Select Works of Plotinus — trans. Thomas Taylor

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\ HISTORICAL

LONDON :

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1817.

GEORGE MEREDITH, ESQ.

AS A TRIBUTE OF THE WARMEST GRATITUDE,

FOR THE ASSISTANCE WHICH HE HAS GIVEN,

IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS BROTHER,

WILLIAM MEREDITH,

TO THE PROMULGATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE,

AND A TESTIMONY OF GREAT ESTEEM FOR HIS CHARACTER,

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED

BY THE TRANSLATOR,

THOMAS TAYLOR.

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The following is a List of Translations and

Original Works

BY T. TAYLOR.

Cranslations.

FROM THE GREEK.

The Hymns of Orpheus, 12mo, 2s. 6d.

Plotinus on the Beautiful, l2mo. Is. 6d.

Proclus on Euclid, and his Elements of Theology, in which |he principal dogmas of a Theology coeval with the Universe are unfolded. 2 vols. 4to. 1/. 10s.

Four Dialogues of Plato, viz. the Cratylus, Phaedo, Parme¬ nides, and Timseus. 8vo. *Js. 6d.

The Phaedrus of Plato. 4to. 6s.

Sallust on the Gods and the World. 8vo. 3s.

Two Orations of the Emperor Julian, one to the Sovereign Sun, and the other to the Mother of the Gods. 8vo. 3s.

Five Books of Plotinus, viz. on Felicity ; on the Nature and Origin of Evil; on Providence; on Nature, Contempla¬ tion, and the One ; and on the Descent of the Soul. 8vo. 5s.

Pausanias's Description of Greece, with copious Notes, in which much of the Mythology of the Greeks is unfolded from genuine ancient sources. 3 vols. 8vo. 18s.

Aristotle’s Metaphysics, with copious Notes, in which the Platonic doctrine of Ideas is largely unfolded. 4 to 2/. 2s.

The Dissertations of Maximus Tyrius. 2 vols. 12mo. 12s.

The Works of Plato, in which the substance is given of nearly all the existing Greek MSS., Commentaries and Scho¬ lia on Plato, and his most abstruse Dogmas are unfolded. 5 vols. 4to. 10/. 10s.

The Works of Aristotle, accompanied with copious elucida¬ tions from the best of his Greek Commentators, viz. Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Syrianus, Ammonius Hermasas, Priscianus, Olympiodorus, Simplicius, &c. 9 vols. 4to. 47/. 5s.

The six Books of Proclus on the Theology of Plato, to which a seventh Book is added by the Translator, in order to supply the deficiency of another Book on this subject, which was written by Proclus, but since lost. Also Proclus’s Elements of Theology. 2 vols. 4to. 5/. 10s.

Select Works of Plotinus, and Extracts from Synesius on Providence. 8vo. 1 5s.

FROM THE LATIN.

The Fable of Cupid and Psyche from Apuleius, with an Introduction explaining the meaning of the Fable, and proving that it alludes to the descent of the Soul. 8vo. 5s.

2 vols. 4to. 5/. 10s.

Select Works of Plotinus, and Extracts from Synesius on Providence. 8vo. 1 5s.

FROM THE LATIN.

The Fable of Cupid and Psyche from Apuleius, with an Introduction explaining the meaning of the Fable, and proving that it alludes to the descent of the Soul. 8vo. 5s.

Proclus on Providence and Fate; Extracts from his Treatise entitled Ten Doubts concerning Providence ; and Extracts from his Treatise on the Subsistence of Evil; as preserved in the Bibliotheca Gr. of Fabricius. See Proclus on the The¬ ology of Plato.

YII

SDriffinal (BHorket.

History of the Restoration of the Platonic Theology, by the genuine disciples of Plato. See the 2nd vol. of Proclus on Euclid.

A Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries, in which much new and important information, relative to those most venerable and august institutions, is given from Greek Manu¬ scripts. 8vo. 5s. A Second Edition of this work is printed in Nos. XV. and XVI. of the Pamphleteer.

A complete Collection of all the existing Chaldaean Oracles, with concise explanations. See the 3d vol. of the Old Monthly Magazine.

A Dissertation on Nullities and Diverging Series, in which Nullities are proved to be infinitely small quantities, and the Platonic doctrine of to ev, or the One , is illustrated. See the end of the first edition of the Translation of Aristotle's Meta¬ physics.

An Answer to Dr. Gillies’s Supplement to his Translation of Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, in which the extreme unfaith¬ fulness of that translation is unfolded. 12mo. 2s. 6d.

A poetical Paraphrase on the Speech of Diotima on the Beautiful, in the Banquet of Plato. See the Translation of the Fable of Cupid and Psyche.

Hymns. See the before-mentioned Sallust, Julian, Plotinus, and Cupid and Psyche.

A new edition of Hederic's Greek Lexicon, in which many words are inserted, not found in other modern Lexicons, and an Explanation is given of some words agreeably to the Plato¬ nic Philosophy. 4to. 1803. 2l. 2s.

The Elements of the true Arithmetic of Infinites, in which all the Propositions in the Arithmetic of Infinites invented by Dr. Wallis, relative to the summation of infinite series, and also the principles of the doctrine of Fluxions, are demonstrated to be false; and the nature of Infinitesimals is unfolded, 4to. 5s.

VIII

Miscellanies in Prose and Verse ; containing the Triumph of the Wise Man over Fortune, according to the doctrine of the Stoics and Platonists ; The Creed of the Platonic Philoso¬ pher; A Panegyric on Sydenham, &c. &c. 12mo. 2s. 6d .

5s.

VIII

A Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle, in four Books ; in which his principal Physical and Metaphysical dogmas are unfolded ; and it is shown from indubitable evidence, that his Philosophy has not been accurately known since the destruction of the Greeks. The insufficiency also of the Philosophy that has been substituted by the moderns for that of Aristotle, is demonstrated. This volume was written as an Introduction to the Translation of Aristotle's works. 4to. 51. 5s.

Theoretic Arithmetic, in three Books ; containing the sub¬ stance of all that has been written on this subject by Theo of Smyrna, Nicomachus, Iamblichus, and Boetius. — Together with some remarkable particulars respecting perfect, amicable, and other numbers, which are not to be found in the writings of any ancient or modern mathematicians. Likewise a specimen ©f the manner in which the Pythagoreans philosophized about numbers ; and a developement of their mystical and theologi- fcal arithmetic. 8vo. 14i.

erratum.

p. 161. note, for πλ*ιν read 7r«p.

INTRODUCTION ·

The philosophy of Plato is deeply in¬ debted to two very extraordinary men, who rank among the chief of its leaders and hierophants, viz. Plotinus and Proclus ; to the former for its restoration, and to the latter for the complete developement of all its sublimities and mysteries.

It is indeed a remarkable historical fact, though but little known, that the depths of this philosophy, as I have elsewhere observed,1 were not perfectly fathomed,

1 See the General Introduction to my translation of Platp,

Plot » b

INTRODUCTION.

Λ i

except by his immediate disciples, for more than five hundred years after its first pro¬ pagation. 1 For though Grantor, Atticus,

♦

1 This fact must necessarily be very little known at pre¬ sent, as the philosophy of Plato is no longer studied as it was in ancient times, having become for many centuries obsolete. And yet it is no uncommon thing with the literati, and particularly with the critics of the present age, to decide with as much confidence on the dogmas of this philosophy, and on the writings of its most celebrated votaries, as on the nugatory and fungous productions of the day. These men

forget, when they boast of having consumed the best part of their life in the study of the Greek and Latin languages, that philology is a very different thing from* philosophy, and that there is extreme danger in being well-grounded at great Grammar schools, of being at the same time well-ground . Their presumption however is by no means wonderful when we consider that they have been disciplined by the spectre of the Dunciad,

“ Whose beaver’d brow a birchen garland wears.

Their presumption however is by no means wonderful when we consider that they have been disciplined by the spectre of the Dunciad,

“ Whose beaver’d brow a birchen garland wears.

Dropping with infants’ blood, and mothers’ tears/’

And whose language is,

• — — “ Since man from beast by words is known.

Words are man’s province, words we teach alone.

When Reason doubtful, like the Samian letter.

INTRODUCTION.

VII

Albinus, Galen and Plutarch, were men of great genius, and made no common pro¬ ficiency in philosophic attainments, yet they appear not to have developed the profundity of Plato's conceptions; they* withdrew not the veil which covers his secret meaning, like the 'curtains* which

Points him two ways, the narrower is the better.

Plac'd at the door of learning, youth to guide»

We never suffer it to stand too wide .

To ask, to guess, to know as they commence,

As Fancy opens the quick springs of Sense,

We ply the memory , we load the brain ,

Bind rebel Wit, and double chain on chain ;

Confine the thought, to exercise the breath ,

And keep them in the pale of Words till death ,

Whate’er the talents, or howe’er design’d ,

We hang one jingling padlock on the wind .

Punciad, Book IV.

3 Έπι των Χεγομενων τεΧετων, τα μεν α bvra ην, ως δηΧοι και τοννομα, τα be παραπετάσματα προβεβΧηνται, αθέατα τα εν tois abvrois r « 1 * ·

At that time there were many Christians and others, who forsaking the ancient philosophers became the followers of Adelphius and Aquilinus. These men possessed many writings of Alexander Libycus, Philocomus, Demostratus, and Lydus ; and openly exhibited certain revelations of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nico- theus, Allogenes, Mesus, and others of a like kind. They also deceived many, and were themselves deceived, asserting that

INTRODUCTION,

Plato had by no means penetrated the depth of an intelligible essence. On this occasion, Plotinus urged many arguments in his conferences against these impostors, and composed a treatise in confutation of their tenets, which Porphyry inscribed against the Gnostics/1 But A melius wrote forty books against the treatise of Zostrianus; and Porphyry showed by a variety of argu« ments that the book which they attributed to Zoroaster was spurious and recent, and was fabricated by the propagators of the heresy, in order that their opinions might pass for the genuine dogmas of the ancient Zoroaster.

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Porphyry farther informs us, that some Greeks falsely accused Plotinus of being a plagiary of the doctrines of Numenius ;

Ivi

INTRODUCTION*

>' i , . l ' .

Porphyry farther informs us, that some Greeks falsely accused Plotinus of being a plagiary of the doctrines of Numenius ;

Ivi

INTRODUCTION*

which calumny Tryphon, a Stoic and Pla~ tonist, told to Amelias* On this occasion Amelius wrote a treatise* inscribed by Porphyry* on the difference between the dogmas of Plotinus and Numenius , which he dedicated to Porphyry* Each of the books indeed of this truly great man bears such evident marks of original thought and singular depth* the execution in each is so similar* and the conceptions so uncom¬ monly abstruse* that no one can under¬ stand his meaning, and believe him indebted to the labours of others* Porphyry adds, that he was likewise considered by many as a mere trifler, and treated with contempt, because, says he, they could by no means understand what he said* Besides, the manners of Plotinus contributed to produce and increase this disdain* For he was

INTRODUCTION.

Ivii

foreign from all sophistical ostentation and pride; and conducted himself, in the com» pany of disputants, with the same freedom and ease as in his familiar discourses. With the superficial and the vain indeed, a haughty carriage and severe aspect are considered as the badges of wisdom ; but nothing in reality is more foreign from its possession. For true wisdom when it is deeply possessed, gives affability and modesty to the manners, illumines the countenance with a divine serenity, and diffuses over the whole external form an air of dignity and ease. Add to this, that Plotinus did not hastily disclose to every one the syllogistic necessities which were latent in his discourse. “ The same thing,” says Porphyry, i( happened to me, when I first heard Plotinus. On which account X

kill . INTRODUCTION.

endeavoured to excite him by writing against him* and striving to show that intellections are external to intellect” But after the writings of Porphyry on this subject were read to Plotinus, he said smiling : “ It must be your employment, Amelias* to dissolve these doubts, occa¬ sioned by his ignorance of our opinion*” After Amelias, therefore, had composed no small treatise against the objections of Por¬ phyry, and Porphyry had again contradicted his writings, and was once more answered by Amelias ; u At length/" says Porphyry, 66 having scarcely after all these attempts fathomed the depth 8 of Plotinus, I

1 it therefore a man of such great sagacity and penetra¬ tion as Porphyry, and who from the period in which he lived possessed advantages with respect to the attainment of phi¬ losophy which are denied to every modern, found so much difficulty in fathoming the profundity of Plotiuus, there must

INTRODUCTION.

lix

changed my opinion, wrote a recantation of my error, which I recited in his school ; considered the books of Plotinus ever after as most worthy of belief, and excited my master to the ambition of disclosing his opinions in a more particular and copious manner/'

lix

The testimony of the celebrated Longinus also concerning our philosopher, sufficiently evinces his uncommon excellence and

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necessarily be very few at present by whom this can be accomplished. Let no one therefore deceive himself by fancying that he can understand the writings of Plotinus by barely reading them. For as the subjects which he discusses are for the most part the objects of intellect alone* to under¬ stand them is to see them, and to see them is to come into contact with them. But this is only to be accomplished by kmg familiarity with, and a life conformable to the things themselves. For then, as Plato says,

INTRODUCTION. Ixix

and this by an ineffable energy, and not in capacity. The oracle also adds, that while Plotinus was wandering [on the sea of life] the Gods frequently directed him into the right path, by benignantly extending to him abundant rays of divine light; so that he may be said to have composed his works from the contemplation and intuition of divinity. But from a vigilant internal and

external contemplation, he is said by the

· . ■ _ v . ·

oracle to have seen many beautiful specta¬ cles, which no other philosopher has easily beheld. For merely human contemplation may indeed have various degrees of excel¬ lence, but when compared with divine knowledge, though it may be elegant and pleasing, yet cannot fathom a depth, such as is penetrated by the Gods. Hitherto the oracle has shown what were the energies Plot . . f

INTRODUCTION*

of Plotinus, and what he obtained, while surrounded with body. But after his libe¬ ration from body, it declares that he arrived at the divine society, where friendship, pure desire, joy and love, suspended from deity, perpetually reign. Besides this, it also says that the sons of God, Minos, Rhada-

manthus, and iEacus, are the judges of

souls ; and that Plotinus departed to these, not for the purpose of receiving their decisions of his conduct, but to enjoy their conversation, with whom also other Gods of the most excellent kind associate. It further says that Plato and Pythagoras likewise reside here, together with such other souls as stably form the choir of immortal love ; and that the most blessed daemons have here fixed their abode. And in the last place it adds, that the life of this

INTRODUCTION® Ixxi

divine society is ever flourishing, and full of joy, and perseveres in perpetuity of bliss through the beneficent communications of the Gods/'

* I

And in the last place it adds, that the life of this

INTRODUCTION® Ixxi

divine society is ever flourishing, and full of joy, and perseveres in perpetuity of bliss through the beneficent communications of the Gods/'

* I

And thus much for the life of Plotinus, who was a philosopher pre-eminently distin¬ guished for the strength and profundity of his intellect, and the purity and elevation of his life. He was a being wise without the usual mixture of human darkness, and great without the general combination of human weakness and imperfection. He seems to have left the orb of light solely for the benefit of mankind ; that he might teach them how to repair the ruin contract¬ ed by their exile from good, and how to return to their true country, and legitimate kindred and allies. I do not mean that he

1e *

XXII

lKTKOi)UCTl0Ne

descended into mortality, for the purpose of unfolding the sublimest truths to the vulgar part of mankind ; for this would have been a vain and ridiculous attempt ; 1

1 In every class of beings in the universe (as I have else¬ where observed) there is a first, a middle, and a last, in order that the progression of things may form one unbroken chain, originating from deity, and terminating in matter. In con¬ sequence of this connexion, one part of the human species naturally coalesces, through transcendency, with beings of an order superior to man ; another part, through diminution, unites with the brutal species ; and a third part, which sub¬ sists as the connecting medium between the other two, possesses those properties which characterize human nature in a manner not exceeding but exactly commensurate to the condition of humanity. The first of these parts, from its surpassing excellence, consists of a small number of mankind. That which subsists as the middle, is numerous. But that which ranks as the last in gradation, is composed of a count¬ less multitude,

“ Thick as autumnal leaves that strow the brooks

In Vallombrosa.,'

In consequence of this beautiful gradation, the most subor¬ dinate part of mankind arc only to be benefited by good

INTRODUCTION.

ke ο β

X 11 1

since the eyes of the multitude, as Plato justly observes, are not strong enough to

look to truth. But he came as a guide to

the few who are born with a divine destiny;

gain the

lost region of light, but know not how to break the fetters by which they are detained : who are impatient to leave the obscure cavern of sense, where all is delusion and

But he came as a guide to

the few who are born with a divine destiny;

gain the

lost region of light, but know not how to break the fetters by which they are detained : who are impatient to leave the obscure cavern of sense, where all is delusion and

rulers, laws, and customs, through which they become peace» able members of the communities in which they live, and make a proficiency, as Maximus Tyrius well observes, not by any accession of good, but by a diminution of evil. Hence the present efforts to enlighten by education the lowest class of mankind is an attempt to break the golden chain of beings, to disorganise society, and to render the vulgar dis¬ satisfied with the servile situations in which God and nature intended them to be placed. In short, it is an attempt cal¬ culated to render life intolerable, and knowledge contemp¬ tible, to subvert all order, introduce anarchy, render super¬ stition triumphant, and restore, in the language of Pope, the throne of

— u Night primaeval and of Chaos o

Ixxiv

INTRODUCTIONS

shadow, and to ascend to the realms of intellect, where all is substance and reality.

This very extraordinary man also appears to have been the first of the Platonic philosophers, who clearly and distinctly asserted the subsistence of the three hypos¬ tases that rank as principles ( αρχικοα υποσ-τα- (rsig) viz. the good9 intellect , and soul , and who demonstrated that there can be neither more nor less than these. But these three are thus denominated, because they are not consubsistent ; and they are not consub- sistent, because they are essentially different from each other. For according to Plato the good is superessential ; intellect is an impartible , immoveable essence ; and soul is a self-motive essence, and subsists as a medium between intellect and the nature

INTRODUCTION.

Ixxv

which is distributed about bodies.1 By no means therefore is the Platonic the same with the Christian trinity, as the advocates for the latter have ignorantly and idly supposed. For the good or the highest God according to Plato being so perfectly exempt from all multitude, that he is even

beyond essence, is not to be cormumerated

with any thing, or to be co-arranged with the second and third principles in the above- mentioned or any other triad. Indeed, according to the philosophy of Plato, as I have elsewhere shown, in every order of

1 See my translation of Proclus' Elements of Theology, where all this is shown by geometrical necessities to be true. See also the bth book of the Republic of Plato, in which Socrates clearly asserts that the good is superessential ; and the Timaeus, in which the difference between intellect and soul is most clearly indicated. See likewise the notes on the 3d Epistle of Plato in Vol, V. of my translation of hijg works.

Ixxvi

INTRODUCTION.

See likewise the notes on the 3d Epistle of Plato in Vol, V. of my translation of hijg works.

Ixxvi

INTRODUCTION.

things a triad is the immediate progeny of a monad. Hence the intelligible triad proceeds immediately from the ineffable principle of things. Phanes, or intelligible intellect, who is the last of the intelligible order, is the monad, leader, and producing cause of a triad, which is denominated νοητός και vospog, i. e. intelligible , and at the same time intellectual . In like manner the extremity of this order produces immedi¬ ately from itself the intellectual triad, Saturn, Rhea, and Jupiter. Again, Jupiter, who is also the demiurgus, is the monad of the supermundane triad. Apollo, who subsists at the extremity of the supermun¬ dane order, produces a triad of liberated Gods. (Seoi απόλυτό*.) And the extremity of the liberated order becomes the monad

INTRODUCTION.

Ixxvii

of a triad of mundane Gods.1 This theory too, which is the progeny of the most con¬ summate science, is in perfect conformity with the theology of the Chaldaeans. And hence it is said in one of their oracles, “ In every world a triad shines forth , of which a monad is the ruling principle Γ ( παντι yap εν κοσμώ 7\αμπει τριας , rjg μονας άρχει.)

This likewise appears to be the peculi¬ arity of the philosophy of Plotinus, that it considered all the above-mentioned orders, all true beings that are superior to soul, and the multiform variety of ideas, or paradigms

of things, as comprehended in one supreme intellect, which it denominates the intelli¬ gible world, and as there subsisting in impartible union, without any specific

See my translation of Prod us on the Theology of

Plato.

"Έ β « ®

IXXVlll

INTRODUCTION,

distinction. Hence Plotinus was more anxiously employed in profoundly investi¬ gating the nature of this divine world, than in scientifically unfolding the order of the beings it contains. Indeed, his genius on every subject seems to have been more adapted to an intimate perception of the occult essence of a thing, than to an expla¬ nation of its gradual evolution, and a descri ption of the mode ofits participations. However, though he did not develope the more particular progressions of true beings, yet he inserted the principles of this sub¬ lime investigation in his writings; and laid

the foundation of that admirable and

, \

beautiful system, which was gradually revealed by succeeding Platonists, and at last received its perfection by the acute,

INTRODUCTION.

Ixxix

accurate, and elegant genius of Proclus.1

Ixxix

accurate, and elegant genius of Proclus.1

1 The following beautiful extract from the treatise of Plotinus, “ On intelligible beauty/' is a specimen of his manner of surveying all things, as subsisting without specific distinction in one supreme intellect. The whole of the extract likewise is the result of roepa επιβολή, or intuition through the projecting energies of intellect. “All the Gods are venerable and beautiful, and their beauty is immense. What else however is it but intellect through which they are such? and because intellect energizes in them in so great a degree as to render them visible [by its light.] ? For it is not because their bodies are beautiful. For those Gods that have bodies, do not through this derive their subsistence as Gods ; but these also are Gods through intellects For they are not at one time wise, and at another destitute of wisdom ; but they are always wise, in an impassive, stable, and pure intellect. They likewise know all things, not human concerns [precedaneously] but their own, which are divine, and such as intellect sees. Of the Gods however, those that are in the sensible heaven, for they abound in leisure, always contemplate, as if remotely, what the intelligible heaven contains, and this with an elevated head. But those that dwell in the latter, occupy the whole of the heaven a which

α The heaven which Plotinus here celebrates as the same wdth the intelligible world, and the supreme intellect, belongs, accurately speaking, to that divine order which is denominated by the Chaldaeait theologists νοητος χαι votgo;, intelligible and at the same time intellectual , and is beautifully unfolded by Proclus in bis 4th book On the Theology of Plato.

Ixxx

INTRODUCTION.

I shall only add* with respect to the

is there, and survey [its blessed] inhabitants. For all things there are heaven, and there the earth is heaven, as also

are the sea, animals, plants, and men. And in short, every

Ixxx

INTRODUCTION.

I shall only add* with respect to the

is there, and survey [its blessed] inhabitants. For all things there are heaven, and there the earth is heaven, as also

are the sea, animals, plants, and men. And in short, every

thing pertaining to that heaven is celestial. The Gods likewise that it contains do not think men undeserving of their regard, nor any thing else that is there [because every thing there is divine.1] And they occupy and pervade with¬ out ceasing the whole of that [blissful] region. For the life which is there is unattended with labor, and truth [as Plato says in the Phaedrus] is their generator, and nutriment, their essence and nurse. They likewise see all things, not those with which generation, but those with which essence is pre¬ sent. And they perceive themselves in others. For all things there are diaphanous ; and nothing is dark and resisting, but every thing is apparent to every one internally and throughout. For light every where meets with light ; since every thing contains all things in itself, and again sees all things in another. So that all things are every where, and all is all. Each thing likewise is every thing. And the splendor there is infinite. For every thing there is great, since even that which is small is great. The sun too which is there is all the stars: and again each star is the sun and all the stars. In each, however, a different property predomi-

1 From the version of Ficinus it appears that the words on tcm ?xh

0fiov, are omitted in the original.

INTRODUCTION.

Ixxxi

The sun too which is there is all the stars: and again each star is the sun and all the stars. In each, however, a different property predomi-

1 From the version of Ficinus it appears that the words on tcm ?xh

0fiov, are omitted in the original.

INTRODUCTION.

Ixxxi

nates, but at the same time all things are visible in each. Motion likewise there is pure ; for the motion is not con¬ founded by a mover different from it. Permanency also suffers no change of its nature, because it is not mingled witli the unstable. And the beautiful there is beautiful, because it does not subsist in beauty [as in a subject.] Each thing too is there established, not as in a foreign land, but the seat of each thing is that which each thing is ; and concurs with it, while it proceeds as it were on high from whence it origina¬ ted. Nor is the thing itself different from the place in which it subsists. For the subject of it is intellect, and it is itself intellect. Just as if some one should conceive that stars germinate from the light of this visible heaven which is luminous. In this sensible region therefore, one part is not produced from another, but each part is alone a part. But there each part always proceeds from the whole, and is at the same time each part and the whole. For it appears indeed as a part ; but by him whose sight is acute, it will be seen as a whole ; viz. by him whose sight resembles that which Lynceus is said to have possessed, and which pene¬ trated the interior parts of the earth ; the fable obscurely indicating the acuteness of the vision of supernal eyes. There is likewise no weariness of the vision w hich is there, nor any plenitude of perception which can bring intuition to an end. For neither was there any vacuity, which when filled might cause the visive energy to cease : nor is this one thing, but that another, so as to occasion a part of one thing not to be

χχχπ

INTRODUCTION.

treatise of Synesius 1 On Providence, that the extracts which are given from it in this volume, contain, as it appears to me, indu¬ bitable proofs that it was written by him while he was a Platonic philosopher and a heathen. This however I leave to the decision of the intelligent reader. Suidas

amicable with that of another. Whatever likewise is there, possesses an untamed and unwearied power. And that which is there insatiable is so, because its plenitude never causes it to despise that by which it is filled. For by seeing it more abundantly sees, and perceiving both itself and the objects of its perception to be infinite, it follows its own nature [in unceasing contemplation.] And life indeed is not wearisome to any one, when it is pure. Why, therefore, should that which leads the most excellent life be weary t But the life there is wisdom ; a wisdom not obtained bv a reasoning process, because the whole of it always was, and is not in any respect deficient, so as to be in want of investi¬ gation. But it is the first wisdom, and is not derived from another."

* For an account of Synesius, who from being a heathen became a bishop, see Toland's Hypatia.

INTRODUCTION*

Ixxxiii

calls the treatise admirable (βανμ.α and

1 The dialectic of Plato, which is here discussed, is not the same with that dialectic which is the subject of opinion, and is accurately investigated in the Topics of Aristotle. For the former is irreprehensible and most expeditious ; since it is con¬ nate with things themselves, and employs a multitude of powers in order to the attainment of truth. It likewise imitates intel¬ lect, from which it receives its principles, and ascends through well-ordered gradations to real being itself. It also terminates the wandering of the soul about sensibles ; and explores every thing by methods which cannot be confuted, till it arrives at the ineffable principle of things. The business, likewise, of this first of sciences, is to employ definitions, divisions, anne¬ xations, and demonstrations, as primary sciences in the inves¬ tigation of causes ; imitating the progression of beings from the first principle of things, and their continual conversion to it as the ultimate object of desire.

But there are three energies,” (says Proclus in MS. Com¬ ment. in Parmenid.) “ of this most scientific method ; the first

the first principle of things, is granted, and is de¬ monstrated through many arguments. The argu-

But there are three energies,” (says Proclus in MS. Com¬ ment. in Parmenid.) “ of this most scientific method ; the first

the first principle of things, is granted, and is de¬ monstrated through many arguments. The argu-

of which is adapted to youth, and is useful for the purpose of exciting their intellect, which is, as it were, in a dormant state. For it is a true exercise of the eye of the soul in the specula¬ tion of things, leading forth through opposite positions, the essential impression of ideas which it contains, and considering not only the divine path, as it were, which conducts to truth, but exploring whether the deviations from it contain any thing worthy of belief ; and lastly, stimulating the all-various com ceptions of the soul. But the second energy takes place when intellect rests from its former investigations, as becoming most familiar with the speculation of beings, and beholds truth itself firmly established on a pure and holy foundation. This energy, according to Socrates, by a progression through ideas, evolves the whole of an intelligible nature, till it arrives at that which is first; and this by analyzing, defining, demonstrating, and dividing, proceeding upwards and downwards, till having en¬ tirely investigated the nature of intelligibles, it raises itself to a nature superior to beings. But the soul being perfectly esta¬ blished in this nature, as in her paternal port, no longer tends to a more excellent object of desire, as she has now arrived at the end of her search. And you may say that what is deli¬ vered in the Phsedrus and Sophista, is the employment of this energy, giving a twofold division to some, and a fourfold to other operations of the dialectic art. Hence it is assigned to such as philosophize purely, and no longer require preparatory exercise, but nourish the intellect of their soul in pure intel¬ lection. But the third energy, which is declarative according to truth, purifies from twofold ignorance,1 when its reasons are

1 i. e. When a man is ignorant that lie is ignorant ; and this is the disease of the multitude.

But the third energy, which is declarative according to truth, purifies from twofold ignorance,1 when its reasons are

1 i. e. When a man is ignorant that lie is ignorant ; and this is the disease of the multitude.

ments also through which this is demonstrated, are a certain elevation to this end. But what kind of a person is it necessary the man should be who is elevated thither ? Is it not, as Plato says, one who has seen all, or most things ? And who in his first generation has descended into the seed of a man who will be a philosopher, or a musician, or a lover? The philosopher, therefore, the musician, and the lover, are naturally adapted to be elevated. What, therefore, is the mode ? Is there one and the same mode for all these ? Or is there a different mode for each ? There is, indeed, a twofold pro» gression to all of them ; one to those who are ascending ; but the other to those who have arrived at the supernal realms. For the former proceeds from things beneath ; but the latter ranks among those who are now in the intelligible region, and who in that place have as it were fixed their foot¬ step. There, also, it is necessary for them to pro¬ ceed, till they have arrived at the extremity of the place. The end of the progression, however, is

employed upon men, full of opinion ; and this is spoken of in the Sophista.”

See this subject more amply discussed in the additional notes at the end of this volume.

then obtained, when some one arrives at the sum¬ mit of the intelligible world. But let this at pre¬ sent remain [without any further discussion.] And let us first endeavour to speak concerning this ele¬ vation.

In the first place, therefore, let these men be distinguished by us, and let us begin from the mu¬ sician, and show who he naturally is. We must admit, then, that he is easily excited 1 and asto¬ nished at the beautiful ; yet is not disposed to be moved from himself, but is prepared from casual occurrences as from certain types or impressions, to be excited by sounds, and to the beautiful in these, just as the timid are by noises. He like¬ wise always flies from dissonance ; and pursues in songs and rythms, that which is one, congruous, and elegant. After these sensible sounds, rythms, and figures therefore, he is thus to be elevated, viz. by separating the matter, in which analogies and ratios are inherent, and contemplating the beauty which they contain. He must also be taught that the things about which he was astonished were, intelligible harmony, and the beauty which is in it,

* For ακίνητον here, it is necessary to read ευκίνητον r

and in short, the beautiful itself, and not a certain beauty only. The reasonings, likewise, of philo¬ sophy must be inserted in him, through which he will be led to a belief of truths of which he is igno¬ rant, thougli he [occultly] possesses them. What these reasonings however, are, will be hereafter un¬ folded,

The reasonings, likewise, of philo¬ sophy must be inserted in him, through which he will be led to a belief of truths of which he is igno¬ rant, thougli he [occultly] possesses them. What these reasonings however, are, will be hereafter un¬ folded,

II. But the lover, into which the musician may be changed, and being changed will either remain [in that character] or will pass beyond it, has in a certain respect a recollection of beauty. Being however separated from it, he is incapable of learn¬ ing what it is. But as he is struck by the beautiful objects which present themselves to the sight, he is seized with astonishment about them. He therefore must be taught not to be abjectly asto¬ nished about one beautiful body, but he must be led by the exercise of the reasoning power to all beautiful bodies, and he who does this must exhibit to him that which is one and the same in all of them, and inform him that it is different from and is derived elsewhere, than from bodies, and is rather inherent in other things, such as beautiful pursuits, and beautiful laws. For the lover will

now become accustomed to incorporeal natures. He likewise must be led to the beauty which is in the arts, in sciences, and the virtues, and after¬ wards to that which is one and the same in all these ; and he must be taught after what manner beauty is inherent in each of them. But after the virtues, he must now ascend to intellect, and being itself, and there commence the progression on high*

III. The philosopher, however, is naturally prompt, and as it were, winged, and does not re¬ quire a separation [from sensible objects,] like the other characters ; since he is excited to the super¬ nal region, but is dubious, and therefore is only in want of one that may point out the way. The path, therefore, must be shown to him, and he must be liberated, since he is naturally willing, and was formerly freed [from the fetters of a corporeal na¬ ture.] Hence, he must be instructed in the ma¬ thematical disciplines, in order that he may be accustomed to the perception of and belief in an incorporeal essence. For he will easily admit its subsistence, as he is desirous of learning. As he is naturally, therefore, endued with virtue, he must

be led to the perfection of tiie virtues ; and after the mathematics, he must be taught dialectic rea¬ sonings, and in short, must be rendered skilful in dialectic,

As he is naturally, therefore, endued with virtue, he must

be led to the perfection of tiie virtues ; and after the mathematics, he must be taught dialectic rea¬ sonings, and in short, must be rendered skilful in dialectic,

IV. What, then, is the dialectic which ought to be delivered in addition to the former particu¬ lars ? It is, indeed, a habit enabling its possessor to reason about every thing, to know what each thing is, and in what it differs from other things, what the common something is which it partici¬ pates, where each of these subsists, if a thing is, w hat it is, what the number is of beings, and again of non-beings [which are not nothing] but different from beings. This, also, discusses the good , and that which is not good ; such things as are under the good , and such as are under the contrary to it ; and what that is which is eternal, and that which is not a thing of this kind. All these likewise it dis¬ cusses scientifically, and not from opinion. Rest¬ ing, also, from the wandering about a sensible nature, it establishes itself in the intelligible world, and there has its employment, dismissing falsehood, and nourishing the soul in what is called the plain of truth, employing for this purpose the division of

5 15

Plato, and also for the separation of forms* It likewise employs this division for the purpose of defining what a thing is, and in order to obtain a knowledge of the first genera of things, intellectually connecting that which results from these, till it has proceeded through the whole of an intelligible na¬ ture ; and again, by an analytic process it arrives at that to which it had proceeded from the first* Then, however, it becomes quiescent, because so far as it arrives thither it is at rest, and being no longer busily employed, but becoming one, it sur¬ veys what is called logic, which is occupied about propositions and syllogisms, — just as if giving to another art, the knowledge of writing ; some of which it considers as necessary, and prior to art. But it forms a judgment of these* as well as of other things, and thinks that some of them are use¬ ful, but others superfluous, and pertaining to the method by which these are discussed*

V. Whence, however, does this science derive its principles ? May we not say that intellect im¬ parts clear principles to the soul that is able to re¬ ceive them ? Afterwards, the soul compounds the things consequent to these principles, and connects

Whence, however, does this science derive its principles ? May we not say that intellect im¬ parts clear principles to the soul that is able to re¬ ceive them ? Afterwards, the soul compounds the things consequent to these principles, and connects

and divides them, till it arrives at a perfect intel¬ lect. For, as Plato says, this science is the purest part of intellect and [intellectual] prudence. It is necessary, therefore, since it is the most honourable habit of those things that are in us, that it should be conversant with being, and the most honorable nature ; and that prudence, indeed, should be con¬ versant with being, but intellect with that which is beyond being. What, then, is philosophy ? That which is most honorable. Is philosophy, therefore, the same as dialectic ? Or is not dialectic the most honorable part of philosophy ? For it must not be fancied that it is the instrument of the philosopher ; since it does not consist of mere theorems and rules, but is conversant with things, and has beings as it were for its subject matter. Nevertheless, it pro¬ ceeds in a path to beings, possessing things them¬ selves together with theorems. It knows, however, that which is false and sophistical accidentally, something else being the cause of these ; and it forms a judgment of them as of that which is foreign, knowing the false by the truths it contains in itself, when it is adduced by any one, because it is con¬ trary to the rule of truth. Propositions, therefore, are not the object of its knowledge ; for these are

letters. But, knowing truth, it knows that which is called a proposition. And universally, it knows the motions of the soul, what the soul admits, and what it rejects, and whether it rejects that which it admits, or something else. Likewise, whether dif¬ ferent or the same things are adduced ; applying itself to them in a way resembling sense/ But it assigns to another power an accurate discussion of these particulars.

