricator is, and how the fabricative and at the same time paternal pecu-
liarity, is considered by Plato as adapted to the demiurgus.
If therefore, Ave divide all things into the Gods, and the progeny of the
Gods, and tliis is the same thing as to divide them into superessential
monads, and the progressions of beings, father indeed will be generative
of the Gods and superesseutial unities ; but fabricator will give subsist-
ence to essences and beings. For again, according to this reason Timaeus
says, that the natures which are generated by the demiurgus are equal to
the Gods ; for the demiurgus is not only fabricator, but also father; but
that those which are produced by the junior Gods, are allotted a mortal
nature. For these Gods are alone producers and fabricators of things
which participate of existence alone, and not of the superessential pecu-
liarity. Hence through that by which they suffer a diminution with re-
spect to the demiurgic monad, through this they are not allotted a power
generative of things equal to the Gods. And through that by which the
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CHAP. XVI.
OF PLATO.
349
intellectual deraiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this
he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures.
And through that by which the
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CHAP. XVI.
OF PLATO.
349
intellectual deraiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this
he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures.
But if again, we divide beings into the total and partial, father indeed,
•will appear to us to be the hypostatic cause of wholes, but fabricator of
partial natures. For the former is the cause exemptly of things that are
generated ; J but the latter proximately. And the former, produces
indeed by his very being, energy giving perfection to his hyparxis ; but
the latter produces by energizing, his hypostasis being fixed according
to energy. If also we again separately divide the generations of perpe-
tual and mortal natures, we must refer the generation of perpetual na-
tures to the paternal cause, but the generation of mortal natures to the
fabricative cause. For the fabricator indeed produces that which is ge-
nerated from non-being to being. For the Elean guest defines the
effective art to be this. But the father constitutes things posterior to
himself consubsistent with himself. For he is father by his very being,
and has the power of generating united with himself. Each therefore, I
mean the paternal and the effective or fabricative, is assimilated to the
principle of bound. And the former indeed is the cause of union, but
the latter of the production of forms. And the former is the cause of
wholes, but the latter of an extension as far as to parts. And the one
indeed, is the primary leader of simple, but the other of composite na-
tures. Again however, in these the generative cause, and the cause
which is productive of life, are opposed to each other ; because the
paternal cause indeed is connascent with generative powers, but the
effective with vivific powers. Ami as the paternal and the effective
causes pertain to the coordination of bound, so every thing prolific and
vivific, pertains to vivification, and the first infinity.
These things, however, being thus divided by us, it is evident that the
paternal indeed, is itself by itself primarily in the intelligible Gods. For
they are the fathers of wholes, being fixed according to supreme intelligi-
ble union. And on this- account, Plato also calls the first God father,
from the natures which are proximately established after him, transfer-
ring to him the appellation of father. For every where indeed, it is usual
with Plato to introduce names to the ineffable from secondary causes,
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For every where indeed, it is usual
with Plato to introduce names to the ineffable from secondary causes,
350
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and the causes which are posterior to it. But at one time indeed, he
introduces the names from all beings, and at another from the first beings.
For it neither was nor is lawful to refer names to him who is exempt from
all beings, from subordinate natures, and which are placed in an order
very remote from him. If therefore, all beings participate of the paternal
peculiarity, wc must say that Plato gives this name to the one from all
beings ; for there is not among all beings such a cause as this. Hence it
is evident that Plato introduces to the one an appellation of this kind,
from that which is the first and highest in the Gods. The intelligible
Gods, liowever, are more ancient than all the divine orders, and subsist
immediately aller the one. The paternal cause therefore of beings is in
the intelligible Gods, and the intelligible Gods are the fathers of all the
divine genera, being established in the highest essences, and occultly pro-
ducing wholes. And the first God indeed, is beyond the appellation of
father, as he is likewise beyond all other names ; and he is neither properly
called the good, or the one, through his ineffable and unknown transcen-
dency. But the intelligible Gods are primarily superessential unities
and goodnesses, and are the exempt fathers of beings.
The paternal peculiarity, therefore, originates supernally from the first
intelligible triad ; but the fabricative first presents itself to the view in
the third triad. For that which generates all forms, and adorns all things
with forms is the third triad of intelligibles. For there, as we have said,
all-perfect animal subsists, which is comprehensive of the first and intel-
ligible paradigms. Here therefore, the effective also or fabricative at the
same time subsists. For animal itself constitutes the Gods, and produces
the forms of all beings. Hence it is allotted the paternal peculiarity,
according to the divine cause, but according to the formal cause, it un-
folds into light the effective principle of wholes. But again, on the con-
trary, the effective and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is allotted
its hypostasis in the demiurgic monad. Hence also the demiurgus of
wholes is the hypostatic cause of Gods. In a particular manner however,
he fabricates the world, energizing with forms and demiurgic reasons.
For he constitutes intellect, aouls and bodies, adorning all things with
forms, some indeed with first, others with middle, aud others with last forms.
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CHAP. XVI.
OF PLATO.
351
For he constitutes intellect, aouls and bodies, adorning all things with
forms, some indeed with first, others with middle, aud others with last forms.
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CHAP. XVI.
OF PLATO.
351
Do you not see, therefore, how the end of intelligibles indeed, was
paternal and at the same time effective ; but the end of intellectuals is
effective and at the same time paternal. There however, the paternal
peculiarity is more predominant ; but here the effective. For in both
indeed, both causes preexist; nevertheless in the paradigm [i. e. in ani-
mal itself] the paternal is more prevalent, but in the demiurgus the
effective. For the former produces by his very being ; but the latter by
energizing. And in the former indeed, fabrication [or effective energy]
is essential ; but in the latter essence is effective. Forms also are with
both; but in the former intelligibly, and in the latter intellectually. From
these things therefore, it is evident, that the demiurgic cause subsists
analogous to the paradigmatic cause; and that it has the same order with
respect to intellectuals, as that has with respect to intelligibles. And on
this account Timeeus also says that the demiurgus of wholes was extended
to that paradigm. For lie says, " Whatever ideas intellect perceived by
the dianoetic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it
necessary for the universe to contain." And together with this analogy,
there is a diminution of the intellectual with reference to the intelligible.
For the latter is more united ; but the former is more separated. And
the one indeed is preestablished in the order of the desirable ; but the
other is moved about the desirable. And the one fills with paternal
power ; but the other absorbs as it were and embosoms the whole prolific
abundance of the desirable. And after this manner, the demiurgus of the
universe is all-perfect, receiving whole intelligible powers, from all-perfect
• animal. For the universe is threefold ; one indeed beiug intelligibly [all] ;
another intellectually ;- and another sensibly. For the world is perfect,
from perfect natures, as Timreus says. And animal itself is perfect ac-
cording to all things, as the same Timaeus asserts. The demiurgus like-
wise, being the best of causes, is all-perfect.
Again therefore, resuming what we have said, we repeat, that the
paternal cause commences from the supreme union of intelligibles; but
the paternal and at the same time effective cause is consubsistent in the
intelligible paradigm ; and the effective and at the same time paternal
cause is defined according to the whole demiurgus. But the cause whicu
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is alone effective and fabricative, pertains to the junior Gods who give
subsistence to partial and mortal things. The peculiarity therefore of
the demiurgic cause is effective and paternal. And this Timseus asserts,
not only in the beginning of the discourse about it. in which he says, " [To
discover] therefore, the artificer and father of this universe, &c.;" but
also in the speech to the junior Gods, he does the same thing ; for the
demiurgus in a simitar manner says to them : " Gods of Gods of whom I
am the demiurgus and father, [Whatever is generated by me is indissolu-
ble, I being willing that it should be so.]" For he does not call himself
father and demiurgus, but demiurgus and father, just as there fTimaeus
calls him] fabricator and father. And not in the Timaeus only is this
mode of the arrangement of the names defined, but in the Politicus also,
the FJean guest speaking about the world says that it imitates the instruc-
tion of its demiurgus and father ; and in the beginning indeed, he uses
these names more accurately, but in the end more negligently. Since
Plato therefore, every wliere preserves this order of names unchanged, it
is evident to those who are not entirely unskilled in things of this kind,
that he defines the demiurgic monad according to this peculiarity, and
that he considers it to be effective and at the same time paternal. For
because indeed, it is the end of the intellectual triad, it is allotted a pa-
ternal transcendency with respect to all the second genera of Gods ; but
because it produces from itself all the partial genera and species of beings,
it possesses an effective cause of the natures to which it gives subsistence.
And because indeed, it is father, power is in it, and at the same time in-
tellect. For the demiurgus himself says, " Imitating the power which I
employed iu your generation." And again, Timaeus says concerning the
demiurgus ; " Whatever ideas intellect perceived in animal itself, such
and so many he conceived by the dianoetic energy it necessary for this
universe to contain." Hence he is father, and the power of the father is
in him, aod intellect. All these however, are in him intellectually, and
not intelligibly. Hence, I think he is called father indeed, not simply,
but together with effector and demiurgus; and power, not by itself, but
the power of the demiurgus and father. For he who calls himself demi-
urgus and father, says that it is the power of himself. But he is immedi-
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CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 553
For he who calls himself demi-
urgus and father, says that it is the power of himself. But he is immedi-
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CHAP. XVI. OF PLATO. 553
ately called intellect, without the addition of power, and the other
appellations. *' Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived," &c. For
all things are in him intellectually, and both power and father, by which
he imitates the intelligible paradigm. Tor in him all things were intelli-
gibly, ' viz. bound, infinity, and that which is mixed from both these.
These, however, arc father, power, and intellect. But the intellectual of
the paradigm indeed was intelligible in the intelligible Gods, sub-
sisting prior to an intellectual cause. The intellectual however of the
demiurgus, is of itself intellectual, being intellectual in intellectuals, as
was before observed. Because indeed, as we have said, he is father,
power is in him, and also intellect. But because these are defined ac-
cording to the effective and demiurgic, he is coarranged with the vivific
order, and together with it constitutes the genera of life, and vivifies the
whole world. What this order is however, and where it is arranged, we
shall shortly survey. But thus much is evident from what has been said,
that so far as he is the demiurgus, he requires contact with the vivific
order, together with it generates total lives, and conjoins it to himself.
Disseminating, however, all the measures of life in it, and together with
it adorning and producing them, he again converts them to himself. For
it belongs to him to generate all things, and to recall all things to him-
self, no less than to generate them, because he is established at the end
of the intellectual order, and is the demiurgic intellect. As he is there-
fore demiurgic, he gives subsistence to all thirigs; but as intellect, he
convolves multitude to union, and converts it to himself. He also
accomplishes both these, by the words which he delivers to the junior
Gods. For he fills them with demiurgic and prolific power, collects them
to himself, constitutes himself the object of desire as it were to the mul-
titude of Gods, and extends about himself all the demiurgi in the world,
' For rsrpas,-, it u necessary to read rmrrcef.
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CHAPTER XVII.
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CHAPTER XVII.
In the third place therefore, let us purify our conceptions about the de-
miurgic cause according to other projecting energies of intellect, following
for this purpose Timams. In the first place then, Timseus in the begin-
ning of the theory concerning the demiurgus, sufficiently exhibits his good-
ness, and his unenvying and abundant communication of demiurgic
reasons, being impelled to this from the seat of goodness which is in-
herent in him, and from his exuberant deity. For his goodness and his
unenvying abundance, are not as it were a certain habit of good, and a
power, or a form itself by itself existing prior to many goods, but it is one
ineffable participation of good, and the one of the demiurgic order; ac-
cording to which the demiurgus also is a God, and fills all things with
their proper good. For because there is deity in him which desires to
adorn and arrange all things, and an hyparxis which is extended to the
providence of the whole of things, on this account he establishes the prin-
ciple of fabrication. His goodness therefore is nothing else than demi-
urgic deity. But his will is the progeny of the energy of his goodness,
bounding the end of his power. For since in the demiurgus of wholes
there are, as we have said, father, power, and intellect, and these subsist
in him intellectually, according to each of these he is filled with the par-
ticipation of the one. And through goodness indeed, that which is
paternal in biro, and which is as it were the intelligible of intellect, is
illuminated. But through will, his power is governed, and is extended
to one intelligible good. And through providence, his intellect is perfect,
and gives subsistence to all things. All these likewise are the progeny
of the one deity in the demiurgus.
In the first place, therefore, as I have said, Timaeus unfolds through
these things the divine peculiarity of the demiurgus. But in the second
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CHAP. XVII.
OF PLATO.
355
All these likewise are the progeny
of the one deity in the demiurgus.
In the first place, therefore, as I have said, Timaeus unfolds through
these things the divine peculiarity of the demiurgus. But in the second
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CHAP. XVII.
OF PLATO.
355
place, he presents to our view the intelligible cause which is in him, and
also the united paradigmatic cause of wholes which he contains. For
to make all things similar to himself, evinces that he is the intelligible
paradigm of every thiug beautiful and good in the world. For because
he gives subsistence to all things by his very being, that to which he
gives subsistence is the image of himself. And according to this
reasoning the demiurgus is not only a God, but he contains in himself
the intelligible, and true being, and antecedently comprehends not only
the final cause of mundaoe natures, but also the paradigmatic cause.
But again, in the third place, Timseus celebrates the demiurgic power,
and the principle which abolishes every thing disorderly and indefinite,
and prepares the beautiful alone and the good to have dominion in
wholes. For the assertion that the demiurgus to the utmost of bis power
suffered nothing evil and vile to exist, indicates his unconquerable
power, which adorns things material in an unpolluted manner, and
imparts by illumination bound to indefinite, and order to disorderly
In which part of the Tiro feus, likewise, this dogma of Plato will appear
to you to be admirable, that matter is generated from some one of the
Gods situated above the demiurgus. For the demiurgus receiving
matter occupied by the vestiges of forms, thus himself introduces into it
all the perfection of ornament and arrangement. Matter, therefore, and
the whole of that which is the subject of bodies, proceed supernally from
the first principles, which on account of their exuberance of power, are
able to generate even the last of beings. But the demiurgus of the
universe, imparts by illumination, order, bound, and ornament, and the
whole world is fabricated an image of intelligible*, through the commu-
nication of forms.
