Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 34 — The Vedanta-Sutras, Part I (Sankara/Thibaut, page scans)

T5U \o\6

THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

[34]

HENRY FROWDE

Oxford University Press Warehouse Amen Corner, E.C.

THE

SACRED BOOKS OF THE EAST

TRANSLATED

BY VARIOUS ORIENTAL SCHOLARS

AND EDITED BY

F. MAX MULLER

vol. xxxiv

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1890

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(r$0Lr0L&M,as\ asp

CA^,

THE

VEDANTA-SOTRAS

WITH THE COMMENTARY BY

5ANKARArARYA

TRANSLATED BY

GEORGE THIBAUT

PART I

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1890

[All rights reserved ]

CONTENTS.

PAGE

Introduction ix

VEDANTA-SUTRAS WITH THE COMMENTARY ^ BY SANKARAZArYA.

i Adhyaya I.

* Pada I 3

vi Pada II ioy

^ Pada III 154

« Pada IV 237

$L AdhyAya II.

Pada I , . . 290

Pada II 363

Transliteration of Oriental Alphabets adopted for the Trans- lations of the Sacred Books of the East . . . . 445

vV

INTRODUCTION.

To the sacred literature of the Brahmans, in the strict sense of the term, i.e. to the Veda, there belongs a certain number of complementary works without whose assistance the student is, according to Hindu notions, unable to do more than commit the sacred texts to memory. In the first place all Vedic texts must, in order to be under- stood, be read together with running commentaries such as Saya;za\s commentaries on the Sa;^hitas and Brahma^as, and the Bhashyas ascribed to vSarikara on the chief Upani- shads. But these commentaries do not by themselves conduce to a full comprehension of the contents of the sacred texts, since they confine themselves to explaining the meaning of each detached passage without investigating its relation to other passages, and the whole of which they form part ; considerations of the latter kind are at any rate introduced occasionally only. The task of taking a com- prehensive view of the contents of the Vedic writings as a whole, of systematising what they present in an unsyste- matical form, of showing the mutual co-ordination or sub- ordination of single passages and sections, and of reconciling contradictions — which, according to the view of the orthodox commentators, can be apparent only — is allotted to a sepa- rate jastra or body of doctrine which is termed Mtmawsa, i. e. the investigation or enquiry kclt efox^, viz. the enquiry into the connected meaning of the sacred texts.

Of this Mimosa two branches have to be distinguished, the so-called earlier (purva) Mima^sa, and the later (uttara) Mima^sa. The former undertakes to systematise the karmaka^a, i. e. that entire portion of the Veda which is concerned with action, pre-eminently sacrificial action, and which comprises the Sawhitas and the Brahma^as exclusive of the Ara/zyaka portions ; the latter performs the same

VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

service with regard to the so-called gn&nakanda, i. e. that part of the Vedic writings which includes the Ara^yaka portions of the Brahma/zas, and a number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.

service with regard to the so-called gn&nakanda, i. e. that part of the Vedic writings which includes the Ara^yaka portions of the Brahma/zas, and a number of detached treatises called Upanishads. Its subject is not action but knowledge, viz. the knowledge of Brahman.

At what period these two ^astras first assumed a definite form, we are unable to ascertain. Discussions of the nature of those which constitute the subject-matter of the Purva Mima^sa must have arisen at a very early period, and the word Mima^sa itself together with its derivatives is already employed in the Brahma^as to denote the doubts and discussions connected with certain contested points of ritual. The want of a body of definite rules prescribing how to act, i. e. how to perform the various sacrifices in full accordance with the teaching of the Veda, was indeed an urgent one, because it was an altogether practical want, continually pressing itself on the adhvaryus engaged in ritualistic duties. And the task of establishing such rules was moreover a comparatively limited and feasible one ; for the members of a certain Vedic .rakha or school had to do no more than to digest thoroughly their own brahma/za and sa/^hita, without being under any obligation of reconciling with the teaching of their own books the occasionally con- flicting rules implied in the texts of other jakhas. It was assumed that action, as being something which depends on the will and choice of man, admits of alternatives, so that a certain sacrifice may be performed in different ways by members of different Vedic schools, or even by the followers of one and the same sakhL

The Uttara Mima^sa-^astra may be supposed to have originated considerably later than the Purva Mima/^sa. In the first place, the texts with which it is concerned doubtless constitute the latest branch of Vedic literature. And in the second place, the subject-matter of those texts did not call for a systematical treatment with equal urgency, as it was in no way connected with practice ; the mental attitude of the authors of the Upanishads, who in their lucubrations on Brahman and the soul aim at nothing less than at definite- ness and coherence, may have perpetuated itself through

INTRODUCTION. XI

many generations without any great inconvenience resulting therefrom.

XI

many generations without any great inconvenience resulting therefrom.

But in the long run two causes must have acted with ever-increasing force, to give an impulse to the systematic working up of the teaching of the Upanishads also. The followers of the different Vedic ^akhas no doubt recog- nised already at an early period the truth that, while conflicting statements regarding the details of a sacrifice can be got over by the assumption of a vikalpa, i. e. an optional proceeding, it is not so with regard to such topics as the nature of Brahman, the relation to it of the human soul, the origin of the physical universe, and the like. Concerning them, one opinion only can be the true one, and it therefore becomes absolutely incumbent on those, who look on the whole body of the Upanishads as revealed truth, to demonstrate that their teaching forms a con- sistent whole free from all contradictions. In addition there supervened the external motive that, while the karma- kanda. of the Veda concerned only the higher castes of brahmanically constituted society, on which it enjoins certain sacrificial performances connected with certain re- wards, the ^Tzanaka/^a, as propounding a certain theory of the world, towards which any reflecting person inside or outside the pale of the orthodox community could not but take up a definite position, must soon have become the object of criticism on the part of those who held different views on religious and philosophic things, and hence stood in need of systematic defence.

At present there exists a vast literature connected with the two branches of the Mima^sa. We have, on the one hand, all those works which constitute the Purva Mima/^sa-.yastra — or as it is often, shortly but not accurately, termed, the Mima^sa- i-astra — and, on the other hand, all those works which are commonly comprised under the name Vedanta-^astra. At the head of this extensive literature there stand two collec- tions of Sutras (i. e. short aphorisms constituting in their totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed authors are Gaimini and Badaraya^a. There can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two

Xli VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

e. short aphorisms constituting in their totality a complete body of doctrine upon some subject), whose reputed authors are Gaimini and Badaraya^a. There can, however, be no doubt that the composition of those two

Xli VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

collections of Sutras was preceded by a long series of pre- paratory literary efforts of which they merely represent the highly condensed outcome. This is rendered probable by the analogy of other ^astras, as well as by the exhaustive thoroughness with which the Sutras perform their task of systematising the teaching of the Veda, and is further proved by the frequent references which the Sutras make to the views of earlier teachers. If we consider merely the preserved monuments of Indian literature, the Sutras (of the two Mimosas as well as of other ^stras) mark the begin- ning ; if we, however, take into account what once existed, although it is at present irretrievably lost, we observe that they occupy a strictly central position, summarising, on the one hand, a series of early literary essays extending over many generations, and forming, on the other hand, the head spring of an ever broadening activity of commentators as well as virtually independent writers, which reaches down to our days, and may yet have some future before itself.

The general scope of the two Mima/^sd-sutras and their relation to the Veda have been indicated in what precedes. A difference of some importance between the two has, how- ever, to be noted in this connexion. The systematisation of the karmaka^a of the Veda led to the elaboration of two classes of works, viz. the Kalpa-sutras on the one hand, and the Purva Mim&^sa-sutras on the other hand. The former give nothing but a description as concise as possible of the sacrifices enjoined in the Brahma/zas; while the latter discuss and establish the general principles which the author of a Kalpa-sutra has to follow, if he wishes to render his rules strictly conformable to the teaching of the Veda. The ^Tzanak&^a of the Veda, on the other hand, is system- atised in a single work, viz. the Uttara Mim&^sa or Ved&nta- sutras, which combine the two tasks of concisely stating the teaching of the Veda, and of argumentatively establishing the special interpretation of the Veda adopted in the Sutras. This difference may be accounted for by two reasons. In the first place, the contents of the karmaki^rfa, as being of an entirely practical nature, called for summaries such as the Kalpa-sutras, from which all burdensome discussions of

INTRODUCTION. Xlll

method are excluded ; while there was no similar reason for the separation of the two topics in the case of the purely- theoretical science of Brahman. And, in the second place, the Vedanta-sutras throughout presuppose the Purva Mima/^sa-sutras, and may therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods already esta- blished in the latter.

And, in the second place, the Vedanta-sutras throughout presuppose the Purva Mima/^sa-sutras, and may therefore dispense with the discussion of general principles and methods already esta- blished in the latter.

The time at which the two Mima^sa-sutras were com- posed we are at present unable to fix with any certainty ; a few remarks on the subject will, however, be made later on. Their outward form is that common to all the so- called Sutras which aims at condensing a given body of doctrine in a number of concise aphoristic sentences, and often even mere detached words in lieu of sentences. Besides the Mima/^sa-sutras this literary form is common to the fundamental works on the other philosophic systems, on the Vedic sacrifices, on domestic ceremonies, on sacred law, on grammar, and on metres. The two Mima//zsa- sutras occupy, however, an altogether exceptional position in point of style. All Sutras aim at conciseness ; that is clearly the reason to which this whole species of literary composition owes its existence. This their aim they reach by the rigid exclusion of all words which can possibly be spared, by the careful avoidance of all unnecessary repeti- tions, and, as in the case of the grammatical Sutras, by the employment of an arbitrarily coined terminology which substitutes single syllables for entire words or combination of words. At the same time the manifest intention of the Sutra writers is to express themselves with as much clear- ness as the conciseness affected by them admits of. The aphorisms are indeed often concise to excess, but not otherwise intrinsically obscure, the manifest care of the writers being to retain what is essential in a given phrase, and to sacrifice only what can be supplied, although perhaps not without difficulty, and an irksome strain of memory and reflection. Hence the possibility of understanding without a commentary a very considerable portion at any rate of the ordinary Sutras. Altogether different is the case of the two Mima/^sa-sutras. There scarcely one single Sutra is

xiv VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

intelligible without a commentary. The most essential words are habitually dispensed with ; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple omission of the subject or predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sutra occurs whose words construe without anything having to be supplied, the phraseology is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sutra refers. When undertaking to translate either of the MimaMsa- sutras we therefore depend altogether on commentaries ; and hence the question arises which of the numerous com- mentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right understanding.

When undertaking to translate either of the MimaMsa- sutras we therefore depend altogether on commentaries ; and hence the question arises which of the numerous com- mentaries extant is to be accepted as a guide to their right understanding.

The commentary here selected for translation, together with Badaraya;za's Sutras 5 (to which we shall henceforth confine our attention to the exclusion of Gaimini's Purva Mima;^sa-sutras), is the one composed by the celebrated theologian Sankara or, as he is commonly called, Sankara- >£arya. There are obvious reasons for this selection. In the first place, the .Sankara-bhashya represents the so- called orthodox side of Brahmanical theology which strictly upholds the Brahman or highest Self of the Upanishads as something different from, and in fact immensely superior to, the divine beings such as Vishnu or Siva, which, for many centuries, have been the chief objects of popular worship in India. In the second place, the doctrine advocated by Sankara is, from a purely philosophical point of view and apart from all theological considerations, the most im- portant and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil ; neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the view represented by Sankara nor any of the non-Vedantic systems can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedanta in boldness, depth, and subtlety of speculation. In the third place, Sankara's bhashya is, as far as we know, the oldest of the extant commentaries, and relative antiquity is at any rate one of the circumstances which have to be

1 The Sutras in which the £7zanakaWa of the Veda is systematised go by- various names, being called either Vedanta-sutras, or Uttara Mimawsa-sutras, or Brahma-sutras, or .Sariraka Mimawsa-sutras.

INTRODUCTION. XV

taken into account, although, it must be admitted, too much weight may easily be attached to it. The .Sankara-briashya further is the authority most generally deferred to in India as to the right understanding of the Vedanta-sutras, and ever since 5ankara's time the majority of the best thinkers of India have been men belonging to his school. If in addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic merits of wSankara's work which, as a piece of philo- sophical argumentation and theological apologetics, un- doubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will be easily understood.

If in addition to all this we take into consideration the intrinsic merits of wSankara's work which, as a piece of philo- sophical argumentation and theological apologetics, un- doubtedly occupies a high rank, the preference here given to it will be easily understood.

But to the European — or, generally, modern — translator of the Vedanta-sutras with wSankara's commentary another question will of course suggest itself at once, viz. whether or not wSankara's explanations faithfully render the intended meaning of the author of the Sutras. To the Indian PaWit of Ankara's school this question has become an indifferent one, or, to state the case more accurately, he objects to its being raised, as he looks on wSankara's authority as standing above doubt and dispute. When pressed to make good his position he will, moreover, most probably not enter into any detailed comparison of wSankara's com- ments with the text of Badar^ya^a's Sutras, but will rather endeavour to show on speculative grounds that wSankara's philosophical view is the only true one, whence it of course follows that it accurately represents the meaning of Bada- raya/za, who himself must necessarily be assumed to have taught the true doctrine. But on the modern investigator, who neither can consider himself bound by the authority of a name however great, nor is likely to look to any Indian system of thought for the satisfaction of his speculative wants, it is clearly incumbent not to acquiesce from the out- set in the interpretations given of the Vedanta-sutras — and the Upanishads — by wSankara and his school, but to submit them, as far as that can be done, to a critical investigation.

This is a task which would have to be undertaken even if wSankara's views as to the true meaning of the Sutras and Upanishads had never been called into doubt on Indian soil, although in that case it could perhaps hardly be entered

Xvi VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

upon with much hope of success ; but it becomes much more urgent, and at the same time more feasible, when we meet in India itself with systems claiming to be Vedantic and based on interpretations of the Sutras and Upanishads more or less differing from those of 6ankara. The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the right under- standing of the fundamental authorities of the Vedanta must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to reject them.

The claims of those systems to be in the possession of the right under- standing of the fundamental authorities of the Vedanta must at any rate be examined, even if we should finally be compelled to reject them.

It appears that already at a very early period the Vedanta-sutras had come to be looked upon as an authori- tative work, not to be neglected by any who wished to affiliate their own doctrines to the Veda. At present, at any rate, there are very few Hindu sects not interested in showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Badarayazza's teaching. Owing to this the commentaries on the Sutras have in the course of time become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing, much less of those referred to and quoted. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall, in his Bibliographical Index, mentions fourteen com- mentaries, copies of which had been inspected by himself. Some among these (as, for instance, Ramanu^a's Vedanta- sara, No. XXXV) are indeed not commentaries in the strict sense of the word, but rather systematic expositions of the doctrine supposed to be propounded in the Sutras; but, on the other hand, there are in existence several true commen- taries which had not been accessible to Fitz-Edward Hall. It would hardly be practical — and certainly not feasible in this place — to submit all the existing bMshyas to a critical enquiry at once. All we can do here is to single out one or a few of the more important ones, and to compare their interpretations with those given by 5ankara, and with the text of the Sutras themselves.

The bhashya, which in this connexion is the first to press itself upon our attention, is the one composed by the famous Vaish^ava theologian and philosopher Ramanu^-a, who is supposed to have lived in the twelfth century. The Rama- nu^a or, as it is often called, the Sri-bh&shya appears to be

INTRODUCTION. XV11

the oldest commentary extant next to .Sankara's. It is further to be noted that the sect of the Rdmanu^-as occupies a pre-eminent position among the Vaish^ava sects which themselves, in their totality, may claim to be considered the most important among all Hindu sects. The intrinsic value of the 6ri- bhashya moreover is — as every student ac- quainted with it will be ready to acknowledge — a very high one ; it strikes one throughout as a very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning and great power of argu- mentation, and in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of Sankara, it not unfrequently deserves to be called brilliant even. And in addition to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Ramanu^a's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty tradition.

And in addition to all this it shows evident traces of being not the mere outcome of Ramanu^a's individual views, but of resting on an old and weighty tradition.

This latter point is clearly of the greatest importance. If it could be demonstrated or even rendered probable only that the oldest bhashya which we possess, i.e. the vSan- kara-bhashya, represents an uninterrupted and uniform tradition bridging over the interval between Badaraya^a, the reputed author of the Sutras, and Sankara ; and if, on the other hand, it could be shown that the more modern bhcishyas are not supported by old tradition, but are nothing more than bold attempts of clever sectarians to force an old work of generally recognised authority into the service of their individual tenets ; there would certainly be no reason for us to raise the question whether the later bhashyas can help us in making out the true meaning of the Sutras. All we should have to do in that case would be to accept Sankara's interpretations as they stand, or at the utmost to attempt to make out, if at all possible, by a careful comparison of Ankara's bhashya with the text of the Sutras, whether the former in all cases faithfully repre- sents the purport of the latter.

In the most recent book of note which at all enters into the question as to how far we have to accept 5ankara as a guide to the right understanding of the Sutras (Mr. A. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that Sankara is the generally recognised expositor

[34] b

Xvili VEDANTA-St)TRAS.

A. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads) the view is maintained (pp. 239 ff.) that Sankara is the generally recognised expositor

[34] b

Xvili VEDANTA-St)TRAS.

of true Vedanta doctrine, that that doctrine was handed down by an unbroken series of teachers intervening between him and the Sutrakara, and that there existed from the beginning only one Vedanta doctrine, agreeing in all essen- tial points with the doctrine known to us from vSankara's writings. Mr. Gough undertakes to prove this view, firstly, by a comparison of Ankara's system with the teaching of the Upanishads themselves ; and, secondly, by a comparison of the purport of the Sutras — as far as that can be made out independently of the commentaries — with the interpre- tations given of them by vSankara. To both these points we shall revert later on. Meanwhile, I only wish to remark concerning the former point that, even if we could show with certainty that all the Upanishads propound one and the same doctrine, there yet remains the undeniable fact of our being confronted by a considerable number of essen- tially differing theories, all of which claim to be founded on the Upanishads. And with regard to the latter point I have to say for the present that, as long as we have only vSarikara's bhashya before us, we are naturally inclined to find in the Sutras — which, taken by them- selves, are for the greater part unintelligible — the meaning which vSankara ascribes to them ; while a reference to other bhashyas may not impossibly change our views at once. — Meanwhile, we will consider the question as to the unbroken uniformity of Vedantic tradition from another point of view, viz. by enquiring whether or not the Sutras themselves, and the 5ankara-bhashya, furnish any indications of there having existed already at an early time essentially different Vedantic systems or lines of Vedantic speculation.

Beginning with the Sutras, we find that they supply ample evidence to the effect that already at a very early time, viz. the period antecedent to the final composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present shape, there had arisen among the chief doctors of the Vedanta differences of opinion, bearing not only upon minor points of doctrine, but affecting the most essential parts of the system. In addition to Badaraya/za himself, the reputed author of the

INTRODUCTION. XIX

In addition to Badaraya/za himself, the reputed author of the

INTRODUCTION. XIX

Sutras, the latter quote opinions ascribed to the following teachers : Atreya, A^marathya, Auafalomi, Karsh/za^ini, Klrakrztsna, (Jaimini, Badari. Among the passages where diverging views of those teachers are recorded and con- trasted three are of particular importance. Firstly, a passage in the fourth pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 5-7), where the opinions of various teachers concerning the characteristics of the released soul are given, and where the important discrepancy is noted that, according to Au^ulomi, its only characteristic is thought (^aitanya), while Caimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities, and Badaraya/za declares himself in favour of a combination of those two views. — The second passage occurs in the third pada of the fourth adhyaya (Sutras 7-14), where Gaimini maintains that the soul of him who possesses the lower know- ledge of Brahman goes after death to the highest Brahman, while Badari — whose opinion is endorsed by vSankara — teaches that it repairs to the lower Brahman only. — Finally, the third and most important passage is met with in the fourth pada of the first adhyaya (Sutras 20-23), where the question is discussed why in a certain passage of the Brz'hadara;zyaka Brahman is referred to in terms which are strictly applicable to the individual soul only. In con- nexion therewith the Sutras quote the views of three ancient teachers about the relation in which the individual soul stands to Brahman. According to A^marathya (if we accept the interpretation of his view given by *Sankara and Ankara's commentators) the soul stands to Brahman in the bhedabheda relation, i. e. it is neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from it, as sparks are from fire. Au^ulomi, on the other hand, teaches that the soul is alto- gether different from Brahman up to the time when ob- taining final release it is merged in it ; and Klsakr/tsna finally upholds the doctrine that the soul is absolutely non- different from Brahman, which in some way or other presents itself as the individual soul.

That the ancient teachers, the ripest outcome of whose speculations and discussions is embodied in the Vedanta- sutras, disagreed among themselves on points of vital

b2

XX VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

importance is sufficiently proved by the three passages quoted. The one quoted last is specially significant as showing that recognised authorities — deemed worthy of being quoted in the Sutras — denied that doctrine on which the whole system of 5ankara hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman.

The one quoted last is specially significant as showing that recognised authorities — deemed worthy of being quoted in the Sutras — denied that doctrine on which the whole system of 5ankara hinges, viz. the doctrine of the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman.

Turning next to the 5ankara-bMshya itself, we there also meet with indications that the Vedintins were divided among themselves on important points of dogma. These indications are indeed not numerous : 5ankara does not on the whole impress one as an author particularly anxious to strengthen his own case by appeals to ancient authorities, a peculiarity of his which later writers of hostile tendencies have not failed to remark and criticise. But yet more than once Sankara also refers to the opinion of ' another/ viz., commentator of the Sutras, and in several places Sankara's commentators explain that the ' other ' meant is the VWtti- k&ra (about whom more will be said shortly). Those references as a rule concern minor points of exegesis, and hence throw little or no light on important differences of dogma ; but there are two remarks of Ankara's at any rate which are of interest in this connexion. The one is made with reference to Sutras 7-14 of the third pada of the fourth adhyaya ; ' some/ he says there, ' declare those Sutras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhanta view, to state merely the purvapaksha ; ' a difference of opinion which, as we have seen above, affects the important question as to the ultimate fate of those who have not reached the knowledge of the highest Brahman. — And under I, 3, 19 vSankara, after having explained at length that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality, but is real only in so far as it is identical with Brahman, adds the following words, 'apare tu vadina^ paramarthikam eva ^aivaw rupam iti manyante asmadiyay ka. ke£it/ i.e. ' other theorisers again, and among them some of ours, are of opinion that the individual soul as such is real.' The term ' ours/ here made use of, can denote only the Aupanishadas or Vedantins, and it thus appears that .Sankara himself

INTRODUCTION. XXI

was willing to class under the same category himself and philosophers who — as in later times the Ramanu^as and others — looked upon the individual soul as not due to the fictitious limitations of Miy&, but as real in itself ; whatever may be the relation in which they considered it to stand to the highest Self.

From what precedes it follows that the Vedantins of the school to which Sankara himself belonged acknowledged the existence of Vedantic teaching of a type essentially different from their own. We must now proceed to enquire whether the R&manug-a system, which likewise claims to be Ved&nta, and to be founded on the Vedanta-sutras, has any title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.

We must now proceed to enquire whether the R&manug-a system, which likewise claims to be Ved&nta, and to be founded on the Vedanta-sutras, has any title to be considered an ancient system and the heir of a respectable tradition.

It appears that Rdmanu^a claims — and by Hindu writers is generally admitted — to follow in his bhashya the autho- rity of Bodhayana, who had composed a vrztti on the Sutras. Thus we read in the beginning of the Sri-bhashya (Pandit, New Series, VII, p. 163), ' Bhagavad-bodhayana- kritkm vistir/zam brahmasutra-wztti//z purv&£arya^ samki- kshipus tanmatanusdre^a sutrakshara/zi vyakhyasyante.' Whether the Bodhayana to whom that vritti is ascribed is to be identified with the author of the Kalpa-sutra, and other works, cannot at present be decided. But that an ancient vrztti on the Sutras connected with Bodh&yana's name actually existed, there is not any reason to doubt. Short quotations from it are met with in a few places of the Sri-bMshya, and, as we have seen above, Sankara's commentators state that their author's polemical remarks are directed against the Vnttikara. In addition to Bodhayana, Ramanu^a appeals to quite a series of ancient teachers — purvaMry&s — who carried on the true tradition as to the teaching of the Vedanta and the meaning of the Sutras. In the Ved&rthasangraha — a work composed by R^manu^a himself — we meet in one place with the enumeration of the following authorities : Bodhayana, 7anka, Drami^/a, Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharu^i, and quotations from the writings of some of these are not unfrequent in the Vedarthasangraha, as well as the Sri-

Xxii VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

bh&shya. The author most frequently quoted is Dramk/a 1, who composed the Dramu/a-bhashya ; he is sometimes referred to as the bhashyakara. Another writer repeatedly quoted as the vakyakara is, I am told 2, to be identified with the 7anka mentioned above. I refrain from inserting in this place the information concerning the relative age of these writers which may be derived from the oral tradition of the Ram^nu^a sect. From another source, however, we receive an intimation that Drami^a^arya or Dravu/aMrya preceded Sankara in point of time. In his /ikd on San- kara's bhashya to the .Oandogya Upanishad III, 10, 4, Anandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of Smrzti on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt made by the Dravida^arya.

In his /ikd on San- kara's bhashya to the .Oandogya Upanishad III, 10, 4, Anandagiri remarks that the attempt made by his author to reconcile the cosmological views of the Upanishad with the teaching of Smrzti on the same point is a reproduction of the analogous attempt made by the Dravida^arya.

It thus appears that that special interpretation of the Ved&nta-sutras with which the Sri-bhashya makes us acquainted is not due to innovating views on the part of R&manu^-a, but had authoritative representatives already at a period anterior to that of »Sankara. This latter point, moreover, receives additional confirmation from the relation in which the so-called Ramanu^a sect stands to earlier sects. What the exact position of Ramanu^a was, and of what nature were the reforms that rendered him so pro- minent as to give his name to a new sect, is not exactly known at present ; at the same time it is generally acknow- ledged that the R&manu^as are closely connected with the so-called Bhagavatas or Pa^aratras, who are known to have existed already at a very early time. This latter point is proved by evidence of various kinds ; for our present purpose it suffices to point to the fact that, according to the interpre- tation of the most authoritative commentators, the last

1 The name of this writer is sometimes given as Dramida, sometimes as Dravk/a. In the opinion of "Pandit R&ma Mijra Gastrin of the Benares College — himself a Ramanu^a and thoroughly conversant with the books and traditions of his sect — the form ' Drami^a' is the correct one.

2 Viz. by Pandit Rama Mi^ra Gastrin. As the "Pandit intends himself to publish all the traditional information he possesses concerning the history of the Bhagavatas and R&manu^as, I limit myself in the text to stating the most relevant results of my study of the Sri-bhashya and the Vedarthasangraha.

INTRODUCTION. XXIU

Sutras of the second p&da of the second adhyaya (Ved&nta- sutras) refer to a distinctive tenet of the Bhagavatas — which tenet forms part of the R&manu^a system also — viz. that the highest being manifests itself in a fourfold form (vyuha) as Vasudeva, Sankarsha^a, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, those four forms being identical with the highest Self, the indi- vidual soul, the internal organ (manas), and the principle of egoity (ahank&ra). Whether those Sutras embody an approval of the tenet referred to, as Ramanu^a maintains, or are meant to impugn it, as vSankara thinks ; so much is certain that in the opinion of the best commentators the Bhagavatas, the direct forerunners of the Ramanu^-as, are mentioned in the Sutras themselves, and hence must not only have existed, but even reached a considerable degree of importance at the time when the Sutras were composed. And considering the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhagavatas and the later Ramanii^as, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedanta-sutras.

And considering the general agreement of the systems of the earlier Bhagavatas and the later Ramanii^as, we have a full right to suppose that the two sects were at one also in their mode of interpreting the Vedanta-sutras.

The preceding considerations suffice, I am inclined to think, to show that it will by no means be wasted labour to enquire how Rclmanu^a interprets the Sutras, and wherein he differs from Sankara. This in fact seems clearly to be the first step we have to take, if we wish to make an attempt at least of advancing beyond the interpretations of scho- liasts to the meaning of the Sutras themselves. A full and exhaustive comparison of the views of the two com- mentators would indeed far exceed the limits of the space which can here be devoted to that task, and will, moreover, be made with greater ease and advantage when the complete Sanskrit text of the .SYi-bhashya has been printed, and thus made available for general reference. But meanwhile it is possible, and — as said before— even urged upon a translator of the Sutras to compare the interpretations, given by the two bh&shyakaras, of those Sutras, which, more than others, touch on the essential points of the Ved&nta system *. This

1 Owing to the importance of the 6ankara-bhashya as the fundamental work of the most influential Hindu school of philosophy, the number of topics which might be discussed in the introduction to its translation is considerable. But

Xxiv VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara^as of the Vedanta-sutras, according to 5ankara; a review which — apart from the side-glances at Ramanu^a's comments- will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the vSankara-bhashya. Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of 5ankara as well as of Ramanu^a, which may be referred to when, later on, discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted. In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details. Of 5ankara's system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition ; it may suffice to refer to Deussen's System of the Veddnta, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the Sankara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra- bhashya, the Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to Sankara's school. With regard to Ramanu^a's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ramanu^a chapter in the Sarvadanra^asa/^graha ; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the Sri- bhashya itself.

With regard to Ramanu^a's philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ramanu^a chapter in the Sarvadanra^asa/^graha ; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the Sri- bhashya itself.

What in .Sarikara's opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows. — Whatever is, is in reality one ; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self. This being is of an abso- lutely homogeneous nature ; it is pure ' Being,' or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (^aitanya,

the limitation of the space at our disposal necessitates a selection, and it can hardly be doubted that, among the possible tasks of a translator, that of ascertaining how far the teaching of 6ankara agrees with that of Badaraya^a, and, further, how far either of them represents the true doctrine of the Upanishads, is the one first to be taken in hand. — Some other topics, such as a detailed account of Ankara's teaching according to the bhashya, an enquiry as to the books and authors quoted by .Sahkara, &c, have, moreover, been treated not long ago in a very thorough fashion by Dr. Deussen in his l System des Vedanta.'

INTRODUCTION. XXV

gn&na). Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance ; Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it. — But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and in which we ourselves exist as individual beings? — Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which the appearance of this entire world is due. This power cannot be called ' being ' (sat), for ' being ' is only Brahman ; nor can it be called * non-being' (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world. It is in fact a prin- ciple of illusion ; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences. Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory ap- pearances of animate and inanimate beings. Maya thus constitutes the upadana, the material cause of the world ; or — if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a ^akti — we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Maya* In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called livara, the Lord.

Maya, under the guidance of the Lord, modifies itself by a progressive evolution into all the individual existences (bheda), distinguished by special names and forms, of which the world consists ; from it there spring in due succession the different material elements and the whole bodily apparatus belonging to sentient beings. In all those apparently individual forms of existence the one indivisible Brahman is present, but, owing to the particular adjuncts into which Maya has specialised itself, it appears to be broken up — it is broken up, as it were — into a multi- plicity of intellectual or sentient principles, the so-called ^ivas (individual or personal souls). What is real in each

xxvi vedAnta-s6tras.

giva. is only the universal Brahman itself; the whole aggregate of individualising bodily organs and mental functions, which in our ordinary experience separate and distinguish one £iva from another, is the offspring of Maya and as such unreal.

The phenomenal world or world of ordinary experience (vyavahara) thus consists of a number of individual souls engaged in specific cognitions, volitions, and so on, and of the external material objects with which those cognitions and volitions are concerned. Neither the specific cognitions nor their objects are real in the true sense of the word, for both are altogether due to MkyL But at the same time we have to reject the idealistic doctrine of certain Bauddha schools according to which nothing whatever truly exists, but certain trains of cognitional acts or ideas to which no external objects correspond; for external things, although not real in the strict sense of the word, enjoy at any rate as much reality as the specific cognitional acts whose objects they are.

The non-enlightened soul is unable to look through and beyond M&ya, which, like a veil, hides from it its true nature. Instead of recognising itself to be Brahman, it blindly identifies itself with its adjuncts (upadhi), the fictitious offspring of Maya, and thus looks for its true Self in the body, the sense organs, and the internal organ (manas), i. e. the organ of specific cognition. The soul, which in reality is pure intelligence, non-active, infinite, thus becomes limited in extent, as it were, limited in knowledge and power, an agent and enjoyer. Through its actions it burdens itself with merit and demerit, the consequences of which it has to bear or enjoy in series of future embodied existences, the Lord— as a retributor and dispenser — allotting to each soul that form of embodiment to which it is entitled by its previous actions. At the end of each of the great world periods called kalpas the Lord retracts the whole world, i.e. the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with up&dhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the

INTRODUCTION. XXV11

the whole material world is dissolved and merged into non-distinct Maya, while the individual souls, free for the time from actual connexion with up&dhis, lie in deep slumber as it were. But as the

INTRODUCTION. XXV11

consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted, they have again to enter on embodied existence as soon as the Lord sends forth a new material world, and the old round of birth, action, death begins anew to last to all eternity as it has lasted from all eternity.

The means of escaping from this endless sa/^sara, the way out of which can never be found by the non-enlightened soul, are furnished by the Veda. The karmaki^^a indeed, whose purport it is to enjoin certain actions, cannot lead to final release ; for even the most meritorious works necessarily lead to new forms of embodied existence. And in the gnknakiinda. of the Veda also two different parts have to be distinguished, viz., firstly, those chapters and passages which treat of Brahman in so far as related to the world, and hence characterised by various attributes, i. e. of l^vara or the lower Brahman; and, secondly, those texts which set forth the nature of the highest Brahman tran- scending all qualities, and the fundamental identity of the individual soul with that highest Brahman. Devout medi- tation on Brahman as suggested by passages of the former kind does not directly lead to final emancipation; the pious worshipper passes on his death into the world of the lower Brahman only, where he continues to exist as a distinct individual soul — although in the enjoyment of great power and knowledge — until at last he reaches the highest knowledge, and, through it, final release. — That student of the Veda, on the other hand, whose soul has been enlightened by the texts embodying the higher know- ledge of Brahman, whom passages such as the great saying, ' That art thou/ have taught that there is no difference between his true Self and the highest Self, obtains at the moment of death immediate final release, i.e. he withdraws altogether from the influence of Mayd, and asserts himself in his true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute highest Brahman.

Thus vSahkara.— According to Ramanu^a, on the other hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows. — There exists only one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self or the Lord. This being is

xxviii vedanta-s6tra$.

Thus vSahkara.— According to Ramanu^a, on the other hand, the teaching of the Upanishads has to be summarised as follows. — There exists only one all-embracing being called Brahman or the highest Self or the Lord. This being is

xxviii vedanta-s6tra$.

not destitute of attributes, but rather endowed with all imaginable auspicious qualities. It is not ' intelligence,' — as 6ankara maintains, — but intelligence is its chief attribute. The Lord is all-pervading, all-powerful, all-knowing, all- merciful ; his nature is fundamentally antagonistic to all evil. He contains within himself whatever exists. While, accord- ing to 5ankara, the only reality is to be found in the non- qualified homogeneous highest Brahman which can only be defined as pure ' Being' or pure thought, all plurality being a mere illusion ; Brahman — according to Ramanu^a's view — ' comprises within itself distinct elements of plurality which all of them lay claim to absolute reality of one and the same kind. Whatever is presented to us by ordinary experience, viz. matter in all its various modifications and the individual souls of different classes and degrees, are essential real constituents of Brahman's nature. Matter and souls (a£it and £it) constitute, according to Rctmanu^a's terminology, the body of the Lord ; they stand to him in the same relation of entire dependence and subserviency in which the matter forming an animal or vegetable body stands to its soul or animating principle. The Lord pervades and rules all things which exist — material or immaterial — as their antaryamin; the fundamental text for this special Ramanu^a tenet— which in the writings of the sect is quoted again and again — is the so-called antaryamin brah- mana. (Brz. Up. Ill, 7) which says, that within all elements, all sense organs, and, lastly, within all individual souls, there abides an inward ruler whose body those elements, sense-organs, and individual souls constitute. — Matter and souls as forming the body of the Lord are also called modes of him (prakara). They are to be looked upon as his effects, but they have enjoyed the kind of individual exist- ence which is theirs from all eternity, and will never be entirely resolved into Brahman. They, however, exist in two different, periodically alternating, conditions. At some times they exist in a subtle state in which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form. Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta) ; the

INTRODUCTION. XXIX

At some times they exist in a subtle state in which they do not possess those qualities by which they are ordinarily known, and there is then no distinction of individual name and form. Matter in that state is unevolved (avyakta) ; the

INTRODUCTION. XXIX

individual souls are not joined to material bodies, and their intelligence is in a state of contraction, non-manifestation (sanko>£a). This is the pralaya state which recurs at the end of each kalpa, and Brahman is then said to be in its causal condition (kara;zavastha). To that state all those scriptural passages refer which speak of Brahman or the Self as being in the beginning one only, without a second. Brahman then is indeed not absolutely one, for it contains within itself matter and souls in a germinal condition; but as in that condition they are so subtle as not to allow of individual distinctions being made, they are not counted as something second in addition to Brahman. — When the pralaya state comes to an end, creation takes place owing to an act of volition on the Lord's part. Primary unevolved matter then passes over into its other condition ; it becomes gross and thus acquires all those sensible attributes, visibility, tangi- bility, and so on, which are known from ordinary experience. At the same time the souls enter into connexion with material bodies corresponding to the degree of merit or demerit acquired by them in previous forms of existence ; their intelligence at the same time undergoes a certain expansion (vika^a). The Lord, together with matter in its gross state and the ' expanded' souls, is Brahman in the condition of an effect (karyavastha). Cause and effect are thus at the bottom the same ; for the effect is nothing but the cause which has undergone a certain change (pari- /zama). Hence the cause being known, the effect is known likewise.

Owing to the effects of their former actions the indi- vidual souls are implicated in the sa//zsara, the endless cycle of birth, action, and death, final escape from which is to be obtained only through the study of the gnawa.- kanda. of the Veda. Compliance with the injunctions of the karmaka^a does not lead outside the sa^sara ; but he who, assisted by the grace of the Lord, cognizes — and meditates on — him in the way prescribed by the Upani- shads reaches at his death final emancipation, i.e. he passes through the different stages of the path of the gods up to the world of Brahman and there enjoys an

XXX VED ANTA-SU TR AS.

everlasting blissful existence from which there is no re- turn into the sphere of transmigration. The character- istics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman ; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract the entire world.

The character- istics of the released soul are similar to those of Brahman ; it participates in all the latter's glorious qualities and powers, excepting only Brahman's power to emit, rule, and retract the entire world.

The chief points in which the two systems sketched above agree on the one hand and diverge on the other may be shortly stated as follows. — Both systems teach advaita, i.e. non-duality or monism. There exist not several fundamentally distinct principles, such as the pra- krzti and the purushas of the Sankhyas, but there exists only one all-embracing being. While, however, the advaita taught by Sankara is a rigorous, absolute one, Ramanii^as doctrine has to be characterised as vlsish/a advaita, i.e. qualified non-duality, non-duality with a difference. Ac- cording to 5ankara, whatever is, is Brahman, and Brahman itself is absolutely homogeneous, so that all difference and plurality must be illusory. According to Ramanu^a also, whatever is, is Brahman ; but Brahman is not of a homo- geneous nature, but contains within itself elements of plurality owing to which it truly manifests itself in a diversified world. The world with its variety of material forms of existence and individual souls is not unreal Maya, but a real part of Brahman's nature, the body investing the universal Self. The Brahman of vSankara is in itself impersonal, a homogeneous mass of objectless thought, transcending all attributes; a personal God it becomes only through its association with the unreal principle of Mayd, so that — strictly speaking — Sankara's personal God, his f ^vara, is himself something unreal. Ramanu^a's Brah- man, on the other hand, is essentially a personal God, the all-powerful and all-wise ruler of a real world permeated and animated by his spirit. There is thus no room for the distinction between a param nirgu^am and an apara^ saguTzam brahma, between Brahman and Lrvara. — vSah- kara's individual soul is Brahman in so far as limited by the unreal upadhis due to Maya. The individual soul of Ramanu^a, on the other hand, is really individual ; it has

INTRODUCTION. XXXI

indeed sprung from Brahman and is never outside Brah- man, but nevertheless it enjoys a separate personal exist- ence and will remain a personality for ever. — The release from sawsara means, according to wSankara, the absolute merging of the individual soul in Brahman, due to the dis- missal of the erroneous notion that the soul is distinct from Brahman ; according to R&manu^a it only means the soul's passing from the troubles of earthly life into a kind of heaven or paradise where it will remain for ever in undisturbed personal bliss. — As Ramanu^a does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him ; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one result only1.

— As Ramanu^a does not distinguish a higher and lower Brahman, the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge is likewise not valid for him ; the teaching of the Upanishads is not twofold but essentially one, and leads the enlightened devotee to one result only1.

I now proceed to give a conspectus of the contents of the Vedanta-sutras according to 6ankara in which at the same time all the more important points concerning which Ramanu^a disagrees will be noted. We shall here have to enter into details which to many may appear tedious. But it is only on a broad substratum of accurately stated details that we can hope to establish any definite conclusions regarding the comparative value of the different modes of interpreta- tion which have been applied to the Sutras. The line of investigation is an entirely new one, and for the present nothing can be taken for granted or known. — In stating the different heads of discussion (the so-called adhikara/zas), each of which comprises one or more Sutras, I shall follow the subdivision into adhikara/zas adopted in the Vyasadhika- ra/zamala, the text of which is printed in the second volume of the Bibliotheca Indica edition of the Sutras.

1 The only • sectarian ' feature of the -Sri-bhashya is, that it identifies Brahman with Vish#u or Narayarca ; but this in no way affects the interpretations put on the Sutras and Upanishads. Narayawa is in fact nothing but another name of Brahman.

XXXI i VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

FIRST ADHYAYA.