VI. This, therefore, is an honourable part; since philosophy has also other parts. For it speculates about nature, receiving assistance from dialectic, in the same manner as the other arts use arithmetic. Philosophy, however, proximately de¬ rives assistance from dialectic. And, in a similar manner, it speculates about manners, surveying them through dialectic, but adding habits, and the exercises from which habits proceed. The rational virtues also have habits, and what are now as pecu- liarities, which they derive from thence. And the other virtues, indeed, have their reasonings in pecu¬ liar passions and actions ; but prudence is a certain

1 i. c. By intuition, so as to come into immediate contact with the objects of its knowledge. It does this, however, so far as its energy is purely intellectual.

ratiocination, and is conversant with that which is

c. By intuition, so as to come into immediate contact with the objects of its knowledge. It does this, however, so far as its energy is purely intellectual.

ratiocination, and is conversant with that which is

more universal. For it considers whether it is pro¬ per now to abstain or hereafter, or in short, whether another thing is better. Dialectic, however, and wisdom, introduce ail things to the use of prudence, universally and immaterially* But whether is it possible to know 18 inferior concerns without dia¬ lectic and wisdom ? Or may they be known in a different and defective way ? It is possible, however, for a man to be thus wise and skilled in dialectic without a knowledge of these. Or this will not be the case, but they will coalesce, either previously, or together. And perhaps some one may have certain physical virtues, from which, when wisdom is possessed, the perfect virtues will be obtained. Wisdom, therefore, is posterior to the physical virtues, but afterwards it perfects the manners ; or rather, the physical virtues existing, both are co-increased, and mutually perfected. Or, one of them being previously assumed, the one will perfect the other. For, in short, physical virtue has an imperfect eye, and imperfect man¬ ners ; and the principles of both are, for the most part, derived from those things which we possess.

1 For tiva i here, it is necessary to read eihcvai.

ON MATTER#

I. All those who have spoken concerning what is called matter, and who have arrived at a concep¬ tion of its nature, unanimously assert, that it is a certain subject and receptacle of forms. They dissent, however, from each other, in investigating what this subject nature is ; and after what man¬ ner, and of what things, it is a recipient. And those, indeed, who alone admit bodies to be beings, and who contend that essence is in these, say, that there is one matter, which is spread under the ele¬ ments, and that it is essence ; but that all other things are, as it were, the passions of matter, and are matter subsisting in a certain w?ay, and thus also are the elements. They, likewise, dare to extend matter as far as to the Gods. And, lastly,

they make even their highest ‘ God to be this mat¬ ter, subsisting in a certain way. They, likewise, give a body to matter, calling it, body mid of qua¬ lity ; and attribute to it magnitude. But others say, that matter is incorporeal ; and some of these do not admit that there is only this one matter, but assert that this is the subject of bodies, and that there is another matter prior to this in intelligibles, which is spread under the forms that are there, and under incorporeal essences»

IL Hence we must enquire concerning this in¬ telligible matter, whether it is, what it is, and after what manner it subsists» If, therefore, it is neces¬ sary that matter should be something indefinite and formless, but in intelligibles as being the most ex¬ cellent £ natures, there is nothing indefinite and without form, matter will not be there. If, also, every thing in the intelligible world is simple, it will not be in want of matter, in order that from it

1 From the version of Ficinus, It appears, that instead of αντον αυτών τον Oeor, we should read, ακροτατον αυτών τον θεόν* For his version is, “ sumraum ipsorum deum.w

a For a opiffTots here, it is necessary to read αριστοι$.

and something else, that which is a composite may be produced. To generated natures, indeed, and to such as make some things from others, matter is necessary, in which also the matter of sensibles is conceived to subsist ; but it is not necessary to things which are not generated. Whence, also, does matter proceed, and how does it subsist among intelligibles ? For if it was generated, it was generated by something ; but if it is eternal, there are many principles ; and first natures will have a casual subsistence. If, likewise, form should ac¬ cede, the composite will be a body, so that body will be there.

III. In the first place, therefore, it must be

said, that the indefinite is not every where to be despised, nor that which in the conception of it is formless, if it applies itself to things prior to itself, and to the most excellent natures. For thus soul is naturally adapted to apply itself to intellect and reason, being formed by these, and brought to pos¬ sess a more excellent nature. In intelligibles, how¬ ever, that which is a composite subsists after a dif¬ ferent manner, and not like bodies ; since reasons, also, [or productive principles] are composites, and

produce a composite in energy, through nature which has an energy directed to form. But if energy is directed to something different from itself, it is derived from something else, and this in a greater degree. The matter, however, of gene¬ rated natures, always possesses another and another form ; but the matter of eternal natures always possesses the same form. Perhaps, also, the matter which is in sensibles subsists in a way contrary to that which is in intelligibles. For the former is alter- nately all things, and is always some different thing. Hence, nothing in it ever remains, one thing conti¬ nually expelling another ; and on this account, nothing is ever the same. But in the latter, matter is all things at once, and hence there is not any thing into which it can be changed. Matter, therefore, in intelligibles, is never formless, since neither is the matter in sensibles ever without form ; but each of these subsists after a different manner. Whether matter, however, is eternal or generated, will be manifest when we have shown what it is.

Matter, therefore, in intelligibles, is never formless, since neither is the matter in sensibles ever without form ; but each of these subsists after a different manner. Whether matter, however, is eternal or generated, will be manifest when we have shown what it is.

IV. At present, however, it is supposed by us that there are forms or ideas, for this we have de-

monstrated elsewhere ; and this being admitted we shall proceed in our discussion. If, therefore, there are many forms, it is necessary, indeed, that there should be something common in them ; and also that there should be something peculiar by which one is distinguished from another. This something peculiar, therefore, and separating diffe¬ rence, are the appropriate form. But if there is form, there is also that which is formed, about which difference subsists. Hence, there is matter [in intelligibles,] which receives the form, and is always the subject of it. Farther still, if the intel¬ ligible world is there, but this our world is the imitation of that, and this is a composite, and con¬ sists of matter [and form,] it is necessary that there also there should be matter. Or how can you denominate it a world [or that which is adorned,] unless you look to form ? And how can you look to form, unless you assume that in which form sub¬ sists ? For the intelligible world, indeed, is perfectly every where impartible ; but in a certain respect is also partible. And if the parts of it are divulsed from each other, the section and divulsion are the passions of matter ; for it is matter which is di¬ vided. But if the many which are there, are Plot . C

one 1 impartible being, the many subsisting in one, —if this be the case, they are in one matter, of which they are the forms. For this various one, is to be considered as having a multiform nature. It must, therefore, be considered as formless prior to its variety. Hence, if by intellect you take away its variety, its forms, its productive principles, and intellections, that which is prior to these is formless and indefinite, and this is no one of the things which subsist together with and in it.

V. If, however, it should be said, that because it always possesses these things, and both [the subject and the forms] are one, this subject is not matter, neither will the subject of bodies here be matter. For the matter of sensibles is never without form, but there is always the whole body. At the same time, however, this is a composite ; and intellect discovers its twofold nature. For it divides till it arrives at that which is simple, and which is no longer capable of being analyzed. But so far as it is able, it proceeds into the profundity of body.

* Instead of cl Se πολλά op , αμεριστον εστι^ in this place, it is necessary to read, cl he πολλά εν ον αμεριστον εστι.

For it divides till it arrives at that which is simple, and which is no longer capable of being analyzed. But so far as it is able, it proceeds into the profundity of body.

* Instead of cl Se πολλά op , αμεριστον εστι^ in this place, it is necessary to read, cl he πολλά εν ον αμεριστον εστι.

The profundity, however, of each body is matter. Hence all matter is dark, because reason is lightf v and intellect is reason. Hence, too, intellect be¬ holding the nature of each [i. e. of intelligible and sensible matter,] conceives that which is beneath, as under light, to be dark ; just as the eye which is luciform, extending itself to the light, and to colours which are illuminations, says, that what is under colours, is dark and material, and concealed by the colours. Nevertheless, that which is dark in intelligibles is different from that which is dark in sensibles ; and the matter of the one differs as much from the matter of the other, as the super¬ vening form of the one from that of the other. For divine matter receiving that which defines and bounds it, possesses a definite and intellectual life. But sensible matter becomes, indeed, a certain de¬ finite thing, yet neither vital nor intellectual, but an unadorned privation of life. The morph e ,* also, is an image, so that the subject likewise is an image.

In intelligibles, however, the morphe is truly form, so that the subject also is real. Hence, those who

* Morphe pertains to the colour* figure, and magnitude of

superficies.

say that matter is essence, if they assert this of in¬ telligible matter, speak rightly. For the subject there is essence, or rather, is the object of intellec¬ tual perception, together with that which it con¬ tains, and is wholly illuminated essence. To in¬ vestigate, however, whether intelligible matter is eternal, is similar to the inquiry whether ideas are eternal. For they are generated, indeed, so far as they have a principle of their subsistence ; but they are not generated, [according to the usual accepta¬ tion of the term] because they have not a temporal beginning, but always proceed from something else, not like the natures which are always rising into existence, or becoming to be, as is the case with the wOrld, but they always are , in the same man¬ ner as the WOrld which is there [has an eternal subsistence.] For the difference which is there always produces matter ; since this which is the first motion is the principle of matter. Hence, it is called difference, because motion and difference were unfolded into light together with it. But the motion and difference wrhich proceed from the first cause of all, are indefinite, and are in want of this cause in order that they may become terminated. They are, however, terminated, when they are con-

But the motion and difference wrhich proceed from the first cause of all, are indefinite, and are in want of this cause in order that they may become terminated. They are, however, terminated, when they are con-

verted to it. But prior to this, matter and diffe¬ rence are indefinite, and are not yet good, but are without the light of the good . For if light is from the good , that which receives the light, prior to its reception of it, does not always possess it, but pos¬ sesses it, being different from it, since the light is from something else. And thus much concerning intelligible matter, which we have discussed per¬ haps more than is fit.

VI. Of the receptacle of bodies, however, we must speak as follows : That it is necessary then, there should be a certain subject to bodies, which is different from them, the mutation of the elements into each other manifests. For there is not a per¬ fect corruption of that which is changed ; since if there was, there would be a certain essence which would be dissolved into nonentity. Nor again, does that which is generated proceed into being from that which in every respect is not ; but there is a mutation from one form into another. That, however, remains, which receives the form of the thing generated, and casts aside another form. This, therefore, in short, corruption mani¬ fests ; for corruption is of that which is a compo-

site. But if this be the case, eacii sensible thing consists of matter and form. This, too, induction testifies, demonstrating that the thing which is cor¬ rupted is a composite. Analysis, likewise, evinces the same thing; as if, for instance, a pot should be resolved into gold ; 1 but gold into water ; and the water being corrupted, will require an analogous process. It is necessary, also, that the elements should either be form, or the first matter, or that which consists of matter and form. But it is im¬ possible, indeed, that they should be form. For how, without matter, could they have bulk and magnitude? Nor are they the first matter; for they are corrupted. Hence, they consist of matter and form. And form, indeed, subsists according to quality and morphe ; but matter according to the subject, which is indefinite, because it is not

form.

,·

* What Plotinus here says of the analysis into gold, is per¬ fectly conformable to the assertion of Albertus Magnus, as cited by Becher in his Physica Subterranea, p. 319. 4to. For his words are, “ Non dari rem elementatam, in cujus ultima substantiatione non reperiatur aurum.’’ That all metals, likewise, may be analyzed into water, is the doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle. See my translation of the Timaeus of the former, and Meteors of the latter.

319. 4to. For his words are, “ Non dari rem elementatam, in cujus ultima substantiatione non reperiatur aurum.’’ That all metals, likewise, may be analyzed into water, is the doctrine both of Plato and Aristotle. See my translation of the Timaeus of the former, and Meteors of the latter.

VII. Empedocles, however, who substitutes the elements for matter, has the corruption of them testifying against him. But Anaxagoras, who makes the mixture of things to be matter, and who says, that it has not an aptitude to [become] all things, but has all things in energy, subverts the intellect which he introduces ; not assigning to it the production of morphe and form, nor asserting that it is prior to matter, but that it subsists in conjunction with it. It is, however, impossible that intellect and matter should be consubsistent. For if the mixture participates of being, it follows that being is prior to it. But if being also is a mixture, a certain third thing is wanting to these. If, therefore, it is necessary that the demiurgus should have a prior subsistence, why is it necessary that forms should be in matter according to parvitude ; and that afterwards intellect by a vainly laborious process should separate them from each other ? For it is possible to impress quality in mat¬ ter, since it is without quality, and to extend mor¬ phe through the whole of it. And, besides, is it not impossible that all things should be in every thing ? But he who asserts that the infinite is mat¬ ter, should explain what this infinite is. And if it

is infinite in such a way as that which cannot fie passed over, it must be observed, that there is not any such thing among beings, neither if it is the infinite itself, nor if it is inherent in another nature, as an accident to a certain body» It is not, in¬ deed, the infinite itself, because the part of it is necessarily infinite. Nor is it the infinite as an accident, because that to which it is an accident would not be of itself infinite, nor simple, and there¬ fore evidently would not be matter. But neither have atoms the order of matter, which indeed have no subsistence whatever/ For every body is en¬ tirely divisible. This opinion is also confuted from the continuity and moisture of bodies ; and also from the impossibility of things subsisting without intellect and soul, which could not be formed from atoms. Again, it is not possible to fabricate any other nature, besides atoms from atoms ; since no artificer is able to produce any thing from matter which is not continuous. Ten thousand other objections might and have been urged against this hypothesis, and therefore it i& superfluous to dwell longer on these particulars.

1 i. e. As things perfectly indivisible.

VIII. What, then, is this nature, which is said to be one, continued, and void of quality ? And, indeed, that it is not a body if void of quality, is evident ; 1 for if it were, it would have quality.

1 i. e. As things perfectly indivisible.

1 Though from the arguments adduced here by Plotinus, it appears to be impossible that the first matter should be body void of quality, yet I think there will not be any absurdity in admitting with Simplicius, that body is twofold, one kind as subsisting according to form and productive power, and de¬ fined by certain intervals ; but another as characterized by intensions and remissions, and an indefiniteness of an incorpo¬ real, impartible, and intelligible nature; this not being form¬ ally defined by three intervals, but entirely remitted and dissi¬ pated, and on all sides flowing from being into non-being. “ Such an interval as this, we must perhaps,” (says Simplicius) %t admit matter to be, and not corporeal form, which now measures and bounds the infinite and indefinite nature of such an interval as this, and which stops it in its flight from being* Matter, however, is that by which material things differ from such as are immaterial. But they differ by bulk, interval, division, and things of this kind, and not by things which are defined according to measure, but by things void of measure and indefinite, and which are capable of being bounded by formal measures. The Pythagoreans appear to have been the first of the Greeks that had this suspicion concerning matter ; but after them Plato, as Moderatus also informs us. For he, conformably to the Pythagoreans, evinced that the first one is above being, and all essence ; but he says, that forms are the second one, which is true being and the intelligible ; and that the third one, which is psychical, or belonging to soul, parti¬ cipates of the one , and of forms. He adds, that the last nature

But we say that it is the matter of all sensibles, and that it is not the matter of some, but the form of others ; as clay is matter to the potter, but is not simply matter. We do not, therefore, speak of it in this way, but with reference to ail things ; and this being the case, we must not attribute to the

from this, and which is the nature of sensibles, does not parti¬ cipate them, but is adorned according to a representation of them, matter which is in them being the shadow of the non- being, which is primarily in quantity, or rather depending on and proceeding from it. According to this reasoning, there¬ fore, matter is nothing else than the mutation of sensibles, with respect to intelligibles, deviating from thence, and carried downwards to non-being.

According to this reasoning, there¬ fore, matter is nothing else than the mutation of sensibles, with respect to intelligibles, deviating from thence, and carried downwards to non-being.

Those things, indeed, which are the properties of sensibks are irrational, corporeal, distributed into parts, and passing into bulk and divulsion, through an ultimate progression into generation, viz, into matter; for matter is always truly the last sediment. Hence, also, the Egyptians call the dregs of the first life, which they symbolically deno¬ minate water, matter, being as it were a certain mire. And matter is, as it were, the receptacle of generated and sensible natures, not subsisting as any definite form, but as the state or condition of subsistence ; just as the impartible, the immate¬ rial, true being, and things of this kind, are the constitution of an intelligible nature ; all forms, indeed, subsisting both here and there, but here materially, and there immaterially ; viz. there impartibly and truly, but here partibly awd shadowy. Hence, every form is here distributed according to material interval.” See more on this subject in the notes to Book I. of my translation of Aristotle's Physics.

nature of it any thing which is perceived among sensibles. Hence, besides not granting to it other qualities, such as colour, heat and cold, we must ascribe to it neither levity or gravity, neither den- sity or rarity, or figure ; and therefore, neither must we ascribe to it magnitude. For magnitude itself is one thing, and to be great another. And figure itself is one thing, and that which is figured another. It is necessary, however, that it should not be a composite; but simple, and one certain thing in its own nature. For thus it will be desti¬ tute of all things. And he who imparts morphe to it, will impart morphe as something different from matter. He will also profer, as it were, magnitude and all things from the things which exist ; for otherwise, he would be subservient to the magni¬ tude of matter, and his production would not pos¬ sess the quantity which he wished it should, but that which matter is capable of receiving. To assert, however, that the will of the artificer con¬ curs with the magnitude of matter, is fictitious. But if the maker is prior to matter, in this case- matter will entirely be such as the maker wishes it to be, and will with facility be brought to all things, and therefore to magnitude. If, however, it has

But if the maker is prior to matter, in this case- matter will entirely be such as the maker wishes it to be, and will with facility be brought to all things, and therefore to magnitude. If, however, it has

magnitude, it is also necessary that it should have figure, so that it will be still more difficult to be fashioned by the artificer. Form, therefore, enters matter, bringing all things with it. But every form possesses magnitude, and the quantity which it contains is accompanied with reason [i. e. with a productive principle] and subsists under this. Hence, in every genus of things, quantity is defined together with form. For there is one magnitude of a man, and another of a bird. And it would be absurd to suppose, that the introduction of quantity to the matter of a certain bird, is any thing else than adding to it its proper quality. Nor must it be said that quality is a productive principle, but that quantity is not form, since it is both measure and number.

IX. How then can any thing w hich ranks among beings be apprehended, which has no magnitude ? Perhaps every thing which is not the same with a certain quantity. For being and a certain quantity are not the same ; since there are many other things besides a definite quantity. And, in short, it must be admitted that every incorporeal nature is without quantity. Matter, also, is incorporeal ;

since quantity itself is not a quantum, [or a certain quantity] but that is a quantum which participates of quantity. Hence, from this it is evident, that quantity is form. As, therefore, a certain white thing is produced by the presence of whiteness ; but that which produces a white colour in an animal, and other various colours, is not a various colour, but a various productive principle ; thus also, that which produces a definite quantity, is not a definite quantity, but a quantum itself, or quan¬ tity itself, or a productive principle. Does quan¬ tity, therefore, acceding, evolve matter into magni* tude ? By no means. For it was not contracted into a small space ; but it imparts magnitude which prior to this was not, in the same manner as it imparts quality which had not a prior existence*

X. What, therefore, is that which is void of magnitude in matter ? What, also, do you conceive that to be which is in a certain way void of quality ? And what is the intellection and the perception of it by the reasoning power ? Shall we say it is inde¬ finiteness ? For if the similar is perceived by the similar, the indefinitaalso will be apprehended by the indefinite. Reason, therefore, will become

And what is the intellection and the perception of it by the reasoning power ? Shall we say it is inde¬ finiteness ? For if the similar is perceived by the similar, the indefinitaalso will be apprehended by the indefinite. Reason, therefore, will become

bounded about the indefinite ; but the intuition of it will be indefinite. If, however, every thing is known by reason and intelligence, but here, reason indeed says what it is requisite to say about it, and wishing to become intelligence, is not intelligence, but, as it were, a privation of intellect, — if this be the case, the phantasm of matter will rather be spurious, and not genuine, being composed of an imagination which is not true, and another kind of reason. And perhaps Plato, looking to this, says, [in the Timasus] that matter is apprehended by a spurious reasoning. What, therefore, is the inde¬ finiteness of the soul ? Is it an all-perfect ignorance, such as the absence [of knowledge ?] Or does the indefinite consist in a certain negation 1 in conjunc¬ tion with a certain affirmation ; and is it like dark¬ ness to the eye, obscurity being the matter of every invisible colour? Thus, therefore, the soul also, taking away whatever in sensibles resembles light, and not being able to bound what remains, is simi¬ lar to the eye placed in darkness, and then becomes

1 In the original η εν καταψασα. tivl , but it appears from the version of Ficinus, that we should read, -η er αποφασει σνν KaTatyaaet nyi . This emendation the sense also requires and is adopted in the above translation.

in a certain respect the same with that which, as it were, it sees. Does it therefore see ? Perhaps it sees matter as something deformed, and as void of colour, and void of light ; and besides this, as not having magnitude, since if it had, it would be in- vested with form. When, therefore, the soul un¬ derstands nothing, is she not affected in the same manner as when she sees matter ? By no means. For when she understands nothing, she says no- thing, or rather, she suffers nothing. But when she beholds matter, she suffers such a passion as when she receives the resemblance of that which is formless ; since also when she understands things that have figure and magnitude, she understands them as composites. For she understands them as things diversified, and in short as possessing quali¬ ties. Hence, she understands the whole, and at the same time both, and her intellection or sensa¬ tion of the inherent properties is clear and manifest But her perception of a formless subject is ob¬ scure ; for it is not form. When, therefore, in the whole and composite, she receives the subject to¬ gether with its inherent properties, and analyze® and separates them, then she understands obscurely that which reason leaves, darkly that which is dark.

When, therefore, in the whole and composite, she receives the subject to¬ gether with its inherent properties, and analyze® and separates them, then she understands obscurely that which reason leaves, darkly that which is dark.

and sees intellectually, not understanding. And since matter itself does not remain formless, but in [sensible] things is invested with form, the soul -also immediately impresses it with the form of things, being pained with the indefinite, as if afraid of being placed out of the order of beings, and not enduring to stop any longer at nonentity.

XT. But why is it requisite there should be something else besides magnitude and all qualities, to the composition of bodies ? Or is it not neces- sary there should be that which is the recipient of all things ? It will not therefore be bulk. For if it were bulk, it would also be magnitude. But if it is without magnitude, it will not have a place where it may receive [all other things.] For being void of magnitude, what advantage would it derive from place, if it neither contributes to form and quality, nor to interval and magnitude ? the two latter of which appear to be derived to bodies from matter, wherever it may be. In short, as actions and productions, times and motions, though they have no substratum of matter in them, yet rank among beings ; thus, also, neither is it necessary that the first bodies should have a matter [which is

without magnitude], but that, each of them should be wholly that which it is, being more various by the mixture with things that have their composition from many forms. So that this matter which is without magnitude, is a vain name. In the first place, therefore, it is not necessary that whatever receives any thing should have bulk, if magnitude is not now present with it ; since soul, likewise, which receives all things, has all things at once· But if it happened to have magnitude, it would possess every thing that it contains, in magnitude. Matter, however, on this account, receives the things which it receives, in interval, because it is the recipient of interval ; just as animals and plants, while they are extended with magnitude, receive at the same time the production of quality ; and quantity being contracted, quality also is contracted. If, however, because a certain magnitude pre-exists in things of this kind, as a subject to the formator, some one should also require this in matter, he will not conceive rightly. For in the formation of these, not matter simply considered, is employed, but matter of a certain kind. But it is necessary that matter simply considered, should possess mag¬ nitude from something else. Hence, it is not Plot. D

For in the formation of these, not matter simply considered, is employed, but matter of a certain kind. But it is necessary that matter simply considered, should possess mag¬ nitude from something else. Hence, it is not Plot. D

necessary that the recipient of form should be bulk, but that at the same time it becomes bulk, it should receive another quality ; and that it should have indeed the phantasm of bulk, because, as being the first matter, it is an aptitude to the reception of it. It is, however, a void bulk ; and hence some assert that matter and a vacuum are the same. For the soul having nothing which it can bound, when it associates with matter, diffuses itself into the inde¬ finite, neither circumscribing it, nor being able to arrive at any fixed point [of survey ;] since other¬ wise it would define it. Hence, neither is it to be separately called great, nor again small ; but it must be denominated both small and great. And thus it is bulk, and thus is without magnitude, be¬ cause it is the matter of bulk. Being also con¬ tracted from the great to the small, and extended from the small to the great, it runs as it were through bulk. The indefiniteness of it, likewise, is a bulk of this kind, being the receptacle of magni¬ tude in itself ; but in imagination in the way before explained. For with respect to such other things without magnitude as are forms, each of them is definite ; so that they bring with them no coficep- tion whatever of bulk. But matter being indefinite,

and never at rest 1 with itself, and being borne along to every form, in every direction, and easily led every where, becomes multitudinous by its generation and transition to all things. And after

o o

this manner it possesses the nature of bulk.

XII. Magnitude, therefore, contributes some¬ thing to bodies ; for the forms of bodies, are in dimensions. These forms, however, are not gene¬ rated about magnitude, but about that which is amplified. For if they were generated about mag¬ nitude, and not about matter, they would be simi¬ larly void of magnitude and without subsistence, or would be productive principles alone. But forms are conversant with soul, and therefore are not bodies. Hence, it is necessary that here, many things should subsist about one thing ; but this is distended with magnitude. And this [which is thus amplified,] is different from magnitude ; since now also such things as are mingled, in consequence of having matter, pass into a sameness of condition,

1 Instead of μη πω πασα παρ' αντης , it is necessary to read μη π ore παυσασα παρ αυτη$ , agreeably to the version of Fi« cinus.

and do not require any thing else about which they may subsist, because each of the things that are mingled brings with it its own matter. At the same time, however, a certain recipient is neces¬ sary, viz. either a vessel, or place. But place is posterior to matter, and to bodies ; so that bodies prior to this will be indigent of matter. Nor does it follow that because productive energies and actions are immaterial, on this account bodies also are without matter. For the latter are composites, but this is not the case w ith actions. Matter also imparts a subject to agents when they act, abiding in them, but not giving itself to act ; for this is not investigated by material agents. Nor is one action changed into another, in order that matter may be in them ; but the agent passes from one action to another, so that he has the relation of matter to the actions themselves. Matter, therefore, is necessary both to quality and magnitude, so that it is also necessary to bodies. Nor is it a vain name, but it is a certain subject, though it is invisible, and with¬ out magnitude. For if this is not granted, neither must we say that there are qualities ; and for the same reason we must deny the existence of magni¬ tude. For each of these, if assumed by itself alotie,

must be said to be nothing. But if these have a subsistence, though each of them obscurely exists, much more will matter have an existence, though it does not clearly subsist, and is apprehended, though not by the senses. For it is not perceived by the eyes, since it is without colour. Nor by the hearing ; for it has no sound. Nor by the smell, or the taste ; for it has neither moisture, nor vapour. Is it, therefore, perceived by the touch ? Or is not this impossible, because neither is it a body P For the touch pertains to body,, because it pertains either to the dense, or the rare, the soft, or the hard, the moist, or the dry. None of these, however, subsist about matter ; so that it is per¬ ceptible by reasoning, but not by sense ; and by a reasoning not derived from, but void of intellect, on which account, as we have before observed, this reasoning is spurious. But neither is corporeity about matter. For if corporeity is a productive principle, it is different from matter. But if it is a thing now made, and as it were mingled, it will evidently be body, and not matter only.

XIII. If, however, the subject of things is a certain quality, being something common in each

For if corporeity is a productive principle, it is different from matter. But if it is a thing now made, and as it were mingled, it will evidently be body, and not matter only.

XIII. If, however, the subject of things is a certain quality, being something common in each

of the elements, in the first place indeed, it must be shown what it is. And, in the next place., how quality can be a subject must be explained. How, likewise, can a thing which has quality be surveyed in that which is without magnitude, and without matter? Likewise, if the quality is defined, how can it be matter? But if it is something indefinite, it is not quality, but a subject, and matter which we are now investigating. What hinders, there¬ fore, but that it may indeed be void of quality in consequence of not in its own nature participating any one of other things, and yet through not parti¬ cipating of any thing, it may be endued with quality, entirely possessing a certain peculiarity, and differing from other things, being as it were a certain privation of them ? For he who suffers a privation of any thing, as for instance, a blind man, is [it may be said] a participant of quality. If, therefore, there is a privation of these things about matter, how is it possible it should not be endued with quality ? But if, in short, there is privation about it, it is in a still greater degree a participant of quality, if privation is a certain something that has quality. He, however, who thus objects, what else does he do than make all things to be qualities,

and the participants of quality ? So that quantity, and also essence, will be quality. And if each of these is such like, quality will be present with it. It is, however, ridiculous to make that which is different from the participant of quality, and which is not such like, to be endued with quality. But if it should be said, this is because a thing that is dif¬ ferent is a participant of quality, we reply, if indeed it is difference itself, it will not subsist as a thing that is such like, since neither is quality the parti¬ cipant of quality. If, however, it is different alone, it is not alone different through itself, but through difference, and is the same through sameness. Neither, therefore, is privation quality, nor the participant of quality, but is destitute of quality, or of something else, just as silence is the absence of sound or of some other thing. For privation is a negation. But a thing endued with quality consists in affirmation. The peculiarity, likewise, of matter is not morphe ; for not to possess quality is not to possess a certain form. It is absurd, therefore, to call that thing quality, which is not a participant of quality, and is just as if it should be said that a thing without magnitude, in consequence of being without, possesses magnitude. The peculiarity,

It is absurd, therefore, to call that thing quality, which is not a participant of quality, and is just as if it should be said that a thing without magnitude, in consequence of being without, possesses magnitude. The peculiarity,

therefore, of matter, is not any thing else than that which matter is : nor is its peculiarity adjacent to it, but rather subsists in a habitude to other things, because matter is different from them. And other things, indeed, are not only others, but each of them is a certain thing as having form. Matter, how¬ ever, may be aptly said to be alone that which is another. Perhaps, also, it may be appropriately denominated other things, lest by calling it in the singular number another, you should limit [its boundless nature ;] but by denominating it others , you will indicate the indefiniteness of its subsis? tence.

XIV. That, however, is to be investigated, whether matter is privation, or privation subsists about matter. He, therefore, who says that both are one in subject, but two in definition, ought in justice to teach us what definition of each should be given. And to the definition of matter, indeed, he should adapt nothing of privation ; and to the definition of privation, nothing of matter. For either the one is not in the definition of the other, or each is in the definition of each, or one of them only is in the definition of the other, whichever it

may be. If, therefore, each is defined separately* and neither of them requires the other, both will he two things, and matter will be different from privation, though privation may happen to it. In the definition of the one, however, it is necessary that the other should not be seen, not even in capa= city. But if they are as a flat nose, and flatness of the nose, thus also each of them is twofold and two. And if they are as fire and heat, heat being in fire, but fire not being assumed in heat, and matter is so privation as fire is hot, —in this case, privation will be, as it were, the form of matter, but the subject will be another thing, which it is necessary should be matter. Neither, likewise, in this way will they be one. Are they, therefore, thus one in subject, but two in definition, privation not signifying that a certain thing is present, but that it is not present, and privation being as it were a negation of beings, as if some one should say non-being ? For negation does not add any thing, but says a thing is not, and thus privation will be as non-being. If, therefore, it is non-being, because it is not being but something else, will there be two definitions ; the one indeed regarding the sub¬ ject, but the other privation, manifesting a habitude

If, therefore, it is non-being, because it is not being but something else, will there be two definitions ; the one indeed regarding the sub¬ ject, but the other privation, manifesting a habitude

to other things ? Or shall we say, that the defini¬ tion of matter respects other things, and that this is also the case with the definition of a subject ; but that the definition of privation, if it manifests the indefiniteness of it, will perhaps touch upon its nature, excepting that each is one in the subject, but two in definition ? But if privation in conse¬ quence of being indefinite, infinite, and without quality, is the same with matter, how will there be any longer two definitions ?

XV. Again, it must be investigated, whether if the infinite and indefinite are in another nature accidentally, how this is an accident, and whether privation happens to it. If, indeed, such things as numbers and reasons [or productive principles] are remote from infinity ; for they are boundaries and orders, and arrangement is derived to other things from these ; but these arrange not that which is arranged, nor the orders of things, that which ar¬ ranges being different from that which is arranged ; and end, bound, and reason, arrange ; — if this be the case, it is necessary that what is arranged and bounded, should be infinite. Matter, however, is arranged, and also such things as are not matter,

by participating or possessing the nature of matter. Hence it is necessary, that matter should be infinite, yet not infinite in such a way as if the infinite was accidental to matter. For in the first place, that which happens to any thing ought to be formative ; but the infinite is not formative. In the next place, to what existing thing will the infinite be an acci¬ dent? Will it be to bound, and that which is bounded ? Matter, however, is neither any thing bounded, nor bound. The infinite, also, acceding to that which is bounded, loses its own nature. Hence, the infinite is not an accident to matter. Matter, therefore, is the infinite ; since in intelligi- bles alsox matter is the infinite which is there.1

1 “ Power,0 says Proclus, (in Theol. Plat. lib. iii. cap. p.) Sl is every where the cause of prolific progressions, and of all multitude; occult power, indeed, being the cause of occult multitude ; but the power which exists in energy, and which unfolds itself into light, being the cause of all-perfect multi¬ tude. Through this cause, therefore, I think that every being, and every essence, has connascent powers. For it participates of infinity, and derives its hyparxis indeed from bound, but its power from infinity. And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this ac¬ count being is one many. — It appears to me also, that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form as ana-

And being is nothing else than a monad of many powers, and a multiplied hyparxis, and on this ac¬ count being is one many. — It appears to me also, that Plotinus and his followers, frequently indicating these things, produce being from form and intelligible matter, arranging form as ana-

And there, indeed, it is generated from the infinity or power of the one , or from the ever, infinity not being in the one , but proceeding from it. How, therefore, is the infinite there, and also here ? Or is not the infinite twofold ? And in what do they differ ? They differ in the same manner as arche¬ type and image. Is the latter, therefore, in a less degree infinite ? Perhaps it is more infinite. For so far as the image flies from the reality of exist¬ ence, so far it is in a greater degree infinite. For infinity is in a greater degree in that which is less bounded. For that which is less in good is more in evil. Hence the infinite which is in intelligible^, in consequence of having more of being, is but as an image [with respect to the infinity of matter.] But the infinite which is here, as having less of being, so far as it flies from existence and truth, and is drawn down to the nature of an image, is a

logous to the one , and to hyparxis, but power as analogous to matter. And if, indeed, they say this, they speak rightly. But if they ascribe a certain formless and indefinite nature to an intelligible essence, they appear to me to wander from the conceptions of Plato on this subject. For the infinite is not the matter of bound, but the power of it, nor is bound the form of the infinite, but the hyparxis of it.” See tny transla¬ tion of this work of Proclus, vol. i. p. 173.