Ia the fourth place,, therefore, let us survey how Timacus unfolds to
us the demiurgic intellect. " By a reasoning process," says he, " the
demiurgus discovered from the things which are visible according to
nature, that no work which is destitute of intelligence can ever become
more beautiful than that which possesses intellect." What therefore is
this reasoning ? What is the discovery, and whence does it originate ?
356 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
What is the discovery, and whence does it originate ?
356 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
Reasoning, therefore, is indeed distributed intellection, looking to itself,
and in itself investigating good. For every one who reasons, passes from
one thing to another, and being converted to himself, searches after
good. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, in adorning and arranging the
universe subsists analogously to him who reasons ; for he emits the
divided causes of mundane natures, which preexist unitedly in intel-
ligibles. For those things which intelligible intellect constitutes
uniformly and excmptly, these intellectual intellect separating, distri-
buting into parts, and as it were fabricating by itself, generates.
Reasoning therefore is the being filled with the intelligible, and an all-
perfect union with it. By which also it is evident that it is not fit to
think this reasoning [of the demiurgus] is either investigation or doubt,
or a wandering of divine intellect, but tliat it is stable intelligence
intellectually perceiving the multiform causes of beings. For intellect is
always united to the intelligible, and is filled with its own intelligibles.
And in a similar manner it is intellect in energy, and intelligible. For
at one and the same time, it intellectually perceives and is perceived,
discovers itself, entering into itself, and the reasoning also finds what
this intelligence is, but not according to transition. For the intelligence
of the Gods is eternal. And invention with them is not the discovery of
that which h absent; for all things are always present to the intellect
of the Gods. The intelligible likewise there is not separated from
intellect. The conversion, therefore, of intellect to itself may be called
reasoning; but the being filled from intelligibles invention. And
intelligibles themselves may be denominated things visible according to
nature. For because Tim sens had denominated the unadorned subject
of bodies when it was vanquished by the obscure vestiges of forms,
visible, hence, I think, ho calls intelligibles visible according to nature.
For it is according to nature, to intellect to look to these, and not to
things subordinate to these. As, therefore, he says, that intellect itself
sees intelligibles, after the same manner also he calls intelligibles things
naturally visible, and converts intellect to the intelligible, as that which
sees to that which is seen. If, therefore, intellect sees animal itself, and
assimilates to it the whole world, it may be said that animal itself is
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CHAP. XVIH. OF PLATO. 357
visible to the demiurgus of the universe. For there the most splendid of
intelligibles subsists ; and this is that which we before demonstrated,
when we said that there the fountain of beauty shines forth, wbieh
Socrates, in the Phsednts, denominates splendid and fulgid.
CHAPTER XVIII.
357
visible to the demiurgus of the universe. For there the most splendid of
intelligibles subsists ; and this is that which we before demonstrated,
when we said that there the fountain of beauty shines forth, wbieh
Socrates, in the Phsednts, denominates splendid and fulgid.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Such therefore are the conceptions which are to be assumed of the
demiurgic cause, and from these things they are to be derived. We
shall however obtain one perfection of the summit of the dogmas
concerning it, if we are able to survey the words which this cause
extends to the junior demiurgi, and to unfold the concealed meaning of
them. This, therefore, we shall also do, establishing the following principle
of the explanation of them : The energies and powers of the Gods are
twofold. And some indeed abide in, and energize about them, and
have for their end one hypostasis, and which is united to essence. But
others proceed from them, exhibit an efficacious power about secondary
natures, and coexist with the multitude of their recipients, and with the
peculiarity of essence. These, however, being twofold, the secondary
are suspended from those that are prior to them, are defined about them,
and receive their proper hyparxis according to them. For it is every
where necessary that externally proceeding should be the images of
internal energies, evolving the at-once-collected nature of their indi-
visibility ; multiplying that in them which is united, and dividing their
impartibility.
According to this reasoning, therefore, the energy of nature is also
twofold, one being that which abides in it, according to which it connects
itself, and the reasons it contains, but the other proceeding from it,
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358 0N THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
According to this reasoning, therefore, the energy of nature is also
twofold, one being that which abides in it, according to which it connects
itself, and the reasons it contains, but the other proceeding from it,
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358 0N THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
through which also bodies are filled with these physical powers, which
being moved by nature, act on each other, and physically suffer by each
other. Again, the motion of the soul likewise is twofold. And the one
indeed is self-motive, is converted to itself, is of itself, concurs with the
life of the soul, and is without any difference with respect to it. But
the other is incumbent on alter-motive natures, moves these, and about
these extends the power of itself. The energy of intellect, therefore, is
likewise twofold. And one indeed is intellectual, is united to true
beings, and is impartible, being co-existent with the intelligible itself of
intellect, or rather being the intelligible itself, and intellect. For intellect
is not of itself in capacity, and afterwards receiving energy, intellec-
tually perceives the intelligible ; but it is one simple energy. For the
multitude of it is unical, and its energy is directed to itself. But the
other energy of intellect is directed to externals, and to things which are
able to participate of intellect. For these intellect causes to be intel-
lectual through itself, splendidly as it were emitting the light of its own
intelligence, and imparting it to others. It is necessary, therefore, that
the divine and demiurgic intellect itself, should always indeed be united
to the intelligible, and that it should have the plenitude and self-
sufficiency of demiurgic intelligence eternally established according to a
union exempt from wholes ; to which, as it appears to me, Timaeus also
looking says, that the father of the universe abides in his accustomed
manner, and withdraws himself to his own place of survey, delivering
the fabrication of mortal natures to the mundane Gods. For so far as
he is exempt from the beings posterior to himself aud is uncoordinated
with the more partial multitude of Gods, so far he is converted to
himself, and surveys and intellectually perceives the natures prior to
himself, according to one uniform union. But in consequence of the
more ruling and leading Gods being extended towards him, he emits
from himself secondary energies, to all the partial orders.
Timaeus, therefore, fashions through words, these powers and effica-
cious energies which proceed from the whole and one fabrication to the
demiurgic multitude of Gods. For words are the images of intellections ;
because indeed they evolve that which is contracted in intelligibles, but
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CHAP. XVTII.
OF PLATO.
359
For words are the images of intellections ;
because indeed they evolve that which is contracted in intelligibles, but
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CHAP. XVTII.
OF PLATO.
359
lead forth that which is impartible into a partible hypostasis. They
likewise transfer that which abides in itself into habitude to another
thing. And it is evident that the reasons which are impelled from
nature, are certain natural [powers], and render that which receives them
physical. But the reasons which arc generated from soul, are indeed
vivific, but render the inanimate nature which participates of them
([animated] and moved from itself, through the power of soul, as Socrates
says in the Phaedrus, and communicate to it the resemblance of self-
motion. And the reasons which are generated from intellect, illumi-
nating the natures posterior to it, distribute all intellectual goods to their
recipients, being the suppliers of true knowledge, of purity and a more
simple life. After the same manner also the demiurgic words produce
in the junior Gods, whole, impartible, and united measures of exempt
fabrication, and fill their essences with demiurgic providence. They
likewise render them second demiurgi, and emulous of their father.
For he indeed gives subsistence to the whole plenitudes of the world.
But they, imitating him, fabricate all partial natures in conjunction with
wholes. And he produces the essence of perpetual natures. But they
fashioning mortal natures according to one generation-producing circle,
likewise transmute these. And as the one demiurgus governs the whole
periods of the universe, thus also the many demiurgi convolve the
divisible circles of the natures that are borne along 1 in generation. If,
therefore, we assert these things rightly concerning the words proceeding
from the demiurgus to the multitude of mundane Gods, and they are
efficacious, fabricative, and convertive of their recipients to a union with
him, and are also perfective of the beneficent reasons which they
contain, we shall no longer seem to speak paradoxically, if we say that
these words extend to the Gods in the world the participation of all the
powers that are firmly established in the father, and of the causes prior
to, and subsisting after him. And as he convolving the end of the
intellectual Gods, is the plenitude of all things, so likewise the demiurgic
words proceeding from him, produce in the junior Gcds the peculiarities,
' For tupyif/ar read ? tf»p«n»>.
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360 °N THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
as I may say, of all the divine genera that are above the world, through
which they are suspended from all the orders prior to them ; just I think
as the whole of this world [is suspended from the mundane Gods who ']
fabricate all mortal natures, and impart to different things a different
power, and an efflux of divine powers.
What, therefore, in short, is it whieh Plato indicates the Gods derive
through these words from the first demiurgus, and the all-perfect fabri-
cation ? In the first place, indeed, they derive this, that they are Gods of
Gods. For the vocal address proceeding to thent from the father, is the
supplier of divine power, and is allotted an efficacious preseuce in its
participant, as we before observed. But in the next place, these xvords
impart to them an indissoluble power. The demiurgus of wholes,
however, comprehends in himself the cause of dissolution, in order that
they may indeed be essentially indissoluble, but according to the cause
of binding, not indissoluble. In the third place, therefore, the demiurgus
produces in them from on high, through these words, a renovated
immortality. For the assertion that they are neither immortal, nor shall
be subject to the fatality of death, establishes them in this form of
immortality, which the fable in the Politicus denominates renovated.
In addition to this also, the words testify that they derive from the father
a power perfective of wholes. For if the world is imperfect without the
subsistence of mortal animals, it is doubtless necessary that those who
preside over the generation of them should be the causes of |>erfcction
to the universe. And in the last place, these words impart to the junior
Gods a paternal and generative empire derived from the exempt and
intellectual cause of wholes; and insert in them the proximate powers
of regeneration. For through these words, the junior Gods again receive
in themselves the natures that are corrupted, fabricate parts from wholes,
and again effect the dissolution of parts into their wholes. And
universally tlic words of the demiurgus subject the perpetually-generated
course of uature, to the fabrication of the junior Gods. In short,
■ There is evidently something wanting in the original in this part ; and as it appears to me
after xaJsnrij (otp-eti) mm o
intellect, it is evidently necessary that the demkirgus of wholes should be
the same with Jupiter, and that there should be one byparxis of both,
which administers every thing in the world according to rectitude, and
' circularly leads every thing confused and disorderly into order. For,
says Timaeus, it is not lawful for that which is best to effect any thing
else than that which is most beautiful. How therefore is it possible that he
who adorns and arranges wholes through Themis, and together with ber
produces all things, should not essentially possess in himself the whole of
the political science ?
How is it possible likewise that he should not be the first Jupiter, who
definitely imparts to ail things that which is divine, and weaves one polity
from all things, but is exempt from all partial causes and the Titannic
genera, and is guarded by his own undefiled powers, beyond the whole
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CHAP. XXV.
OP PLATO.
379
XXV.
OP PLATO.
379
world ? For the guards which surround him, obscurely signify his immu-
table order, and the undeviating defence of fabrication, through which
being firmly established in himself, he pervades through all things without
impediment, and being present to all his progeny, is according to supreme
transcendency expanded above wholes. Moreover, the citadel of Jupiter,
according to the rumours of theologists, is a symbol of intellectual circula-
tion, and of the highest summit of Olympus, which all the wise suspend
from the intellectual watch tower of Jupiter, to which he extends all the
mundane Gods, imparting to them from thence intellectual powers,
divine light, and vivific illuminations, and compressing all the profundi-
ties of the worlds by one most simple circulation, through which the
summit also of the apparent worlds is denominated the period of same-
ness, and the most prudent and uniform circulation, as Timeeus says,
expressing the unical intellectual power of demiurgic conversion, and
being allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the sensible
world that the supreme summit of Jupiter possesses with respect to all
the arrangement of the firmaments. These things may also be assumed
by us as subservient to the proposed investigation, from the fabulous
fictions in the Protagoras.
RAPIER XXV.
Wb may, however, approach still nearer to the truth, and assume in
the present discussion, the fable in the Politicus. For in this it will ap-
pear that Plato in a remarkable manner considers the demiurgus of the
universe to be the same with Jupiter, and even as far as to the very
names asserts the same things a6 Timaeus. The Elean guest, therefore,
as we have before observed, assigns £in this dialogue] twofold circulations
380 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
to the whole of this world, the one intellectual, and which elevates souls
but the other proceeding into nature, and imparting things contrary to
the former. And the one indeed, being unapparent, and governed by
divine providence, but the other apparent, and convolved according to
the order of Fate. He also places twofold motive causes over these
circulations. For every mutation and period require a certain moving
cause. And prior to the causes that move the circulations, he asserts
that there are as it were twofold ends of the periods, and assigns first-
effective canscs of the motions, coordinate to the moving causes, and to
the circulations themselves which differ from each other. Jupiter there-
fore moves, and circularly leads one of the periods, whether you are wil-
ling to call it intellectual, or providential, or in whatever other way you
may denominate it, and he also supplies the world with life, and imparts
to it a renovated immortality. But he prcestablishes his father Saturn
as the object of desire to, and the end of the whole of this circulation. For
he leads back wholes, and converts them to himself.
But he prcestablishes his father Saturn
as the object of desire to, and the end of the whole of this circulation. For
he leads back wholes, and converts them to himself.