PAda I.

The first five adhikara^as lay down the fundamental positions with regard to Brahman. Adhik, I (i)1 treats of what the study of the Vedanta presupposes. Adhik. II (2) defines Brahman as that whence the world originates, and so on. Adhik. Ill (3) declares that Brahman is the source of the Veda. Adhik. IV (4) proves Brahman to be the uniform topic of all Vedanta-texts. Adhik. V (5-1 1) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brah- man, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be iden- tified with the non-intelligent pradhana from which the world springs according to the Sankhyas.

Adhik. V (5-1 1) is engaged in proving by various arguments that the Brah- man, which the Vedanta-texts represent as the cause of the world, is an intelligent principle, and cannot be iden- tified with the non-intelligent pradhana from which the world springs according to the Sankhyas.

With the next adhikara/za there begins a series of dis- cussions of essentially similar character, extending up to the end of the first adhyaya. The question is throughout whether certain terms met with in the Upanishads denote Brahman or some other being, in most cases the ^iva, the individual soul. 6ankara remarks at the outset that, as the preceding ten Sutras had settled the all-important point that all the Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman, the question now arises why the enquiry should be continued any fur- ther, and thereupon proceeds to explain that the acknow- ledged distinction of a higher Brahman devoid of all qualities and a lower Brahman characterised by qualities necessitates an investigation whether certain Vedic texts of prima facie doubtful import set forth the lower Brah- man as the object of devout meditation, or the higher Brahman as the object of true knowledge. But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first adhyaya, appears neither from the wording of the Sutras nor even from 5ankara's own treatment of the Vedic

1 The Roman numerals indicate the number of the adhikarawa ; the figures in parentheses state the Sutras comprised in each adhikara^a.

INTRODUCTION. XXXU1

texts referred to in the Sutras. In I, I, so, for instance, the question is raised whether the golden man within the sphere of the sun, with golden hair and beard and lotus-coloured eyes — of whom the ^Oandogya Upanishad speaks in I, 6, 6 — is an individual soul abiding within the sun or the highest Lord. .Sankara's answer is that the passage refers to the Lord, who, for the gratification of his worshippers, manifests himself in a bodily shape made of Maya. So that according to 6ankara himself the alternative lies between the sagu^a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the sagu?za Brahman and the nirgu/za Brahman.

So that according to 6ankara himself the alternative lies between the sagu^a Brahman and some particular individual soul, not between the sagu?za Brahman and the nirgu/za Brahman.

Adhik. VI (r 2-19) raises the question whether the ananda- maya, mentioned in Taittiriya Upanishad II, 5, is merely a transmigrating individual soul or the highest Self. 5an- kara begins by explaining the Sutras on the latter suppo- sition— and the text of the Sutras is certainly in favour of that interpretation — gives, however, finally the preference to a different and exceedingly forced explanation according to which the Sutras teach that the anandamaya is not Brah- man, since the Upanishad expressly says that Brahman is the tail or support of the anandamaya1. — Ramanu^a's in- terpretation of Adhikara/za VI, although not agreeing in all particulars with the former explanation of vSankara, yet is at one with it in the chief point, viz. that the ananda- maya is Brahman. It further deserves notice that, while vSankara looks on Adhik. VI as the first of a series of interpretatory discussions, all of which treat the question whether certain Vedic passages refer to Brahman or not, Ramanii^a separates the adhikara/za from the subsequent part of the pada and connects it with what had preceded. In Adhik. V it had been shown that Brahman cannot be

1 Deussen's supposition (pp. 30, 150) that the passage conveying the second, interpretation is an interpolation is liable to two objections. In the first place, the passage is accepted and explained by all commentators ; in the second place, Sankara in the passage immediately preceding Sutra 12 quotes the adhikarawa ' anandamayo*bhyasat ' as giving rise to a discussion whether the param or the aparam brahman is meant. Now this latter point is not touched upon at all in that part of the bhashya which sets forth the former explanation, but only in the subsequent passage, which refutes the former and advocates the latter interpretation.

[34] c

XXXIV VEDANTA-stlTRAS.

identified with the pradhana ; Adhik. VI shows that it is different from the individual soul, and the proof of the fundamental position of the system is thereby completed \ — Adhik. VII (20, 21) demonstrates that the golden person seen within the sun and the person seen within the eye, mentioned in Kh. Up. I, 6, are not some individual soul of high eminence, but the supreme Brahman. — Adhik. VIII (22) teaches that by the ether from which, according to Kh. Up. I, 9, all beings originate, not the elemental ether has to be understood but the highest Brahman. — Adhik. IX (23). The pra/za also mentioned in Kh. Up. I, 11, 5 denotes the highest Brahman 2. — Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman 3. — Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the pra/za mentioned in Kau. Up. Ill, 2 is Brahman.

PAda II.

Up. I, 11, 5 denotes the highest Brahman 2. — Adhik. X (24-27) teaches that the light spoken of in Kh. Up. Ill, 13, 7 is not the ordinary physical light but the highest Brahman 3. — Adhik. XI (28-31) decides that the pra/za mentioned in Kau. Up. Ill, 2 is Brahman.

PAda II.

Adhik. I (1-8) shows that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, &c, mentioned in Kh. Up. Ill, 14, is not the individual soul, but Brahman. The Sutras of this adhikara/za emphatically dwell on the dif- ference of the individual soul and the highest Self, whence vSankara is obliged to add an explanation — in his comment on Sutra 6 — to the effect that that difference is to be under- stood as not real, but as due to the false limiting adjuncts of the highest Self. — The comment of Ramanu^a through- out closely follows the words of the Sutras ; on Sutra 6 it simply remarks that the difference of the highest Self

1 Evaw ^i^asitasya brahma^aj Manabhogyabhuta^a^arupasattvara^astamo- mayapradhanad vyavrzttir ukta, idaniw karmavajyat trigu^atmakaprakr/ti- sawsarganimittananavidhanantadiikhasagaranima^anenajuddha/§ ka. pratya- gatmano^nyan nikhilaheyapratyanikaw niratirayanandam brahmeti pratipa- dyate, anandamayo * bhyasat.

2 There is no reason to consider the passage ' atra ke£it' in Ankara's bhashya on Sutra 23 an interpolation as Deussen does (p. 30). It simply contains a criticism passed by Ankara on other commentators.

3 To the passages on pp. 150 and 153 of the Sanskrit text, which Deussen thinks to be interpolations, there likewise applies the remark made in the preceding note.

INTRODUCTION. XXXV

from the individual soul rests thereon that the former as free from all evil is not subject to the effects of works in the same way as the soul is1. — Adhik. II (9, 10) decides that he to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food (Ka/yfca Up. I, 2, 25) is the highest Self.— Adhik. Ill (11, 12) shows that the two entered into the cave (Ka/^a Up. I, 3, 1) are Brahman and the individual soul2. — Adhik. IV (13-17) shows that the person within the eye mentioned in Kh. Up. IV, 15, 1 is Brahman. — Adhik. V (18-20) shows that the ruler within (antaryamin) described in Brz. Up. Ill, 7, 3 is Brahman. Sutra 20 clearly enounces the difference of the individual soul and the Lord ; hence 6ankara is obliged to remark that that difference is not real. — Adhik.

VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in Mundaka, Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman. — Adhik.

VII (24-32) shows that the atman vaLsvanara of Kh. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.

PAda III.

— Adhik.

VI (21-23) proves that that which cannot be seen, &c, mentioned in Mundaka, Up. I, 1, 3 is Brahman. — Adhik.

VII (24-32) shows that the atman vaLsvanara of Kh. Up. V, 11, 6 is Brahman.

PAda III.

Adhik. I (1-7) proves that that within which the heaven, the earth, &c. are woven (Mu^. Up. II, 2, 5) is Brahman. — Adhik. II (8, 9) shows that the bhuman referred to in Kh. Up. VII, 23 is Brahman. — Adhik. Ill (10-12) teaches that the Imperishable in which, according to Brz. Up. Ill, 8, 8, the ether is woven is Brahman. — Adhik. IV (13) decides that the highest person who is to be meditated upon with the syllable Om, according to Pra^na Up. V, 5, is not the

1 £ivasya iva parasyapi brahma^a^ jarirantarvartitvam abhyupagata?7z ket tadvad eva ^arirasambandhaprayuktasukhadukhopabhogapraptir iti ken na, hetuvaireshyat, na hi jarirantarvartitvam eva sukhadukhopabhogahetu& api tu pu^yapaparupakarmaparavajatvaw tak Hpahatapapmana^ paramatmano na sambhavati.

2 The second interpretation given on pp. 184-5 °f ^e Sanskrit text (beginning with apara aha) Deussen considers to be an interpolation, caused by the reference to the Paingi-upanishad in -5ankara's comment on I, 3, 7 (p. 232). But there is no reason whatever for such an assumption. The passage on p. 232 shows that *Sankara considered the explanation of the mantra given in the Paingi-upanishad worth quoting, and is in fact fully intelligible only in case of its having been quoted before by 6ahkara himself. — That the ' apara ' quotes the Brzhadara^yaka not according to the Ka^va text — to quote from which is Ankara's habit— but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the circum- stance of his being an ' apara,' i.e. not 6ankara.

C 2

XXXVI VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

— That the ' apara ' quotes the Brzhadara^yaka not according to the Ka^va text — to quote from which is Ankara's habit— but from the Madhyandina text, is due just to the circum- stance of his being an ' apara,' i.e. not 6ankara.

C 2

XXXVI VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

lower but the higher Brahman. — According to Ramanu^a the two alternatives are Brahman and Brahmd (^ivasa- mashrirupo^^adhipatu ^aturmukha^). — Adhik. V and VI (comprising, according to 5ankara, Sutras 14-21) 1 discuss the question whether the small ether within the lotus of the heart mentioned in Kh. Up. VIII, 1 is the elemental ether or the individual soul or Brahman ; the last alternative being finally adopted. In favour of the second alternative the purvapakshin pleads the two passages Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 4 and VIII, 12, 3, about the serene being (samprasada) ; for by the latter the individual soul only can be understood, and in the chapter, of which the latter passage forms part, there are ascribed to it the same qualities (viz. freeness from sin, old age, death, &c.) that were predicated in VIII, 1, of the small ether within the heart. — But the reply to this is, that the second passage refers not to the (ordinary) individual soul but to the soul in that state where its true nature has become manifest, i. e. in which it is Brahman ; so that the subject of the passage is in reality not the so-called individual soul but Brahman. And in the former of the two passages the soul is mentioned not on its own account, but merely for the purpose of intimating that the highest Self is the cause through which the individual soul manifests itself in its true nature. — What Ramanu^a understands by the avirbhava of the soul will appear from the remarks on IV, 4.

The two next Sutras (22, 23) constitute, according to vSankara, a new adhikara^a (VII), proving that he ' after whom everything shines, by whose light all this is lighted ' (KaMa Up. II, 5, 15) is not some material luminous body, but Brahman itself. — According to R&manu^a the two Sutras do not start a new topic, but merely furnish some further arguments strengthening the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutras2.

1 Sutras 14-2 1 are divided into two adhikara/zas by the Adhikara/mratnamala, but really constitute a simple adhikara^a only.

2 Itaj ^aitad evam. Anukrztes tasya £a. Tasya daharakaj-asya parabrahma/zo mukarad ayam apahatapapmatvadigu/zako vimuktabandha^ pratyagatma na daharaka^a^ tadanukaras tatsamyaw tatha hi pratyagatmanoxpi vimuktasya

INTRODUCTION* XXXV11

Adhik. VIII (34, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Ka#5a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

VIII (34, 25) decides that the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in Ka#5a Up. II, 4, 12 is not the individual soul but Brahman.

The two next adhikara/zas are of the nature of a digres- sion. The passage about the angush/^amatra was explained on the ground that the human heart is of the size of a span ; the question may then be asked whether also such individuals as belong to other classes than mankind, more particularly the Gods, are capable of the knowledge of Brahman : a question finally answered in the affirmative. — This discussion leads in its turn to several other digressions, among which the most important one refers to the problem in what relation the different species of beings stand to the words denoting them (Sutra 38). In connexion herewith 5ankara treats of the nature of words (^abda), opposing the opinion of the Mimawsaka Upavarsha, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constitutive letters, to the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a super- sensuous entity called ' spho/a,' which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the sense of a word (Adhik. IX ; Sutras

Adhik. X (34-38) explains that £udras are altogether disqualified for Brahmavidya.

Sutra 39 constitutes, according to 5ankara, a new adhi- kara^a (XI\ proving that the pra/^a in which everything trembles, according to Ka/fa Up. II, 6, 2, is Brahman. — According to Ramanu^-a the Sutra does not introduce a new topic but merely furnishes an additional reason for the

parabrahmanukara^ mvyate yada pasyaA pajyate rukmavama;;/ kartaram isa.m purushaw brahmayoniw tada vidvan pu/zyapape vidhuya nira^anaA paramaw samyam upaitity ato*nukarta pra^apativakyanirdish/a^ anukaryaw paraw brahma na daharaka\fa/$. Api ka. smaryate. Sawsari/zo * pi muktavasthaya;^ paramasamyapattilakshawa/fc parabrahmanukara^ smaryate idaw ^anam upamtya, &c— Ke/Sdd anukrztes tasya Hpi smaryate iti ka. sutradvayam adhi- karawantarazw tarn eva bhantam anubhati sarvaw tasya bhasa sarvam id&m vibhatity asya/fc srutek parabrahmaparatvanirwayaya pravWtta/» vadanti. Tat tv adwyatvadiguwako dharmokte/fc dyubhvadyayatanazra sva^abdad ity adhi- kararcadvayena tasya prakarawasya brahmavishayatvapratipadanat gyotiska.- rawabhidh&nat ity adishu parasya brahma^o bharupatvavagatej kz. purvapaksha- nutthanad ayuktaw sutraksharavairupya/& ka,.

xxxviii vedanta-sOtras.

Tat tv adwyatvadiguwako dharmokte/fc dyubhvadyayatanazra sva^abdad ity adhi- kararcadvayena tasya prakarawasya brahmavishayatvapratipadanat gyotiska.- rawabhidh&nat ity adishu parasya brahma^o bharupatvavagatej kz. purvapaksha- nutthanad ayuktaw sutraksharavairupya/& ka,.

xxxviii vedanta-sOtras.

decision arrived at under Sutras 24, 25, viz. that the angush- /^amatra is Brahman. On this supposition, Sutras 24-39 f°rm one adhikara^a in which 26-38 constitute a mere digression led up to by the mention made of the heart in 25. — The angush/^amatra is referred to twice in the Ka/^a Upanishad, once in the passage discussed (II, 4, 12), and once in II, 6, 17 (' the Person not larger than a thumb '). To determine what is meant by the angush^amatra, Ramdnu^-a says, we are enabled by the passage II, 6, 2, 3, which is intermediate between the two passages concerning the angush^amatra, and which clearly refers to the highest Brahman, of which alone everything can be said to stand in awe.

The next Sutra (40) gives rise to a similar difference of opinion. According to Sankara it constitutes by itself a new adhikara/za (XII), proving that the ' light ' (,£*yotis) mentioned in Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3 is the highest Brahman. - — According to Ramanu£*a the Sutra continues the pre- ceding adhikara^a, and strengthens the conclusion arrived at by a further argument, referring to Ka^a Up. II, 5, 15 — a passage intermediate between the two passages about the angush/^amatra — which speaks of a primary light that cannot mean anything but Brahman. The Sutra has in that case to be translated as follows : ' (The angush/^a- matra is Brahman) because (in a passage intervening be- tween the two) a light is seen to be mentioned (which can be Brahman only).'

The three last Sutras of the pada are, according to »Sankara,to be divided into two adhikara^as (XIII and XIV), Sutra 41 deciding that the ether which reveals names and forms [Kh. Up. VIII, 14) is not the elemental ether but Brahman ; and 42, 43 teaching that the vi£7?anamaya, ' he who consists of knowledge,' of Brz. Up. IV, 3, 7 is not the individual soul but Brahman. — According to Ramanu^a the three Sutras make up one single adhikara/za discussing whether the Khandogya. Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release ; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding (' Shaking off

INTRODUCTION. XXXIX

Upanishad passage about the ether refers to Brahman or to the individual soul in the state of release ; the latter of these two alternatives being suggested by the circumstance that the released soul is the subject of the passage immediately preceding (' Shaking off

INTRODUCTION. XXXIX

all evil as a horse shakes off his hair,' Sec). Sutra 41 decides that ' the ether (is Brahman) because the passage designates the nature of something else/ &c. (i.e. of some- thing other than the individual soul ; other because to the soul the revealing of names and forms cannot be ascribed, &c.) — But, an objection is raised, does not more than one scriptural passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical, and is not therefore the ether which reveals names and forms the soul as well as Brahman ? — (The two, Sutra 43 replies, are different) ' because in the states of deep sleep and departing (the highest Self) is designated as different ' (from the soul) — which point is proved by the same scriptural passages which *Sankara adduces ; — and ' because such terms as Lord and the like ' cannot be applied to the individual soul (43). Reference is made to IV, 4, 14, where all ^agadvyapara is said to belong to the Lord only, not to the soul even when in the state of release.

Pada IV.

The last pada of the first adhyaya is specially directed against the S&nkhyas.

The first adhikara^a (1-7) discusses the passage Ka/^a Up. I, 3, 10 ; 11, where mention is made of the Great and the Undeveloped —both of them terms used with a special technical sense in the Sankhya-^astra, avyakta being a synonym for pradhana. — Sankara shows by an exhaustive review of the topics of the Ka//za Upanishad that the term avyakta has not the special meaning which the Sankhyas attribute to it, but denotes the body, more strictly the subtle body (sukshma jarira), but at the same time the gross body also, in so far as it is viewed as an effect of the subtle one.

Adhik. II (8-10) demonstrates, according to Sankara, that the tricoloured agk spoken of in Sve. Up. IV, 5 is not the pradhana of the Sankhyas, but either that power of the Lord from which the world springs, or else the primary causal matter first produced by that power. — What Rama-

xl VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

nu^a in contradistinction from >Sankara understands by the primary causal matter, follows from the short sketch given above of the two systems.

Adhik. Ill (11-13) shows that the panks. pankagana/i mentioned in Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sankhyas. — Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i. e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

pankagana/i mentioned in Bri. Up. IV, 4, 17 are not the twenty-five principles of the Sankhyas. — Adhik. IV (14, 15) proves that Scripture does not contradict itself on the all-important point of Brahman, i. e. a being whose essence is intelligence, being the cause of the world.

Adhik. V (16-18) is, according to vSankara, meant to prove that ' he who is the maker of those persons, of whom this is the work,' mentioned in Kau. Up. IV, 19, is not either the vital air or the individual soul, but Brahman. — The subject of the adhikara/za is essentially the same in Ramanu£*a's view ; greater stress is, however, laid on the adhikara/za being polemical against the Sankhyas, who wish to turn the passage into an argument for the pradhana doctrine.

The same partial difference of view is observable with regard to the next adhikara;za (VI ; Sutras 19-22) which decides that the 'Self to be seen, to be heard,' &c. (Bri. Up. II, 4, 5) is the highest Self, not the individual soul. This latter passage also is, according to Ramanu^-a, made the subject of discussion in order to rebut the Sankhya who is anxious to prove that what is there inculcated as the object of knowledge is not a universal Self but merely the Sankhya purusha.

Adhik. VII (23-27) teaches that Brahman is not only the efficient or operative cause (nimitta) of the world, but its material cause as well. The world springs from Brahman by way of modification (pari/zama ; Sutra 26). — Ramanu^a views this adhikara^a as specially directed against the Se^vara-sankhyas who indeed admit the existence of a highest Lord, but postulate in addition an independent pradhana on which the Lord acts as an operative cause merely.

Adhik. VIII (28) remarks that the refutation of the Sankhya views is applicable to other theories also, such as the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms.

INTRODUCTION. xli

After this rapid survey of the contents of the first adhyaya and the succinct indication of the most important points in which the views of 5ankara and Ramanu^a diverge, we turn to a short consideration of two questions which here naturally present themselves, viz., firstly, which is the prin- ciple on which the Vedic passages referred to in the Sutras have been selected and arranged ; and, secondly, if, where vSankara and Rimanu^a disagree as to the subdivision of the Sutras into Adhikara^as, and the determination of the Vedic passages discussed in the Sutras, there are to be met with any indications enabling us to determine which of the two commentators is right. (The more general question as to how far the Sutras favour either vSankara's or Rama- nu^a's general views cannot be considered at present.)

(The more general question as to how far the Sutras favour either vSankara's or Rama- nu^a's general views cannot be considered at present.)

The Hindu commentators here and there attempt to point out the reason why the discussion of a certain Vedic passage is immediately followed by the consideration of a certain other one. Their explanations— which have occa- sionally been referred to in the notes to the translation — rest on the assumption that the Sutrakara in arranging the texts to be commented upon was guided by technicalities of the Mima^sa-system, especially by a regard for the various so-called means of proof which the Mima/^saka employs for the purpose of determining the proper meaning and position of scriptural passages. But that this was the guiding principle, is rendered altogether improbable by a simple tabular statement of the Vedic passages referred to in the first adhyaya, such as given by Deussen on page 130; for from the latter it appears that the order in which the Sutras exhibit the scriptural passages follows the order in which those passages themselves occur in the Upanishads, and it would certainly be a most strange coincidence if that order enabled us at the same time to exemplify the various prama/zas of the Mima;/zsa in their due systematic suc- cession.

As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages dis- cussed are taken from the KMndogya. Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first adhyaya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those ATMndogya passages of which it

xlii VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

As Deussen's statement shows, most of the passages dis- cussed are taken from the KMndogya. Upanishad, so many indeed that the whole first adhyaya may be said to consist of a discussion of all those ATMndogya passages of which it

xlii VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

is doubtful whether they are concerned with Brahman or not, passages from the other Upanishads being brought in wherever an opportunity offers. Considering the prominent position assigned to the Upanishad mentioned, I think it likely that the Sutrak&ra meant to begin the series of doubtful texts with the first doubtful passage from the .Oandogya, and that hence the sixth adhikara/za which treats of the anandamaya mentioned in the Taittiriya Upanishad has, in agreement with Ramanu^a's views, to be separated from the subsequent adhikara^as, and to be com- bined with the preceding ones whose task it is to lay down the fundamental propositions regarding Brahman's nature. — The remaining adhikara^as of the first pada follow the order of passages in the ATMndogya Upanishad, and there- fore call for no remark ; with the exception of the last adhikara^a, which refers to a Kaushitaki passage, for whose being introduced in this place I am not able to account. — The first adhikara^a of the second pada returns to the A"Mndogya Upanishad. The second one treats of a passage in the Ka/^a Upanishad where a being is referred to which eats everything. The reason why that passage is introduced in this place seems to be correctly assigned in the 5ri-bhashya, which remarks that, as in the preceding Sutra it had been argued that the highest Self is not an enjoyer, a doubt arises whether by that being which eats everything the highest Self can be meant \ — The third adhikara^a again, whose topic is the ' two entered into the cave ' (Ka^a Up. I, 3, i), appears, as Ramanu^a remarks, to come in at this place owing to the preceding adhikara^a ; for if it could not be proved that one of the two is the highest Self, a doubt would attach to the explanation given above of the * eater,' since the 'two entered into the cave,' and the 'eater' stand under the same prakara/m, and must therefore be held to refer to the same matter.— The fourth adhikara^a is again occupied with a jOandogya passage.— The fifth adhikara/za, whose topic is the Ruler within (antaryamin), manifestly owes its place, as remarked by Ramanu^a also,

1 Yadi paramatma na bhokta evaw tarhi bhoktrz'taya pratiyamano ^iva eva syad ity asankyaha atta.

INTRODUCTION. xllll

INTRODUCTION. xllll

to the fact that the Vedic passage treated had been employed in the preceding adhikara^a (I, 2, 14) for the purpose of strengthening the argument 1. — The sixth adhikara^a, again, which discusses ' that which is not seen' (adrcsya ; Mund. Up. 1, 1 , 6), is clearly introduced in this place because in the pre- ceding adhikara/za it had been said that adrzsh/a, &c. denote the highest Self. — The reasons to which the last adhikara^a of the second pada and the first and third adhikara^as of the third pada owe their places are not apparent (the second adhikara^a of the third pada treats of a ATMndogya passage). The introduction, on the other hand, of the passage from the Pragma Upanishad treating of the akshara Owkara is clearly due to the circumstance that an akshara, of a different nature, had been discussed in the preceding adhikara^a. — The fifth and sixth adhikara/zas investigate KMndogya. passages. — The two next Sutras (22, 23) are, as remarked above, con- sidered by Sankara to constitute a new adhikara^a treating of the ' being after which everything shines \M\xnd. Up. II, 2, 10); while Ramanu^a looks on them as continuing the sixth adhikara/za. There is one circumstance which renders it at any rate probable that Ramanu^a, and not *Sankara, here hits the intention of the author of the Sutras. The general rule in the first three padas is that, wherever a new Vedic passage is meant to be introduced, the subject of the dis- cussion, i. e. that being which in the end is declared to be Brahman is referred to by means of a special word, in most cases a nominative form 2. From this rule there is in the preceding part of the adhyaya only one real exception, viz. in I, 2, 1, which possibly may be due to the fact that there a new pada begins, and it therefore was considered super-

1 Sthanadivyapadeja^ ka. ity atra ya.h ^akshushi tish/^ann ity adina prati- padyamanaw ^akshushi sthitiniyamanadikaw paramatmana eveti siddhaw krztv& akshipurushasya paramatmatvaw sadhitam idani//* tad eva samarthayate antary&°.

2 Anandamaya^ I, 1, 12 ; anta^ I, 1, 20 ; akasak I, 1, 22 ; prana^ I, 1, 23 ; gyotih I, 1, 24; prana^ I, 1, 28; atta I, 2, 9 ; guham pravish^au I, 2, 11; antara I, 2, 13 ; antaryaml I, 2, 18 ; adrwyatvadiguTzaka/fc 1^ 2, 21 ; valrvanara^ I, 2, 24 ; dyubhvadyayatanam I, 3, 1 ; bhuma I, 3, 8 ; aksharam I, 3, 10 ; sak I, 3, 13 ; dahara^ I, 3, 14; pramita^ I, 3, 24; (^-yotlfc I, 3, 40;) aka^a^ I, 3, 4i-

xliv vedAnta-s^tras.

fluous to indicate the introduction of a new topic by a special word. The exception supplied by I, 3, 19 is only an apparent one ; for, as remarked above, Sutra 1 9 does not in reality begin a new adhikara/za. A few exceptions occurring later on will be noticed in their places. — Now neither Sutra 22, nor Sutra 23 contains any word intimating that a new Vedic passage is being taken into consideration, and hence it appears preferable to look upon them, with Ramanu^-a, as continuing the topic of the preceding adhika- ra;za. — This conclusion receives an additional confirmation from the position of the next adhikara^a, which treats of the being ' a span long' mentioned in Ka/fe Up. II, 4, 12 ; for the reason of this latter passage being considered here is almost certainly the reference to the alpairuti in Sutra 21, and, if so, the angush/Zzamatra properly constitutes the sub- ject of the adhikara^a immediately following on Adhik. V, VI ; which, in its turn, implies that Sutras 22, 23 do not form an independent adhikara^a. — The two next adhikara/zas are digressions, and do not refer to special Vedic passages. — Sutra 39 forms a new adhikara^a, according to 5ankara, but not according to Ramanu^a, whose opinion seems again to be countenanced by the fact that the Sutra does not exhibit any word indicative of a new topic. The same difference of opinion prevails with regard to Sutra 40, and it appears from the translation of the Sutra given above, according to Ramanu^-a's view, that 'gyotik' need not be taken as a nomi- native.— The last two adhikara/zas finally refer, according to Ramanug*a, to one ATMndogya passage only, and here also we have to notice that Sutra 42 does not comprise any word intimating that a new passage is about to be discussed.

From all this we seem entitled to draw the following conclusions. The Vedic passages discussed in the three first padas of the Vedanta-sutras comprise all the doubtful — or at any rate all the more important doubtful — passages from the .Oandogya Upanishad. These passages are arranged in the order in which the text of the Upanishad exhibits them. Passages from other Upanishad s are dis- cussed as opportunities offer, there being always a special reason why a certain KMndogya, passage is followed by

INTRODUCTION. xlv

a certain passage from some other Upanishad. Those reasons can be assigned with sufficient certainty in a num- ber of cases although not in all, and from among those passages whose introduction cannot be satisfactorily ac- counted for some are eliminated by our following the subdivision of the Sutras into adhikara/zas adopted by Ramanu^a, a subdivision countenanced by the external form of the Sutras.

The fourth pada of the first adhyaya has to be taken by itself. It is directed specially and avowedly against Sankhya-interpretations of Scripture, not only in its earlier part which discusses isolated passages, but also — as is brought out much more clearly in the vSri-bhashya than by vSankara — in its latter part which takes a general survey of the entire scriptural evidence for Brahman being the material as well as the operative cause of the world.

Deussen (p. 221) thinks that the selection made by the Sutrakara of Vedic passages setting forth the nature of Brahman is not in all cases an altogether happy one. But this reproach rests on the assumption that the pas- sages referred to in the first adhyaya were chosen for the purpose of throwing light on what Brahman is, and this assumption can hardly be upheld. The Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima^s^-sutras are throughout Mi- mams&, i.e. critical discussions of such scriptural passages as on a primd facie view admit of different interpretations and therefore necessitate a careful enquiry into their mean- ing. Here and there we meet with Sutras which do not directly involve a discussion of the sense of some particular Vedic passage, but rather make a mere statement on some important point. But those cases are rare, and it would be altogether contrary to the general spirit of the Sutras to assume that a whole adhyaya should be devoted to the task of showing what Brahman is. The latter point is suf- ficiently determined in the first five (or six) adhikara/zas ; but after we once know what Brahman is we are at once confronted by a number of Upanishad passages concerning which it is doubtful whether they refer to Brahman or not. With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the

xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

With their discussion all the remaining adhikara/zas of the

xlvi VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

first adhyaya are occupied. That the Vedanta - sutras view it as a particularly important task to controvert the doctrine of the Sankhyas is patent (and has also been fully pointed out by Deussen, p. 33J. The fifth adhikara^a already declares itself against the doctrine that the world has sprung from a non-intelligent principle, the pradhana, and the fourth pada of the first adhyaya returns to an express polemic against Sahkhya interpretations of cer- tain Vedic statements. It is therefore perhaps not saying too much if we maintain that the entire first adhy&ya is due to the wish, on the part of the Sutrakara, to guard his own doctrine against Sahkhya attacks. Whatever the attitude of the other so-called orthodox systems may be towards the Veda, the Sahkhya system is the only one whose adherents were anxious — and actually attempted — to prove that their views are warranted by scriptural pas- sages. The S&nkhya tendency thus would be to show that all those Vedic texts which the Vedantin claims as teaching the existence of Brahman, the intelligent and sole cause of the world, refer either to the pradhana or some product of the pradhana, or else to the purusha in the Sankhya sense, i.e. the individual soul. It consequently became the task of the Vedantin to guard the Upanishads against misinterpretations of the kind, and this he did in the first adhyaya of the Vedanta-sutras, selecting those passages about whose interpretation doubts were, for some reason or other, likely to arise. Some of the passages singled out are certainly obscure, and hence liable to various interpretations ; of others it is less apparent why it was thought requisite to discuss them at length. But this is hardly a matter in which we are entitled to find fault with the Sutrakara ; for no modern scholar, either European or Hindu, is — or can possibly be — sufficiently at home, on the one hand, in the religious and philosophical views which prevailed at the time when the Sutras may have been composed, and, on the other hand, in the in- tricacies of the Mima/^sa, to judge with confidence which Vedic passages may give rise to discussions and which not.

INTRODUCTION. xlvii

SECOND ADHYAYA.

The first adhyaya has proved that all the Vedanta-texts unanimously teach that there is only one cause of the world, viz. Brahman, whose nature is intelligence, and that there exists no scriptural passage which can be used to establish systems opposed to the Vedanta, more especially the Sankhya system. The task of the two first p&das of the second adhyaya is to rebut any objections which may be raised against the Vedanta doctrine on purely specula- tive grounds, apart from scriptural authority, and to show, again on purely speculative grounds, that none of the sys- tems irreconcilable with the Ved&nta can be satisfactorily established.

Pada I.

Pada I.

Adhikara^a I refutes the Sankhya objection that the acceptation of the Vedanta system involves the rejection of the S&nkhya doctrine which after all constitutes a part of Smrzti, and as such has claims on consideration. — To accept the Scinkhya-smrzti, the Vedantin replies, would compel us to reject other Smrztis, such as the Manu-smr/ti, which are opposed to the Sankhya doctrine. The con- flicting claims of Smrztis can be settled only on the ground of the Veda, and there can be no doubt that the Veda does not confirm the Sankhya-smrzti, but rather those Smrztis which teach the origination of the world from an intelligent primary cause.

Adhik. II (3) extends the same line of argumentation to the Yoga-smrzti.

Adhik. Ill (4-1 1) shows that Brahman, although of the nature of intelligence, yet may be the cause of the non- intelligent material world, and that it is not contaminated by the qualities of the world when the latter is refunded into Brahman. For ordinary experience teaches us that like does not always spring from like, and that the qualities of effected things when the latter are refunded into their causes — as when golden ornaments, for instance, are melted

xlvill VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

and thereby become simple gold again — do not continue to exist in those causes. — Here also the argumentation is specially directed against the Sankhyas, who, in order to account for the materiality and the various imperfections of the world, think it necessary to assume a causal sub- stance participating in the same characteristics.

Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning fol- lowed in the preceding adhikara^a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.

Adhik. IV (12) points out that the line of reasoning fol- lowed in the preceding adhikara^a is valid also against other theories, such as the atomistic doctrine.

The one Sutra (13) constituting Adhik. V teaches, accord- ing to Sahkara, that although the enjoying souls as well as the objects of fruition are in reality nothing but Brahman, and on that account identical, yet the two sets may prac- tically be held apart, just as in ordinary life we hold apart, and distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom waves, ripples, and foam are all of them identical as being neither more nor less than sea-water. — The 6n-bhashya gives a totally different interpretation of the Sutra, according to which the latter has nothing whatever to do with the eventual non-distinction of enjoying souls and objects to be enjoyed. Translated according to Ramanu^a's view, the Sutra runs as follows : ' If non-distinction (of the Lord and the individual souls) is said to result from the circum- stance of (the Lord himself) becoming an enjoyer (a soul), we refute this objection by instances from every-day ex- perience.' That is to say : If it be maintained that from our doctrine previously expounded, according to which this world springs from the Lord and constitutes his body, it follows that the Lord, as an embodied being, is not essen- tially different from other souls, and subject to fruition as they are; we reply that the Lord's having a body does not involve his being subject to fruition, not any more than in ordinary life a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo. — The construction which Ramanu^a puts on the Sutra is not repugnant either to the words of the Sutra or to the context in which the latter stands, and that it rests on earlier authority appears

INTRODUCTION. xlix

from a quotation made by Ramanu^a from the Drami- dabhashyakara \

Adhik. VI (14-30) treats of the non-difference of the effect from the cause; a Vedanta doctrine which is de- fended by its adherents against the Vaueshikas according to whom the effect is something different from the cause. — The divergent views of 5ankara and Ramanu^a on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

— The divergent views of 5ankara and Ramanu^a on this important point have been sufficiently illustrated in the general sketch of the two systems.

Adhik. VII (31-33) refutes the objection that, from the Vedic passages insisting on the identity of the Lord and the individual soul, it follows that the Lord must be like the individual soul the cause of evil, and that hence the entire doctrine of an all-powerful and all-wise Lord being the cause of the world has to be rejected. For, the Sutra- kara remarks, the creative principle of the world is addi- tional to, i. e. other than, the individual soul, the difference of the two being distinctly declared by Scripture. — The way in which the three Sutras constituting this adhikara^a are treated by 5ankara on the one hand and Ramanu^-a on the other is characteristic. Ramanu^*a throughout simply follows the words of the Sutras, of which Sutra 21 formu- lates the objection based on such texts as ' Thou art that,' while Sutra 33 replies that Brahman is different from the soul, since that is expressly declared by Scrip- ture. vSankara, on the other hand, sees himself obliged to add that the difference of the two, plainly maintained in Sutra 33, is not real, but due to the soul's fictitious limiting adjuncts.

Adhik. VIII (24, 35) shows that Brahman, although des- titute of material and instruments of action, may yet pro- duce the world, just as gods by their mere power create

1 Lokavat. Yatha loke ra^ajasananuvartinaw ka. ra^anugrahanigrahakrzta- sukhadukhayoge^pi na sa^ariratvamatrewa jasake ra^-any api jasananuvrz'ttya- tiv^'ttmimittasukhadukhayor bhokt^tvaprasanga/fc. Yathaha Drami^/abha- shyakara^ yatha loke ra^a pra^uradandajuke ghore*narthasawkafe*pi pradere vartamano * pi vya^anadyavadhutadeho doshair na sprwyate abhipre- tams ka lokan paripipalayishati bhogawj ka gandhadin avirva^anopabhogyan dharayati tathasau lokcyvaro bhramatsvasamarthyaHmaro doshair na spmyate rakshati ka lokan brahmalokadi#w Hvii-va^anopabhogyan dharayatiti.

[34] d

1 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.

palaces, animals, and the like, and as milk by itself turns into curds.

Adhik. IX (26-29) explains that, according to the express doctrine of Scripture, Brahman does not in its entirety pass over into the world, and, although emitting the world from itself, yet remains one and undivided. This is possible, ac- cording to 5ankara, because the world is unreal ; according to Ramanu^a, because the creation is merely the visible and tangible manifestation of what previously existed in Brah- man in a subtle imperceptible condition.

Adhik. X (30, 31) teaches that Brahman, although des- titute of instruments of action, is enabled to create the world by means of the manifold powers which it possesses.

Adhik. XI (32, ^) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XI (32, ^) assigns the motive of the creation, or, more properly expressed, teaches that Brahman, in creating the world, has no motive in the strict sense of the word, but follows a mere sportive impulse.

Adhik. XII (34-36) justifies Brahman from the charges of partiality and cruelty which might be brought against it owing to the inequality of position and fate of the various animate beings, and the universal suffering of the world. Brahman, as a creator and dispenser, acts with a view to the merit and demerit of the individual souls, and has so acted from all eternity.

Adhik. XIII (37) sums up the preceding argumentation by declaring that all the qualities of Brahman — omniscience and so on — are such as to capacitate it for the creation of the world.

Pada II.

The task of the second pada is to refute, by arguments independent of Vedic passages, the more important philo- sophical theories concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta view. — The first adhikara;za (1-10) is directed against the Sankhyas, whose doctrine had already been touched upon incidentally in several previous places, and aims at proving that a non-intelligent first cause, such as the pradhana of the Sankhyas, is unable to create and dispose. — The second adhikara^a (11-17) refutes the

INTRODUCTION.

Vaueshika tenet that the world originates from atoms set in motion by the adrzsh/a. — The third and fourth adhika- ra^as are directed against various schools of Bauddha phi- losophers. Adhik. Ill (18-27) impugns the view of the so-called sarvastitvav&dins, or bahy&rthavadins, who main- tain the reality of an external as well as an internal world ; Adhik. IV (28-32) is directed against the vi^anavddins, according to whom ideas are the only reality. — The last Sutra of this adhikara^a is treated by R&m&nu^a as a separate adhikara^a refuting the view of the Madhyamikas, who teach that everything is void, i.e. that nothing what- ever is real. — Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doc- trine of the Gainas ; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philo- sophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

that nothing what- ever is real. — Adhik. V (33-36) is directed against the doc- trine of the Gainas ; Adhik. VI (37-41) against those philo- sophical schools which teach that a highest Lord is not the material but only the operative cause of the world.

The last adhikara/za of the pada (42-45) refers, according to the unanimous statement of the commentators, to the doctrine of the Bhagavatas or Pa/zz&aratras. But 6ankara and Ramanu^a totally disagree as to the drift of the Sutrakara's opinion regarding that system. According to the former it is condemned like the systems previously referred to ; according to the latter it is approved of. — Sutras 42 and 43, according to both commentators, raise objections against the system; Sutra 42 being directed against the doctrine that from the highest being, called Vasudeva, there is originated Sankarsha^a, i.e. the ^iva, on the ground that thereby those scriptural passages would be contradicted which teach the soul's eternity ; and Sutra 43 impugning the doctrine that from Sankarsha^a there springs Pradyumna, i.e. the manas. — The Sutra on which the difference of interpretation turns is 44. Literally trans- lated it runs, 'Or, on account of there being' (or, 'their being') 'knowledge and so on, there is non-contradiction of that.' — This means, according to Safikara, ' Or, if in consequence of the existence of knowledge and so on (on the part of Sankarsha^a, &c. they be taken not as soul, mind, &c. but as Lords of pre-eminent knowledge, &c), yet there is non-contradiction of that (viz. of the objection raised in Sutra 42 against the Bhagavata doctrine).' —

d2

Hi vedAnta-sOtras.

According to Raminu^a, on the other hand, the Sutra has to be explained as follows : ' Or, rather there is non- contradiction of that (i. e. the Pa^aratra doctrine) on ac- count of their being knowledge and so on (i. e. on account of their being Brahman)/ Which means : Since San- karsha^a and so on are merely forms of manifestation of Brahman, the Pa^aratra doctrine, according to which they spring from Brahman, is not contradicted. — The form of the Sutra makes it difficult for us to decide which of the two interpretations is the right one ; it, however, appears to me that the explanations of the 'v&' and of the 'tat,' implied in Rdmanu^a's comment, are more natural than those resulting from ^ankara's interpretation. Nor would it be an unnatural proceeding to close the polemical pada with a defence of that doctrine which — in spite of objec- tions— has to be viewed as the true one.

PAda III.

The third p&da discusses the question whether the dif- ferent forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co- eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

PAda III.