6 i

more true infinite. Is, therefore, the infinite the same thing as to be infinite ? Perhaps where there are that which has a productive and forming power, and matter, each of these is different ; but where there is matter alone, they must either be said to be the same, or in short, and which also is better, to be infinite is not here. For it would be reason in order that it might be infinite [i. e. would have a productive and forming power,] which is not in the infinite. Hence matter must be said to be of itself infinite, through having an arrangement opposite to reason. For as reason not being any thing else is reason, thus also it must be said, that matter being opposed to reason according to infinity, is infinite in such a way as not to be any thing else*

XVI. Is, therefore, matter the same with dif¬ ference, or is it not the same ? Perhaps it is not the same with difference simply considered,1 but with a part of difference which is opposed to beings properly so called, and which are productive prin-

1 it appears from the version of Ficinus, that the words η ον tclvtqv €Τ€ροτηπ απ\ω$> are wanting in this place in the original.

ciples. Hence, also, non-being is thus a certain being, and the same with privation, if privation is an opposition to the things which subsist in reason. Will, therefore, privation be corrupted by the ac¬ cession of that of which it is the privation ? By no means* For the receptacle of habit, is not habit, but privation. The receptacle, likewise, of bound, is not that which is terminated, nor bound, but the infinite, and this so far as it is infinite. How is it possible, therefore, that bound approaching should not destroy the nature of the infinite, especially since this infinite has not an accidental subsistence ? Or may we not say that if this infinite was infinite in quantity, it would perish? Now, however, this is not the case, but on the contrary its being is pre¬ served by bound. For bound brings that which the infinite is naturally adapted to be, into energy and perfection ; just as that which is not yet sown [is brought to perfection] when it is sown, and as the female [when impregnated] by the male. For then the female nature is not destroyed, but pos¬ sesses the female characteristic in a greater degree ; since then it becomes more eminently that which it is. Is, therefore, matter evil when it partakes of good ? Or shall we say it is evil on this account

because it was in want of good ? For it did not pos¬ sess it. For that which is in want of any thing, and obtains what it wants, will perhaps become a medium between good and evil, if it is equally dis* posed towards both. But that which possesses nothing, as being in poverty, or rather being poverty itself, is necessarily evil. For this is not the want

of wealth or of strength, but it is the want of wis¬ dom, and the want of virtue, of beauty, strength, morphe, form, and quality. How, therefore, is it possible it should not be deformed ? How is it pos¬ sible it should not be perfectly base ? How is it possible it should not be perfectly evil ? The mat¬ ter, however, which is in intelligibles is [real] being. For that which is prior to it is beyond being. But here [in the sensible region,] that which is prior to, matter is being. Hence the matter which is here is not being, since it is different from it when com¬ pared with the beauty of being.

AGAINST THE GNOSTICS/

I. Since it has appeared to us that the nature of the good is simple and the first ; for every thing

Hence the matter which is here is not being, since it is different from it when com¬ pared with the beauty of being.

AGAINST THE GNOSTICS/

I. Since it has appeared to us that the nature of the good is simple and the first ; for every thing

1 “ At the time in which Plotinus lived/’ (says Porphyry in his life of our philosopher,) " there were many Christians and others, who departing from the ancient philosophy, be¬ came heretics, [with respect to it;] viz. the followers of Adel- phius and Acylinus, who being in possession of many of the writings of Alexander, Philocomus, Demostratus, and Lydus, and exhibiting the revelations of Zoroaster, Zostrianus, Nico- theus, Allogenes, Meses, and certain others, deceived many, and were themselves deceived. For they asserted, that Plato had not penetrated the depth of an intelligible essence. Hence Plotinus in his conferences adduced many arguments against them, and also wrote a book which we have inscribed ‘Against the Gnostics/ leaving the rest to our judgment.”

After this testimony of Porphyry, it is singular, as Fabricius observes, that Plotinus should not even once use the word Gnostics, in any part of his treatise against them. But as he was a man sparing of words beyond all other writers, he was perhaps satisfied with the inscription which he knew would be given to the book by Porphyry, and being wholly attentive to the conceptions of his own wonderful mind, did not busy him» self with a repetition of names. Wherever this word, therefore, occurs in the following translation, it is inserted by me for the sake of perspicuity.

which is not the first is not simple ; and since it has nothing in itself, but is one alone, and the nature of what is called the oney is the same with the good; for it is not first something else, and afterwards one, — nor is the good something else, and afterwards the good; — this being the case, when we say the one , and when w^e say the good , it is necessary to think that we speak of one and the same nature ; not predicating any thing of it, but manifesting it to ourselves as much as possible. It is also called the first , because it is most simple ; and sufficient to itself, because it does not consist of many things. For if it did, it would be sus¬ pended from the things of which it consists. It likewise is not in any thing else, because every thing which is in another, is also derived from another. If, therefore, it is neither from, nor in another, and has not any composition in its nature, it is necessary that there should not be any thing superior to it. Hence, it is not requisite to pro¬ ceed to other principles, but having admitted this, and next to this intellect which is primarily inteF lect, we ought afterwards to place soul, as the next in rank. For this is the order according to nature, neither to admit more, nor fewer than these in the Plot. E

For this is the order according to nature, neither to admit more, nor fewer than these in the Plot. E

intelligible. For those who admit fewer than these, must either say that soul and intellect are the same, or that intellect and that which is first are the same. It has, however, been frequently demon¬ strated by us, that these are different from each other.

It remains, therefore, that we should consider at present, if there are more than these three, what the natures are which exist besides these. For since the principle of all things subsists in the way we have shown, it is not possible for any one to find a more simple and elevated principle. For they [the Gnostics] will not say 1 that there is one principle in capacity, but another in energy ; since it is ridiculous in things which are in energy, and immaterial, to make many natures by dividing into capacity and energy. But neither in the natures posterior to these, is it to be supposed that there is a certain intellect established in quiet, but that another is as it were moved. For what is the quiet of intellect, what the motion and language of it ? And what will be the leisure of one intellect, and

* Instead of ου yap bet, here, it is necessary to read ου yap δη9

the work of the other ? Tor intellect always pos¬ sesses an invariable sameness of subsistence, being constituted in a stable energy. But motion direct¬ ed to, and subsisting about it, is nowT the employ¬ ment of soul Reason also proceeding from intel¬ lect into soul, causes soul to be intellectual, and does not produce a certain other nature between intellect and soul. Moreover, neither is it neces¬ sary to make many intellects on this account, that one of them perceives intellectually, but another sees that it sees intellectually. For if in these, to perceive intellectually is one thing, but another to perceive that it sees intellectually, yet there must be one intuitive perception in these which is not in¬ sensible of its own energies. For it would be ridi¬ culous to form any other conception than this of true intellect. But the intellect will be entirely the same, which perceives intellectually, and which sees that it sees intellectually. For if this were not the case, the one would be alone intelligent but the other would perceive that it was intelligent, and the former would be different from the latter. If, however, they say that these two [only] differ from each other in conceptions, in the first place indeed,

they will be deprived of many hypostases ; and in the next place it is necessary to consider, whether any conception of ours can admit the subsistence of an intellect which is alone intelligent, and which does not perceive that it sees intellectually. For when a thing of this kind happens to us who are always attentive to impulses and cogitations, if we are moderately worthy, it becomes the cause to us of folly.

For when a thing of this kind happens to us who are always attentive to impulses and cogitations, if we are moderately worthy, it becomes the cause to us of folly.

When, therefore, that which is truly intellect intellectually perceives itself in its intellections, and the intelligible of it is not externally posited, but intellect itself is also the intelligible, it necessarily follows that in intellectual perception it possesses itself, and sees itself. But seeing itself, it perceives itself not to be void of intelligence, but intelligent. So that in primarily energizing intellectually, it will also have a perception that it sees intellectually, both being as one ; nor can there be any concep¬ tion of duplicity there. If, likewise, always per¬ ceiving intellectually it is that which it is, what place can there be for the conception w hich sepa¬ rates intellectual perception from the perceiving that it sees intellectually P If, however, some one

should introduce a third conception to the second, which asserts that it perceives that it sees intellec¬ tually, and should say that it understands, (i. e. sees intellectually) that what understands under¬ stands, the absurdity is still more apparent. And why ma}r not assertions of this kind be made to in¬ finity ? The reason, likewise, proceeding from in¬ tellect which may be adduced, and from which afterwards another reason is generated in the soul, so as to become a medium between intellect and soul, deprives the soul of intellectual perception,* if it does not derive this reason from intellect, but from some other intermediate nature* Hence it would possess an image of reason, but not reason itself. And in short, it would not have a know¬ ledge of intellect, nor would it be intelligent.

II. Hence it must not be admitted that there are more principles than these [in the intelligible world,] nor must these superfluous conceptions be adopted, which have no place there ; but it must be said that there is one intellect always subsisting with invariable sameness, and in every respect with¬ out fluctuation, which imitates as much as possible its father ; and with respect to our soul, that one

part of it always abides on high,1 that another part of it is conversant with sensibles, and that another has a subsistence in the middle of these. For as there is one nature in many powers, at one time the whole soul tends upward in conjunction with the most excellent part, of itself, and of the uni¬ verse, * but at another time, the worse part being drawn down, draws together with itself the middle part. For it is not lawful that the whole of it should be drawn downward. This passion also happens to the soul, because it did not abide in that which is most beautiful, where the soul which does not rank as a part [continually] abiding, and of which we are not a part, imparts to the whole

For it is not lawful that the whole of it should be drawn downward. This passion also happens to the soul, because it did not abide in that which is most beautiful, where the soul which does not rank as a part [continually] abiding, and of which we are not a part, imparts to the whole

1 This is one of the peculiar dogmas of Plotinus, which is however opposed, and 1 think very justly by Prod us, in the last Proposition of his Elements of Theology. “ For if,’’ (as he there says) “ something pertaining to the soul remains on high in the intelligible world, it will always perceive intellec¬ tually, without transition, or transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect, and not a part of the soul. And if with transition, then from that which always, and from that which sometimes energizes intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, is impossible.

α From the version of Ficinus, it appears that instead of του ovtos in this place, we should read του παντός.

body of the universe, as much as it is able to re¬ ceive from it. At the same time also, this soul remains free from all solicitude, not governing the world by the discursive energy of reason, nor cor¬ recting any thing [in itself ;] but by the vision of that which is prior to itself, adorning the universe with an admirable power. For the more it looks to itself, the more beautiful and powerful it be¬ comes, and possessing these excellencies from the intelligible world, it imparts them to that which is posterior to itself, and as it is always illuminated, it always illuminates.

III. Being therefore always illuminated, and continually possessing light, it imparts it to the natures that are in a consequent order. And these are always contained and irrigated by this light, and enjoy life through it, as far as they are able. Just as if a fire being placed in a certain middle, what¬ ever is capable of receiving heat, should be heated by it as much as possible ; though the fire is limited by measure. But when the powers not being measured, are never-failing, how is it possible that they should have an existence, and yet nothing should participate of them ? It is, however, neces-

But when the powers not being measured, are never-failing, how is it possible that they should have an existence, and yet nothing should participate of them ? It is, however, neces-

sary that every thing should impart itself to some¬ thing else ; or the good will not be good, nor intel¬ lect be intellect, nor soul be soul ; unless after that which lives primarily, there is also that which has a secondary life, as long as that exists which is pri¬ marily vital. Hence it is necessary that all things should be perpetually consequent to each other, and should be generated by other things, because they depend on others for their subsistence. Things therefore that are said to be generated, were not generated at a certain time, but were and will be rising into existence ; nor will they be corrupted, those things excepted which they contain, into which they may be resolved. But that which has nothing into which it can be resolved, will not be corrupted. If, however, some one should say that things which are in generation may be resolved into matter, we reply, and why may not matter also be dissolved ? But if it is said that matter may be disr solved, we ask what necessity there was that it should be generated ? If they say it was necessary, and therefore it was generated, we reply, and it is also now necessary. But if it should be left alone, divine natures would not be every where, but would be circumscribed in a certain place, as if surrounded

with a wall. If, however, this is impossible, mat¬ ter is perpetually 1 2 illuminated [by divinity.]

IV. But if they say that soul suffering as it were a defluxion of its wings, made the world, we reply, that this does not befal the soul of the uni¬ verse. If also they say this soul is deceived and in error, they should assign the cause of its decep¬ tion and error. When likewise was it deceived ? For if from eternity, it will for the same a reason remain in error. But if it began at a certain time to be deceived, why was it not deceived prior to that time ? We, however, do not say that the tendency of the soul downward produced the world, but rather the non-tendency of it. But if it tends downward, it is evident that this must arise from its forgetfulness of what the intelligible world contains. And if it is forgetful of these, how did it fabricate the world ? For whence can it make, except from the things which it saw there ? But if it fabricates recollecting the things that are there, it

1 It appears that aei is wanting here in the original.

2 Instead of κατα τον αυτών λογον , it is necessary to read κατα τον αυτόν λογον.

For whence can it make, except from the things which it saw there ? But if it fabricates recollecting the things that are there, it

1 It appears that aei is wanting here in the original.

2 Instead of κατα τον αυτών λογον , it is necessary to read κατα τον αυτόν λογον.

has not in short, any tendency downward. For it does not possess nor see them obscurely, if it is without this tendency. And why, if it has any re¬ collection of them, should it not wish to return thither ? For what can it suppose will happen to itself from fabricating the world ? For it is ridi¬ culous to assert that it made the world, in order that it might be honoured, and is an opinion derived from the makers of statues. If, likewise, soul fa¬ bricated by a reasoning process, and did not natu¬ rally possess a producing power, how did it make this world ? When also will it destroy the world ? For if it repented having made it, why does it defer its destruction ? But if it does not yet repent, neither will it ever, as being now accustomed to it, and becoming through time more friendly towards it. If, also, it defers the destruction of the world on account of partial souls, waiting for their union with it, these souls ought not to have descended again into generation, having experienced in a former descent, the evils which are here ; so that prior to the present time they would have ceased to descend. Nor must we grant them that this world was produced in an evil condition, because there are many molestations in it. For this arises

from forming too exalted an opinion of this sensible world, and conceiving it to be the same with that which is intelligible, and not the image of it. For what more beautiful image of it could have been generated ? What other fire could be a better image of the fire which is there, than the tire which is here ? Or what other earth than this, of the earth which is there ? What sphere, also, could be more accurate and venerable, or more orderly in its mo¬ tion [than that of this sensible universe,] after the comprehension which is there of the intelligible world in itself? And what other sun after the intel¬ ligible sun, can be prior to this which is the object of sight ?

V. It is however truly absurd, that they having a body like other men, together with desires, pains, and anger, should not despise the power of these, but assert that they are able to come into contact with the intelligible, and yet that there is not in the sun a more impassive power, though it exists in a * superior order, and has not as our bodies have, a predominant tendency to a change of quality, and that it has not likewise a wisdom more excellent than we have whose origin is recent^ and who are

prevented by so many impediments from arriving at truth. Nor again , is it fit to assert that the soul of the vilest men is immortal and divine , hut that all heaven and the stars that are there , do not participate of immortality , though they consist of things far more beautiful and pure [ than any thing terrestrial ,] and though it is evident that whatever is there is orderly and elegant ; espe¬ cially since they blame the disorder which is about the earth, as if an immortal soul would chitse this inferior abode, and willingly though more excellent be subservient to a mortal soul. The introduction also of this other soul by them is absurd, which according to them derives its composition from the elements. For how can a composition from the elements possess any life? For the mixture of these produces either the hot or the cold, or that which is mingled from both, or the dry, or the moist, or a compound from these. How, likewise, is soul the connecting bond of the four elements, since it consists from and is posterior to them ? But when they also add animadversion and will, and ten thousand other things to this soul, it may be asked why they ascribe these to it. Farther still , they do not honour this sensible fabrication of

things , nor this visible earth , but they say that there is a nezv 1 earth produced for them , into which they are to ascend from hence ; and that this new earth is the productive principle of the world ; though why is it necessary that they should dwell in the paradigm of a world which they hate ? Whence likewise does this paradigm subsist P For this, according to them, derived its subsistence from the maker of the world, verging to terrestrial na¬ tures. If, therefore, by the maker of the universe great attention is paid to the production of another world, after the intelligible world which he pos¬ sesses, why is this attention requisite ? And if he \yas thus attentive prior to the world, was it in order that souls might be saved? How is it, there¬ fore, that they are not saved ? So that the world was made in vain. But if he was thus attentive posterior to the world, receiving his knowledge by a spoliation of form from matter, in this case, the skill which souls derive from experience, is suffi¬ cient to their salvation. But if they think that the form of the world should be assumed in souls, from whence is this novel doctrine derived ?

1 It appears from the version of Ficinus, that for νυν here, we should read veav.

But if they think that the form of the world should be assumed in souls, from whence is this novel doctrine derived ?

1 It appears from the version of Ficinus, that for νυν here, we should read veav.

VI. And why is it requisite to speak of the other hypostases which they introduce, such as transmigrations, repercussions, and repentances ? 1 For if they say that these are the passions of soul when it repents, and repercussions, when it con* templates as it were the images of beings, and not beings themselves, — these are vain assertions, ad¬ duced for the purpose of establishing a peculiar sect. For as they do hot adhere to the ancient wisdom of the Greeks, they fabricate such fictions as these. For the Greeks knew and asserted with¬ out any arrogance and pride, that there are methods of ascent from the cavern [of sense] and gradual progressions to a more and more true survey [of an intelligible essence. ] And, in short, some things are assumed by the Gnostics from Plato, but others

1 Forms or ideas, according to the ancient wisdom of the Greeks, leap into matter, which is adapted by the exemplar of the universe to receive the images of them, and like a mirror gives back the influx of the ideas which it receives. Souls, therefore, falling from the intelligible world become deceived, by mistaking the resemblances of forms for forms themselves, till by repentance they return to their true country, from which they have been as it were banished, through their abode on the earth. The Gnostics perverting this doctrine, gave the names of essences to such like passions of the soul.

are innovations of their own, in order that they may establish a peculiar philosophy, and are devia¬ tions from the truth. For the punishments and rivers in Hades, and transmigrations into other bodies, are derived from Plato. The admission, likewise, of multitude in intelligibles, viz. of being and intellect ; and another demiurgus, and soul, is assumed from what is said in the Timaeus. For Plato there says, “ Intellect, therefore, perceiving ideas in that which is animal itself, understood by the discursive energy of reason, that the universe should contain as many as are there.” But they not understanding Plato, introduce an intellect at rest, containing all things in itself ; a second intellect besides this, contemplating what the first contains ; and a third intellect energizing dianoetically. Fre¬ quently, likewise, the fabricating soul is assumed by them for the reasoning intellect. And they fancy that this soul is the Demiurgus, according to Plato ; not knowing who the Demiurgus is. And, in short, they falsely ascribe to Plato the mode of fabrication which they introduce, and many other things, and pervert the opinions of the man ; as if they alone understood an intelligible nature, but he, and other blessed men were ignorant of it. Deno-

And, in short, they falsely ascribe to Plato the mode of fabrication which they introduce, and many other things, and pervert the opinions of the man ; as if they alone understood an intelligible nature, but he, and other blessed men were ignorant of it. Deno-

minating, likewise, the intelligible multitude, they fancy that they have accurately discovered its na¬ ture ; though at the same time, by the multitude which they introduce, they draw down the intelli¬ gible nature into a similitude with that which is sensible and subordinate. For it is necessary to consider intelligible multitude as subsisting accord¬ ing to the least possible number, and ascribing all things to that which is posterior to the first, not to investigate any other intelligibles ; that being all things, and the first intellect and essence, and such other beautiful essences as exist after the first na¬ ture. But we should admit that the form of soul ranks in the third place.

Moreover, we should investigate the diffe¬ rences of souls, in passions, or in nature, so as not in any respect to reprehend divine men, but should benevolently receive their assertions, as be¬ ing sanctioned by antiquity, adopting what has been well said by them, respecting the immortality of the soul, the intelligible world, and the first God ; as also, that it is necessary the soul should fly from an association with the body, and that a separa¬ tion from the body is a flight from generation to

real essence. For if they were clearly to assert these things, which are admitted by Plato, they would do well. No one , however , will envy their wishing to dissent from these dogmas ; nor their endeavours to establish their own opinions among their auditors , by d faming and insolently attack¬ ing the doctrines of the Greeks., But they ought to demonstrate that their own peculiar opinions, which are different from those of the Greeks, are right ; and should benevolently and philosophically adduce the opinions of the ancients. Justly, also, looking to truth when they oppose the ancients, they ought not to aim at renown by censuring those who from a remote period have been celebrated by no contemptible men, nor assert that they are bet¬ ter than them. For what the ancients have said concerning intelligibles, is much better, and more replete with learning than what they say ; and is easily known to be so by those who are not deceived by the fraud which at present invades mankind . Indeed, the additions which the Gnostics have made to what they received from the ancients, will be found to be by no means appropriate ; and hence in their oppositions to them, they introduce manifold generations and corruptions. They like- Plot. F

wise find fault with this universe, reprobate the communion of the soul with body, and blame the governor of the world. They also confound the demiurgus with soul, and ascribe the same passions to the soul of the world as to partial souls.

They like- Plot. F

That this world, therefore, never began, nor will ever cease to be, but will continue in exist¬ ence, as long as intelligibles have a subsistence, has been elsewhere shown by us. And that the com¬ munion of our soul with the body, is not better for the soul, has been asserted prior to them. But that the soul of the universe should receive any thing from ours, is just as if some one adducing the tribe of potters or braziers, in a well-governed city, should blame the whole city [on their account.] It is necessary, however, to be persuaded that the soul of the universe governs in a way very different from ours ; and not bound to body as our souls are. For besides ten thousand other differences which we have elsewhere enumerated, this also ought to be considered, that we are bound by the body, the bond being now in reality produced. For the na¬ ture of body being bound in the whole soul, binds together with itself whatever it may comprehend ;

but the soul of the universe is not bound by the things which it binds. For it has dominion over them. Hence it is not passively affected by them. We, however, are not the lords of these. But so much of the soul of the world as is raised to the divine nature which is above it, so much of it re¬ mains entire and simple, and without impediment ; and so much of it as imparts life to the body whth which it is connected, receives nothing from it. For, in short, that which is in something different from itself, necessarily receives the passive proper» ties of that in which it is. But this no longer im¬ parts any thing of itself to that which possesses its own proper life. Just as if one thing should be centrically inserted in another, and which is co¬ passive with that in which it is inserted ; but the latter being decayed, should permit the former to have its own life ; since, neither when the fire which is in you is extinct, is the wholeness of fire extinguished. Nor if the whole of fire should perish, this would not affect the soul of the universe, but the composition of the mundane body. And if in each of the remaining elements there should be a certain world, this would not affect the soul of the universe, since the composition of the world is

Nor if the whole of fire should perish, this would not affect the soul of the universe, but the composition of the mundane body. And if in each of the remaining elements there should be a certain world, this would not affect the soul of the universe, since the composition of the world is

different from that of each of the animals which it contains* For the soul of the world stands as it were over its body* and orders it to abide ; but here the elements secretly as it were withdrawing themselves, are bound in their proper order by a secondary bond. In the former case, however, they have no place into which they can fly. Hence, it is neither necessary to contain them internally, nor by external compression to impel them inwardly ; but each remains where nature from the first in¬ tended it should remain. And if any one of them is naturally moved, those things to which motion is not natural are affected by it. The bodies, how- ever? which are naturally moved, are moved in a beautiful manner, as being parts of the w hole ; but certain things are corrupted, in consequence of not being able to sustain the order of the whole. Just as if in a great dance, which is conducted in a be¬ coming manner, a tortoise being caught in the middle of the progression, should he trod upon, not being able to escape the order of the dance ; though if the tortoise had arranged itself with the dance, it would not have suffered from those that composed it.

To enquire, however, why the world was made, is the same thing as to ask why soul is ; and why the demiurgus made it ? For this indeed, in the first place, is the enquiry of those who suppose there is a beginning of perpetuity. In the next place, they fancy that the demiurgus became the cause of the fabrication of the world, through being changed from one thing to another. Hence, they are to be taught, if they are equitably disposed, what the nature of these things is, that they may cease to revile what is honourable, which they will easily do, if they become properly cautious respect¬ ing such like particulars. For no one can rightly blame the administration of the universe, since in the first place it demonstrates the magnitude of an intelligible nature. For if it proceeds into life in such a way, as not to have an indistinct and con¬ fused life, such as the smallest natures in it possess, which are perpetually generated night and day through the abundant life it contains ; but is con¬ tinued, clear and abundant, and is every where a liie exhibiting an inestimable wisdom., how is it possible not to assert that it is a perspicuous and beautiful statue of the intelligible Gods ? But if though it imitates the intelligible paradigm it is not

But if though it imitates the intelligible paradigm it is not

the same with it, this is conformable to nature ; since if it were the same with, it would no longer imitate it. The assertion, however, is false, that it imitates this paradigm in a dissimilar manner. For nothing is omitted, which a beautiful and natural image can possibly possess ; since it was indeed necessary that this imitation should exist, but yet that it should not be an imitation resulting- from the discursive energy of reason, and an artificial care. For it was not possible that the intelligible should be the last of things ; since it was necessary that the energy of it should be twofold, one indeed abid¬ ing in itself, but the other proceeding into something else. Hence it was necessary that there should be something posterior to it. For that alone which is the most powerless of all things, has nothing of it¬ self which proceeds downwards. But an admirable power flourishes in intelligibles, so that this power perpetually 1 fabricates.

If, however, there is another [sensible] world better than this, what is it ? But if it is neces-

x It appears from the version of Ficinus, that aei is, here wanting in the original. And indeed, the sense requires it should be inserted.

sary that this world should exist, and there is no other, it is this world which preserves the imitation of the intelligible universe. For the whole earth indeed, is full of various animals, and of immortal beings; and all things are replete with these, as far as to the heavens. And with respect to the stars, both those which are in the inferior spheres, and those which are in the highest orb, what reason can be assigned why they are not Gods, since they are moved in order, and revolve with such beauti- ful bodies P Why should they not possess virtue, or what can hinder them from obtaining it? For those things have no place there, which are the causes of evils here ; nor is that evil of body there, which here is disturbed and disturbs. What, likewise, prevents celestial natures from possessing intellec¬ tual energy, since they are always at leisure, and from receiving in their intellect divinity, and the other intelligible Gods ? But to assert that our wis¬ dom is more excellent than theirs, wall be said by no one who is not insane ; since if souls have de¬ scended hither, through being compelled by the soul of the world, how since they suffer compulsion are they better than that soul ? For in souls, that which has dominion is more excellent. And if

souls descended hither voluntarily, why do you blame this sensible region, into which you willingly came ? Especially since you may be liberated from it, if it is not agreeable to you to stay. If, how¬ ever, this universe is a place of such a kind, that it is possible to obtain wisdom in it, and while dwell¬ ing here to live according to a similitude of intelli- gibles, does not this testify that sensible are sus¬ pended from intelligible forms ?

If, how¬ ever, this universe is a place of such a kind, that it is possible to obtain wisdom in it, and while dwell¬ ing here to live according to a similitude of intelli- gibles, does not this testify that sensible are sus¬ pended from intelligible forms ?

IX. If, however, some one should blame wealth and poverty, and the inequality in the dispensation of every thing of this kind, in the first place, such a one is ignorant that the worthy man does not seek for equality in such like particulars ; nor is of opi¬ nion that those who possess many things, have more [of good ;] nor that rulers are better than private individuals, but suffers others to make such things as these the objects of their pursuit. He also knows that the present life is twofold, the one being that of worthy men, but the other that of the mul¬ titude. And that the life of worthy men tends to the summit, and that w hich is on high ; but that the life which is merely human is again tw’ofold, the one kind being mindful of virtue, and partici-

paling of a certain good, but the other pertaining to the vile rabble and to artificers, who administer to the necessities of more worthy men. But if one man slays another, or is vanquished by pleasure, through imbecility of mind, what is there wonder¬ ful in this, since the guilt is not in intellect, but in souls that are of a puerile nature? And if this should happen to be an exercise of the victors and the vanquished, how is it possible that this also should not subsist rightly ? But if you should be injured, what dreadful thing is there in this to an immortal nature ? And if you kill another [instead of being killed yourself,] you have what you wish. If, however, you still blame the administration of things, there is no necessity for you to continue any longer in life. But it is acknowledged that there are judicial decisions here, and punishments. How, therefore, is it right to blame a city for distri¬ buting to every one according to his desert, since virtue is honoured in it, and vice has its appropriate disgrace ? There are, likewise, in the world, not only statues of the Gods, but the Gods themselves, beholding from on high, who easily, as it is said, escape the accusations of men, since they conduct all things in order from the beginning to the end,

There are, likewise, in the world, not only statues of the Gods, but the Gods themselves, beholding from on high, who easily, as it is said, escape the accusations of men, since they conduct all things in order from the beginning to the end,

and distribute an appropriate allotment to every one, conformable to the mutations of lives, and to actions in a pre-existent state ; of which he who is ignorant, is of all men the most rash and rustic in divine concerns. It is requisite, however, that you should endeavour to become a most excellent cha¬ racter, and not think that you alone are able to become so ; for thus you will not yet be. most ex¬ cellent. But you ought to be persuaded that there are other transcendently good men, and also good daemons ; and much more Gods, who dwell in this world, and look to that which is intelligible ; and especially that there is that most blessed soul the leader and ruler of this universe. From hence also , it is proper that you should celebrate the in¬ telligible Gods ; and besides all these , the great king which is there , and should demonstrate that the magnitude of his nature especially consists in the multitude of Gods . For it is the province if those who know the power of God , not to contract this power into one , but to shoxv that the amplitude of divinity is as great as he himsef has demon¬ strated it to be ; since remaining that which he is , he has produced many Gods , all of whom are sus¬ pended from , and subsist through and by him .

This world , likewise , w through him ,

/ooA\9 ifo to divinity , # will , besides all other goods , genuinely exhibit simple and vene¬ rable manners , in conjunction with the possession of wisdom , and will not endeavour to become inso¬ lent and proud ; but will possess confidence accom¬ panied with reason , much security and caution , and great circumspection .*

There are four lines more in this section in the original ; hut the meaning of them is so very obscure, that I have not attempted to translate them.

108

XV. What these assertions, however, effect iri the souls of those that hear them, persuading them to despise the world , and the things that are in it, ought not by any means to be concealed from us. For there are two sects of philosophers with re¬ spect to the attainment of the end of life, one of which places the pleasure of the body as the end ; but the other chooses the beautiful and virtue, the desire of which is derived and suspended from God. The manner, however, in which this is ac¬ complished, must be elsewhere discussed. And Epicurus, indeed, taking away providence, exhorts us to pursue pleasure and delight, as the only things which then remain. But the doctrine of the Gnos¬ tics, as still more juvenile than this, blames the domination of providence, and providence itself, despises all human laws, and virtue which has ex¬ isted in every age, and considers temperance as ridiculous, in order that nothing beautiful and good may be seen to subsist among men. Together with temperance also it subverts justice which is con- nascent with it in manners, and which derives its perfection from reason and exercise ; and in short, it subverts every thing by which a man may become a worthy character. Hence, nothing else is left

109

for them to pursue but pleasure, and their own concerns and utility, and not that which is com¬ mon to other men ; unless some one among them happens to be superior to these assertions. For none of the abovementioned particulars are consi¬ dered as beautiful by them, but something else whatever it may be which they pursue ; though they ought to endeavour to correct those with whom they are well acquainted, applying themselves from a divine nature to human concerns. For it is the province of this nature which despises the pleasure of the body, to know what is beautiful and good. But those who are destitute of virtue, are not at all excited to supernal natures. This is testified by their never saying any thing about virtue, and by their entirely omitting the discussion of things per¬ taining to it. Nor do they say what virtue is , or how many virtues there are , or direct their atten¬ tion to the numerous and beautiful assertions which may be surveyed in the writings of the ancients , or to the means of acquiring and possessing virtue , and of cultivating and purify ing the soul For it is to no purpose to say , look to God , unless you also teach how we are to look to him. For what hinders , some one may say , but that a man may look to God

110

For what hinders , some one may say , but that a man may look to God

110

who does not abstain from any one pleasure , and who suffers his anger to be without any restraint ; such a one recollecting indeed the name of God , but being held in bondage by all the passions , and not at all endeavouring to expel them ? Virtue , there¬ fore, indeed proceeding to the end [i. e. to its per¬ fection ,] and being ingenerated in the soul in con¬ junction with wisdom , will present God to the view , But to speak of God without true virtue , is to utter nothing but a name .

XVI. Again , to despise the zvorld, and the Gods , and other beautiful natures that are con¬ tained in it, is not to become a good man. For every bad man will in the first place despise the Gods ; and no one is completely bad till he does despise them . Hence, if he is not bad in every thing else, from this very thing he will become so. For the honour which the Gnostics say is paid by them to the intelligible Gods, is utterly incongruous . For he who loves any thing, is delighted with every thing which is allied to the object of his love. For you also love the children of the father whom you love. But every soul is the daughter of the father of the universe. And the souls in the mundane

Ill

spheres, are intellectual, and good, and are united to intelligible essences much more than ours . For how could this world be separated from the intelli¬ gible world ; or the Gods in it, from the intelligi¬ ble Gods ? But these things have been discussed by us before. Now, however, we must say, that those who despise things allied to the intelligible Gods, have no knowledge of those Gods, except what is merely verbal. For how can it be pious to assert as they do, that providence does not extend to terrene affairs, and to every thing whatever it may be ? How also is this consonant to their own doctrine ? For they say that divinity providentially attends to them alone. Whether, therefore, did he pay attention to them while they were with super¬ nal natures, or does he also attend to them during their existence here P For if the former, how came they to descend ? But if the latter, how is it that they are still upon the earth ? How, likewise, does it happen that divinity is not present in the earth ? For whence does he know that they are here, and that being here and revolting from him, they have become evil ? But if he has a knowledge of souls that have not become evil, he will also know those that have, in order that he may be able to distin-

112

For whence does he know that they are here, and that being here and revolting from him, they have become evil ? But if he has a knowledge of souls that have not become evil, he will also know those that have, in order that he may be able to distin-

112

guish the former from the latter. He will, there¬ fore, be present to all things, and will be in this world, whatever the mode may be of his subsistence in it. So that the world will participate of him. But if he is absent from the world, he will also be absent from you ; and you will not have any thing to say either about him, or the natures posterior to him. But whether a certain providence proceeds from divinity to you, or whatever you may think fit to assert respecting it, the world certainly derives its subsistence from thence, and is not, nor ever will be, deserted by him. For the providence of divinity is in a much greater degree extended to wholes than to parts ; and the former of these par¬ ticipate of him more abundantly than the latter. And much more does he providentially attend to the soul of the world. This is evident from the existence of the world, and from the wisdom of the mode in which it exists. For xvho among those that are stupidly proud , is so orderly and wise as the universe? Indeed, to compare the one with the other is ridiculous, and is attended with great absurdity. Hence, when the comparison is made for any other purpose than that of argument, it is attended with impiety. Nor is it the province of

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a wise man to investigate things of this kind [as if he was dubious about them,] but of one who is men¬ tally blind , who is entirely destitute both of sense and intellect , and who being very remote from a knowledge of the intelligible world , does not look to the sensible universe. For what musician is there, who on perceiving the harmony in the intelligible world, is not moved when he hears the harmony arising from sensible sounds? Or who that is skilled in geometry and numbers, when he beholds through his eyes that which is commensurate, ana¬ logous and orderly, is not delighted with the view ? For those who view through the eyes the produc¬ tions of art, in pictures, do not behold them in the same way as they do the originals of which they are the resemblances. But the geometrician and arithmetician, knowing in the sensible object the imitation of that w hich subsists in intellection, they are as it were agitated, and brought to the recollec¬ tion of reality. And from this passion also, love is excited. He however, who sees beauty resplen¬ dent in the face, tends thither. But his mind must be dull and sluggish in the extreme, and incapable of being incited to any thing else, who on seeing all the beautiful objects in the sensible world, all this Plot . H

114

He however, who sees beauty resplen¬ dent in the face, tends thither. But his mind must be dull and sluggish in the extreme, and incapable of being incited to any thing else, who on seeing all the beautiful objects in the sensible world, all this Plot . H

114

symmetry and great arrangement of things, and the form apparent in the stars though so remote, is not from this view mentally agitated, and does not venerate them as admirable productions of still more admirable causes. For he who is not thus affected, will neither direct his attention to the one, nor have a knowledge of the other.