Moreover, he extends happy souls to the watch-tower of his father, viz.
those souls whose corporeal nature is obliterated, and whose circulation
is to the incorporeal and the impartible. All the generation-producing*
symbols likewise of these souls are amputated, and the form of their life
is transferred to the intellectual summit. For these souls are also said to
t>e the nurselings of Saturn, but to commit the government of themselves
to Jupiter, and through him to be extended to the intelligible, and the
Saturnian dominion. For the intelligible is nutriment, as it is said by the
Gods themselves. And as Socrates in the Phaedrus elevates souls
through the circulation of the heaven to the supercelestial place, where
souls are nourished, survey true beings, and the unknown order of the
Cods, with the highest powers of themselves, and as he there says, intel-
lectually perceive with the lieads of the charioteers,— thus also the Elean
guest circularly leads souls under Jupiter, to the Saturnian watch-tower,
and asserts that such as have ascended are nourished by Saturn, and calls
them the nurselings of the God. For every where indeed, the intelligible
is perfective of, and has the power of filling an intellectual life, and the
• For Tttovtwpy*, it is necessary to read yntvMp/x.
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CHAP. XXV.
©F PLATO.
pate of the natures that are beyond, establish themselves in more elevated
intellectuals, and ascend as far as to the unknown order, but remote from
the good, and the one principle of all things. But the souls [that ascend
through the circulation of the heaven] are extended to the first intellect,
which is imparticipable, and the intelligible itself, and when they are
there, and have established their life in the occult order as in a port, they
ineffably participate of the union proceeding from the good, and of the
light of truth.
With respect however to what remains respecting the twofold periods,
as we have said, the world itself indeed moves itself, being moved
according to its own nature, and giving completion to the order of Fate.
But the nrst-eflective cause of this motion of the world, and of its life, i»
the God who illuminates it with the power of being moved and of living,
and is the mighty Jupiter. Hence also this period is said to be Jovian,
so far as Jupiter is the cause of this apparent arrangement, just as Saturn
is the cause of the intellectual and unapparent arrangement. It is better,
however, to hear Plato himself discussing these things. That there are,
therefore, twofold circulations of the universe, and that the God who
moves it is the leader of the one, but of the other the world itself convolv-
ing itself, Plato here teaches us. But as was just now said, and which is
the only thiug that remains, the universe is at one time co-governed by
another divine cause, again acquiring life, and receiving a renovated
immortality from the deouurgus; but at another time, when he lays aside
as it were the handle of his rudder, the world being left by itself, moves
for a time by itself, so as frequently to proceed in an inverted order.
Again, however, that one of the periods, viz. the apparent, in Jovian,
but that the other is referred to the kingdom of Saturn, Plato himself
determines in what follows, subjoining these words, after the celebration
of that life, and of the undented polity of the souls that are there, which
is liberated from all corporeal pains, and the servitude about matter :
" You have beard, Socrates, what was the life of men under Saturn ; but
youyourself have seen what the condition of the present life is, which is said
to be under Jupiter." And moreover, that of these two circulations,
OW THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V.
(since the apparent is under'" Jupiter) Jupiter is the cause and maker of
it, is obvious to every one, and that again Jupiter is the power that moves
the unapparent circulation, which is Saturnian, may be demonstrated
from what in written. For it is necessary that these two Gods should
cither rule over each of these circulations, or that one of them should rule
over the unapparent, but the other over the present circulation. If,
however, Jupiter moves the universe according to this period, the world
can no longer be said to convolve itself, and to govern every thing it
contains. Nor will it be true neither that the whole is convolved by
divinity with twofold and contrary circulations, nor again, that two
certain Gods convolve it whose decisions are contrary to each other.
For if Saturn indeed moves it according to one circulation, but Jupiter
moves it according to a period contrary to that of Saturn, two Gods
will move it according to contrary circumvolutions. If, however, these
things are impossible, it is indeed manifest to every one that both the
divine causes preside over the circulation according to the Saturnian
convolution; Saturn indeed as the supplier of an intellectual life; but
Jupiter, as elevating all things to the Saturnian empire, and establishing
them in his own intelligible. And thus that period may be called Sa-
turnian, in consequence of Saturn imparting the first effective cause of
the whole [of an intellectual] life. But according to this more physical
circulation, and which is known to every one, Fate and connate desire
move the universe.
Jupiter, however, is the cause of this motion esemptly, who gives
Fate and an adscititious life to the world. These things, therefore, being
demonstrated by us, let us consider what the particulars are which are
asserted of the God who moves the world according to the other period.
And they are these; " that the world indeed at another time is
conjointly governed by another divine cause, again acquiring life, and
receiving a renovated immortality from the demiurgus." It is obvious,
therefore, to every one, that the Elean guest says, that the God who
moves the universe according to the Saturnian period, supplies it with
life, and imparts to it a renovated immortality, and that he clearly calls
him the demiurgus. Hence, if it is Jupiter who conjointly governs that
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CHAP. XXV.
OF PLATO.
Hence, if it is Jupiter who conjointly governs that
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CHAP. XXV.
OF PLATO.
period, as has been demonstrated, he will be the demiurgus of the world,
and the supplier of immortality. And what occasion is there to say
much on the subject ? For if the same God is the cause of life, and is
denominated the demiurgus, again the Cratylus will present itself to
us, and Jupiter according to this will be the same with the demiurgus.
For life accedes to all things from Jupiter, as it is asserted in that
dialogue. Moreover, in what follows, as Timteus calls the cause of the
. circulation of Fate, demiurgus and father, after the same manner the
Elean guest denominates this cause, and also calls it the maker. " For
the world," says he, " revolves, remembering the doctrine of the demi-
urgus and father." Properly, therefore, do we denominate the whole
of this period Jovian, because the world moves and convolves itself,
according to the doctrine of Jupiter, and the order imparted to it from
him. Again, therefore, Jupiter is demiurgus and father. And here also
the Elean guest preserves the same order of the divine names as Timaeus.
For he does not' call him father and demiurgus, but on the contrary, in
the same manner as Timseus, demiurgus and father ; because the demi-
urgic peculiarity in him is more manifest than the paternal deity. These
things, however, have been copiously investigated before ; and it has
been shown in what respect the demiurgic is different from the paternal
genus, how they are complicated with each other,* where the paternal
subsists essentially, but the demiurgic according to cause, and where
again, the demiurgic subsists essentially, but the paternal, according to
participation.
■ For uu ymf it if oecemry to read ov yaj.
* For i* **)*>s, it it requisite to read n>
384 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
CHAPTER XXVI.
■ For uu ymf it if oecemry to read ov yaj.
* For i* **)*>s, it it requisite to read n>
384 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
CHAPTER XXVI.
It will remain, therefore, that we should make mention of what is
written in the Laws concerning Jupiter. For perhaps in them alto it
will appear that Plato assigns the same order to the demiurgus and to
Jupiter. As the equalities therefore, according to which polities are
adorned, are twofold, and the one polity indeed proposes the equal
according to number, and proceeds through things which differ from
each other according to an equal law ; but the other embraces in all
things, the equality winch is according to desert; and also, since
equality subsists according to ratio, — this being the case, each of these
equalities exists in the providence of the world. For the essence of the
soul, indeed, is primarily divided by its fabricator by the equality
according to ratio ; but it is also consummately filled with the remaining
middles, and bound with them through the whole of itself. The several
bodies [of the world] likewise, participate of a certain common essenoe,
m the fabrication of things ; and on this account they are allotted the
equality which is according to number. But all things are arranged and
adorned through the best of analogies, and the demiurgus according to
this inserts both in wholes and parts, an indissoluble order in the
universe, and an adaptation of tliem to each other.
This equality, therefore, the Athenian guest exhorts his citizens
particularly to honour, in consequence of assimilating his city to the
universe. He also says that it is a thing of this kind, but that it is not
likewise easy for every one to perceive the most true and excellent
equality ; for it is the judgment of Jupiter. What therefore is the cause
on account of which the Athenian guest asserts this analogy to be the
judgment of Jupiter? What other cause can we assign than its con-
tributing to the perfection of the world, and its power and dominion in
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CHAP. XXVI.
OF PLATO.
385
What therefore is the cause
on account of which the Athenian guest asserts this analogy to be the
judgment of Jupiter? What other cause can we assign than its con-
tributing to the perfection of the world, and its power and dominion in
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CHAP. XXVI.
OF PLATO.
385
the fabrication of wholes ? For that which gives an orderly distinction to
the genera of causes, contrives the most beautiful bond of them, and
weaves together one order from wholes, is according to Tim&eus the
power of this analogy. For it established soul in the middle (of the
universe) analogous to intellect and a corporeal nature. For soul is the
middle of an impartible and partible essence. And by how much it
surpasses a partible, by so much it falls short of an impartible hypostasis.
The power of this analogy, however, binds the soul from double and
triple ratios, and connects the whole of it proceeding from and at the
same time returning to (its principles,) by the primary and self-motive
boundaries of equality. It likewise constitutes the corporeal series from
the four first genera. And it adapts indeed the extremes to each other
through the middles, but mingles the middles according to the pecu-
liarity of the extremes. It reduces, however, all things to one world,
and one indissoluble order connectedly comprehended in the universe.
If, therefore, we acknowledge that this equality has dominion in the
whole fabrication of things, the best of analogies is the judgment of the
demiurgus, and according to the decision of him who generated wholes
it is allotted that great dominion in the fabrication of the universe,
which we have before shown it to possess. Hence if the same analogy
is the judgment of Jupiter, as the Athenian guest says it is, it is obvious
to every one that the nature of Jupiter is demiurgic. For it is not any
thing else which judges of the dignity of this analogy than that which
employs it in the arrangement of wholes. And to this the legislator
establishing himself analogous, binds and in a particular manner adorns
the city which is assimilated to the universe, by this analogy.
Proc.
Vol. I.
3 C
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V
CHAPTER XXVII.
And to this the legislator
establishing himself analogous, binds and in a particular manner adorns
the city which is assimilated to the universe, by this analogy.
Proc.
Vol. I.
3 C
ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK V
CHAPTER XXVII.
Fbom these things, therefore, and from all that has been previously said,
we confidently assert, following Plato and paternal rumours, that Jupiter
is the demiurgus of the universe ; and we may collect into one, the
scattered opinions of the ancients on this subject ; of whom, some, indeed,
refer the paradigm of the world, and the demiurgic cause to the same
order ; but others divide these from each other. And some place all-
perfect animal prior to the demiurgus ; but others afford an hypostasis
to it after the demiurgus. For if the demiurgus is, as has been said, the
great Jupiter, and the paradigm proposed to the demiurgus in order to
the generation of the world, is all-perfect animal, these are at the same
time united to each other, and are allotted an essential separation.
And animal itself, indeed, intelligibly comprehends in itself the whole
Jovian series ; but Jupiter the demiurgus of the universe intellectually
pre-establishes in himself the nature of animal itself. For animal itself
is the supplier of life to all things, and all things primarily live on
account of it, and Jupiter being the cause of life, possesses the paradigm
and the generative principle of the essence of all animals. Justly,
therefore, does Timaeus, in Plato, having called the intelligible paradigm
animal, conjoin the demiurgic intellect to the first intelligible animal ;
and through the all-perfect union of the demiurgus and father with it, he
also arranges and adorns this universe. For Jupiter binding to himself
the fabrication of the universe, and being an intellectual animal, is
united to intelligible animal, and being allotted a progression analogous
to it, constitutes all things intellectually, which proceed from animal
itself intelligibly.
For, as we have said, the intelligible hypostases being triple, and one
indeed, being allotted its hyparxis according to existence and the one
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CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO. 387
For, as we have said, the intelligible hypostases being triple, and one
indeed, being allotted its hyparxis according to existence and the one
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CHAP. XXVII. OF PLATO. 387
being; but another according to intelligible life, and the middle centre
of the intelligible breadth, where eternity, all life, and intelligible life
subsist, as Plotinus somewhere says; and another according to intel-
ligible multitude, the first plenitude of life, and the all-perfect paradigm
of wholes, — this being the case, the three kingdoms of the intellectual
Gods are divided analogous to the three intelligible hypostases. And
one indeed, the mighty Saturn, being allotted an hyparxis according to
the summit of intellectuals, and having a paternal transcendency,
possesses a dominion analogous to the summit of the intelligible Gods,
and the occult order. And as in that order, all things are uniformly,
and are ineffably, and without separation united, thus also this God
again converts to himself, and conceals in himself the natures that have
proceeded from him, imitating the occult of the first summit. But again,
the order which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, and is filled
indeed, from the generative power of Saturn, but fills from itself the
whole fabrication wilh vivific rivers, has the same order in intellectuals
which eternity has in intelligibles, and the uniform cause of the life
which is there. And as eternity proximately generates intelligible
animal, which is also denominated eternal, through the participation of
eternity, thus also the middle bosom of the intellectual Gods, unfolds
the deraiurgus of the universe, and the vivific fountain of wholes. But
the third king, viz. the fabricator and at the same time father, is indeed
co-ordinate to the remainder of the intelligible triad, viz. to all-perfect
animal. And as that is an animal, so likewise is Jupiter. And Jupiter
indeed is intelligibly in all-perfect animal ; but all-perfect animal is
intellectually in Jupiter. The extremities likewise of the intelligible
and intellectual Gods are united to each other ; and in them, separation
is co-existent with union. And one of them, indeed, is exempt from
fabrication ; but the other is converted to the intelligible, is filled from
thence with total goods, and is allotted a paternal transcendency through
the participation of it. The maker, therefore, and father of the universe,
who has firmly established in himself the uniform strength and power of
all fabrication, who possesses and comprehends the primary cause of
the generation of wholes, and who stably fixes in himself all things, and
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again produces them from himself in an undefiled manner, being allotted
such an order as this among the intellectual fathers, is celebrated, as I
may say, through the whole of the Timaeus, in which dialogue, his
prolific and paternal power is unfolded, and his providence which
pervades from on high as far as to the extremities of the universe. He
is also frequently celebrated by Plato in other dialogues, so far as it is
possible to celebrate his uniform and united power,' and which through
transcendency is exempt from wholes.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
If however some one recollecting what is said in the beginning of the
Timaeus about him, viz. that it is difficult to discover him, and when
found, impossible to speak of him to all men, should enquire in the first
place, why since the Grecian theology ascribes such a name to the
demiurgus, as we have before mentioned, Timaeus says that he is ineffable,
and established above all the indication which subsists in words. In
the next place, if he should inquire why intelligible animal which is
arranged above the demiurgus is both denominated, and is made known
by many signs, but the demiurgus who has established his kingdom in
an order secondary to that of all-perfect animal, and is an intellectual
God, (all-perfect animal receiving an intelligible transcendency) is left by
Timaeus ineffable, as we have said, and unknown, perhaps we also,
following Plato, may be able to dissolve all such doubts. For every
order of the Gods originates from a monad, and presides over its
1 Svrayu, is omitted in the original.
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CHAP. XXV III. OF PLATO. 5gp
proper series according to the 6rst-erTective cause. And such things
indeed as are nearer to this principle arc more total than those
that are more remote from it But more total natures are manifestly
seen to be less* distant from the monad, and conjoin things which
are diminished according to essence to the natures that are prior
to them. Every order of the Gods likewise is a whole united to
itself through the whole, is allotted one indissoluble connexion, both
in wholes and parts, and through the monad which collects every order
into one, it is converted about itself, is suspended from this, and is
wholly convolved according to it.