The third p&da discusses the question whether the dif- ferent forms of existence which, in their totality, constitute the world have an origin or not, i.e. whether they are co- eternal with Brahman, or issue from it and are refunded into it at stated intervals.

The first seven adhikara^as treat of the five elementary substances. — Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the ether is not co-eternal with Brahman, but springs from it as its first effect. — Adhik. II (8) shows that air springs from ether ; Adhik. IV, V, VI (10; 11 ; 13) that fire springs from air, water from tire, earth from water. — Adhik. Ill (9) explains by way of digression that Brahman, which is not some special entity, but quite generally 'that which is,' cannot have originated from anything else.

Adhik. VII (13) demonstrates that the origination of one element from another is due, not to the latter in itself, but to Brahman acting in it.

Adhik. VIII (14) teaches that the reabsorption of the elements into Brahman takes place in the inverse order of their emission.

Adhik. IX (15) remarks that the indicated order in which

INTRODUCTION. Kli

the emission and the reabsorption of the elementary sub- stances take place is not interfered with by the creation and reabsorption of the organs of the soul, i.e. the sense organs and the internal organ (manas); for they also are of elemental nature, and as such created and retracted to- gether with the elements of which they consist.

The remainder of the p&da is taken up by a discussion of the nature of the individual soul, the £*iva. — Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as ' Devadatta is born,' * De- vadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

— Adhik. X (16) teaches that expressions such as ' Devadatta is born,' * De- vadatta has died,' strictly apply to the body only, and are transferred to the soul in so far only as it is connected with a body.

Adhik. XI (17) teaches that the individual soul is, accord- ing to Scripture, permanent, eternal, and therefore not, like the ether and the other elements, produced from Brahman at the time of creation. — This Sutra is of course com- mented on in a very different manner by 5ankara on the one hand and Ramanu^a on the other. According to the former, the ^*iva is in reality identical — and as such co- eternal — with Brahman ; what originates is merely the soul's connexion with its limiting adjuncts, and that con- nexion is moreover illusory. — According to R&manu^a, the ^-iva is indeed an effect of Brahman, but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as an individual being and as a mode (prak&ra) of Brahman. So indeed have also the material elements ; yet there is an important distinction owing to which the elements may be said to originate at the time of creation, while the same cannot be said of the soul. Previously to creation the material elements exist in a subtle condition in which they possess none of the qualities that later on render them the objects of ordinary experience ; hence, when passing over into the gross state at the time of creation, they may be said to originate. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities, i.e. they are cognizing agents; only, whenever a new creation takes place, they associate themselves with bodies, and their intelligence therewith undergoes a certain expansion or development (viklra), contrasting with the unevolved or contracted state (san-

liv vedAnta-s6tras.

ko£a) which characterised it during the preceding pralaya. But this change is not a change of essential nature (svaru- pdnyathabhava), and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.

But this change is not a change of essential nature (svaru- pdnyathabhava), and hence we have to distinguish the souls as permanent entities from the material elements which at the time of each creation and reabsorption change their essential characteristics.

Adhik. XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul. The Sutra declares that the soul is ' gn&? This means, according to .Safikara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai^eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul. The soul is not a knower, but knowledge ; not intelligent, but intelligence. — Ramanu^*a, on the other hand, explains ' gna.' by 'gn&tri,9 i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the VaLreshikas, but also against those philo- sophers who — like the Scinkhyas and the Vedantins of 6ankara's school — maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure ^aitanya. — The wording of the Sutra cer- tainly seems to favour Ramanu^a's interpretation ; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of .Sankara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul's nature, use the term gna. of which the most obvious interpretation is gnatrt, not ^anam.

Adhik. XIII (19-33) treats the question whether the individual soul is a;m, i. e. of very minute size, or omni- present, all-pervading (sarvagata, vy&pin). Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views. — In .Sankara's opinion the Sutras 19-28 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the ^*iva is ami, while Sutra 29 formu- lates the siddhanta, viz. that the ^iva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as ami in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ — which itself is ami — constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sawsara. — According to Ramanu^a, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhi- kara/za gives utterance to the siddh&nta view, according to which the soul is of minute size ; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it ; while the

INTRODUCTION. lv

— According to Ramanu^a, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhi- kara/za gives utterance to the siddh&nta view, according to which the soul is of minute size ; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it ; while the

INTRODUCTION. lv

Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under* Sutra 1 8, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (gna.tr i) stands to knowledge (gna.na). — In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details. — Sankara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried ; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be re- jected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bond fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with 5ankara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and thus im- plicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that Sankara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced. Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word * pra^avat ') the Sutra runs as follows : ' But on account of that quality (or "those qualities ; " or else " on account of the quality — or qualities— of that ") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or " the designation of that").' This An- kara maintains to mean, ' Because the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa;/zsara state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/2u.' Now, in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of the first ' tat ' by buddhi. And — which is more important — in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether on Sahkara's own system the qualities of the buddhi — such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, &c. — can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the sawsara state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to Sankara's sys- tem, is knowledge or intelligence ; whatever is due to its

lvi VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.

The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to Sankara's sys- tem, is knowledge or intelligence ; whatever is due to its

lvi VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

association with the buddhi is non-essential or, more strictly, unreal, false.

There are no similar difficulties in the way of R^manu^a's interpretation of the adhikara^a. He agrees with 5ankara in the explanation of Sutras 19-25, with-this difference that he views them as setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddh&nta. Sutras 26-2,8 also are interpreted in a manner not very different from Sankara's, special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the sub- stratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term vignana. when meaning the indi- vidual soul. The answer is given in Sutra 29, ' The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for its essence/ i. e. because knowledge is the essential character- istic quality of the soul, therefore the term ' knowledge ' is employed here and there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra which, according to ^Sankara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha, serves on Rctmanu^a's view to set aside a previously-raised objection ; an altogether legitimate assumption.

Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/za (30-32), 30 explains, according to 6ankara, that the soul may be called a/zu, since, as long as it exists in the sa/^sara con- dition, it is connected with the buddhi. According to Ramanu^a the Sutra teaches that the soul may be called wignkna. because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists. — Sutra 31 intimates, according to 5ankara, that in the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is poten- tially connected with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes actually manifest. The same Sutra3 according to Ram^nu^-a, teaches that gnatritva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul only. — In Sutra 32, finally, 5ankara sees a statement of the

INTRODUCTION. lvil

doctrine that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would either be permanently cognizing or perma- nently non-cognizing; while, according to R&m&nu^a, the Sutra means that the soul would either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure knowledge and all-pervading (instead of being gndXri and a^u, as it is in reality). — The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

— The three Sutras can be made to fit in with either interpretation, although it must be noted that none of them explicitly refers to the soul's connexion with the buddhi.

Adhik. XIV and XV (33-39 ; 40) refer to the kartn'tva of the ^Iva, i. e. the question whether the soul is an agent. Sutras 33-39 clearly say that it is such. But as, according to vSankara's system, this cannot be the final view, — the soul being essentially non-active, and all action belonging to the world of upadhis, — he looks upon the next following Sutra (40) as constituting an adhikara^a by itself, and teaching that the soul is an agent when connected with the instru- ments of action, buddhi, &c, while it ceases to be so when dissociated from them, 'just as the carpenter acts in both ways/ i. e. just as the carpenter works as long as he wields his instruments, and rests after having laid them aside. — Rclminu^*a, perhaps more naturally, does not separate Sutra 40 from the preceding Sutras, but interprets it as follows : Activity is indeed an essential attribute of the soul ; but therefrom it does not follow that the soul is always actually active, just as the carpenter, even when furnished with the requisite instruments, may either work or not work, just as he pleases.

Adhik. XVI (41, 42) teaches that the soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord who impels it with a view to its former actions.

Adhik. XVII (43-53) treats of the relation of the indivi- dual soul to Brahman. Sutra 43 declares that the individual soul is a part (amsa) of Brahman, and the following Sutras show how that relation does not involve either that Brahman is affected by the imperfections, sufferings, &c. of the souls, or that one soul has to participate in the experiences of other souls. The two commentators of course take entirely

lviii vedAnta-s^tras.

different views of the doctrine that the soul is a part of Brahman. According to Rdmdnu^*a the souls are in reality parts of Brahman1; according to vSankara the ' af/wa ' of the Sutra must be understood to mean ' a^j-a iva,' ' a part as it were ; ' the one universal indivisible Brahman having no real parts, but appearing to be divided owing to its limiting adjuncts. — One Sutra (50) in this adhikara^a calls for special notice. According to Sankara the words 'albMsa eva £a' mean '(the soul is) a mere reflection/ which, as the commentators remark, is a statement of the so-called pratibimbavada; i. e. the doctrine that the so-called individual soul is nothing but the reflection of the Self in the buddhi ; while Sutra 43 had propounded the so-called avaM^edav&da, i. e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts. — According to R&manu^a the £bh&sa of the Sutra has to be taken in the

e. the doctrine that the soul is the highest Self in so far as limited by its adjuncts. — According to R&manu^a the £bh&sa of the Sutra has to be taken in the

1 61vasya kaxtritv&m paramapurusMyattam ity uktam. Idaniw kim ayaw gtv&h parasmad atyantabhinna^ uta param eva brahma bhrantam uta brahmaivo- pidhyava^Minnam atha brahmawja iti sazwrayyate jrutivipratipatte^ sa.msaya.a. Nanu tadananyam arambhawarabdMibhya^ adhikaw tu bhedanird&fad ity atraivayam artho nirnfta/i. Satya/rc sa eva ninatvaikatvajrutivipratipattya * kshipya ^ivasya brahmaw.ratvopapadanena vlreshato niraiyate. Yavad dhi ^ivasya brahmawsatvaw na niraitam tava^* ^ivasya brahmano * nanyatvaw brahma^as tasmad adhikatvaw ka. na pratitish^ati. Kim tavat praptam. Atyantaw bhinna iti. Kuta^. Gnkgnau dvav ityadibhedanirde.rat. Gna.gna.yor abhedairutayas tv agnina sizzled itivad viruddharthapratipadanad aupa^arikya^. Brahma/zo * mso ^iva ity api na sadhiya^, ekavastvekadcrava^i hy a.msa.sa,bda.a, ^ivasya brahmaikade-ratve tadgata dosha brahmam bhaveyu^. Na ka, brahma- khaWo gha, ity aw^atvopapatti^ kha^ananarhatvad brahma^a^ pragukta- doshaprasanga^ ka,, tasmad atyantabhinnasya ta.damsa.t\a,m durupapadam. Yadv& bhrantaw brahmaiva ^iva^. Kuta^. Tat tvam asi ayam atma brah- metyadibrahmatmabhavopadejat, nanatmatvavadinyas tu pratyakshadisiddhar- thanuvaditvad ananyathasiddhadvaitopadejaparabhi/^ jrutibhi^ pratyakshadaya^ hi avidyantargata/fc khyapyante. — Athava brahmaivanadyupadhyava/^Minnaw ^iva^. Kuta/fc. Tata eva brahmatmabha.vopade.rat. Na Hyam upadhir bhrantiparikalpita ita vaktum sakyam bandhamokshadivyavasthanupapatter. Ity evaw prapte * bhidhiyate. Brahma^wa iti. Kuta>&. Nana.vyapade.rad anyatha >£aikatvena vyapadcrad ubhayatha hi vyapade^o dwyate. Nanavya- padcras tavat srash/rztvasrz^yatva — niyantrztvaniyamyatva — sarva^/zatva- gnalva. — svadhinatvaparadhmatva — juddhatvaj-uddhatva — kalyaTzagrmakarat- vaviparitatva — patitvareshatvadibhir dwyate. Anyatha Hbhedena vyapa- de.yo.spi tat tvam asi ayam atma brahmetyadibhir drwyate. Api dsbakita- vaditvam apy adhfyate eke, brahma d&ra brahma da^a brahmeme kitava ity atharvamka brahma^o da\rakitavaditvam apy adhiyate, tataj* ka. sarva^ivavya- pitvena abhedo vyapadlryata ity artha^. Evam ubhayavyapade^amukhyatva- siddhaye givo*ya.m brahma^o * msa. ity abhyupagantavya^.

INTRODUCTION. llX

sense of hetvabhasa, a fallacious argument, and the Stitra is explained as being directed against the reasoning of those Vedantins according to whom the soul is Brahman in so far as limited by non-real adjuncts \

Pada IV.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-4 ; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra/zas (by which generic name are denoted the buddhtndriyas, karmen- driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman ; are eleven in number ; and are of minute size (a;/u).

Adhik. I, II, III (1-4 ; 5-6; 7) teach that the pra/zas (by which generic name are denoted the buddhtndriyas, karmen- driyas, and the manas) spring from Brahman ; are eleven in number ; and are of minute size (a;/u).

Adhik. IV, V, VI (8; 9-12; 13) inform us also that the mukhya pra^a, i.e. the vital air, is produced from Brahman; that it is a principle distinct from air in general and from the pra^as discussed above ; and that it is minute (a^u).

Adhik. VII and VIII (14-16; 17-19) teach that the pra/zas are superintended and guided in their activity by special divinities, and that they are independent principles, not mere modifications of the mukhya pra;za.

Adhik. IX (20-2,2) declares that the evolution of names and forms (the namarupavyakara/za) is the work, not of the individual soul, but of the Lord.

THIRD ADHYAYA. PAda I.

Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when passing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhutasukshma) which serve as an abode to the pra;zas attached to the soul.

Adhik. II (8-1 1) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodi- ment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anuraya) of their

1 Nanu bhrantabrahma^ivavade * py avidyak^/topadhibhedad bhogavya- vasthadaya upapadyanta ata aha, abhasa eva ka.. Akha^aikarasapraka\rama- tratvarupasya svanlpatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva. Praka^aikasvarupasya prakajatirodhanaw praksLranaja eveti prag evopapaditam. AbhasEi eveti va paY^a/6, tatha sati hetava abhasa^.

Akha^aikarasapraka\rama- tratvarupasya svanlpatirodhanapurvakopadhibhedopapadanahetur abhasa eva. Praka^aikasvarupasya prakajatirodhanaw praksLranaja eveti prag evopapaditam. AbhasEi eveti va paY^a/6, tatha sati hetava abhasa^.

lx VEDANTA-S on tne whole, explained as by Sankara ; Sutra 12, however, is said to mean, ' Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation ; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be intro- duced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priya^irastva. — If priy&rirastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them ? — ' Because/ Sutra 14 replies, * there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious medita- tion.'— But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.) — ' Be- cause,' Sutra 15 replies/ the term " Self" (atma anandamaya) is applied to it.' — But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in atma pra/zamaya, Sec.) is applied to non- Selfs also ; how then do you know that in atma ananda- maya it denotes the real Self? — ' The term Self,' Sutra 16 replies, ' is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (atma va idam eka, &c), as we con- clude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.' — But, an objection is raised, does not the con- text show that the term ' Self,' which in all the preceding

lxx VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

clauses about the pra/zamaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage ? — To this question asked in the former half of 1 7 (anvayad iti ktt) the latter half replies, ' Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz. II, 1, ' From that Self sprang ether/

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the pra^asa^vada. — The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I. — Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature ; in Brz. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye ; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyas. — Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra/zaya- niya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding AT/zandogya vidya, because the stated difference of Brah- man's abode involves difference of vidya. — Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

— Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brahma;za passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads — as, for instance, a brahma;za about the maha- vrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-ara/zyaka — do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Sutras 27-30 constitute, according to Sankara, two adhi- kara/zas of which the former (XVI ; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place — not, as

INTRODUCTION. lxXl

the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world — but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body ; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken literally. — The latter adhikara^a (XVII ; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu^am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/zam brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place.

Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu^am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/zam brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place.

The Sri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikara^a whose two first Sutras are explained as by vSankara, while Sutra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, * the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i. e. partly at the moment of death, partly on the road to Brahman ; for otherwise there would be a con- tradiction ' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodi- less soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the gods). — To this Sutra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i. e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body ; com- pare the passage, £para^ ^yotir upasampadya svena rupe- ;zabhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti kridan ramamana/^ sa svar&d bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama^aro bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's vidyamahatmya. — That the explanation of the 5ri-bhashya agrees with the text as well as Ankara's, a comparison of the two will show ; especially forced is 5ankara's explana- tion of ' arthavattvam ubhayatha,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case.

The next Sutra (31) constitutes an adhikara/za (XVIII)

lxxii vedanta-s6tras.

deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyas which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the sagu/za-vidyas of Brahman. — The explanation given in the •Sri-bhashya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman — without any reference to the dis- tinction of nirgu/za and sagu/za — proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The .Sri-bhashya reads 'sarvesh&m,' i. e. all worshippers, not ' sarvasam/ all sagu^a-vidyas.)

(The .Sri-bhashya reads 'sarvesh&m,' i. e. all worshippers, not ' sarvasam/ all sagu^a-vidyas.)

Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices. — In the Sri-bhashya, where the Sutra follows immediately on Sutra 30, the adhikara^a determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body— there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move — and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties.

Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some vidyas — such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c. — are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.— Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Ka/^a Up. Ill, 1, and Mu. Up. Ill, t, constitute one vidya only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to Ramanu^-a the Sutra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutra.— Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two passages, Bri Up. Ill, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidya only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.— Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the passage Ait. Ar. II, 2, 4, 6 con- stitutes not one but two meditations.— Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the vidyd of the True contained in Bri. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only.— According to Rdmanu^a,

INTRODUCTION/ 1

XX1U

Sutras 35-38 constitute one adhikara^a only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to Sankara.

XXIV (38) again determines that the vidyd of the True contained in Bri. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only.— According to Rdmanu^a,

INTRODUCTION/ 1

XX1U

Sutras 35-38 constitute one adhikara^a only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to Sankara.

Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Kh. Up. VIII, 1 and Bri. Up. IV, 4, %% cannot constitute one vidya, since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with Brahman as destitute of qualities. — Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to 5ah- kara, of a minor question connected with Kh. Up. V, 1 1 ff. — According to the Sri-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one adhikara^a whose first Sutra reaches essentially the same conclusion as 5ankara under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to re- mark, which in the two passages discussed are predicated of Brahman — such as va.ritva, satyakamatva, &c. — cannot be considered real (paramarthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final release. — To this objec- tion Sutra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not to be left out (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passages under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with emphasis1/ — But, another objection is raised, Scrip- ture says that he who meditates on Brahman as satyakama, &c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in Kh. Up. VIII, 1 ; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation. — To this ob- jection Sutra 41 replies, ' Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom (i. e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.)

1 Ramanu^u has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set aside in any meditation : ' Na ka, matapitWsahasrebhyo * pi vatsalataraw SB.stra.rn prat&rakavad aparamarthikau nirasaniyau guwau pramawantaraprati- pannau adarewopadijya sawsara^akraparivartanena pftrvam eva bambhramya- manan mumukshtin bhuyo*pi bhramayitum alam/

Ixxiv vedAnta-s^tras.

Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as perma- nently requisite parts of the latter. — Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a Bri.Up. passage and a similar Kh. Up. passage, Vayu and Pra;za are not to be identified, but to be held apart.— Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the fire- altars made of mind, &c, which are mentioned in the Agni* rahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but merely subjects of meditations.

Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to 5ankara, in the way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists maintain).— According to the vSri-bha- shya the adhikara^a does not refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras then have to be translated as follows : ' Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, such as gnatritva and the like), because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.* « — The next Sutra rejects this view, ' This is not so, but the separatedness (i. e. the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because that will be * the state (of the Self in the condition of final release).'

Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of difference of svara in the udgitha, &c, valid, not only for that sakha in which the medita- tion actually is met with, but for all rakhas. — Adhik.

1 The *Sri-bhashya as well as several other commentaries reads tadbhava* bhavitvat for iankara's tadbhavabhavitvat.

INTRODUCTION. ' lxxV

XXXII (57) decides that the VaLrvanara Agni of Kh. Up. V, 1 1 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.— Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidya, vSa/zafilyavidya, &c. remain separate.

is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.— Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidya, vSa/zafilyavidya, &c. remain separate.

Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumu- lated.— Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to choice. — Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with constituent elements of action, such as the udgitha.

Pada IV.

Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha, i. e. subordinate to action, but indepen- dent.— Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by show- ing that the state of the pravra^ins is enjoined by the sacred law, and that for them vidyd only is prescribed, not action. — Adhik. Ill (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part of vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but themselves enjoin the meditation. — The legends recorded in the Vedanta-texts are not to be used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying — as arthavadas — the injunctions with which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24). — For all these reasons the urdhvare- tasa^ require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25). — Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c, are required as conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik. VI, 26, 27). — Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII, 28-31). — The a-sramakarmam are obligatory on him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII,

lxxvi vedAnta-s6tras.

32-35)* — Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are anlsrama have claims to vidyi (Adhik. IX, 36-39). — An urdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40). — Ex- piation of the fall of an urdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42). — Exclusion of the fallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43). — Those meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the ya^*amana (Adhik. XIII, 44-46). — Brz. Up. Ill, 5> 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to balya and p&nditya. (Adhik. XIV, 47-49). — By balya is to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

XIII, 44-46). — Brz. Up. Ill, 5> 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to balya and p&nditya. (Adhik. XIV, 47-49). — By balya is to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

Sutras 51 and 53 discuss, according to R&manu^a, the question when the vidya, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises. Sutra 51 treats of that vidyd whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that ' it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in which latter case the vidyd arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various passages).'— Sutra 52, ' Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i. e. of sometimes having an obstacle, some- times not). — 5ankara, who treats the two Sutras as two adhikara/zas, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu^a-vidyds.

FOURTH ADHYAYA,

PAda I.

Adhikara^a I (1, 2). — The meditation on the Atman enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be repeated again and again.

Adhik. II (3). — The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self,

INTRODUCTION. lx

XVU

Adhik. Ill (4). — To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara^a the so-called pratikopasanas, i.e. those medita- tions in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or out- ward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety upasita) constitute an exception, i. e. the devotee is not to consider the pratika as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. IV (5). — In the pratikopasanas the pratika is to be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the pratika. — Ramanu^a takes Sutra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived at under Sutra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new adhikara^a.

Adhik. V (6). — In meditations connected with constitu- tives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evasau tapati tarn udgitham upasita) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance, the udgitha is to be viewed as Aditya, not Aditya as the udgitha.

Adhik. VI (7-10). — The devotee is to carry on his medi- tations in a sitting posture. — vSankara maintains that this rule does not apply to those meditations wThose result is sa^yagdanana ; but the Sutra gives no hint to that effect.

Adhik. VI I ( 1 1 ). — The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhik. VIII (12). — The meditations are to be continued until death. — .Sankara again maintains that those medita- tions which lead to sa^yagdar^ana are excepted.

Adhik. VI I ( 1 1 ). — The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhik. VIII (12). — The meditations are to be continued until death. — .Sankara again maintains that those medita- tions which lead to sa^yagdar^ana are excepted.

Adhik. IX (13). — When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvan is no longer affected by the consequences of either past or future evil deeds.

Adhik. X (14). — Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency. — The literal translation of the Sutra is, ' There is likewise non-attachment (to the vidvan) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place)/ The last words of the Sutra, ' but on the fall,' are separated by Sankara from the preceding part of the Sutra and interpreted to mean, ' when death takes place (there results mukti of

lxxviii VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

the vidvan, who through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of works).'- — According to Ramanug-a the whole Sutra simply means, ' There is likewise non-attach- ment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is reached), but on the death of the vidvan V

Adhik. XI (15). — The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding adhikara/zas holds good only in the case of anarabdhakarya works, i. e. those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend to the arabdhakarya works on which the present existence of the devotee depends.

Adhik. XII (16, 17). — From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya) : so, for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of knowledge.

Adhik. XIII (18), — The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accom- panied with the knowledge of the upasanas referring to the different members of those works.

Adhik. XIV (19). — The arabdhakarya works have to be worked out fully by the fruition of their effects ; whereupon the vidvan becomes united with Brahman. — The ' bhoga ' of the Sutra is, according to vSahkara, restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete know- ledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which other- wise would lead to future embodiments. According to Ramanu^a a number of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the arabdhakarya works are exhausted,

Pada II.

This and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya describe the fate of the vidvan after death. According to vSankara we have to distinguish the vidvan who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest

This and the two remaining padas of the fourth adhyaya describe the fate of the vidvan after death. According to vSankara we have to distinguish the vidvan who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest

1 Nanu vidushoxpi setikartavyatakopasananirvrzttaye vWshfyannadiphala- nisltfany eva kathaw tesham virodhad vina^a u>£yate. Tatraha pate tv iti. .Sarirapate tu tesham vinasa/i j-arirapatad urdhvaw tu vidyanuguwadmh^a- phalani sukn'tani na-syantity artha/£.

INTRODUCTION. lxxix

Brahman, and the vidvan who knows only the lower Brah- man, and have to refer certain Sutras to the former and others to the latter. According to Rctmclnu^a the vidvan is one only.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).— On the death of the vidvan (i.e. of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to 5ankara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (prd^a), the vital air in the individual soul (^iva), the soul in the subtle elements. — According to R&m&niig-a the combination (sampatti) of the senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/^yoga), not a merging (lay a).

Adhik. IV (7). — The vidvan (i.e. according to Sankara, he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidv&n, i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle elements, and so on into the n&dis. — The vidv&n also remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet completely destroyed avidya, so that the immor- tality which Scripture ascribes to him (amr/tatva;/z hi vidvan abhya^nute) is only a relative one. — Ramanu^-a quotes the following text regarding the immortality of the vidvan :

c Yad& sarve pramu^yante k&ma ye*sya hrz'di sthita^ atha martyo * mrito bhavaty atra brahma sama^nute/ and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvan as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the destruction— mentioned in the preceding pada — • of all the effects of good and evil works, while the ' reaching of Brahman ' can only refer to the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.

Adhik. V (8-li) raises, according to 6ankara, the ques- tion whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with the highest deity (te^-a^ parasyaw devatay&m) are completely merged in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached ; that, on the other hand, as long as the sa^sara state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with

lxxx VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new bodies for the soul.

Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new bodies for the soul.

According to Ramanu^a the Sutras 8-n do not con- stitute a new adhikara«a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul from the body, * because Scripture declares sa#/sara, i. e. embodiedness up to the reaching of Brahman ' (tasya tavad eva kiratn y&van na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8). — That the soul after having departed from the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority1 (9). — Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the body (10).

Adhik. VI (13-14) is of special importance. — According to Sankara the Sfitras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidya) the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the body of the dying devotee ; this implies at the same time that they do not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman. which indeed has no direct bearing on the distinction of apara and para vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of vSankara's interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the Sutras. The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the opinions of three different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the vidvan repairs on death, or — according to Ramanu^a — the worshippers of which Brah- man repair to (the highest) Brahman. Ramanu^a treats the views of Badari and (Jaimini as two purvapakshas, and the opinion of Badaraya^a — which is stated last — as the siddhanta. vSankara, on the other hand, detaching the Sutras in which Badaraya/za's view is set forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/za (a proceeding which, although not

INTRODUCTION. XC1

plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegiti- mate), maintains that Badari's view, which is expounded first, represents the siddhanta, while Caimini's view, set forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere purva- paksha. This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima;/zsa-sutras to conclude the dis- cussion of contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted as the authoritative one. This is so patent that vSarikara feels himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only if .Sankara's system itself is already accepted.

This is so patent that vSarikara feels himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only if .Sankara's system itself is already accepted.

The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice but to side with Ramanu^a as to the general subject-matter of the fourth adhyaya of the Sutras. We need not accept him as our guide in all particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the same vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in Sankara's sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the dis- tinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid. But this is not a point to be decided at once on the negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted. And intimately connected with this investiga- tion— in fact, one with it from a certain point of view — is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or l^vara. That Ramanu^a denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Maya we have seen above ; we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and inter-

XC11 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

pretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras themselves.

That Ramanu^a denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Maya we have seen above ; we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and inter-

XC11 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

pretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras themselves.

Placing myself at the point of view of a vSankara, I am startled at the outset by the second Sutra of the first adhyaya, which undertakes to give a definition of Brahman. 'Brahman is that whence the origination and so on (i. e. the sustentation and reabsorption) of this world proceed.' What, we must ask, is this Sutra meant to define? — That Brah- man, we are inclined to answer, whose cognition the first Sutra declares to constitute the task of the entire Vedanta ; that Brahman whose cognition is the only road to final release; that Brahman in fact which 5ankara calls the highest. — But, here we must object to ourselves, the highest Brahman is not properly defined as that from which the world originates. In later Vedantic writings, whose authors were clearly conscious of the distinction of the higher absolute Brahman and the lower Brahman related to Mayd or the world, we meet with definitions of Brahman of an altogether different type. I need only remind the reader of the current definition of Brahman as sa£-£id-ananda, or, to mention one individual instance, refer to the introductory ^lokas of the Pa#£ada.ri dilating on the samvid svayam- prabha, the self-luminous principle of thought which in all time, past or future, neither starts into being nor perishes (P. D. I, 7). ' That from which the world proceeds ' can by a 5ankara be accepted only as a definition of l^vara, of Brahman which by its association with Maya is enabled to project the false appearance of this world, and it certainly is as improbable that the Sutras should open with a definition of that inferior principle, from whose cognition there can accrue no permanent benefit, as, according to a remark made above, it is unlikely that they should con- clude with a description of the state of those who know the lower Brahman only, and thus are debarred from obtaining true release. As soon, on the other hand, as we discard the idea of a twofold Brahman and conceive Brah^ man as one only, as the all-enfolding being which some- times emits the world from its own substance and sometimes again retracts it into itself, ever remaining one in all its

INTRODUCTION. XC111

various manifestations— -a conception which need not by any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the Ramanu^as — the definition of Brahman given in the second Sutra becomes altogether unobjectionable.

XC111

various manifestations— -a conception which need not by any means be modelled in all its details on the views of the Ramanu^as — the definition of Brahman given in the second Sutra becomes altogether unobjectionable.

We next enquire whether the impression left on the mind by the manner in which Badaraya^a defines Brah- man, viz. that he does not distinguish between an absolute Brahman and a Brahman associated with Mayd, is con- firmed or weakened by any other parts of his work. The Sutras being throughout far from direct in their enun- ciations, we shall have to look less to particular terms and turns of expression than to general lines of reasoning. What in this connexion seems specially worthy of being taken into account, is the style of argumentation employed by the Sutrakara against the Sankhya doctrine, which maintains that the world has originated, not from an intelligent being, but from the non-intelligent pradhana. The most important Sutras relative to this point are to be met with in the first pada of the second adhyaya. Those Sutras are indeed almost unintelligible if taken by them- selves, but the unanimity of the commentators as to their meaning enables us to use them as steps in our investiga- tion. The sixth Sutra of the p&da mentioned replies to the Sankhya objection that the non-intelligent world cannot spring from an intelligent principle, by the remark that c it is thus seen/ i. e. it is a matter of common observation that non-intelligent things are produced from beings endowed with intelligence ; hair and nails, for instance, springing from animals, and certain insects from dung. — Now, an argu- mentation of this kind is altogether out of place from the point of view of the true vSankara. According to the latter the non-intelligent world does not spring from Brahman in so far as the latter is intelligence, but in so far as it is associated with Maya. Maya is the upadana of the material world, and Maya itself is of a non-intelligent nature, owing to which it is by so many Vedantic writers identified with the prakr/ti of the Sankhyas. Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal sub-

XC1V VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Similarly the illustrative instances, adduced under Sutra 9 for the purpose of showing that effects when being reabsorbed into their causal sub-

XC1V VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

stances do not impart to the latter their own qualities, and that hence the material world also, when being refunded into Brahman, does not impart to it its own imperfections, are singularly inappropriate if viewed in connexion with the doctrine of Maya, according to which the material world is no more in Brahman at the time of a pralaya than during the period of its subsistence. According to 5ankara the world is not merged in Brahman, but the special forms into which the upadana of the world, i.e. Maya, had modified itself are merged in non-distinct Maya, whose relation to Brahman is not changed thereby.— The illus- tration, again, given in Sutra 24 of the mode in which Brah- man, by means of its inherent power, transforms itself into the world without employing any extraneous instruments of action, ' kshiravad dhi,' ' as milk (of its own accord turns into curds)/ would be strangely chosen indeed if meant to bring nearer to our understanding the mode in which Brahman projects the illusive appearance of the world ; and also the analogous instance given in the Sutra next following, ' as Gods and the like (create palaces, chariots, &c. by the mere power of their will) ' — which refers to the real creation of real things — would hardly be in its place if meant to illustrate a theory which considers unreality to be the true character of the world. The mere cumulation of the two essentially heterogeneous illustrative instances (kshiravad dhi ; devadivat), moreover, seems to show that the writer who had recourse to them held no very definite theory as to the particular mode in which the world springs from Brahman, but was merely concerned to render plausible in some way or other that an intelligent being can give rise to what is non-intelligent without having recourse to any extraneous means1.

That the Maya doctrine was not present to the mind of the Sutrakara, further appears from the latter part of the fourth pada of the first adhyaya, where it is shown that Brahman is not only the operative but also the material cause of the world. If anywhere, there would have been

1 Ankara's favourite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive sights is — significantly enough — not known to the Sutras.

INTRODUCTION. XCV

If anywhere, there would have been

1 Ankara's favourite illustrative instance of the magician producing illusive sights is — significantly enough — not known to the Sutras.

INTRODUCTION. XCV

the place to indicate, had such been the author's view, that Brahman is the material cause of the world through Maya only, and that the world is unreal ; but the Sutras do not contain a single word to that effect. Sutra 26, on the other hand, exhibits the significant term 'parkamat ;' Brahman produces the world by means of a modification of itself. It is well known that later on, when the terminology of the Vedanta became definitely settled, the term 'pari/zamavada' was used to denote that very theory to which the followers of vSankara are most violently opposed, viz. the doctrine according to which the world is not a mere vivarta, i.e. an illusory manifestation of Brahman, but the effect of Brah- man undergoing a real change, may that change be con- ceived to take place in the way taught by Ramanu^a or in some other manner. — With regard to the last-quoted Sutra, as well as to those touched upon above, the commentators indeed maintain that whatever terms and modes of ex- pression are apparently opposed to the vivartavada are in reality reconcilable with it ; to Sutra 26, for instance, Govindananda remarks that the term ' pari^ama ' only denotes an effect in general (karyamatra), without implying that the effect is real. But in cases of this nature we are fully entitled to use our own judgment, even if we were not compelled to do so by the fact that other commentators, such as Ramanu^-a, are satisfied to take ' pari^ama ' and similar terms in their generally received sense.

A further section treating of the nature of Brahman is met with in III, 2, 11 ff. It is, according to Sankara's view, of special importance, as it is alleged to set forth that Brah- man is in itself destitute of all qualities, and is affected with qualities only through its limiting adjuncts (upadhis), the offspring of Maya. I have above (in the conspectus of contents) given a somewhat detailed abstract of the whole section as interpreted by 5ankara on the one hand, and Ramanu^ci on the other hand, from which it appears that the latter's opinion as to the purport of the group of Sutras widely diverges from that of 6arikara. The wording of the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators — if

XCV1 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

The wording of the Sutras is so eminently concise and vague that I find it impossible to decide which of the two commentators — if

XCV1 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

indeed either — is to be accepted as a trustworthy guide ; regarding the sense of some Sutras 5ankara's explanation seems to deserve preference, in the case of others Rama- nu£"a seems to keep closer to the text. I decidedly prefer, for instance, Ramanu^a's interpretation of Sutra 22, as far as the sense of the entire Sutra is concerned, and more especially with regard to the term ' prakrztaitavat- tvam,' whose proper force is brought out by Rimanu^-a's explanation only. So much is certain that none of the Sutras decidedly favours the interpretation proposed by >Sankara. Whichever commentator we follow, we greatly miss coherence and strictness of reasoning, and it is thus by no means improbable that the section is one of those — perhaps not few in number — in which both inter- preters had less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing Badaraya^a's Sutras to bear testimony to the truth of their own philo- sophic theories.

With special reference to the Mayd doctrine one impor- tant Sutra has yet to be considered, the only one in which the term 'maya' itself occurs, viz. Ill, 2, 3. According to vSahkara the Sutra signifies that the environments of the dreaming soul are not real but mere Maya, i. e. unsub- stantial illusion, because they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Ramanu^a (as we have seen in the conspectus) gives a different explanation of the term ' maya/ but in judging of .Sankara's views we may for the time accept 5ankara's own interpretation. Now, from the latter it clearly follows that if the objects seen in dreams are to be called Maya, i.e. illusion, because not evincing the characteristics of reality, the objective world surround- ing the waking soul must not be called Maya\ But that the world perceived by waking men is Maya, even in a higher sense than the world presented to the dreaming con- sciousness, is an undoubted tenet of the Sankara Vedanta ; and the Sutra therefore proves either that Badaraya/za did not hold the doctrine of the illusory character of the world, or else that, if after all he did hold that doctrine, he used the term ' maya ' in a sense altogether different from that

INTRODUCTION. XCV11

in which Sankara employs it. — If, on the other hand, we, with R&manug-a, understand the word ' mkyk ' to denote a wonderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing what- ever on the doctrine of Mayd in its later technical sense.

XCV11

in which Sankara employs it. — If, on the other hand, we, with R&manug-a, understand the word ' mkyk ' to denote a wonderful thing, the Sutra of course has no bearing what- ever on the doctrine of Mayd in its later technical sense.

We now turn to the question as to the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Do the Sutras indicate any- where that their author held vSarikara's doctrine, according to which the ^iva is in reality identical with Brahman, and separated from it, as it were, only by a false surmise due to avidya, or do they rather favour the view that the souls, although they have sprung from Brahman, and constitute elements of its nature, yet enjoy a kind of individual exist- ence apart from it ? This question is in fact only another aspect of the Maya question, but yet requires a short separate treatment.

In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in vSankara's sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Rama- nu£*a, that the soul is of minute size. We have further seen that Sutra 1 8 of the third p&da of the second adhyaya, which describes the soul as '^Tza,' is more appropriately under- stood in the sense assigned to it by Ramanu^a ; and, again, that the Sutras which treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with Sankara's views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to authorise. — We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the soul is distinctly said to be a part (aw^a) of Brahman, and which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in with vSankara's views only if a^j-a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by fa^a iva,' while Ramanu^a is able to take the Sutra as it stands. — We also have already referred to Sutra 50,'abMsa eva £a/ which vSankara interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavada according to which the indi- vidual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self. But almost every Sutra — and Sutra 50 forms no exception — being so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous [34] g

xcviii vedanta-sAtras.

But almost every Sutra — and Sutra 50 forms no exception — being so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous [34] g

xcviii vedanta-sAtras.

aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favour- able to the pratibimba doctrine. How indeed could Sutra 5°* if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sutra 43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman ? For that 43 contains, as iankara and his commentators aver, a statement of the ava^Medavctda, can itself be ac- cepted only if we interpret amsa, by antss. iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever. I confess that Ramanu^a's interpretation of the Sutra (which however is accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sutras unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term abhasa, which may mean ' reflection/ but may mean hetvabhasa, i. e. fallacious argument, as well. But as things stand, this one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavcida which, in its turn, pre- supposes the miyavada, is the teaching of the Sutras.

To the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of vSankara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with here and there in the Sutras. In the conspectus of contents we have had occasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1,23, which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i. e. additional to, or different from, the individual soul, since Scripture declares the two to be different. Analogously I, 2, 20 lays stress on the fact that the ^arira is not the antaryamin, because the Madhyandinas, as well as the Ka/zvas, speak of him in their texts as different (bhedena enam adhiyate), and in 32 the ^arira and the pradhana are referred to as the two ' others ' (itarau) of whom the text predicates distinctive attributes separating them from the highest Lord. The word ' itara ' (the other one) appears in several other passages (I, 1, 16 ; I, 3, 16; II, 1, 31) as a kind of technical term denoting the individual soul in con- tradistinction from the Lord. The 5ankaras indeed main- tain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction

INTRODUCTION. XC1X

The 5ankaras indeed main- tain that all those passages refer to an unreal distinction

INTRODUCTION. XC1X

due to avidya. But this is just what we should like to see proved, and the proof offered in no case amounts to more than a reference to the system which demands that the Sutras should be thus understood. If we accept the inter- pretations of the school of 5ankara,it remains altogether un- intelligible why the Sutrakara should never hint even at what vSankara is anxious again and again to point out at length, viz. that the greater part of the work contains a kind of exoteric doctrine only, ever tending to mislead the student who does not keep in view what its nature is. If other reasons should make it probable that the Sutrakara was anxious to hide the true doctrine of the Upanishads as a sort of esoteric teaching, we might be more ready to accept vSankara's mode of interpretation. But no such reasons are forthcoming ; nowhere among the avowed followers of the vSankara system is there any tendency to treat the kernel of their philosophy as something to be jealously guarded and hidden. On the contrary, they all, from Gau- rfapada down to the most modern writer, consider it their most important, nay, only task to inculcate again and again in the clearest and most unambiguous language that all appearance of multiplicity is a vain illusion, that the Lord and the individual souls are in reality one, and that all knowledge but this one knowledge is without true value.

There remains one more important passage concern- ing the relation of the individual soul to the highest Self, a passage which attracted our attention above, when we were reviewing the evidence for early divergence of opinion among the teachers of the Vedanta. I mean I, 4, 20-32, which three Sutras state the views of A^ma- rathya, Au^/ulomi, and Kajakrztsna as to the reason why, in a certain passage of the Brzhadara/zyaka, characteristics of the individual soul are ascribed to the highest Self. The siddhanta view is enounced in Sutra 22/ avasthiter iti Ka^a- krztsna^,' i.e. Klrakrz'tsna (accounts for the circumstance mentioned) on the ground of the 'permanent abiding or abode.' By this ' permanent abiding' vSankara understands the Lord's abiding as, i. e. existing as — or in the condition of — the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enuncia-

g2

vedanta-s6tras.

e. existing as — or in the condition of — the individual soul, and thus sees in the Sutra an enuncia-

g2

vedanta-s6tras.

tion of his own view that the individual soul is nothing but the highest Self, 'avikrzta^ parame^varo £*ivo nanya^.' Rama- nu^a, on the other hand, likewise accepting Ka^akrztsna's opinion as the siddhanta view, explains ' avasthiti ' as the Lord's permanent abiding within the individual soul, as de- scribed in the antaryamin-brahma^a. — We can hardly main- tain that the term 'avasthiti' cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by 5ankara, viz. special state or condition, but so much must be urged in favour of Rarnanu^a's interpreta- tion that in the five other places where avasthiti (or ana- vasthiti) is met with in the Sutras (I, 2, 17; II, 2, 4 ; II, 2, 13; II, 3, 24; III, 3, 32) it regularly means permanent abiding or permanent abode within something.