XVII. If also, they are induced to hate the nature of body, because they have heard that Plato greatly blames it as being an impediment to the soul, and says, that the whole of a corporeal nature is inferior to the soul, yet separating this by the discursive energy of reason, it is requisite to survey what remains, viz. the intelligible sphere, compre¬ hending in itself the form of the world, souls in an orderly series without bodies, imparting magnitude according to the intelligible, and producing it into interval ; so that the magnitude of that which is generated, may as much as possible be adequate to the im parti bility of the paradigm. For that which is there great in power, is here great in bulk. And whether they wish to understand this sphere as cir¬ cularly moved by a divine power, which contains the beginning, middle, and end of the whole sphere,

115

or whether they consider it as stable* and not yet governing any thing else* they will thus be led to form a proper conception of the soul which go» verns this universe. They ought likewise to con¬ nect body with this soul in such a manner that soul may not be at all passive, but may impart some¬ thing to the body, which it is able to receive, be¬ cause it is not lawful there should be envy in the Gods. They should likewise ascribe such a power to the soul of the world, as is able to render the nature of body which is not of itself beautiful, a participant of beauty as far as it is capable of being adorned ; which beauty also excites divine souls. Unless, indeed, the Gnostics should say that their souls are not excited by beauty, and that they do not in a different manner survey deformed and beautiful bodies. If, however, this be the case, neither are they differently affected by base and beautiful studies, nor by beautiful disciplines and the contraries to these. Hence neither do they perceive the transcendency of the contemplative energy, nor of God himself. For on account of first natures the above-mentioned particulars sub¬ sist. If, therefore, the latter are not beautiful, neither are the former. Hence, the latter are beau-

116

Hence neither do they perceive the transcendency of the contemplative energy, nor of God himself. For on account of first natures the above-mentioned particulars sub¬ sist. If, therefore, the latter are not beautiful, neither are the former. Hence, the latter are beau-

116

tiful after the former. When, however, they say that they despise the beauty which is here, they would do well to despise the beauty in boys and women, so as not to be vanquished by lust. But it is requisite to know that they ought not to boast, if they despise what is base, but if they despise what they before had acknowledged to be beautiful, and by which they were in a certain respect affect¬ ed. In the next place it must be observed, that there is not the same beauty in a part and the whole, in all individuals and the universe. And in the third place, that there is so great a beauty even in sensibles, and partial natures such as dasmons, as to cause us to admire the maker of these, and to believe that they are derived from him. Hence, when we are not detained by these lower beauties, but proceed from these without reviling them to supernal natures, we then proclaim that the beauty of the latter is immense. And if, indeed, we are inwardly as well as outwardly beautiful, we must say that the one accords with the other. But if we are internally bad, we ought then to acknowledge that we suffer a diminution in things of a more ex- cellent nature. Nothing, however, that is truly beautiful externally, is internally deformed. For

117

every thing which is externally beautiful, is so in consequence of the domination of inward beauty. But those who are said to be beautiful, and are at the same time internally deformed, have a false external beauty. And if some one should say that he has seen those who are outwardly truly beauti¬ ful, but are inwardly base, I am of opinion that he has not seen such persons, but has mistaken others for them ; or if he has seen them, their inward de¬ formity has been adventitious to them, they being naturally beautiful. For there are many impedi¬ ments here which prevent our arriving at the. end. But what is there to prevent the universe which is externally beautiful from being so internally ? Moreover, those to whom nature has not given per¬ fection from the beginning, are perhaps incapable of arriving at the end ; so that it is possible for them to become depraved. The universe, how¬ ever, was never once a child so as to be imperfect ; nor does it acquire any thing new 1 by proceeding, and which is added to its body. For whence could it acquire this ? Since it already possessed all things. Nor can any addition to the soul of it be devised*

1 τι vtov is omitted in the original..

118

But even if some one should grant the Gnostics that there can, yet nothing evil can be added to it-

For whence could it acquire this ? Since it already possessed all things. Nor can any addition to the soul of it be devised*

1 τι vtov is omitted in the original..

118

But even if some one should grant the Gnostics that there can, yet nothing evil can be added to it-

XVII I. Perhaps, however, they will say that they by their arguments cause those who believe in them, to fly far from, and hate the body, but that our doctrines detain the soul in body. But this is just as if two persons dwelling in the same house, one of them should blame the furniture and the builder of it, and yet nevertheless stay in it ; but the other should not blame either of these, but assert that the builder of it had constructed it in a most artificial manner, and should wait for the time as long as he dwells in it, in which he may be liberated, and may no longer be in want of a house. The former of these, however, is thought to be the wiser of the two, and more prepared to depart, because he knows that the house is composed of inanimate stones and wood, and is very far from being a true edifice, though he is ignorant of the great difference between bearing [properly,] and not bearing things of a necessary nature ; since he would not be indignant if he was moderately pleased with the beauty of the stones. It is

119

necessary, however, that those who have a body should remain in the habitations which are fabri¬ cated by a sister beneficent soul, and who possesses an abundant power of fabricating without labour. Indeed the Gnostics think fit to call the vilest men their brethren , but refuse thus to denominate the sun , and the other stars ; and with an insane mouth separate the soul of the world from an alli¬ ance with ours . While, therefore, we are bad, it is not indeed lawful to conjoin us with supernal natures ; but then only this can take place, when we become worthy, since we are not bodies, but souls resident in bodies, and capable of dwelling in them in such a manner, as to approximate very nearly to the mode in which the soul of the universe

inhabits the whole bodv of the world. This

«/

however, consists in being free from impulsion, in not yielding to externally-acceding pleasures, or visible objects, and in not being disturbed at any severe occurrence. The soul of the world, there¬ fore, is not impelled ; for there is not any tiling by which it can be. And we dwelling in this region of sense, may indeed by virtue repel the percus¬ sions of external objects, so as by magnitude and

120

The soul of the world, there¬ fore, is not impelled ; for there is not any tiling by which it can be. And we dwelling in this region of sense, may indeed by virtue repel the percus¬ sions of external objects, so as by magnitude and

120

strength of decision, to diminish some of the per» cussions, and prevent others from taking place. But when we proximately accede - to that which cannot be impelled, then we shall imitate the soul of the universe, and the soul of the stars, and be¬ coming near through similitude, we shall hasten to be one and the same with them. Then also those things which w?ere the objects of their vision from the first, will be ours, in consequence of being well prepared for this [felicitous event] both by nature and study The Gnostics, however, will not, by saying that they alone are able to survey [divine natures] behold more of them on this account ; nor because they assert that when they die they shall entirely lay aside the body, though this is not per¬ mitted to the souls that always adorn the heavens. For Ihey say this through ignorance of the meaning of being out of the body, and of the manner in which the whole soul of the universe pays attention to that which is inanimate. It is possible there¬ fore, not to be a lover of body, to become pure, to despise death, to have a knowledge of more excel¬ lent natures, and to make them the objects of pur- suit ; and also not to envy those who are able to

121

pursue them, and always do so, as if they did not. Nor should we be affected in the same manner as those who fancy that the stars do not move, be¬ cause sense announces to them that they stand still. For on this account also, the Gnostics fancy, that the nature of the stars does not survey the intelli- gibles that are as it were external to them, because they themselves do not see the soul of them exter¬ nally subsisting.

122

ON THE IMPASSIVITY OF

INCORPOREAL NATURES.

I. If we should say that the senses are not passions, but energies and judgments about the passions, the passions indeed subsisting about some» thing else, as for instance about a body affected in a certain manner, but judgment about the soul; judgment not being passion, for if it were, another judgment would again be necessary, and thus we should be obliged to proceed in an infinite ascent ; —if we should thus speak, it would nevertheless be here dubious, whether judgment itself has nothing in it of the subject of its decision, or whether if it has an impression of it, it is not passively affected. At the same time, however, let us speak about these impressions as they are called, and show that

123

At the same time, however, let us speak about these impressions as they are called, and show that

123

the mode of their subsistence is entirely different from what it is apprehended to be, and is such as that of intellections, which being energies are able to know without passivity. And in short, neither our reason, nor our will permits us to subject the soul to such conversions and changes in quality, as are the calefactions and refrigerations of bodies. With respect to what is called the passive part of the soul also, it is requisite to see and consider, whether we must admit this likewise to be immuta¬ ble, or grant that passivity belongs to this alone. This however, we shall discuss hereafter. But let us now direct our attention to the doubts pertain¬ ing to the former particulars. For it is dubious how that part of the soul, whatever it may be, is immutable, which is prior to the passive part, and to sense, since depravity is ingenerated in it, and false opinions and ignorance ; and besides these, familiarity and alleniation, when it is pleased and pained, is angry and envious, is emulous and desir¬ ous ; and in short, which is never quiescent, but is moved and changed by every incidental circum¬ stance. If, indeed, the soul is body and has mag¬ nitude, it is not easy, or rather is wholly impossible to show that it is impassive and immutable in any

one of the particulars, which are said to take place about it. But if it is an essence void of magnitude, and it is necessary that the incorruptible should be present with it, we should take care not to ascribe to it passions of this kind, lest we should also igno¬ rantly grant that it is corruptible. Whether, like¬ wise, the essence of it is number or reason, as we say it is, how can passion be ingenerated in number or reason ? But we ought rather to think that irra¬ tional reasons, and impassive passions are produced in it. And these being transferred to it from bo¬ dies, are each of them to be oppositely assumed, and according to analogy, so that the soul [after a manner] possessing these, does not [really] possess them, and being passive to them does not suffer. And it must be considered what the mode is of such like affections.

II. In the first place however, it is requisite to speak of virtue and vice, and to show what then takes place when vice is said to be present with the soul. For we say it is necessary to take away something, as if a certain evil was in the soul, and that virtue should be inserted in it, and it should be adorned and made beautiful, instead of being,

125

For we say it is necessary to take away something, as if a certain evil was in the soul, and that virtue should be inserted in it, and it should be adorned and made beautiful, instead of being,

125

as it was before, base and deformed. If therefore we should say that virtue is harmony, but vice dis¬ sonance, shall we adduce an opinion conformable to that of the ancients ? For this assertion will in no small degree promote the object of our investi¬ gation. For if, indeed, virtue consists in the parts of the soul being naturally concordant with each other, but vice, in their not being concordant, nothing adventitious or extraneous will take place ; but each part will proceed such as it is, into an appropriate order, and being such will not enter into dissonance, like dancers who in dancing do not accord with each other ; either one of them singing, when the rest do not sing, or each singing by him¬ self. For it is not only necessary that they should sing together, but that each should sing well with an appropriate music, as far as pertains to his own part of the performance ; so that then also in the soul there is harmony, when each part performs that which is adapted to it. It is requisite, howr~ ever, prior to the harmony, that there should be another virtue of each of the parts, and another vice of each prior to their dissonance with respect to each other. What is it therefore, from which being present, each part is evil ? Is it from vice

126

being present? And again* is each part good through the presence of virtue ? Perhaps, therefore, some one may say that ignorance in the reasoning power is the vice of it, this ignorance consisting in the negation of knowledge, and not in the presence of a certain thing. But when false opinions are inherent, which especially produce vice, how is it possible in this case that something should not be ingenerated, and that this part of the soul should not thus be changed in quality ? Is not also the irascible part affected in one way when it is timid, and in another when it is brave ? And is not the epithymetic 1 part likewise, affected differently when it is intemperate, and when it is temperate ? Or may we not say, that when each part possessing virtue, energizes according to the essence by which it is characterized, we then say it is obedient to reason ? And the reasoning part, indeed, is obedient to intellect, but the other parts to reason. Or shall we say that to be obedient to reason is as it were to see, that which is obedient not being figured,

1 i. e. The part characterized by desire ; the whole soul receiving a triple division, into reason, anger, and desire, which last is a tendency to the possession and enjoyment of external good.

127

but seeing, and being in energy when it sees ; just as sight both when it is in capacity, and when in energy, is the same in essence ; but energy is not a change in quality, but at once applies itself to that

to which it is essentially adapted, and perceives

127

to which it is essentially adapted, and perceives

and knows without passivity. The reasoning power also thus subsists with reference to intellect, and thus sees. And the power of intellection is this, not becoming internally, the impressions as it were of a seal, but it possesses, and again does not pos¬ sess that which it sees. It possesses the spectacle

indeed, in consequence of knowing it ; but does

not possess it, because nothing is impressed in it from the object of vision, like the figure in the wax. It is, however, necessary to recollect, that memory is not a certain repository of impressions , but a power of the soul exciting itself in such a way as to possess that which it had not .

What then, was it not one thing before it thus recollected, and another afterwards when it now recollects ? [It was] if you are willing to call it another, and not to say that it is changed in qua- %; unless some one should assert that a progres¬ sion from power to energy is a mutation in quality. Nothing however is here added, but that is effected

128

which there was a natural aptitude to effect. For in short, the energies of immaterial natures are not themselves in energizing changed in quality, or they would perish, but they much rather energize by remaining permanent. But to energize with passi¬ vity is the province of things which are connected in their energies with matter. If however that which is immaterial is passively affected, it will not be able any where to abide, as in the sight, vision energizing, it is the eye which suffers [and not the energy of seeing.] And opinions are as it were visions. But how7 is the irascible part timid ? And how also does it possess fortitude ? Shall we sav it is timid indeed, either because it does not look to reason, or because it looks to depraved rea¬ son ; or that it is so through a defect of instru¬ ments, such as the want or the weakness of corpo¬ real arms, in consequence of which it is either pre¬ vented from energizing, or is not moved so as to be as it were incited ? But it possesses fortitude, if the contrary takes place ; in neither of w hich cases, there is not any change of quality, or passion. Again, that part of the soul w hich desires, when it energizes alone, produces what is called intem¬ perance. For [sometimes] it performs all things

129

But it possesses fortitude, if the contrary takes place ; in neither of w hich cases, there is not any change of quality, or passion. Again, that part of the soul w hich desires, when it energizes alone, produces what is called intem¬ perance. For [sometimes] it performs all things

129

alone, other things not being present, whose pro¬ vince it is in their turn to have dominion, and to point out to this part [what it ought to do.] In the mean time the power whose province it is to see, performs something else, and not all things ; but is elsewhere at leisure, in consequence of seeing as much as possible other things. Perhaps, too, what is called the vice of this part, consists very much in a bad habit of the body ; but the virtue of it is a contrary habit; so that no addition is in either case made to the soul.

. X . - φ

III. But how is it that familiarities and aliena¬ tions, pains, anger, and pleasures, desires and fears, are not mutations and passions inherent and ex¬ citing? It is necessary, therefore, thus to distin¬ guish concerning these. For not to acknowledge that changes in quality are ingenerated in us, and also vehement sensations of these, is the province of one who denies things that are evident. It is requisite, therefore, admitting the subsistence of these, that we should investigate what that is which is changed. For by asserting that these things take place about the soul, we are in danger of falling into the same absurdity as if we should admit that Plot . I

130

the soul is red, or becomes pale, not considering that these passions are produced indeed on account of the soul, but subsist about another composition [than that of the soul.] And shame, indeed, in the Soul, arises from an opinion of baseness ; the body, (that we may not err in our conceptions) being as it were contained in the soul, and not being the same with that which is inanimate. The animated body, therefore, when it is moved with facility, un¬ dergoes a change in the blood, from the shame which subsists in the soul. And with respect to what is called fear, the principle of it, indeed, is in the soul; but the paleness produced by it, arises from the blood retreating in vrardly. In pleasure, also, the sensible diffusion of it subsists about the body ; but that which takes place about the soul is no longer passion. The like also must be asserted with respect to pain. For the principle of desire latently subsisting in the soul, that wdiich proceeds from thence is recognized by sense. For w hen we say that the soul is moved in desires, in reasonings, and in opinions, we do not say that it produces these in consequence of being agitated, but that motions are generated from it ; since also, when we assert that life is motion, we do not conceive

131

For w hen we say that the soul is moved in desires, in reasonings, and in opinions, we do not say that it produces these in consequence of being agitated, but that motions are generated from it ; since also, when we assert that life is motion, we do not conceive

131

that it is a change of quality. But the natural energy of each part of the soul, is life not departing from itself. In short, it will be sufficient if we do not admit that energies, lives, and appetites, are mutations in quality ; that recollections are not types impressed in the soul ; and that imaginations are not configurations described as it were in wax. For every where, in all passions and motions, the soul must be acknowledged to subsist with invaria¬ ble sameness in its subject and essence ; and that virtue and vice are not produced in it after the same manner as black and white, or heat and cold about the body. But it must be admitted that The soul subsists with reference to both these, and in short, about all contraries, according to the above mentioned mode.

IV. Let us, however, direct our attention to what is called the passive part of the soul ; though we have already after a manner spoken concerning this, when we discussed all the passions which are produced about the irascible and epithymetic part, and showed how each of them subsists. Never¬ theless, it is requisite to discuss it more amply ; in the first place assuming what that which is passive

in the soul is said to be. It is said, therefore, to be that about which the passions appear to subsist. But these are things to which pleasure and pain are consequent. Of the passions, however, some ori¬ ginate from opinions, as when some one being of opinion that he shall die, is terrified, or fancying that he shall obtain some good is delighted ; the opinion indeed, being in one thing, but the exciting passion in another. But other passions are such as, existing involuntarily, produce opinion in that which is naturally adapted to opine. And we have already observed that opinion permits the nature which opines to remain immoveable. Un¬ expected fear, however, when it accedes, will be found to originate from opinion, affording as it were a certain perception to the part of the soul which is said to be afraid. For what does this being afraid effect ? Perturbation it is said, and astonish¬ ment from the expectation of evil. It is evident, however, that the phantasy is in the soul, both the first 1 which we call opinion, and the second which

1 The phantasy or imagination is the highest of the gnostic irrational powers of the soul. But this in its summit is united to opinion , or that gnostic rational power which knows that a thing is, but docs not know xvhy it is ; and in its other extre-

133

But this in its summit is united to opinion , or that gnostic rational power which knows that a thing is, but docs not know xvhy it is ; and in its other extre-

133

is derived from the first, and is no longer opinion {truly so called,] but is conversant with that which is beneath, being as it were obscure opinion, and an unadvised and rash imagination, such as the energy which is said to be inherent in nature, according to which it produces every thing without phantasy. But a sensible perturbation from these is produced about the body ; viz. a trembling and concussion, paleness, and an inability of speaking. For these effects are not in the psychical part ; since if they were, we should not say that they are corporeal. For if they pertained to the soul, that power of it whose province it is to transmit these, w^ould no longer perform its office, in consequence of being detained by passions, and departing from itself. This passive part, therefore, of the soul, is not in¬ deed body, but a certain form. Nevertheless, it is in matter, as are also the epithymetic, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers, the three latter of which are the root and principle of the epithymetic and passive form. It is requisite, how-

mity it is conjoined with sense. So far, therefore, as it is united to opinion, it may be said to be the same with it. See my Introduction to, and translation of Aristotle’s treatise On the Soul.

134

ever, that no perturbation, or in short passion

v' ·'· t .

171

making matter so great as it appears to be. Hence the magnitude which is here is the phantasm of it which is apparent. Matter, however, being com» pelled to concur with this attraction, at once im¬ parts itself wholly and every where ; for it is the matter of the universe, and not some particular matter. But that which is not of itself some par» ticular thing, may on account of something else be¬ come contrary to what it was, and having become contrary, no longer is [what it was] ; since if it were, it w ould cease to be changed.

XVIII. If some one, therefore, possessing an intellectual conception of magnitude, should have this conception attended with a power not only of subsisting in itself, but also of proceeding as it were externally, and the powder should receive a nature not existing in the intellectual perceiver, nor having a certain form, nor a certain vestige of magnitude or of any other form, what would he produce through this power ? Not a horse, or an ox. For other powers would produce these. Or shall we say, that since this power proceeds from a great father, nothing else [besides matter] is able to re¬ ceive this magnitude, and that its possession of it

172

Not a horse, or an ox. For other powers would produce these. Or shall we say, that since this power proceeds from a great father, nothing else [besides matter] is able to re¬ ceive this magnitude, and that its possession of it

172

will only be imaginary, and not real. Hence, to that which does not so obtain magnitude, as to be in its own nature the great itself, it remains for it to be apparently only as much as possible great. But this is not to be deficient, and not to proceed to many things in many places ; but to possess in itself kindred parts, and not to leave any thing des¬ titute of itself. For it is not possible that in a small bulk, there should still be an equal image of magnitude, since it is an image of greatness ; but so far as it aspires through its hope, it accedes as far as it is possible for it to accede, and running in conjunction with that which is not able to leave it, it causes that to be great w hich is not great, yet not so as to appear to he the magnitude which is seen in bulk. At the same time, however, matter pre¬ serves its own nature, using this magnitude as a vestment, through which it ran together with it, when magnitude running became its leader. But if at any time it should divest itself of magnitude, it would again remain the same as it w as before in itself ; or would be as great as form when present caused it to be. And soul, indeed, possessing the forms of beings, since she is also herself a form, contains all things at once. Since, likewise, each

173

form is at once wholly contained in her, hence per¬ ceiving the forms of sensibles as it were converted

and acceding to her, she cannot endure to receive them with multitude, but sees them divested of bulk. For she cannot become any thing else than what she is.

Matter, however, having nothing repercussive ; for it has no energy ; but being a shadow, stays to suffer whatever the producing cause may effect in it. That also which proceeds from the reason that is in soul, has now a vestige of the thing which is about to be effected ; just as in the iconic nature of the phantasy, reason which is moved, or the motion from reason, is a division into parts ; since if it was one and the same, it would not be moved, but be permanent. Matter, however, is not able to intro¬ duce at once all things into itself, for if it were able, it would be some one of all things. But since it is necessary that it should receive all things, yet not impartibly, it is requisite that existing as the place of all things, it should proceed to all things, meet with them, and be sufficient for every interval, because it is not itself comprehended by interval, but is exposed to the reception of it. How does it happen, therefore, that one thing entering into

174

How does it happen, therefore, that one thing entering into

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matter, does not impede other things ? It is because all things cannot enter together at the same time ; for if they could, there would not be any thing which is first. But if there is, it is the form of the universe ; so that all things are indeed simulta¬ neous, but each has a partial existence. For the matter of the animal nature is distributed in con¬ junction with the division of the animal into parts. For if this were not the case, nothing would have been produced besides reason.

XIX. The things, therefore, which enter into matter as a mother, neither injure it, nor benefit it. For the impulses of these do not pertain to matter, but to each other, because the powers of these also pertain to contraries, but not to subjects, unless the subjects are considered in conjunction with the im¬ pulses. For heat destroys cold, and the black the white; or if they are mingled together, another quality is produced from the mixture. Hence, things which are mingled suffer ; but with them, to suffer, is not to be that which they were before. In animated natures, also, the passions indeed, are about the bodies, the change in quality taking place according to the inherent qualities and powers.

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But when their state of existence is dissolved, or congregated, or transposed preternatu rally, then, the passions indeed are in the bodies, but know¬ ledge is in the souls that perceive the more vehe¬ ment passions. If, however, they do not perceive them, they have no knowledge of them, but matter still remains. For matter suffers nothing, when cold departs, and heat accedes ; since neither of these is either friendly or foreign to it. Hence, the appellations of a receptacle and nurse are more appropriate to it [than any other names.] But *vhy is it called a mother ? For it does not generate. Those, however, appear to have denominated it a mother, who think that a mother has the relation of matter towards her offspring, as alone receiving, but imparting nothing to the things begotten ; since whatever of body there is in the offspring, is de¬ rived from the nutriment. But if the mother im¬ parts any thing to her progeny, it is not so far as she has the relation of matter, but because she is also form. For form alone is prolific, but the other nature is barren. Whence , also , I think the ancient wise men obscurely signifying this in their mysteries , represent the ancient Hermes always possessing the organ of generation erects thus

176

For form alone is prolific, but the other nature is barren. Whence , also , I think the ancient wise men obscurely signifying this in their mysteries , represent the ancient Hermes always possessing the organ of generation erects thus

176

manifesting that it is intelligible reason which generates in the sensible universe . But they in - dicated the unproliflc nature of matter which al¬ ways remains the same , by the barren substances which were placed about it . For they introduce the mother of all things, which they thus proclaim, receiving the principle according to the subject, and they give her this appellation in order to render their meaning manifest, wishing to indicate to those who are desirous of more accurately compre¬ hending the nature of matter, and who do not in- vestigate it superficially, that it is not entirely similar to a mother. By this, indeed, they demon¬ strate remotely, but at the same time as much as they are able, that matter is unprolific, and not perfectly feminine ; but that it is of a female nature so far as it receives, but not so far as pertains to a generative power. For that which has proceeded into matter, is neither feminine, nor able to gene¬ rate, but is separated from all generative power, which is alone inherent in that which continues to be of a masculine nature.

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Ο Ν ETERNITY AND TIME

I. With respect to eternity and time, we say that each of these is different from the other, and that one of them indeed is conversant with a per¬ petual nature, but the other about that which is generated. We also think that we have a certain clear perception of these in our souls spontaneously, and, as it were, from the more collected projections of intellectual conception ; always and every where calling these by the same appellations. When, however, we endeavour to accede to the inspection of these, and to approach as it were nearer to them, again we are involved in doubt, admitting some of the decisions of the ancients about these, and re¬ jecting others, and perhaps receiving differently the same decisions. Resting also in these, and think- Plot. * M

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Resting also in these, and think- Plot. * M

178

mg it sufficient if when interrogated we are able to relate the opinion of the ancients concerning time and eternity, we are liberated from any farther investigation about them. It is necessary, there¬ fore, to think that some of the ancient and blessed philosophers have discovered the truth ; but it is fit to consider who those are that have obtained it, and after what manner we also may acquire the same knowledge on these subjects. In the first place, however, it is requisite to investigate what those conceive eternity to be, who admit that it is different from time. For that which is established as the paradigm being known, that also which is the image of it, and which they say is time, will per¬ haps become manifest* But if some one, prior to the survey of eternity, should imagine what time is, it will happen to him, proceeding from hence thither by reminiscence, that he will behold the nature to which time is assimilated, if the latter has a simili¬ tude to the former.

II. What, therefore, is it requisite we should assert eternity to be ? Shall w?e say it is the intelli¬ gible essence itself, just as if some one should say that time is the whole heaven and the world ? For

179

some are said to have had this opinion concerning time. For since we imagine and conceive eternity to be something most venerable, and an intelligible nature is also most venerable, we are unable to say which is the more venerable of the two ; and since also, that which is beyond these is not to be predi¬ cated in the same way, some one may he induced to consider eternity and an intelligible essence as the same. For again, both the intelligible world and eternity comprehend in themselves the same things. When, however, we say that the one is in the other, we place intelligibles in eternity ; and when we predicate the eternal of intelligibles, as when Plato in the Timaeus says, “ if the nature of the paradigm is eternal,” we then assert that the eternal is different from the intelligible. Never¬ theless, we say that it either exists about, or in, or is present with an intelligible essence. That each of them, however, is venerable, does not manifest a sameness of nature ; for perhaps the venerableness of the one is derived from the other. With respect to comprehension also, that of the intelligible is as of parts, but eternity comprehends the whole at once not as a part, but because all such things as are eternal subsist according to it. Shall we, there-

180

With respect to comprehension also, that of the intelligible is as of parts, but eternity comprehends the whole at once not as a part, but because all such things as are eternal subsist according to it. Shall we, there-

180

fore, say that eternity exists according to the per¬ manency which is in intelligibles ; just as here, time is said to exist according to motion ? It may, however, be very properly investigated, whether eternity is the same with permanency, or whether it is not simply the same, but is the same with the permanency which is about essence. For if it is the same with permanency [simply considered] in the first place, we cannot say that permanency is eternal, as neither do we say that eternity is eternal. For the eternal is that which participates of eter¬ nity. And in the next place, how is motion eter¬ nal ? For thus it will be stable. Farther still, how does the conception of permanency contain in itself ihe ever ? I do not mean the ever which is in time, but such as we intellectually perceive when we speak of the eternal. But if it contains the ever in the stability of essence, again, we shall separate the other genera of being from eternity. Besides, it is not only necessary to conceive eternity as sub¬ sisting in permanency, but also as subsisting in one. And in the next place, we must admit that eternity is without interval, in order that it may not be the same with time. Permanency, however, so far as it is permanency, neither contains in itself the con-

181

ception of unity, nor of that which is without inter- val. But we predicate of eternity that it abides in one. Hence, it will participate of permanency, but will not be permanency itself.

III. What, therefore, will that be according to which we say, the whole world which is there is eternal and perpetual ? And what is perpetuity ? Whether it is the same with eternity, or eternity subsists according to perpetuity. Shall we say, therefore, that it is necessary to conceive of eternity as one certain thing, but a certain intelligence or nature collected together from many things, whe¬ ther it be something consequent to the natures in the intelligible world, or existing together with, or perceived in them, but which is able to effect and is many things. Indeed, he who surveys an abundant power collected into one, according to this parti¬ cular thing which is as it were a subject, he deno¬ minates it essence ; afterwards, so far as he be¬ holds life in it, he denominates it motion ; and in the next place, he calls it permanency, so far as it entirely possesses an invariable sameness of sub¬ sistence. And he denominates it different and the same, so far as all these are at once one. Thus,

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And he denominates it different and the same, so far as all these are at once one. Thus,

182

therefore, composing these, so as to be at once one life alone, contracting in them difference, and be¬ holding an unceasing sameness of ener gy, and which never passes from one intelligence or life to ano¬ ther, but always possesses the invariable, and is without interval ; — beholding all these, he will be¬ hold eternity. For he will perceive life abiding in sameness, and always possessing every thing pre¬ sent, and not at one time this, and afterwards ano¬ ther thing, but containing all things at once, and not now some things, and again others. For it is an impartible end ; just as in a point where all things subsist at once, and have not }ret proceeded into a [linear] flux. It likewise abides in the same, i. e. in itself, and does not suffer any change. But it is always in the present, because nothing of it is past, nor again will be in future, but this very thing which it is, it always is. Hence, eternity is not a subject, but that which as it were shines forth from a subject, according to sameness itself, which it announces not concerning the future, but that which is now present, indicating that it subsists in this manner, and in no other. For what can after¬ wards happen to this, which it now is not? Nor again, will it be in futurity what it is not at present.

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For there is not any thing from which it can arrive at the present time. For it is not another thing, hut this. Nor will it be this in future, which it does not now possess from necessity ; nor does it possess about itself that which was. For what is there which was present with it and is past? Nor does that which will be, belong to it. For what is there which will happen to it? It remains, there¬ fore, that in to be , it is that which it is. Hence, that which neither was, nor will be, but alone is, stably possessing its being, in consequence of not changing into will be, nor having been changed from the past, is eternity. The life, therefore, which is about being, and which in existence or to be , is at once total and full, and every where without interval, is the eternity which we investi-

7 *j

gate.

IV. Nor must we think that this [eternity] happens externally to that nature, [viz. to being itself,] but that it is in it, and from it, and subsists together with it. For it is seen to be profoundly inherent in it. For perceiving all such other things as we say are there, to be inherent, we assert that all of them are from, and subsist together with

184

to being itself,] but that it is in it, and from it, and subsists together with it. For it is seen to be profoundly inherent in it. For perceiving all such other things as we say are there, to be inherent, we assert that all of them are from, and subsist together with

184

essence. For it is necessary that things which have a primary subsistence, should exist together with first essences, and should be contained in them ; since the beautiful also is in and from them, and truth also is inherent in them. And in a cer¬ tain degree, indeed, the whole itself is as it were in a part, and the things which are there are as parts in a whole, as if in reality this were an all not col¬ lected from parts, but itself generating parts, in order that through this it may be truly all. The truth also which is there, is not a concord with something else that is intelligible, but of each thing itself of which it is the truth. It is necessary, therefore, that the whole of this which is true, if it is truly all, should not only be every thing so far as it is all things, but likewise that the all should sub¬ sist in such a way, as not to be in any thing defi¬ cient. But if this be the case, nothing will accede to it. For if something will be added to it, it was prior to the accession of this deficient. Hence, prior to this it was not every thing. But what can happen to it preternaturally ? For it suffers nothing. If, therefore, nothing can accede to it, it neither is about to be, nor will be, nor was. If, indeed, you take away from generated natures, the it will be ,

185

since they subsist in perpetual acquisition, non- existence is immediately present with them. But to things which are not such as these, if you add the it will he , a departure from the seat of exist¬ ence is the consequence of such an addition. For it is evident that existence is not connascent with them, if they are in any respect indebted to futurity for their subsistence. For in generated natures, indeed, essence is seen to be an extension from the beginning of generation, to the extremity of the time in which they no longer exist. This it is, therefore, for them to be ; and if any one should deprive them of this extension of being, their life would be diminished. So that it is necessary that the existence of the universe also, should be an ex¬ tension of this kind. Hence, it hastens to be in futurity, and is not willing to stop, since it attracts existence to itself, in performing another and ano¬ ther thing, and is moved in a circle through a cer¬ tain desire of essence. So that we have found what existence is in such natures as these, and also what the cause is of a motion which thus hastens to be perpetually in the future periods of time. In first and blessed natures, however, there is not any desire of the future ; for they are now the whole,

186

So that we have found what existence is in such natures as these, and also what the cause is of a motion which thus hastens to be perpetually in the future periods of time. In first and blessed natures, however, there is not any desire of the future ; for they are now the whole,

186

and whatever of life they ought to possess, they wholly possess, so that they do not seek after any thing, because there is not any thing which can be added to them in futurity. Hence, neither does that happen to them in which there is the future. The all-perfect and total essence therefore of being, is not only total in its parts, but is not in any thing deficient, and is that to which nothing pertaining to non-being can happen ; for it is not only necessary that all beings should be present with the all , and the whole , but likewise that nothing should be added to it of that which sometimes is not. Hence this disposition and nature of the all -perfect essence of being, will be eternity. For eternity is denomi¬ nated from that which always is.