If, therefore, we assert these things truly, in each order a monad is
allotted a transcendency with respect to multitude, analogous to the
good. And as the unical cause of whole goods, and which is incom-
prehensible by all things, is exempt from all things, constitutes all things
about itself, generates them from itself, and hastily withdraws the unions
of all things to its own ineffable superunion, thus also the uniform and
generative principle of every co-ordinate multitude, connects, guards and
perfects the whole series of itself, imparts good to it from itself, and
fills it with order and harmony. It is likewise that to its own progeny,
which the good is to all beings, and is the object of desire to all the
natures that originate from itself. Thus, therefore, the union of the
intelligible father subsists prior to the whole paternal order; the one
wholeness of the Sy noches is prior to the connective order ; and the first
effective cause of life, to the vivi6c order.
Hence also, of every demiurgic series, which is suspended from the
triad of the sons of Saturn, the monad which proximately fabricates
wholes, and is established above this triad, comprehends in itself all the
demiurgic Gods, converts them to itself, and is of a boniform nature.
The one fountain likewise of all the demiurgic numbers, subsists, as I
may say, with respect to all this order analogous to the one, and to the
one principle of all things. Timaeus therefore, indicating these things
to us, asserts directly in the beginning of the generation of the world,
' For w&fo* if is evidently necessary to read ijrror.
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390 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
Timaeus therefore, indicating these things
to us, asserts directly in the beginning of the generation of the world,
' For w&fo* if is evidently necessary to read ijrror.
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390 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
that this monad which proximately fabricates wholes, is difficult to be
known, and is indescribable, as having the same ratio as the ineffable
and unknown cause of all beings. Whence likewise, I think, he calls
the demiurgus the best of causes, and the father of this universe, as being
allotted the highest order among the demiurgi, and convolving to himself,
and producing from himself all the effective principles. That one how-
ever, Parmenides demonstrates to be perfectly unknown and ineffable ;
but Timaeus says that it is difficult to discover the maker and father of
the world, and impossible to speak of him to all men ; which assertion
falls short of the cause that flies from all knowledge, and all language,
and appears to verge to the nature of things known and effable. For
when he saj'S that it is impossible to speak of him to all men, he does
not leave him entirely ineffable and unknown. And the assertion that it
is difficult to discover him, is not the sign of a peculiarity perfectly
unknown. For because the demiurgus has established a kingdom
analogous to the good, but in secondary and manifold orders of it, he
participates indeed of the signs of the good, but is allotted the participa-
tion in conjunction with an appropriate peculiarity, and a communion
with beings adapted to him. And as he is good, but not the good itself,
so likewise he is difficult to be known by the natures posterior to him,
but is not unknown. He is also celebrated in mystic language, but is
not perfectly ineffable. You may see however, the order of things, and
the remission in* them proceeding in a downward progression. For the
good indeed, is exempt from all silence, and all language. But the genus
of the intelligible Gods rejoices in silence, and is delighted with ineffable*
symbols. Hence also, Socrates in the Pbaedrus, calls the vision of the
intelligible monads the most holy of initiations, as being involved in
silence, and perceived intellectually in an arcane manner. But the
vision of intellectuals is indeed effable, yet is not effable and known to all
men, but is known with difficulty. For through diminution with respect
to the intelligible, it proceeds from silence and a transcendency which is
to be apprehended by intelligence alone, into the order of things which
are now effable.
• For a|^T».f, ic it necessary to read « sr)™t .
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CHAP. XXIX.
OF PLATO.
391
• For a|^T».f, ic it necessary to read « sr)™t .
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CHAP. XXIX.
OF PLATO.
391
If however, this be the case, all-perfect animal is much more ineffable
and unknown than the demiurgic monad. For it is at once the monad
of every paradigmatic order, and is intelligible, but not intellectual.
How therefore, do we endeavour to denominate, and as it were unfold it,
but thus magnificently celebrate the demiurgic cause ? And how do we
class this cause in the same rank with things ineffable ? For this will not
be acting conformably to Plato, who arranges animal itself beyond the
demiurgus ; but this will be giving an hypostasis to it in a secondary
order of Gods, where it will be ranked, and will be effable and known
more than the demiurgic monad. To which may be added, that to
denominate that all-perfect animal most beautiful, but the demiurgus the
best of causes, gives indeed the same analogy to these causes with
respect to each other, as there is of the good with respect to the beautiful*
And as the good is prior to the beautiful, (for the first beauty, as Socrates
says in the Philebus, is in the vestibules of the good) so likewise the best '
is prior to the most beautiful, and the demiurgus is prior to all-perfect
animal. For the best indeed, remarkably participates of the good, but
the most beautiful, of beauty.
In addition to these things therefore, it must also be asserted by us,
that the most beautiful and the best, are simply indeed related to each
other according to order, as the good is to the beautiful. For the series
of the whole of goodness is expanded above all the progression and
arrangement of the beautiful. Every where, therefore, the best is prior
CHAFFER XXIX.
■ For offrrc,, it is
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For the series
of the whole of goodness is expanded above all the progression and
arrangement of the beautiful. Every where, therefore, the best is prior
CHAFFER XXIX.
■ For offrrc,, it is
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ON THE THEOLOGY
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to the most beautiful. And the one, indeed, with reference to an inferior
order, will be the best, but the other with reference to a more excellent
order, will be the most beautiful. I say for instance, that the most
beautiful, as in intelligibles, will have this peculiarity ; but the best as in
intellectuals. And if the most beautiful, in supermundane natures, is a
thing of this kind, the best will be said to be best as with reference to the
Gods in the world. Hence, if the best of causes is the leader of the
demiurgic series, and according to it is allotted a transcendency of this kind,
but the most beautiful of intelligible animals preestablishes the illustrious
power of beauty in a higher order, by what contrivance can it on this
account be shown that intelligible and all-perfect animal is subordinate
to the intellectual cause ? And that the demiurgus is converted to that
which is posterior to himself? Or how can it be said that animal itself is
visible to him, and all-perfect animal, and that which is comprehensive
of all intelligibles, if it is made to be comprehended by another? For
thus the demiurgus will be more comprehensive than animal itself, if the
former indeed being characterized according to the best, is expanded
above the paradigm, but the latter being denominated as most beautiful
is secondary to the demiurgic cause.
Moreover, as that all-perfect and intelligible animal is particularly
considered by Timaeus according to a formal nature, and not according
to the union which is in it, and an hypostasis which is above all forms,' he
very properly grants that animal itself may be known and manifested by
words, but considers the demiurgus as in a certain respect ineffable, and
superior to knowledge. For both indeed, I mean the demiurgus and
animal itself, participate of union, and prior to a formal essence, are con-
tained in the one. And if you assume the unities which are in them, you
must admit the unity of the paradigm to be intelligible, but the demiurgic
unity to be intellectual, and that an intelligible hyparxis is nearer to the
first one, which is unknown and incomprehensible by all things, than an
intellectual hyparxis. But if you are willing to survey the forms of the
' Instead of too warn*, it it doubtless necessary to read ra xarra. For the demiurgus also has
an hypostasis which is above the forms of the universe.
CHAP. XXIX. OF PLATO. 393
But if you are willing to survey the forms of the
' Instead of too warn*, it it doubtless necessary to read ra xarra. For the demiurgus also has
an hypostasis which is above the forms of the universe.
CHAP. XXIX. OF PLATO. 393
paradigm by themselves, according to which it is said to be the paradigm
of every thing in the world, and the goodness and union of the demiurgus,
the former will appear to you to be known and effable ; but the demiur-
gic cause will be seen to participate of the unknown and ineffable pecu-
liarity of the Gods. For again, Timajus was in a remarkable degree in
want of the demiurgus and father, as the producing cause of wholes, and
the generator of the world- But to generate, to produce and provide are
the peculiarities of Gods, so far as they are Gods. Hence also Ti-
maeus denominates the peculiarity of the demiurgus according to which he
is a God, the cause of the generation of the universe, and the most proper
principle of the arrangement of wholes. But he denominates the pecu-
liarity of the paradigm to be that which comprehends the first forms,
according to which the world also is invested with forms. For it is the
image of the paradigm, but the effect of the demiurgus. It belongs,
therefore, to the paradigm to be the first of forms, but to the demiurgus
to be the best of causes, according to his goodness, and the hyparxis of
essence. For, as we have said, to generate, to give subsistence to, and to
provide for other things, especially pertain to the Gods, and not to the
natures which are primarily suspended ' from them ; but the latter are
allotted through the former an abundance prolific of secondary natures.
It appears to me that Socrates in the Republic indicating these things,
does not say that the sun is the cause of generation, till be had declared
him to be the progeny of the superessential principle of all things ; just as
Timoeus does not begin the fabrication of the universe, till lie had cele-
brated the goodness of the demiurgus of wholes. For each [i. e. the
demiurgus and the sun] is a producing cause according to tht good, the
former indeed of the universe, but the latter of a generated nature; but
not according to the intellect which is in them, or life, or any other form
of essence. For these through the participation of the good constitute
the natures posterior to themselves. And thus through these things we
have answered the before-mentioned doubts.
• For i^munn, it is necessary to read ttyryunif .
*
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CHAPTER XXX.
And thus through these things we
have answered the before-mentioned doubts.
• For i^munn, it is necessary to read ttyryunif .
*
Prcc. Vol. I. 3D
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CHAPTER XXX.
Of the problems pertaining to total fabrication, it now remains for me
to relate what my opinion is respecting the Crater, and the genera that
are mingled in it. For these also Timae us co-arranges with the demiurgic
monad, in the generation of the soul. The demiurgus, therefore, mingles-
the elements of the hypostasis of souls ; but the middle genera of being
are mingled. The much-celebrated Crater, however, receives this mix-
ture, and generates souls in conjunction with the demiurgus. Hence, in
the first place, the genera of being must be admitted to be twofold. And
it must be granted indeed, that some of them give completion to total
hypostases, but others, to such as are partial ; and that the hyparxes of
first effective and united causes, are established in the intelligible Gods-
For there essence subsists primarily in the summit of intelligibles, and
motion and permanency are in the middle centre. For intelligible eter-
nity abides in one, and at once both abides and is the occult cause of all
life. Hence, Plotinus also calls eternity life which is one and total : and.
again, in another part of his works he calls it intelligible life. But the
third from him, Theodorus, denominates it permanency. And both
these opinions harmonize with each other ; because permanency also is ia
eternity, (for according to Timaeus, eternity abides in one) and motion.
For eternity is intelligible life, and that which participates of it is intelli-
gible animal. Moreover, sameness and difference, are in the extremity
of intelligibles. For whence does multitude originate, but from differ-
ence? And whence is the communion of parts with wholes, and the
hyparxisof things which are divided in each other derived but from same-
ness? For that one participates of being, uud being of the one. All the
parts likewise of the one being pervade through each other in an uncon-
fused manner ; for at one and the same time sameness and difference are
there occultly. And the whole intelligible breadth is allotted its hypo*
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CHAP. XXX.
OF PLATO.
stasis according to the first and most uniform genera. As essence likewise
presents itself to the view in conjunction with the one, according to the
first triad, so motion and permanency shine forth in the second, and
sameness and difference in tlie third triad. And all things are essentially
in the intelligible; just ns life and intellect are there intelligibly. For
since all beings proceed from intelligibles, all things preexist there
according to cause. And motion and permanency arc there essentially,
and sameness and difference uniformly.
And all things are essentially
in the intelligible; just ns life and intellect are there intelligibly. For
since all beings proceed from intelligibles, all things preexist there
according to cause. And motion and permanency arc there essentially,
and sameness and difference uniformly.
Again, in the middle genera of the intelligible and intellectual hypo-
stases, the same things subsist secondarily and vitally. In the summit of
them indeed, essence subsists. For Socrates in the Pluedrus speaking
about this order, characterizes the whole of it from essence. For the
truly-existing essence which is without colour, without figure, and without
contact, subsists after this manner. But in the middle centre there are
motion and permanency. For there the circulation of the heaven sub-
sists, as the same Socrates says; being established indeed undeviatingly,
in one form of intelligence; but being moved in, and about itself; or
rather being motion and eternal life. But in the extremity of thiB order,
sameness and difference are vitally established. Hence it is converted to
the beginning according to the nature of sameness, is divided uniformly,
proceeds into more numbers, and generates from itself more partial
monads.