If, now, I am shortly to sum up the results of the pre- ceding enquiry as to the teaching of the Sutras, I must give it as my opinion that they do not set forth the distinc- tion of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman ; that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and f .svara in vSankara's sense ; that they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world ; and that they do not, with 5ankara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self. I do not wish to advance for the present beyond these negative results. Upon Ramanu^-a's mode of interpretation — although I accept it without reserve in some important details — I look on the whole as more useful in providing us with a powerful means of criticising vSankara's explanations than in guiding us throughout to the right understanding of the text. The author of the Sutras may have held views about the nature of Brahman, the world, and the soul differing from those of 6ankara, and yet not agreeing in all points with those of Ramdnu^a. If, however, the negative conclusions stated above should be well founded, it would follow even from them that the system of Badaraya/za had greater affinities with that of the Bhagavatas and Ramanu^a than with the one of which the 6ankara-bhashya is the classical exponent.

It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sutras that only a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment

INTRODUCTION. CI

It appears from the above review of the teaching of the Sutras that only a comparatively very small proportion of them contribute matter enabling us to form a judgment

INTRODUCTION. CI

as to the nature of the philosophical doctrine advocated by Badariya^a. The reason of this is that the greater part of the work is taken up with matters which, according to .Sarikara's terminology, form part of the so-called lower knowledge, and throw no light upon philosophical questions in the stricter sense of the word. This circumstance is not without significance. In later works belonging to .Sankara's school in which the distinction of a higher and lower vidycl is clearly recognised, the topics constituting the latter are treated with great shortness ; and rightly so, for they are unable to accomplish the highest aim of man, i. e. final release. When we therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called lower vidycl are treated very fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called sagu/za, i. e. lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the fact of almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidya ; we cer- tainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what 6ankara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed in Bcldarciya^a's opinion part of that knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition.

The question as to what kind of system is represented by the Vedcinta-sutras may be approached in another way also. While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sutras by means of the different com- mentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras what doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teach- ing the Sutras doubtless aim at systematising. If, it might be urged, the Upanishads can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must consider it at the least highly probable that that very same doctrine — of whatever special nature it may be — is hidden in the enig- matical aphorisms of Badaraya^a 1.

I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation

1 Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.

cii vedanta-s^tras.

I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation

1 Cp. Gough's Philosophy of the Upanishads, pp. 240 ff.

cii vedanta-s^tras.

a safe one. Even if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled unhesitatingly to assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine. What- ever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient times not one but several essen- tially differing systems, all of which lay claim to the dis- tinction of being the true representatives of the teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Mayd is distinctly enunciated in the Upanishads ; nevertheless Ramanu£*a and, for all we know to the contrary, the whole series of more ancient commentators on whom he looked as authorities in the interpretation of the Sutras, denied that the Upanishads teach Maya, and it is hence by no means impossible that Bddaraya/za should have done the same. The a priori style of reasoning as to the teaching of the Sutras is therefore without much force.

But apart from any intention of arriving thereby at the meaning of the Sutras there, of course, remains for us the all-important question as to the true teaching of the Upa- nishads, a question which a translator of the Sutras and .Sankara cannot afford to pass over in silence, especially after reason has been shown for the conclusion that the Sutras and the vSarikara-bhashya do not agree concerning most important points of Vedantic doctrine. The Sutras as well as the later commentaries claim, in the first place, to be nothing more than systematisations of the Upani- shads, and for us a considerable part at least of their value and interest lies in this their nature. Hence the further question presents itself by whom the teaching of the Upa- nishads has been most adequately systematised, whether by Badaraya/za, or vSarikara, or Ramanu^-a, or some other commentator. This question requires to be kept altogether separate from the enquiry as to which commentator most faithfully renders the contents of the Sutras, and it is by no means impossible that 5ankara, for instance, should in

INTRODUCTION. Clll

the end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with regard to the teaching of the Upanishads than concerning the meaning of the Sutras*

Clll

the end have to be declared a more trustworthy guide with regard to the teaching of the Upanishads than concerning the meaning of the Sutras*

We must remark here at once that, whatever commenta- tor may be found to deserve preference on the whole, it appears fairly certain already at the outset that none of the systems which Indian ingenuity has succeeded in erecting on the basis of the Upanishads can be accepted in its entirety. The reason for this lies in the nature of the Upanishads themselves. To the Hindu commentator and philosopher the Upanishads came down as a body of revealed truth whose teaching had, somehow or other, to be shown to be thoroughly consistent and free from contra- dictions ; a system had to be devised in which a suitable place could be allotted to every one of the multitudinous statements which they make on the various points of Vedantic doctrine. But to the European scholar, or in fact to any one whose mind is not bound by the doctrine of >Sruti, it will certainly appear that all such attempts stand self-condemned. If anything is evident even on a cursory review of the Upanishads — and the impression so created is only strengthened by a more careful investigation — it is that they do not constitute a systematic whole. They themselves, especially the older ones, give the most unmis- takable indications on that point. Not only are the doctrines expounded in the different Upanishads ascribed to different teachers, but even the separate sections of one and the same Upanishad are assigned to different authorities. It would be superfluous to quote examples of what a mere look at the .Oandogya Upanishad, for instance, suffices to prove. It is of course not impossible that even a multitude of teachers should agree in imparting precisely the same doctrine ; but in the case of the Upanishads that is certainly not antecedently probable. For, in the first place, the teachers who are credited with the doctrines of the Upanishads manifestly belonged to different sec- tions of Brahminical society, to different Vedic j-akhas ; nay, some of them the tradition makes out to have been kshattriyas. And, in the second place, the period, whose

civ vedAnta-s^tras.

And, in the second place, the period, whose

civ vedAnta-s^tras.

mental activity is represented in the Upanishads, was a creative one, and as such cannot be judged according to the analogy of later periods of Indian philosophic de- velopment. The later philosophic schools as, for instance, the one of which vSankara is the great representative, were no longer free in their speculations, but strictly bound by a traditional body of texts considered sacred, which could not be changed or added to, but merely sys- tematised and commented upon. Hence the rigorous uniformity of doctrine characteristic of those schools. But there had been a time when, what later writers received as a sacred legacy, determining and confining the whole course of their speculations, first sprang from the minds of creative thinkers not fettered by the tradition of any school, but freely following the promptings of their own heads and hearts. By the absence of school traditions, I do not in- deed mean that the great teachers who appear in the Upanishads were free to make an entirely new start, and to assign to their speculations any direction they chose ; for nothing can be more certain than that, at the period as the outcome of whose philosophical activity the Upanishads have to be considered, there were in circulation certain broad speculative ideas overshadowing the mind of every member of Brahminical society. But those ideas were neither very definite nor worked out in detail, and hence allowed themselves to be handled and fashioned in different ways by different individuals. With whom the few leading conceptions traceable in the teaching of all Upanishads first originated, is a point on which those writings themselves do not enlighten us, and which we have no other means for settling ; most probably they are to be viewed not as the creation of any individual mind, but as the gradual outcome of speculations carried on by generations of Vedic theologians. In the Upanishads themselves, at any rate, they appear as floating mental possessions which may be seized and moulded into new forms by any one who feels within himself the required inspiration. A certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be

INTRODUCTION. CV

A certain vague knowledge of Brahman, the great hidden being in which all this manifold world is one, seems to be

INTRODUCTION. CV

spread everywhere, and often issues from the most unex- pected sources. 6Vetaketu receives instruction from his father Uddalaka ; the proud G&rgya has to become the pupil of A^ata^atru, the king of Karf ; Bhugyu Sahya- yani receives answers to his questions from a Gandharva possessing a maiden; Satyakama learns what Brahman is from the bull of the herd he is tending, from Agni and from a flamingo ; and Upako^ala is taught by the sacred fires in his teacher's house. All this is of course legend, not history; but the fact that the philosophic and theological doctrines of the Upanishads are clothed in this legendary garb certainly does not strengthen the ex- pectation of finding in them a rigidly systematic doctrine.

And a closer investigation of the contents of the Upani- shads amply confirms this preliminary impression. If we avail ourselves, for instance, of M. Paul Regnaud's Materiaux pour servir a l'Histoire de la Philosophic de l'lnde, in which the philosophical lucubrations of the different Upanishads are arranged systematically according to topics, we can see with ease how, together with a certain uniformity of general leading conceptions, there runs throughout divergence in details, and very often not unimportant details. A look, for instance, at the collection of passages relative to the origination of the world from the primitive being, suffices to show that the task of demonstrating that whatever the Upanishads teach on that point can be made to fit into a homogeneous system is an altogether hopeless one. The accounts there given of the creation belong, beyond all doubt, to different stages of philosophic and theological development or else to different sections of priestly society. None but an Indian commentator would, I suppose, be inclined and sufficiently courageous to attempt the proof that, for in- stance, the legend of the atman purushavidha, the Self in the shape of a person which is as large as man and woman together, and then splits itself into two halves from which cows, horses, asses, goats, &c. are produced in succession (Bri. Up. I, i, 4), can be reconciled with the account given of the creation in the KMndogya. Upanishad, where it is said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat,

cvl vedAnta-s6tras.

are produced in succession (Bri. Up. I, i, 4), can be reconciled with the account given of the creation in the KMndogya. Upanishad, where it is said that in the beginning there existed nothing but the sat,

cvl vedAnta-s6tras.

i that which is,5 and that feeling a desire of being many it emitted out of itself ether, and then all the other elements in due succession. The former is a primitive cosmogonic myth, which in its details shows striking analogies with the cosmogonic myths of other nations ; the latter account is fairly developed Vedanta (although not Vedanta implying the Maya doctrine). We may admit that both accounts show a certain fundamental similarity in so far as they derive the manifold world from one original being ; but to go beyond this and to maintain, as vSankara does, that the atman purushavidha of the Br/hadara^yaka is the so-called Virct^ of the latter Vedanta — implying thereby that that section consciously aims at describing only the activity of one special form of tjvara, and not simply the whole pro- cess of creation — -is the ingenious shift of an orthodox commentator in difficulties, but nothing more.

How all those more or less conflicting texts came to be preserved and handed down to posterity, is not difficult to understand. As mentioned above, each of the great sections of Brahminical priesthood had its own sacred texts, and again in each of those sections there existed more ancient texts which it was impossible to dis- card when deeper and more advanced speculations began in their turn to be embodied in literary compositions, which in the course of time likewise came to be looked upon as sacred. When the creative period had reached its termina- tion, and the task of collecting and arranging was taken in hand, older and newer pieces were combined into wholes, and thus there arose collections of such heterogeneous character as the KMndogya. and Br/hadara^yaka Upani- shads. On later generations, to which the whole body of texts came down as revealed truth, there consequently devolved the inevitable task of establishing systems on which no exception could be taken to any of the texts ; but that the task was, strictly speaking, an impossible one, i. e. one which it was impossible to accomplish fairly and honestly, there really is no reason to deny.

For a comprehensive criticism of the methods which the different commentators employ in systematising the contents

INTRODUCTION. CV11

of the Upanishads there is no room in this place. In order, however, to illustrate what is meant by the ' impossibility,' above alluded to, of combining the various doctrines of the Upanishads into a whole without doing violence to a certain number of texts, it will be as well to analyse in detail some few at least of 5ankara's interpretations, and to render clear the considerations by which he is guided.

We begin with a case which has already engaged our attention when discussing the meaning of the Sutras, viz. the question concerning the ultimate fate of those who have attained the knowledge of Brahman. As we have seen, vSankara teaches that the soul of him who has risen to an insight into the nature of the higher Brahman does not, at the moment of death, pass out of the body, but is directly merged in Brahman by a process from which all. departing and moving, in fact all considerations of space, are altogether excluded. The soul of him, on the other hand, who has not risen above the knowledge of the lower qualified Brahman departs from the body by means of the artery called sushum^a, and following the so-called devayana, the path of the gods, mounts up to the world of Brahman. A review of the chief Upanishad texts on which 5ankara founds this distinction will show how far it is justified.

In a considerable number of passages the Upanishads contrast the fate of two classes of men, viz. of those who perform sacrifices and meritorious works only, and of those who in addition possess a certain kind of knowledge. Men of the former kind ascend after death to the moon, where they live for a certain time, and then return to the earth into new forms of embodiment ; persons of the latter kind proceed on the path of the gods — on which the sun forms one stage — up to the world of Brahman, from which there is no return. The chief passages to that effect are Kh. Up. V, 10 ; Kaush. Up. I, 2 ff. ; Mund. Up. I, 3, 9 ff. ; Bri. Up. VI, 2, 15 ff. ; Pra^na Up. I, 9 ff. — In other passages only the latter of the two paths is referred to, cp.K/z. Up. IV,i5;VIII,6,5;Taitt.Up.I,6; Bri. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9 ;V, 10 ; Maitr.Up.VI, 30, to mention only the more important ones.

Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows

CVlii VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

I, 9 ff. — In other passages only the latter of the two paths is referred to, cp.K/z. Up. IV,i5;VIII,6,5;Taitt.Up.I,6; Bri. Up. IV, 4, 8, 9 ;V, 10 ; Maitr.Up.VI, 30, to mention only the more important ones.

Now an impartial consideration of those passages shows

CVlii VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

I think, beyond any doubt, that what is meant there by the knowledge which leads through the sun to the world of Brahman is the highest knowledge of which the devotee is capable, and that the world of Brahman to which his know- ledge enables him to proceed denotes the highest state which he can ever reach, the state of final release, if we choose to call it by that name. — Kh. Up. V, 10 says, c Those who know this (viz. the doctrine of the five fires), and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities go to light/ &c. — Kh. Up. IV, 15 is manifestly intended to convey the true knowledge of Brahman ; Upako,?ala's teacher himself represents the instruction given by him as superior to the teaching of the sacred fires. — Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 5 quotes the old i*loka which says that the man moving upwards by the artery penetrating the crown of the head reaches the Im- mortal.— Kaush. Up. I, % — which gives the most detailed account of the ascent of the soul — contains no intimation whatever of the knowledge of Brahman, which leads up to the Brahman world, being of an inferior nature. — Mund. Up. I, 2, 9 agrees with the ATMndogya in saying that ' Those who practise penance and faith in the forest, tranquil, wise, and living on alms, depart free from passion, through the sun, to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is imperishable,' and nothing whatever in the context coun- tenances the assumption that not the highest knowledge and the highest Person are there referred to. — Bri. Up. IV, 4, 8 quotes old jlokas clearly referring to the road of the gods (' the small old path '), on which ' sages who know Brahman move on to the svargaloka and thence higher on as entirely free. — That path was found by Brah- man, and on it goes whoever knows Brahman/ — Bri Up. VI, 2, 15 is another version of the Pa^agnividya, with the variation, * Those who know this, and those who in the forest worship faith and the True, go to light,' &c. — Pra^na Up. 1, 10 says, ' Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path Aditya, the sun. There is the home of the spirits, the im- mortal free from danger, the highest. From thence they do not return, for it is the end.' — Maitr. Up. VI, 30 quotes

INTRODUCTION. C1X

jlokas, ' One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the solar orb : by it, having stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to the highest path/

From thence they do not return, for it is the end.' — Maitr. Up. VI, 30 quotes

INTRODUCTION. C1X

jlokas, ' One of them (the arteries) leads upwards, piercing the solar orb : by it, having stepped beyond the world of Brahman, they go to the highest path/

All these passages are as clear as can be desired. The soul of the sage who knows Brahman passes out by the sushum?z&, and ascends by the path of the gods to the world of Brahman, there to remain for ever in some bliss- ful state. But, according to Sankara, all these texts are meant to set forth the result of a certain inferior knowledge only, of the knowledge of the conditioned Brahman. Even in a passage apparently so entirely incapable of more than one interpretation as Br/. Up. VI, 2, 15, the 'True/ which the holy hermits in the forest are said to worship, is not to be the highest Brahman, but only Hira/zyagarbha ! — And why ? — Only because the system so demands it, the system which teaches that those who know the highest Brahman become on their death one with it, without having to resort to any other place. The passage on which this latter tenet is chiefly based is Bri. Up. IV, 4, 6, 7, where, with the fate of him who at his death has desires, and whose soul therefore enters a new body after having departed from the old one, accompanied by all the pra//as, there is contrasted the fate of the sage free from all desires. ' But as to the man who does not desire, who not desiring, freed from desires is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, the vital spirits of him (tasya) do not depart — being Brahman he goes to Brahman/

We have seen above (p. lxxx) that this passage is referred to in the important Sutras on whose right interpretation it, in the first place, depends whether or not we must admit the Sutrakara to have acknowledged the distinction of a para and an apari vidya\ Here the passage interests us as throwing light on the way in which Sankara systematises. He looks on the preceding part of the chapter as describing what happens to the souls of all those who do not know the highest Brahman, inclusive of those who know the lower Brahman only. They pass out of the old bodies followed by all pra^as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand, section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out of the body, but becomes one with Brahman then

CX VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

They pass out of the old bodies followed by all pra^as and enter new bodies. He, on the other hand, section 6 continues, who knows the true Brahman, does not pass out of the body, but becomes one with Brahman then

CX VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

and there. This interpretation of the purport of the entire chapter is not impossibly right, although I am rather in- clined to think that the chapter aims at setting forth in its earlier part the future of him who does not know Brahman at all, while the latter part of section 6 passes on to him who does know Brahman (i. e. Brahman pure and simple, the text knowing of no distinction of the so-called lower and higher Brahman). In explaining section 6 5ankara lays stress upon the clause 'na tasya pra/za utkramanti/ c his vital spirits do not pass out,' taking this to signify that the soul with the vital spirits does not move at all, and thus does not ascend to the world of Brahman ; while the purport of the clause may simply be that the soul and vital spirits do not go anywhere else, i. e. do not enter a new body, but are united, somehow or other, with Brahman. On vSahkara's interpretation there immediately arises a new difficulty. In the .rlokas, quoted under sections 8 and 9, the description of the small old path which leads to the svargaloka and higher on clearly refers — as noticed already above — to the path through the veins, primarily the sushum^a, on which, according to so many other pas- sages, the soul of the wise mounts upwards. But that path is, according to 6ankara, followed by him only who has not risen above the lower knowledge, and yet the ^lokas have manifestly to be connected with what is said in the latter half of 6 about the owner of the para vidya. Hence 6ankara sees himself driven to explain the ^lokas in 8 and 9 (of which a faithful translation is given in Professor Max Muller's version) as follows :

8. £aitanyagu/zena Mtmanatmd v& vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri.

2 Whether they belong to the karmakaw^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^anaka^^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA.

£aitanyagu/zena Mtmanatmd v& vastuto na svalpenapi yu^yate. Ananda Giri.

2 Whether they belong to the karmakaw^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which enjoins active religious duty or the ^anaka^^a, i. e. that part of the Veda which treats of Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA.

knowledge such as perception, inference, &c, and scrip- tural texts have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience1? — Because, we reply, the means of right knowledge cannot operate unless there be a knowing per- sonality, and because the existence of the latter depends on the erroneous notion that the body, the senses, and so on, are identical with, or belong to, the Self of the knowing person. For without the employment of the senses, per- ception and the other means of right knowledge cannot operate. And without a basis (i. e. the body 2) the senses cannot act. Nor does anybody act by means of a body on which the nature of the Self is not superimposed 3. Nor can, in the absence of all that 4, the Self which, in its own nature is free from all contact, become a knowing agent. And if there is no knowing agent, the means of right knowledge cannot operate (as said above). Hence perception and the other means of right knowledge, and the Vedic texts have for their object that which is de- pendent on Nescience. (That human cognitional activity has for its presupposition the superim position described above), follows also from the non-difference in that respect of men from animals. Animals, when sounds or other sensible qualities affect their sense of hearing or other senses, recede or advance according as the idea derived from the sensation is a comforting or disquieting one. A cow, for instance, when she sees a man approaching with a raised stick in his hand, thinks that he wants to beat her, and therefore moves away ; while she walks up to a man who advances with some fresh grass in his hand. Thus men also — who possess a higher intelligence — run away when

1 It being of course the function of the means of right know- ledge to determine Truth and Reality.

2 The Bhamati takes adhish/Mnam in the sense of superintend- ence, guidance. The senses cannot act unless guided by a super- intending principle, i. e. the individual soul.

8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.

4 I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.

8 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

e. the individual soul.

8 If activity could proceed from the body itself, non-identified with the Self, it would take place in deep sleep also.

4 I. e. in the absence of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the Non-Self and their attributes.

8 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

they see strong fierce-looking fellows drawing near with shouts and brandishing swords; while they confidently approach persons of contrary appearance and behaviour. We thus see that men and animals follow the same course of procedure with reference to the means and objects of knowledge. Now it is well-known that the procedure of animals bases on the non-distinction (of Self and Non- Self) ; we therefore conclude that, as they present the same appearances, men also — although distinguished by superior intelligence — proceed with regard to perception and so on, in the same way as animals do ; as long, that is to say, as the mutual superimposition of Self and Non- Self lasts. With reference again to that kind of activity which is founded on the Veda (sacrifices and the like), it is true indeed that the reflecting man who is qualified to enter on it, does so not without knowing that the Self has a relation to another world ; yet that qualification does not depend on the knowledge, derivable from the Veddnta- texts, of the true nature of the Self as free from all wants, raised above the distinctions of the Br&hma^a and Kshat- triya-classes and so on, transcending transmigratory exis- tence. For such knowledge is useless and even contra- dictory to the claim (on the part of sacrificers, &c. to perform certain actions and enjoy their fruits). And before such knowledge of the Self has arisen, the Vedic texts continue in their operation, to have for their object that which is dependent on Nescience. For such texts as the following, ' A Brahma^a is to sacrifice,' are operative only on the supposition that on the Self are superimposed particular conditions such as caste, stage of life, age, out- ward circumstances, and so on. That by superimposition we have to understand the notion of something in some other thing we have already explained. (The superimpo- sition of the Non-Self will be understood more definitely from the following examples.) Extra-personal attributes are superimposed on the Self, if a man considers himself sound and entire, or the contrary, as long as his wife, children, and so on are sound and entire or not. Attri- butes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.

Attri- butes of the body are superimposed on the Self, if a man

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I.

thinks of himself (his Self) as stout, lean, fair, as standing, walking, or jumping. Attributes of the sense-organs, if he thinks 'I am mute, or deaf, or one-eyed, or blind.' Attributes of the internal organ when he considers himself subject to desire, intention, doubt, determination, and so on. Thus the producer of the notion of the Ego (i. e. the internal organ) is superimposed on the interior Self, which, in reality, is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ, and vice versa the interior Self, which is the witness of everything, is superimposed on the internal organ, the senses, and so on. In this way there goes on this natural beginning — and endless superimposition, which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of individual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the results of their actions), and is observed by every one.

With a view to freeing one's self from that wrong notion which is the cause of all evil and attaining thereby the knowledge of the absolute unity of the Self the study of the Vedanta-texts is begun. That all the Vedanta-texts have the mentioned purport we shall show in this so-called S&riraka-mim&Ms& 1.

Of this Ved&nta-mim&#zs& about to be explained by us the first Sutra is as follows.

i. Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

The word c then ' is here to be taken as denoting imme- diate consecution ; not as indicating the introduction of a new subject to be entered upon ; for the enquiry into Brahman (more literally, the desire of knowing Brahman) is not of that nature 2. Nor has the word ' then ' the sense

1 The Mima/rasd, i. e. the enquiry whose aim it is to show that the embodied Self, i. e. the individual or personal soul is one with Brahman. This Mima^sd being an enquiry into the meaning of the Vedanta-portions of the Veda, it is also called Vedanta-mimawsa\

2 Nadhik&r&rtha iti. Tatra hetur brahmeti. Asyartha^, kim ayam atha^abdo brahma£-#ane^Mya^ kim v&ntarmtavi^arasya athave^Mvijesha^a^MnasyarambMrtha^. N&dya^ tasya mima/#- sapravartikay&s tadapravartyatvad an&rabhyatvat tasysta /fottaratra

IO vedanta-s6tras.

of auspiciousness (or blessing) ; for a word of that meaning could not be properly construed as a part of the sentence. The word 'then' rather acts as an auspicious term by- being pronounced and heard merely, while it denotes at the same time something else, viz. immediate consecution as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows more- over from the circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate consecution x.

immediate consecution as said above. That the latter is its meaning follows more- over from the circumstance that the relation in which the result stands to the previous topic (viewed as the cause of the result) is non-separate from the relation of immediate consecution x.

If, then, the word ' then ' intimates immediate consecution it must be explained on what antecedent the enquiry into Brahman specially depends ; just as the enquiry into active religious duty (which forms the subject of the Purva. Mima^sa) specially depends on the antecedent reading of the Veda. The reading of the Veda indeed is the common antecedent (for those who wish to enter on an enquiry into religious duty as well as for those desirous of knowing Brahman). The special question with regard to the enquiry into Brahman is whether it presupposes as its antecedent the understanding of the acts of religious duty (which is acquired by means of the Purva Mima^sa). To this question we reply in the negative, because for a man who has read the Vedanta-parts of the Veda it is possible to enter on the enquiry into Brahman even before engaging in the enquiry into religious duty. Nor is it the purport of the word ' then ' to indicate order of succession ; a purport which it serves in other passages, as, for instance, in the one enjoining the cutting off of pieces from the heart and other

pratyadhikara/zam apratipadanat. Na dvitiyo*tha.rabdenanantar- yoktidvara vmsh/adhiMryasamarparae s&dhana£atush/ayasampan- nana/ra brahmadhitadvi^arayor anarthitvad vi^aranarambhan na £a viHravidhiva^ad adhikari kalpya^ prarambhasyapi tulyatvad adhi- kariwa^ fa vidhyapekshitopadhitvan na trz'tiya^ brahma^Mnasya- nandasakshatkaratvenadhik^ryatvexpyapradhanyad atha^abdasam- bandhat tasman narambharthateti. Ananda Giri.

1 Any relation in which the result, i. e. here the enquiry into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may be comprised under the relation of anantarya.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. II

Ananda Giri.

1 Any relation in which the result, i. e. here the enquiry into Brahman may stand to some antecedent of which it is the effect may be comprised under the relation of anantarya.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, I. II

parts of the sacrificial animal1. (For the intimation of order of succession could be intended only if the agent in both cases were the same ; but this is not the case), because there is no proof for assuming the enquiry into religious duty and the enquiry into Brahman to stand in the rela- tion of principal and subordinate matter or the relation of qualification (for a certain act) on the part of the person qualified2; and because the result as well as the object of the enquiry differs in the two cases. The knowledge of active religious duty has for its fruit transitory felicity, and that again depends on the performance of religious acts. The enquiry into Brahman, on the other hand, has for its 1 fruit eternal bliss, and does not depend on the performance J of any acts. Acts of religious duty do not yet exist at the time when they are enquired into, but are something to be accomplished (in the future) ; for they depend on the activity of man. In the Brahma-mima^sa, on the other hand, the object of enquiry, i. e. Brahman, is something already accomplished (existent), — for it is eternal, — and does not depend on human energy. The two enquiries differ moreover in so far as the operation of their respective fundamental texts is concerned. For the fundamental texts on which active religious duty depends convey information to man in so far only as they enjoin on him their own particular subjects (sacrifices, &c.) ; while the fundamental texts about Brahman merely instruct man, without lay- ing on him the injunction of being instructed, instruction being their immediate result. The case is analogous to that of the information regarding objects of sense which ensues as soon as the objects are approximated to the senses. It therefore is requisite that something should be

1 He cuts off from the heart, then from the tongue, then from the breast.

2 Where one action is subordinate to another as, for instance, the offering of the praya^as is to the darjapurwamasa-sacrifice, or where one action qualifies a person for another as, for instance, the offering of the darjapuraamasa qualifies a man for the performance of the Soma-sacriflce, there is unity of the agent, and consequently an inti- mation of the order of succession of the actions is in its right place.

1 2 vedanta-s6tras.

1 2 vedanta-s6tras.

stated subsequent to which the enquiry into Brahman is pro- posed.— Well, then, we maintain that the antecedent condi- tions are the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal ; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both here and hereafter ; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means \ and the desire of final release. If these conditions exist, a man may, either before entering on an enquiry into active religious duty or after that, engage in the enquiry into Brahman and come to know it ; but not otherwise. The word ' then ' therefore intimates that the enquiry into Brahman is subsequent to the acquisition of the above- mentioned (spiritual) means.

The word ' therefore ' intimates a reason. Because the Veda, while declaring that the fruit of the agnihotra and similar performances which are means of happiness is non- eternal (as, for instance, Kk. Up. VIII, i, 6, ' As here on earth whatever has been acquired by action perishes so perishes in the next world whatever is acquired by acts of religious duty '), teaches at the same time that the highest aim of man is realised by the knowledge of Brahman (as, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, i, ' He who knows Brahman attains the highest ') ; therefore the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken subsequently to the acquirement of the mentioned means.

By Brahman is to be understood that the definition of which will be given in the next Sutra (I, i, 2); it is therefore not to be supposed that the word Brahman may here denote something else, as, for instance, the brahminical caste. In the Sutra the genitive case (' of Brahman ; ' the literal translation of the Sutra being 'then therefore the desire of knowledge of Brahman ') denotes the object, not something generally supplementary (^esha 2) ; for the desire of knowledge

1 The ' means ' in addition to jama and dama are discontinuance of religious . ceremonies (uparati), patience in- suffering (titiksha), attention and concentration of the mind (samadhana), and faith (jraddha).

2 According to Pacini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case ex- presses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I. 1 3

2 According to Pacini II, 3, 50 the sixth (genitive) case ex- presses the relation of one thing being generally supplementary to, or connected with, some other thing.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, I. 1 3

demands an object of desire and no other such object is stated. — But why should not the genitive case be taken as expressing the general complementary relation (to express which is its proper office)? Even in that case it might constitute the object of the desire of knowledge, since the general relation may base itself on the more particular one.— -This assumption, we reply, would mean that we refuse to take Brahman as the direct object, and then again indirectly introduce it as the object ; an altogether needless procedure. — Not needless ; for if we explain the words of the Sutra to mean ' the desire of knowledge connected with Brahman' we thereby virtually promise that also all the heads of discussion which bear on Brahman will be treated.— This reason also, we reply, is not strong enough to uphold your interpretation. For the statement of some principal matter already implies all the secondary matters connected therewith. Hence if Brahman, the most eminent of all objects of knowledge, is mentioned, this implies already all those objects of enquiry which the enquiry into Brahman presupposes, and those objects need therefore not be men- tioned, especially in the Sutra. Analogously the sentence ' there the king is going ' implicitly means that the king together with his retinue is going there. Our interpretation (according to which the Sutra represents Brahman as the direct object of knowledge) moreover agrees with Scripture, which directly represents Brahman as the object of the desire of knowledge ; compare, for instance, the passage, * That from whence these beings are born, &c, desire to know that. That is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 1). With passages of this kind the Sutra only agrees if the genitive case is taken to denote the object. Hence we do take it in that sense. The object of the desire is the knowledge of Brahman up to its complete comprehension, desires having reference to results1. Knowledge thus constitutes the

1 In the case of other transitive verbs, object and result may be separate ; so, for instance, when it is said ' gramas ga^ati/ the village is the object of the action of going, and the arrival at the village its result. But in the case of verbs of desiring object and result coincide.

14 vedanta-s6tras.

means by which the complete comprehension of Brahman is desired to be obtained. For the complete comprehension of Brahman is the highest end of man, since it destroys the root of all evil such as Nescience, the seed of the entire Sa^sara. Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be entertained.

But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.

Hence the desire of knowing Brahman is to be entertained.

But, it may be asked, is Brahman known or not known (previously to the enquiry into its nature)? If it is known we need not enter on an enquiry concerning it; if it is not known we can not enter on such an enquiry.

We reply that Brahman is known. Brahman, which is all-knowing and endowed with all powers, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, exists. For if we consider the derivation of the word ' Brahman,' from the root brzh, ' to be great,' we at once understand that eternal purity, and so on, belong to Brahman 1. More- J over the existence of Brahman is known on the ground of I its being the Self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of (his) Self, and never thinks ' I am not.' If the existence of the Self were not known, every one would think ' I am not.' And this Self (of whose existence all are conscious) is Brahman. But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no room for an enquiry into it! Not so, we reply ; for there is a conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Unlearned people and the Lokayatikas are of opinion that the mere body endowed with the quality of intelligence is the Self; others that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others maintain that the inter- nal organ is the Self; others, again, that the Self is a mere momentary idea ; others, again, that it is the Void. Others, again (to proceed to the opinion of such as acknowledge

I the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is a trans- migrating being different from the body, and so on, which is both agent and enjoy er (of the fruits of action) ; others teach

1 That Brahman exists we know, even before entering on the Brahma-mima#zsa, from the occurrence of the word in the Veda, &c, and from the etymology of the word we at once infer Brahman's chief attributes.

I ADHVAYA, I PADA, 2. 1 5

that that being is enjoying only, not acting ; others believe that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all- knowing, all-powerful Lord1. Others, finally, (i. e. the Vedantins) maintain that the Lord is the Self of the en- joyer (i. e. of the individual soul whose individual existence! is apparent only, the product of Nescience).

Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them oil fallacious arguments and scriptural texts mis- Understood 2. If therefore a man would embrace some one of these opinions without previous consideration, he would bar himself from the highest beatitude and incur grievous loss. For this reason the first Sutra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with the help of Con- formable arguments, and having for its aim the highest beatitude.

For this reason the first Sutra proposes, under the designation of an enquiry into Brahman, a disquisition of the Vedanta-texts, to be carried on with the help of Con- formable arguments, and having for its aim the highest beatitude.

So far it has been said that Brahman is to be enquired into. The question now arises what the cftaractexifi*tcs-of ■ ^ that Brahman are, and the reverend author of the Sutras therefore propounds the following aphorism.

2. (Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i. e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

The term, &c. implies subsistence and re-absorption. That the origin is mentioned first (of the three) depends on the declaration of Scripture as well as on the natural development of a substance. Scripture declares the order

1 The three last opinions are those of the followers of the Nyaya, the Sahkbya, and the Yoga-philosophy respectively. The three opinions mentioned first belong to various materialistic schools ; the two subsequent ones to two sects of Bauddha philo- sophers.

2 As, for instance, the passages 'this person consists of the essence of food ; ' ' the eye, &c. spoke ; ' ' non-existing this was in the beginning,' &c.

1 6 vedanta-s6tras.

of succession of origin, subsistence, and dissolution in the passage, Taitt. Up. Ill, t, 'From whence these beings are born,' &c. And with regard to the second reason stated, it is known that a substrate of qualities can subsist and be dissolved only after it has entered, through origination, on the state of existence. The words 'of this' denote that substrate of qualities which is presented to us by- perception and the other means of right knowledge ; the genitive case indicates it to be connected with origin, &c. The words ' from which ' denote the cause. The full sense of the Sutra therefore is : That omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence, and dissolu- tion of this world— which world is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoy ers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having their definite places, times, and causes1, and the nature of whose arrange- ment cannot even be conceived by the mind, — that cause, we say, is Brahman. Since the other forms of existence (such as increase, decline, Sec.) are included in origination, subsistence, and dissolution, only the three latter are referred to in the Sutra, As the six stages of existence enumerated by Yaska2 are possible only during the period of the world's subsistence, it might — were they referred to in the Sutra — be suspected that what is meant are not the origin, subsistence, and dissolution (of the world) as dependent on the first cause. To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into Brahman.

To preclude this suspicion the Sutra is to be taken as referring, in addition to the world's origination from Brahman, only to its subsistence in Brahman, and final dissolution into Brahman.

The origin, &c. of a world possessing the attributes stated above cannot possibly proceed from anything else but a Lord possessing the stated qualities ; not either from a non-intelligent pradhana3, or from atoms, or from non-

1 So the compound is to be divided according to An. Gi. and Go. ; the Bha\ proposes another less plausible division.

2 According to Nirukta I, 2 the six bhavavikara^ are : origina- tion, existence, modification, increase, decrease, destruction.

3 The pradMna, called also prakrz'ti, is the primal causal matter of the world in the Sahkhya-system, It will be fully discussed in

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 2. I J

being, or from a being subject to transmigration1; nor, again, can it proceed from its own nature (i.e. spontaneously, without a cause), since we observe that (for the production of effects) special places, times, and Causes have invariably to be employed.

(Some of) those who maintain a Lord to be the cause of the world2, think that the existence of a Lord different from mere transmigrating beings can be inferred by means of the argument stated just now (without re- course being had to Scripture at all). — But, it might be said, you yourself in the Sutra under discussion have merely brought forward the same argument! — By no means, we reply. The Sutras (i. e. literally ' the strings ') have merely the purpose of stringing together the flowers of the Vedanta-passages. In reality the Vedanta-passages referred to by the Sutras are discussed here. For the comprehension of Brahman is effected by the ascertain- ment, consequent on discussion, of the sense of the Vedanta- texts, not either by inference or by the other means of right knowledge. While, however, the Vedanta-passages primarily declare the cause of the origin, &c, of the world, inference also, being an instrument of right knowledge in so far as it does not contradict the Vedanta-texts, is not to be excluded as a means of confirming the meaning ascer- tained. Scripture itself, moreover, allows argumentation ; for the passages, Bri. Up. II, 4, 5 (' the Self is to be heard, to be considered '), and Kh. Up. VI, 14, % (' as the man, &c, having been informed, and being able to judge for himself, would arrive at GandMra, in the same way a man who meets with a teacher obtains knowledge'), declare that human understanding assists Scripture 3.

Scriptural text, &c.4, are not, in the enquiry into Brahman,

later parts of this work. To avoid ambiguities, the term pradhSna has been left untranslated. Cp. Sankhya Karika 3.

1 Ke&t tu hirawyagarbhaw saws&ri«am evagama^ ^agaddhetum a^akshate. Ananda Giri.

2 Viz. the Vaueshikas.

3 Atmana^ jruter ity artha^. Ananda Giri.

4 Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical

[34] C

Cp. Sankhya Karika 3.

1 Ke&t tu hirawyagarbhaw saws&ri«am evagama^ ^agaddhetum a^akshate. Ananda Giri.

2 Viz. the Vaueshikas.

3 Atmana^ jruter ity artha^. Ananda Giri.

4 Text (or direct statement), suggestive power (linga), syntactical

[34] C

1 8 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.

the only means of knowledge, as they are in the enquiry into active duty (i. e. in the Purva Mima//zsa), but scriptural texts on the one hand, and intuition 1, &c, on the other hand, are to be had recourse to according to the occasion : firstly, because intuition is the final result of the enquiry into Brahman; secondly, because the object of the enquiry is an existing (accomplished) substance. If the object of the knowledge of Brahman were something to be accom- plished, there would be no reference to intuition, and text, &c, would be the only means of knowledge. The origina- tion of something to be accomplished depends, moreover, on man since any action either of ordinary life, or dependent on the Veda may either be done or not be done, or be done in a different way. A man, for instance, may move on either by means of a horse, or by means of his feet, or by some other means, or not at all. And again (to quote examples of actions dependent on the Veda), we meet in Scripture with sentences such as the following : ' At the atiratra he takes the shodasm cup,' and ' at the atiratra he does not take the shodsLsin cup;' or, 'he makes the oblation after the sun has risen/ and, 'he makes the oblation when the sun has not yet risen.' Just as in the quoted instances, injunctions and prohibitions, allowances of optional pro- cedure, general rules and exceptions have their place, so they would have their place with regard to Brahman also (if the latter were a thing to be accomplished). But the fact is that no option is possible as to whether a substance is to be thus or thus, is to be or not to be. All option depends on the Motions of man ; but the knowledge of the real nature of a thing does not depend on the notions of man, but only on the thing itself. For to think with regard to a post, 'this is a post or a man, or something else,' is not knowledge of truth ; the two ideas, 'it is a man or something else,' being false, and only the third idea, ' it

connection (vakya), &c., being the means of proof made use of in the Purva Mima/rcsa.

1 The so-called s&ksMtk&ra of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 9

1 The so-called s&ksMtk&ra of Brahman. The &c. comprises inference and so on.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 1 9

is a post/ which depends on the thing itself, falling under the head of true knowledge. Thus true knowledge of all existing things depends on the things themselves, and hence the knowledge of Brahman also depends altogether on the thing, i. e. Brahman itself. — But, it might be said, as Brahman is an existing substance, it will be the object of the other means of right knowledge also, and from this it follows that a discussion of the Vedanta-texts is purpose- less.— This we deny ; for as Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with those other means of knowledge. For the senses have, according to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman. If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect only (i. e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or something else. Therefore the Sutra under discussion is not meant to propound in- ference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather to set forth a Vedanta-text. — Which, then, is the Vedanta-text which the Sutra points at as having to be considered with reference to the characteristics of Brahman? — It is the passage Taitt. Up. Ill, i, ' Bhrzgu Vkruni went to his father Varu;za, saying, Sir, teach me -Brahman,5 &c, up to ' That from whence these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which they enter at their death, try to know that. That is Brahman.' The sentence finally determining the sense of this passage is found III, 6 : ' From bliss these beings are born ; by bliss, when born, they live ; into bliss they enter at their death.5 Other passages also are to be adduced which declare the cause to be the almighty Being, whose essential nature is eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom.

That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the Sutrakara continues as follows :

3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of Scripture.