V. He, however, will know that eternity T thus

subsists, who by the projecting * energies of intel¬ lect is able to speak concerning it : or rather, he who sees it to be a thing of such a kind, that

s Instead of nvt here, it appears to me to be necessary to read τω αιωνι.

* The visive energies of intellect are thus denominated, be¬ cause such an energy is an immediate darting forth as it were to the object of its intuition.

187

nothing in short has ever been generated about it ; for otherwise it would not be perpetual being, or would not always be a certain total being. Is it therefore now perpetual ? It is not, unless a nature of such a kind is inherent in it, as to procure credi¬ bility concerning it, that it thus subsists, and no longer in any other way. So that if again you survey it by the projecting energies of intellect, you will find that it is such a thing as this. What then, if some one should never depart from the contemplation of it, but should incessantly perse¬ vere in admiring its nature, and should be able to

do this through the possession of an unwearied

nature, such a one perhaps running to eternity, would there stop, and never decline from it, in order that he might become similar to it, and eter¬ nal, surveying eternity and the eternal by that which is eternal in himself. If, therefore, that which thus subsists is eternal, and always being, which does not decline in any respect to another nature, but the life which it possesses is now all, neither having received, nor receiving, nor being about to receive any thing in future ; — that which thus subsists, will indeed be perpetual. And per-

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And per-

188

petuity is such a collocation as this of a subject, subsisting from it, and being inherent in it. But eternity is the subject in conjunction with a collo¬ cation of this kind presenting itself to the view. Hence eternity is venerable, and as our intellectual conception of it says, is the same with deity. But it says that it is the same with that God [whom we call by the appellation of being and life.] And eternity may be properly denominated a God un¬ folding himself into light, and shining forth, such as he essentially is, viz. as immutable and the same, and thus firmly established in life. It ought not, however, to be considered as wonderful, if we say that it consists of many things. For every thing in the intelligible world is many, on account of the infinite power which it possesses ; since the infinite receives its appellation from a never-failing essence. And this properly, because nothing pertaining to it is consumed. Hence, if some one should thus denominate eternity, calling it life which is now infinite, because it is all, and nothing of which is consumed, because nothing pertaining to it is either past or future, since otherwise it would not be all things at once ; — if some one should thus denomi-

J89

nate it, he will be near to the true definition 1 of it. For what is afterwards added, viz. that it is all things at once, and that nothing of it is consumed, will be an exposition of the assertion, that it is now infinite life.

VI. Because, however, such a nature as this, thus all-beautiful and perpetual, subsists about the one , proceeding from and with it, and in no respect departing from it, but always abides about and in the one , and lives according to it, hence I think it is beautifully and with a profundity of decision, said by Plato, that “ eternity abides in one,” 1 that he might not only lead it to the one which is in itself, but that he might also in a similar manner lead the life of being about the one . This, there¬ fore, is that which we investigate, and that which thus abides is eternity. For this very thing, and

1 This definition of eternity is justly admired by Proclus in his 3d book On the Theology of Plato, of which see my trans¬ lation. Boetius, likewise, as I have elsewhere observed, has adopted this definition in lib. 5. De Consol. Philosoph.

* Plato, however, does not by the one in this place, mean the ineffable principle of things, but the one of being, or the summit of the intelligible order, as is shown by Proclus in the above mentioned work.

190

5. De Consol. Philosoph.

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which thus abides, which is the energy of a life abiding from itself, subsisting with and in the one , and which neither in existing nor living is false and fictitious, will certainly be eternity. For to be truly, is never not to be, nor to be otherwise. But the former of these is to be invariably the same ; and the latter is to be without diversity. Hence it has not in any respect, another and another. You must not, therefore, conceive it to have interval, nor evolve, nor extend it. Neither, therefore, must you admit that there is any thing of prior and pos¬ terior in it. Hence, if there is neither prior nor posterior about it, but the is, is the truest of all the things about it, and is itself, and this in such a way as to be essence and life ; — if this be the case, again that which we call eternity will present itself to our view. But when we say that it is always, and that it is not at one time being, and at another time non-being, it is requisite to think that we thus speak for the sake of perspicuity ; since the term always, is perhaps not properly employed, but is assumed for the purpose of manifesting its incor¬ ruptible 1 nature. And farther still, it signifies that

1 After του άφθαρτου in the Greek, the words πλανώ αν την φυχψ', ets εκβασιν τον πλειονοε follow, which are to me uiiiiif

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it never fails. Perhaps, however, it would be better to call it only being. But though being is a name sufficient to essence, yet since some are of opinion that generation also is, essence, it is requi¬ site for the sake of discipline to add the term al¬ ways. For one thing is not being, but another perpetual being ; as neither is a philosopher one thing, but a true philosopher another. Because, however, some persons are only philosophers in appearance, the addition of a true philosopher be¬ came necessary. Thus, likewise, the always was added to being, and being to the always . So that it was called axon ; on which account the always was assumed, in order that the conjunction of being with the always , might indicate that which is truly being. The always , likewise, must be contracted into a power devoid of interval, and which besides what it now possesses, is not in want of any thing. But it possesses every thing. Hence it is every thing and being, and is not indigent of any thing.

telligible. Something, I conceive, is omitted ; but ί am not able to conjecture what the omission is. The version of these words by Ficinus is certainly nonsense ; for it is, " animum potest reddere vagabundum per quendam in plura exitum et proven! um.”

19%

Nor is a nature of this kind, full indeed in one re¬ spect, but deficient in another. For that which exists in time, though it may seem to be as perfect as is sufficient to body, yet it is perfect through soul, and is in want of something future, because it is deficient in time of which it is indigent ; so that it exists together with time, if it is present with it, and being imperfect, runs in conjunction with it. On this account, therefore, it is equivocally said to be a perfect being. That, however, which is a thing; of such a kind, as neither to be in want of futurity, nor to be measured by some other time, nor to be in futurity infinite, and this infinitely, but now possesses that which it ought to be ; — -this

is that after which our intellectual conception

» »

aspires ; the being of which is not derived from a certain quantity of extension, but is prior to all quantity. For it is fit, since it is not of a definite quantity, that it should not at all come into contact with quantity, lest the life of it being divided, should lose its pure impartibiiity ; but that it should be both in life and essence impartible. When, however, it is said in the Timasus that the demiurgus was good, this must be referred to the conception of the universe, signifying that what is

193

beyond the universe, does not originate from a cer¬ tain time ; so that neither is the world allotted a certain temporal beginning, since the cause of its existence is the source of priority. At the same time, however, Plato thus speaking for the sake of perspicuity, blames afterwards this expression was goody as not altogether rightly employed in things which are allotted what is called and is intellec¬ tually conceived to be, an eternal subsistence^

VII. Do we, therefore, bear witness to the things of which we now speak, as to things foreign from our nature ? But how is this possible ? For how can intellectual perception be effected, except by contact ? And how can we come into contact with things that are foreign to us ? It is necessary, therefore, that we also should participate of eter¬ nity. Since, however, we exist in time, how is this possible ? But we shall know what it is to be in time, and what it is to be in eternity, when we have discovered what time is. We must, therefore, descend from eternity to time, and the investigation of time. For there, indeed, the progression was to that which is above, but we must now speak de¬ scending, yet not profoundly, but our descent must

Plot . N

194

We must, therefore, descend from eternity to time, and the investigation of time. For there, indeed, the progression was to that which is above, but we must now speak de¬ scending, yet not profoundly, but our descent must

Plot . N

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be such as that of time· If, indeed, nothing had been said concerning time by ancient and blessed men, it would be necessary that connecting from the beginning what follows with eternity, we should endeavour to speak what appears to us to be the truth on this subject, and to adapt our opinion to the conception of it which we possess. Now, however, it is necessary first to assume those asser¬ tions which especially deserve attention, and to consider if what we say is concordant with some one of them. But perhaps the assertions concern- ing time, ought in the first place to receive a three¬ fold division. For time may be said to be either motion, or that which is moved, or something per¬ taining to motion. For to say that it is either permanency, or that which is stable, or something pertaining to permanency, will be perfectly remote from the conception of time, since it is in no re¬ spect the same, [and therefore, can never accord with that which is stable.] Of those, however, who sav that time is motion, some indeed assert that it is every motion ; but others, that it is the motion of the universe. But those who say it is that which is moved, assert it to be the sphere of the universe. And of those who say it is some-

195

thing pertaining to motion, or the interval of mo¬ tion ; some assert that it is the measure of motion, but others that it is an attendant on it, and either on every motion, or on that which is arranged/

VIII. It is not, indeed, possible, that time should be motion, neither if all motions are assumed, and one as it were is produced from all of them, nor if that motion is assumed which is orderly. For each of these motions is in time. If, however, some one should say that motion is not in time, much less will motion be time ; since that in which mo¬ tion is, is one thing, and motion itself another a

1 Archytas the Pythagorean defined time to be the universal interval of the nature of the universe, in consequence of sur» veying the continuity in the productive principles of that na¬ ture, and their departure into division. Others still more ancient defined time to be, as the name manifests, a certain dance of intellect ; but others defined it to be the periods of soul ; others, the natural receptacle of these periods ; and others, orderly circulations ; all which (says Iamblichus, from whom this information is derived) the Pythagoric sect com¬ prehends. Both Archytas also and Aristotle appear to have admitted time to be a continued and indivisible fux of nows . See a treasure of the conceptions of the ancients on this sub¬ ject, in the Additional Notes to my translation of Aristotle’s Physics.

For a\y ov here, it is necessary to read άλλον.

196

Both Archytas also and Aristotle appear to have admitted time to be a continued and indivisible fux of nows . See a treasure of the conceptions of the ancients on this sub¬ ject, in the Additional Notes to my translation of Aristotle’s Physics.

For a\y ov here, it is necessary to read άλλον.

196

thing. Since, however, there are besides these other assertions, it may be sufficient to observe, that motion may indeed cease and be interrupted, but time cannot. But if some one should say that the motion of the universe is not interrupted, yet this motion, if it is admitted that the circulation [of the world] is in a certain time, will itself be carried round to the same point from whence it began ; and not to that point in which the half of it only is accomplished. And this motion, indeed, will be the half, but the other will be double, each being the motion of the universe, both that which proceeds from the same to the same, and that which arrives only at the half. The assertion, also, that the motion of the outermost sphere is most vehement and rapid, bears witness to what we say * so that the motion of it is one thing, and time another. For that motion is the most rapid of all, which in the least time passes through the greatest interval. But other motions are slower, which are performed in a longer time, and pass through a part only of the same space. If, therefore, time is not the motion of the outermost sphere, much less will it be that sphere itself, which in conse* quence of being moved is conceived to be time.

197

Is, therefore, time something belonging to motion ? If indeed it is interval, in the first place, there is not the same interval of every motion, nor of uni¬ form motion. For the motion which is in place is swifter and slower, and both the intervals may be measured by another third interval, which may with greater rectitude be denominated time. But of which of these motions will time be the interval ? Or rather, will it be the interval of any one of them, since they are infinite ? And if time is the interval of orderly motion, it is not the interval of every motion, nor of every motion of this kind. For these are many. So that there will also be at once many times. But if time is the interval of the uni¬ verse, if indeed it is the interval in motion itself, what else will it be than motion, viz. so much ; and this quantity of motion will either be measured by place, because the place which it passes through is so much in quantity, and the interval will be this. This, however, is not time, but place. Or motion by its continuity, and from not immediately ceasing, but being always assumed, possesses interval. But this will be the multitude of motion. And if some one looking to motion should assert that it is much, just as if it should be said that heat is much, neither

198

Or motion by its continuity, and from not immediately ceasing, but being always assumed, possesses interval. But this will be the multitude of motion. And if some one looking to motion should assert that it is much, just as if it should be said that heat is much, neither

198

will time here also present itself to our view, nor become obvious ; but motion again and again will occur, like water repeatedly flowing, and also the interval which is beheld in it. The again and again also will be number, as the duad or the triad ; but the interval will belong to bulk. Thus, therefore, the multitude of motion will he as the decad, or as the interval which is beheld as it were in the bulk of motion, which is not attended with a conception of time. But this quantity of motion will be gene¬ rated in time ; for otherwise, time will not be every where, but will be in motion as in a subject. It will, likewise, again happen that time will be said to be motion For the interval is not external to motion, but is motion not at once collected toge¬ ther. But if it is not at once collected, if an at- once-collected subsistence is in time, in what re¬ spect does that which is not at-once-collected differ from that which is P Shall we say that they differ in time ; so that the separating motion, and the inter¬ val of it, are not time itself, but subsist in time ? If, however, some one should say, that the interval of motion is time, by the interval not meaning the peculiarity of motion, but that with which motion has an extension* as if running together with it, yet

199

what this is, k not unfolded. For it is evident that time is that in which the motion was generated* This, therefore, is that which was investigated from the first, viz. what that existing thing is which is time ; since this is just as if some one being asked what time is, should say that the interval of motion is in time. What, therefore, is this interval, which he calls time, who supposes it to be external to the proper interval of motion ? For again, he who places temporal interval in motion itself, will be dubious where he should place the interval of rest. For as much as a certain thing is moved, so much also will something else have been quiescent. And you may say that the time of each is the same, though its relation to the one, is different from its relation to the other. What therefore is this interval, and what nature does it possess ? For it is not possible that it should be local, since this has an external subsistence.

IX. In the next place, it must be considered how time is the number or measure of motion ; for it is better to assert this of it, on account of its continuity. In the first place, therefore, here also it may be doubted* whether it is similarly the num-

200

her or measure of every motion, in the same manner as it was dubious respecting the interval of motion. For how can any one numerate inordinate and ano-

In the first place, therefore, here also it may be doubted* whether it is similarly the num-

200

her or measure of every motion, in the same manner as it was dubious respecting the interval of motion. For how can any one numerate inordinate and ano-

malous motion, or what number or measure will there be of it, or according to what will the measure subsist ? But if he numerates and measures with the same thing, both irregular and regular motion, whether swift or slow, the number and the measure will be a thing of such a kind, as if it were the decad, measuring both horses and oxen, or as if the same thing were the measure both of moist and dry substances. If, therefore, time is a measure of this kind, it has indeed been shown what the things are of which time is the measure, viz. that it is the measure of motions, but it has not yet been shown what time is. If, however, in the same manner as the decad when assumed without horses, may be understood as number, and a measure is a

measure possessing a certain proper nature, though it should not yet measure any thing, thus also it is necessary time should subsist, being a measure; — if therefore time is such a thing in itself as number, in what will it differ from this number which sub¬ sists according to the decad, or from any other monadic number ? But if it is a continued measure,

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being a certain quantity, it will be such a measure as a certain cubital magnitude. It will, therefore, be magnitude, such as a line accompanied with motion. But how, since it also runs, can it mea¬ sure that with which it runs in conjunction ? For why should one measure rather than the other ? And it is better and more probable to admit this not in every motion, but in that with which it con¬ curs. This, however, ought to be continuous, so far as the concurrent motion is successive. But that which measures ought not to be considered as subsisting externally, nor as separate, but as at once measured motion. And what will that be w hich measures ? Will the motion indeed be mea¬ sured, but the magnitude be that w?hich measures ? And which of these will time be ? Will it be the measured motion, or the magnitude which mea¬ sures ? For time will either be the motion which is measured by magnitude, or magnitude which mea¬ sures, or that which uses magnitude, as a cubit for the purpose of measuring the quantity of the mo¬ tion. In all these, however, it is more probable as we have said to suppose that the motion is equable. For without equability, and besides this, without one motion of the universe, the doubt will be

202

In all these, however, it is more probable as we have said to suppose that the motion is equable. For without equability, and besides this, without one motion of the universe, the doubt will be

202

greater than that which results from admitting that time is in some way or other the measure of motion. But if time is measured motion, and is measured by quantity, then just as if it were neces¬ sary that motion should be measured, it would not be requisite that it should be measured by itself, but by something else, thus also it is necessary, if motion has another measure besides itself, and on this account we are in want of a continuous mea¬ sure, for the purpose of measuring it, that magni¬ tude itself should have a measure, in order that the motion may be as much in quantity as its measure. And thus time will be the number of the magnitude attending the motion, and not the magnitude which runs in conjunction with the motion.

It is necessary, however, to doubt what this

·»

number is, whether it is monadic, and how it mea¬ sures ? For though some one should discover how it measures, yet he would not find time measuring, but a certain quantity of time. This, however, is not the same with time [simply considered.] For it is one thing to speak of time, and another, of so much time. For prior to the so much, it is neces¬ sary to say what that is which is so much. Is time, therefore, the number which measures motion ex-

203

ternally ? Such as the decad in horses* and not that which is assumed together with horses. What this number, therefore, is, has not been shown, which prior to measuring, is what it is, in the same man¬ ner as the decad. Shall we say it is that number which measures by running according to the prior and posterior of motion ? 1 But it is not yet mani¬ fest what this number is which measures according to prior and posterior. That, however, which measures according to prior and posterior, whether by a point, or by any thing else, entirely measures according to time. This number,2 therefore, which measures motion by prior and posterior, will be successive to, and in contact with time, in order that it may measure it. For prior and posterior, must either be assumed locally, as the beginning

* Time is defined by Aristotle, to be the number of motion according to prior and posterior , which accords with Plato?s definition of it in the Timas us, viz. that it is an eternal image flowing according to number . For this shows that time sub¬ sists according to number which has the relation of an image, and exists according to the order of motion, i. e. according to prior and posterior. In short, time is properly the measure of motion according to the flux of being, which is the peculiarity of generation , or becoming to he .

% For xporos here, it is necessary to read αριθμοα.

204

e. according to prior and posterior. In short, time is properly the measure of motion according to the flux of being, which is the peculiarity of generation , or becoming to he .

% For xporos here, it is necessary to read αριθμοα.

204

[and end] of a stadium, or temporally. For in short, with respect to prior and posterior, the former indeed is time ending in the now ; but the latter is time beginning from the now . Time, therefore, is different from the number which measures motion according to prior and posterior, not only motion of any kind, but also that which is orderly. In the next place, why when number is adjoined, whether according to the measured, or the measuring, (for the same number may be both that which measures, and is measured) — why therefore when number is added, w ill there be time ; but motion existing, and prior and posterior entirely subsisting about it, there will not be time ? Just as if some one should say that magnitude is not as great as it is, unless some one apprehends what the quantity of it is. Since time, however, is, and is said to be infinite, how will there be number about it, unless a part of it being selected is measured, in which case it will happen that it exists prior to its being measured. But why will not time be prior to the existence of soul that measures it? Unless it should be said thaf the generation of it is effected by soul ; since it is by no means necessary that time should exist because it is measured by soul. For it would exist

205

as much as it is in quantity, though no one should measure it. And if some one should say that it is soul which uses magnitude for the purpose of mea-

suring time, what will this have to do with the con¬ ception of time ?

X. But to say that time is an appendix of motion, is not to teach what time is, nor ought this to be said before it is shown what the appendix is. For perhaps it may be time. With respect to this appendix, however, it must be considered, whether it has a posterior, or simultaneous, or prior sub¬ sistence ; if there is an appendix of this kind. For in whatever manner it may be spoken of, it is spoken of in time. Hence, if this is time, it will follow that time is the appendix of motion in time. Since, however, we do not investigate what time is not, but what it is, and much has been said on this subject by many prior to us, according to each position, he who discusses these would rather com¬ pose a history [than discover the nature of time ] To which may be added, that we have occasionally said something concerning these different positions. Some things also may be opposed from what has been already said, to him who asserts that time is

206

Some things also may be opposed from what has been already said, to him who asserts that time is

206

the measure of the universe, and likewise such other things as have just now been asserted respect¬ ing the measure of motion. For separate from inequality, all the other particulars may be ad¬ duced, which are adapted to their positions. It follows, therefore, that we should now show what it is necessary to think time is.

XI. Again, therefore, it is requisite that we should betake ourselves to that condition of being which we have said is in eternity ; a condition which is immutable, and at once total, a life now infinite and perfectly inflexible, and abiding in one, and directed to the one . But time was not yet, or at least was not in those natures ; but was about to be generated * by the reason and nature of that which is posterior. Inteiligibles, therefore, quietly energizing in themselves, he who desires to know how time first fell, will not perhaps call upon the Muses who did not then exist, to tell him. Per¬ haps, however, he will, since the Muses also then

8 Time* as well as the world, is said to have been generated, not because it once was not* for It always existed, but because it depends for its subsistence on causes naturally prior to itself.

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had a being.1 Perhaps, too, he will find time itself generated, so far as it is generated and unfolded into light. But he will speak about it as follows :

Before this priority originated, and was indigent of the posterior, the former was quiescent together with the latter in being, time not yet existing ; but itself also quietly abiding [i. e. subsisting causally] in real being. A certain nature, however, much conversant with action, wishing to govern, and pos¬ sess authority from itself, and chusing to explore more of the present, was itself indeed moved, and together with it likewise time, always tending to hereafter and the posterior, and not to the same, but to another, and again another existence. But we from this motion producing a certain length of progression, conceive time to be the image of eter¬ nity. For since there was a certain unquiet power

* The Muses, considered according to their subsistence in Apollo, belong to the intellectual order, and are therefore superior to time. But if time is supposed to have had a beginning, then the Muses, according to their mundane sub¬ sistence, had no existence prior to the generation of time. To say, therefore, that the Muses did not once exist, is equivalent to the assertion that the intellectual is prior to the mundane order of them, according to nature, order, dignity, and causality.

208

To say, therefore, that the Muses did not once exist, is equivalent to the assertion that the intellectual is prior to the mundane order of them, according to nature, order, dignity, and causality.

208

of the soul, wishing always to transfer what it there saw to something else, it was not willing that an at- once-collected all should be present with it. But as reason [i. e. a productive principle] evolving itself from a quiet seed, produces as it fancies an abundant progression, abolishing the abundant by division, and instead of the one subsisting in itself, consuming the one which is not in itself, and thus proceeds into a more imbecile length ; in a similar manner, this nature of soul, producing the sensible through the imitation of the intelligible world, and being moved not with the motion which is there, but with a motion resembling it, and wish¬ ing to be its image, in the first place indeed, renders itself temporal, producing this instead of eternity. In the next place, it causes that which is generated to be subservient to time, making the whole of it to be in time, and comprehending all the progres¬ sions of it in time. For the world is moved in the nature of soul ; since there is not any other place of this universe than soul, and in the time of soul it is moved. For soul exhibiting its energy succes¬ sively, generates together with its energy that which is successive, and proceeds in conjunction with • another reasoning process after that energy, which

was not before ; since, neither was the discursive energy of reason effective, nor the present life of soul similar to that which preceded it. Hence, at the same time, there is another life, and this other life will have another time. Distance of life, there¬ fore, [or the interval between one life and another,] will be attended with time. The perpetual exten¬ sion of life also to the anterior part, will have per¬ petual time : and the past life will be accompanied with past time. If, therefore, some one should say that time is the energy 1 of soul, proceeding in a transitive motion from one life to another, will he not appear to say something to the purpose? a For if eternity is life consisting in permanency, and in

8 The word cvepyeia is omitted in the original.

% Time, however, according to Proclus, is a medium be¬ tween that which is alone the cause of motion, as soul, and that which is alone immoveable, as intellect. Hence time is truly, so iar as it is considered in itself, immoveable, but so far as it is in its participants, it is moveable, and subsists toge¬ ther with them, unfolding itself into them. He adds, hence it is a certain proceeding intellect , established indeed in eternity, but proceeding and abundantly flowing into the things which are guarded by it. This definition of time by Proclus, appears to me to be uncommonly beautiful and accurate, bee the whole of the passage from which it is taken, in the Additional Notes to my translation of the Timteus of Plato.

This definition of time by Proclus, appears to me to be uncommonly beautiful and accurate, bee the whole of the passage from which it is taken, in the Additional Notes to my translation of the Timteus of Plato.

Plot.

an invariable sameness of subsistence, and which is now infinite, but it is necessary that time should be the image of eternity, just as this universe is the image of the intelligible world ; — if this be the case, instead of the life which is there, it is necessary there should be another life of the discursive power of the mundane soul, homonymous as it w^ere to the life of eternity ; and instead of intellectual motion, that there should be the motion of a certain part of the soul. It is also necessary, that instead of an invariable sameness and permanency of sub¬ sistence, there should be that wdiich does not abide in the same, but alw?ays has another and another energy. Likewise, that instead of an essence which is without interval and one, there should be an image of the one , and which possesses unity in con¬ tinuity of succession. That instead of that which is now infinite, and a whole, there should be that which proceeds ad infinitum, according to what is perpetually successive. And that instead of an at-once-collected whole, there should be that which is a whole according to parts, and is always about to be a whole. For thus it will imitate that which is now wholly what it is, and which is at-once- collected, and infinite, if it wishes its being to con-

211

sist in perpetual acquisition ; since it will thus also imitate the being of eternity. It is necessary, however, not to assume time externally to soul* as neither is eternity in the intelligible world external to being. Nor again, must it be considered as any thing consecutive, or posterior to soul, as neither is eternity to being. But it must be beheld within, and subsisting together with soul, in the same man¬ ner as eternity with being.

XII. Here, however, it is necessary to under¬ stand, that this is the nature of time, viz. that it is the length of such a life as we have before men¬ tioned, proceeding in equable and similar muta¬ tions, which themselves proceed in a silent course; this length also possessing a continuity of energy. If, therefore, we again in words make this power to revert, and the life of it to cease which it now pos¬ sesses, and wThich is unceasing, and will never end, because it is the energy of a certain ever-existing soul, not directed to itself, nor in itself, but em¬ ployed in producing and generating if, therefore, we suppose this power no longer energizing, but ceasing from this energy, and also this part of the soul converted to real being and eternity, and

212

abiding in quiet, what will there any further be besides eternity? What will any longer be another and another, where all things abide in one ? And what will be prior or posterior, or more extended ? Where, likewise, will the soul any further betake itself to any other thing than that in which it is ? Or rather, neither will it betake itself to this. For in this case, it must have first departed from it, in order that it may accede to it ; since neither is it the sphere itself [of the universe] which had not an existence prior to time. For this sphere exists, and is moved in time. And though time should stop, this sphere still continuing to energize, we should nevertheless measure the duration of its permanency, as long as the permanency of eternity is external to it. If, therefore, this sphere becom¬ ing quiescent and united, time is taken away, it is evident that the commencement of its motion, round the earth, and this its life, generate time. Hence, also, it is said [in the Timas us of Plato,] that time was generated together with the universe, because soul produced it in conjunction with the universe. For in an energy of this kind, this world was generated. And this energy indeed is time, but the universe is in time. If, however, some one

213

should say, that the circulations of the stars are also denominated by Plato times, he should recol¬ lect that he says these were generated for the pur¬ pose of rendering time manifest and distinct, and that the measure of it might be conspicuous to us. For since it was not possible for time itself to be bounded by soul, nor for each part of it to be measured by us, since it is invisible and incompre¬ hensible, and especially since this is impossible to those who do not know how to numerate,— hence the Demiurgus made day and night, through which mankind were enabled to» apprehend two things by their difference ; from which, as Plato says, they arrived at the conception of number. Afterwards receiving the interval produced by the motion of the sun from the east to the east again, they appre¬ hended what was the quantity of time, the form of the motion being equable ; adhering to which, we use a thing of this kind as a measure of time. For time itself is not a measure. For how could it measure ; and what would it say if it measured ? Will it say this thing is as much in quantity as I am? Who therefore is it that says I? Is it that according to which the measure subsists r Has it not therefore an existence in order that it may

For time itself is not a measure. For how could it measure ; and what would it say if it measured ? Will it say this thing is as much in quantity as I am? Who therefore is it that says I? Is it that according to which the measure subsists r Has it not therefore an existence in order that it may

measure, but is not a measure ? Hence the mea¬ sured motion of the universe will be according to time And time will not be the measure of mo- tipn, according to that which it is, but according to accident, so that being something else prior to this, it renders the quantity of the motion manifest. One motion also being assumed in so much time, and being frequently enumerated, leads to a con- cep tion of the quantity of time that is past. So that if some one should say that motion and circu¬ lation, after a certain manner, measure time as much as possible, as manifesting in their quantity the quantity of time, which cannot in any other way be assumed or understood, he indeed will not adduce an absurd manifestation of time. Hence , that which is measured by circulation , viz. which is manifested , and not generated by it , will be time . And thus the measure of motion is that which is measured by a definite motion, and is measured by it, as being different from it. For if that which measures was one thing, and that which is measured another, but is measured accidentally ; in this case, it would he just as if some one should say that what is measured by a cubit is magnitude, but should not say what that is which defines the mag-

215

nitude. It would also be just as if some one not being able to render motion itself manifest on account of its indefinite nature, should say that motion is that which is measured by place. For assuming the place which motion passes through, he will say that the quantity of the motion is equal to the quantity of the place.

XIII. Circulation, therefore, renders time in which it is performed manifest. It is necessary^ however, that time should no longer alone be that in which something is performed, but that prior to this it should be what it is, namely, that in which other things are moved and at rest, in an equable and orderly manner ; and that from a certain thing of an orderly nature, it should become apparent, and shine forth to our conceptions, yet not be gene¬ rated by this thing, whether it is at rest, or in mo¬ tion. It becomes, however, more apparent when this thing is in motion. For motion contributes more to the knowledge, and transition to the nature of time than rest. And the quantity of the motion of a thing is more known than the quantity of its rest. Hence [some philosophers] have been in¬ duced to say that time is the measure of motion,.

216

For motion contributes more to the knowledge, and transition to the nature of time than rest. And the quantity of the motion of a thing is more known than the quantity of its rest. Hence [some philosophers] have been in¬ duced to say that time is the measure of motion,.

216

instead of saying that it is measured by motion. In the next place, it is requisite to add what that is which is measured by motion, and not to adduce that which accidentally takes place about it, and this alternately. Perhaps, however, they do not intend to say that this takes place alternately, and we do not understand their meaning ; but they clearly asserting that time is a measure according to that which is measured, we do not apprehend their conceptions on this subject. The cause however, why we do not, is because they have not clearly shown in their writings what time is, whether it is a measure, or that which is measured, as if they were writing to those who were acquainted with their opinions, and to their auditors. Plato, indeed, does not say that the essence of time is either a measure, or that which is measured by something, but asserts in order to render it mani¬ fest, that the circulation [of the universe] is allotted something which is the smallest [i. e. the centre,] for the purpose of unfolding the smallest part of time ; so that from hence both the quality and quantity of time may be known. Wishing, how¬ ever, to manifest the essence of time, he says that it was generated together with the universe, and

217

that it is a moveable image of its paradigm eter¬ nity ; because neither does time remain, life not remaining, in conjunction with which it runs and is convolved. But he says, it was generated together with the universe, because such a life as this pro» duced the universe, and one life fabricated both the world and time. If, therefore, this life could be converted into one, time which exists in this life would immediately cease, and also the universe, in consequence of no longer possessing this life.

If, however, some one assuming the prior and posterior of the life which is here, should assert this to be time, because this is something, but that the more true motion which has prior and posterior is not any thing, his assertion would be most ab¬ surd. For he would ascribe to inanimate motion the prior and posterior, and also time together with it, but he would not grant this to the motion through the imitation of which the inferior motion exists ; though from this superior motion prior and posterior primarily subsist, since it is a self¬ operative motion. As, likewise, it generates its several energies, thus too it produces that which is successive, and together with the generation a trans-

As, likewise, it generates its several energies, thus too it produces that which is successive, and together with the generation a trans-

Ition of energies. Why, therefore, do we refer this motion of the universe to the comprehension of the more true motion, and assert that it is in time, but do not refer to this the motion of soul which subsists in itself, and proceeds in a perpetual course? Shall we say it is because that which is prior to it is eternity, which neither runs in con¬ junction, nor is co-extended with this motion ? This first motion, therefore, is referred to time which also it generates, and which together with its own energy it possesses. How, therefore, is time every where ? Because this life and motion are not absent from any part of the world, as neither does the life which is in us desert any part of us. If, however, some one should say that time consists in a non¬ hypostasis, or non-hyparxis, for we are deceived about its essence, in the same manner as when we say of God that he was or will be ; for thus he will be and was in the same manner as that in which it is said he will be , [i. e. in the same manner as time ;] to assertions of this kind there belongs another mode of discussion. With respect to all that has been said, however, it is necessary to. ob¬ serve, that when any one assumes the quantity of

219

space passed over by a man that is moved, he also assumes the quantity of the motion, and when he assumes the quantity of the motion, such for in- stance as is produced in walking, he directs his attention to the boundary s of motion existing in the man prior to this motion, in order that he may judge whether he has walked to the full extent of this boundary. And the body, indeed, which has been moved in so much time, he refers to so much motion ; for this is the cause of its being moved ; and to the time of this motion. But he refers this motion of the body to the motion of the soul which produced an equality of interval. To what, there¬ fore, will he refer the motion of the soul ? For that whatever it may be to which he may wush to refer it, will be now without interval. Hence, this sub¬ sists primarily, and is that in which the rest are contained ; but it is itself no longer contained in any thing else. For there is not any thing by which it can be contained. This, therefore, is primarily ; and the like takes place in the soul of

1 The word used by Plotinus here is ^ayημ a, which signifies in the Physics of Aristotle, the boundary of motion.

220

the universe. Is then time in us also ? May we not say that it is in every such soul, that it subsists uniformly in every similar soul, and that all of them are [in a certain respect] one ? Hence, time will not be divulsed, since neither is eternity, which according to another characteristic is in all uniform natures.

221

ON THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL#

Hence, time will not be divulsed, since neither is eternity, which according to another characteristic is in all uniform natures.

221

ON THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL#

I. Whether each [part] of us is immortal, or the whole perishes, or one part of us is dissipated and corrupted, but another part perpetually remains, which part is the man himself, may be learnt by considering conformably to nature as follows : Man, indeed, is not something simple, but there is in him a soul, and he has also a body, whether it is annexed to us as an instrument, or after some other manner. However this may be, it must be ad¬ mitted, that the nature and essence of each of these must be thus divided. Since the body, therefore, is itself a composite, reason shows that it cannot remain [perpetually the same] ; and sense likewise sees that it is dissolved and wastes away, and re- ceives all-various destructions ; since each of the

222

things inherent in it tends to its own [i. e. to the whole from which it was derived], and one thing belonging to it corrupts another, and changes and perishes into something else. This, too, is espe¬ cially the case when the soul, which causes the parts to be in friendly union with each other, is not pre- sent with the corporeal masses. If each body, likewise, is left by itself, it will not be one, since it is capable of being dissolved into form and matter, from which it is also necessary that simple bodies should have their composition. Moreover, as be¬ ing bodies they have magnitude, and consequently may be cut and broken into the smallest parts, and through this are the recipients of corruption. Hence, if body is a part of us, we are not wholly immortal. But if it is an instrument [of the soul] it is necessary that being given for a certain time, it should be naturally a thing of this kind. That, however, which is the most principal thing, and the man himself, will be that with reference to the body which form is with reference to matter, since this according to form is as body to matter ; or according to that which uses, the body has the relation to it of an instrument. But in each way soul is the man himself.

But in each way soul is the man himself.