Again, in the third orders, the highest of the intellectual Gods possesses
all things according to essence, and is the intelligible itself and true being
in intellectuals, again recalling the separation which is iu himself into
undivided union. But the middle order subsists according to motion and
at the same time permanency. For it is a vivific deity, abiding and at
the same time proceeding, being established with purity, and vivifying
all things by prolific powers. And the third progression subsists accord-
ing to sameness, together with difference. For this separates itself from
the fathers, and is conjoined to tltein through intellectual conversion. And
it binds, indeed, at once the natures posterior to itself, to each other,
according to the common powers of forms, and at the same time separates
them by intellectual sections. But in this order, all genera and species
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And
it binds, indeed, at once the natures posterior to itself, to each other,
according to the common powers of forms, and at the same time separates
them by intellectual sections. But in this order, all genera and species
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first shine forth to the view ; because it is especially characterized
according to difference, being allotted the end of all the total hypostases.
From this likewise it proceeds to all things, viz. to participated intellect,
the multiform orders of souls, and the whole of a corporeal nature. For,
in short, it constitutes triple genera of the natures posterior to itself;
some indeed, being impartible and the first; others being media
between partible and impartible natures; and others being divided about
bodies. And through these things it generates all the more partial genera
of beings. That we may therefore again return to what has been before
said,, the genera must be admitted to subsist every where, yet not every
where after the same manner; but in the highest orders of divine natures
indeed, they subsist uniformly, without separation, and unitedly, where
also permanency participates of motion, and motion of permanency, and
there is one united progression of both. In the more partial orders, however,
it must be admitted that the same things subsist in a divided manner, and
together with an appropriate remission. For since the first and most
total of forms are m the extremity of intelligibles, it is indeed necessary
that genera should have the beginning of their hypostasis in intelligibles.
And if the demiurgic cause is generative of all the partial orders, it com-
prehends the first genera of the hypostasis of them. As likewise the
fountain of all forms subsists in this cause, though there arc intelligible
forms, so the genera of being, preexist in it, though there are other whole
genera prior to it. And the divine Jamblichus somewhere rightly
observes that the genera of being present themselves to the view in the ex-
tremity of the intelligible Gods. The present theology likewise, following
things themselves, gives a progression to these as well as forms supernallyr
from the intelligible Gods. For such things as subsist according to cause,-
occultly, and without separation in the first essences [i. e. in intelligibles]
these subsist in a divided and partible manner, and according to the nature
ofeach,in intellectuals. For from hence, all the divisibleorders of beings are
filled both with these genera, and with formal hyparxes. And on this ac-
count, the demiurgus also is said to comprehend all genera, and to have the
fountain of forms, because he generates all the partial rivers [of life] and
imparts to them from himself by illumination all the measures of subsistence.'
CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 397
And on this ac-
count, the demiurgus also is said to comprehend all genera, and to have the
fountain of forms, because he generates all the partial rivers [of life] and
imparts to them from himself by illumination all the measures of subsistence.'
CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 397
Hence triple genera of all beings proceed from the derniurgus, some
indeed being impartible, others partible, ' and others subsisting between
these, being more united indeed than the partible, but more separated
than the impartible genera; but subsisting according to the middle of
both, and connectedly containing the one bond of beings. And the
derniurgus indeed produces the intellectual essence, through the first and
impartible genera; but the corporeal essence through the third and
partible genera ; and the psychical hypostasis which is in the middle of
these, through the middle genera in beings. Moreover, he generates
every intellectual and impartible nature from himself, and fills thein with
total generative power. But he constitutes the psychical essence, in
conjunction with the Crater; and the corporeal essence, in conjunction
with total Nature.
CHAPTER XXXL
1
•
That in this arrangement likewise we follow Timaeus, any one may
learn from the following considerations : The derniurgus producing the
intellect of the universe, himself produces it from his own essence alone,
unfolding it at once according to one union, in consequence of consti-
tuting it eternally, and no mention whatever is here made of the Crater.
But the derniurgus in arranging and adorning soul prior to body, mingles
the genera, and energizes in conjunction with the Crater. And in fa-
shioning the body of the universe, and describing the heaven, he fabri-
cates it in conjunction with Necessity. For the nature of the universe,
says Tiuia:us, was generated mingled from intellect and necessity. And nei-
ther does he here assume the Crater in order to the arrangement of bodies.
* The words rm h fufurr* arc omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.
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And nei-
ther does he here assume the Crater in order to the arrangement of bodies.
* The words rm h fufurr* arc omitted in the original, but evidently ought to be inserted.
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But it has been abundantly shown by us elsewhere, that Plato calls
physical production, a production through necessity, and does not, a*
some suppose, consider necessity to be the same with matier. It is
evident, therefore, that the demiurgus produces the generation of bodies
together with total Nature, mingles the partible genera in the first Nature,
and thus produces bodies from intellect and necessity. For bodies
receive' from intellect indeed, good and union; but from necessity a
progression which terminates in interval and division. He arranges and
adorns, however, the 6elf-motive essence of souls, in conjunction with the
Crater. And neither intellect, nor bodies, require a cause of this kind.
The demiurgus indeed is the common source of the triple genera. But
the Crater is the peculiar cause of souls, and is co-arranged with the de-
miurgus and filled from him, but fills souls. And receiving from thence
indeed the powers of prolific abundance, it pours them on souls according
to the measures of their respective essences. To some of them likewise it
orderly distributes the summits of the genera [of being], to others the
middle progressions of the genera, and to others, the terminations of
them. Hence the Crater is indeed essentially vivific, since souls also are
certain lives, but it is the first-effective cause of souls, according to the
peculiarity of hyparxis, and is the uniform and all-perfect monad, not
of every life, but of that which is psychical. For from this Crater the
soul of the universe subsists, and likewise the second and third genera of
partible souls, and of those souls that are allotted a progression between
these.
The whole number, therefore, of the psychical order proceeds from the
Crater, and is divided according to the prolific powers which it contains.
Hence the Crater is said to be the cause of souls, the receptacle of their
fabrication, and the generative monad of them, and the like. For it is
said to be so rightly, and conformably to the mind of Plato. If, how-
ever, the Crater is co-arranged with the demiurgus, and equally consti-
tutes with him the genera of souls, it is indeed necessary that this Crater
should be fontal, in the same manner as the whole demiurgus. Hence
■ For hxofuia, it is necessary to read g^spou.
CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 399
If, how-
ever, the Crater is co-arranged with the demiurgus, and equally consti-
tutes with him the genera of souls, it is indeed necessary that this Crater
should be fontal, in the same manner as the whole demiurgus. Hence
■ For hxofuia, it is necessary to read g^spou.
CHAP. XXXI. OF PLATO. 399
the Crater is the fountain of souls, but is united to the demiurgic monad.
And on this account, Socrates also in the Philebns says, that in Jupiter
there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect. For that which we at present
denominate fontal, he calls royal; though the name of fountain when
applied to souls is well known to Plato. For Socrates, in the Phredrus,
says, that the self- motive nature is the fountain and principle of motion
to such other things as are moved.
And you see that as a twofold divine monad prior to souls is delivered
by theologists, the one being indeed fontal, but the other of a primary
ruling nature, Plato likewise gives to the progeny of these twofold
appellations, assuming one name from the more total, but the other from
the more partial monad. For the self-motive nature, is a fountain indeed,
as being the offspring of the fontal soul, but it is a principle, as participa-
ting of the primary ruling soul. If therefore, the name of fountain, and
also of principle is assigned by Plato to souls, what occasion is there to
wonder if we denominate the exempt monads of them, fountains and
principles? Or rather from these things that is demonstrated. For
whence is a ruling power imparted to all souls except from the ruling
monad ? For that which similarly extends to all souls, is necessarily
imparted to them from one and the same cause. If therefore, some one
should say it is imparted by the demiurgus, so far as he is the demiurgus,
it is necessary that in a similar manner it should be inherent in all other
things which proceed from the demiurgic monad. But if it proceeds
from the definite and separate cause of souls, that cause must be
denominated the first fountain and principle of them.
Moreover, that of these two names, the ruling is more allied to souls
than the fontal, as being nearer to them according to order, Plato
manifests in the same dialogue. For calling the self-motive nature the
fountain and at the same time principle of the motion of the whole of
things, he nevertheless frames his demonstration of its un begotten
subsistence from principle alone. For, says he, principle is unbegotteu.
For it is necessary that every thing which is generated should be
generated from a principle. If therefore, demonstrations are from things
proximate to the things demonstrated, it is necessary that principle
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For, says he, principle is unbegotteu.
For it is necessary that every thing which is generated should be
generated from a principle. If therefore, demonstrations are from things
proximate to the things demonstrated, it is necessary that principle
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should be more proximate to souls than fountain. Farther still, if every
thing which is generated is generated from a principle, as Plato says, but
souls are in a certain respect generated, as Timaeus says, there is also a
precedaneous principle of souls. And as they are the principles of
things which are generated according to time, so after another manner
principle subsists prior to souls, which are generated. And as they are
unbegotten according to the generation of bodies, thus also the principle
of souls is exempt from all generation. Through these things therefore, it
is demonstrated by us, that tbeCrater is the fountain of souls, that after the
fountain there is a primary ruling monad of them, and that this monad
is more proximate to souls than the fountain, but is established above
them, as being their prolific cause. And all these particulars we hav e
demonstrated from the words of Plato.
i
CHAPTER XXXII.
Again therefore, let us return to the things proposed, and teach in a
greater degree the lovers of the contemplation of truth, concerning this
Crater. For the whole vivific deity having established in the middle of
the intellectual kings the prolific cause of divine natures, and according
to her highest, most intellectual and all-perfect powers, being occultly
united to the first father, but according to more partial and secondary
causes from them, being conjoined to the demiurgus, and establishing
one conspiration together with him of the generation of the partial orders,
Timaeus mystically mentions those more ancient powers of the Goddess,
and which abide in the first father. But with respect to those powers
that are co-arranged with the demiurgus, and adorn together with him
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CHAP. XXXII. OF PLATO. 401
the natures in the universe, some of these he delivers more clearly but
the whole of others through indication. For the secondary monads
themselves of the Goddess are triple, as the wise assert, one of them
being the fountain of souls, the second, being the fountain of the virtues,
but the third being the fountain of Nature which is suspended from the
back of the Goddess. The demiurgus therefore, also assumes these three
hypostases to his own prolific production. And the Crater indeed, as
we have said, is the fountain of souls, unically containing the whole and
perfect number of them.' And as the demiurgus is allotted a paternal
cause with respect to the psychical generation, so the Crater is prolific,
and is allotted the ratio and order of a mother. For such things as
Jupiter produces paternally in souls, the fountain of souls produces
maternally and generatively.
For such things as
Jupiter produces paternally in souls, the fountain of souls produces
maternally and generatively.
Virtue however, energizes by itself, and adorns and perfects wholes.
And on this account, the universe having participated of soul, immedi-
ately also participates of virtue. " For the demiurgus, says Timseus,
having placed soul in the middle, extended it through the universe, and
besides this surrounded the body of it externally with soul as with a veil,
and causing circle to revolve in circle, constituted heaven one, alone and
solitary, but through virtue able to converse with itself, and being in want
of no other thing, but sufficiently known and friendly itself to itself." At
one and the same time therefore the world is animated, lives through the
whole of its life according to virtue, and possesses from the virtues as its
highest end, friendship with itself, and an all-perfect knowledge of itself.
For it is itself sufficiently known and friendly to itself through virtue.
Moreover, nature also is consubsistent with the generation of body.
For the demiurgus generates body through necessity, and fashions it
together with its proper life. And on this account, shortly after, having
constituted partial souls, he shows to them the nature of the universe,
and the laws of Fate. For in consequence of possessing the cause of
total Nature and Fate, he also exhibits these to souls. For the
demiurgus is not converted to things posterior to himself, but primarily
' For ivrw, it U necessary to read oantn,
Proc. Vol. I. 3 E
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402 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
contains in himself the things which are exhibited, and unfolds to souls
the powers of himself. Hence, the paradigm of all Nature, and the one
cause of the laws of Fate pre-subsist in him. For the fountain of
Nature, is called the first Fate by the Gods themselves. "You should
not look upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal." Hence also, Tinneus
says, that souls at one and the same time see the laws of Fate, and the
nature of the universe, viz. they see as it were mundane Fate, and the
powers of it. And the Elean guest in the Politicus, denominates the
motive cause of the more physical circulation of the universe, Fate.
For he says that "Fate and connate desire convolve the world." And
the same person likewise clearly acknowledges that the world possesses
this power from the demiurgus and father. For he say* that all the
apparent arrangement and circulation are derived from Jupiter. It is
demonstrated therefore, that according to these three causes of the vivific
Goddess which are co-arranged with the demiurgus, the world is perfec-
ted by him, viz. according to the fontal Crater, the fountain of the
virtues, and the first-effective cause of nature.
It is
demonstrated therefore, that according to these three causes of the vivific
Goddess which are co-arranged with the demiurgus, the world is perfec-
ted by him, viz. according to the fontal Crater, the fountain of the
virtues, and the first-effective cause of nature.
It is likewise manifest that again in these things Plato does not refuse
to- employ the name of fountain. For in the Laws he calls the power
of prudence which is essentially inherent in souls, and which is productive
of the virtues in us, the fountain of intelligence. And he also says, that
two other fountains are imparted to us by nature, viz. pleasure and pain.
As, therefore, we before demonstrated that souls are called the fountains
of motions, on account of the one fountain of them, of which they
participate, thus also when Plato calls the first progeny of Nature
fountains, it is obvious to every one, that he will permit the exempt
cause itself of them to be denominated a fountain. After the same
manner, likewise, since he magnificently celebrates the essential power
of virtue in us, as the fountain of intelligence, he will not be compelled
to hear a name which does not at all pertain to his philosophy, if some
one should be willing to denominate, the first monad of the virtues, a
fountain. But where shall we have the name of fountain posited by him
in the intellectual Gods? In the Cratylus, therefore, he says that Tethys
is the occult name of a fountain, and he calls Saturn himself and the
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.CHAP.' XXXIII. OF PLATO. 403
queen Rhea fluxions. For these divinities are rivers of the intelligible
fountains, and proceeding from fountains placed above them, they fill
all the natures posterior to themselves with the prolific rivers of life.