C2

20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

That Brahman is omniscient we have been made to infer from it being shown that it is the cause of the world. To confirm this conclusion, the Sutrakara continues as follows :

3. (The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of Scripture.

C2

20 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Brahman is the source, i. e. the cause of the great body of Scripture, consisting of the Rig-veda. and other branches, which is supported by various disciplines (such as grammar, nyaya, pura/za, &c.) ; which lamp-like illuminates all things ; which is itself all-knowing as it were. For the origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience can- not be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself. It is generally understood that the man from whom some special body of doctrine referring to one province of knowledge only originates, as, for instance, grammar from Pknini possesses a more extensive knowledge than his work, comprehensive though it be ; what idea, then, shall we have to form of the supreme omniscience and omnipotence of that great Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his breath, has produced the vast mass df holy texts known as the i£zg-veda, &c, the mine of all knowledge, consisting of mani- fold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men ! See what Scripture says about him, 'The i?/g-veda, &c, have been breathed forth from that great Being' (Bri. Up. II, 4, 10).

Or else we may interpret the Sutra to mean that Scripture consisting of the Rig-veda, &c, as described above, is the source or cause, i. e. the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of Brahman. So that the sense would be : through Scripture only as a means of know- ledge Brahman is known to be the cause of the origin, &c, of the world. The special scriptural passage meant has been quoted under the preceding Sutra ' from which these beings are born/ &c. — But as the preceding Sutra already has pointed out a text showing that Scripture is the source of Brahman, of what use then is the present Sutra ? — The words of the pre- ceding Sutra, we reply, did not clearly indicate the scriptural passage, and room was thus left for the suspicion that the origin, &c, of the world were adduced merely as determining an inference (independent of Scripture). To obviate this suspicion the Sutra under discussion has been propounded.

But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action (according to the Purva Mima^sd

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 21

To obviate this suspicion the Sutra under discussion has been propounded.

But, again, how can it be said that Scripture is the means of knowing Brahman? Since it has been declared that Scripture aims at action (according to the Purva Mima^sd

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3. 21

Sutra I, 2, 1, c As the purport of Scripture is action, those scriptural passages whose purport is not action are purport- less'), the Vedanta-passages whose purport is not action are purportless. Or else if they are to have some sense, they must either, by manifesting the agent, the divinity or the fruit of the action, form supplements to the passages en- joining actions, or serve the purpose of themselves enjoining a new class of actions, such as devout meditation and the like. For the Veda cannot possibly aim at conveying information regarding the nature of accomplished substances, since the latter are the objects of perception and the other means of proof (which give sufficient information about them ; while it is the recognised object of the Veda to give information about what is not known from other sources). And if it did give such information, it would not be connected with things to be desired or shunned, and thus be of no use to man. For this very reason Vedic passages, such as c he howled, &c.,' which at first sight appear purposeless, are shown to have a purpose in so far as they glorify certain actions (cp. Pu. Mt. Su. I, 2, 7, ' Because they stand in syntac- tical connection with the injunctions, therefore their purport is to glorify the injunctions '). In the same way mantras are shown to stand in a certain relation to actions, in so far as they notify the actions themselves and the means by which they are accomplished. So, for instance, the mantra, ' For strength thee (I cut ; ' which accompanies the cutting of a branch employed in the darcapunzamasa-sacrifice). In short, no Vedic passage is seen or can be proved to have a meaning but in so far as it is related to an action. And injunctions which are defined as having actions for their objects cannot refer to accomplished existent things. Hence we maintain that the Vedanta-texts are mere supplements to those passages which enjoin actions; noti- fying the agents, divinities, and results connected with those actions. Or else, if this be not admitted, on the ground of its involving the introduction of a subject-matter foreign to the Vedanta-texts (viz. the subject-matter of the Karmaka^a of the Veda), we must admit (the second of the two alternatives proposed above, viz.) that the

2 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Vedanta-texts refer to devout meditation (upasana) and similar actions which are mentioned in those very (Vedanta) texts. The result of all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows :

4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scrip- ture), because it is connected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport

The result of all of which is that Scripture is not the source of Brahman.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies as follows :

4. But that (Brahman is to be known from Scrip- ture), because it is connected (with the Vedanta-texts) as their purport

The word ' but ' is meant to rebut the purva-paksha (the prima facie view as urged above). That all-knowing, all- I powerful Brahman, which is the cause of the origin, sub- jsistence, and dissolution of the world, is known from the Vedanta-part of Scripture. How? Because in all the Vedanta-texts the sentences construe in so far as they have for their purport, as they intimate that matter (viz. Brahman). Compare, for instance, ' Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second' {Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1) ; ' In the beginning all this was Self, one only ' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1); c This is the Brahman without cause and without effect, without anything inside or outside ; this Self is Brahman perceiving everything ' {Bri. Up. II, 5, 19) ; ' That immortal Brahman is before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); and similar passages. If the words contained in these passages have once been determined to refer to Brahman, and their purport is understood thereby, it would be improper to assume them to have a different sense; for that would involve the fault of abandoning the direct statements of the text in favour of mere assumptions. Nor can we con- clude the purport of these passages to be the intimation of the nature of agents, divinities, &c. (connected with acts of religious duty) ; for there are certain scriptural passages which preclude all actions, actors, and fruits, as, for instance, Bri. Up. II, 4, 13, 'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be the object of perception and the other means of

I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 4.

II, 4, 13, 'Then by what should he see whom?' (which passage intimates that there is neither an agent, nor an object of action, nor an instrument.) Nor again can Brahman, though it is of the nature of an accomplished thing, be the object of perception and the other means of

I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 4.

knowledge ; for the fact of everything having its Self in Brahman cannot be grasped without the aid of the scriptural passage ' That art thou ' {Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7). Nor can it rightly be objected that instruction is purportless if not connected with something either to be striven after or shunned ; for from the mere comprehension of Brahman's Self, which is not something either to be avoided or endeavoured after, there results cessation of all pain, and thereby the attainment of man's highest aim. That passages notifying certain divinities, and so on, stand in subordinate relation to acts of devout meditation mentioned in the same chapters may readily be admitted. But it is impossible that Brahman should stand in an analogous relation to injunctions of devout meditation, for if the know- ledge of absolute unity has once arisen there exists no longer anything to be desired or avoided, and thereby the conception of duality, according to which we distinguish actions, agents, and the like, is destroyed. If the conception of duality is once uprooted by the conception of absolute unity, it cannot arise again, and so no longer be the cause of Brahman being looked upon as the complementary object of injunctions of devotion. Other parts of the Veda may have no authority except in so far as they are con- nected with injunctions ; still it is impossible to impugn on that ground the authoritativeness of passages conveying the knowledge of the Self; for such passages have their own result. Nor, finally, can the authoritativeness of the Veda be proved by inferential reasoning so that it would be dependent on instances observed elsewhere. From all which it follows that the Veda possesses authority as a means of right knowledge of Brahman.

Here others raise the following objection : — Although the Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brah- man, yet it intimates Brahman only as the object of certain injunctions, just as the information which the Veda gives about the sacrificial post, the ahavaniya-fire and other objects not known from the practice of common life is merely supplementary to certain injunctions1. Why so?

1 So, for instance, the passage * he carves the sacrificial post and

24 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

Why so?

1 So, for instance, the passage * he carves the sacrificial post and

24 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

Because the Veda has the purport of either instigating to action or restraining from it. For men fully acquainted with the object of the Veda have made the following declaration, ' The purpose of the Veda is seen to be the injunction of actions' (Bhashya on Caimini Sutra I, i, 1) ; c Injunction means passages impelling to action ' (Bh. on Cairn. Su. I, i, 2) ; ' Of this (viz. active religious duty) the knowledge comes from injunction ' (part of Cairn. Su. I, i, 5) ; ' The (words) denoting those (things) are to be connected with (the injunctive verb of the vidhi-passage) whose pur- port is action ' (Cairn. Su. 1, 1, 25) ; 'As action is the purport of the Veda, whatever does not refer to action is purport- less ' (Cairn. Su. I, 2, 1). Therefore the Veda has a purport in so far only as it rouses the activity of man with regard to some actions and restrains it with regard to others ; other passages (i. e. all those passages which are not directly injunctive) have a purport only in so far as they supplement injunctions and prohibitions. Hence the Vedanta-texts also as likewise belonging to the Veda can have a mean- ing in the same way only. And if their aim is injunc- tion, then just as the agnihotra-oblation and other rites are enjoined as means for him who is desirous of the heavenly world, so the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined as a means for him who is desirous of immortality. — But — somebody might object — it has been declared that there is a difference in the character of the objects enquired into, the object of enquiry in the karma-ka^a (that part of the Veda which treats of active religious duty) being some- thing to be accomplished, viz. duty, while here the object is the already existent absolutely accomplished Brahman. From this it follows that the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman must be of a different nature from the fruit of the knowledge of duty which depends on the performance of actions1. — We reply that it must not be such because the

makes it eight-cornered/ has a purpose only as being supplementary to the injunction * he ties the victim to the sacrificial post/

1 If the fruits of the two jastras were not of a different nature, there would be no reason for the distinction of two jastras ; if they

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 25

25

Vedanta-texts give information about Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions of actions. We meet with injunctions of the following kind, ' Verily the Self is to be seen' (Br/. Up. II, 4, 5) ; 'The Self which is free from sin that it is which we must search out, that it is which we must try to understand' (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; ' Let a man worship him as Self (Br/. Up. I, 4, 7) ; ' Let a man worship the Self only as his true state ' (Bri. Up. 1,4, 15) ; ' He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9). These injunctions rouse in us the desire to know what that Brahman is. It, therefore, is the task of the Vedanta-texts to set forth Brahman's nature, and they perform that task by teaching us that Brahman is eternal, all-knowing, absolutely self-sufficient, ever pure, intelli- gent and free, pure knowledge, absolute bliss. From the devout meditation on this Brahman there results as its fruit, final release, which, although not to be discerned in the ordinary way, is discerned by means of the ^astra. If, on the other hand, the Vedanta-texts were considered to have no reference to injunctions of actions, but to contain statements about mere (accomplished) things, just as if one were saying ' the earth comprises seven dvipas,' 'that king is marching on,' they would be pur- portless, because then they could not possibly be connected with something to be shunned or endeavoured after. — Per- haps it will here be objected that sometimes a mere state- ment about existent things has a purpose, as, for instance, the affirmation, 'This is a rope, not a snake,' serves the purpose of removing the fear engendered by an erroneous opinion, and that so likewise the Vedanta-passages making statements about the non-transmigrating Self, have a pur- port of their own (without reference to any action), viz. in so far as they remove the erroneous opinion of the Self being liable to transmigration. — We reply that this might

are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.

2 6 vedanta-s6tras.

— We reply that this might

are of a different nature, it cannot be said that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release, in the same way as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like.

2 6 vedanta-s6tras.

be so if just as the mere hearing of the true nature of the rope dispels the fear caused by the imagined snake, so the mere hearing of the true nature of Brahman would dispel the erroneous notion of one's being subject to transmigration. But this is not the case ; for we observe that even men to whom the true nature of Brahman has been stated continue to be affected by pleasure, pain, and the other qualities attaching to the transmigratory condition. Moreover, we see from the passage, Br/. Up. II, 4, 5> ' The Self is to be heard, to be considered, to be reflected upon/ that con- sideration and reflection have to follow the mere hearing. From all this it results that the jastra can be admitted as a means of knowing Brahman in so far only as the latter is connected with injunctions.

To all this, we, the Vedantins, make the following reply: — The preceding reasoning is not valid, on account of the different nature of the fruits of actions on the one side, and of the knowledge of Brahman on the other side. The enquiry into those actions, whether of body, speech, or mind, which are known from 5ruti and Smrz'ti, and are comprised under the name 'religious duty' (dharma), is carried on in the Gaimini Sutra, which begins with the words 'then therefore the enquiry into duty ;' the opposite of duty also (adharma), such as doing harm, &c, which is defined in the prohibitory injunctions, forms an object of enquiry to the end that it may be avoided. The fruits of duty, which is good, and its opposite, which is evil, both of which are defined by original Vedic statements, are generally known to be sensible pleasure and pain, which make them- selves felt to body, speech, and mind only, are produced by the contact of the organs of sense with the objects, and affect all animate beings from Brahman down to a tuft of grass. Scripture, agreeing with observation, states that there are differences in the degree of pleasure of all em- bodied creatures from men upward to Brahman. From those differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of the merit acquired by actions in accord- ance with religious duty; therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those qualified to perform

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 2j

From those differences it is inferred that there are differences in the degrees of the merit acquired by actions in accord- ance with religious duty; therefrom again are inferred differences in degree between those qualified to perform

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 2j

acts of religious duty. Those latter differences are more- over known to be affected by the desire of certain results (which entitles the man so desirous to perform certain religious acts), worldly possessions, and the like. It is further known from Scripture that those only who perform sacrifices proceed, in consequence of the pre-eminence of their knowledge and meditation, on the northern path (of the sun ; Kh. Up. V, 10, 1), while mere minor offerings, works of public utility and alms, only lead through smoke and the other stages to the southern path. And that there also (viz. in the moon which is finally reached by those who have passed along the southern path) there are degrees of pleasure and the means of pleasure is understood from the passage ' Having dwelt there till their works are con- sumed.' Analogously it is understood that the different degrees of pleasure which are enjoyed by the embodied creatures, from man downward to the inmates of hell and to immovable things, are the mere effects of religious merit as defined in Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, from the different degrees of pain endured by higher and lower embodied creatures, there is inferred difference of degree in its cause, viz. religious demerit as defined in the pro- hibitory injunctions, and in its agents. This difference in the degree of pain and pleasure, which has for its antecedent embodied existence, and for its cause the difference of de- gree of merit and demerit of animated beings, liable to faults such as ignorance and the like, is well known — from vSruti, Smrz'ti, and reasoning — to be non-eternal, of a fleeting, changing nature (sa^sara). The following text, for instance, 'As long as he is in the body he cannot get free from pleasure and pain ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 1), refers to the sa//z- sara-state as described above. From the following passage, on the other hand, ' When he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him/ which denies the touch of pain or pleasure, we learn that the unembodied state called ' final release ' (moksha) is declared not to be the effect of religious merit as defined by Vedic injunctions. For if it were the effect of merit it would not be denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said

2 8 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

For if it were the effect of merit it would not be denied that it is subject to pain and pleasure. Should it be said

2 8 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

that the very circumstance of its being an unembodied state is the effect of merit, we reply that that cannot be, since Scripture declares that state to be naturally and originally an unembodied one. 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent does never grieve ' (Ka. Up. II, %%)\ 'He is without breath, without mind, pure'(Mu. Up, II, i, 2); 'That person is not attached to anything' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 15)1. All which passages establish the fact that so-called release differs from all the fruits of action, and is an eternally and essentially disembodied state. Among eternal things, some indeed may be 'eternal, al- though changing' (pari/zaminitya), viz. those, the idea of whose identity is not destroyed, although they may undergo changes; such, for instance, are earth and the other ele- ments in the opinion of those who maintain the eternity of the world, or the three gu^as in the opinion of the Sankhyas. But this (moksha) is eternal in the true sense, i. e. eternal without undergoing any changes (ku^astha- nitya), omnipresent as ether, free from all modifications, absolutely self-sufficient, not composed of parts, of self- luminous nature. That bodiless entity in fact, to which merit and demerit with their consequences and threefold time do not apply, is called release ; a definition agreeing with scriptural passages, such as the following : ' Different from merit and demerit, different from effect and cause, different from past and future ' (Ka. Up. I, %, 14). It2 (i. e. moksha) is, therefore, the same as Brahman in the enquiry into which we are at present engaged. If Brahman were represented as supplementary to certain actions, and re-

1 The first passage shows that the Self is not joined to the gross body ; the second that it is not joined to the subtle body ; the third that is independent of either.

2 Ananda Giri omits ' 2X2J1! His comment is : prnhaggi^asa- vishayatva^ k& dharmadyasprzsh/atvaztt brahma/zo yuktam ityaha I tad iti 1 ata^ jabdapaZ/fe dharmadyaspar^e karmaphalavailakshawyaw hetukr/'tam. — The above translation follows Govindananda's first explanation. Tat kaivalyam brahmaiva karmaphalavilaksha^atvad ity artha^.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 2 9

lease were assumed to be the effect of those actions, it would be non-eternal, and would have to be considered merely as something holding a pre-eminent position among the described non-eternal fruits of actions with their various degrees. But that release is something eternal is acknow- ledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching con- cerning Brahman can therefore not be merely supplemen- tary to actions.

But that release is something eternal is acknow- ledged by whoever admits it at all, and the teaching con- cerning Brahman can therefore not be merely supplemen- tary to actions.

There are, moreover, a number of scriptural passages which declare release to follow immediately on the cognition of Brahman, and which thus preclude the possibility of an effect intervening between the two ; for instance, ' He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman' (Mu. Up. Ill, 3, 9) ; 'All his works perish when He has been beheld, who is the higher and the lower' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 8); ' He who knows the bliss of Brahman fears nothing ' (Taitt. Up. II, 9) ; ' O Ganaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness ' (Br/. Up. IV, 2,4); ' That Brahman knew its Self only, saying, I am Brahman. From it all this sprang' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 10); 4 What sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who beholds that unity ? ' (f s. Up, 7.) We must likewise quote the passage, Br/. Up. I, 4, 10, (' Seeing this the Rishi V&madeva understood : I was Manu, I was the sun,') in order to exclude the idea of any action taking place between one's seeing Brahman and becoming one with the universal Self; for that passage is analogous to the following one, ' standing he sings,' from which we understand that no action due to the same agent inter- venes between the standing and the singing. Other scrip- tural passages show that the removal of the obstacles which lie in the way of release is the only fruit of the knowledge of Brahman ; so, for instance, ' You indeed are our father, you who carry us from our ignorance to the other shore ' (Pr. Up. VI, 8) ; ' I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine ' (Kh. Up. VII, 1, 3) ; ' To him after his faults had been rubbed out, the vener- able Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness' {Kk* Up. VII, 26, 2). The same is the purport of the Sutra, sup- ported by arguments, of (Gautama) A^arya, ' Final release

30 VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.

results from the successive removal of wrong knowledge, faults, activity, birth, pain, the removal of each later mem- ber of the series depending on the removal of the preceding member' (Nyay. Su. I, i, %) ; and wrong knowledge itself is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of Brahman.

Su. I, i, %) ; and wrong knowledge itself is removed by the knowledge of one's Self being one with the Self of Brahman.

Nor is this knowledge of the Self being one with Brahman a mere (fanciful) combination \ as is made use of, for instance, in the following passage, ' For the mind is endless, and the VIrvedevas are endless, and he thereby gains the endless world ' (Br/. Up. Ill, i, g)2 ; nor is it an (in reality unfounded) ascription (superimposition) 3, as in the passages, 'Let him meditate on mind as Brahman,' and ' Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine' (Kk. Up. Ill, 18, i ; 19, i), where the contemplation as Brahman is superimposed on the mind, Aditya and so on ; nor, again, is it (a figurative conception of identity) founded on the connection (of the things viewed as identical) with some special activity, as in the passage, 'Air is indeed the absorber ; breath is indeed the absorber 4 ' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 1 ; 3) ; nor is it a mere (ceremonial) purifi- cation of (the Self constituting a subordinate member) of an action (viz. the action of seeing, &c, Brahman), in the same way as, for instance, the act of looking at the sacri-

1 Sampat. Sampan namalpe vastuny alambane samanyena kena&n mahato vastuna^ sampadanam. Ananda Giri.

2 In which passage the mind, which may be called endless on account of the infinite number of modifications it undergoes, is identified with the VLrvedevas, which thereby constitute the chief object of the meditation ; the fruit of the meditation being immor- tality. The identity of the Self with Brahman, on the other hand, is real, not only meditatively imagined, on account of the attribute of intelligence being common to both.

8 Adhyasa^ jastrato^tasmi^s taddhi^. Sampadi sampadyama- nasya pradhanyenanudhyanam, adhyase tu alambanasyeti vLresha^. Ananda Giri.

4 Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term ' absorber/ Seyaw sawvargadrzsh/ir vayau prawe £a da^a^agataw ^agad danayati yatha ^ivatmani brim- hawakriyaya brahmad/Ysh/ir amr/'tatvayaphalaya kalpataiti. Bhamatt.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 3 1

4 Air and breath each absorb certain things, and are, therefore, designated by the same term ' absorber/ Seyaw sawvargadrzsh/ir vayau prawe £a da^a^agataw ^agad danayati yatha ^ivatmani brim- hawakriyaya brahmad/Ysh/ir amr/'tatvayaphalaya kalpataiti. Bhamatt.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 3 1

ficial butter 1. For if the knowledge of the identity of the Self and Brahman were understood in the way of combina- tion and the like, violence would be done thereby to the connection of the words whose object, in certain passages, it clearly is to intimate the fact of Brahman and the Self being really identical ; so, for instance, in the following passages, * That art thou ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) ; J9)» That the knowledge of Brahman refers to something which is not a thing to be done, and therefore is not concerned either with the pursuit or the avoidance of any object, is the very thing we admit ; for just that constitutes our glory, that as soon as we comprehend Brahman, all our duties come to an end and all our work is over. Thus vSruti says, ' If a man understands the Self, saying, " I am he," what could he wish or desire that he should pine after the body?' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 13.) And similarly Smrzti declares, ' Having understood this the understanding man has done with all work, O Bharata ' (Bha. Gita XV, 20). Therefore Brahman is not represented as the object of injunctions.

We now proceed to consider the doctrine of those who maintain that there is no part of the Veda which has the purport of making statements about mere existent things, and is not either an injunction or a prohibition, or supple* mentary to either. This opinion is erroneous, because the soul (purusha), which is the subject of the Upanishads, does not constitute a complement to anything else. Of that soul which is to be comprehended from the Upanishads only, which is non-transmigratory, Brahman, different in nature from the four classes of substances1, which forms a topic of its own and is not a complement to anything else ; of that

1 Viz. things to be originated (for instance, gha/azrc karoti), things to be obtained (gramas ga&£//ati), things to be modified (suvanzazra kundalam karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 37

things to be originated (for instance, gha/azrc karoti), things to be obtained (gramas ga&£//ati), things to be modified (suvanzazra kundalam karoti), and things to be ceremonially purified (vrihin prokshati).

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 4. 37

soul it is impossible to say that it is not or is not apprehended ; for the passage, ' That Self is to be described by No, no ! ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26) designates it as the Self, and that the Self is cannot be denied. The possible objection that there is no reason to maintain that the soul is known from the Upanishads only, since it is the object of self-conscious- ness, is refuted by the fact that the soul of which the Upanishads treat is merely the witness of that (i. e. of the object of self-consciousness, viz. the ^ivatman). For neither from that part of the Veda which enjoins works nor from reasoning, anybody apprehends that soul which, different from the agent that is the object of self-consciousness, merely witnesses it ; which is permanent in all (transitory) beings; uniform; one; eternally unchanging; the Self of everything. Hence it can neither be denied nor be repre- sented as the mere complement of injunctions ; for of that very person who might deny it it is the Self. And as it is the Self of all, it can neither be striven after nor avoided. All perishable things indeed perish, because they are mere modifications, up to (i. e. exclusive of) the soul. But the soul is imperishable 1, as there is no cause why it should perish ; and eternally unchanging, as there is no cause for its undergoing any modification ; hence it is in its essence eternally pure and free. And from passages, such as * Beyond the soul there is nothing ; this is the goal, the highest road ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 11), and 'That soul, taught in the Upanishads, I ask thee' (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 36), it appears that the attribute of resting on the Upanishads is properly given to the soul, as it constitutes their chief topic. To say, therefore, that there is no portion of the Veda referring to existing things, is a mere bold assertion.

With regard to the quotations made of the views of men acquainted with the purport of the Sastra (who alone were stated to have declared that the Veda treats of actions) it is to be understood that they, having to do with the enquiry into duty, refer to that part of the Sastra which consists of

1 Whence it follows that it is not something to be avoided like transitory things.

3 8 VEDANTA-SU TR AS.

3 8 VEDANTA-SU TR AS.

injunctions and prohibitions. With regard to the other passage quoted (' as action is the purport of the Veda, what- ever does not refer to action is purportless ') we remark that if that passage were taken in an absolutely strict sense (when it would mean that only those words which denote action have a meaning), it would follow that all information about existent things is meaningless1. If, on the other hand, the Veda — in addition to the injunctions of activity and cessation of activity — does give information about existent things as being subservient to some action to be accom- plished, why then should it not give information also about the existent eternally unchangeable Self? For an existent thing, about which information is given, does not become an act (through being stated to be subservient to an act). — But, it will be said, although existent things are not acts, yet, as they are instrumental to action, the information given about such things is merely subservient to action. — This, we reply, does not matter; for although the information may be subservient to action, the things themselves about which information is given are already intimated thereby as things which have the power of bringing about certain actions. Their final end (prayo^ana) indeed may be sub- serviency to some action, but thereby they do not cease to be, in the information given about them, intimated in themselves. — Well, and if they are thus intimated, what is gained thereby for your purpose2? We reply that the information about the Self, which is an existing thing not comprehended from other sources, is of the same nature (as the information about other existent things); for by the comprehension of the Self a stop is put to all false knowledge, which is the cause of transmigration, and thus a

1 That, for instance, in the passage ' he is to sacrifice with Soma/ the word ' soma/ which does not denote an action, is devoid of sense.

2 I.e. for the purpose of showing that the passages conveying in- formation about Brahman as such are justified. You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established ?

I ABHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 39

You have (the objector maintains) proved hitherto only that passages containing information about existent things are admissible, if those things have a purpose; but how does all this apply to the information about Brahman of which no purpose has been established ?

I ABHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 39

purpose is established which renders the passages relative to Brahman equal to those passages which give information about things instrumental to actions. Moreover, there are found (even in that part of the Veda which treats of actions) such passages as ' a Brahma^a is not to be killed/ which teach abstinence from certain actions. Now abstinence from action is neither action nor instrumental to action. If, therefore, the tenet that all those passages which do not express action are devoid of purport were insisted on, it would follow that all such passages as the one quoted, which teach abstinence from action, are devoid of purport — a con- sequence which is of course unacceptable. Nor, again, can the connexion in which the word ' not' stands with the action expressed by the verb ' is to be killed ' — which action is naturally established 1 — be used as a reason for assuming that ' not ' denotes an action non-established elsewhere 2, different from the state of mere passivity implied in the abstinence from the act of killing. For the peculiar function of the particle ' not ' is to intimate the idea of the non- existence of that with which it is connected, and the concep- tion of the non-existence (of something to be done) is the cause of the state of passivity. (Nor can it be objected that, as soon as that momentary idea has passed away, the state of passivity will again make room for activity ; for) that idea itself passes away (only after having completely destroyed the natural impulse prompting to the murder of a Brahma^a, &c), just as a fire is extinguished only after having completely consumed its fuel. Hence we are of opinion that the aim of prohibitory passages, such as ' a Brahma^a is not to be killed,' is a merely passive state, consisting in the abstinence from some possible action; excepting some special cases, such as the so-called Pra^apati- vow, &c.3 Hence the charge of want of purpose is to be

1 It is 'naturally established ' because it has natural motives— not dependent on the injunctions of the Veda, viz. passion and the like.

2 Elsewhere, i. e. outside the Veda.

3 The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda

40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

considered as referring (not to the Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose of man.

e. outside the Veda.

3 The above discussion of the prohibitory passages of the Veda

40 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

considered as referring (not to the Vedanta-passages, but only) to such statements about existent things as are of the nature of legends and the like, and do not serve any purpose of man.

The allegation that a mere statement about an actually existent thing not connected with an injunction of some- thing to be done, is purposeless (as, for instance, the state- ment that the earth contains seven dvipas) has already been refuted on the ground that a purpose is seen to exist in some such statements, as, for instance, 'this is not a snake, but a rope.' — But how about the objection raised above that the information about Brahman cannot be held to have a purpose in the same way as the statement about a rope has one, because a man even after having heard about Brahman continues to belong to this transmigratory

is of a very scholastic nature, and various clauses in it are differently interpreted by the different commentators. *Sankara endeavours to fortify his doctrine, that not all parts of the Veda refer to action by an appeal to prohibitory passages which do not enjoin action but abstinence from action. The legitimacy of this appeal might be contested on the ground that a prohibitory passage also, (as, for instance, ' a Brahmawa is not to be killed/) can be explained as enjoining a positive action, viz. some action opposed in nature to the one forbidden, so that the quoted passage might be interpreted to mean ' a determination, &c. of not killing a Brahmarca is to be formed;' just as we understand something positive by the expression * a non-Brahma«a/ viz. some man who is a kshattriya or something else. To this the answer is that, wherever we can, we must at- tribute to the word ' not ' its primary sense which is the absolute negation of the word to which it is joined ; so that passages where it is joined to words denoting action must be considered to have for their purport the entire absence of action. Special cases only are excepted, as the one alluded to in the text where certain pro- hibited actions are enumerated under the heading of vows ; for as a vow is considered as something positive, the non-doing of some particular action must there be understood as intimating the per- formance of some action of an opposite nature. The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Purvd Mimosa ; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 fF.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 4 1

The question as to the various meanings of the particle 'not' is discussed in all treatises on the Purvd Mimosa ; see, for instance, Arthasamgraha, translation, p. 39 fF.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 4 1

world ?- — We reply as follows : It is impossible to show that a man who has once understood Brahman to be the Self, belongs to the transmigratory world in the same sense as he did before, because that would be contrary to the fact of his being Brahman. For we indeed observe that a person who imagines the body, and so on, to consti- tute the Self, is subject to fear and pain, but we have no right to assume that the same person after having, by means of the Veda, comprehended Brahman to be the Self, and thus having got over his former imaginings, will still in the same manner be subject to pain and fear whose cause is wrong knowledge. In the same way we see that a rich householder, puffed up by the conceit of his wealth, is grieved when his possessions are taken from him ; but we do not see that the loss of his wealth equally grieves him after he has once retired from the world and put off the conceit of his riches. And, again, we see that a person possessing a pair of beautiful earrings derives pleasure from the proud conceit of ownership ; but after he has lost the earrings and the conceit established thereon, the pleasure derived from them vanishes. Thus Sruti also declares, c When he is free from the body, then neither pleasure nor pain touches him ' (Kk. Up. VIII, 12, 1). If it should be objected that the condition of being free from the body follows on death only, we demur, since the cause of man being joined to the body is wrong knowledge. For it is not possible to establish the state of embodiedness upon anything else but wrong knowledge. And that the state of disembodiedness is eternal on account of its not having actions for its cause, we have already explained. The ob- jection again, that embodiedness is caused by the merit and demerit effected by the Self (and therefore real), we refute by remarking that as the (reality of the) conjunction of the Self with the body is itself not established, the circumstance of merit and demerit being due to the action of the Self is likewise not established ; for (if we should try to get over this difficulty by representing the Self's embodiedness as caused by merit and demerit) we should commit the logical fault of making embodiedness dependent on merit and de-

42 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

merit, and again merit and demerit on embodiedness. And the assumption of an endless retrogressive chain (of em- bodied states and merit and demerit) would be no better than a chain of blind men (who are unable to lead one another). Moreover, the Self can impossibly become an agent, as it cannot enter into intimate relation to actions. If it should be said that the Self may be considered as an agent in the same way as kings and other great people are (who without acting themselves make others act) by their mere presence, we deny the appositeness of this instance ; for kings may become agents through their relation to servants whom they procure by giving them wages, &c, while it is impossible to imagine anything, analogous to money, which could be the cause of a connexion between the Self as lord and the body, and so on (as servants). Wrong imagination, on the other hand, (of the individual Self, considering itself to be joined to the body,) is a manifest reason of the connexion of the two (which is not based on any assumption). This ex- plains also in how far the Self can be considered as the agent in sacrifices and similar acts1. Here it is objected that the Self's imagination as to the body, and so on, belonging to itself is not false, but is to be understood in a derived (figurative) sense. This objection we invalidate by the remark that the distinction of derived and primary senses of words is known to be applicable only where an actual difference of things is known to exist. We are, for instance, acquainted with a certain species of animals having a mane, and so on, which is the exclusive primary object of the idea and word ' lion,' and we are likewise acquainted with per- sons possessing in an eminent degree certain leonine quali- ties, such as fierceness, courage, &c. ; here, a well settled difference of objects existing, the idea and the name ' lion ' are applied to those persons in a derived or figurative sense. In those cases, however, where the difference of the objects is not well established, the transfer of the conception and

1 The Self is the agent in a sacrifice, &c. only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body ; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 43

only in so far as it imagines itself to be joined to a body ; which imagination is finally removed by the cognition of Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 43

name of the one to the other is not figurative, but simply founded on error. Such is, for instance, the case of a man who at the time of twilight does not discern that the object before him is a post, and applies to it the conception and designation of a man ; such is likewise the case of the con- ception and designation of silver being applied to a shell of mother-of-pearl somehow mistaken for silver. How then can it be maintained that the application of the word and the conception of the Ego to the body, &c, which application is due to the non-discrimination of the Self and the Not- Self, is figurative (rather than simply false) ? considering that even learned men who know the difference of the Self and the Not-Self confound the words and ideas just as common shepherds and goatherds do.

As therefore the application of the conception of the Ego to the body on the part of those who affirm the existence of a Self different from the body is simply false, not figurative, it follows that the embodiedness of the Self is (not real but) caused by wrong conception, and hence that the person who has reached true knowledge is free from his body even while still alive. The same is declared in the *Sruti passages concerning him who knows Brahman : s And as the slough of a snake lies on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, thus lies this body; but that disembodied immortal spirit is Brahman only, is only light ' (Bn. Up. IV, 4, 7) ; and ' With eyes he is without eyes as it were, with ears without ears as it were, with speech without speech as it were, with a mind without mind as it were, with vital airs without vital airs as it were.' Smrzti also, in the passage where the characteristic marks are enume- rated of one whose mind is steady (Bha. Gita II, 54), declares that he who knows is no longer connected with action of any kind. Therefore the man who has once com- prehended Brahman to be the Self, does not belong to this transmigratory world as he did before. He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not

44 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

He, on the other hand, who still belongs to this transmigratory world as before, has not comprehended Brahman to be the Self. Thus there remain no unsolved contradictions.

With reference again to the assertion that Brahman is not

44 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

fully determined in its own nature, but stands in a comple- mentary relation to injunctions, because the hearing about Brahman is to be followed by consideration and reflection, we remark that consideration and reflection are themselves merely subservient to the comprehension of Brahman. If Brahman, after having been comprehended, stood in a subordinate relation to some injunctions, it might be said to be merely supplementary. But this is not the case, since consideration and reflection no less than hearing are subservient to comprehension. It follows that the 5astra cannot be the means of knowing Brahman only in so far as it is connected with injunctions, and the doctrine that on account of the uniform meaning of the Vedanta- texts, an independent Brahman is to be admitted, is thereby fully established. Hence there is room for beginning the new *Sastra indicated in the first Sutra, 'Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.' If, on the other hand, the Ved&nta- texts were connected with injunctions, a new 5astra would either not be begun at all, since the vSastra concerned with injunctions has already been introduced by means of the first Sutra of the Purva Mima^sa, ' Then therefore the enquiry into duty ;' or if it were begun it would be intro- duced as follows : ' Then therefore the enquiry into the remaining duties ;' just as a new portion of the Purva Mima/^sa Sutras is introduced with the words, 'Then therefore the enquiry into what subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, and what subserves the purpose of man ' (Pu. Mt. Su. IV, i, i). But as the comprehension of the unity of Brahman and the Self has not been propounded (in the previous S&stra), it is quite appropriate that a new vSastra, whose subject is Brahman, should be entered upon. Hence all injunctions and all other means of knowledge end with the cognition expressed in the words, ' I am Brah- man ;' for as soon as there supervenes the comprehension of the non-dual Self, which is not either something to be eschewed or something to be appropriated, all objects and knowing agents vanish, and hence there can no longer be means of proof. In accordance with this, they (i. e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration : —

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 45

In accordance with this, they (i. e. men knowing Brahman) have made the following declaration : —

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 4. 45

' When there has arisen (in a man's mind) the knowledge, " I am that which is, Brahman is my Self," and when, owing to the sublation of the conceptions of body, relatives, and the like, the (imagination of) the figurative and the false Self has come to an end1; how should then the effect2 (of that wrong imagination) exist any longer? As long as the knowledge of the Self, which Scripture tells us to search after, has not arisen, so long the Self is knowing subject ; but that same subject is that which is searched after, viz. (the highest Self) free from all evil and blemish. Just as the idea of the Self being the body is assumed as valid (in ordinary life), so all the ordinary sources of knowledge (perception and the like) are valid only until the one Self is ascertained.'

(Herewith the section comprising the four Sutras is finished3.)

So far it has been declared that the Vedanta-passages, whose purport is the comprehension of Brahman being the Self, and which have their object therein, refer exclusively to Brahman without any reference to actions. And it has further been shown that Brahman is the omniscient omni- potent cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. But now the Sankhyas and others being of opinion that an existent substance is to be known through other means of proof (not through the Veda) infer different causes, such as the pradhana and the like, and there- upon interpret the Ved&nta-passages as referring to the latter. All the Vedanta-passages, they maintain, which treat of the creation of the world distinctly point out that the cause (of the world) has to be concluded from the effect by inference ; and the cause which is to be inferred is the connexion of the pradhana with the souls (purusha). The followers of Kaz^ada again infer from the very same

1 The figurative Self, i.e. the imagination that wife, children, possessions, and the like are a man's Self; the false Self, i. e. the imagination that the Self acts, suffers, enjoys, &c.

2 I. e. the apparent world with all its distinctions.

3 The words in parentheses are not found in the best manuscripts.

46 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.

passages that the Lord is the efficient cause of the world while the atoms are its material cause. And thus other argumentators also taking their stand on passages apparently favouring their views and on fallacious argu- ments raise various objections. For this reason the teacher (Vyasa) — thoroughly acquainted as he is with words, pas- sages, and means of proof — proceeds to state as p r i m a f a c i e views, and afterwards to refute, all those opinions founded on deceptive passages and fallacious arguments. Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedanta- texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

Thereby he at the same time proves indirectly that what the Vedanta- texts aim at is the comprehension of Brahman.

The Sankhyas who opine that the non-intelligent pra- dhana consisting of three constituent elements (guna) is the cause of the world argue as follows. The Vedanta-passages which you have declared to intimate that the all-knowing all-powerful Brahman is the cause of the world can be consistently interpreted also on the doctrine of the pra- dhana being the general cause. Omnipotence (more liter- ally: the possession of all powers) can be ascribed to the pradhana in so far as it has all its effects for its objects. All- knowingness also can be ascribed to it, viz. in the following manner. What you think to be knowledge is in reality an attribute of the guna. of Goodness1, according to the Smrzti passage ' from Goodness springs knowledge ' (Bha. Gita XIV, 17). By means of this attribute of Goodness, viz. knowledge, certain men endowed with organs which are effects (of the pradhana) are known as all-knowing Yogins ; for omniscience is acknowledged to be connected with the very highest degree of ' Goodness.' Now to the soul (purusha) which is isolated,, destitute of effected organs, consisting of pure (undifferenced) intelligence it is quite impossible to ascribe either all-knowingness or limited knowledge ; the pradhana, on the other hand, because consisting of the three gu/zas, comprises also in its pra- dhana state the element of Goodness which is the cause of all-knowingness. The Vedanta-passages therefore in

1 The most exalted of the three constituent elements whose state of equipoise constitutes the pradhana.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 5. 47

a derived (figurative) sense ascribe all-knowingness to the pradhana, although it is in itself non-intelligent. Moreover you (the Vedantin) also who assume an all-knowing Brah- man can ascribe to it all-knowingness in so far only as that term means capacity for all knowledge. For Brahman cannot always be actually engaged in the cognition of everything ; for from this there would follow the absolute permanency of his cognition, and this would involve a want of independence on Brahman's part with regard to the activity of knowing. And if you should propose to con- sider Brahman's cognition as non-permanent it would follow that with the cessation of the cognition Brahman itself would cease. Therefore all-knowingness is possible only in the sense of capacity for all knowledge. Moreover you assume that previously to the origination of the world Brahman is without any instruments of action. But with- out the body, the senses, &c. which are the instruments of knowledge, cognition cannot take place in any being. And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as con- sisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modi- fications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

And further it must be noted that the pradhana, as con- sisting of various elements, is capable of undergoing modi- fications, and may therefore act as a (material) cause like clay and other substances; while the uncompounded homogeneous Brahman is unable to do so.

To these conclusions he (Vyfisa) replies in the following Sutra.

5. On account of seeing (i. e. thinking being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world ; the pradhana) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads ; for) it is not founded on Scripture.

It is impossible to find room in the Vedanta-texts for the non-intelligent pradhana, the fiction of the Sankhyas ; because it is not founded on Scripture. How so? Because the quality of seeing, i. e. thinking, is in Scripture ascribed to the cause. For the passage, Kh. Up. VI, 2, (which begins : ' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second/ and goes on, ' It thought (saw),

48 vedanta-sCtras.

may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire,') declares that this world differentiated by name and form, which is there denoted by the word 'this/ was before its origination identical with the Self of that which is and that the principle denoted by the term 'the being' (or ' that which is ') sent forth fire and the other elements after having thought. The following passage also (' Verily in the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? He sent forth these worlds,' Ait. Ar. II, 49 1, 2) de- clares the creation to have had thought for its antecedent. In another passage also (Pr. Up. VI, 3) it is said of the person of sixteen parts, ' He thought, &c. He sent forth Pra/za.' By ' seeing ' (i. e. the verb ' seeing ' exhibited in the Sutra) is not meant that particular verb only, but any verbs which have a cognate sense ; just as the verb ' to sacrifice ' is used to denote any kind of offering. Therefore other passages also whose purport it is to intimate that an all- knowing Lord is the cause of the world are to be quoted here, as, for instance, Mu. Up. I, 1, 9, 'From him who perceives all and who knows all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name and form and food.'