II. What, therefore, is the nature of this thing [soul] ? If indeed it is a body, it is in every respect capable of being analyzed. For every body is a composite. But if it is not a body, but of another nature, that also must be considered either after the same, or after another manner. In the first place, however, it must be considered into what body this body which they call soul ought to be analyzed. For since life is necessarily present with soul, it is also necessary that this body which is supposed to be soul, if it consists of two or more bodies, should have a connascent life in both, or in each of them ; or that one of these should have life, but the other not, or that neither should be vital. If, therefore, life is present with one of them only, this very thing will be soul. Hence, what body will this be which has life from itself? For fire, air, w^ater and earth, are of themselves inanimate; and with whichever of these soul is present, the life which it uses is adventitious. There are not, however, any other bodies besides these. And those to whom it appears that there are other bodies the elements of these, do not assert that they are souls, or that they have life. But if it should be said, that though no one of these bodies pos-

224

sesses life, yet the congress of them produces life, he who says this would speak absurdly And if each of them has life, one will be sufficient. Or rather, it is impossible that a coacervation of bo¬ dies should produce life, and things void of intel¬ lect generate intellect. Moreover, neither will these, in whatever manner they may say they are mixed, generate either intellect or soul.’ Hence, it is necessary there should be that which arranges, and which is the cause of the mixture ; so that this will have the order of soul. For that which is compounded will not be that which arranges and produces the mixture. But neither will there be a simple body in the series of things, without the existence of soul in the universe ; if reason [or a productive principle] acceding to matter, produces body. For reason cannot proceed from any thing else than from soul.

III. If some one, however, should say that an assemblage of atoms or impartibles produce soul by their union, such a one will be confuted by

8 The words η vow , η are omitted in the original ;

but from the version of Ficinus it appears that they ought to be inserted.

225

III. If some one, however, should say that an assemblage of atoms or impartibles produce soul by their union, such a one will be confuted by

8 The words η vow , η are omitted in the original ;

but from the version of Ficinus it appears that they ought to be inserted.

225

similitude of passion, and by apposition ; since one thing will not thus be generated through the whole, nor will that which is co-passive be produced from bodies which are without passion and incapable of being united. But soul is co-passive with itself. And of impartibles neither body nor magnitude can consist. Moreover, with respect to a simple body, they will not say that it has life from itself so far as it is material. For matter is void of quality. But they will rather say that what is arranged in body according to form possesses life. Hence, if they say that this form is essence, soul will not be both, but one of these ; and this will no longer be body. For this will not also consist of matter ; since if it did, we must again analyze it after the same man¬ ner. But if they assert that this form is a passion of matter and not essence, they must inform us what that is from which this passion and life are derived into matter. For matter will not give form to itself, nor insert soul in itself. Hence, it is necessary that there should be something which is the supplier of life, whether the supply is to matter, or to a certain body, this supplier being external to, and beyond every corporeal nature. Indeed, neither will there be any body, if there is no psychi- Plot . P

226

cal power. For body [perpetually] flows, and its nature is in [continual] motion. The universe 1 also would rapidly perish if all things were bodies ; though some one of them should be denominated soul. For it would suffer the same things as other bodies, since there would be one matter in all of them. Or rather, nothing would be generated, but all things would stop in matter, as there would not be any thing to invest it with form. Perhaps, too, neither would matter have any subsistence what¬ ever. This universe also will be dissolved, if it is committed to the connexion of body, and the order of soul is given to body, as far as to names, viz. to air and a dissipable spirit, and which has not from itself any oneness. For how is it possible, since all bodies are divisible, that this universe if it is committed to any one of them, should not be borne along in a foolish and casual manner? For what order is there, or reason or intellect, in a pneumatic substance, which is in want of order from soul ? But if soul, indeed, has a subsistence, all these will be subservient to it in order to the composition of the world, and the existence of every animal, a

1 το παν is omitted in tlie original.

227

different power contributing from a different thing to [the perfection of] the whole. If soul, however, is not present to the whole of things, these will neither have a subsistence, nor any arrangement.

227

IV. Compelled by truth, the authors of the above mentioned hypothesis also testify, that it is necessary there should be a certain form of soul prior to and more excellent than bodies. For they introduce a spirit endued with intellect, and an in¬ tellectual fire, as if it was not possible there could be a better condition among beings without fire and spirit, and without a place in which it might be established, though they ought to have investigated where bodies are to be placed ; for it is necessary that these should be established in the powers of soul. But if they assert that life and soul are nothing else than a spirit or wind, we must enquire what this celebrated spirit introduced by them is, and how it subsists. For they are compelled to fly to this when they admit that there is another efficacious nature besides bodies. If therefore not every spirit is soul, because there are myriads of inanimate spirits, but a spirit subsisting after a cer¬ tain manner is according to them soul, we ask them

228

whether they say that such a spirit and this habi¬ tude is something belonging to beings, or nothing. But if indeed it is nothing, it will be a name alone. And its subsistence after a certain manner will be also merely a name, and thus it will be an accident to beings. Hence, according to them nothing but matter will have an existence, and soul, deity, and every thing [except matter] will be merely names. If, however, habitude is something pertaining to beings, and different from a subject and from mat¬ ter, and subsists indeed in matter, but is itself im¬ material, because it is not again composed from matter -if this be the case, it will be a certain reason [or productive principle] and will not be body, but of another nature. Farther still, from the following considerations it will be no less mani¬ fest that it is impossible for soul to be any body whatever. For it would either be hot or cold, or hard, or soft, or moist, or firm, or black, or white, and all such different qualities as are in different bodies. Apd if indeed it is hot alone, it will alone heat ; if cold alone, it will alone refrigerate. If also it is alone light, it will by its presence cause things to be light ; if heavy, it will alone render them heavy ; if black, it will blacken ; and if white,

229

Apd if indeed it is hot alone, it will alone heat ; if cold alone, it will alone refrigerate. If also it is alone light, it will by its presence cause things to be light ; if heavy, it will alone render them heavy ; if black, it will blacken ; and if white,

229

will cause them to be white. For it is not the pro¬ vince of fire to refrigerate, nor of cold to produce heat. But soul produces different effects in diffe¬ rent animals, and contrary effects in the same ani¬ mal ; fixing some things, but diffusing others. And some things indeed it causes to be dense, but others rare, black, white, light and heavy ; though from the nature of one body it ought to produce one quality only, and not different qualities. But now it produces many qualities.

V. With respect to motions also, why are different motions produced by the soul, and not one only, there being but one [natural] motion of every body ? But if they assign deliberate choice as the cause of some motions, and reasons [or pro¬ ductive principles] as the causes of others, these indeed are rightly assigned. Deliberate choice, however, does not pertain to body, nor reasons, since they are different, but an elementary body is one and simple. Nor can such a body be full of productive power, except so far as this is imparted to it by that which makes it to be hot or cold. But how can it belong to body to increase at cer¬ tain times, and to a certain extent, since it is

230

* τ' » Τ *ί

naturally adapted to be increased, except so far as the power of augmenting is assumed in the bulk of matter, and is subservient to that which through it produces the increase P For if soul being body in¬ creases, it is necessary that it should also be in¬ creased, viz. by the addition of a similar body, in order that it may be of an equal bulk vuth that which is increased by it. And that which is added will either be soul, or an inanimate bod) . And if indeed it is soul, whence and how is it introduced, atid how is it added ? But if that which is added is inanimate, how is this animated, how does it accord with the preceding soul, and become one with it, and how does it entertain the same opinions with the former soul ? Will not this added soul, as being foreign, be ignorant of what the other knows P And in the same manner as with another mass belonging to our frame, there will be an efflux from, and an influx into it, and nothing will continue the same.. How, therefore, shall we remember ? And how shall we recognize such things as are appropriate to us, since we shall never employ the same soul ? Moreover, if soul is body, since the nature of body is divided into many parts, each of the parts will not be the same with the whole. If, therefore.

231

And how shall we recognize such things as are appropriate to us, since we shall never employ the same soul ? Moreover, if soul is body, since the nature of body is divided into many parts, each of the parts will not be the same with the whole. If, therefore.

231

soul was a magnitude of a certain quantity, if this quantity should become less, it would no longer be soul ; just as the being of every quantity is changed by ablation, from what it was before. But if some one of those things which have magnitude, being diminished in bulk, should remain the same in quality, so far indeed as it is body, and so far as it is quantity, it is different from what it was ; but through quality which is different from quantity it is able to preserve itself the same. What, there¬ fore, will those say who contend that the soul is body ? In the first place, indeed, with respect to each part of the soul which is in the same body, is each part soul in the same manner as the whole soul ? And again, is this the case with the part of a part ? For if this is admitted, magnitude will con¬ tribute nothing to the essence of the soul ; though it is necessary that it should if soul is a certain quantity. The whole soul, likewise, is every where present with the body ; but it is impossible for the same corporeal whole to be in many things at the same time, or for a part of it to be the same as the whole. And if they say that each of the parts is not soul, then according to them, soul will consist of things inanimate. Besides, if the magnitude of

232

each soul is definite, it will no longer be soul, if it is either extended or diminished. When, there¬ fore, from one copulation and one seed, twins are begotten, or as in other animals many offspring are produced, most of the seed being distributed into many places, where also each part of the seed is a whole, how is it possible this should not teach those who are willing to learn, that where the part is the same w ith the whole, this in the very essence of itself transcends the nature of quantity ; and ought from necessity to be without quantity. For thus alone it can remain the same, quantity being withdrawn, since it has no need of eittier quantity or bulk, its essence being something different from either. Hence soul and reasons [or productive principles] are void of quantity.

VI. But that if soul is body, it will not be pos¬ sible to perceive either sensibly or intellectually, or to know scientifically, and that there will neither be virtue, nor any thing beautiful [in human con¬ duct,] will be manifest from the following consi¬ derations. Whatever is able to have a sensible perception of any thing, ought itself to be one, and to apprehend every thing by one and the same

233

power. This will also be the case, if many things

enter through many organs of sense, or there are

many qualities about one thing, and likewise when

there is a variegated appearance such as that of

This will also be the case, if many things

enter through many organs of sense, or there are

many qualities about one thing, and likewise when

there is a variegated appearance such as that of

the face, through one thing. For one thing does

not perceive the nose, and another the eves, but

the same thing perceives at once all the parts of

the face. And though one thing proceeds through

the eyes, but another through the ears, yet it is

necessary there should be one thing at which both

these arrive. Or how could the soul sav that these

·/

are different, unless the perceptions of sense at once terminated in the same thing ? It is necessary, therefore, that this should be as it were a centre, that the senses should on all sides be extended to this, like lines from the circumference of a circle, and that a thing of this kind which apprehends the perceptions of sense should be truly one. For if it were any thing divisible, and the informations of the senses arrived at this as at the two extremities of a line, they must either again concur in one and the same thing as a middle, or there would be ano¬ ther thing there and another, and each would have a sensible perception of each ; just as if I should perceive one thing, but you another, even though

234

the object of sense should be one thing, such as the Face ; or they must be collected into one. And this indeed appears to be the case. For visible forms are collected in the pupils of the eyes ; or how through these could the greatest things be seen ? Hence5 in a still greater degree the forms which arrive at the ruling part of the soul, become as it were conceptions ; and therefore this part also must be impartible. For if it had magnitude, it would be co-divided with the object of sensible perception. Hence, one part of it would perceive a part of the sensible object, and nothing in us would have the apprehension of the whole of a sen¬ sible thing. But the whole is one thing. For how can it be divided ? For in the division, equal can¬ not be adapted to equal, because the ruling part is not equal to every sensible thing. Into how many parts, therefore, must the division of it be made ? Must it be divided into as many parts, as the sen¬ sible perception which is introduced to it, is divided into ? And will each of the parts of the soul, there¬ fore, perceive the parts of the sensible object ? Or shall we say that the parts of the soul will not have a sensation of the parts of the thing perceived ? This however is impossible. But if any part what-

235

ever perceives the whole of the sensible object, since magnitude is adapted to be divided infinitely, it will happen that infinite sensible perceptions will be produced about each part ; so that, for instance, there will be infinite images of the same thing in

ο O

But if any part what-

235

ο O

our ruling part. Moreover, if that which perceives is body, it will not be able to perceive in any other way, than as if certain images were impressed from wax in a seal ; whether the sensible forms are im¬ pressed in blood, or in air. And if, indeed, they

are impressed as in moist bodies, which it is reason¬ able to suppose they will be, if as in water, they \vill be confounded, and there will be no memory. But if the impressions remain, either it will not be possible for others to be impressed while they re¬ main, so that there will be no other sensible per¬ ceptions, or if others are produced, the former w ill be destroyed, so that there will not be a remem¬ brance of any thing. But if it is possible to remember, and to have a sensible perception of other things after others, the former not impeding the latter, it is impossible for the soul to be body,

VII. The same thing also may be seer» from pain and the sensation of pain ; when a man is said

236

to have a pain in his finger or about his finger. For then it is manifest that the sensation of pain is pro¬ duced about the principal or ruling part ; a portion of the spirit being pained, but the ruling part having a perception of the pain, and the whole soul in con¬ sequence of this suffering the same thing. How, therefore, does this happen ? They will say by suc¬ cession, the psychical spirit about the finger suffer¬ ing in the first place, but imparting the passion to that which is next to it, and afterwards to some¬ thing else, until the passion arrives at the ruling part. Hence, it is necessary if that which is pri¬ marily pained perceives, that there should be ano¬ ther sensation of that which is second, if sensation is produced according to succession. And likewise, that there should be another sensation of that which is the third in order ; that there should be many and infinite sensible perceptions of one and the same pain ; and that afterwards all these should be perceived by the ruling part, and besides these, that it should have a perception of its own passion. In reality, however, each of these does not perceive the pain that is in the finger ; but one sensation perceives that the part of the palm of the hand which is next to the finger is pained, and another

237

In reality, however, each of these does not perceive the pain that is in the finger ; but one sensation perceives that the part of the palm of the hand which is next to the finger is pained, and another

237

more remote sensation perceives the pain which is in a more remote part. There will also be many pains, the ruling part not perceiving the passion which is in the finger, but that which is present with itself. And this it will alone know, but will bid farewell to the others, not perceiving that the finger is pained. If, therefore, it is not possible that sensible perception of a thing of this kind should subsist according to succession, and it does not belong to body, since it is a bulk, that one part of it suffering, another part should recognize the suffering ; for in every magnitude this is one thing, and that another ; — if this be the case, it is neces¬ sary that the power which perceives should be a thing of such a kind, as to be every where itself the same with itself. But this pertains to any thing else rather than to body.

VIII. Moreover, that neither will it be possi¬ ble to perceive intellectually if the soul is body, may be demonstrated as follows. For if to per¬ ceive sensibly is, for the soul using the body to apprehend sensibles, intellectual perception will not be an apprehension of the objects of such per¬ ception, through body. For unless this is admitted,

238

intellectual will be the same with sensible percept tion. Hence, if to perceive intellectually is to apprehend without body, by a much greater priority it is necessary that the nature which thus perceives should not be body. Farther still, if sense indeed is the perception of sensibles, intellection is the perception of intelligibles. If, however, they are not willing to admit this, yet there will be in us intellections of certain intelligibles, and apprehen¬ sions of things without magnitude. How, there¬ fore, will intellect if it is magnitude, understand that which is not magnitude, and by that wdiich is partible that which is impartible? Shall we say it will understand it by a certain impartible part of itself? But if this be the case, that which under¬ stands will not be body. For there is no need of the whole in order to come into contact with the object of its intellection ; since contact according to one certain thing is sufficient. If, therefore, they admit that the first intellections, which is true, are entirely liberated from body, it is necessary that the nature which intellectually perceives the form separate from body of each thing, should know either real being, or that which is becoming to be. But if they say that intellections are of

239

But if they say that intellections are of

239

forms inherent in matter, yet they are then only apprehended when by intellect they are separated from body. For the separation [i. e. abstraction] of a circle and triangle, of a line and a point, is not effected in conjunction with flesh, or in short, with matter. Hence it is necessary that the soul also, in a separation of this kind, should separate itself from the body. And therefore it is necessary that it should not be itself body. I think, likewise, that the beautiful and the just are without magnitude, and consequently the intellection of these is un¬ attended with magnitude. Hence, these approach¬ ing to us are apprehended by that which is imparti¬ ble in the soul, and in the soul they reside in the impartible. How also, if the soul is body, can temperance and justice be the virtues of it, which are its saviours, so far as they are received by it ?

IX. There must, therefore, be another nature which possesses existence from itself, and such is every thing which is truly being, and which is neither generated, nor destroyed. For without the subsistence of this, all things would vanish into non-entity, and this perishing, would not afterwards be generated ; since this imparts safety to all other

240

things, and also to the universe which through soul is preserved and adorned. For soul is the princi¬ ple of motion, with which it supplies other things, itself moving itself, and imparting life to the ani¬ mated body. But it possesses life from itself, which it will never lose, because it is derived from itself. For all things do not use an adventitious life, or there would be a progression of life to infi¬ nity. But it is necessary there should be a certain nature primarily vital, w hich is also necessarily in¬ destructible and immortal, as being the principle of life to other things. Here, likewise, it is requisite that every thing divine and blessed should be esta¬ blished, living from itself, and existing primarily being, and primarily vital, void of essential muta¬ tion, and being neither generated nor destroyed. For whence could it be generated, or into what could it perish ? If, likewise, it is necessary that the appellation of being should truly belong to this nature, it is requisite that it should not at one time exist, and at another not ; just as a colour which is of itself white, is not at one time wrhite, and at ano¬ ther not white. If, however, whiteness was [real] being, together with being white, it would likewise always be. But now it possesses whiteness alone.

241

If, however, whiteness was [real] being, together with being white, it would likewise always be. But now it possesses whiteness alone.

241

That, however, to which being is present which is from itself, and is primarily being, will always have a subsistence. Hence, this which is primarily and perpetually being, ought not to be destitute of life, like a stone, or a piece of wood, but to be vital, and enjoy a pure life, in that part of itself which is alone permanent. But that part of it which is mingled with a subordinate nature is an impediment to its possession of the best of things, yet it does not through this lose its nature, but resumes its ancient condition, when it recurs to things which are [truly] its owm.

X. That soul, however, is allied to a more di¬ vine and eternal nature, is evident from its not being body as w^e have demonstrated, -and also be- cause it has neither figure nor colour. Moreover, this likewise may be shown from the following considerations. It is acknowledged by all of us, that every divine nature, and which is truly being, enjoys an excellent and wise life. This, therefore, being admitted, it is necessary to consider in the next place, what the nature is of our soul. We must assume the soul, however, not receiving in the body irrational desires and angers, and other pas- Plot . Q

242

sions, but as abolishing all these, and as much as possible having no communication with the body. For such a soul as this will perspicuously show that evils are an addition to the soul, and are ex¬ ternally derived ; and that the most excellent things are inherent in it when it is purified, viz. wisdom and every other virtue, which are its proper posses¬ sions, If, therefore, the soul is such when it re¬ turns to itself, how is it possible it should not be¬ long to that nature which we say is possessed by every thing eternal and divine ? For wisdom and true virtue being divine, cannot be inherent in any vile and mortal thing ; but that which is of this kind is necessarily divine, as being full of divine goods, through an alliance and similitude of essence to a divine nature. Hence, whoever of us resembles a soul of this description, will in soul itself differ but little from superior beings ; in this alone being in¬ ferior to them, that he is in body. On which account, also, if every man was such, or if the mul¬ titude employed souls of this kind, no one would be so incredulous as not to believe that our soul is entirely immortal. Now, however, men perceiving that the soul of the greater part of the human race is defiled with vice, they do not reason about it,

243

Now, however, men perceiving that the soul of the greater part of the human race is defiled with vice, they do not reason about it,

243

either as a divine or an immortal thing. But it is necessary, in considering the nature of every things to direct our attention to the purity of it ; since whatever is added, is always an impediment to the knowledge of that to which it is added. Consider the soul, therefore, by taking away [that which is extraneous] ; or rather, let him who takes this away survey himself, and he will believe himself to be immortal, when he beholds himself in the intel¬ ligible wrorld, and situated in a pure abode. For he will perceive intellect seeing not any thing sen¬ sible, nor any of these mortal objects, but by an eternal power contemplating that which is eternal ; every thing in the intelligible world, and itself also being then luminous, in consequence of being en¬ lightened by the truth proceeding from the good \ which illuminates all intelligibles with reality. By such a soul as this, therefore, it may be properly said,

Farewell, a God immortal now am 1/

having ascended to divinity, and earnestly striving to become similar to him. If, however, purifica¬ tion causes the soul to have a knowledge of the

* A celebrated line of Empedocles,

244

most excellent things, the sciences also which are inwardly latent will then shine forth, and which are truly sciences. For the soul does not by running to externals behold temperance and justice, but perceives them herself by herself, in the intellection of herself, and of that which she formerly was, and views them like statues established in herself, which through time have become covered with rust. These she then purifies, just as if gold were animated, and in consequence of being incrusted with earth, and not perceiving itself to be gold, should be ignorant of itself ; but afterwards shaking off the earth which adheres to it, should be filled with admiration on beholding itself pure and alone. Then, also, it would perceive that it has no need of adventitious beauty, and would consider with itself that it is then in the best condition when it is permitted to be wholly by itself.

XI. Who, therefore, endued with intellect will doubt that a thing of this kind is not immortal, to which indestructible life is present from itself? For how is it possible it should perish, since it is not adventitious, and is not possessed in the same way as heat is present with fire ? I do not mean by this,

245

For how is it possible it should perish, since it is not adventitious, and is not possessed in the same way as heat is present with fire ? I do not mean by this,

245

that heat is adventitious to fire, but that it is so to the subject matter of fire, though it is not to fire itself. For through this fire is dissolved. Soul, however, does not possess life in such a way, as that matter is the subject of it, but life acceding, demonstrates the presence of soul. For either life is essence, and is an essence of such a kind as to live from itself, which is soul, the object of our investigation, and this they acknowledge to be im¬ mortal ; or they must analyze it as a composite. This, also, they must analyze, till they arrive at that which is immortal, and moved from itself, and to which it is not lawful to receive the destiny of death. Or if they say that life is a passion adven¬ titious to matter, they are compelled to acknow¬ ledge that nature to be immortal from which this passion was imparted to matter, and which is inca¬ pable of receiving the contrary to that which it im¬ parts. For it is one nature living in energy.

XII. Farther still, if they say that every soul is corruptible, it would be requisite that all things should have long since perished. But if they assert that one soul is corruptible, and another not, as for instance, that the soul of the universe is immortal.

246

but ours not, it is necessary that they should assign the cause of this difference. For each is the cause of motion, and each lives from itself. Each, like¬ wise, comes into contact with the same things by the same power, intellectually perceiving the na¬ tures in the heavens, and also those that are beyond the heavens, investigating every thing which has an essential subsistence, and ascending as far as to the first principle of things. To which may be added, that it is evident the soul gave being to itself prior to the body, from its ability of apprehending what each thing is, by itself, from its own inherent spec¬ tacles, and from reminiscence. And from its em¬ ploying eternal sciences, it is manifest that it is itself perpetual. Besides, since every thing which can be dissolved receives composition, hence, so far as a thing is a composite, it is naturally adapted to be dissolved. But soul being one simple energy, and a nature characterized by life, cannot be cor¬ rupted as a composite. Will it, therefore, through being divided and distributed into minute parts, perish ? Soul, however, is not, as we have demon¬ strated, a certain bulk or quantity. May it not, therefore, through being changed in quality, be cor¬ rupted ? Change in quality however which corrupts,

247

takes away form, but leaves the subject matter. But this is the passion of a composite. Hence* if it is not possible for the soul to be corrupted according to any of these modes, it is necessarily incorruptible.

Change in quality however which corrupts,

247

XIII. How, therefore, since the intelligible is separate, does the soul descend into body ? 1 Be»

1 Souls fall into bodies, (says Proclus in Tim. p. 343.) be¬ cause they wish to imitate the providential energies of the Gods, and on this account proceed into generation, and leave the contemplation of true being. For as divine perfection is twofold, one kind being intellectual and the other providential, and one kind consisting in an abiding energy, but the other in motion, hence souls imitate the prolific, intellectual, and im¬ mutable energy of the Gods by contemplation, but their provi¬ dential and motive characteristic, through a life conversant with generation. As the intelligence too, of the human soul is partial, so likewise is her providence ; but being partial it associates with a partial body. But still further, the descent of the soul contributes to the perfection of the universe. For it is necessary that there should not only be immortal and in¬ tellectual animals, such as are the perpetual attendants of the Gods, nor yet mortal and irrational animals only, such as are the last progeny of the Demiurgus of the universe, but like¬ wise such as subsist between these, and which are by no means [wholly] immortal, but are capable of participating reason and intellect. And in many parts of the universe, there are many animals of this kind. For man is not the only rational and mortal animal, but there are other such-like species, some of

248

cause so far as intellect alone is impassive in intel- ligibles, having an intellectual life alone, it abides

■which are more daemoniacal, and others approximate nearer to our essence. But the descents of a partial soul contribute to the perfect composition of all animals, which are at the same time mortal and rational.

Should it be again asked. Why, therefore, are partial souls

descending into generation filled with such material perturba-

But the descents of a partial soul contribute to the perfect composition of all animals, which are at the same time mortal and rational.

Should it be again asked. Why, therefore, are partial souls

descending into generation filled with such material perturba-

tiou, and such numerous evils ? We reply, that this takes place through the inclination arising from their free will ; through their vehement familiarity with body ; through their sympathy with the image of soul, or that divisible life which is distributed about the body ; through their abundant mutation from an intelligible to a sensible nature, and from a quiet energy to one entirely conversant with motion ; and through a disordered condition of being, naturally arising from the composition of dissimilar natures, viz. of the immortal and mortal, of the in¬ tellectual and that which is deprived of intellect, of the indivi¬ sible and that which is endued with interval. For all these become the cause to the soul of this mighty tumult and labour in the realms of generation ; since we pursue a flying mockery which is ever in motion. And the soul, indeed, by verging to a material life, kindles a light in her dark tenement the body, but she herself becomes situated in obscurity ; and by giving life to the body, she destroys herself and her own intellect, in as great a degree as these are capable of receiving destruction. For thus the mortal nature participates of intellect, but the intellectual part of death, and the whole becomes a prodigy, as Plato beautifully observes in his Laws, composed of the mortal and immortal, of the intellectual and that which is deprived of intellect. For this physical law, which binds the soul to the body, is the death of the immortal life, but is the cause of vivification to the mortal body/7

249

For this physical law, which binds the soul to the body, is the death of the immortal life, but is the cause of vivification to the mortal body/7

249

there eternally. For it has not any impulse, or appetite. But that which receives appetite, and is next in order to that intellect, by the addition of appetite proceeds as it were to a greater extent, and being desirous to adorn, in imitation of the forms which it sees in intellect, it becomes as it were pregnant from them. Hence, becoming par¬ turient, it hastens to make and fabricate, and through this festination becoming extended about a sensible nature, when it subsists in conjunction with the soul of the universe, it transcends the sub¬ ject of its government, by being external to it, and thus together with the mundane soul presides over the universe with a providential care. But when it wishes to govern a part of the world, it then governs alone, and becomes [merged] in that in which it is ; yet not so as to be wholly absorbed by body, but even then it possesses something external to body. Hence, neither is the intellect of this soul passive. But this soul is at one time in body, and at another external to it. And being impelled, indeed, to descend from first natures, it proceeds as far as to such as rank in the third degree, and to those with which we are conversant, by a certain energy of intellect ; intellect at the same time

250

abiding in itself, and through soul filling every thing with all that is beautiful, being an immortal adorner through an immortal soul. For intellect itself also exists eternally, through unceasing energy.

XIV. With respect to the souls of other animals, such among these as have fallen from a better con» dition, and have proceeded as far as to brutal bodies, these likewise are necessarily immortal. But if there is another species of soul, it is neces¬ sary that this also should not be derived from any other source than a vital nature, since this likewise is the cause of life to animals, and besides this, of the life which is in plants. For all these proceed¬ ing from the same principle, have an appropriate life of their own. And these souls also are incor¬ poreal, impartible, and essences. If, however, it is requisite that the soul of man being tripartite should be dissolved with the composite, we must say that pure souls which are liberated from the body, dismiss that which adhered to them in gene¬ ration ; but that this is accomplished by others in long periods of time. That also which is dis¬ missed, is the worse part, nor will this be destroyed, as long as that subsists from whence it originates.

251

For nothing which is comprehended in being perishes.

That also which is dis¬ missed, is the worse part, nor will this be destroyed, as long as that subsists from whence it originates.

251

For nothing which is comprehended in being perishes.

XV. And thus much has been said by us to those who require demonstration on this subject But such things as should be adduced to those who stand in need of the evidence arising from faith mingled with sensible information, may be selected from history, which abounds with instances in con¬ firmation of the immortality of the soul. It may also be obtained from what the Gods have deli¬ vered in Oracles, when they order the anger of souls that have been injured, to be appeased ; and likewise honours to be paid to the dead, as being still sentient, which honours all men pay to de¬ parted souls. Many souls also who once ranked among men, do not cease when liberated from bo¬ dies to benefit mankind. And these by employing divination benefit us in other respects, and demon¬ strate through themselves, that other souls also do not perish.

252

ON THE

THREE HYPOSTASES,

THAT RANK AS THE

PRINCIPLES OF THINGS

I. What is the reason that souls become obli¬ vious of divinity, being ignorant both of themselves and him, though their allotment is from thence, and they in short partake of God ? The principle therefore of evil to them is audacity, generation, the first difference,1 and the wish to exercise an unrestrained freedom of the will. When, therefore, they began to be delighted with this unbounded

1 The five genera of being are, essence, sameness, difference , motion and permanency. This difference , therefore, which ranks as the first, and which is the source of all diversity, causes souls by predominating in them to be forgetful of deity, and themselves .

253

liberty, abundantly employing the power of being moved from themselves, they ran in a direction contrary [to their first course], and thus becoming most distant from their source, they were at length ignorant that they were thence derived. Just as children who are immediately torn from their parents, and have for a long time been nurtured at a great distance from them, become ignorant both of themselves and their parents. Hence, souls neither seeing their father, nor themselves, despise themselves through ignorance of their race, but honour other things, and admiring every thing rather than themselves, being vehemently astonished about, and adhering to sensible natures, they as much as possible hurl themselves [from their true parents], and thus despise the beings from which they have become elongated. Hence, the honour which they pay to sensible objects, and the con¬ tempt of themselves, happen to be the causes of their all-perfect ignorance. For at the same time they pursue and admire something else, and acknowledge themselves to be inferior to that which they admire and pursue. But the soul admitting that it is something subordinate to things which are generated and corrupted, and apprehending that it

For at the same time they pursue and admire something else, and acknowledge themselves to be inferior to that which they admire and pursue. But the soul admitting that it is something subordinate to things which are generated and corrupted, and apprehending that it

254

is the most ignoble and mortal of every thing which it honours, neither believes in the nature nor power of God. Hence, it is necessary that there should be a twofold discourse to those who are thus af¬ fected, in order to convert them to the contraries [to the things they admire], and to first natures, and to elevate them as far as to that which is highest, and one, and the first. What, therefore, is each of these discourses ? One of them, indeed, is that which shows the cause why the soul honours these sensible objects, which we have elsewhere largely discussed ; but the other teaches and re¬ minds the soul of the greatness of its origin, and its true dignity ; which discussion is prior to the former, and when manifested will render that ma¬ nifest Of this, therefore, we must now speak. For this is proximate and conducive to the object of enquiry. For that which is investigated is soul ; and what it investigates should be known by it, in

-r

order that it may in the first place learn whether it has the power of investigating things of this kind ; and also whether it has such an eye as is able to see them, and whether they are properly objects of its enquiry. For if they are foreign to its nature, why should it investigate them ? But if they are

255

allied to it, it is expedient and possible to discover them.

IT. Every soul, therefore, ought to consider in the first place, that soul produced all animals, and inspired them with life ; viz. those animals w hich the earth and sea nourish, those w'hich live in the air, and the divine stars contained in the heavens. Soul also made the sun ; soul made and adorned this mighty heaven. Soul, too, circumvolves it in an orderly course, being of a nature different from the things which it adorns, which it moves, and causes to live, and is necessarily more honourable than these. For these are corrupted when soul deserts them, and generated when it supplies them with life. But soul always exists, because it never deserts itself What the mode is, however, by which life is supplied to the universe, and to each of its parts, may be considered to be as follows : Let a certain other soul whose dignity in contem¬ plating is not small, being liberated from deception, and the allurements which fascinate other souls, be established in a quiet condition and survey a mighty soul. And let not only the surrounding body and the storms of body be at rest with respect to it,

256

but the whole of that by which it is surrounded. Let the earth, therefore, be still ; let the sea be still, the air, and the heavens themselves which are more excellent than the elements.1 Afterwards,

And let not only the surrounding body and the storms of body be at rest with respect to it,

256

1 Proclus had evidently this beautiful passage in view, when, in his second book On the Theology of Plato, he celebrates the ineffable principles of things, with the following matchless magnificence of diction.

unities, images of the erne], descending from the father ; and from these descending, the soul plucks of empyrean fruits, the soul-nourishing flower.” See my Collection of these Oracles, in the Old Monthly Magazine.

344

as in its progression it has soul for its saviour. The magnitude of the shadow, likewise, is as great as the reason .[or productive principle] which is sus¬ pended from soul. But the reason was of such a kind as to be able to produce as great a magnitude as the form of it wished might be produced.

X. Thus conceiving, therefore, it is requisite that again betaking ourselves to that which always subsists invariably the same, we should assume all things existing at once, such as the air, light, the sun, and the moon. And, likewise, that we should again consider light and the sun as at once all things, but having the order of things first, second, and third. Here, also, we must consider soul as being always established ; and in the next place, we must assume the natures which are first, and those that are in a consequent order, as the extre¬ mity of fire in that which is posterior ; from the shadow of that fire which subsists at the extremity of things, forming a conception of the fire which ranks as the first. In the next place, we must conceive this ultimate fire to be at the same time illuminated, so as to resemble form running into that nature which is hurled towards it, which was

345

In the next place, we must conceive this ultimate fire to be at the same time illuminated, so as to resemble form running into that nature which is hurled towards it, which was

345

first generated, and is entirely obscure. It is, how» ever, adorned according to reason by the power of soul, which possesses in itself wholly a power of adorning by reasons [or productive principles] ; just as the reasons in seeds fashioir and give form to animals, as if they were certain little worlds. For whatever comes into contact with soul, is made to be such as the essence of soul is naturally adapted to make it. Soul, however, makes, not by an adventitious decision, nor by waiting for counsel and consideration ; for thus it would make not according to nature, but according to adscititious art. For art is posterior to, and imitates soul ; producing obscure and imbecile imitations, which are things of a ludicrous nature, and not of much worth, and employing many machines in the form¬ ation of images. But soul by the power of essence has dominion over bodies in such a way, that they are generated and subsist, just as she leads them, since they are unable from the first to oppose her will. For in things of a posterior nature which impede each other, matter 1 is frequently deprived of the attainment of the appropriate form which

1 From the version of Ficinus, it is necessary here to supply the word η ν\η.

346

the productive principle [latent] in the seed wished it to haver There, however, [i. e. in the universe], the whole form being generated by soul, and the generated natures having at the same time an arrangement, that which is produced becomes beautiful without labour, and without impediment. But in the universe are fabricated, some things in¬ deed which are statues of the Gods, others which are the habitations of men, and others which are adapted to other things. For what else ought to b£ generated about soul, except those things which it possesses the power of producing? For the pro¬ perty of fire is to produce heat, and of another thing [cold] to refrigerate. But the peculiarity of soul is, partly to produce something from itself into another thing, and partly to produce something in itself. For in inanimate natures, indeed, that which is from themselves, lies in them as it were in a dor¬ mant state ; but that which tends to another thing, endeavours to assimilate to itself that which is able to be passive to it. And this is common to each of them, to lead other things to a similitude to itself. That which energizes, however, in soul is something of a vigilant nature, and this is also the case with that which tends from it to another thing.