And the Crater itself likewise is fontal. The Gods, therefore, also
denominate the first>eftective causes of partial natures, fontal Craters.
These things, however, we shall more fully investigate elsewhere. Let
it be considered also, that we have here sufficiently examined the
particulars concerning the demiurgic monad, according to the narration
of Plato.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
These things, however, we shall more fully investigate elsewhere. Let
it be considered also, that we have here sufficiently examined the
particulars concerning the demiurgic monad, according to the narration
of Plato.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
In the next place, let us survey those causes and leaders of uncon-
taminated purity, and see if Plato any where appears to remind us of
this order of Gods, and of the inflexible power proceeding from them to
all the divine genera. For the first-effective triad of the immutable
order, is united to the triad of the intellectual kings and the progressions
of the former are co-divided with the monads of the latter. And the
summit of the triad, and as it were, the flower of the inflexible guard of
wholes is united to the first intellectual king. But the middle centre of
the triad, is in a kindred manner conjoined to the second intellectual
king, proceeds together with him, and subsists about him. And the
extremity' of the whole triad is connected with the third intellectual
king, is converted with him to the principle [of the intellectual order,]
and together with him is convolved to the one union of the father of all
the intellectual Gods. And after this manner, indeed, the three
• to is omitted in the original.
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unpolluted guardians of the intellectual fathers, are monadically divided.
But together with this division they have also an hypostasis united to
each other. All of them, likewise, are in a certain respect in each of
the fathers, and all of them energize about all. And after a certain
manner indeed according to their proper hypostasis, they are divided
from the fathers ; but after another manner they are impartibly assumed
with them, and at one and the same time they arc allotted an equally-
dignified order with the fathers, and appear to possess an essence
subordinate to them.
Such, therefore, being their nature, they preserve, indeed, the whole
progressions of the fathers undefiled, but supply them with inflexibility
in their powers, and immutability in their energies. They are suspended,
however, from total purity. And if some of the ancients have in any
of their writings surveyed in intellect that which always subsists with
invariable sameness, which receives nothing into itself from subordinate
natures, and is not mingled with tilings inferior, they celebrate all such
goods as these, as pervading to intellect, and other natures, from these
Gods. For the oration in the Banquet of Plato, celebrates in a remark-
able manner the immiscibility of the divine essence with secondary
natures ; and that which transcends the whole of things in purity and
immutable power, arrives to the Gods through the guardian cause. And
as the intellectual fathers, are the suppliers of prolific production, both
to all other things, and to the inflexible Gods, thus also, the undefiled,
Gods, impart the power of purity, both to the fathers, and to the other
divine orders. At one and the same time, therefore, the three unpolluted
Gods subsist with the three intellectual kings, are the guardians of the
fathers themselves, establish about them an immutable guard, and
firmly fix themselves in them. Hence also, the Athenian guest, as he
arranges and adorns his polity through the best analogy, through which
the demiurgus binds and constitutes the whole number [of the elements,]
so likewise he appoints a guard to all the inhabitants of the region, that
nothing, as much as possible, may be without defence ; imitating in this
the intellectual Gods themselves who guard all things by the undefiled
leaders. And it appears to me that on tins account he calls the rulers
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CHAP. XXXIV. OF PLATO. 405
[of his polity] guardians of the laws, or [simply] guardians, because the
inflexible guardians are consubsistent with the intellectual leaden of the
whole worlds.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
And it appears to me that on tins account he calls the rulers
Digitized
CHAP. XXXIV. OF PLATO. 405
[of his polity] guardians of the laws, or [simply] guardians, because the
inflexible guardians are consubsistent with the intellectual leaden of the
whole worlds.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
These arguments, however, will be more remote from that divine
triad, and are referred to it from ultimate images. But perhaps
omitting these, we may abound with greater conceptions, and more
conducive to the investigation of the thing proposed, and speculating
together with Plato the divine genera, we may discover how he also
celebrates this order of Gods, and constitutes them together with the
three kings that are now discussed, just as by other theologists also, we
are mystically instructed in the truth concerning them. In the fable
therefore of Protagoras, Plato indicating to us the exempt watch-tower
of Jupiter, and the transcendency of his essence which is unmingled with
all secondary natures, through which he is inaccessible and unrevealed
to the partible genera of Gods, refers the cause of this to his ' immutable
guard, aiid the defensive order by which he * is surrounded. For on
account of this, all the demiurgic powers indeed are firmly established in
themselves. But all the torms [that are in him] are according to supreme
transcendency exempt from secondary natures. And in short, the
demiurgic intellect [through this order] abides after its accustomed
manner. For the fable says that the guards of Jupiter are terrible to
all things. And on this accoant such [partible] genera of Gods (one of
• For mnm, it i* necewary to read mnau.
' The tame emendatioo it here also necessary, U abort.
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which also Prometheus is) cannot be immediately conjoined with the
undented and Olympian powers of the demiurgus. If, therefore, Socrates
himself in the form of a fable clearly delivers to us the guard about the
demiurgus, is it not through these things evident that the guardian
genus is consubsistent with the intellectual Gods ? For as the Oracles
say, that the demiurgio order is surrounded with a burning guard, thus
also Plato says that guards stand round it, and defend inflexibly the
summit of it exempt from all secondary natures.
For as the Oracles
say, that the demiurgio order is surrounded with a burning guard, thus
also Plato says that guards stand round it, and defend inflexibly the
summit of it exempt from all secondary natures.
But in the Cratylus, Socrates unfolding through the truth which is
expressed in names, who Saturn is, demonstrates indeed his ' peculiar
hyparxis, according to which he subsists as the leader of the total intel-
lectual orders. He likewise unfolds to us the monad of the unpolluted
order, which is united with Saturn. For Saturn, as he says in that
dialogue, is a pure intellect. For, he adds, the koron (to xogo*) of him,
does not signify his being a boy, but the purity, and incorruptible nature
of intellect. After an admirable manner therefore, the fabricator of these
divine names, has at one and the same time conjoined the Saturnian
peculiarity, and the first monad of the unpolluted triad. For the union
of the first father with the first of the unpolluted Gods, is transcendent,
and hence this inflexible God is called silent by the Gods, is said to accord
with intellect, and to be known by souls according to intellect alone ;
because he subsists in the first intellect according to one union with it.
Saturn therefore, as being the first intellect, is defined according to its
proper order, but as a pure and incorruptible intellect, he has the unde-
fined conjoined in himself. And on this account, he is the king of all the
intellectual Gods. For as intellect he gives subsistence to all the
intellectual Gods, and as a pure intellect, he guards the total orders of
them. The two fathers therefore, [Saturn and Jupiter] are shown by the
words of Plato to be co-arranged with the immutable Gods, according to
union indeed, the first, but according to separation the third.
If you are willing however, to survey the one inflexible guard of them
with respect to each other, according to which the third father is stably
1 For avrqt, it it requisite to read utrw.
»
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CHAP. XXXIV.
OF PLATO
407
If you are willing however, to survey the one inflexible guard of them
with respect to each other, according to which the third father is stably
1 For avrqt, it it requisite to read utrw.
»
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CHAP. XXXIV.
OF PLATO
407
in the first, as being the intellect of him, and energizing about him, again
direct your attention to the bonds in the Cratylus, of which indeed,
partible lives, and the lives deprived of intellect, and which are stupidly
astonished about matter, are unable to participate. But a divine intel-
lect itself, and the souls which are conjoined to it, participate of these
bonds according to an order adapted to them. For the Saturnian bonds,
appear indeed to bind the mighty Saturn himself, but in reality, they •
connect about him in an undefiled manner the natures that throw the.
bonds around him. For a bond is the symbol of the connective order of
the Gods, since every thing which is bound is connected by a bond.
Again therefore from these things, the guardian good which extends from
the connective Gods to the intellectual kings is apparent, since it unites,
and collects them into one. For a bond guards that which is connected
by it. But the immutable Gods inflexibly preserve their own appropri-
ate orders. For the guardship of these Gods is twofold ; the one indeed,
being primary and uniform, and suspended from the triad of the
connective Gods ; but the other being co-existent with the intellectual
kings, and defending them from a tendency to all secondary natures.
For all the intellectual fathers ride on the unpolluted Gods, and are
established above wholes, through their inflexible, undeviating, and
immutable power.
If however, it be not only necessary that these two fathers should
participate of this guardian order, but that the middle vivific deity of
them should be allotted a monad of the immutable Gods coordinate to
herself, it is indeed necessary that the first [guardianship] of the unpol-
luted leaders in the intellectual fathers, should be triad ic, and should have
the same perfect number with the three intellectual Gods. It is likewise
necessary that the first of these leaders should be stably united to the
first [of the intellectual kings] ; but that the second should in a certain
respect be separated from the second of these kings, together with a
union with him. And that the third should now be entirely separated
from the third king. And thus the unpolluted proceeds conformably to
the paternal order, and is after the same manner with it triadically
divided. The first of the unpolluted Gods likewise guards the occult
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408 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
And thus the unpolluted proceeds conformably to
the paternal order, and is after the same manner with it triadically
divided. The first of the unpolluted Gods likewise guards the occult
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nature of Saturn, and the first-effective monad which transcends wholes,
and establishes perfectly in him the causes that proceed from, and again
return to him. But the second, preserves the generative power of the
queen Rhea, pure from matter, and undented, and sustains from the
incursions of secondary natures her progression to all things, on which
she pours the rivers of life. And the third preserves the whole fabrica-
tion of things established above the fabrications, and firmly abiding in
itself. It likewise guards it so as to be inflexible, one, and all-perfect
with respect to the subjects of its providential case, and expanded above
CHAPTER XXXV.
Let us now then from this indefinite and common doctrine about
these Gods, adduce the Grecian rumour concerning it, as delivered to us
by Plato, and demonstrate that he as far as to the very names follows
the theologists of the Greeks, just as in the mystic theory of the three
kings, and the narration of the unpolluted Gods, he does not depart from
their interpretation. For who that is in the smallest degree acquainted
with the divine wisdom of the Greeks, does not know that in their arcane
mysteries, and other concerns respecting the Gods, the order of the
Curetes, is in a remarkable manner celebrated by them, as presiding
over the undefiled peculiarity, as the leader of the goddess £Rhea,] and
as binding in itself the guardianship of wholes? These Gods therefore,
are said to guard the queen Rhea, and the demiurgus of wholes, and
proceeding as far as to the causes of partible vivification and fabrication,
to preserve the Proserpine and Bacchus which are among these causes,
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CHAP. XXXV. OF PLATO. 40g
These Gods therefore,
are said to guard the queen Rhea, and the demiurgus of wholes, and
proceeding as far as to the causes of partible vivification and fabrication,
to preserve the Proserpine and Bacchus which are among these causes,
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CHAP. XXXV. OF PLATO. 40g
exempt from secondary natures, just as here [i.e. in the intellectual order],
they defend the vivifications of total life, and the first-effective monads of
all-perfect fabrication. Not only Orpheus therefore, and the theologists
prior to Plato knew this Curetic order, and knowing, venerated it, but
the Athenian guest also in the Laws celebrates it. For he says, that the
nnncd sports of the Curetes in Crete, are the principal paradigms of all
elegant motion. And now, neither is he satisfied with having mentioned
this Curctic order, but he also adds the one unity of the Curetes, viz. our
mistress Minerva, from which the mystic doctrine also of theologists
prior to him, suspends the whole progression of the Curetes. He like-
wise, surrounds them above with the symbols of Minerva, as presiding
over an ever-flourishing life, and vigorous intellection ; but beneath, he
• manifestly arranges them under the providence of Minerva. For the
first Curetes indeed, as being the attendants of the intelligible and occult
Goddess, are satisfied with the signs that proceed from thence ; but those
in the second Jind third orders, are suspended from the intellectual
Minerval monad.
What then is it, that the Athenian guest says concerning this monad,
which converts to itself in an undefiled manner the Curetic progressions ?
"The core i.e. virgin, and mistress that is with us, being delighted
with the discipline of dancing, did not think it proper to play with empty
hands ; but being adorned with an all-perfect panoply, she thus gave
perfection to dancing." Through these things therefore, the Athenian
guest clearly shows the alliance of the Curetic triad to the Minerval
monad. For as that triad is said to sport in armour, so he says that the
Goddess who is the leader of them [i.e. of their progression] being
adorned with an all-perfect panoply, is the source to them of elegant
motion. And as he denominates that triad Curetic, from purity, so like-
wise he calls this goddess Core, as being the cause of undefiled power
itself. For koron (-nxop*) as Socrates ' says in the Cratylus, signifies the
pure and incorruptible. Whence also the Curetes are allotted their
appellation, as presiding over the undefiled purity of the Gods. Aud
1 Kf *tij{ is erroneously printed in the original for X'wxgtrrm.
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Whence also the Curetes are allotted their
appellation, as presiding over the undefiled purity of the Gods. Aud
1 Kf *tij{ is erroneously printed in the original for X'wxgtrrm.
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the monad of them is particularly celebrated as a mistress and as Core
[a virgin] she being the supplier of an inflexible and flourishing dominion
to the Gods. The word koron therefore, as we have said, is a symbol of
purity, of which these Gods are the primary leaders, and according to
which ■ they are participated by others. But their being armed, is a
symbol of the guardian power according to which they connect wholes,
guard them exempt from secondary natures, and preserve them estab-
lished in themselves. For what other benefit do men derive from arms
except that of defence? For these are in a particular manner the safe-
guard of cities. Hence fables also ascribing to the unpolluted Gods an
unconquerable strength, give to them an armed apparatus. Hence
adorning the one unity of them with an all-perfect panoply, they estab-
lish it at the summit of the progression of these Gods. For the all-perfect
precedes things which are divided according to parts, and the panoply
exists prior to the partible distribution of guardian powers. And it
appears to me that through these particulars Plato again asserts the same
things as were afterwards revealed by the Gods. For what they denomi-
nate every kind of armour, this Plato celebrates as adorned with an
all-perfect panoply. [For the Gods say,] "Armed with every kind of
armour, he resembles the Goddess." For the all-perfect in the habit of
Pyrrhich arms, and the undefiled in power, pertain, according to Plato,
to the Minerval monad ; but according to the narration of the Oracles
they pertain to that which is furnished with every kind of arms.