The argumentation of the Sahkhyas that the pradhana may be called all-knowing on account of knowledge con- stituting an attribute of the gu/za Goodness is inadmissible. For as in the pradhana-condition the three gu^as are in a state of equipoise, knowledge which is a quality of Goodness only is not possible1. Nor can we admit the explanation that the pradhana is all-knowing because endowed with the capacity for all knowledge. For if, in the condition of equipoise of the guTzas, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Dark-

For if, in the condition of equipoise of the guTzas, we term the pradhana all-knowing with reference to the power of knowledge residing in Goodness, we must likewise term it little-knowing, with reference to the power impeding knowledge which resides in Passion and Dark-

1 Knowledge can arise only where Goodness is predominant, not where the three qualities mutually counterbalance one an- other.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 5. 49

ness. Moreover a modification of Goodness which is not connected with a witnessing (observing) principle (sakshin) is not called knowledge, and the non-intelligent pradh&na lis destitute of such a principle. It is therefore impossible to ascribe to the pradh&na all-knowingness. The case of the Yogins finally does not apply to the point under consideration ; for as they possess intelligence, they may, owing to an excess of Goodness in their nature, rise to omniscience1.— Well then (say those Sankhyas who believe in the existence of a Lord) let us assume that the pradh&na possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle (the Lord), just as the quality of burning is im- parted to an iron ball by fire.— No, we reply; for if this were so, it would be more reasonable to assume that that which is the cause of the pradhana having the quality of thought i.e. the all-knowing primary Brahman itself is the cause of the world.

The objection that to Brahman also all-knowingness in its primary sense cannot be ascribed because, if the activity of cognition were permanent, Brahman could not be con- sidered as independent with regard to it, we refute as follows. In what way, we ask the Sankhya, is Brah- man's all-knowingness interfered with by a permanent cognitional activity? To maintain that he, who possesses eternal knowledge capable to throw light on all objects, is not all-knowing, is contradictory. If his knowledge were considered non-permanent, he would know sometimes, and sometimes he would not know; from which it would follow indeed that he is not all-knowing. This fault is however avoided if we admit Brahman's knowledge to be permanent. — But, it may be objected, on this latter alternative the knower cannot be designated as independent with reference to the act of knowing.— Why not ? we reply ; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent

1 The excess of Sattva in theYogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle in- dependent of Sattva.

[34] E

50 VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.

we reply ; the sun also, although his heat and light are permanent, is nevertheless designated as independent

1 The excess of Sattva in theYogin would not enable him to rise to omniscience if he did not possess an intelligent principle in- dependent of Sattva.

[34] E

50 VEDANTA-SIJTRAS.

when we say, ' he burns, he gives light1/ — But, it will again be objected, we say that the sun burns or gives light when he stands in relation to some object to be heated or illuminated ; Brahman, on the other hand, stands, before the creation of the world, in no relation to any object of knowledge. The cases are therefore not parallel. — This objection too, we reply, is not valid ; for as a matter of fact we speak of the Sun as an agent, saying 'the sun shines/ even without reference to any object illuminated by him, and hence Brahman also may be spoken of as an agent, in such passages as ' it thought,' &c, even without reference to any object of knowledge. If, however, an object is supposed to be required (' knowing ' being a transitive verb while e shining' is intransitive), the texts ascribing thought to Brahman will fit all the better.— What then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world ? — Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved but about to. be evolved. For if, as the adherents of the Yoga-^astra assume, the Yogins have a perceptive knowledge of the past and the future through the favour of the Lord ; in what terms shall we have to speak of the eternal cognition of the ever pure Lord himself, whose objects are the creation, subsistence, and dissolution of the world ! The objection that Brahman, previously to the origin of the world, is not able to think because it is not connected with a body, &c. does not apply ; for Brahman, whose nature is eternal cognition— as the sun's nature is eternal luminous-

1 Ananda Giri comments as follows: paroktanupapattim ni- rasitum iprtkkAati idam iti. Prakn'tyarthabhavat pratyayarthabhavad va brahma«o sarva^^ateti pra^nam eva praka/ayati katham iti. Pra- thama/rc pratyaha yasyeti. Ukta#z vyatirekadv&ra vivrinoti anityatve hiti. Dvitfya#z jarikate ^Mneti. Svato nityasyapi ^Tzanasya tatta- darthava^^innasya karyatvat tatra svatantryam pratyayartho brah- ma»a^ sidhyatity dha. — The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is in- dependent with regard to each particular act of knowledge ; the verbal affix in '^anati ' indicating the particularity of the act.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 5. 51

— The knowledge of Brahman is eternal, and in so far Brahman is not independent with regard to it, but it is in- dependent with regard to each particular act of knowledge ; the verbal affix in '^anati ' indicating the particularity of the act.

I ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 5. 51

ness — can impossibly stand in need of any instruments of knowledge. The transmigrating soul (sa^sarin) indeed, which is under the sway of Nescience, &c., may require a body in order that knowledge may arise in it ; but not so the Lord, who is free from all impediments of knowledge. The two following Mantras also declare that the Lord does not require a body, and that his knowledge is without any obstructions. * There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better ; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as knowledge and force.' ' Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears. He knows what can be known, but no one knows him ; they call him the first, the great person ' (Sv. Up. VI, 8 ; III, 19).

But, to raise a new objection, there exists no trans- migrating soul different from the Lord and obstructed by impediments of knowledge ; for .Sruti expressly declares that ' there is no other seer but he ; there is no other knower but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23). How then can it be said that the origination of knowledge in the transmigrating soul depends on a body, while it does not do so in the case of the Lord ? — True, we reply. There is in reality no transmigrating soul different from the Lord. Still the connexion (of the Lord) with limiting adjuncts, consisting of bodies and so on, is assumed, just as we assume the ether to enter into connexion with divers limiting adjuncts such as jars, pots, caves, and the like. And just as in con- sequence of connexion of the latter kind such conceptions and terms as e the hollow (space) of a jar,' &c. are generally current, although the space inside a jar is not really different from universal space, and just as in consequence thereof there generally prevails the false notion that there are different spaces such as the space of a jar and so on ; so there prevails likewise the false notion that the Lord and the transmigrating soul are different ; a notion due to the non-discrimination of the (unreal) connexion of the soul with the limiting conditions, consisting of the body and so on. That the Self, although in reality the only existence, imparts the quality of Selfhood to bodies and the like

E 2

5 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

which are Not-Self is a matter of observation, and is due to mere wrong conception, which depends in its turn on antecedent wrong conception. And the consequence of the soul thus involving itself in the transmigratory state is that its thought depends on a body and the like.

The averment that the pradhana, because consisting of several elements, can, like clay and similar substances, occupy the place of a cause while the uncompounded Brahman cannot do so, is refuted by the fact of the pra- dhana not basing on Scripture, That, moreover, it is possible to establish by argumentation the causality of Brahman, but not of the pradhana and similar principles, the Sutrakara will set forth in the second Adhyaya (II, i, 4, &c).

Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The difficulty started by you, he says, viz. that the non- intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world, because thought is ascribed to the latter in the sacred texts, can be got over in another way also, viz. on the ground that non-intelligent things are sometimes figura- tively spoken of as intelligent beings. We observe, for instance, that people say of a river-bank about to fall, ' the bank is inclined to fall (pipatishati),' and thus speak of a non-intelligent bank as if it possessed intelligence. So the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may, when about to create, be figuratively spoken of as thinking. Just as in ordinary life some intelligent person after having bathed, and dined, and formed the purpose of driving in the after- noon to his village, necessarily acts according to his purpose, so the pradhana also acts by the necessity of its own nature, when transforming itself into the so-called great principle and the subsequent forms of evolution ; it may therefore figuratively be spoken of as intelligent. — But what reason have you for setting aside the primary meaning of the word ' thought ' and for taking it in a figurative sense ? —The observation, the Sankhya replies, that fire and water also are figuratively spoken of as intelligent beings in the two following scriptural passages, ' That fire thought ; that water thought ' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 3 ; 4). We therefrom con- clude that thought is to be taken in a figurative sense there

i adhyAya, i pada, 6. 53

also where Being (Sat) is the agent, because it is mentioned in a chapter where (thought) is generally taken in a figura- tive sense \

To this argumentation of the Sclnkhya the next Sutra replies :

6. If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of the world).

If it is said that (the word 'seeing') has a figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of the world).

Your assertion that the term ' Being ' denotes the non- intelligent pradhana, and that thought is ascribed to it in a figurative sense only, as it is to fire and water, is untenable. Why so ? On account of the term ' Self.' For the passage Kh. Up. VI, a, which begins ' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning,' after having related the creation of fire, water, and earth (' it thought/ &c. ; ' it sent forth fire,' &c.), goes on — denoting the thinking principle of which the whole chapter treats, and likewise fire, water, and earth, by the term ' divinities ' — as follows, ' That divinity thought : Let me now enter those three divinities with this living Self (^iva dtman) and evolve names and forms.' If we assumed that in this passage the non-intelligent pradhana is figuratively spoken of as thinking, we should also have to assume that the same pradhana — as once constituting the subject-matter of the chapter — is referred to by the term ' that divinity/ But in that case the divinity would not speak of the ^iva as ' Self.' For by the term ' Civa ' we must understand, according to the received meaning and the etymology of the word, the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the Self of the non-intelligent pradhana ? By * Self ' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent Giva cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent pradhana. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent Brahman, to

1 In the second Khanda. of the sixth Prapa/^aka of the Kh. Up. ' aikshata ' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.

54 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

of the sixth Prapa/^aka of the Kh. Up. ' aikshata ' is twice used in a figurative sense (with regard to fire and water); it is therefore to be understood figuratively in the third passage also where it occurs.

54 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word * Self with reference to the Giva is quite adequate. Then again there is the other passage, ' That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self. That art thou, O -SVetaketu 5 (Kk. Up. VI, 8, 7, &c). Here the clause 'It is the Self designates the Being of which the entire chapter treats, viz. the subtle Self, by the word ' Self,' and the concluding clause, ' that art thou, O 5vetaketu,' declares the intelligent *Svetaketu to be of the nature of the Self. Fire and water, on the other hand, are non-intelligent, since they are objects (of the mind), and since they are declared to be implicated in the evolution of names and forms. And as at the same time there is no reason for ascribing to them thought in its primary sense — while the employment of the word 'Self furnishes such a reason with reference to the Sat — the thought attributed to them must be explained in a figura- tive sense, like the inclination of the river-bank. Moreover, the thinking on the part of fire and water is to be under- stood as dependent on their being ruled over by the Sat. On the other hand, the thought of the Sat is, on account of the word ' Self,' not to be understood in a figurative sense1. Here the Sankhya comes forward with a new objection. The word c Self,5 he says, may be applied to the pradhana, although unintelligent, because it is sometimes figuratively used in the sense of 'that which effects all purposes of another ; ' as, for instance, a king applies the word ' Self ' to some servant who carries out all the king's intentions, ' Bha- drasena is my (other) Self/ For the pradhana, which effects the enjoyment and the emancipation of the soul, serves the latter in the same way as a minister serves his king in the affairs of peace and war. Or else, it may be said, the one word ' Self may refer to non-intelligent things as well as to intelligent beings, as we see that such expressions as ' the Self of the elements,' ' the Self of the senses,5 are made use of, and as the one word ' light ' (^yotis) denotes a certain

1 So that, on this latter explanation, it is unnecessary to assume a figurative sense of the word ' thinking ' in any of the three pas- sages.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 7. 55

sacrifice (the ^yotish/oma) as well as a flame. How then does it follow from the word ' Self ' that the thinking (ascribed to the cause of the world) is not to be taken in a figurative sense ?

To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies :

7. (The pradh&na cannot be designated by the term ' Self) because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).

To this last argumentation the Sutrakara replies :

7. (The pradh&na cannot be designated by the term ' Self) because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).

The non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the object of the term * Self' because in the passage Kh. Up. VI, % fT., where the subtle Sat which is under discussion is at first referred to in the sentence, i That is the Self/ and where the subsequent clause, * That art thou, O vSVetaketu,' declares the intelligent vSVetaketu to have his abode in the Self, a passage sub- sequent to the two quoted (viz. ' a man who has a teacher obtains true knowledge ; for him there is only delay as long as he is not delivered, then he will be perfect') declares final release. For if the non-intelligent pradhana were denoted by the term ' Sat,' and did comprehend — by means of the phrase ' That art thou ' — persons desirous of final release who as such are intelligent, the meaning could only be ' Thou art non -intelligent ; ' so that Scripture would virtually make contradictory statements to the disadvantage of man, and would thus cease to be a means of right know- ledge. But to assume that the faultless ,rastra is not a means of right knowledge, would be contrary to reason. And if the ^stra, considered as a means of right knowledge, should point out to a man desirous of release, but ignorant of the way to it, a non -intelligent Self as the real Self, he would — comparable to the blind man who had caught hold of the ox's tail1 — cling to the view of that being the Self,

1 A wicked man meets in a forest a blind person who has lost his way, and implores him to lead him to his village ; instead of doing so the wicked man persuades the blind one to catch hold of the tail of an ox, which he promises would lead him to his place. The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c, through which the ox drags him.

56 vedAnta-s6tras.

The consequence is that the blind man is, owing to his trustfulness, led even farther astray, and injured by the bushes, &c, through which the ox drags him.

56 vedAnta-s6tras.

and thus never be able to reach the real Self different from the false Self pointed out to him ; hence he would be de- barred from what constitutes man's good, and would incur evil. We must therefore conclude that, just as the jastra teaches the agnihotra and similar performances in their true nature as means for those who are desirous of the heavenly world, so the passage ' that is the Self, that art thou, G iSvetaketu,' teaches the Self in its true nature also. Only on that condition release for him whose thoughts are true can be taught by means of the simile in which the person to be released is compared to the man grasping the heated axe (Kk. Up. VI, 16). For in the other case, if the doctrine of the Sat constituting the Self had a secondary meaning only, the cognition founded on the passage ' that art thou ' would be of the nature of a fanciful combination only 1, like the knowledge derived from the passage, ' I am the hymn ' (Ait. Ar. II, 1, 2, 6), and would lead to a mere transitory reward; so that the simile quoted could not convey the doctrine of release. Therefore the word ' Self is applied to the subtle Sat not in a merely figurative sense. In the case of the faithful servant, on the other hand, the word 'Self can — in such phrases as 'Bhadrasena is my Self — be taken in a figurative sense, because the difference between master and servant is well established by per- ception. Moreover, to assume that, because words are sometimes seen to be used in figurative senses, a figurative sense may be resorted to in the case of those things also for which words (i.e.Vedic words) are the only means of knowledge, is altogether indefensible ; for an assumption of that nature would lead to a general want of confidence. The assertion that the word ' Self ' may (primarily) signify what is non-intelligent as well as what is intelligent, just as the word '^yotis ' signifies a certain sacrifice as well as light, is inadmissible, because we have no right to attribute to words a plurality of meanings. Hence (we rather assume that) the word ' Self ' in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative

Cp. above, p. 30.

I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 8. 57

Hence (we rather assume that) the word ' Self ' in its primary meaning refers to what is intelligent only and is then, by a figurative

Cp. above, p. 30.

I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, 8. 57

attribution of intelligence, applied to the elements and the like also ; whence such phrases as 'the Self of the elements/ 'the Self of the senses/ And even if we assume that the word ' Self ' primarily signifies both classes of beings, we are unable to settle in any special case which of the two meanings the word has, unless we are aided either by the general heading under which it stands, or some determina- tive attributive word. But in the passage under discussion there is nothing to determine that the word refers to something non-intelligent, while, on the other hand, the Sat distinguished by thought forms the general heading, and Svetaketu, i.e. a being endowed with intelligence, is mentioned in close proximity. That a non-intelligent Self does not agree with Svetaketu, who possesses intelligence, we have already shown. All these circumstances determine the object of the word ' Self here to be something intelli- gent. The word '^yotis' does moreover not furnish an appropriate example ; for according to common use it has the settled meaning of 'light' only, and is used in the sense of sacrifice only on account of the arthavada assuming a similarity (of the sacrifice) to light.

A different explanation of the Sutra is also possible. The preceding Sfitra may be taken completely to refute all doubts as to the word c Self having a figurative or double sense, and then the present Sfttra is to be explained as con- taining an independent reason, proving that the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause is untenable.

Hence the non-intelligent pradhana is not denoted by the word ' Self.' This the teacher now proceeds to prove by an additional reason.

8. And (the pradh&na cannot be denoted by the word 'Self') because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.

If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term * Being ' (Sat), and if the passage ' That is the Self, that art thou, O *Svetaketu,' referred to the pradhana ; the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the

58 vedanta-s6tras.

If the pradhana which is the Not-Self were denoted by the term * Being ' (Sat), and if the passage ' That is the Self, that art thou, O *Svetaketu,' referred to the pradhana ; the teacher whose wish it is to impart instruction about the

58 vedanta-s6tras.

true Brahman would subsequently declare that the pradhana is to be set aside (and the true Brahman to be considered) ; for otherwise his pupil, having received the instruction about the pradhana, might take his stand on the latter, looking upon it as the Non-Self. In ordinary life a man who wishes to point out to a friend the (small) star Arundhatf at first directs his attention to a big neighbouring star, saying ' that is Arundhati,' although it is really not so ; and thereupon he withdraws his first statement and points out the real Arundhati. Analogously the teacher (if he intended to make his pupil understand the Self through the Non-Self) would in the end definitely state that the Self is not of the nature of the pradhana. But no such statement is made; for the sixth Prapa/^aka arrives at a conclusion based on the view that the Self is nothing but that which is (the Sat).

The word ' and ' (in the Sutra) is meant to notify that the contradiction of a previous statement (which would be implied in the rejected interpretation) is an additional reason for the rejection. Such a contradiction would result even if it were stated that the pradhana is to be set aside. For in the beginning of the Prapaz^aka it is intimated that through the knowledge of the cause everything becomes known. Compare the following consecutive sentences, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what cannot be heard, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known? What is that instruction? As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the modification (i.e. the effect) being a name merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is clay merely,' &c. Now if the term ' Sat ' denoted the pradhana, which is merely the cause of the aggregate of the objects of enjoyment, its knowledge, whether to be set aside or not to be set aside, could never lead to the knowledge of the aggregate of enjoy ers (souls), because the latter is not an effect of the pradhana. Therefore the pradhana is not denoted by the term ' Sat/ — For this the Sutrakara gives a further reason.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9. 59

9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana).

Therefore the pradhana is not denoted by the term ' Sat/ — For this the Sutrakara gives a further reason.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 9. 59

9. On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana).

With reference to the cause denoted by the word c Sat,' Scripture says, ' When a man sleeps here, then, my dear, he becomes united with the Sat, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say of him, " he sleeps " (svapiti), because he is gone to his own (svam apita)/ \Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1.) This passage explains the well-known verb ' to sleep/ with refer- ence to the soul. The word, ' his own,' denotes the Self which had before been denoted by the word Sat ; to the Self he (the individual soul) goes, i.e. into it it is resolved, according to the acknowledged sense of api-i, which means ' to be resolved into.' The individual soul (givs) is called awake as long as being connected with the various external objects by means of the modifications of the mind — which thus constitute limiting adjuncts of the soul — it apprehends those external objects, and identifies itself with the gross body, which is one of those external objects1. When, modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind2.5 When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i. e. the subtle and the gross bodies), and the consequent absence of the modi- fications due to the adjuncts, it is, in the state of deep sleep, merged in the Self as it were, then it is said to be asleep (resolved into the Self). A similar etymology of the word ' hrzdaya ' is given by .sruti, ' That Self abides in the heart. And this is the etymological explanation : he is in the heart (hrtdi ayam)/ (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 3.) The words a^anaya and udanya are similarly etymologised : ' water is carrying away what has been eaten by him ; ' ' fire carries away what has been drunk by him ' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 3 ; 5). Thus the passage quoted above explains the resolution (of the soul) into the Self, denoted by the term ' Sat/ by means of the etymology of the word 'sleep/ But the intelligent

1 So according to the commentators, not to accept whose guidance in the translation of scholastic definitions is rather hazardous. A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.

2 With reference to Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2.

6o VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

A simpler translation of the clause might however be given.

2 With reference to Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2.

6o VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

Self can clearly not resolve itself into the non-intelligent pradhana. If, again, it were said that the pradhana is denoted by the word ' own/ because belonging to the Self (as being the Self's own), there would remain the same ab- surd statement as to an intelligent entity being resolved into a non-intelligent one. Moreover another scriptural passage (viz. ' embraced by the intelligent — prAgna, — Self he knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within,' Bri. Up. IV, 3, 3i) declares that the soul in the condition of dream- less sleep is resolved into an intelligent entity. Hence that into which all intelligent souls are resolved is an intelligent cause of the world, denoted by the word ' Sat,' and not the pradhana. — A further reason for the pradhana not being the cause is subjoined.

10. On account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedinta-texts, Brahman is to be considered the cause).

If, as in the argumentations of the logicians, so in the Vedanta-texts also, there were set forth different views con- cerning the nature of the cause, some of them favouring the theory of an intelligent Brahman being the cause of the world, others inclining towards the pradhana doctrine, and others again tending in a different dif ectkm ; ' then it might perhaps be possible to interpret such passages as those, which speak of the cause of the world as thinking, in such a manner as to make them fall in with the pradhana theory. But the stated condition is absent since all the Vedanta-texts uni- formly teach that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman. Compare, for instance, ' As from a burning fire $parks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pra^as proceed each towards its place ; from the pra^as the gods, from the gods the worlds ' (Kau. Up. Ill, 3). And 'from that Self sprang ether' (Taitt. Up. II, 1). And 'all this springs from the Self (Kk. Up. VII, 26, 1). And 'this pr&^a is born from the Self (Pr. Up. Ill, 3); all which passages declare the Self to be the cause. That the word 'Self denotes an intelligent being, we have already shown.

I ADHYAYA, I pAdA, II. 6 1

And that all the Vedanta-texts advocate the same view as to an intelligent cause of the world, greatly strengthens their claim to be considered a means of right knowledge, just as the corresponding claims of the senses are strengthened by their giving us information of a uniform character re-f garding colour and the like. The all-knowing Brahman is'; therefore to be considered the cause of the world, 'on account of the uniformity of view (of the Vedanta-texts)/— A further reason for this conclusion is advanced*

ii. And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).

And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).

That the all-knowing Lord is the cause of the world, is also declared in a text directly referring to him (viz. the all-knowing one), viz. in the following passage of the man- tropanishad of the 6Veta.svataras (VI, 9) where the word * he ' refers to the previously mentioned all-knowing Lord, 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord.' It is therefore finally settled that the all-knowing Brahman is the general cause, not the non-intelligent pradhctna or anything else.

In what precedes we have shown, availing ourselves of appropriate arguments, that the Vedanta-texts exhibited \ under Sutras 1, 1-11, are capable of proving that the all- ; knowing, all-powerful Lord is the cause of the origin, subsistence, and dissolution of the world. And we have explained, by pointing to the prevailing uniformity of view (1, 10), that all Vedanta-texts whatever maintain an intelli- gent cause. The question might therefore be asked, ' What reason is there for the subsequent part of the Vedanta- sutras?' (as the chief point is settled already.)

To this question we reply as follows : Brahman is appre- hended under two forms ; in the first place as qualified by limiting conditions owing to the multiformity of the evolu- tions of name and form (i. e. the multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the opposite of this, i. e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. Compare

62 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

e. the multiformity of the created world); in the second place as being the opposite of this, i. e. free from all limiting conditions whatever. Compare

62 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

the following passages: Bri. Up. IV, 5, 15, 'For where there is duality as it were, then one sees the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another ? ' Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the greatest. Where one sees something else, hears something else, under- stands something else, that is the little. The greatest is immortal; the little is mortal;' Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7, 'The wise one, who having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling (the things by their names x) ; ' Sv. Up. VI, 19, ' Who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without faults, without taint, the highest bridge of immor- tality, like a fire that has consumed its fuel;' "Bri. Up. II, 3, 6, 'Not so, not so;5 Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 8, c It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long ; ' and ' defective is one place, perfect the other.' All these passages, with many others, declare Brahman to possess a double nature, accord- ing as it is the object either of Knowledge or of Nescience. As long as it is the object of Nescience, there are applied to it the categories of devotee, object of devotion, and the like2. The different modes of devotion lead to different results, some to exaltation, some to gradual emancipation, some to success in works ; those modes are distinct on account of the distinction of the different qualities and limiting conditions3. And although the one highest Self only, i. e. the Lord distinguished by those different qualities constitutes the object of devotion, still the fruits (of devotion) are distinct, according as the devotion refers to different qualities. Thus Scripture says, 'According as man wor- ships him, that he becomes;' and, 'According to what his thought is in this world, so will he be when he has departed

1 The wise one, i.e. the highest Self; which as givatman is con- versant with the names and forms of individual things.

2 I. e. it is looked upon as the object of the devotion of the individual souls ; while in reality all those souls and Brahman are one.

3 Qualities, i. e. the attributes under which the Self is meditated on ; limiting conditions, i. e. the localities — such as the heart and the like — which in pious meditation are ascribed to the Self.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, II. 63

this life' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). Smrzti also makes an analo- gous statement, ' Remembering whatever form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters, being impressed with it through his constant meditation' (Bha. GitaVIII, 6).

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, II. 63

this life' (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 1). Smrzti also makes an analo- gous statement, ' Remembering whatever form of being he leaves this body in the end, into that form he enters, being impressed with it through his constant meditation' (Bha. GitaVIII, 6).

Although one and the same Self is hidden in all beings movable as well as immovable, yet owing to the gradual rise of excellence of the minds which form the limiting conditions (of the Self), Scripture declares that the Self, although eternally unchanging and uniform, reveals itself1 in a graduated series of beings, and so appears in forms of various dignity and power; compare, for instance (Ait. Ar. II, 3, 2, 1), ' He who knows the higher manifestation of the Self in him V &c. Similarly Smriti remarks, ' Whatever being there is of power, splendour or might, know it to have sprung from portions of my glory ' (Bha. Gita X, 41) ; a passage declaring that wherever there is an excess of power and so on, there the Lord is to be worshipped. Accordingly here (i. e. in the Sutras) also the teacher will show that the golden person in the disc of the Sun is the highest Self, on ac- count of an indicating sign, viz. the circumstance of his being unconnected with any evil (Ved. Su. 1, 1,20) ; the same is to be observed with regard to 1, 1, 22 and other Sutras. And, again, an enquiry will have to be undertaken into the meaning of the texts, in order that a settled conclusion may be reached concerning that knowledge of the Self which leads to instan- taneous release ; for although that knowledge is conveyed by means of various limiting conditions, yet no special con- nexion with limiting conditions is intended to be intimated, in consequence of which there arises a doubt whether it (the

1 Ananda Giri reads avish/asya for avishkr/tasya.

2 Cp. the entire passage. All things are manifestations of the highest Self under certain limiting conditions, but occupying differ- ent places in an ascending scale. In unsentient things, stones, &c. only the satt&, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap ; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.

64 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

In unsentient things, stones, &c. only the satt&, the quality of being manifests itself; in plants, animals, and men the Self manifests itself through the vital sap ; in animals and men there is understanding; higher thought in man alone.

64 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

knowledge) has the higher or the lower Brahman for its object ; so, for instance, in the case of Sutra I, i, 1 2 1. From all this it appears that the following part of the 6astra has a special object of its own, viz. to show that the Vedanta- texts teach, on the one hand, Brahman as connected with limiting conditions and forming an object of devotion, and on the other hand> as being free from the connexion with such conditions and constituting an object of knowledge. The refutation, moreover, of non-intelligent causes different from Brahman, which in I,- 1 , 10 was based on the uniformity of the meaning of the Vedanta-texts, will be further detailed by the Sutrakara, who, while explaining additional passages relating to Brahman, will preclude all causes of a nature opposite to that of Brahman.

12. (The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of the repetition (of the word "bliss/ as denoting the highest Self).

The Taittiriya-upanishad (II, 1-5), after having enume- rated the Self consisting of food, the Self consisting of the vital airs, the Self consisting of mind, and the Self consisting of understanding, says, ' Different from this which consists of understanding is the other inner Self which consists of bliss.' Here the doubt arises whether the phrase, * that which con- sists of bliss/ denotes the highest Brahman of which it had been said previously, that ' It is true Being, Knowledge, with- out end/ or something different from Brahman, just as the

1 Ananda Giri on the preceding passage beginning from 'thus here also :' na kevalazra dvaividhyam brahmawa^ jrutismrz'tyor eva siddhazrc kim tu sutrakrz'to*pi matam ity dha, evam iti, .rrutismrz'tyor iva prakrzte*pi jastre dvairupyam brahmawo bhavati ; tatra sopa- dhikabrahmavishayam antastaddharmadhikara/zam udaharati adi- tyeti ; uktanyayazrc tulyade^eshu prasarayati evam iti ; sopadhikopa- dejavan nirupadhikopade^aztf danayati evam ityadina, atma^anaw ninzetavyam iti sambandha^ ; niraayaprasangam aha pareti ; an- namay&dyupadhidv&roktasya katham paravidyavishayatva/# tatraha up&dhiti ; nirwayakramam dha v&kyeti, ukt&rtham adhikara«aw kvd- stity &sankyokta#z yatheti.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12, 65

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 12, 65

Self consisting of food, &c., is different from it. — The purvapakshin maintains that the Self consisting of bliss is a secondary (not the principal) Self, and something different from Brahman ; as it forms a link in a series of Selfs, beginning with the Self consisting of food, which all are not the principal Self. To the objection that even thus the Self consisting of bliss may be considered as the primary Self, since it is stated to be the innermost of all, he replies that this cannot be admitted, because the Self of bliss is declared to have joy and so on for its limbs, and because it is said to be embodied. If it were identical with the primary Self, joy and the like would not touch it ; but the text expressly says * Joy is its head ;' and about its being em- bodied we read, c Of that former one this one is the em- bodied Self (Taitt. Up. II, 6), i.e. of that former Self of Understanding this Self of bliss is the embodied Self. And of what is embodied, the contact with joy and pain cannot be prevented. Therefore the Self which consists of bliss is nothing but the transmigrating Soul.

To this reasoning we make the following reply : — By the Self consisting of bliss we have to understand the highest Self, Von account of repetition.' For the word ' bliss' is repeatedly applied to the highest Self. So Taitt. Up. II, 7, where, after the clause * That is flavour ' — which refers back to the Self consisting of bliss, and declares it to be of the nature of flavour — we read, 'For only after having perceived flavour can any one perceive delight. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth if that Bliss existed not in the ether (of the heart) ? For he alone causes blessedness ;' and again, II, 8, 'Now this is an examination of Bliss;' ' He reaches that Self consisting of Bliss ; ' and again, II, 9, ' He who knows the Bliss of Brahman fears nothing;' and in addition, ' He understood that Bliss is Brahman ' (III, 6). And in another scriptural passage also (Bri. Up. Ill, 9, 28), ' Knowledge and bliss is Brahman/ we see the word ' bliss ' applied just to Brahman. As, therefore, the word l bliss ' is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only denote [34] F

66 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

As, therefore, the word l bliss ' is repeatedly used with reference to Brahman, we conclude that the Self consisting of bliss is Brahman also. The objection that the Self consisting of bliss can only denote [34] F

66 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

the secondary Self (the Sa^sarin), because it forms a link in a series of secondary Serfs, beginning with the one consisting of food, is of no force, for the reason that the Self consisting of bliss is the innermost of all. The 3astra, wishing to convey information about the primary Self, adapts itself to common notions, in so far as it at first refers to the body consisting of food, which, although not the Self, is by very obtuse people identified with it ; it then proceeds from the body to another Self, which has the same shape with the preceding one, just as the statue possesses the form of the mould into which the molten brass had been poured ; then, again, to another one, always at first representing the Non-Self as the Self, for the purpose of easier comprehension ; and it finally teaches that the innermost Self1, which consists of bliss, is the real Self. Just as when a man, desirous of pointing out the star Arundhati to another man, at first points to several stars which are not Arundhati as being Arundhati, while only the star pointed out in the end is the real Arundhati ; so here also the Self consisting of bliss is the real Self on account of its being the innermost (i. e. the last). Nor can any weight be allowed to the objection that the attribution of joy and so on, as head, &c, cannot possibly refer to the real Self; for this attribution is due to the immediately preceding limiting condition (viz. the Self consisting of understanding, the so-called vi^anako^a), and does not really belong to the real Self. The possession of a bodily nature also is ascribed to the Self of bliss, only because it is represented as a link in the chain of bodies which begins with the Self consisting of food, and is not ascribed to it in the same direct sense in which it is predicated of the transmigrating Self. Hence the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Brahman.

13. If (it be objected that the term anandamaya, consisting of bliss, can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word denoting a modifica-

1 After which no other Self is mentioned.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 15. 67

tion (or product) ; (we declare the objection to be) not (valid) on account of abundance, (the idea of which may be expressed by the affix maya.)

Here the purvapakshin raises the objection that the word anandamaya (consisting of bliss) cannot denote the highest Self. — Why ?— Because the word anandamaya is understood to denote something different from the original word (i. e. the word ananda without the derivative affix maya), viz. a modification ; according to the received sense of the affix maya. 'Anandamaya ' therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya (consisting of food) and similar words do.

e. the word ananda without the derivative affix maya), viz. a modification ; according to the received sense of the affix maya. 'Anandamaya ' therefore denotes a modification, just as annamaya (consisting of food) and similar words do.

This objection is, however, not valid, because c maya. ' is also used in the sense of abundance, i. e. denotes that where there is abundance of what the original word expresses. So, for instance, the phrase ' the sacrifice is annamaya ' means ' the sacrifice is abounding in food ' (not ' is some modifica- tion or product of food '). Thus here Brahman also, as abounding in bliss, is called anandamaya. That Brahman does abound in bliss follows from the passage (Taitt. Up. II, 8), where, after the bliss of each of the different classes of beings, beginning with man, has been declared to be a hundred times greater than the bliss of the immediately preceding class, the bliss of Brahman is finally proclaimed to be absolutely supreme. Maya therefore denotes abundance.

14. And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i. e. of bliss ; therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)

Maya must be understood to denote abundance, for that reason also that Scripture declares Brahman to be the cause of bliss, ' For he alone causes bliss ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7). For he who causes bliss must himself abound in bliss; just as we infer in ordinary life, that a man who enriches others must himself possess abundant wealth. As, there- fore, maya may be taken to mean ' abundant,' the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

15. Moreover (the dnandamaya is Brahman be-

f 2

68 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

cause) the same (Brahman) which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i. e. proclaimed in the Brahma^a passage as the anandamaya.)

15. Moreover (the dnandamaya is Brahman be-

f 2

68 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

cause) the same (Brahman) which had been referred to in the mantra is sung, (i. e. proclaimed in the Brahma^a passage as the anandamaya.)

The Self, consisting of joy, is the highest Brahman for the following reason also \ On the introductory words * he who knows Brahman attains the highest' (Taitt. Up. II, i), there follows a mantra proclaiming that Brahman, which forms the general topic of the chapter, possesses the quali- ties of true existence, intelligence, infinity ; after that it is said that from Brahman there sprang at first the ether and then all other moving and non- moving things, and that, entering into the beings which it had emitted, Brahman stays in the recess, inmost of all ; thereupon, for its better comprehension, the series of the different Selfs (' different from this is the inner Self,' &c.) are enumerated, and then finally the same Brahman which the mantra had proclaimed, is again proclaimed in the passage under discussion, ' different from this is the other inner Self, which consists of bliss.' To assume that a mantra and the Brahma/za passage be- longing to it have the same sense is only proper, on account of the absence of contradiction (which results therefrom) ; for otherwise we should be driven to the unwelcome in- ference that the text drops the topic once started, and turns to an altogether new subject.

Nor is there mentioned a further inner Self different from the Self consisting of bliss, as in the case of the Self con- sisting of food, &c.2 On the same (i. e. the Self consisting of bliss) is founded, ' This same knowledge of Bhrzgu and Varu/za ; he understood that bliss is Brahman ' (Taitt. Up. Ill, 6). Therefore the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

1 The previous proofs were founded on lihga ; the argument which is now propounded is founded on prakarazza.

2 While, in the case of the Selfs consisting of food and so on, a further inner Self is duly mentioned each time. It cannot, there- fore, be concluded that the Selfs consisting of food, &c, are likewise identical with the highest Self referred to in the mantra.

I ADHYAVA, I PADA, 1 7. 69

16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other (i. e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the latter assump- tion).

I ADHYAVA, I PADA, 1 7. 69

16. (The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self,) not the other (i. e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the latter assump- tion).

And for the following reason also the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self only, not the other, i. e. the one which is other than the Lord, i. e. the transmigrating in- dividual soul. The personal soul cannot be denoted by the term ' the one consisting of bliss/ Why ? On account of the impossibility. For Scripture says, with reference to the Self consisting of bliss, ' He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. He brooded over himself. After he had thus brooded, he sent forth whatever there is/ Here, the desire arising before the origination of a body, &c, the non- separation of the effects created from the creator, and the creation of all effects whatever, cannot possibly belong to any Self different from the highest Self.

17. And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the anandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).

The Self consisting of bliss cannot be identical with the transmigrating soul, for that reason also that in the section treating of the Self of bliss, the individual soul and the Self of bliss are distinctly represented as different ; Taitt. Up. II, 7, 'It (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss) is a flavour; for only after perceiving a flavour can this (soul) perceive bliss/ For he who perceives cannot be that which is per- ceived.— But, it may be asked, if he who perceives or attains cannot be that which is perceived or attained, how about the following Sruti- and Smr zti-passages, ' The Self is to be sought ;' ' Nothing higher is known than the attain- ment of the Self 1?'— This objection, we reply, is legitimate (from the point of view of absolute truth). Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is never anything

1 Yadi labdM na labdhavyaA kathaw tarhi paramatmano vastuto Abhinnena ^ivatmana paramatm& labhyata ity artha^. Bhamati.

70 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

Yet we see that in ordinary life, the Self, which in reality is never anything

1 Yadi labdM na labdhavyaA kathaw tarhi paramatmano vastuto Abhinnena ^ivatmana paramatm& labhyata ity artha^. Bhamati.

70 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

but the Self, is, owing to non-comprehension of the truth, identified with the Non-Self, i. e. the body and so on ; whereby it becomes possible to speak of the Self in so far as it is identified with the body, and so on, as something not searched for but to be searched for, not heard but to be heard, not seized but to be seized, not perceived but to be perceived, not known but to be known, and the like. Scripture, on the other hand, denies, in such passages as 'there is no other seer but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23), that there is in reality any seer or hearer different from the all-knowing highest Lord. (Nor can it be said that the Lord is unreal because he is identical with the unreal individual soul ; for)1 the Lord differs from the soul (vignk- natman) which is embodied, acts and enjoys, and is the product of Nescience, in the same way as the real juggler who stands on the ground differs from the illusive juggler, who, holding in his hand a shield and a sword, climbs up to the sky by means of a rope ; or as the free unlimited ether differs from the ether of a jar, which is determined by its limiting adjunct, (viz, the jar.) With reference to this fictitious difference of the highest Self and the individual Self, the two last Sutras have been propounded.

18. And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the anandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i. e. to the pradhina inferred by the Sankhyas.)

Since in the passage ' he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which occurs in the chapter treating of the anandamaya (Taitt. Up. II, 6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred, i. e. the non- intelligent pradhana assumed by the Sankhyas, cannot be regarded as being the Self consisting of bliss and the cause of the world. Although the opinion that the pradhana is the

1 Yatha parame^varad bhinno ^ivatma drash/a na bhavaty evam £-ivatmano*pi drash/ur na bhinna^ parame^vara iti ^ivasydnirva^- yatve parame^varo^py anirva^yaA syad ity ata aha paramcrvaras tv avidyakalpitad iti. Ananda Giri.

I ADHYAYA, T PADA, 1 9. 7 1

cause of the world, has already been refuted in the Sutra I, 1, 5, it is here, where a favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the basis of the scrip- tural passage about the cause of the world feeling desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all scriptural passages).

1 9. And, moreover, it (i. e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i.e. the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on that (being fully known).

1 9. And, moreover, it (i. e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i.e. the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on that (being fully known).

And for the following reason also the term, 'the Self consisting of bliss,' cannot denote either the pradhana or the individual soul. Scripture teaches that the individual soul when it has reached knowledge is joined, i. e. identified, with the Self of bliss under discussion, i.e. obtains final release. Compare the following passage (Taitt. Up. II, 7),! ' When he finds freedom from fear, and rest in that which ' is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has obtained the fearless. For if he makes but the smallest distinction in it there is fear for him.' That means, if he sees in that Self consisting of bliss even a small difference in the form of non-identity, then he finds no release from the fear of transmigratory existence. But when he, by means of the cognition of absolute identity, finds absolute rest in the Self consisting of bliss, then he is freed from the fear of transmigratory existence. But this (finding absolute rest) is possible only when we understand by the Self con- sisting of bliss, the highest Self, and not either the pra- dhana or the individual soul. Hence it is proved that the Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.

But, in reality, the following remarks have to be made concerning the true meaning of the word ' dnandamaya V On what grounds, we ask, can it be maintained that the

1 The explanation of the anandamaya given hitherto is here re- called, and a different one given. The previous explanation is attributed by Go. An. to the vrzttikara.

72 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

The previous explanation is attributed by Go. An. to the vrzttikara.