347

And this is common to each of them, to lead other things to a similitude to itself. That which energizes, however, in soul is something of a vigilant nature, and this is also the case with that which tends from it to another thing.

347

Hence, it causes other things to live which do not live from themselves, and confers on them such a life as it lives itself. The life of soul, therefore, being essentialized in reason, imparts reason to body, as an image of that which it possesses itself. For that which it imparts to body is an image of life. Body, also, receives from soul corporeal morphcz , of which soul contains the productive principles. Soul, likewise, comprehends in itself the productive principles of Gods/ and of all things. Hence, the world also contains all things in itself.

XI. Those ancient wise men, likewise, who wishing that the Gods should be present with them, fabricated temples and statues, appear to me to have directed their attention to the nature of the universe, and to have intellectually perceived, that the nature of soul is every where tractable ; and that it may be received the most easily of all things, if any thing is fashioned so as to be passive to it, and is able to receive a certain portion of it. But

i. e. Of divine souls, each of which is a God according to participation. See the first book of my translation of Pro cl us On the Theology of Plato.

every thing is disposed to be passive which is in any way imitative, so as to be able like a mirror to seize a certain form. For the nature of the uni¬ verse has fashioned all things most artificially in imitation of those forms the participations of which it contains in itself. And since every thing is thus generated, the reason [or productive principle] in matter, which was fashioned according to a reason prior to matter, is conjoined to that God, con¬ formably to whom it was generated, and which the soul looks to, and possesses while it fabricates. Hence it was not possible for any thing to be gene¬ rated destitute of this God ; nor again , is it possi¬ ble for him t& descend hither; since this God is intellect, the sun of the intellectual world. Let this, therefore, be assumed by us as the paradigm of reason. But next to this soul follows, suspended from permanently abiding intellect, and being also itself permanent. Soul, therefore, imparts the ter¬ minations of itself which are prior to this visible sun, to this sun ; and causes it through itself as a medium to be conjoined to intellect, becoming as it were an interpreter of the things derived from in¬ tellect to the sun, and also of those which revert from the sun to intellect, so far as the former recurs

^49

through soul to the latter. For no one thing is very remote from another ; and yet again, it is re^ mote through difference and mixture. But every thing [in the intellectual region] is in itself, not locally, and each is united to each, and is at the same time separate from each. These, however, [i. e. the mundane spheres] are Gods, because they are never deserted by intellect and soul ; and are suspended from the primordial soul, which is as it were departing [from mundane natures]. These, therefore, so far as they are what they are, and so far as they are said to look to intellect [are divine] ; the vision of soul itself being directed no where else than to intellect.1

XII. The souls of men, however, beholding the images of themselves, like that of Bacchus in a mirror,* were from thence impelled to descend i

1 The latter part of this sentence in the original is as fol¬ lows ; ovhafiov ψυχής αυτής η σώματος €Κ€ΐ βΧεπονσης ; but both the sense and the version of Ficinus require that the word σώματος should be expunged.

% The meaning of what is here said by Plotinus, will be illustrated by the following remarkable passage from the MS* Commentary of Olympiodorus On the Phaedo. “ In order, ’* (says he) “ to the soul's descent, it is necessary that she should

350

yet were not cut off from their principle and from intellect. For they did not descend in conjunction with intellect, but proceeded as far as to the earth, their heads being at the same time established above the heavens. It happened, however* that their descent was more extended, because that which subsists in them as a medium, is compelled to exercise a guardian care, in consequence of the

first establish an image of herself in the body ; and in the second place, that she should sympathize with the image according to a similitude of form. For every form hastens into a sameness with itself, through an innate convergency to itself. In the third place, becoming situated in a divisible nature, it is necessary that she should be lacerated and scat¬ tered together with such a nature, and that she should fall into an ultimate distribution, till through a cathartic life, she raises herself from the extreme dispersion, loosens the bond of sym¬ pathy through which she is united to the body, and energizing without the image, becomes established according to her pri¬ mary life. And we may behold a resemblance of all this, in the fable respecting Bacchus the paradigm of our intellect. For it is said that Dionysius, establishing his image in a mirror, pursued it, and thus became distributed into the universe. But Apollo excited and elevated Bacchus, this God being a cathartic deity, and the true saviour of Dionysius. And on this account he is celebrated as Dionysoter. (διοννσωτηρ, for so it is requisite to read, and not δίονυσοπ?*.)” See more on this subject in the second edition of my treatise, On the Eleu- sinian and Bacchic Mysteries, in Number l6 of the Pam¬ phleteer, for Nov. 1816.

351

And on this account he is celebrated as Dionysoter. (διοννσωτηρ, for so it is requisite to read, and not δίονυσοπ?*.)” See more on this subject in the second edition of my treatise, On the Eleu- sinian and Bacchic Mysteries, in Number l6 of the Pam¬ phleteer, for Nov. 1816.

351

nature into which it arrives requiring solicitous attention. But the father Jupiter, commiserating laborious souls, made the bonds about which they labour mortal, causing them to have periodical ces¬ sations of their toil, and a liberation from body, that they also may become situated there where the soul of the universe always resides, without any conversion to these inferior realms. For what the world now possesses is sufficient to it, and will be perpetually through all the following revolutions and periodic restitutions of time, and this esta¬ blished in measures of definite lives, in which these are led to an harmonious agreement with those. At the same time, likewise, all things are arranged by one reason, with reference to die ascent and descent of souls, and every other particular. The symphony , however , of souls with the order of the universe , which nevertheless are not suspended from the universe , hut co-adapt themselves in their de¬ scent, and make one concord with the mundane cir¬ culation , is testified by this , that their fortunes , lives, and deliberate elections , are signified by the figures of the stars . That the universe, likewise, utters as it were one voice harmonically and aptly,

352

is asserted by the ancients more than any thing else, though obscurely. But this would not be the case, unless the universe was both active and pas¬ sive through its participation of intellectual forms, in the measures of its periods, orders, and lives ; souls evolving themselves according to the genera of discursive progressions, at one time in the intel¬ ligible world, at another in the heavens, and at another being converted to these inferior realms. Every intellect, however, is always in the intelligb ble world, and never departing from its own proper habitation, but established on high, sends through soul these objects of sensible inspection. But soul from its proximity to intellect, is in a greater de¬ gree disposed according to the form which flourishes there, and to some of the natures posterior to itself imparts a sameness of subsistence, but. to others a subsistence which is different at different times, and a wandering which proceeds in an orderly course. Souls, however, do not always equally descend, but sometimes more, and at other times less, though they may belong to the same genus. But each soul descends to that which is prepared for its reception, according to similitude of disposi-

355

lion. For it tends to that to which it has become

r ·

r ' »

similar ; one soul indeed to iman, but another to some other animal.

; . . l, ,·'··■- . ^ · . ( .·

But each soul descends to that which is prepared for its reception, according to similitude of disposi-

355

lion. For it tends to that to which it has become

r ·

r ' »

similar ; one soul indeed to iman, but another to some other animal.

; . . l, ,·'··■- . ^ · . ( .·

XIII. For justice, which is said to be inevita¬ ble, subsists in such a manner in a ruling nature, that every thing proceeds in that order with refer* ence to which it was generated an image of arche¬ typal pre-election and disposition. And that whole form of the soul, is similar to that to which it has in itself a disposition, and which then sends and introduces it where it is proper for it to be situated ; not that it may then descend into body, or into this particular body ; but that when the prescribed period arrives, souls may as it were spontaneously descend, and enter into that receptacle in which it is necessary for them to reside. A different souh also, has a different time of descent; which when it arrives, souls descend, as if called by a cryer# enter into an appropriate body, and are similarly affected with those who are moved and borne along by the powers and strong attractions of magicians.

resemble the administration which takes place in one animal, which moves each in a certain time, and generates hair, the beard, and the Plot. Z

354

nature of horns, and now impels them to, and causes them to be efflorescent in things of this kind, which they did not possess before. They are also similar to the administration in the growth of trees which vegetate in orderly pre-established periods of time. Souls, however, proceed neither voluntarily, nor from compulsion. For that which is voluntary in them [when they descend] is not as if it were deli¬ berate choice, but resembles a physical leaping, or the natural tendencies to wedlock, or the impulses to certain beautiful actions, to which we are not excited by a reasoning process. A certain parti¬ cular thing, however, is always accompanied with a certain destiny. And to this thing the present

time, but to another the future pertains, [as to the

• .

accomplishment of the decrees of fate]. The des¬ tiny, indeed, of the intellect which is prior to the world, is to remain in the intelligible region, and from thence to impart something [to the sensible universe]. And particulars, falling under the uni¬ versal law, are from thence sent hither. For in each, that which is universal is inherent. This law, also, does not receive its perfective power exter¬ nally, but is imparted so as to be in the natures that use it, and to be carried about with them. When

355

For in each, that which is universal is inherent. This law, also, does not receive its perfective power exter¬ nally, but is imparted so as to be in the natures that use it, and to be carried about with them. When

355

the time, likewise* arrives [which the law decreed]* then that is effected which it wished to be effected* by those who possess this law. Hence, they them¬ selves accomplish the law which surrounds them* and becomes strong through being established in them ; oppressing them as it were with its wreight* and producing in them a promptitude and veher merit desire of arriving at that place, to which the law within them announces they should come.

XIV* These things* therefore* thus subsisting, this world having many lights* and being illustrated by souls* Is adorned by other prior worlds* deriving a different gift from a different world ; both from those Gods themselves, and from other intellects* through whom souls are imparted to the universe· And it is probable* that this is obscurely indicated by the fable, in which it is said that Prometheus having fashioned a woman* the other Gods also contributed to her embellishment. It is likewise said, that he mingled earth with water* and inserted the human voice ; that he gave her a form resem¬ bling that of the Goddesses ; that Venus and the Graces imparted something to her; and that a different divinity bestowed on her a different gift

And lastly, that from the gift, and all the givers, she was called Pandora. 1 For all the Gods gave something to this figment, which was produced by a certain providence.1 But what else is signified

E The recondite meaning of this fable, is thus beautifully unfolded· by Olympiodorus in his MS. Scholia, On the Gor- gias of Plato : “ Prometheus is the inspective guardian of the descent of rational souls : for to exert a providential energy is the employment of the rational soul, and prior to any thing else to know itself. Irrational natures, indeed, perceive through percussion, and prior to impulsion know nothing; but the rational nature is able, prior to information from ano¬ ther, to know what is useful. Hence, Epimetheus is the in¬ spective guardian of the irrational soul, because it knows

.... , . i t * r

through percussion, and not prior to it. Prometheus, there¬ fore, is that power which presides over the descent of rational souls. But the fire which he stole from heaven, signifies the rational soul itself ; because as fire tends upward, so the ra¬ tional soul pursues things on high. But you will say, why is this fire said to have been stolen ? I answer, that which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is foreign. Since, therefore, the rational soul is sent from its proper place of abode on high, to earth as to a foreign region, on this

account the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it con-

' » * * · ^ r *. .

I answer, that which is stolen is transferred from its proper place to one that is foreign. Since, therefore, the rational soul is sent from its proper place of abode on high, to earth as to a foreign region, on this

account the fire is said to be stolen. But why was it con-

' » * * · ^ r *. .

cealed in a reed ? Because a reed is cavernous, and therefore signifies the fluid body in which the soul is carried. Why, however, was the fire stolen, contrary to the will of Jupiter?

- , ·' r* t ■ ■' .. - * · '

Again, the fable speaks as a fable. For both Prometheus and Jupiter are willing that the soul should abide on high ; but as it is requisite that she should descend, the fable fabricates par^· ticulars accommodated to the persons. And it represents, in·

.** r*4*' f

deed, tt*c superior character, which is Jupiter, as unwilling ;

857

by Prometheus warning his brother Epimetbeus, not to accept the gift4 [Pandora], than that the choice of that which is in the intelligible, is more excellent [than of that which is in the sensible world ?] The maker, however, Prometheus, was afterwards bound, because in a certain respect he comes into contact with the thing generated by

for he wishes the soul always to abide on high : but .the jnfe» rior character, Prometheus, obliges her to descend, Jupiter, therefore, ordered Pandora to be made9 And what else is this than the irrational soult which is of a feminine characteristic f For as it was necessary that the soul should descend to these lower regions, but being incorporeal and divine, it was impos¬ sible for her to be conjoined with body without a medium ; hence she becomes united with it through the irrational souL But this irrational soul was called Pandora, because each of the Gods bestowed on it some particular gift» And this signi·» iies that the illuminations which terrestrial natures receive, take place through the celestial bodies/* 3

a Fieinus, in what is here said of Prometheus, appears to have entirely mistaken the meaning of Plotinus, and also not to have attended to what is asserted in the fable itself. For the translation of Ficinus is : “ Quod a lit, cm Epimetbeus ei donum dederit nullum/* But the Greek is : o Se π γομηθεν$ €ΐ7τοποιονμςνο$ το Βωρον αυτόν & See the Works and Days of Hesiod.

s For the irrational soul is an immaterial bodyr or in other words, vitalized extension , inch as the mathematical bodies which we frame in the phantasy or imagination ; and the celestial bodies are of /this·· kind, „

358

him. A bond, also* of this kind is external, and the solution of it is by Hercules ; because he possesses a liberating power* Of these things, however, any one may form whatever opinion he pleases* But it is evident that the gifts imparted to the world are indicated by this fable, and that it accords with what has been before said.

XV. Souls, therefore, fall from the intelligible world, in the first place indeed, into the heavens, and there receiving a body, they now proceed through it into more terrene bodies, so far as their progressions are more extended in length. And some of them indeed, proceed from the heavens into inferior bodies, but others pass from certain bodies into others ; these being such as have not a power sufficient to raise themselves from hence, on account of the great weight and oblivion which they have attracted, and which draw them downward by their oppressive influence. But souls become different from each other, either through the diver¬ sity into which they are introduced, or through the difference of their fortunes and educations ; or again, they have a difference from themselves ; or they differ in all these respects, or in some of them.

359

And some of them, indeed, entirely fall under the dominion of the fate which is here ; but others, at one time are subject to fate, and at another are dependent only on themselves* Others again grant that such things as are necessary must indeed be endured, but that such things as are their own works belong to themselves, and that living accord» ing to another legislation which comprehends in itself all beings, they give themselves to another more sacred law* This legislation, however, is a contexture consisting of all the reasons and causes that are here, of psychical motions and the laws derived from thence· It also accords with these, thence receives its principles, and weaves together with them whatever is of a consequent nature· And such things indeed, as are able to save them¬ selves according to their proper habit, it preserves unshaken ; but it conducts other things to that con¬ dition of being to which they are naturally adapted, so as to be the cause in their descent of the different

situations of different things.

XVI. The punishments, therefore, which are inflicted with justice on the wicked, it is proper to refer to the order which leads every thing in a be-

coming manner. Such things* however, as happen to the good without justice, as punishments, or poverty, or disease, may be said to take place through offences committed in a former life. For these things are woven together, and are pre-signi-

fied, so that they are also produced according to

Such things* however, as happen to the good without justice, as punishments, or poverty, or disease, may be said to take place through offences committed in a former life. For these things are woven together, and are pre-signi-

fied, so that they are also produced according to

reason. Or shall we say that these are not effected according to physical reasons, nor to he ranked among things which have a precedaneous subsist¬ ence* but among such as are consequent to them ? As if some edifice should fall, the animal upon which it falls would be killed, whatever it might be. Or as if two certain things moving with an orderly motion, or even one thing thus moving, that which happens to fall at the time, should be broken or trampled on. Or it may be said, that this un¬ just circumstance is not an evil to him who suffers it, and is useful to the connexion of the whole of things. Or that neither is it unjust, things having a just retribution from antecedent transactions. For it is not proper to think that some things are co-ordinated, but that others are to be referred to the impulse of arbitrary will. For if it is necessary that things should be generated according to causes and physical consequences, and according to one

361

reason and one order, it is also necessary to think that the smallest things are co-ordinated, and woven together. Hence the unjust conduct of one man towards another, is indeed unjust to the doer, and the agent is not without blame, yet being co-ordi¬ nated in the universe, it is not unjust with reference to it, nor to him who suffers the injury, but it was thus fit that it should take place. But if he who is injured is a worthy man, the end of these things is good to him.® For it is necessary to think, that this co-ordination of things is not without divinity, and is not unjust, but is accurate in the retribution of that which is appropriate ; but that it has im ma¬ nifest causes, and on this account is the occasion of

j . ' - -

blame to the ignorant.

XVII. That souls, however, first descend from

401

' - -

blame to the ignorant.

XVII. That souls, however, first descend from

401

itself. And this again in another, as far as to in¬ tellect. But not in place. For no one o.f these was in place. And much less is intellect in place; so that neither is soul. Hence, soul being no where, in that which is no where it is thus also every where. But if soul proceeding to the super¬ nal realms, should stop in its progression in that which is between, before it has entirely arrived at the summit, it will have a middle life, and will be established in that part of itself. Intellect, how¬ ever, is all these, and yet it is not. It is, indeed, because they are from it ; and again, it is not, be¬ cause abiding in itself, it gave them to exist Hence, there is an abundant life in the universe, which is as it were extended into length, and has each of its parts in a successive order. The whole, however, is in continuity with itself, but the parts are distinguished by a proper difference, that which is prior not being destroyed in that which is pos¬ terior. What then is the soul which is ingenerated in plants ? And does it generate nothing else than that in which it is ? How this is effected, however, must be considered by us, assuming for this pur¬ pose another principle*

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Plot .

402

GNOSTIC HYPOSTASES,

AND

THAT WHICH IS BEYOND THEM.

I. Is it therefore necessary, that intellect should be in itself various, in order that by one of the things contained in itself, having surveyed the rest, it may be thus said to understand itself, as if it would not be able to be converted to, and have an intellectual perception of itself, if it was entirely simple ? Or is it also possible for that which is not a composite, to have the intellection of itself? For that which is said to perceive itself intellectually because it is a composite, and because by one of the things in itself it understands the rest, just as if by sense we should apprehend the form * of our-

s The word used here by Plotinus is μορφή , which, as we have elsewhere observed, pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies.

403

selves, and the other nature of the body, will not have a truly intellectual perception of itself. For in a thing of this kind, the whole will not be known, unless that which understands other things that are with itself, understands also itself ; since otherwise we shall not have the object of investigation, viz* that which perceives itself, but we shall have one thing perceiving another* It is necessary, there¬ fore, to admit that the intellectual perception of itself is the province of a simple nature, and how this is effected must, if possible, be considered ; or we must abandon the opinion that there is some¬ thing which truly intellectually perceives itself. To abandon, however, this opinion is not easy, since the rejection of it is attended with many absurdi¬ ties. For if we do not admit that to assign this power to the soul is not very absurd, yet not to ascribe it to the nature of intellect is perfectly ab¬ surd ; viz. if we grant that it has indeed a know¬ ledge of other things, but has no knowledge and science of itself. For sense, and not intellect, will have an apprehension of things external ; and if you are willing to grant it, this will also be the case with the dianoetic power and opinion. But whe¬ ther intellect has a knowledge of these or not, it is

404

fit to consider. It is evident, indeed, that intellect knows such things as are intelligible. Does it, therefore, know these alone, or also itself that knows these ? And does it thus far know itself, that it knows these alone, but does not know what itself is ? Hence, it will perceive that it knows some things belonging to itself, but it will not know what itself is ; or it will both know the things which are its own, and itself. And what the mode of this knowledge is, and how far it extends, must be con» sidered.

II. In the first place, however, we must inquire concerning the soul, whether the knowledge of it* self is to be attributed to it, what the gnostic power of it is, and how it subsists. With respect to the sensitive power, therefore, of the soul, we must immediately say that its energy is directed to ex¬ ternals alone. For though there is a co-sensation of things which inwardly take place in the body, yet here the apprehension is of things which are external to sense : for then there is a sensation of the passions which are in the body. But the power in the soul which reasons, and which forms a judg¬ ment of the phantasms adjacent from sense, collects

405

But the power in the soul which reasons, and which forms a judg¬ ment of the phantasms adjacent from sense, collects

405

and divides them, surveys the impressions as it were which are derived from intellect, and pos¬ sesses about these the same power [as intellect]. It likewise assumes intelligence, as knowing and adapting new and recently acceding impressions to those in itself which are ancient. And this know¬ ledge and adaptation, we say, are the reminiscences of the soul. The intellect of the soul, also, stops as far as this in its power. [It must be investi¬ gated, therefore, whether the reasoning power also,1] is converted to, and knows itself, or whether this must be referred to intellect. For if we attri¬ bute a knowledge of itself to this part, we must admit that it is intellect ; and in this case, we must investigate in what it differs from a superior intel¬ lect. But if we do not grant that it has a know- ledge of itself, by a reasoning process we must pro¬ ceed to the intellect which is superior, and we must consider what it is for this to know itself. And if we grant that this is also the province of the reasoning power, we must investigate what the dif-

* It appears from the version of Ficinus, that it is necessary here after the word Ιυναμει in the original, to supply and read as follows: Ζητητεον apa , et το λογιζομενον καί -as eavror.

ferc-nce is between the two in self-knowledge. For if there is no difference, then this our intellect is the highest. This dianoetic part, therefore, of the soul, is it converted to itself, or not ? Or has it [only] a knowledge of the impressions which it re¬ ceives both from intellect and sense ? And in the first place, it must be investigated how it possesses this knowledge.

III. For sense, indeed, sees a man, and trans¬ mits the figure of him to the dianoetic part. But what does this part say ? Perhaps it does not yet say any thing, but only knows that it is a man, and there stops. Unless, indeed, it should consider with itself, who this is, if it happens that it has be¬ fore met with him, and should say, employing memory for this purpose, that it is Socrates. If, however, it should also evolve the form of the man, it will then distribute into parts those things which it received from the imagination. And if it should also say, Is he a good man ? it will make this inquiry from the information which it derived through sense. But that which it says on this occasion, it will now possess from itself, containing in itself a role by which it forms a judgment of

407

And if it should also say, Is he a good man ? it will make this inquiry from the information which it derived through sense. But that which it says on this occasion, it will now possess from itself, containing in itself a role by which it forms a judgment of

407

good. How then does it contain the good in it¬ self? May we not say, so far as it is boniform, and is corroborated to the perception of a thing of this kind, in consequence of intellect shining upon it? For the pure part of the soul is this, and receives the supervening vestiges of intellect. Why, how¬ ever, is not this intellect, but the rest beginning from the sensitive power is soul ? May we not say, because it is necessary that soul should consist in the discursive energies of reason ? But all these^ are the works of the reasoning power. Why, how¬ ever, do we not grant to this part the power of intellectually perceiving itself, and thus become liberated from doubt ? Is it because we assign to it the office of considering, and being busily em¬ ployed about externals ; but we conceive it to be the province of intellect, to survey both itself, and the forms which it contains ? If, however, some one should say, what therefore prevents this part from considering things pertaining to itself, by ano¬ ther power ? He who says this, does not investigate either the dianoetic or reasoning power, but assumes a pure intellect. What then prevents a pure intel¬ lect from existing in the soul ? We reply, nothing prevents this. But farther still, it is necessary to

408

inquire, whether this pure intellect is something belonging to soul? 1 We reply, it does not belong to the soul, and yet it is our intellect, being dif¬ ferent from the dianoetic power, and proceeding on its summit. At the same time, however, it is ours, though we must not con-numerate it with the parts of the soul. Or we may say, that it is ours, and yet not ours. Hence we use, and do not use it ; but we always employ the dianoetic power. And it is ours indeed, when we use it, but not ours

when we do not use it .* But what is it to use a

- - *

* Both the sense of this passage, and the version of Ficinus require that instead of αλλ’ eri bei Xeyeiv, ψυχής τουτο3 we should read, aXX' ert bei Xeyeiv, ei tl ψυχής τούτο ;

And it is ours indeed, when we use it, but not ours

when we do not use it .* But what is it to use a

- - *

z The intellect which is ours when we use it, and not ours when we do not, is a partial intellect of the Mi nerval series, which is proximately participated by daemoniacal souls, and illuminates ours when we convert ourselves to it, and render our rational part intellectual. This in the Phaedrus is said to be the governor of the soul, and to be the only thing which perceives real being. But the soul also perceives it in con¬ junction with this intellect, when she is nourished by the sum¬ mit of her reasoning power and by science. This intellect, likewise, is spoken of in the Tim* us, and is denominated intel¬ ligence. For it is there said, that true being is apprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason . Hence, as Proclus beautifully observes, “ when reason intellectually perceives eternal being, as reason indeed, it energizes transitively, but as perceiving intellectually , it energizes with simplicity, under-

409

pure intellect? Is it to pronounce ourselves as be¬ coming either such an intellect, or conformable to

standing each thing as simple, yet not understanding all things at once, but passing from some things to others. At the same time, however, it perceives each of the things which it sees transitively as one simple thing.”

At the same time, however, it perceives each of the things which it sees transitively as one simple thing.”

In another part of his Commentary on the Timaeus, (p. 321.) he also admirably observes respecting this partial intellect as follows : “ What the impartible is in each partial soul (i. e. in a soul such as ours) is truly dubious. For it must not be admitted, that there is an intellect in each, and this partial. May we not say, therefore, that each partial soul is essentially suspended from a certain daemon ; and as every daemon has a daemoniacal intellect above itself, a partial soul also has this same intellect arranged as an impartible essence prior to it¬ self? Hence, the daemoniacal soul participates piimarily of this intellect ; but the partial souls that are under it, seconda» rily ; and which also causes them to be partial. For each partial soul has the partible as its peculiarity, but has the im¬ partible in common with the drnmons that are above these souls and whose peculiarity is the impartible. Hence, too, d®mons remain on high, but partial souls at a certain time descend, and divide themselves about bodies, as being more adapted to these. For if in partial souls, the genus of differ¬ ence is exuberant, which is the reason why they are not always able to energize according to all their powers, it is necessary that they should be in a greater degree adapted to a life divisi¬ ble about body, and in a greater degree be separated from an impartible essence ; by this means preserving an analogy to each of the extremes. Just as it is necessary that the most divine of souls, through their similitude to intellect, should in a greater degree be exempt from partible natures, but be more united to the impartible essences above them, and from which

410

it? For we are not intellect. We subsist, there¬ fore, conformable or according to it, the first rea¬ soning power being the recipient of it. For we are sentient through sense, and we ourselves per¬ ceive sensibly. Are we therefore thus dianoetically perceived, and do we thus dianoetically energize ? Or shall we say that we indeed are reasoning beings, and that we intellectually perceive the con¬ ceptions which are in dianoia ? For we are this. But the conceptions arising from the energies of intellect, are in such a way above us, as those

Or shall we say that we indeed are reasoning beings, and that we intellectually perceive the con¬ ceptions which are in dianoia ? For we are this. But the conceptions arising from the energies of intellect, are in such a way above us, as those

they are connascently suspended. They also have an intellec¬ tual arrangement among souls. And it is reasonable to sup¬ pose, that the intellect of each daemon, so far as it is a whole and one, is the intellect of the daemon which proximately [i. c. immediately] participates it, but that it comprehends in itself the number of souls that are under it, and the intellectual paradigms of them. Each partial soul, therefore, will have its appropriate paradigm in this intellect, and not simply the whole of this intellect, in the same manner as the daemon who is essentially the leader of these souls. Defining, therefore, more accurately, we may say, that the impartible of each par¬ tial soul, is the form that is above it, which is comprehended in the one intellect that is allotted the government of the demoniacal series, under which each partial soul is arranged. And thus both the assertions are true, viz. that the intellect alone of each of these souls ranks among things which are al¬ ways established on high, and that every partial soul is the medium of the impartible above it, and the partible nature posterior to it/'

411

arising frofm the energies of sense are beneath us. And we are this peculiarity of soul, viz. the middle of a twofold power, the worse and the better ; sense being the worse, but intellect the better power. And with respect to sense, indeed, it seems that we always grant it to be ours ; for we are always sentient ; but this is dubious with re¬ spect to intellect, because we do not always use it s and because it is separate. But it is separate be¬ cause it does not verge to us, but we rather looking on high, tend to it. Sense, however, is our mes¬ senger, but intellect is our king. ay as she was when she came from the one , then she is able to perceive it, as far as it is naturally capable of being seen. He, therefore, who has not yet arrived thither* but either on account of the abovementioned obstacle is deprived of this vision, or through the want of reason which may conduct him to it, and impart faith respecting it ; such a one may consider him¬ self as the cause of his disappointment through these impediments, and should endeavour by sepa¬ rating himself from all things to be alone. But with respect to arguments in the belief of which he is deficient* he should conceive as follows :

V. Whoever fancies that beings are governed by fortune and chance* and are held together by corpo- Plot, 2 H

482

But with respect to arguments in the belief of which he is deficient* he should conceive as follows :

V. Whoever fancies that beings are governed by fortune and chance* and are held together by corpo- Plot, 2 H

482

real causes, is very remote from God, and the con¬ ception of the one . Our arguments, likewise, are not addressed to these, but to those who admit that there is another nature besides bodies, and who ascend [at least] as far as to soul. It is necessary, therefore, that these should be well acquainted with the nature of soul, both as to other things, and to its being derived from intellect ; from which also parti¬ cipating of reason, it possesses virtue. After these things, however, he should admit the subsistence of another intellect, different from that which reasons, and which is denominated rational. He should likew ise consider reasonings to subsist now as it were in interval and motion, and sciences to be such-like reasons in the soul, with an [evolved] and manifest subsistence ; in consequence of intellect which is the cause of sciences being now infused into the soul. Hence in this ease, the soul has as it were a sensible perception of intellect, through apprehend¬ ing it incumbent on soul, and containing in itself the intelligible world, a tranquil intellect, and a quiet motion, and having and being all things, — a multitude without separation, and again a separate multitude. For it is neither separated like the reasons [i. e, forms or ideas in the human soul]

483

which are perceived by our intellect one at a time/ [and not simultaneously,] nor is it a confused mul¬ titude. For each of the forms contained in it pro¬ ceeds separate from the rest ; in the same manner as in the sciences, where all things subsisting in an impartible nature, at the same time each is separate from the rest. This multitude, therefore, subsisting at once is the intelligible world, which is imme- diately united to the first principle of things, and which the same reason that demonstrates the exist¬ ence of soul says has a necessary subsistence. This, however, has a more principal subsistence than soul, yet is not the first of things, because it is not [profoundly] one, and simple. But the onei and the principle of all things, is simple. Hence that which is prior to the most honourable thing among beings/ if it is necessary there should be

1 In the original, owe γαρ διακεκριται ως οι Χογοι οι ηδη καθ' εν νοούμενοι , which Ficinus not understanding has erroneously translated as follows: “ Neque enim discernitur sicut rationes in probatione solcnt, sed tanquam rationes jam secundum unum quiddam excogitante." For the human intellect perceives only one form or idea at a time ; but a divine intellect sees all forms at once.

1 Instead of το δη ττρο τον εν τοι$ ου δ' τιμιωτατον here, it is necessary to read το δη ττρο τον cv rois ονσιν τιμιωτατον*

484

- r

1 Instead of το δη ττρο τον εν τοι$ ου δ' τιμιωτατον here, it is necessary to read το δη ττρο τον cv rois ονσιν τιμιωτατον*

484

- r

something prior to intellect, which wishes indeed to be one, yet is not one, but has the form of one, be-6 cause intellect is not in itself dispersed, but is truly present with itself, and does not, in consequence of its proximity to the one , divulse itself, though in a certain respect it dares to depart from the one that, I say, which is prior to intellect and is the oney is a prodigy, and is not being, lest here also the one should be predicated of another thing, to wffiich no name is in reality adapted. But if it is necessary to give it a name, it may appropriately be called in common one} yet not as being first something else* and afterwards one. It is indeed on this account difficult to be known ; but is principally to be known from its offspring essence. And intellect leads to essence. The nature also of the one is such, that it is the fountain of the most excellent things, and a power generating beings, abiding in itself without diminution, and not subsisting in its progeny. But we denominate it the one from ne^ cessity, in order that we may signify it to each other by a name, and may be led to an impartible con¬ ception, being anxious that our soul may be one.®

* Instead of και την ^ν^ην ev ου OeXovres in this place, it is requisite to read και την ψνχην ev eivat OeXovres*

485

We do not, however, here speak of the one and the impartible in such a way as when we speak of a point or the monad. For that which is after this manner one, is the principle of quantity, which could not subsist unless essence had a prior exist¬ ence, and also that which is antecedent to essence* It is necessary therefore to project the dianoetic power to these ; but we should consider the monad and a point as having an analogical similitude to the one , on account of their simplicity, and their dying from multitude and division,

VI. How, therefore, can we speak of the onef and how can we adapt it to intellectual concep¬ tion ? Shall we say that this may be accomplished, by admitting that it is more transcendently one than the monad and a point? For in these, in¬ deed, the soul taking away magnitude and the multitude of number, ends in that which is smallest, and fixes itself in a certain thing which is indeed impartible, but which was in a partible nature, and is in something different from itself. But the one is neither in another thing, nor in that which is partible. Nor is it impartible in the same way as that which is smallest. For it is the greatest of all

486

But the one is neither in another thing, nor in that which is partible. Nor is it impartible in the same way as that which is smallest. For it is the greatest of all

486

things, not in magnitude, but in power. So that it is without magnitude in power. For the natures also which are [immediately] posterior to it, are im¬ partible in powers, and not in bulk. The prin¬ ciple of all things likewise must be admitted to be infinite, not because he is magnitude or number which cannot be passed over, but because the power of him is incomprehensible.1 For when you conceive him to be intellect or God, lie is more [excellent] than these. And again, when by the dianoetic power you equalize him with the o)ie, or conceive him to be God, by recurring to that which is most united in your intellectual perception, he even transcends these appellations. For he is in himself, nor is any thing accidental to him. By that which is sufficient to itself also the unity of his nature may be demonstrated. For it is neces¬ sary that the principle of all things should be most sufficient both to other things, and to itself, and that it should also be most un-indigent. But every thing which is multitudinous and not one, is indi¬ gent ; since consisting of many things it is not one. Hence the essence of it requires to be one. But

5 For περϊΧηπτφ here, it is necessary to read αχ€ριληπτφ laudari% amari denique a videntibus possunt , multiformis adunata con¬ gest io, Nam et tenebrae praeponentur lumini, et mors vita utilior judicabitur. Nemo suspiciet ccelum. Religiosus pro insano, irreligiosus putabitur prudenst furiosus fortis, pro bono habebitur pessirnus. Anima enim et omnia circum earn qui-

552

purpose called in the assistance of the Barbarians* and erected a temple in the city, having previously

Nemo suspiciet ccelum. Religiosus pro insano, irreligiosus putabitur prudenst furiosus fortis, pro bono habebitur pessirnus. Anima enim et omnia circum earn qui-

552

purpose called in the assistance of the Barbarians* and erected a temple in the city, having previously

bus aut immortalis nata est, aut immortal itatem se consecti- turam esse praesumit ; secundum quod vobis exposui, non solum risus, sed etiam putabitur vanitas. Sed mihi credite etiam periculum capitate constituetur in eum, qui se mentis reli- gioni dederit . Nova constituentur jura, lex nova, nihil sanc¬ tum, nihil religiosum, nec ccelo, nec coelestibus dignum audietur, aut mente credetur. Fiet Deorum ab hominibits dolenda se¬ cession soli nocentes angeli remanebant, qui humanitati commixti ad omnia audacice mala miseros manu inject a compellent in bella, in rapinas , in fraudes, et in omnia quce sunt animarum naturae cont r aria. Tunc non terra constabit, nec navigabitur mare, nec coelum astrorum cursibus, nec siderum cursus con- stabit in ccelo. Omnis vox divina necessaria taciturnitate mutescet, fructus terrae corrumpentur, nec foecundaerit tellus, et aer ipse mcesto torpore languescet. Haec et talis senectus veniet mundi, irreligio, inordinatio, irrationabilitas bonorum omnium. Cbm ha2c cuncta contigerint, O Asclepi, tunc ille dominus et pater, Deus primipotens, et unus gubernator mun¬ di, intuens in mores factaque voluntaria voluntate sua, qum est Dei benignitas, vitiis resistens, et corruptelae omnium errorem revocans, malignitatem omnem vel alluvione diluens, vel igne consumens, vel morbis pestilentiisque per diversa loca dispersis finiens, ad antrquam faciem mundam revocabit, ut et mundus ipse adorandus videatur et mirandus, et tanti operis effector et restitutor Deus ab omnibus qui tunc eruht frequentibus lau- dum praeconiis benedictionibusque celebretur. Haec enim mundi genitura cunctarum reformatio rerum bonarum, et na¬ turae ipsius sanctissima et religiosissima restitutio, peracto tern- poris cursu, quae est et fuit sine initio sempiterna. Voluntas enim Dei caret initio, qua? eadem est, et ubique est sempi- terna.” i. e.