Farther still, rythm and dancing are a mystic sign of this deity, because
the Curetes contain the undefiled power of a divine life ; because they
preserve the whole progressions of it always arranged according to one
divine boundary ; and because they sustain these progressions from the
incursions of matter. For the formless, the indefinite, and the privation
of rythm, are the peculiarities of matter. Hence, the immaterial, the
definite, and the undefiled, are endued with rythm, are orderly, and
intellectual. For on this account, the heavens also are said to form a
perpetual dance, and all the celestial orbs participate of rythmical and
' For xtJf nitii necessary to read x«J" v
CHAP. XXXVI.
OF PLATO.
411
For on this account, the heavens also are said to form a
perpetual dance, and all the celestial orbs participate of rythmical and
' For xtJf nitii necessary to read x«J" v
CHAP. XXXVI.
OF PLATO.
411
harmonious motion, being filled with this power supernally from the
unpolluted Gods. For because they are moved in a circle thejr express
intellect, and the intellectual circulation. But because they are moved
harmonically, and according to the first and best rythms, they participate
of the peculiarity of the guardian Gods. Moreover, the triad of the
unpolluted leaders is suspended from the summit of the intellectual
Gods. And that it proceeds from this summit, Plato himself teaches us,
by placing the first cause of purity in Saturn the king of all the intellec-
tual hebdomad. For purity (to xogw) is there primarily, as he informs us
in the Cratylus, and the first-effective cause of purity, preexists unically
in Saturn. For on this account also, the Minerval monad, is called Cote
(a virgin) and the Curetic triad is after this manner celebrated, being
suspended from the purity in the intellectual father.
CHAFFER XXXVI.
Concerning the undefiled leaders, thus much we have had to say,
according to the narration of Plato. The monad therefore, now remains,
which closes the number of all the intellectual hebdomad, and is the first
and uniform cause of all division, which must in the next place be
discussed by us. The sections therefore, of the intellectual Gods which
are celebrated by all the wise in divine concerns among the Greeks, and
which obscurely signify the separations in those Gods, are effected in
them through the seventh monad, which is the cause of division, and
according to which they separate themselves from the Gods that are
placed above them, proceeding into another order, are allotted a union
exempt from subordinate natures, and by themselves have a definite
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ON TE1E THEOLOGY
HOOK V.
order, and a progression bounded according to number. Plato however,,
allows indeed poets that are inspired by Phoebus, to signify things of this-
kind obscurely and mystically; but he excludes the multitude from
hearing these things, because they believe without examination in the
fabulous veils of truth. And thi9 is what Socrates reprobates in Euthy-
phron, who was thus affected in consequence of being ignorant of divine
concerns. According to the divinely-inspired intellect of Plato therefore,
transferring all such particulars to the truth concerning wholes, and
unfolding the concealed theory which they contain, we shall procure
for ourselves the genuine worship of a divine nature. For Socrates
himself in the Cratylus, unfolds to us the Saturnian bonds, and their
mystic meaning, and in a remarkable manner demonstrates that the
visions of those ancient and illustrious men do not fall off from the
truth.
For Socrates
himself in the Cratylus, unfolds to us the Saturnian bonds, and their
mystic meaning, and in a remarkable manner demonstrates that the
visions of those ancient and illustrious men do not fall off from the
truth.
After the same manner therefore, he will permit his friends to assume
intellectual sections, and the power which is productive of these, accord-
ing to divinely-inspired conceptions, and will suffer them to survey these
together with bonds in the intellectual Gods. Farther still, the fable in
the Gorgias, in a clearer manuer separates the empire of Jupiter from
the Saturnian kingdom, and calls the former the second from, and more
recent than the latter. What is the cause, therefore, which separates
these paternal monads ? What intellectual power produced the intel-
lectual empire from that which is exempt from it ? For it is necessary
that there should be with the Gods themselves the first-effective fountain
of division, through which Jupiter also separates himself from tlie monad
his father, Saturn from the kingdom of the Heaven, and the natures
posterior to Jupiter, proceeding into an inferior order, are separated
from his all-perfect monad.
Moreover, the demiurgus himself in the production of the genera
posterior to himself, at one and the same time is the cause to them of
union, and the source of their all-various divisions. For fabricating the
soul one whole, he separates it into parts, and all-various powers. And
in the Timaeus where the demiurgus is said to do this, Plato himself
does not refuse to call these separations, and essential divisions, sectiom.
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chap, xxxvii.
OF PLATO.
413
For fabricating the
soul one whole, he separates it into parts, and all-various powers. And
in the Timaeus where the demiurgus is said to do this, Plato himself
does not refuse to call these separations, and essential divisions, sectiom.
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chap, xxxvii.
OF PLATO.
413
He likewise cuts off parts from thence, places tliem in that which h
between these, and again separates parts from the whole, and thus the
mixture from which he had cut off these parts, was now wholly con-
sumed. Is it therefore any longer wonderful that the framers of fables
should denominate the divisions of the intellectual leaders, sections, since
even Timaeus himself who does not devise fables, but indicates the
essential progression of souls into multitude, uses as a sign the word
section ? And does not also Plato in the greatest degree accord with the
highest of theologists, when he delivers to us the demiurgus glittering
with intellectual sections ? As therefore the demiurgus, when producing
the essence of souls, constitutes it according to true being, when gene-
rating life, he generates it according to the life which is in real beings,
and produces the intellect which is in souls according to the intellect
which is in himself, — thus also when cutting the essence of the soul from
itself, and separating it, he energizes according to the sections and
separations which are in the intellectual order, and according to the one
and intellectual cause of them. According to Plato, therefore, there is
a first monad of the total divisions in intellectuals, and together witb
the twofold triads, I mean the paternal and the undefiled, it gives
completion to the whole intellectual hebdomad. And we, following
Plato, and other theologists, concede the same things.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
Let us now, however, return to the beginning, and demonstrate that
Parmenides delivers the same things concerning this intellectual heb-
domad, and that he produces this hebdomad ic aibn {eternity) and the
peculiarity of the Gods which is intellectual alone, in continuity with.
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the triple orders of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual
Gods. And, in the first place, let us survey what he says concerning
the father of the intellectual Gods, and the undefilcd power which is
co-arranged with him. For after the threefold figure, and the order of
the Gods which perfects all things, that which is in itself and in another,
becomes apparent. These things, however, are demonstrated to be
signs of the intellectual summit of the intellectual monads. For the
first father of the Gods in this order, at one and the same time is allotted
a paternal transcendency with respect to those posterior to him, and is the
intellect of the first intelligibles. For every imparticipable intellect is
said to be the intellect of the natures prior to itself, and towards them,
from whom it is produced, it has an intellectual conversion, and in theni
as first-effective causes it establishes itself. Whence also the demiurgic
intellect is the intellect of the natures above itself, and proximately indeed
of its own father, from which likewise it proceeds, but eminently of the
intelligible unities beyond [Saturn].
The first king, therefore, in intellectuals, is both an intellectual father,
and a paternal intellect. lie is, however, the intellectual father indeed
of the Gods that proceed from himself; but he is the paternal intellect
of the intelligibles prior to himself. For he is indeed intellectual
essentially ; but he has an intelligible transcendency in intellectuals ;
because he is also established analogous to the unknown order of the
intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, and to the occult
order of the intelligible triads. And as they are expanded above the
triadic hypostases of the Gods posterior to themselves, thus also the
father of intellectuals, is a father expanded above the whole intellectual
hebdomad, in consequence of being a paternal intellect. And analo-
gously to the above-mentioned orders of Gods, he establishes himself in
them, and is filled from them with paternal and intelligible union. On
this account also, he is occult, shuts in himself the prolific powers of
himself, and producing from himself total causes, he again establishes
them in, and converts them to himself.
' For w ovnp, it is necessary to read n tam*.
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CHAP. XXXVII
OF PLATO.
415
On
this account also, he is occult, shuts in himself the prolific powers of
himself, and producing from himself total causes, he again establishes
them in, and converts them to himself.
' For w ovnp, it is necessary to read n tam*.
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CHAP. XXXVII
OF PLATO.
415
These things, therefore, Parmcnides also indicating, magnificently
celebrates this order by these twofold signs, and characterizes the first
king and father of the intellectual 1 Gods through these peculiarities.
For he is in himself, and in another. For so far indeed as he is a total
intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so far as he is in the intel-
ligibles prior to himself, he establishes in another the all-perfect intelli-
gence of himself. For, indeed, this subsistence in another, is more
excellent than the subsistence of a thing in itself ; since, as Parmenides
himself concludes, the subsistence of Saturn in another, pertains to him
according to whole, but the subsistence of him in himself, according to
parts. Where, therefore, does the another pre-exist? And to what order
of the Gods prior to Saturn does it belong? Or is not this also divinely
unfolded by our preceptor? For he says that this another, remarkably
pertains to that order, according to which the power of difference first
shines forth, being the progeny of intelligible and paternal power. Hence
in the first triad the another was occultly, so far as power also had there
an occult subsistence ; but it particularly shines forth in the first order
of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. For there
the first difference, the feminine nature of the Gods, and the paternal
and unvocal power subsist.
[Saturn therefore] who is the first of the intellectual fathers being
intelligible, so far as he is a whole, establishes himself in the intelligible
triads prior to himself, from which also he is filled with united and occult
goods. And on this account he is said to be in another. With respect
to those triads indeed, the another is occultly and according to cause in
the intelligible [i. e. in the first triad] of intelligibles ; but according to
essence in the intelligible of the intelligible, and at the same time,
intellectual Gods. All intelligibles therefore are united ; the intelligible
indeed of the intelligible and intellectual Gods being united to the
intelligible of the intelligibles prior* to intellectuals; but the intelligible
of intellectuals, to both. And the subsistence indeed in another, adheres
* For voir*,, it U olmotwly neceiwry to read >«pw>.
* For rpmrm, it U neceswry to read *?o row.
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416 ON THE THEOLOGY
ROOK V.
to the difference which is according to uuical number. But unical
number is suspended from the occult union of the one being; on which
account also it is unical.
* For rpmrm, it U neceswry to read *?o row.
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416 ON THE THEOLOGY
ROOK V.
to the difference which is according to uuical number. But unical
number is suspended from the occult union of the one being; on which
account also it is unical.
Farther still, we also say, that there is a twofold conversion in those
orders, the one indeed being towards themselves, but the other towards
the causes of them, (for it neither was nor will be lawful for divine natures,
to convert themselves in any respect to natures posterior to themselves).
And the intelligible Gods generate all things stably ; but the intelligible
and intellectual Gods who illuminate imparticipable life, impart the
original cause of progression to all things; and the intellectual Gods
arrange and adorn wholes according to conversion. Hence, it is indeed
necessary that the summit of iutellectuals which pours forth from itself
the whole and all-perfect form of conversion, should be characterized by
both the couvertive symbols, and should be at one and the same time
converted to itself, and to the natures prior to itself. Hence, because
indeed, it is converted to itself, it is in itself; but because it is converted
to the intelligible orders beyond itself, it is in another. For the another
is more excellent than the whole intellectual order. As, therefore, the
summit of intelligiblcs primarily subsists according to the intelligible
peculiarity itself, and is firmly established above wholes; and as the
summit of intelligiblcs and intellectuals primarily unfolds the peculiarity
of this order, subsisting according to divine diversity, and being to all
things the cause of all-various progressions ;— thus also the intelligible
deity of intellectuals, exhibits from himself according to union the twofold
forms of conversion, being indeed in another according to the more
excellent form of conversion, but in himself according to the less excellent
form. For to be converted to himself is inferior to the conversion to
more excellent natures.
Again, therefore, the subsistence in another, is the illustrious prero-
gative of the intelligible aud paternal peculiarity. For the another is
intelligible, and difference was the power proceeding from the intelligible
fathers, and from the natures firmly established in them. Hence, that
which is comprehended in this power, and is fdled from it, is paternal
and intelligible. But the subsistence of a thing in itself is the proper
■
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CHAP. XXXVII. OF PLATO. 417
Hence, that
which is comprehended in this power, and is fdled from it, is paternal
and intelligible. But the subsistence of a thing in itself is the proper
■
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CHAP. XXXVII. OF PLATO. 417
sign of the unpolluted monad. For as we have before observed, the
summits of the two intellectual triads are conjoined. And the monad
.of the guardian triad has eternally established itself iu the paternal
•monad, and again establishes in, and converts to itself the natures which
;have proceeded from itself. And the first intellectual father is indeed
father on account of himself, but on account of the unpolluted [monad,]
ihe comprehends in himself the genera of himself, stably recalls them
j[when they have proceeded from him] to himself, and in his own
allness ' contains the intelligible multitudes of intellectuals in onpro-
rceeding* union with their monad.
The first leader, therefore, of the guardian order subsists in conjunction
with the father. And the father indeed comprehends the unpolluted
cause, but is comprehended by the first intelligibles. And as he is
intelligibly established in them, so likewise he has established in himself,
and constituted about himself, the one summit of the inflexible Gods.
Id the Parmenides, therefore, also the same God appears to us to be a
pure intellect. Because, indeed, he is intellect, being extended to the
intelligible place of survey, and on this account being in another, so far
as he is wholly established in it. But again, because he is pure and
immaterial, being converted to himself, and shuttiug in himself aH his
own powers. For the parts of this wholeness, are more partial powers,
which hasten indeed to a progression from the father, but are on all
sides established and -comprehended by the wholeness. And the whole-
ness itself is a deity, connectedly containing in itself intelligible parts,
toeing parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, generating all things
stably, and again embosoming and collecting to itself its progeny, and
us the more tragical fables say* absorbiug and depositing them in itself.