72 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

affix ' maya ' after having, in the series of compounds begin- ning with annamaya and ending with vi^Tzanamaya, denoted mere modifications, should all at once, in the word ananda- maya, which belongs to the same series, denote abun- dance, so that anandamaya would refer to Brahman ? If it should be said that the assumption is made on account of the governing influence of the Brahman proclaimed in the mantra (which forms the beginning of the chapter, Taitt. Up. II), we reply that therefrom it would follow that also the Selfs consisting of food, breath, &c, denote Brahman (because the governing influence of the mantra extends to them also). — The advocate of the former interpretation will here, perhaps, restate an argument already made use of above, viz. as follows : To assume that the Selfs consisting of food., and so on, are not Brahman is quite proper, because after each of them an inner Self is mentioned. After the Self of bliss, on the other hand, no further inner Self is mentioned, and hence it must be considered to be Brahman itself; otherwise we should commit the mistake of dropping the subject-matter in hand (as which Brahman is pointed out by the mantra), and taking up a new topic. — But to this we reply that, although unlike the case of the Selfs con- sisting of food, &c, no inner Self is mentioned after the Self consisting of bliss, still the latter cannot be considered as Brahman, because with reference to the Self consisting of bliss Scripture declares, ' Joy is its head. Satisfaction is its right arm. Great satisfaction is its left arm. Bliss is its trunk. Brahman is its tail, its support.' Now, here the very same Brahman which, in the mantra, had been introduced as the subject of the discussion, is called the tail, the support ; while the five involucra, extending from the involucrum of food up to the involucrum of bliss, are merely introduced for the purpose of setting forth the knowledge of Brahman. How, then, can it be maintained that our interpretation implies the needless dropping of the general subject-matter and the introduction of a new topic? — But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i. e. a member of the Self consisting of bliss ; analogously to those passages in which a tail and

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9. 73

— But, it may again be objected, Brahman is called the tail, i. e. a member of the Self consisting of bliss ; analogously to those passages in which a tail and

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9. 73

other members are ascribed to the Selfs consisting of food and so on. On what grounds, then, can we claim to know that Brahman (which is spoken of as a mere member, i. e. a subordinate matter) is in reality the chief matter referred to ? — From the fact, we reply, of Brahman being the general subject-matter of the chapter. — But, it will again be said, that interpretation also according to which Brahman is cognised as a mere member of the anandamaya does not involve a dropping of the subject-matter, since the ananda- maya himself is Brahman. — But, we reply, in that case one and the same Brahman would at first appear as the whole, viz. as the Self consisting of bliss, and thereupon as a mere part, viz. as the tail ; which is absurd. And as one of the two alternatives must be preferred, it is certainly appro- priate to refer to Brahman the clause ' Brahman is the tail ' which contains the word ( Brahman,' and not the sentence about the Self of Bliss in which Brahman is not mentioned. Moreover, Scripture, in continuation of the phrase, 'Brahman is the tail, the support/ goes on, ' On this there is also the following sloka. : He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non- existing. He who knows Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing/ As this ^loka, without any refer- ence to the Self of bliss, states the advantage and disadvan- tage connected with the knowledge of the being and non- being of Brahman only, we conclude that the clause, ' Brahman is the tail, the support,' represents Brahman as the chief matter (not as a merely subordinate matter). About the being or non-being of the Self of bliss, on the other hand, a doubt is not well possible, since the Self of bliss distinguished by joy, satisfaction, &c, is well known to every one. — But if Brahman is the principal matter, how can it be designated as the mere tail of the Self of bliss (' Brahman is the tail, the support ') ? — Its being called so, we reply, forms no objection ; for the word tail here denotes that which is, of the nature of a tail, so that we have to understand that the bliss of Brahman is not a member (in its literal sense), but the support or abode, the one nest (resting-place) of all worldly bliss. Analogously another

74 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

Analogously another

74 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

scriptural passage declares, ' All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 32). Further, if by the Self consisting of bliss we were to understand Brahman, we should have to assume that the Brahman meant is the Brahman distinguished by qualities (savuesha), because it is said to have joy and the like for its members. But this assumption is contradicted by a complementary passage (II, 9) which declares that Brahman is the object neither of mind nor speech, and so shows that the Brahman meant is the (absolute) Brahman (devoid of qualities), * From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away unable to reach it, he who knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing.' Moreover, if we speak of something as ' abounding in bliss V we thereby imply the co-existence of pain ; for the word ' abundance ' in its ordinary sense implies the existence of a small measure of what is opposed to the thing whereof there is abundance. But the passage so understood would be in conflict with another passage [Kh. Up. VII, 24), ' Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite ; ' which declares that in the Infinite, i. e. Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from it. Moreover, as joy, &c. differ in each individual body, the Self consisting of bliss also is a different one in each body. Brahman, on the other hand, does not differ according to bodies ; for the mantra at the be- ginning of the chapter declares it to be true Being, knowledge, infinite, and another passage says, c He is the one God, hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self within all beings ' (Sv. Up. VI, 11). Nor, again, does Scripture exhibit a frequent repetition of the word ' anandamaya ; ' for merely the radical part of the compound (i. e. the word ananda without the affix maya) is repeated in all the following passages : ' It is a flavour, far only after seizing flavour can any one seize bliss. Who could breathe, who could breathe forth, if that bliss existed not in the ether? For he alone causes blessed- ness ;' ' Now this is an examination of bliss;' ' He who

1 In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must be taken if understood to denote Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9. 75

For he alone causes blessed- ness ;' ' Now this is an examination of bliss;' ' He who

1 In which sense, as shown above, the word anandamaya must be taken if understood to denote Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 9. 75

knows the bliss of that Brahman fears nothing;' 'He understood that bliss is Brahman.' If it were a settled matter that Brahman is denoted by the term, 'the Self consisting of bliss,' then we could assume that in the subse- quent passages, where merely the word ' bliss ' is employed, the term ' consisting of bliss ' is meant to be repeated ; but that the Self consisting of bliss is not Brahman, we have already proved by means of the reason of joy being its head, and so on. Hence, as in another scriptural passage, viz. ' Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 28), the mere word ' bliss ' denotes Brahman, we must conclude that also in such passages as, ' If that bliss existed not in the ether,' the word bliss is used with reference to Brahman, and is not meant to repeat the term ' consisting of bliss.' The repetition of the full compound, ' consisting of bliss,' which occurs in the passage, ' He reaches that Self consisting of bliss ' (Taitt. Up. II, 8), does not refer to Brahman, as it is contained in the enumeration of Non-Selfs, comprising the Self of food, &c, all of which are mere effects, and all of which are represented as things to be reached. — But, it may be said, if the Self consisting of bliss, which is said to have to be reached, were not Brahman — just as the Selfs con- sisting of food, &c. are not Brahman — then it would not be declared (in the passage immediately following) that he who knows obtains for his reward Brahman. — This objection we invalidate by the remark that the text makes its declaration as to Brahman — which is the tail, the support — being reached by him who knows, by the very means of the declaration as to the attainment of the Self of bliss ; as appears from the passage, ' On this there is also this sloka., from which all speech returns,' &c. With reference, again, to the passage, ' He desired : may I be many, may I grow forth/ which is found in proximity to the mention of the Self consisting of bliss, we remark that it is in reality con- nected (not with the Self of bliss but with) Brahman, which is mentioned in the still nearer passage, ' Brahman is the tail, the support,' and does therefore not intimate that the Self of bliss is Brahman. And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted (' it desired,' &c), the later passage

76 vedanta-s6tras.

And, on account of its referring to the passage last quoted (' it desired,' &c), the later passage

76 vedanta-s6tras.

also, ' That is flavour/ &c, has not the Self of bliss for its subject. — But, it may be objected, the (neuter word) Brah- man cannot possibly be designated by a masculine word as you maintain is done in the passage, ' He desired/ &c. — In reply to this objection we point to the passage (Taitt. Up. II, i), ' From that Self sprang ether/ where, likewise, the masculine word 'Self can refer to Brahman only, since the latter is the general topic of the chapter. In the know- ledge of Bhrzgu and Varu;m finally ('he knew that bliss is Brahman '), the word ' bliss ' is rightly understood to denote Brahman, since we there meet neither with the affix ' maya/ nor with any statement as to joy being its head, and the like. To ascribe to Brahman in itself joy, and so on, as its members, is impossible, unless we have recourse to certain, however minute, distinctions qualifying Brahman ; and that the whole chapter is not meant to convey a knowledge of the qualified (savlresha) Brahman is proved by the passage (quoted above), which declares that Brahman transcends speech and mind. We therefore must conclude that the affix maya, in the word anandamaya, does not denote abundance, but expresses a mere effect, just as it does in the words annamaya and the subsequent similar com- pounds.

The Sutras are therefore to be explained as follows. There arises the question whether the passage, ' Brahman is the tail, the support/ is to be understood as intimating that Brahman is a mere member of the Self consisting of bliss, or that it is the principal matter. If it is said that it must be considered as a mere member, the reply is, ' The Self consisting of bliss on account of the repetition.5 That means : Brahman, which in the passage ' the Self con- sisting of bliss/ &c, is spoken of as the tail, the support, is designated as the principal matter (not as something subordinate). On account of the repetition ; for in the memorial doka, ' he becomes himself non-existing/ Brah- man alone is reiterated. ' If not, on account of the word denoting a modification ; not so, on account of abundance.' In this Sutra the word ' modification ' is meant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 20. 77

' If not, on account of the word denoting a modification ; not so, on account of abundance.' In this Sutra the word ' modification ' is meant to convey the sense of member. The objection that on account of

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 20. 77

the word 'tail/ which denotes a mere member, Brahman cannot be taken as the principal matter must be refuted. This we do by remarking that there is no difficulty, since a word denoting a member may be introduced into the passage on account of pra/hirya *. Pra^urya here means a phraseology abounding in terms denoting members. After the different members, beginning with the head and ending with the tail, of the Selfs, consisting of food, &c. have been enumerated, there are also mentioned the head and the other limbs of the Self of bliss, and then it is added, ' Brahman is the tail, the support; ' the intention being merely to intro- duce some more terms denoting members, not to convey the meaning of ' member,' (an explanation which is impos- sible) because the preceding Sutra already has proved Brahman (not to be a member, but) to be the principal matter. ' And because he is declared to be the cause of it.' That means : Brahman is declared to be the cause of the entire aggregate of effects, inclusive of the Self, consisting of bliss, in the following passage, ' He created all whatever there is ' (Taitt. Up. II, 6). And as Brahman is the cause, it cannot at the same time be called the member, in the literal sense of the word, of the Self of bliss, which is nothing but one of Brahman's effects. The other Sutras also (which refer to the Self of bliss2) are to be considered, as well as they may, as conveying a knowledge of Brahman, which (Brahman) is referred to in the passage about the tail.

20. The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on account of his qualities being declared 3.

The following passage is found in Scripture (Kh. Up. I, 6, 6 ff.), ' Now that person-bright as gold who is seen within ■»

1 I. e. the word translated hitherto by abundance.

2 See I, 1, 15-19.

3 The preceding adhikara^a had shown that the five Selfs (con- sisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates, are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities ; while that Brahman

78 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

3 The preceding adhikara^a had shown that the five Selfs (con- sisting of food, mind, and so on), which the Taitt. Up. enumerates, are introduced merely for the purpose of facilitating the cognition of Brahman considered as devoid of all qualities ; while that Brahman

78 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

the sun, with beard bright as gold and hair bright as gold, bright as gold altogether to the very tips of his nails, whose eyes are like blue lotus ; his name is Ut, for he has risen (udita) above all evil. He also who knows this rises above all evil. So much with reference to the devas.' And further on, with reference to the body, 'Now the person who is seen in the eye/ &c. Here the following doubt presents itself. Do these passages point out, as the object of devotion directed on the sphere of the sun and the eye, merely some special individual soul, which, by means of a large measure of knowledge and pious works, has raised itself to a position of eminence ; or do they refer to the eternally perfect highest Lord ?

The purvapakshin takes the former view. An individual soul, he says, is referred to, since Scripture speaks of a definite shape. To the person in the sun special features are ascribed, such as the possession of a beard as bright as gold and so on, and the same features manifestly belong to the person in the eye also, since they are expressly trans- ferred to it in the passage, ' The shape of this person is the same as the shape of that person.' That, on the other hand, no shape can be ascribed to the highest Lord, follows from the passage (Kau. Up. I, 3, 15), 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay.' That an individual soul is meant follows moreover from the fact that a definite abode is mentioned, ' He who is in the sun ; he who is in the eye.' About the highest Lord, who has no special abode, but abides in his own glory, no similar state- ment can be made ; compare, for instance, the two following passages, 'Where does he rest? In his own glory?' [Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1); and 'like the ether he is omnipresent, eternal.' A further argument for our view is supplied by the fact that the might (of the being in question) is said to be limited ; for the passage, ' He is lord of the worlds beyond that, and of the wishes of the devas,' indicates the

itself is the real object of knowledge. The present adhikara^a un- dertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents he savLresha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.

T ADHYAYA, I PADA, 20. 79

The present adhikara^a un- dertakes to show that the passage about the golden person represents he savLresha Brahman as the object of devout meditation.

T ADHYAYA, I PADA, 20. 79

limitation of the might of the person in the sun ; and the passage, ' He is lord of the worlds beneath that and of the wishes of men,' indicates the limitation of the might of the person in the eye. No limit, on the other hand, can be admitted of the might of the highest Lord, as appears from the passage (Brz. Up. IV, 4, 22), 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a boundary so that these worlds may not be confounded ; ' which passage intimates that the Lord is free from all limiting distinctions. For all these reasons the person in the eye and the sun cannot be the highest Lord.

To this reasoning the Sutra replies, ' The one within, on account of his qualities being declared.' The person referred to in the passages concerning the person within the sun and the person within the eye is not a trans- migrating being, but the highest Lord. Why? Because his qualities are declared. For the qualities of the highest Lord are indicated in the text as follows. At first the name of the person within the sun is mentioned — 'his name is Ut' — and then this name is explained on the ground of that person being free from all evil, ' He has risen above all evil.' The same name thus explained is then transferred to the person in the eye, in the clause, ' the name of the one is the name of the other.' Now, entire freedom from sin is attributed in Scripture to the highest Self only; so, for instance (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1), ' The Self which is free from sin,' &c. Then, again, there is the passage, ' He is Rik, he is Saman, Uktha, Ya^us, Brah- man,' which declares the person in the eye to be the Self of the Rik, Saman, and so on ; which is possible only if that person is the Lord who, as being the cause of all, is to be considered as the Self of all. Moreover, the text, after having stated in succession Rik and Saman to have earth and fire for their Self with reference to the Devas, and, again, speech and breath with reference to the body, continues, ' Rik and Saman are his joints,' with reference to the Devas, and ' the joints of the one are the joints of the other,' with reference to the body. Now this statement

8o VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.

Now this statement

8o VEDANTA-sfjTRAS.

also can be made only with regard to that which is the Self of all. Further, the passage, * Therefore all who sing to the Vina sing him, and from him also they obtain wealth,' shows that the being spoken of is the sole topic of all worldly songs ; which again holds true of the highest Lord only. That absolute command over the objects of worldly desires (as displayed, for instance, in the bestowal of wealth) entitles us to infer that the Lord is meant, appears also from the following passage of the Bhagavad- gita (X, 41), ' Whatever being there is possessing power, glory, or strength, know it to be produced from a portion of my energy1.' To the objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in the clauses, 'With a beard bright as gold,' &c, cannot refer to the highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases, assume a bodily shape formed of Maya, in order to gratify thereby his devout worshippers. Thus Smriti also says, ' That thou seest me, O Narada, is the Mdya emitted by me ; do not then look on me as endowed with the qualities of all beings.' We have further to note that expressions such as, 'That which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay,' are made use of where instruction is given about the nature of the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities ; while passages such as the following one, ' He to whom belong all works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes' (KA. Up. Ill, 14, a), which represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of him, who is the cause of everything, as possessing some of the qualities of his effects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage under discussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With reference to the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant because an abode is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of devout meditation, a special abode may be assigned to Brahman, although it abides in its own glory only ; for as Brahman is, like ether, all-pervading, it may be viewed as

1 So that the real giver of the gifts bestowed by princes on poets and singers is Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 22. 8l

being within the Self of all beings. The statement, finally, about the limitation of Brahman's might, which depends on the distinction of what belongs to the gods and what to the body, has likewise reference to devout meditation only. From all this it follows that the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun is the highest Lord.

21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the individual souls animating the sun, &c), on account of the declaration of distinc- tion.

From all this it follows that the being which Scripture states to be within the eye and the sun is the highest Lord.

21. And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the individual souls animating the sun, &c), on account of the declaration of distinc- tion.

There is, moreover, one distinct from the individual souls which animate the sun and other bodies, viz. the Lord who rules within; whose distinction (from all individual souls) is proclaimed in the following scriptural passage, ' He who dwells in the sun and within the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body the sun is, and who rules the sun within ; he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal ' (Brz. Up. Ill, 7, 9). Here the expression, ' He within the sun whom the sun does not know/ clearly indicates that the Ruler within is distinct from that cognising individual soul whose body is the sun. With that Ruler within we have to identify the person within the sun, according to the tenet of the sameness of purport of all Vedanta-texts. It thus remains a settled conclusion that the passage under dis- cussion conveys instruction about the highest Lord.

22. The aka^a, i. e. ether (is Brahman) on account of characteristic marks (of the latter being men- tioned).

In the KMndogya (I, 9) the following passage is met with, 'What is the origin of this world ? ' ' Ether,5 he replied. 'For all these beings take their rise from the ether only, and return into the ether. Ether is greater than these, ether is their rest.' — Here the following doubt arises. Does the word ' ether' denote the highest Brahman or the elemental ether? — Whence the doubt ? — Because the word is seen to be used in both senses. Its use in the sense of * elemental ether ' is well established in ordinary as well as in Vedic speech ; [34] G

82 vedAnta-s6tras.

and, on the other hand, we see that it is sometimes used to denote Brahman, viz. in cases where we ascertain, either from some complementary sentence or from the fact of special qualities being mentioned, that Brahman is meant. So, for instance, Taitt. Up. II, 7, ' If that bliss existed not in the ether;' and Kk. Up. VIII, 14, £a ^abdadaya^ pa^a pr/thivyadayai' ka da^a bhutamatra^ pa^a buddhindriyam pa^a buddhaya iti da^a pra^amatra^. Yadvd ^anendriyartha^ pa^a karmendriyartha^ kd. panketi da^a bhutamatrcU dvividhanindriyam pra^amatra dajeti bhava^. An. Gi.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3 1. IO5

Up. VIII, 14, £a ^abdadaya^ pa^a pr/thivyadayai' ka da^a bhutamatra^ pa^a buddhindriyam pa^a buddhaya iti da^a pra^amatra^. Yadvd ^anendriyartha^ pa^a karmendriyartha^ kd. panketi da^a bhutamatrcU dvividhanindriyam pra^amatra dajeti bhava^. An. Gi.

I ADHYAYA, I PADA, 3 1. IO5

individual soul is one with Brahman, are by no means out of place. That the Self which is active in speaking and the like is Brahman appears from another scriptural passage also, viz. Ke. Up. I, 5, ' That which is not expressed by speech and by which speech is expressed that alone know as Brahman, not that which people here adore.' The remark that the statement about the difference of pra/za and pra^a (contained in the passage, ' Together they dwell in this body, together they depart ') does not agree with that interpretation according to which pra/za is Brahman, is without force ; for the mind and the vital air which are the respective abodes of the two powers of cognition and action, and constitute the limiting conditions of the internal Self may be spoken of as different. The internal Self, on the other hand, which is limited by those twb adjuncts, is in itself non-differentiated, so that the two may be identified, as is done in the passage 'pra/za is pra^a.'

The second part of the Sutra is explained in a different manner also1, as follows : Characteristic marks of the individual soul as well as of the chief vital air are not out of place even in a chapter whose topic is Brahman. How so ? ' On account of the threefoldness of devout meditation.' The chapter aims at enjoining three kinds of devout meditation on Brahman, according as Brahman is viewed under the aspect of pra^a, under the aspect of pra^a, and in itself. The passages, ' Meditate (on me) as life, as immortality. Life is pra/za,' and ' Having laid hold of this body it makes it rise up. Therefore let man worship it alone as uktha,' refer to the pra^a aspect. The introductory passage, ' Now we shall explain how all things become one in that pra^/ta,' and the subsequent passages,' Speech verily milked one portion thereof; the word is its object placed outside ;' and, ' Having by pra^vza taken possession of speech he obtains by speech all words &c.,' refer to the pra^a. aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, ' These ten

1 Viz. by the vn'ttiMra.

1 06 VEDANTA-sflTRAS.

aspect. The Brahman aspect finally is referred to in the following passage, ' These ten

1 Viz. by the vn'ttiMra.

1 06 VEDANTA-sflTRAS.

objects have reference to pragnk, the ten subjects have reference to objects. If there were no objects there would be no subjects; and if there were no subjects there would be no objects. For on either side alone no- thing could be achieved. But that is not many. For as in a car the circumference of the wheel is set on the spokes and the spokes on the nave, thus are these objects set on the subjects and the subjects on the prtoa.' Thus we see that the one meditation on Brahman is here repre- sented as threefold, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to two limiting conditions or in itself. In other passages also we find that devout meditation on Brahman is made dependent on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts ; so, for instance (Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 2), ' He who consists of mind, whose body is pra^a.' The hypothesis of Brahman being meditated upon under three aspects perfectly agrees with the pra/za chapter1; as, on the one hand, from a comparison of the introductory and the concluding clauses we infer that the subject-matter of the whole chapter is one only, and as, on the other hand, we meet with characteristic marks of pra/za, pra^Yia, and Brahman in turns. It therefore remains a settled con- clusion that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.

1 Ihapi tad yugyate explaining the ' iha tadyogat ' of the Sutra.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, I. IO7

SECOND PADA.

Reverence to the highest Self!

In the first pada Brahman has been shown to be the cause of the origin, subsistence, and reabsorption of the entire world, comprising the ether and the other elements. More- over, of this Brahman, which is the cause of the entire world, certain qualities have (implicitly) been declared, such as all- pervadingness, eternity, omniscience, its being the Self of all, and so on. Further, by producing reasons showing that some words which are generally used in a different sense denote Brahman also, we have been able to determine that some passages about whose sense doubts are entertained refer to Brahman. Now certain other passages present themselves which because containing only obscure indica- tions of Brahman give rise to the doubt whether they refer to the highest Self or to something else. We therefore begin the second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points.

I. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) be- cause there is taught what is known from everywhere.

We therefore begin the second and third padas in order to settle those doubtful points.

I. (That which consists of mind is Brahman) be- cause there is taught what is known from everywhere.

Scripture says, ' All this indeed is Brahman, beginning, ending, and breathing in it ; thus knowing let a man meditate with calm mind. Now man is made of determination (kratu) ; according to what his determination is in this world so will he be when he has departed this life. Let him there- fore form this determination : he who consists of mind, whose body is breath (the subtle body),' &c. {Kh. Up. Ill, 14). Concerning this passage the doubt presents itself whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation, by means of attributes such as consisting of mind, &c, is the embodied (individual) soul or the highest Brahman.

The embodied Self, the purvapakshin says. — Why? — Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2),

I08 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

— Why? — Because the embodied Self as the ruler of the organs of action is well known to be connected with the mind and so on, while the highest Brahman is not, as is declared in several scriptural passages, so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2),

I08 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

' He is without breath, without mind, pure.' — But, it may be objected, the passage, ' All this indeed is Brahman,' mentions Brahman directly ; how then can you suppose that the embodied Self forms the object of meditation ? — This objec- tion does not apply, the purvapakshin rejoins, because the passage does not aim at enjoining meditation on Brahman, but rather at enjoining calmness of mind, the sense being : because Brahman is all this, ta^alan, let a man meditate with a calm mind. That is to say : because all this aggregate of effects is Brahman only, springing from it, ending in it, and breathing in it ; and because, as everything constitutes one Self only, there is no room for passion ; therefore a man is to meditate with a calm mind. And since the sentence aims at enjoining calmness of mind, it cannot at the same time enjoin meditation on Brahman1; but meditation is separately enjoined in the clause, ' Let him form the determination, i.e. reflection.' And thereupon the subsequent passage, ' He who consists of mind, whose body is breath/ &c. states the object of the meditation in words indicatory of the individual soul. For this reason we maintain that the meditation spoken of has the individual soul for its object. The other attributes also subsequently stated in the text, ' He to whom all works, all desires belong,5 &c. may rightly be held to refer to the individual soul. The attributes, finally, of being what abides in the heart and of being extremely minute which are mentioned in the pas- sage, ' He is my Self within the heart, smaller than a corn of rice, smaller than a corn of barley,' may be ascribed to the individual soul which has the size of the point of a goad, but not to the unlimited Brahman, If it be objected that the immediately following passage, i greater than the earth,' &c, cannot refer to something limited, we reply that smallness and greatness which are mutually opposite cannot indeed be ascribed to one and the same thing ; and that, if one attribute

1 The clause ' he is to meditate with a calm mind ' if taken as a gu^avidhi, i. e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin meditation ; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence (vakyabheda).

T ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. IO9

e. as enjoining some secondary matter, viz. calmness of mind of the meditating person, cannot at the same time enjoin meditation ; for that would involve a so-called split of the sentence (vakyabheda).

T ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2. IO9

only is to be ascribed to the subject of the passage, smallness is preferable because it is mentioned first ; while the great- ness mentioned later on may be attributed to the soul in so far as it is one with Brahman. If it is once settled that the whole passage refers to the individual soul, it follows that the declaration of Brahman also, contained in the passage, f That is Brahman ' (III, 14, 4), refers to the individual soul1, as it is clearly connected with the general topic. Therefore the individual soul is the object of meditation indicated by the qualities of consisting of mind and so on.

To all this we reply : The highest Brahman only is what is to be meditated upon as distinguished by the attributes of consisting of mind and so on. — Why ? — ' On account of there being taught here what is known from everywhere.' What is known from all Vedanta-passages to be the sense of the word Brahman, viz. the cause of the world, and what is mentioned here in the beginning words of the passage, (' all this indeed is Brahman,') the same we must assume to be taught here as distinguished by certain qualities, viz. consisting of mind and so on. Thus we avoid the fault of dropping the subject-matter under discussion and needlessly introducing a new topic. — But, it may be said, it has been shown that Brahman is, in the beginning of the passage, introduced merely for the purpose of intimating the injunc- tion of calmness of mind, not for the purpose of intimating Brahman itself. — True, we reply ; but the fact nevertheless remains that, where the qualities of consisting of mind, &c. are spoken of, Brahman only is proximate (i. e. mentioned not far off so that it may be concluded to be the thing referred to), while the individual soul is neither proximate nor intimated by any word directly pointing to it. The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.

2. And because the qualities desired to be ex- pressed are possible (in Brahman ; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

1 £ive*pi dehadibrz/tfhanag- ^yastvanyayad va brahmatety artha/2. An. Gi.

I I O VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.

The cases of Brahman and the individual soul are therefore not equal.

2. And because the qualities desired to be ex- pressed are possible (in Brahman ; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

1 £ive*pi dehadibrz/tfhanag- ^yastvanyayad va brahmatety artha/2. An. Gi.

I I O VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.

Although in the Veda which is not the work of man no wish in the strict sense can be expressed *, there being no speaker, still such phrases as 'desired to be expressed,' may- be figuratively used on account of the result, viz. (mental) comprehension. For just as in ordinary language we speak of something which is intimated by a word and is to be received (by the hearer as the meaning of the word), as ' desired to be expressed ; ' so in the Veda also whatever is denoted as that which is to be received is ' desired to be expressed,' everything else 'not desired to be expressed.' What is to be received as the meaning of a Vedic sentence, and what not, is inferred from the general purport of the passage. Those qualities which are here desired to be expressed, i. e. intimated as qualities to be dwelt on in meditation, viz. the qualities of having true purposes, &c. are possible in the highest Brahman ; for the quality of having true purposes may be ascribed to the highest Self which possesses unimpeded power over the creation, subsist- ence, and reabsorption of this world. Similarly the qualities of having true desires and true purposes are attributed to the highest Self in another passage, viz. the one beginning, 'The Self which is free from sin" {Kh. Up. VIII, 7, 1). The clause, ' He whose Self is the ether,' means ' he whose Self is like the ether;' for Brahman may be said to be like the ether on account of its omnipresence and other qualities. This is also expressed by the clause, ' Greater than the earth.' And the other explanation also, accord- ing to which the passage means 'he whose Self is the ether ' is possible, since Brahman which as the cause of the whole world is the Self of everything is also the Self of the ether. For the same reasons he is called ' he to whom all works belong, and so on.' Thus the qualities here intimated as topics of meditation agree with the nature of Brahman. We further maintain that the terms ' consisting of mind,' and ' having breath for its body,' which the purvapakshin asserts

1 The discussion is brought on by the term ' vivakshita ' in the Sutra whose meaning is 'expressed, aimed at/ but more literally ' desired to be expressed.'

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 3. Ill

Ill

cannot refer to Brahman, may refer to it. For as Brahman is the Self of everything, qualities such as consisting of mind and the like, which belong to the individual soul, belong to Brahman also. Accordingly vSruti and Smrzti say of Brahman, ' Thou art woman, thou art man ; thou art youth, thou art maiden ; thou as an old man totterest along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere ' (5ve. Up. IV, 3), and * its hands and feet are everywhere, its eyes and head are everywhere, its ears are everywhere, it stands encompassing all in the world ' (Bha. Gita III, 13).

The passage (quoted above against our view), ' Without breath, without mind, pure,' refers to the pure (unrelated) Brahman. The terms ' consisting of mind ; having breath for its body,' on the other hand, refer to Brahman as distinguished by qualities. Hence, as the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman, we conclude that the highest Brahman only is represented as the object of meditation.

3. On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c).

The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman ; the present Sutra states that they are not possible in the embodied Self. Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on ; not the em- bodied individual soul. For qualities such as expressed in the words, { He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,' cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self. By the term ' embodied ' (^arira) we have to understand ' residing5 in a body. If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body1, we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only ; for jruti declares him to be all-pervading ; compare, ' He is greater than the earth ; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.' The individual soul, on the other

1 Because he is vyapin.

112 VEDANTA-sflTRAS.

hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.

4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.

112 VEDANTA-sflTRAS.

hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.

4. And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.

The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent. In the passage, ' When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him ' {Kh. Up. Ill, 14, 4), the word ' him ' refers to that which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, &c, as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be obtained ; while the words, 4 1 shall obtain,' represent the meditating individual Self as the agent, i. e. the obtainer. Now, wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the same time. The relation existing between a person medi- tating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes. — And thus for the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

5. On account of the difference of words.

That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a difference of words.

That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter (5at. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), 'Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self.5 There one word, i. e. the locative ' in the Self,' denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative 'person/ denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of con- sisting of mind, &c. We therefrom conclude that the two are different.

6. And on account of Smrzti.

Smrzti also declares the difference of the embodied Self

I ADHYAVA, 2 PADA, 7. II3

and the highest Self, viz. Bha. Gita XVIII, 6r5'The Lord, O Ar^una, is seated in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.'

But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the preceding Sutras ? vSruti passages, as well as Smriti, expressly deny that there is any Self apart from the highest Self ; compare, for instance, Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 33, * There is no other seer but he ; there is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. GitA XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O Bh&rata, to be the kshetra^a in all kshetras.'

Up. Ill, 7, 33, * There is no other seer but he ; there is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. GitA XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O Bh&rata, to be the kshetra^a in all kshetras.'

True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body, the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of as if it were embodied. Simi- larly the ether, although in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self) the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically assumed, as long as we have not learned — from the passage, 'That art thou' — that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final release, and the like.

7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations of that (i. e. of minuteness) ; we say, no ; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and be- cause the case is analogous to that of ether.

On account of the limitation of its abode, which is men- tioned in the clause, ' He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, ' He is smaller than a grain of rice/ &c. ; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not [34] I

1 1 4 vedanta-s6tras.

; the embodied soul only, which is of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under discussion, and not [34] I

1 1 4 vedanta-s6tras.

the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the purva- paksha of Sutra I, and restated in the purvapaksha of the present Sutra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as omnipresent ; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of Ayodhya although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole earth. — But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to occupy a limited space and to be minute? — He may, we reply, be spoken of thus, ' because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under discus- sion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar qualities — which apprehension of the Lord is ren- dered possible through a modification of the mind — just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred stone called 5alagram. Although present everywhere, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is, moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether, although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle ; so Brahman also. But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special forms of con- templation, and are not real. The latter consideration dis- poses also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would follow that it is affected by all the imper- fections which attach to beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and so on.

8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman) ; we say, no ; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 8. II5

8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman) ; we say, no ; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 8. II5

But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the nature of intelligence and therefore not dif- ferent from the individual soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure, pain, and so on (as the indi- vidual soul). The same result follows from its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other knower but he' (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23), and similar pas- sages. Hence the highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory existence.

This is not so, we reply ; because there is a difference of nature. From the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is the dif- ference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on ; while the latter is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of more than one omni- present Self. In reply to the assertion, that because Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as, ' That art thou,' { I am Brahman/ ' There is no other knower but he,' and so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.

I 2

1 1 6 VEDANTA-S#TRAS.

Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.

I 2

1 1 6 VEDANTA-S#TRAS.

Scriptural texts, such as fthat art thou/ teach that Brahman which is free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel even the opinion that the em- bodied soul is subject to fruition ; how then should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the part of Brahman ? — Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.— In that case, we reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in con- sequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason the Sutrakara says1 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition on the part of Brahman ; because there is a difference. For there is a difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of fruition on Brahman's part.

9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as his food).

We read in the Ka/^avallf (I, 3, 25), ' Who then knows where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment ? ' This passage intimates, by means of the words ' food ' and ' condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that Upanished, the subjects of questions2.

1 Another interpretation of the later part of Sutra.

2 Cp. Ka/^a Up. I, 1, 13; 20; I, 2, 14.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, IO. I 1 7

The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from Scripture as well (cp. Bri. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater, according to the passage, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'

Up. Ill, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu. Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'

The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self ' because there is mentioned what is movable and what is immov- able.' For all things movable and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggre- gate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being the condiment ; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman) ; for it is well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. There- fore the eater can here be Brahman only.

10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to

1 1 8 vedanta-s6tras.

is moreover evident from the passage (Ka. Up. I, 3, 18), (' The knowing Self is not born, it dies not '), which shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then knows where he is/ shows that the cognition is connected with difficulties ; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.

ii. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the in- dividual soul and the highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature).

In the same Ka/^avalli we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i. e. the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light ; likewise those householders who perform the Tri;z&- kiketa, sacrifice/

e. the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light ; likewise those householders who perform the Tri;z&- kiketa, sacrifice/

Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i. e. the body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead — some saying he is ; others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand, the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul ; and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), ' That which thou seest as different from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the past and the future, tell me that.'

The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus

I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, II. II9

been stated, a caviller starts the following objection : neither of the stated views can be maintained. — Why ? — On account of the characteristic mark implied in the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i. e. to enjoy, the fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be main- tained ; for drinking (i. e. the fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

of the two being the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be main- tained ; for drinking (i. e. the fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that in phrases such as ' the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking,' the attri- bute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that, while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the agent — a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as ' the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the individual soul and the highest Self.

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as ' entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another interpretation is possible, to assume

1 20 VEDANTA-S$TRAS.

that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world of their good deeds ' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or bad works ; according to the scriptural passage, ' It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we con- clude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of. To this we make the following reply : — In the passage under discussion the individual soul (vi^anatman) and the highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature. For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are understood to be meant ; when, for instance, the order is given, ' Look out for a second (i. e. a fellow) for this bull,5 people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood ; for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the soul. — But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the cave ? — Well, we reply, jruti as well as smrz'ti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12), ' The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss ; ' Taitt. Up. II, 1, ' He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;' and, ' Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not contrary to reason to assign to the omni- present Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works, which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 12. 121

and shade also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like light and shade ; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by the two ' entered into the cave,' the individual soul and the highest Self. — Another reason for this interpretation follows.

12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

We therefore understand by the two ' entered into the cave,' the individual soul and the highest Self. — Another reason for this interpretation follows.

12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent passage (I, 3, 3), ' Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot/ which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and final release, while the passage (9), ' He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/zu,' repre- sents the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And fur- ther, the clause, f Those who know Brahman call them,' &c, which brings forward a special class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest Self.

The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1), 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant ; we therefore conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the passage, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is meant, and from

12 2 vedanta-s6tras.

the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of in- telligence, implied in the words, ' The other looks on without eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. { Merged into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence (antra), bewildered ; but when he sees the other Lord (Ira) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away/

In a subsequent mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. { Merged into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence (antra), bewildered ; but when he sees the other Lord (Ira) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away/

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra, ' Two birds inseparable/ &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the Paingi-rahasya Brahma^a. According to the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva ; the other being which looks on without eating, the individual soul {gna) ; so that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetra^a). The objection that the word sattva might denote the indi- vidual soul, and the word kshetra^a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words sattva and kshetra^a have the settled meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are, in the second place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Paingi-rahasya,) ' The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams ; the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetra^na ; the two are therefore the internal organ and the individual soul/ Nor does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying ; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the sawsara and is of the nature of Brahman, i. e. is pure intelligence ; as is evident from the clause, ' The other looks on without eating/ That agrees, moreover, with jruti and smrz'ti passages, such as, ' That art thou,' and ' Know me also to be the individual soul ' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the section, * These two are the sattva and the kshetra^vm ; to him indeed

I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 1 3. I 23

Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding passage of the section, * These two are the sattva and the kshetra^vm ; to him indeed

I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 1 3. I 23

who knows this no impurity attaches V — But how can, on the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i. e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, ' One of them eats the sweet fruit ? ' — The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. To that end2 the passage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul ; while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy ; not the former, because it is non-intelligent ; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agree- ment with what we have here maintained, Scripture (' For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other,' Brz. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical assump- tion of agents, and so on — comparable to the assumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream — holds good in the sphere of Nescience only ; while the pas- sage, ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another ? ' declares that all that practically postulated exist- ence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

1 Freedom from impurity can result only from the knowledge that the individual soul is in reality Brahman, The commentators explain ra^as by avidya\

2 Tadartham iti, ^ivasya brahmasiddhyartham iti yayat, ^aitany- aMayapanna dhiA sukhadina pari/zamata iti, tatra purusho*pi bhak- trz'tvam ivanubhavati na tattvata iti vaktum adhyaropayati, Ananda Giri.

124 vedanta-s6tras.

Scripture says, 'He spoke : The person that is seen in the eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides,' &c. [Kh. Up.

IV, 15, i).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

[Kh. Up.

IV, 15, i).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows : What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i. e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye of another) ; for of that it is well known that it is seen, and the clause, ' The person that is seen in the eye,5 refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual Self (cognitional Self, vi^anatman) which perceives the colours by means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and, moreover, the word ' Self (which occurs in the passage) favours this interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight ; compare the passage (Bri. Up. V, 5, 2), ' He (the person in the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person in the right eye).' More- over, qualities such as immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the scriptural passage) may some- how belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other hand 1i cannot be meant, because a particular locality is spoken of.

Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by the person within the eye. — Why? — ' On account of the agreement.' For the qualities men- tioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts as ' That

1 Who, somebody might say, is to be understood here, because immortality and similar qualities belong to him not somehow only, but in their true sense.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A 1 4. I 25

is the Self/ ' That art thou.' Immortality and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scrip- ture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the passage, ' Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the qualities of sa/^yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord only (Kk. Up. IV. 15, 2, 'They call him Sa^yadvama, for all blessings (vama) go towards him (sawyanti). He is also vamani, for he leads (nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati) in all worlds '). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the highest Lord.

14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

He is also vamani, for he leads (nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati) in all worlds '). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the highest Lord.

14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which is omnipresent like the ether? — To this question we reply that there would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were assigned to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so on, are attributed to him in the passage, ' He who dwells in the earth,' &c. (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, ' He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase ' and so on,' which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is assigned to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that also such things as name and form, although not appro- priate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it. That, in such passages as c His name is ut, he with the golden beard ' (Kh. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of, for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman

1 2 6 vedanta-sOtras.

a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not con- trary to reason 1 ; no more than to contemplate Vishnu in the sacred ^alagram.

15. And on account of the passage referring to that which is distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brah- man).

There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant in the passage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman being meant is established * by the reference to that which is distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter2, viz. in the clauses, ' Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brah- man,' that same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present passage also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion ; the clause, ' The teacher will tell you the way3,' merely announcing that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject will be started]. — How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the passage ? — We reply : On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. ' Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upako^ala says, ' I under- stand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, ' What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether. If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to qualify the sense of ' Kha/ we should conclude

If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to qualify the sense of ' Kha/ we should conclude

1 The /ikas say that the contents of this last sentence are hinted at by the word ' and ' in the Sutra.

2 I. e. at the beginning of the instruction which the sacred fires give to Upakorala, Kh, Up. IV, 10 ff.

3 Which words conclude the instruction given by the fires, and introduce the instruction given by the teacher, of which the passage ' the person that is seen in the eye/ &c. forms a part.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 5. 12J

that the name Brahman is here symbolically 1 given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure, If2 in the passage referred to (viz. ' Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second Brahman (i. e. the word Brahman in the clause ' Ka is Brahman ') were not added, and if the sentence would run ' Ka, Kha is Brahman/ the word Ka would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words — Ka as well as Kha — are joined with the word Brahman (' Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brah- man'). For the passage wishes to intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as some- thing in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, ' This is our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self; ' wherein they point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, ' The teacher will tell you the way ' (which form the last clause of the concluding passage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying, 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it ' (which words intervene between the concluding

1 A^rayantarapratyayasya^rayantare kshepaA pratika^, yatha brahma^abda^ paramatmavishayo namadishu kshipyate. Bha.

2 The following sentences give the reason why, although there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.

128 vedanta-s6tras.

Bha.

2 The following sentences give the reason why, although there is only one Brahman, the word Brahman is repeated.

128 vedanta-s6tras.

speech of the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires ; to represent it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of Sa^eyadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus knows passes on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, ' That person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'

1 6. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.

The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following reason also. From sruti as well as smrzti we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i. e. who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the gods, is described (Pra. Up. I, 10), ' Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest. From thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gita VIII, 2,4), ' Fire, light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Kk. Up. IV, 15, 5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to light;5 and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brah- man. Those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7. 1 29

17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self ; on account of the non-perma- nency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the im- possibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed to the other Selfs).