553

subverted the laws of his country. When these things therefore came to pass, the stranger began

Voluntas enim Dei caret initio, qua? eadem est, et ubique est sempi- terna.” i. e.

553

subverted the laws of his country. When these things therefore came to pass, the stranger began

st Are you ignorant, O Asclepius, that Egypt is the image of heaven, or, which is more true, a translation and descent of every thing which is governed and exercised in heaven ? And if it may be said, our land is truly the temple of the whole world. Nevertheless, because it becomes wise men to fore¬ know all things, it is not lawful you should be ignorant that the time will come when it may seem that the Egyptians have in vain, with a pious mind and sedulous religion, paid attention to divinity, and all their holy veneration shall become void and of no effect. For divinity shall return back from earth to heaven, Egypt shall be forsaken, and the land which was the seat of divinity, shall be destitute of religion, and deprived of the presence of the Gods. For when strangers shall possess and fill this region and land , there shall not only be a neglect of religion , but , which is more miserable , there shall be laws enacted against religion , piety , and divine worship ; they shall be prohibited , and punishments shall be irficted on their vota¬ ries . Then this most holy land, the seat of places consecrated to divinity , and of temples, shall be full of sepulchres and dead bodies. 0 Egypt, Egypt, fables alone shall remain of thy re¬ ligion, , and these such as will be incredible to posterity , and words alone shall be left engraved in stones , narrating thy pious deeds. The Scythian , also , or Indian , or some other similar nation , shall inhabit Egypt. For divinity shall return to heaven, all its inhabitants shall die, and thus Egypt, bereft both of God and man, shall be deserted. Ϊ call <>n thee, O most holy river, and predict to thee future events. Thou Shalt burst forth with a torrent of blood, full even to thy banks, and thy divine waters shall not only be polluted with blood, but the land shall be inundated with it, and the number of the dead shall exceed that of the living. He likewise who survives, shall only by his language be known to be an Egyj -

554

to think that this was the event which divinity had predicted. And perhaps, said he, 1 shall be a

He likewise who survives, shall only by his language be known to be an Egyj -

554

to think that this was the event which divinity had predicted. And perhaps, said he, 1 shall be a

tlan, but by his deeds he will appear to be a stranger. Why do you weep* O Asclepius ? Egypt shall experience more ample, and much worse evils than these, though she was once holy, and the greatest lover of the Gods on the earth, by the desert of her religion. And she who was alone the reductor of sanctity, and the mistress of piety, will be an example of the greatest cruelty. Then also, through the weariness of men, the world will not appear to be an admirable and adorable thing. This whole good, a better than which, as an object of percep¬ tion, there neither is, nor was, nor will be, will be in danger, and will be grievous to men. Hence this whole world will be despised, and will not be beloved, though it is the immutable work of God, a glorious fabric, a good compounded with a multiform variety of images, a machine of the will of God, who in his work gave his suffrage without envy, that all things should be one. It is also a multiform collected heap, capable of being venerated, praised and loved by those that behold it. For darkness shall be preferred to light, and death shall be judged to be more useful than life. No one shall lookup to heaven. The religious man shall be accounted insane, the irre¬ ligious shall be thought wise , the furious brave , and the worst of men shall be considered a good man . For the soul and all things about it, by which it is either naturally immortal, or conceives that it shall attain to immortality, conformably to what I have explained to you, shall not only be the subject of laughter, but shall be considered as vanity. Believe me, like¬ wise , that a capital punishment shall be appointed for him who applies himself to the religion of intellect. New statutes and new laws shall be established , and nothing religious or which is worthy of heaven*, or celestial concerns , shall be heard , or be¬ lieved by the mind. There will be a lamentable departure of

555

spectator of what will follow, He, likewise, then learnt some particulars about Osiris which would

There will be a lamentable departure of

555

spectator of what will follow, He, likewise, then learnt some particulars about Osiris which would

the Gods from men ,1 noxious angels % will alone remain , xvho being mingled with human nature will violently impel the mise¬ rable men [of that time\ to war, to rapine , to fraud , and to every thing contrary to the nature of the soul. Then the earth shall be in a preternatural state, the sea shall not be sailed in, nor shall the heavens accord with the course of the stars, nor the course of the stars continue in the heavens. Every divine voice shall be dumb by a necessary silence , the fruits of the earth shall be corrupted, nor shall the earth be prolific, and the air itself shall languish with a sorrowful torpor. These events and such an old age of the world as this shall take place, such irreligion, inordination, and unreasonableness of all good. When all these things shall happen, O Asclepius, thenlhat lord and father, the God who is first in power, and the one governor of the world, looking into the manners and voluntary deeds [of men], and by his will which is the benignity of God, resist¬ ing vices, and recalling the error arising from the corruption of all things, washing away likewise all malignity, by a de¬ luge, or consuming it by fire, or bringing it to an end by dis» ease and pestilence dispersed in different places, will recall the

* Proclus finding that this was partially the case in his time, says prophetically in the Introduction to his MS. Commentary on the Par¬ menides of Plato, τούτον tyw φαιην ay τύπον φιλοσοφίας ιις ανθξωπους ιλθιιν cr’ ιυίξγισια των TijSt -^vy^wv, α,ντι των αγαλματων, αντί των ιΐξων, αντί της ύλης αγισταας άντης , και σωτήριας apyyyov τοις yi νυν ουσιν ανΟξωποις, και τοις %ισ ανθις γινησο (Λίνοις. i. e, tc With respect to this form of philosophy [viz. of the philosophy of Plato], I should say that it came to men for the benefit of terrestrial souls; that it might be instead of statues, in¬ stead of temples, instead of the whole of sacred institutions , and the leader of salvation both to the men that now are , and to those that shall exist hereafter ”

a i. e. Evil daemons.

556

shortly happen, and others which would take place at some greater distance of time, viz. when the boy

world to its ancient form, in order that the world itself may ap¬ pear to be an adorable and admirable production, and God the fabricator and restorer of so great a work, may be cele¬ brated by all that shall then exist* with frequent solemn praises and benedictions. For this geniture 1 of the world, is the re¬ formation of all good things, and the most holy and religious restitution of the nature of it, the course of time being accom¬ plished ; * since time is perpetual, and always was without a beginning. For the will of God is without beginning, is always the same, and is every where eternal.”

For the will of God is without beginning, is always the same, and is every where eternal.”

Of this very remarkable extract, it is necessary to observe in the first place, that it was principally made by me from the edition of the Asclepian Dialogue, by Ficinus, as he appears to have had a more correct manuscript in his possession than any that have been consulted by more modem editors. Of this the learned, and at the same time philosophic, reader, will be immediately convinced, by comparing this extract with the same part of that dialogue in the most modern editions of it.

1 By the geniture of the world, the greater apucatastasis is signified, as is evident from Julius Firmicus; which restoration of things to their pristine state is, according to that author, accomplished in the space of three hundred thousand years. This great period compre¬ hends in itself, according to Petosyris and Necepso, six less periods, the last of which is under the dominion of Mercury, and abounds with improbity of every kind and inventions full of evil. “ Quia nobile in- genium in homine,” (says Firmicus) u unum vitae cursum servare non potest, ex variis institutis moribusque confusis malitiae crevit improbi- tas, et vitae scelerum flagitia, gens hominum hoc tempore, facinorosis machinationibus, et invenit et tradidit. Hac ex causa, ultimum tem¬ pos Mercuric tradendum putaverunt, ut ad imitationem istius syderis, inventa plena malitia, gens hominum conciperet potestatem.”

α i. e. A mundane period being finished.

Horns would chuse as his associate in battle^ a wolf instead of a lion. But who the wolf is3 is a

Hac ex causa, ultimum tem¬ pos Mercuric tradendum putaverunt, ut ad imitationem istius syderis, inventa plena malitia, gens hominum conciperet potestatem.”

α i. e. A mundane period being finished.

Horns would chuse as his associate in battle^ a wolf instead of a lion. But who the wolf is3 is a

In the second place, that this dialogue is of genuine antiquity and no forgery, is, I think, unquestionably evident from neither Lactantius nor Augustin having any doubt of its authenticity, though it was their interest to have proved it to be spurious if they could, because it predicts, which is the third thing espe¬ cially deserving of remark, that the memorials of the martyrs should succeed in the place of the temples of the Gods. Hence Augustin concludes this to be a prophecy or prediction made instinctu fallacis spirit us y by the instinct or suggestion of a de¬ ceitful spirit. But that this prediction was accomplished is evident, as Dr. Cudworth observes in his True Intellectual System of the Universe, p. 329· from the following passages of Theodoret, which I shall quote as translated by the Doctor. Si Now the martyrs have utterly abolished and blotted out of the minds of men, the memory of those who were formerly called Gods." And again, “ Our Lord hath now brought his dead (i. e. his martyrs) into the room and place (i. e. into the temples) of the Gods ; whom he hath sent away empty, and bestowed their honour upon these his martyrs. For now, in¬ stead of the festivals of Jupiter and Bacchus, are celebrated those of Peter and Paul, Thomas and Sergius, and other holy martyrs." Antoninus, the philosopher, also, according to Eu- napius, predicted the very same thing, viz. that after his de¬ cease, the magnificent temple of Serapis in Egypt, together with the rest, should be demolished, and the temples of the Gods be turned into sepulchres, και τα ιερά τάφους γενησεσβαί* And in the fourth and last place, the intelligent reader who compares this prediction with what is said about the philoso¬ phic stranger by Synesius in the foregoing extract will imme¬ diately see, that the former wonderfully accords with the latter.

558

sacred narration, which it is not holy to divulge, even in the form of a fable.3’

558

sacred narration, which it is not holy to divulge, even in the form of a fable.3’

Typhos, however, through his tyranny, was at length dethroned, and Osiris recalled from exile ; and Synesius towards the end of this treatise ob¬ serves, “ that the blessed body which revolves in a circle, is the cause of the events in the sublunary world. For both are parts of the universe, and they have a certain relation to each other. If, therefore, the cause of generation 1 in the things which surround us, originates in the natures which are above us, it follows that the seeds of things which happen here descend from thence. And if some one should add, since astronomy imparts credibility to this, that there are apocatastatic 1 periods of the stars and spheres, some of which are simple but others compounded, such a one will partly accord with the Egyptians, and partly with the Grecians, and wall be perfectly wise from both,

1 Instead of ei δη yeveffis ev rois π ept ημάς, αίτια yeveaews €v rots νπερ ημάς, it is necessary to read conformably to the above translation, ei δη yeveueojs ev rois περί ημάς, curia γίνε· ται} k. λ.

% i. e. Restitutions to a pristine form or condition.

559

conjoining intellect to science. A man of this kind, therefore, will not deny that in consequence of the same motions returning, effects also will re¬ turn together with their causes ; and that lives on the earth, generations, educations, dispositions and fortunes, will be the same with those that formerly existed. We must not wonder, therefore, if we behold a very ancient history verified in life, and should see things which flourished before our times, accord with what is unfolded in this narration ; and besides this, perceive that the forms which are inserted in matter, are consentaneous to the arcana of a fable.”

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ADDITIONAL NOTES.

Page l. Intellectual "Prudence . The following ac- count of the virtues is extracted from the Notes to my Translation of the Phasdo of Plato : The first of the vir¬ tues are the physical, which are common to brutes, being mingled with the temperaments, and for the most part contrary to each other; or rather pertaining to the animal. Or it may be said that they are illuminations from reason, when not impeded by a certain bad temperament : or that they are the restilt of energies in a former life. Of these Plato speaks in the Politicus and the Laws. The ethi¬ cal virtues, which are above these, are ingenerated by custom and a certain right opinion, and are the virtues of children when well educated. These virtues also are to be found in some brute animals. They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these Plot . 2 N

They likewise transcend the temperaments, and on this account are not contrary to each other. These virtues Plato delivers in the Laws. They pertain however at the same time both to reason and the irrational nature. In the third rank above these Plot . 2 N

562

are the political virtues, which pertain to reason alone ; for they are scientific. But they are the virtues of reason adorning the irrational part as its instrument ; through prudence adorning the gnostic, through fortitude the iras¬ cible, and through temperance the epithymetic power, (or the power which is the source of desire ;) but adorning all the parts of the irrational nature through justice. And of these virtues Plato speaks much in the Republic. These virtues too follow each other. Above these are the cathartic virtues, which pertain to reason alone, with¬ drawing from other things to itself, throwing aside the instruments of sense as vain, repressing also the energies through these instruments, and liberating the soul from the bonds of generation. Plato particularly unfolds these virtues in the Phaedo. Prior to these however are the theoretic virtues, which pertain to the soul, introducing itself to natures superior to itself, not only gnostically, as some one maybe induced to think from the name, but also orectically : for it hastens to become, as it were, intellect instead of soul ; and intellect possesses both desire and knowledge. These virtues are the converse of the po^- litical : for as the latter energize about things subordinate according to reason, so the former about things more excellent according to intellect. These virtues Plato delivers in the Theaetetus.

According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation

563

These virtues Plato delivers in the Theaetetus.

According to Plotinus, there is also another gradation

563

of the virtues besides these, viz. the paradigmatic. For, as our eye, when it is first illuminated by the solar light, is different from that which illuminates, as being illumi- nated, but afterwards is in a certain respect united and conjoined with it, and becomes as it were solar- form ; so also our soul at first indeed is illuminated by intellect, and energizes according to the theoretic virtues, but afterwards becomes, as it were, that which is illuminated, and ener¬ gizes uniformly according to the paradigmatic virtues. And it is the business indeed of philosophy to make us in¬ tellect ; but of theurgy to unite us to intelligibles, so that we may energize paradigmatically. And as when pos¬ sessing the physical virtues, wre know mundane bodies (for the subjects to virtues of this kind are bodies) ; so from possessing the ethical virtues, we know the fate of the universe, because fate is conversant with irrational lives. For the rational soul is not under fate ; and the ethical virtues are irrational, because they pertain to the irrational part. According to the political virtues we know mundane affairs, and according to the cathartic super¬ mundane ; but as possessing the theoretic we know intel¬ lectual, and from the paradigmatic intelligible natures. Temperance also pertains to the ethical virtues ; justice to the political, on account of compacts; fortitude to the cathartic, through not verging to matter ; and prudence to the theoretic. Observe too, that Plato in the Phaedo calls the physical virtues servile, because they may subsist

564

in servile so^ls ; but be calls the ethical

* i. e. Not being soul, it has not the essence of soul; but this does not prevent it from being something else. For the hypo¬ thesis is, if soul is not, which is equivalent to th§ assertion that if a thing is not soul, it is something else.

585

deed a being, but unconnected with soul. For thus it is different from bodies, since these are perpetually connect¬ ed with soul : and again, it is not different from bodies, so far as it has no subsistence, and is not. And this forms the third hexad.

In the fourth place then, if soul is not, the consequen¬ ces to bodies with respect to themselves are, the immove¬ able, privation of difference according to life, and the privation of sympathy with each other. The consequences which do not follow are, a sensible knowledge of each other, and to be moved from themselves. That which follows and does not follow is, to be passive to each other. For in one respect they would be passive, and in another not ; since they would be alone corporeally and not vitally passive.

That which follows and does not follow is, to be passive to each other. For in one respect they would be passive, and in another not ; since they would be alone corporeally and not vitally passive.

Again, if soul is not, the consequences to other things with respect to it are, not to be taken care of, nor to be moved by soul. The consequences which do not follow are, to be vivified and connected by souh The con¬ sequences which follow and do not follow are, to be assimilated and not assimilated to soul. For so far a§ soul having no subsistence, neither will bodies subsist, so far they will be assimilated to soul ; for they will suffer the same with it; but so far as it is impossible for that which is not to be similar to any thing, so far bodies

58 6

will have no similitude to soul. And this forms the fourth and last hexad.

Hence we conclude, that soul is the cause of life, sympathy and motion to bodies ; and in short, of their being and preservation. For soul subsisting, these are at the same time introduced ; but not subsisting, they are at the same time taken away.

P. 191. Note. Hence there is something even beyond the one*-*—' The most sublime of the arcane dogmas of the Platonic Theology is this, that the ineffable principle of things is some thing even beyond the one , as is demonstrated by Proclus in his second book On the Theology of Plato, and particularly by Datnascius in bis MS. treatise περί αρχών, On Principles. See my translation of the former of these works, and of an extract from the latter in the Additional Notes at the end of the third Volume of my Plato, and in my Dissertation on the Philosophy of Aristotle. From this extract, the following observations are selected. “ The one is not the one as that which is smallest, but it is the one as all things. For by its own simplicity it accedes to all things, and makes all things to be one. Hence all things proceed from it, because it is itself all things prior to all. And as that which has an united subsistence is prior to things which are separated from each other, so the one is many prior to the many »

587

Hence all things proceed from it, because it is itself all things prior to all. And as that which has an united subsistence is prior to things which are separated from each other, so the one is many prior to the many »

587

All things, therefore, are from the one , and with reference to the one , as we are accustomed to say. If then accord¬ ing to a more usual manner of speaking, we call things which consist in multitude and separation all things , we must admit that the united , and in a still greater degree the one , are the principles of these. But if we consider these two as all things, and assume them in conjunction with all other things, according to habitude and co-ordina¬ tion with them, we must then investigate another principle prior to all things, which it is no longer proper to consider in any way as all things, nor to co-arrange with its progeny. For if some one should say that the one, though it is all things which have in any respect a subsistence, yet is one prior to all things , and is more one than all things ; since it is one by itself, but all things as the cause of all, and according to a co-ordination with all things ; — if this should be said, the one will thus be doubled, and we ourselves shall become doubled, and multiplied about its simplicity. For, by being the one it is all things after the most simple manner. At the same time also, though this should be said, it is necessary that the principle pf all things should be exempt from all things, and consequently that it should be exempt from the most simple allness r and from a simplicity absorbing all things, such as is that of the one. Our soul, therefore, prophesies that the prin¬ ciple which is beyond all things that can in any respect be conceived, is uncoordinated with all things. Neither,

588

therefore, must it be called principle nor cause, nor that which is first nor prior to all things, nor beyond all things. By no means, therefore, must we celebrate it as all things, nor, in short, is it to be celebrated, or recalled into memory. We may also add, that the one is the summit of the many, as the cause of the things proceeding from it : and that we form a conception of the one according to a purified suspicion extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. But that which is most vene¬ rable must necessarily be incomprehensible by all concep- \

But that which is most vene¬ rable must necessarily be incomprehensible by all concep- \

lions and suspicions ; since also in other things, that which always soars beyond our conceptions is more honour¬ able than that which is more obvious ; so that what dies fro in all our suspicions will be most honourable. But if this be the case, it is nothing. Let however nothing be twofold, one better than the one, the other posterior to sensibles. If also we strive in vain in asserting these things, striving in vain is likewise twofold ; the one falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no respect what¬ ever has any subsistence. For the latter also is ineffable, as Plato says, yet according to the worse, but the former according to the better. If, too, we search for a certain advantage arising from it, this is the most necessary advan¬ tage of all others, that all things proceed as from an ady¬ tum, from the ineffable, and in an ineffable manner. For neither do they proceed as the one produces the many , nor as the united things separated , but as the ineffable similar-

589

ϊν produces all things ineffably, But if in asserting these things concerning it, that it is ineffable, that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we subvert what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names and words of our parturitions, daring anxiously to explore it, and which, standing in the vestibules of the adytum, announce indeed nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but signify the manner in which we are affected about it, our doubts and disappointments ; nor yet this clearty, but through indications to such as are able to understand these investigations. We also see that our parturitions suffer these things about the one , and that in a similar manner they are solicitous and subverted. For the one, says Plato, if it is , is not the one . But if it is not, no assertion can be adapted to it : so that neither can there be a negation of it, nor can any name be given to it ; for neither is a name simple. Nor is there any opinion nor science of it. For neither are these simple ; nor is intellect itself simple. So that the one is in every respect unknown and ineffable.

“ What then ? Shall we investigate something else beyond the ineffable ? Or perhaps, indeed, Plato leads us ineffa¬ bly through the one as a medium, to the ineffable beyond the one which is now the subject of discussion ; and this bv an ablation of the one , in the same manner as he leads us to the one by an ablation of other things. But if hav¬ ing ascended as far as to the one he is silent, this also is

But if hav¬ ing ascended as far as to the one he is silent, this also is

becoming in Plato to be perfectly silent, after the manner of the ancients, concerning things in every respect un¬ speakable; for the discourse was indeed most dangerous in consequence of falling on idiotical ears. Hence that which is beyond the one is to be honoured in the most perfect silence, and prior to this, by the most perfect ignorance, which despises all knowledge.” 4

And in another part of the same admirable work, he further observes : u Ascending therefore to the one , shall we meet with it as that which is known ? Or wishing to meet with it as such shall we arrive at the unknown ? May we not say that each of these is true? For we meet with it afar off as that which is known ; and when we are united to it from afar, passing beyond that in our nature which is gnostic of the one , then are we brought to be one, that is to be unknown instead of being gnostic. This contact, therefore, as of one with one, is above know¬ ledge, but the other is as of that which is gnostic with that which is known. As, however, the crooked is known by the straight, so we form a conjecture of the unknown

1 As that which is below all knowledge is an ignorance worse than knowledge, so the silence in which our ascent to the ineffa¬ ble terminates, is succeeded by an ignorance superior to all know¬ ledge. Let it however be carefully remembered, that such an ignorance is only to be obtained after the most scientific and intellectual energies.

591

by the known. And this indeed is a mode of knowledge* The one , therefore, is so far known, that it does not admit of an approximating knowledge, but appears afar off as known, and imparts a gnostic indication of itself. Unlike other things, however, the nearer we approach to it, it is not the more, but on the contrary less known 5 knowledge being dissolved by the one into ignorance, since as we have before observed where there is knowledge there is also separation. But separation approaching to the one is inclosed in union ; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. This, too, the analogy of Plato requires. For first, we endeavour to see the sun, and we do indeed

see it afar off ; but by how much the nearer we approach

«■>

But separation approaching to the one is inclosed in union ; so that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance. This, too, the analogy of Plato requires. For first, we endeavour to see the sun, and we do indeed

see it afar off ; but by how much the nearer we approach

«■>

to it, by so much the less do we see it : and at length, we neither see other things nor it, the eye becoming spontane¬ ously dazzled by its light. Is therefore the one in its proper nature unknown, though there is something else un¬ known beside the one ? The one indeed wills to be by itself, but with no other ; but the unknown, beyond the one, is per¬ fectly ineffable, w hich we acknowledge we neither know, nor are ignorant of, but which has about itself super-ignorance. Hence by proximity to this Ιΐίβ one itself is darkened : for being very near to the immense principle, if it be lawful so to speak, it remains as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic silence. On this account, Plato in speaking of it finds all his assertions subverted: for it is

592

near to the subversion of every thing, which takes place about the first. It differs from it however in this, that it is one simply, and that according to the one it is also at the same time all things. But the first is above the one and all things, being more simple than either of these.”

P. 558. There are apocatastatic periods of the stars and. spheres.

Of these periods of the stars, which are the causes of fertility and sterility in the sublunary region, Plato speaks in the 8th book of his Republic. And as what he says on this subject is no less obscure than important, I shall pre¬ sent the reader with the following attempt to elucidate his meaning, and to develope the mysteries of the geometric number, which he observes is the author of better and worse generations. The whole is extracted from the notes to my translation of the Republic.

In the first place, then, the passage respecting this num¬ ber is as follows : u It is indeed difficult for a city thus constituted to be changed ; but as every thing which is generated is obnoxious to corruption, neither will such a constitution as this remain for ever, but be dissolved. And its dissolution is this. Not only with respect to ter¬ restrial plants, but likewise in terrestrial animals, a fer¬ tility and sterility of soul as well as of body takes place.

593

And its dissolution is this. Not only with respect to ter¬ restrial plants, but likewise in terrestrial animals, a fer¬ tility and sterility of soul as well as of body takes place.

593

when the revolutions of the heavenly bodies complete the periphery of their respective orbits, which are shorter to the shorter-lived, and contrariwise to such as are the contrary. And with reference to the fertility and sterility of our race, although those are wise that you have edu¬ cated to be governors of cities, yet will they never by rea¬ son in conjunction with sense, observe the proper seasons, but overlook them, and sometimes generate children when they ought not. But the period to that which is divinely generated is that which the perfect number comprehends ; and to that which is generated by man, that period in which the augmentations surpassing and surpassed, when they shall have received three restitutions and four bound¬ aries of things assimilating and dissimilating, increasing and decreasing, shall render all things correspondent and effable ; of which the sesquitertian progeny, when con¬ joined with the pentad, and thrice increased, affords two harmonies. One of these, the equally equal, is a hun¬ dred times a hundred ; but the other, of equal length indeed, but more oblong, is of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of pentads, each being deficient by unity, and from two numbers that are ineffable, and from a hun¬ dred cubes of the triad. But the whole geometric number of this kind, is the author of better and worse generations ; of which when our governors being ignorant, join our couples together unseasonably, the children shall neither be of a good genius, nor fortunate/’

Plot.

oD4

But the whole geometric number of this kind, is the author of better and worse generations ; of which when our governors being ignorant, join our couples together unseasonably, the children shall neither be of a good genius, nor fortunate/’

Plot.

oD4

In the second place, with respect to the meaning of what is here said by Plato, as to the periodical mutation of things in the sublunary region, it must be observed, that all the parts of the universe are unable to participate of the providence of divinity in a similar manner, but some of its parts enjoy this eternally, and others temporally ; some in a primary, and others in a secondary degree. For the universe being a perfect whole, must have a first, a middle, and a last part. But its first parts as having the most excellent subsistence, must always exist according to nature ; and its last parts must sometimes subsist ac¬ cording to, and sometimes contrary to nature. Hence the celestial bodies, which are the first parts of the universe, perpetually subsist according to nature, both the whole spheres, and the multitude co-ordinate to these w holes ; and the only alteration which they experience, is a muta¬ tion of figure, and variation of light at different periods. But in the sublunary region, while the spheres of the ele¬ ments remain on account of their subsistence as wholes, always according to nature, the parts of these wholes have sometimes a natural, and sometimes an unnatural subsist¬ ence ; for thus alone can the circle of generation unfold all the variety w'hich it contains.

The different periods in which these mutations happen, are called by Plato, with great propriety, periods of fertility and sterility. For in these periods, a fertility or sterility of

595

men, animals, and plants, takes place ; so that in fertile periods, mankind will be both more numerous, and upon the whole, superior in mental and bodily endowments to the men of a barren period. And a similar reasoning must be extended to animals and plants. The so much celebrated heroic age, was the result of one of these fertile periods, in which men transcending the herd of mankind, both in practical and intellectual virtue, abounded on the earth.

With respect to the epithet divinely generated , it is well observed by the Greek scholiast, t( that Plato does not mean by this either the whole world, though the

epithet is primarily applicable to it, nor the celestial

With respect to the epithet divinely generated , it is well observed by the Greek scholiast, t( that Plato does not mean by this either the whole world, though the

epithet is primarily applicable to it, nor the celestial

regions only, nor the sublunary world, but every thing which is perpetually and circularly moved , whether in the heavens, or under the moon ; so far as it is corporeal calling it generated, (for no body is self-subsistent,) but so far as it is perpetually moved, divine . For it imitates the most divine of things, which possess an ever-vigilant life. But with respect to the perfect number mentioned here by Plato, we must not only direct our attention to a per¬ fect number in vulgar arithmetic, — for this is rather num¬ bered than number, tends to perfection and is never perfect, as being always in generation,— but we must survey the cause of this number, which is indeed intellec¬ tual, but comprehends the definite boundary of every

period of the world.”

596'

In the third place let us consider what Plato means by augmentations surpassing and surpassed ; things assimi¬ lating and dissimilating, increasing and decreasing, corre¬ spondent and effable.

Augmentations surpassing, are ratios of greater inequa¬ lity, viz. when the greater is compared to the less, and are multiples, super-particulars, super-partients, multiple su¬ per-particulars, and multiple super-partients. But mul¬ tiple ratio is, as we have elsewhere shown, when a greater quantity contains a less many times ; super-particular ratio is, when the greater contains the less quantity once, and some part of it besides ; and super-partient ratio is, when the greater contains the less quantity once, and certain parts of it likewise. Again, multiple super-parti¬ cular ratio is, when the greater contains the less many times, and some part of it besides ; and multiple super- partient ratio is, when the greater contains the less many times, and also some of its parts. But augmentations surpassed, are ratios of less inequality, viz. when the less is compared with the greater quantity ; as for instance, sub-multiples, sub-super-particulars, and sub-super-par- tients, and those which are composed from these three. Those numbers are called by Plato assimilating and dis¬ similating, which are denominated by arithmeticians simi¬ lar and dissimilar. And similar numbers are those whose sides are proportional, but dissimilar numbers those whose sides are not proportional. Plato also calls those

597

numbers increasing and decreasing, which arithmeticians denominate super-perfect and deficient, or more than per¬ fect and imperfect.

And similar numbers are those whose sides are proportional, but dissimilar numbers those whose sides are not proportional. Plato also calls those

597

numbers increasing and decreasing, which arithmeticians denominate super-perfect and deficient, or more than per¬ fect and imperfect.

Things correspondent and effable are boundaries which correspond in ratio with each other, and can be expressed in numbers either integral or fractional, — such as these four terms or boundaries, 27, 18, 12, 8, which are in sesquialter and sub-sesquialter ratios ; since these mutually correspond in ratio and are effable. For effable quantities are those which can be expressed in whole numbers or fractions ; and, in like manner, ineffable quantities are such as cannot be expressed in either of these, and are called by modern mathematicians surds.

< *

In the fourth place let U3 consider what we are to un¬ derstand by the sesquitertian progeny when conjoined with the pentad, and thrice increased, affording two harmonies . By the sesquitertian progeny, then, Plato means the num¬ ber 95. For this number is composed from the addition of the squares of the numbers 4 and 3, (i. e. 25,) which form the first sesquitertian ratio, and the number 70, which is composed from 40 and 30, and therefore consists of two numbers in a sesquitertian ratio. Hence, as 95 is com¬ posed from 25 and 70, it may with great propriety be called a sesquitertian progeny. This number conjoined with 5, and thrice increased, produces ten thousand and a

598

million. For 100x100=10,000, and 10,000x100= 1,000,000. But it must here be observed, that these two numbers, as will shortly be seen, appear to be considered by Plato as analogous to two parallelopipedons, the for¬ mer, viz. ten thousand, being formed from lOx 10 x 100, and the latter from 1000 X lOx 100. These two numbers are called by Plato two harmonies, for the following rea¬ son : — Simplicius, in his commentary on Aristotle’s trea¬ tise De Coelo, informs us, that a cube was denominated by the Pythagoreans harmony , because it consists of 12

bounding lines, 8 angles, and 6 sides ; and 12, 8, and 6, are

in harmonic proportion. As a parallelopipedon, therefore, has the same number of sides, angles, and bounding lines, as a cube, the reason is obvious why the numbers 10,000 and 1,000,000, are called by Plato harmonies. Hence also, it is evident why he says, “ that the other of these harmonies (viz. a million,) is of equal length indeed, but more oblong.” For if we call 100 the breadth, and 10 the depth, both of ten thousand and a million, it is evi¬ dent that the latter number, when considered as produced by 1000x10x100, will be analogous to a more oblong parallelopipedon than the former.

Again, when he says, “ that the number 1,000,000 con¬ sists of a hundred numbers from effable diameters of pentads, each being deficient by unity, and from two that are ineffable, and from a hundred cubes of the triad,” his

599

meaning is as follows. The number 1,000,000 consists of a hundred numbers, (i. e. of a hundred such numbers as 10,000,) each of which is composed from effable dia¬ meters of pentads, Sic. But in order to understand the truth of this assertion, the reader must recollect what has been delivered in chap. 34, of my Theoretic Arithmetic, viz. that there are certain numbers which are called by arithme¬ ticians effable diameters. These, also, are twofold ; for some are the diameters of even, and others of odd squares. And the diameters of effable even squares, when multiplied into themselves, produce square numbers, double of the squares of which they are the diameters, with an excess of unity. Thus, for instance, the number 3, multiplied into itself, produces 9, which is double of the square of the number 4, with an excess of unity ; and therefore 3 will be the diameter of the even square 4. But the diameters of effable odd square numbers, are in power double of the squares of w hich they are the diameters by a deficiency of unity. This being premised, it follows, that the num¬ ber 10,000 will consist of a certain number of heptads ; for 7 is the effable diameter of the square number 25. And, from what follows, it will be found that this number

is 9S9-

But the number 10,000, not only consists of 989 hep- tads, but Plato also adds, “ from two numbers that are ineffable,” viz. from two numbers the roots of which can-

600

not be exactly obtained nor expressed, either in whole numbers or fractions, such as the roots of the numbers 2 and 3. The numbers 300 and 77 are also of this kind ; and, as we shall see, appear to be the numbers signified by Plato. In the last place, he adds, <l and from a hun¬ dred cubes of the triad/’ viz. from the number 2700 ; for this is equal to a hundred times 27, the cube of 3. The numbers, therefore, that form 10,000 are as below ;

989

6,923

300

2,700

10,000

viz. 989 heptads, two ineffable numbers, 300 and 77/ and a hundred times the cube of 3, i. e. 2,700. And the whole geometric number is a million.

1 The reader, who may have my Plato and Aristotle in his pos¬ session, is requested to correct, by the above numbers, an error in the derelopement of this geometric number, which is given in the Republic of the former, and the Politics of the latter. This error originated from mis-stating the product of a hundred times t7 to be 270, instead of 2,700.

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