For the progeny of it are twofold; some indeed, being, as it were, analyzed
-into it; but others being divided from it. And some abiding in it
•through the first unpolluted monad ; but others proceeding according to
the prolific cause of the intellectual Gods, surmounting the union of the
' for sauToniTi read rarontrt. * For ik^t** teU «**4«,nfwu
Proc. Vox. I. 3 G
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418 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and of the
arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first order there-
fore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by Parmenides.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
Vox. I. 3 G
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418 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and of the
arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first order there-
fore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by Parmenides.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
Th£ second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the
middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression and
prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of ihe intellectual
Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in continuity with
the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium between intellect
and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing
the intelligible power which collects together the one and being. As the
intelligible therefore is to the one and hyparxis, so is life to power, and
intellect to being. And as in intelligibles, the one is the object of desire,
but being aspires after the participation of the one, and power collects
being to the participation of the one, and the one to a communion with
being, (for the one here is notimparticipable, and exempt from all power)
so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect, but iuteUect
is filled with it. And life binds indeed intellect to the intelligible, but
unfolds the intelligible to intellect. Whence also, I think, those who are
wise in all divine concerns, call the one and hyparxis intelligible. But that
which is primarily being, they call' the first intellect, conformably to this
analogy. Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in
the same manner as power subsists between the one and being. And all
these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles ;
' For anOuorrts, it is necewary to read «i«x«cAowmf.
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CHAP. XXX VIII.
OF PLATO.
419
And all
these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles ;
' For anOuorrts, it is necewary to read «i«x«cAowmf.
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CHAP. XXX VIII.
OF PLATO.
419
but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals ; and according to a
third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles however, being is
according to essence ; for there intellect is primarily according to cause.
But in intellectuals, intellect indeed, is according to essence; but the
natures prior to intellect, are according to participation. Since therefore,
life is surveyed in a threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to
cause; but in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hvparxis; and
an intellectuals,' according to participation, it is indeed necessary that
the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life, and
participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself. The one
therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the middle, is
not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it has been
demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is self-motive
because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account moved, because
it has the most excellent life. The. first vivific cause, therefore, of the
intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion. If, however, it was the
first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it
motion, and not that which is moved. But since it is life as in intel-
lectuals, but is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time motion, and
that which is moved. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides
demonstrate that the one in this order is moved, because it proceeds from
the causes of all life that are placed above it, and is analogous to the
middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of intelligibles and
intellectuals. Hence also, Socrates in the Phaedrus calls this middle
triad Heaven ; for the whole of it is life and motion. Hut that which
is moved, is the middle in intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i. c from
the life in the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;.] since
eternity also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness,
is all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however,
the middle is life according to cause ; but in intellectuals, it is life
according to participation ; and in the order between these, it is life
• la the original, alter n U wi* m/Toi; mi it it nemury to supply *mf vwmtfir, rv I, nif
»«ip»S, *. r. X.
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boor r.
r. X.
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boor r.
according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as Par men ides
also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness, though the
' wholeness in intelligibies is different from that which is in intelligibles and
intellectuals, as we have before observed,) but producing after this,
intellectual life. For that which is moved, is indeed entirely allied to
the circulation of the Heaveu, and to intellectual and -intelligible life:
Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not
one certain genus of being,. as neither is motion. For beings indeed are
naturally adapted to participate of the genera > of being; but the super-
essential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of beings. If, ■
therefore, Parmenides here* assuming the one itself by itself, surveys in
this motion and permanency, he evidently does not attribute the ele-
ments of being to the Gods, but assigns to them peculiarities appropriate*
all-perfect, and transcending wholes* And thus asserting that Me owe is
moved and stands still, according to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivifie
hyparxis of the Gods, the generative fountain of wholes, and the leading
cause of all things. But according to permanency, he delivers the un-
polluted monad coordinated with motion, and which connectcdly-contains
the middle centres of the guardian triad. For as the summit of the
guardian triad, is united to the first lather, according to the first hypos-
tasis, thus also the deity who contains the middle bond of the unpolluted
leaders, is by a congeniality of nature consubsistent with the motive
cause of all the Gods, which moves wholes, and is primarily moved from
itself. And through this deity, the prolific power of this Goddess [[ Rhea}
is firmly established in herself. Producing likewise, and multiplying all
things, she is [through this deity] exempt from wholes, and inflexibly
exists prior to her progeny. With respect, therefore, to motion here and
permanency, the former indeed is the fountain of the life and generative
power that proceeds to all things ; but the latter,' establishes the whole
vivifie fountain in itself, but is from thence filled with the prolific rivers of
life. Parmenides, therefore, delivering to us these things, and the pro-
gression of them, demonstrates that that which is moved is generated
from that which is in another, but that which stands still, from that which,
' In the original * U is omitted.
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CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO.
421
Parmenides, therefore, delivering to us these things, and the pro-
gression of them, demonstrates that that which is moved is generated
from that which is in another, but that which stands still, from that which,
' In the original * U is omitted.
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CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO.
421
is in itself. For the first monad of the paternal triad constitutes the
natures posterior to it. And after the same manner, the highest of the
unpolluted triad, and which is intelligible as in this triad, imparts at one
and the same time the middle and last monad of the triad. On this
account, also, motion here is better than permanency. For as a subsist-
ence in another is according to cause more ancient than the subsistence
of a thing in itself, so likewise that which is moved, is causally more
ancient than that which is permanent. For the unpolluted Gods, are in
power subordinate to the fathers, and are comprehended in them.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
The third, therefore, to the Saviour, as they say, and let us direct our
attention to the demiurgic monad, unfolding itself into light together with
tl»e coordinate Gods it contains. In the first place, then, here also the
communion of the one with other things, is apparent, and we must no
longer consider the one alone by itself, but according to its habitude
towards other things. Because, therefore, the demiurgic order produces
wholes from itself, and arranges and adorns a corporeal nature, it also
generates all the second and ministrant causes of the Gods. For what
occasion is there to say that the term other things, is a sign of a corporeal
condition of being, since formerly the Pythagoreans thought fit to cha-
racterize an incorporeal nature by the one, but indicated to us the nature
which is divisible about body, through the term others f In the second
place, the number of the conclusions [in this part of the Parmenides} is
doubled. For the one is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or
different, as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand
still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different from
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422 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
For the one is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or
different, as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand
still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different from
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422 ON THE THEOLOGY BOOK V.
itself,' and to be different from other things, and the same with other
things. But this twice appeared to us before to be entirely adapted to
the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists, and to Socrates
in the Cralylus, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from
two words. In the third place, therefore, the multitude of causes is here
separated, and all the monads of the Gods present themselves to the
view, according to the demiurgic progression. For the demiurgic order
is apparent, the prolific power co-ordinate with it, the undefiled monad
the cause of exempt providence, and the distributive fountain of wholes ;
and together with these, as I may say, all the orders about the demiurgus
are apparent, according to which he produces and preserves all tilings,
and being exempt from the things produced, is firmly established
in himself, and separates his own kingdom, from the united empire of
his father.
How, therefore, and through what particulars do these things become
apparent ? We reply, that the same with itself (for this Par men ides first
demonstrates) represents to us about the nature of the one, the monadic
and paternal peculiarity, according to which the demiurgus also subsists.
Hence, likewise, the one is said to be the same with itself. For the
another is in the demiurgus according to the transcendency of different
causes ; but the same, appears to be a sign of his proper, viz. of his
paternal, hyparxis. For being one, and the exempt father and demi-
urgus of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. And in this
one, Parmenides in a remarkable manner shows the uniform, and that
which is allied to bound. But the same with other things, is the singular
good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to, and pervading
through :dl tilings without impediment. For the demiurgus is present
to all things which he produces, aud is in all things the same, which he
arranges and adorns, pre-establishing in himself the generative essence
of wholes. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, bound and
infinity subsist in him demiurgically. And the one iudeed is in the
sameness which is separate from oilier things, but the other is in the
• After %K\x in the original it i* necesnrr to wpply the word* xai twtov Mrm», %%i ir«for mvtki.
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CHAP. XXXIX.
OF PLATO.
423
power which generates other things. For every where power is prolific
of secondary natures. But the principle which subsists according to
bound, is the supplier of an united and stable hypostasis.
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CHAP. XXXIX.
OF PLATO.
423
power which generates other things. For every where power is prolific
of secondary natures. But the principle which subsists according to
bound, is the supplier of an united and stable hypostasis.
Moreover, the different from other things, manifests his undefined purity*
and his transcendency which is exempt from all secondary natures. For
the first intellect was on this account pure and incorruptible, as Socrates
says in the Cratylus, because it is established above coordination or
communion ' with all sensible natures. For as some one of the Gods
says, he does not incline his power to matter, but is at once exempt from
all fabrication. But the demiurgic intellect receiving from thence total
power, and a royal dominion, adorns indeed sensibles, and constitutes
the whole of a corporeal nature. Together however, with prolific
abundance, and the providential attention to secondary natures, he
transcends his progeny, and abides in his own accustomed manner, as
Timneus says, through the inflexible guard which subsists with him, and
the power imparted to him from it, which is uncontaminated with other
participants. Hence, through the never-failing supply of good, and
providential energies, and the generation of subordinate natures, he
is the same with then. For he is participated by them, and fills his
progeny with his own providential care. But through his purity,
undented power, and inflexible energies, he is separate from wholes, is
disjoined from them, and is im participate by other things. And as the
first king of intellectuals is allotted his non-inclination to matter, through
the guard which is united to him, and through the undented monad ;
and as the vivific goddess possesses her stable and indexible power
from the second cause of the guardian Gods ; thus also the demiurgic
intellect preserves a transcendency exempt from other things, and a
union separated from multitude, through the third monad of the leaders
of purity. For the cause of separate providence is a guard coordinate
with the deiniurgus, who hastens to produce' all things, and to pervade
through all things. But the guard which is the supplier of stable power,
• For xtwavuo, it is necessary to read xonwv.aj.
1 The word ra^ayup is omitted in the original, but ought doubtless to be inserted.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK r.
But the guard which is the supplier of stable power,
• For xtwavuo, it is necessary to read xonwv.aj.
1 The word ra^ayup is omitted in the original, but ought doubtless to be inserted.
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ON THE THEOLOGY
BOOK r.
is coordinate with the vivific deity, who is moved to the generation of
wholes. And with the intellect that is multiplied according to intellec-
tual conceptions [i. e. with Saturn,] the guard is coordinate, that imparts
an undented union of the conversion of all his energies to himself. The
monad, therefore, remains, which is arranged as the seventh of these
intellectual monads, which is present with, and energizes with all of
them, but particularly unfolds itself into light in the demiurgic order,
and which Par men ides also producing for us together with the whole
demiurgus, defines it in difference, in the same manner as he does the
undefined cause in the demiurgus. He says however, that this difference
separates the demiurgic moo ad itself from itself. For we have before
observed that this order is the supplier of separation to all the Gods.
As therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself, through the pater-
nal union, after the same manner he is separated from himself and his
father through this difference. Whence therefore, does he derive this
power? From being in himself, says Parmcnides, and in another. For
these were indeed unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third.
Separation therefore, preexisted there according to cause; but in the
demiurgus k shines forth, and unfolds the power of itself.
That the cause however of division, is in a certain respect in the first
father, Parmenides manifests in the first hypothesis, when he says, " that
every thing which is in itself is in a certain respect a duad, and is
separated from itself." There however, the duad is occultly ; but here it
subsists more clearly, where also all intellectual multitude shines forth to
the view. For difference i»* the progeuy of the firmly-abiding duad
which is there. This therefore separates the demiurgic intellect from the
Gods prior to it, and divides the monads in it from each other. For if
so far as it is in another, it is united to the intelligible of itself, but so far
as it is in itself it is separated from it, because it proceeds according to
each order of its own intelligible,- — if this be the case, it is necessary that
this difference should be the cause to it of separation from its father.
All the intellectual monads therefore, have appeared to us to subsist
coordinately with each other. And the subsistence indeed, in another is
fXw sign of the father. Jiut the subsistence in itself, is the sign of the
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CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO. 42j
All the intellectual monads therefore, have appeared to us to subsist
coordinately with each other. And the subsistence indeed, in another is
fXw sign of the father. Jiut the subsistence in itself, is the sign of the
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CHAP. XXXIX. OF PLATO. 42j
first unpolluted monad. Again, motion is the sign of vivific goodness ;
but permanency of the indexible power conjoined with motion. And same-
ness with itself, and with another, is the sign of the demiurgic peculiarity ;
but the being different from other things, is the sign of the guard about
the demiurgus. And in the last place, the being (liferent from itself, is
the sign of the seventh intellectual monad, which is according to cause
indeed, and occultly in the first father, but is allotted its hypostasis more
clearly in the demiurgus. Parmenides likewise appears to me, when
dividing the signs of fabrication, to have unfolded in the middles
themselves, the peculiarities of the undefiled monad, and of the dividing
monad, so far as they also are in a certain respect comprehended in the
fabrication. For he shows in the first of the conclusions that the one is
the same with itself; in the second, that it is different from itself ; in the.
third, that it is different from other thing* ; and in the fourth that it is
the same with other things. For he co-arranges indeed, the dividing
power with the paternal union; but connects with a transcendency
separate from secondary natures, the providential cause of them. For in
the Gods, it is necessary that union should exist prior to separation, and
and a purity unmingled with secondary natures, prior to a providential
inspection of them ; through which likewise, being every where, they are
no where, being present with all things, they are exempt from all tilings,
and being all things, they are not any of their progeny.
END OP VOL. I.
JVoc. Vol. I. 3 II
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