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 7. 1 29

17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self ; on account of the non-perma- nency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the im- possibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed to the other Selfs).

To the assertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cog- nitional Self (the individual soul) or the Self of some deity the following answer is given. — No other Self such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be assumed here, on account of non-permanency. — The reflected Self, in the first place, does not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The passage 'That person within the eye ' must, moreover, be held, on the ground of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye is the object of (that man's) devout medi- tation (and not the reflected image of his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then, another tnan approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) assumption that the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye. Scripture, moreover, (viz. Kh. Up. VIII, 9, 1, ' It (the reflected Self) perishes as soon as the body perishes/) declares the non-permanency of the reflected Self. — And, further, «on account of impossibility' (the person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be perceived in the reflected Self. — Of the cogni- tional Self, in the second place, which is in general con- nexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be [34] K

1 30 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be [34] K

1 30 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

spoken of as connected with particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already. The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it. Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the highest Self, still there are fictitiously ascribed to it (adhyclropita) the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz. mortality and fear ; so that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the sa^yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power (aLrvarya). — In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz. the sun) has its station in the eye — according to the scriptural passage, ' He rests with his rays in him ' — still Selfhood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva). Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the gods only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally belong to them ; as the mantra declares, ' From terror of it (Brahman) the wind blows, from terror the sun rises ; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.' — Hence the person in the eye must be viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known and established, which is contained in the words ' is seen ' (in the phrase ' the person that is seen in the eye '), has to be taken as referring to (the mental perception founded on) the ^astra which belongs to those who know ; and the glorification (of devout meditation) has to be understood as its purpose.

18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because the attributes of that (Brah- man) are designated.

In BW. Up. Ill, 7, 1 ff. we read, ' He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings/ and later on, ' He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8. 131

In BW. Up. Ill, 7, 1 ff. we read, ' He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings/ and later on, ' He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8. 131

the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling within, rules with reference to the gods, the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the beings, the Self. — Here now, owing to the unusualness of the term (antar- yamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self of some deity which presides over the gods and so on, or some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powTers, such as, for instance, the capability of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being. What alternative then does recommend itself?

As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must assume that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all those mentioned above. — Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we have no right to assume something of an altogether indefinite character, and that, on the other hand, the term antarya- min— which is derived from antaryamana (ruling within)— cannot be called altogether unknown, that therefore antar- yamin may be assumed to denote some god presiding over the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (Brz. Up. Ill, 9, 16), ' He whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,' &c. A god of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action ; rulership is there- fore rightly ascribed to him. — Or else the rulership spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable to enter within all things. — The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are required for ruling).

To this we make the following reply. — The internal ruler, of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the gods, must be the highest Self, cannot be anything else. — Why so ? — Because its qualities are designated in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate

K 2

132 vedanta-sGtras.

— Why so ? — Because its qualities are designated in the passage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the gods, and so on, is an appropriate

K 2

132 vedanta-sGtras.

attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things. — The qualities of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the passage, ' He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their primary sense to the highest Self. — Further, the passage, * He whom the earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity ; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth. — The attributes 'unseen,' 'unheard/ also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible qualities. — The objection that the highest Self is destitute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules. — If it should be objected that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual soul] we are driven to assume again another and another ruler ad infinitum ; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no other ruler (but the highest Self1). The objection would be valid only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing. — For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self*

19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Smrzti assumes, (viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not belonging to it.

Good so far, a S&nkhya opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of not being seen, &c, belong also to the pradhana assumed by the S&nkhya-smrzti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. For their

1 According to Scripture, Nimtikusam sarvaniyantritva;# jrautaw na ka tadrke sarvaniyantari bhedo na Mnumanazft jrutibhaditam uttish/^ati. Ananda Giri. Or else, as Go. An. remarks, we may ex- plain : as the highest Self is not really different from the individual soul. So also Bhamati : Na Hnavastha, na hi niyantrantara;/* tena niyamyate kizrc tu yo givo niyanta lokasiddha^ sa paramatmevo- padhyava^^edakalpitabheda^.

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 20. 1 33

Smrzti says, ' Undiscoverable, unknowable, as if wholly in sleep ' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects. Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana. The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra 1, 1, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana. The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra 1, 1, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies that the word i internal ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the Sankhyas admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural passage which forms the complement to the passage about the internal ruler (Br/. Up. Ill, 7, 23) says expressly, ' Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' —And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradhana.

Well, then, if the term ' internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing ; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (indi- vidual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows ; which is internal (pratya/?£), and there- fore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c, belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural passages also, as, for instance (Brt. Up. Ill, 4, 2), ' Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.5 The individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the embodied soul.— To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.

20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be under- stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e. both

1 34 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

recensions of the Brzhad Ara^yaka) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).

20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be under- stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i. e. both

1 34 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

recensions of the Brzhad Ara^yaka) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).

The word ( not ' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c, belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both .r&kh&s, i. e. the Ka^vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as constituting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/zvas read (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 33), 'He who dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, ' He who dwells in the Self/ If the latter reading is adopted, the word ' Self ' denotes the individual soul ; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word £ knowledge ; ' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term ' internal ruler.' — But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him? — Why— we ask in return — should that be impossible? — Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural passages, such as, ' There is no other seer but he,' &c, which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under dis- cussion.— May, we rejoin, that passage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler? — No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.)

We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's objection. — The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, pre- sented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 1 35

— The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, pre- sented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the

I ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 1 35

Self within is one only ; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two ; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those scriptural passages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for per- ception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance with this, the scriptural passage, ' Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience ; while the subsequent passage, * But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.

21. That which possesses the attributes of invisi- bility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.

Scripture says, ' The higher knowledge is this by which the Indestructible is apprehended. That which cannot be seen nor seized, which is without origin and qualities, without eyes and ears, without hands and feet, the eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, infinitesimal, that which is im- perishable, that it is which the wise regard as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, i, 5 ; 6). — Here the doubt arises whether the source of all beings which is spoken of as characterised by invisibility, &c. be the pradhana, or the embodied soul, or the highest Lord.

We must, the purvapakshin says, understand by the source of all beings the non-intelligent pradhana because (in the passage immediately subsequent to the one quoted) only non-intelligent beings are mentioned as parallel in- stances. 'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the Indestructible.5 — But, it

136 vedAnta-s^tras.

'As the spider sends forth and draws in its thread, as plants grow on the earth, as from the living man hairs spring forth on the head and the body, thus everything arises here from the Indestructible.5 — But, it

136 vedAnta-s^tras.

may be objected, men and spiders which are here quoted as parallel instances are of intelligent nature. — No, the purvapakshin replies; for the intelligent being as such is not the source of the threads and the hair, but everybody knows that the non-intelligent body of the spider ruled by intelligence is the source of the threads ; and so in the case of man also. — While, moreover, in the case of the preceding Sutra, the pradhana hypothesis could not be accepted, because, although some qualities mentioned, such as invisibility and so on, agreed with it, others such as being the seer and the like did not; we have here to do only with attributes such as invisibility which agree with the pradhina, no attribute of a contrary nature being men- tioned.— But the qualities mentioned in the complementary passage (Mu. Up. I, 1,9), c He who knows all and perceives all,' do not agree with the non-intelligent pradhana; how, then, can the source of all beings be interpreted to mean the pradhana ? — To this the purvapakshin replies : The passage, ' The higher knowledge is that by which the Indestructible is apprehended, that which cannot be seen/ &c, points, by means of the term ' the Indestructible/ to the source of all beings characterised by invisibility and similar attributes. This same * Indestructible ' is again mentioned later on in the passage, ' It is higher than the high Imperishable/ Now that which in this latter passage is spoken of as higher than the Imperishable may possess the qualities of knowing and perceiving everything, while the pradh&na denoted by the term ' the Imperishable ' is the source of all beings. — If, however, the word * source' (yoni) be taken in the sense of operative cause, we may by ' the source of the beings ' understand the embodied Self also, which, by means of merit and demerit, is the cause of the origin of the complex of things.

To this we make the following reply. — That which here is spoken of as the source of all beings, distinguished by such qualities as invisibility and so on, can be the highest Lord only, nothing else. — Whereupon is this conclusion founded ? — On the statement of attributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving/ clearly states an

I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 21. I 37

— Whereupon is this conclusion founded ? — On the statement of attributes. For the clause, 'He who is all-knowing, all-perceiving/ clearly states an

I ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 21. I 37

attribute belonging to the highest Lord only, since the attributes of knowing all and perceiving all cannot be predicated either of the non-intelligent pradhana or the embodied soul whose power of sight is narrowed by its limiting conditions. To the objection that the qualities of knowing and perceiving all are, in the passage under discussion, attributed to that which is higher than the source of all beings — which latter is denoted by the term 'the Imperishable' — not to the source itself, we reply that this explanation is inadmissible because the source of all beings, which — in the clause, ' From the Indestructible every- thing here arises '—is designated as the material cause of all created beings, is later on spoken of as all-knowing, and again as the cause of all created beings, viz. in the passage (I, 1,9), ' From him who knows all and perceives all, whose brooding consists of knowledge, from him is born that Brahman, name, form, and food.' As therefore the Indestructible which forms the general topic of dis- cussion is, owing to the identity of designation, recognised (as being referred to in the later passage also), we understand that it is the same Indestructible to which the attributes of knowing and perceiving all are ascribed. — We further maintain that also the passage, ' Higher than the high Imperishable,' does not refer to any being different from the imperishable source of all beings which is the general topic of discussion. We conclude this from the circum- stance that the passage, 'He truly told that knowledge of Brahman through which he knows the imperishable true person/ (I, 2, 13; which passage leads on to the passage about that which is higher than the Imperishable,) merely declares that the imperishable source of all beings, distinguished by invisibility and the like — which formed the subject of the preceding chapter — will be discussed. The reason why that imperishable source is called higher than the high Imperishable, we shall explain under the next Sutra. — Moreover, two kinds of knowledge are enjoined there (in the Upanishad), a lower and a higher one. Of the lower one it is said that it comprises the Rig-veda. and so on, and then the text continues, ' The higher knowledge

1 3 8 VED ANTA-S £eti, ^ivasyadrzsh/advara dyubhvadinimittatve*pi na sakshat tadayatanatvam aupadhikatvenavibhutvad ity artha^. Ananda Giri.

2 It would not have been requisite to introduce a special Sutra

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. J 59

accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the follow- ing reason also.

5. On account of the declaration of difference.

Ananda Giri.

2 It would not have been requisite to introduce a special Sutra

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. J 59

accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c. for the follow- ing reason also.

5. On account of the declaration of difference.

The passage 'Know him alone as the Self moreover implies a declaration of difference, viz. of the difference of the object of knowledge and the knower. Here the indi- vidual soul as being that which is desirous of release is the knower, and consequently Brahman, which is denoted by the word ' self and represented as the object of knowledge, is understood to be the abode of heaven, earth, and so on. — For the following reason also the individual soul cannot be accepted as the abode of heaven, earth, &c.

6. On account of the subject-matter.

The highest Self constitutes the subject-matter (of the entire chapter), as we see from the passage, ' Sir, what is that through which, when it is known, everything else becomes known ? ' (Mu. Up. 1, 1, 3), in which the knowledge of everything is declared to be dependent on the knowledge of one thing. For all this (i. e. the entire world) becomes known if Brahman the Self of all is known, not if only the individual soul is known. — Another reason against the individual soul follows.

7. And on account of the two conditions of stand- ing and eating (of which the former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the latter of the individual soul).

With reference to that which is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on, the text says, 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. (Mu. Up. Ill, 1, 1). This passage describes the two states of mere standing, i. e. mere presence, and of eating, the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,5 refer- ring to the eating, i.e. the fruition of the results of works,

for the individual soul — which, like the air, is already excluded by the preceding Sutra — if it were not for the new argument brought forward in the following Sutra which applies to the individual soul only.

l60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

the fruition of the results of works,

for the individual soul — which, like the air, is already excluded by the preceding Sutra — if it were not for the new argument brought forward in the following Sutra which applies to the individual soul only.

l60 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

and the clause, ' The other one looks on without eating/ describing the condition of mere inactive presence. The two states described, viz. of mere presence on the one hand and of enjoyment on the other hand, show that the Lord and the individual soul are referred to. Now there is room for this statement which represents the Lord as separate from the individual soul, only if the passage about the abode of heaven and earth likewise refers to the Lord ; for in that case only there exists a continuity of topic. On any other supposition the second passage would contain a statement about something not connected with the general topic, and would therefore be entirely uncalled for. — But, it may be objected, on your interpretation also the second passage makes an uncalled-for statement, viz. in so far as it represents the individual soul as separate from the Lord. — Not so, we reply. It is nowhere the purpose of Scripture to make statements regarding the individual soul. From ordinary experience the individual soul, which in the different individual bodies is joined to the internal organs and other limiting adjuncts, is known to every one as agent and enjoyer, and we therefore must not assume that it is that which Scripture aims at setting forth. The Lord, on the other hand, about whom ordinary experience tells us nothing, is to be considered as the special topic of all scriptural passages, and we therefore cannot assume that any passage should refer to him merely casually \ —

1 If the individual soul were meant by the abode of heaven, earth, &c, the statement regarding Irvara made in the passage about the two birds would be altogether abrupt, and on that ground objectionable. The same difficulty does not present itself with regard to the abrupt mention of the individual soul which is well known to everybody, and to which therefore casual allusions may be made. — I subjoin Ananda Giri's commentary on the entire pas- sage: (rivasyopadhyaikyenavivakshitatvat tad^ane^pi sarva^ana- siddhes tasyayatanatvadyabhave hetvantaraw va/fcyam ity a^ahkya sutreraa pariharati kuta^etyadina. Tad vya/£ash/e dyubhvaditi. Nirde^am eva darcayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham aha tabhyazrc £eti. Sthitye.fvarasyadanag' £tvasa#zgrahe*pi katham fovarasyaiva virva- yatanatva#z tadaha yaditi. Lrvarasyayanatvenaprakr/tatve ^ivapr/-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. l6l

Tad vya/£ash/e dyubhvaditi. Nirde^am eva darcayati tayor iti. Vibhaktyartham aha tabhyazrc £eti. Sthitye.fvarasyadanag' £tvasa#zgrahe*pi katham fovarasyaiva virva- yatanatva#z tadaha yaditi. Lrvarasyayanatvenaprakr/tatve ^ivapr/-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 7. l6l

That the mantra ' two birds,' &c. speaks of the Lord and the individual soul we have already shown under I, 2, 11, —And if, according to the interpretation given in the Paingi- upanishad (and quoted under I, 2, 11), the verse is under- stood to refer to the internal organ (sattva) and the individual soul (not to the individual soul and the Lord), even then there is no contradiction (between that interpre- tation and our present averment that the individual soul is not the abode of heaven and earth). — How so? — Here (i. e. in the present Sutra and the Sutras immediately- preceding) it is denied that the individual soul which, owing to its imagined connexion with the internal organ and other limiting adjuncts, has a separate existence in separate bodies — its division being analogous to the division of universal space into limited spaces such as the spaces within jars and the like — is that which is called the abode of heaven and earth. That same soul, on the other hand, which exists in all bodies, if considered apart from the limit- ing adjuncts, is nothing else but the highest Self. Just as the spaces within jars, if considered apart from their limiting conditions, are merged in universal space, so the individual soul also is incontestably that which is denoted as the abode of heaven and earth, since it (the soul) cannot really be separate from the highest Self. That it is not the abode of heaven and earth, is therefore said of the indi- vidual soul in so far only as it imagines itself to be con- nected with the internal organ and so on. Hence it follows that the highest Self is the abode of heaven, earth, and so on. — The same conclusion has already been arrived at under I, 2, 21 ; for in the passage concerning the source of all beings (which passage is discussed under the Sutra quoted) we meet with the clause, ' In which heaven and

thakkathananupapattir ity uktam eva vyatirekadvaraha anyatheti. Givasyayatanatvenaprakrz'tatve tulyanupapattir iti ^ahkate nanviti. Tasyaikyarthaw lokasiddhasyanuvadatvan naivam ity aha neti. Gfvasyapurvatvabhavena^ratipadyatvam eva praka/ayati kshetra^o hlti. Irvarasyapi lokavadisiddhatvad apratipadyatety ajahkyaha uvaras tv iti.

[34] M

1 6 2 VEDANTA-sdTRAS.

earth and the sky are woven/ In the present adhikara^a the subject is resumed for the sake of further elucidation.

8. The bhtiman (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is additional to that about the state of deep sleep (i. e. the vital air which remains awake even in the state of deep sleep).

8. The bhtiman (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is additional to that about the state of deep sleep (i. e. the vital air which remains awake even in the state of deep sleep).

We read (Kk. Up. VII, 23; 34), 'That which is much (bhuman) we must desire to understand. — Sir, I desire to understand it. — Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is what is much (bhuman). Where one sees something else, hears something else, under- stands something else, that is the Little.' — Here the doubt arises whether that which is much is the vital air (pr&zza) or the highest Self. — Whence the doubt? — The word ' bhuman,' taken by itself, means the state of being much, according to its derivation as taught by Pacini, VI, 4, 158. Hence there is felt the want of a specification showing what con- stitutes the Self of that muchness. Here there presents itself at first the approximate passage, ' The vital air is more than hope ' (Kk. Up. VII, 15, 1), from which we may conclude that the vital air is bhuman. — On the other hand, we meet at the beginning of the chapter, where the general topic is stated, with the following passage, ' I have heard from men like you that he who knows the Self overcomes grief. I am in grief. Do, Sir, help me over this grief of mine ; ' from which passage it would appear that the bhuman is the highest Self. — Hence there arises a doubt as to which of the two alternatives is to be embraced, and which is to be set aside.

The purvapakshin maintains that the bhuman is the vital air, since there is found no further series of questions and answers as to what is more. For while we meet with a series of questions and answers (such as, ' Sir, is there something which is more than a name?' — ' Speech is more than name.'— ' Is there something which is more than speech ? ' — ' Mind is more than speech '), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet with a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital air (such as, ' Is there something

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 8. 1 6

3

' — ' Mind is more than speech '), which extends from name up to vital air, we do not meet with a similar question and answer as to what might be more than vital air (such as, ' Is there something

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 8. 1 6

3

which is more than vital air ? ' — ' Such and such a thing is more than vital air '). The text rather at first declares at length (in the passage, 'The vital air is more than hope,' &c.) that the vital air is more than all the members of the series from name up to hope; it then acknowledges him who knows the vital air to be an ativadin, i. e. one who makes a statement surpassing the preceding statements (in the passage, ' Thou art an ativadin. He may say I am an ati- vadin ; he need not deny it ') ; and it thereupon (in the passage, 'But he in reality is an ativadin who declares something beyond by means of the True'1), — not leaving off, but rather continuing to refer to the quality of an ativadin which is founded on the vital air, — proceeds, by means of the series beginning with the True, to lead over to the bhuman; so that we conclude the meaning to be that the vital air is the bhuman. — But, if the bhuman is interpreted to mean the vital air, how have we to explain the passage in which the bhuman is characterised, ' Where one sees nothing else?' &c. — As, the purvapakshin replies, in the state of deep sleep we observe a cessation of all activity, such as seeing, &c, on the part of the organs merged in the vital air, the vital air itself may be charac- terised by a passage such as, ' Where one sees nothing else.' Similarly, another scriptural passage (Pra. Up. IV, % ; 3) de- scribes at first (in the words, ' He does not hear, he does not see,5 &c.) the state of deep sleep as characterised by the cessa- tion of the activity of all bodily organs, and then by declaring that in that state the vital air, with its five modifications, remains awake (' The fires of the pra^as are awake in that town '), shows the vital air to occupy the principal position in the state of deep sleep. — That passage also, which speaks of the bliss of the bhuman (' The bhuman is bliss,' Kh. Up. VII, 23), can be reconciled with our explanation, because Pra. Up. IV, 6 declares bliss to attach to the state of deep sleep (' Then that god sees no dreams and at that time that happiness arises in his body ').— Again, the statement, 'The bhuman is immortality' (Kh. Up. VII, 34, 1), may

1 As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle ' but '* introducing the sentence ' but he in reality/ &c.

M 2

1 64 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

Up. VII, 34, 1), may

1 As might be the prima facie conclusion from the particle ' but '* introducing the sentence ' but he in reality/ &c.

M 2

1 64 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

likewise refer to the vital air ; for another scriptural passage says, ' Pra^a is immortality ' (Kau. Up. Ill, 3). — But how can the view according to which the bhuman is the vital air be reconciled with the fact that in the beginning of the chapter the knowledge of the Self is represented as the general topic (' He who knows the Self overcomes grief,5 &c.) ? — By the Self there referred to, the purvapakshin replies, nothing else is meant but the vital air. For the passage, ' The vital air is father, the vital air is mother, the vital air is brother, the vital air is sister, the vital air is teacher, the vital air is Brahma/za' (Kh. Up. VII, 15, i), represents the vital air as the Self of everything. As, moreover, the passage, * As the spokes of a wheel rest in the nave, so all this rests in pra/za,' declares the pra;za to be the Self of all — by means of a comparison with the spokes and the nave of a wheel — the pra^a may be conceived under the form of bhuman, i. e. plenitude. — Bhuman, therefore, means the vital air.

To this we make the following reply. — Bhuman can mean the highest Self only, not the vital air. — Why? — ' On account of information being given about it, subsequent to bliss/ The word ' bliss ' (samprasada) means the state of deep sleep, as may be concluded, firstly, from the etymology of the word ('In it he, i.e. man, is altogether pleased— samprasi- dati')— and, secondly, from the fact of samprasada being mentioned in the Brzhadara/zyaka together with the state of dream and the waking state. And as in the state of deep sleep the vital air remains awake, the word ' sampra- sada ' is employed in the Sutra to denote the vital air ; so that the Sutra means, 'on account of information being given about the bhuman, subsequently to (the informa- tion given about) the vital air.5 If the bhuman were the vital air itself, it would be a strange proceeding to make statements about the bhuman in addition to the statements about the vital air. For in the preceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement about name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i. e. the text does not say ' name is more than name '), but after something has been said about name, a new statement is

i adhyAya, 3 pada, 8. 165

For in the preceding passages also we do not meet, for instance, with a statement about name subsequent to the previous statement about name (i. e. the text does not say ' name is more than name '), but after something has been said about name, a new statement is

i adhyAya, 3 pada, 8. 165

made about speech, which is something different from name (i. e. the text says, ' Speech is more than name '), and so on up to the statement about vital air, each subsequent state- ment referring to something other than the topic of the preceding one. We therefore conclude that the bhuman also, the statement about which follows on the statement about the vital air, is something other than the vital air. — But — it may be objected — we meet here neither with a ques- tion, such as, ' Is there something more than vital air ? ' nor with an answer, such as, ' That and that is more than vital air.5 How, then, can it be said that the information about the bhuman is given subsequently to the information about the vital air ? — Moreover, we see that the circumstance of being an ativaldin, which is exclusively connected with the vital air, is referred to in the subsequent passage (viz. ' But in reality he is an ativadin who makes a statement surpassing (the preceding statements) by means of the True '). There is thus no information additional to the information about the vital air. — To this objection we reply that it is impos- sible to maintain that the passage last quoted merely con- tinues the discussion of the quality of being an ativadin, as con- nected with the knowledge of the vital air; since the clause, * He who makes a statement surpassing, &c. by means of the True/ states a specification. — But, the objector resumes, this very statement of a specification may be explained as referring to the vital air. If you ask how, we refer you to an analogous case. If somebody says, ' This Agnihotrin speaks the truth,' the meaning is not that the quality of being an Agnihotrin depends on speaking the truth ; that quality rather depends on the (regular performance of the) agnihotra only, and speaking the truth is mentioned merely as a special attribute of that special Agnihotrin. So our passage also (' But in reality he is an ativadin who makes a statement, &c. by means of the True ') does not intimate that the quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth, but merely expresses that speaking the truth is a special attribute of him who knows the vital air ; while the quality of being an ativ&din must be con- sidered to depend on the knowledge of the vital air. — This

1 66 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

— This

1 66 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

objection we rebut by the remark that it involves an aban- donment of the direct meaning of the sacred text. For from the text, as it stands, we understand that the quality of being an ativadin depends on speaking the truth ; the sense being : An ativadin is he who is an ativadin by means of the True. The passage does not in anyway contain a eulogisation of the knowledge of the vital air. It could be connected with the latter only on the ground of general subject-matter (prakara^a) 1; which would involve an abandonment of the di- rect meaning of the text in favour of prakara^a2. — Moreover, the particle but (' But in reality he is,' &c), whose purport is to separate (what follows) from the subject-matter of what precedes, would not agree (with the pra^a explanation). The following passage also, c But we must desire to know the True' (VII, 16), which presupposes a new effort, shows that a new topic is going to be entered upon. — For these reasons we have to consider the statement about the ati- vadin in the same light as we should consider the remark — made in a conversation which previously had turned on the praise of those who study one Veda — that he who studies the four Vedas is a great Brahma^a ; a remark which we should understand to be laudatory of persons different from those who study one Veda, i.e. of those who study all the four Vedas. Nor is there any reason to assume that a new topic can be introduced in the form of question and answer only ; for that the matter propounded forms a new topic is sufficiently clear from the circumstance that no connexion can be established between it and the preceding topic. The succession of topics in the chapter under discussion is as follows: Narada at first listens to the instruction which Sanatkumara gives him about various matters, the last of which is Pra^a, and then becomes silent. Thereupon Sanatkumara explains to him spontaneously (without being

1 It being maintained that the passage referred to is to be viewed in connexion with the general subject-matter of the preceding part of the chapter.

2 And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle of the Mima^sl

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 8. 1 67

2 And would thus involve a violation of a fundamental principle of the Mima^sl

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 8. 1 67

asked) that the quality of being an ativadin, if merely based on the knowledge of the vital air — which knowledge has for its object an unreal product, — is devoid of substance, and that he only is an ativadin who is such by means of the True. By the term 'the True' there is meant the highest Brahman ; for Brahman is the Real, and it is called the ' True ' in another scriptural passage also, viz. Taitt. Up. II, 1, ' The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Narada, thus enlightened, starts a new line of enquiry ('Might I, Sir, become an ativadin by the True?') and Sanatkumara then leads him, by a series of instrumental steps, beginning with understanding, up to the knowledge of bhuman. We therefrom conclude that the bhuman is that very True whose explanation had been promised in addition to the (knowledge of the) vital air. We thus see that the instruction about the bhuman is additional to the instruction about the vital air, and bhuman must therefore mean the highest Self, which is different from the vital air. With this interpretation the initial statement, according to which the enquiry into the Self forms the general subject- matter, agrees perfectly well. The assumption, on the other hand (made by the purvapakshin), that by the Self we have here to understand the vital air is indefensible. For, in the first place, Self-hood does not belong to the vital air in any non-figurative sense. In the second place, cessation of grief cannot take place apart from the knowledge of the highest Self; for, as another scriptural passage declares, 'There is no other path to go' (vSVet. Up. VI, 15). Moreover, after we have read at the outset, ' Do, Sir, lead me over to the other side of grief ' (Kh. Up. VII, 1, 3), we meet with the following concluding words (VII, 26, 2), ' To him, after his faults had been rubbed out, the venerable Sanatkumara showed the other side of darkness/ The term ' darkness ' here denotes Nescience, the cause of grief, and so on. — Moreover, if the instruction terminated with the vital air, it would not be said of the latter that it rests on something else. But the brahma^a (Kk. Up. VII, 26, 1) does say, ' The vital air springs from the Self.' Nor can it be objected against this last argument that the concluding

1 68 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

part of the chapter may refer to the highest Self, while, all the same, the bhuman (mentioned in an earlier part of the chapter) may be the vital air. For, from the passage (VII, 24, i), (' Sir, in what does the bhuman rest? In its own greatness,' Sec), it appears that the bhuman forms the con- tinuous topic up to the end of the chapter. — The quality of being the bhuman — which quality is plenitude — agrees, moreover, best with the highest Self, which is the cause of everything.

9. And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned in the text).

— The quality of being the bhuman — which quality is plenitude — agrees, moreover, best with the highest Self, which is the cause of everything.

9. And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned in the text).

The attributes, moreover, which the sacred text ascribes to the bhuman agree well with the highest Self. The passage, ' Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the bhuman/ gives us to understand that in the bhuman the ordinary activities of seeing and so on are absent ; and that this is characteristic of the highest Self, we know from another scriptural passage, viz. ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another ? ' Sec. (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 15). What is said about the absence of the activities of seeing and so on in the state of deep sleep (Pra. Up. IV, 2) is said with the intention of declaring the non-attachedness of the Self, not of describing the nature of the pra/za ; for the highest Self (not the vital air) is the topic of that passage. The bliss also of which Scripture speaks as connected with that state is mentioned only in order to show that bliss constitutes the nature of the Self. For Scripture says (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 32), ' This is his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small por- tion of that bliss.' — The passage under discussion also (' The bhuman is bliss. There is no bliss in that which is little (limited). The bhuman only is bliss') by denying the reality of bliss on the part of whatever is perishable shows that Brahman only is bliss as bhuman, i. e. in its plenitude. — Again, the passage, 'The bhuman is immor- tality/ shows that the highest cause is meant ; for the immortality of all effected things is a merely relative one,

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, IO. 1 69

and another scriptural passage says that 'whatever is different from that (Brahman) is perishable' (Br/. Up. Ill, 4, 2). — Similarly, the qualities of being the True, and of resting in its own greatness, and of being omnipresent, and of being the Self of everything which the text mentions (as belonging to the bhuman) can belong to the highest Self only, not to anything else. — By all this it is proved that the bhuman is the highest Self.

10. The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting (all things) up to ether.

We read (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 7 ; 8), ' In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof? — He said: O G&rgi, the Br&hma^as call this the akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. — Here the doubt arises whether the word ' akshara ' means ' syllable ' or 'the highest Lord.'

Up. Ill, 8, 7 ; 8), ' In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof? — He said: O G&rgi, the Br&hma^as call this the akshara (the Imperishable). It is neither coarse nor fine,' and so on. — Here the doubt arises whether the word ' akshara ' means ' syllable ' or 'the highest Lord.'

The purvapakshin maintains that the word 'akshara' means ' syllable ' merely, because it has, in such terms as akshara-samamnaya, the meaning of ' syllable ; ' because we have no right to disregard the settled meaning of a word ; and because another scriptural passage also (' The syllable Om is all this,' Kk. Up. II, 23,4) declares a syllable, repre- sented as the object of devotion, to be the Self of all.

To this we reply that the highest Self only is denoted by the word 'akshara.' — Why? — Because it (the akshara) is said to support the entire aggregate of effects, from earth up to ether. For the sacred text declares at first that the entire aggregate of effects beginning with earth and differ- entiated by threefold time is based on ether, in which it is 'woven like warp and woof; ' leads then (by means of the question, ' In what then is the ether woven, like warp and woof? ') over to the akshara, and, finally, concludes with the words, ' In that akshara then, O G&rgi, the ether is woven, like warp and woof.' — Now the attribute of supporting everything up to ether cannot be ascribed to any being but Brahman. The text (quoted from the Kk. Up.) says indeed that the syllable Om is all this, but that statement

1 70 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

is to be understood as a mere glorification of the syllable Om considered as a means to obtain Brahman. — Therefore we take akshara to mean either ' the Imperishable' or 'that which pervades ; ' on the ground of either of which explana- tions it must be identified with the highest Brahman.

But — our opponent resumes— while we must admit that the above reasoning holds good so far that the circum- stance of the akshara supporting all things up to ether is to be accepted as a proof of all effects depending on a cause, we point out that it may be employed by those also who declare the pradhana to be the general cause. How then does the previous argumentation specially establish Brah- man (to the exclusion of the pradhana) ? — The reply to this is given in the next Sutra.

11. This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).

The supporting of all things up to ether is the work of the highest Lord only. — Why? — On account of the command. — For the sacred text speaks of a command (; By the command of that akshara, O Gargi,sunand moon stand apart!' 111,8,9), and command can be the work of the highest Lord only, not of the non-intelligent pradhana. For non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to their effects, such as jars and the like.

For non-intelligent causes such as clay and the like are not capable of command, with reference to their effects, such as jars and the like.

12. And on account of (Scripture) separating (the akshara) from that whose nature is different (from Brahman).

Also on account of the reason stated in this Sutra Brahman only is to be considered as the Imperishable, and the supporting of all things up to ether is to be looked upon as the work of Brahman only, not of anything else. The meaning of the Sutra is as follows. Whatever things other than Brahman might possibly be thought to be denoted by the term ' akshara,5 from the nature of all those things Scripture separates the akshara spoken of as the

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 3. 171

support of all things up to ether. The scriptural passage alluded to is III, 8, 11, 'That akshara, 0 Gargi, is unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.' Here the designation of being unseen, &c. agrees indeed with the pradhana also, but not so the designation of seeing, &c, as the pradhana is non- intelligent. — Nor can the word akshara denote the embodied soul with its limiting conditions, for the passage following on the one quoted declares that there is nothing different from the Self ('there is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it ') ; and, moreover, limiting conditions are expressly denied (of the akshara) in the passage, ' It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind,' &c. (Ill, 8, 8). An embodied soul without limiting con- ditions does not exist1. — It is therefore certain beyond doubt that the Imperishable is nothing else but the highest Brahman.

13. On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking of the medi- tation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om).

(In Pra. Up. V, 2) the general topic of discussion is set forth in the words, ' O Satyak&ma, the syllable Om is the highest and also the other Brahman ; therefore he who knows it arrives by the same means at one of the two.' The text then goes on, c Again, he who meditates with this syllable Om of three matras on the highest Person,' &c. — Here the doubt presents itself, whether the object of medi- tation referred to in the latter passage is the highest Brahman or the other Brahman ; a doubt based on the former pas- sage, according to which both are under discussion.

The purvapakshin maintains that the other, i. e. the lower

1 A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.

172 vedanta-s6tras.

The purvapakshin maintains that the other, i. e. the lower

1 A remark directed against the possible attempt to explain the passage last quoted as referring to the embodied soul.

172 vedanta-s6tras.

Brahman, is referred to, because the text promises only a reward limited by a certain locality for him who knows it. For, as the highest Brahman is omnipresent, it would be inappropriate to assume that he who knows it obtains a fruit limited by a certain locality. The objection that, if the lower Brahman were understood, there would be no room for the qualification, ' the highest person,' is not valid, because the vital principle (pra^a) may be called ' higher ' with reference to the body \

To this we make the following reply : What is here taught as the object of meditation is the highest Brahman only. — Why? — On account of its being spoken of as the object of sight. For the person to be meditated upon is, in a com- plementary passage, spoken of as the object of the act of seeing, e He sees the person dwelling in the castle (of the body ; purusham pumayam), higher than that one who is of the shape of the individual soul, and who is himself higher (than the senses and their objects).' Now, of an act of meditation an unreal thing also can be the object, as, for instance, the merely imaginary object of a wish. But of the act of seeing, real things only are the objects, as we know from experience ; we therefore conclude, that in the passage last quoted, the highest (only real) Self which corresponds to the mental act of complete intuition 2 is spoken of as the object of sight. This same highest Self we recognise in the passage under discussion as the object of meditation, in conse- quence of the term, ' the highest person.' — But — an objection will be raised — as the object of meditation we have the highest person, and as the object of sight the person higher than that one who is himself higher, &c. ; how, then, are we to know that those two are identical ? — The two passages, we

1 YindaJi sthulo deha^, pra/za^ sutratma. Ananda Giri. — The lower Brahman (hirarayagarbha on sutratman) is the vital principle (pra^a) in all creatures.

2 Saflzyagdawana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same term which in other places — where it is not requisite to insist on the idea of ' seeing ' in contradistinction from ' reflecting ' or ' medi- tating'— is rendered by perfect knowledge.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 3. I 73

2 Saflzyagdawana, i.e. complete seeing or intuition; the same term which in other places — where it is not requisite to insist on the idea of ' seeing ' in contradistinction from ' reflecting ' or ' medi- tating'— is rendered by perfect knowledge.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 3. I 73

reply, have in common the terms ' highest ' (or ' higher,' para) and ' person.' And it must not by any means be supposed that the term ^ivaghana1 refers to that highest person which, considered as the object of meditation, had previously been introduced as the general topic. For the consequence of that supposition would be that that highest person which is the object of sight would be different from that highest person which is represented as the object of meditation. We rather have to explain the word ^ivaghana as ' He whose shape2 is characterised by the^ivas ;' so that what is really meant by that term is that limited condition of the highest Self which is owing to its adjuncts, and manifests itself in the form of ^ivas, i. e. individual souls ; a condition analogous to the limitation of salt (in general) by means of the mass of a particular lump of salt. That limited condition of the Self may itself be called 'higher/ if viewed with regard to the senses and their objects.

Another (commentator) says that we have to understand by the word '^ivaghana ' the world of Brahman spoken of in the preceding sentence (' by the Saman verses he is led up to the world of Brahman '), and again in the following sentence (v. 7), which may be called ' higher,' because it is higher than the other worlds. That world of Brahman may be called ^ivaghana because all individual souls (^ivaj with their organs of action may be viewed as comprised (sarighata = ghana) within Hira/zyagarbha, who is the Self of all organs, and dwells in the Brahma-world. We thus understand that he who is higher than that ^ivaghana, i. e. the highest Self, which constitutes the object of sight, also constitutes the object of meditation. The qualification, moreover, ex- pressed in the term 'the highest person' is in its place only if we understand the highest Self to be meant. For the name, ' the highest person/ can be given only to the highest Self, higher than which there is nothing. So another scriptural passage also says, ' Higher than the person there is nothing — this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the

1 Translated above by * of the shape of the individual soul/

2 Pacini III, 3, 77, 'murttazra ghana^/

1 74 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

So another scriptural passage also says, ' Higher than the person there is nothing — this is the goal, the highest road.' Hence the

1 Translated above by * of the shape of the individual soul/

2 Pacini III, 3, 77, 'murttazra ghana^/

1 74 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

sacred text, which at first distinguishes between the higher and the lower Brahman (' the syllable Om is the higher and the lower Brahman'), and afterwards speaks of the highest Person to be meditated upon by means of the syllable Om, gives us to understand that the highest Person is nothing else but the highest Brahman. That the highest Self constitutes the object of meditation, is moreover intimated by the passage declaring that release from evil is the fruit (of medita- tion), ' As a snake is freed from its skin, so is he freed from evil.' — With reference to the objection that a fruit confined to a certain place is not an appropriate reward for him who meditates on the highest Self, we finally remark that the objection is removed, if we understand the passage to refer to emancipation by degrees. He who meditates on the highest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of three matras, obtains for his (first) reward the world of Brahman, and after that, gradually, complete intuition.

14. The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of the subsequent (arguments).

We read [Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 1), ' There is this city of Brah- man, and in it the palace, the small lotus, and in it that small ether. Now what exists within that small ether that is to be sought for, that is to be understood,' &c. — Here the doubt arises whether the small ether within the small lotus of the heart of which Scripture speaks, is the elemental ether, or the individual soul (vi^anatman), or the highest Self. This doubt is caused by the words ' ether ' and ' city of Brahman.' For the word ' ether,' in the first place, is known to be used in the sense of elemental ether as well as of highest Brahman. Hence the doubt whether the small ether of the text be the elemental ether or the highest ether, i.e. Brahman. In explanation of the expression c city of Brahman,' in the second place, it might be said either that the individual soul is here called Brahman and the body Brahman's city, or else that the city of Brahman means the city of the highest Brahman. Here (i. e. in con- sequence of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 4. I 75

the nature of the small ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is understood by the Lord of the city.

Here (i. e. in con- sequence of this latter doubt) a further doubt arises as to

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 1 4. I 75

the nature of the small ether, according as the individual soul or the highest Self is understood by the Lord of the city.

The purvapakshin maintains that by the small ether we have to understand the elemental ether, since the latter meaning is the conventional one of the word akaj-a. The elemental ether is here called small with reference to its small abode (the heart). — In the passage, ' As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart,' it is repre- sented as constituting at the same time the two terms of a comparison, because it is possible to make a distinction between the outer and the inner ether1 ; and it is said that 4 heaven and earth are contained within it,' because the whole ether, in so far as it is space, is one 2. — Or else, the purva- pakshin continues, the ' small one ' may be taken to mean the individual soul, on account of the term, ' the city of Brahman.' The body is here called the city of Brahman because it is the abode of the individual soul ; for it is acquired by means of the actions of the soul. On this interpretation we must assume that the individual soul is here called Brahman metaphorically. The highest Brahman cannot be meant, because it is not connected with the body as its lord. The lord of the city, i. e. the soul, is represented as dwelling in one spot of the city (viz. the heart), just as a real king resides in one spot of his residence. Moreover, the mind (manas) constitutes the limiting adjunct of the indi- vidual soul, and the mind chiefly abides in the heart; hence the individual soul only can be spoken of as dwelling in the heart. Further, the individual soul only can be spoken of as small, since it is (elsewhere ; vSvet. Up. V, 8) compared in size to the point of a goad. That it is com- pared (in the passage under discussion) to the ether must be understood to intimate its non-difference from Brahman. —

1 So that the interpretation of the purvapakshin cannot be objected to on the ground of its involving the comparison of a thing to itself.

2 So that no objection can be raised on the ground that heaven and earth cannot be contained in the small ether of the heart.

1 76 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

Nor does the scriptural passage say that the ' small ' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in the clause, ' That which is within that,' &c, it is represented as a mere distinguishing attribute of something else \

1 76 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

Nor does the scriptural passage say that the ' small ' one is to be sought for and to be understood, since in the clause, ' That which is within that,' &c, it is represented as a mere distinguishing attribute of something else \

To all this we make the following reply : — The small ether can mean the highest Lord only, not either the elemental ether or the individual soul. — Why ? — On account of the subsequent reasons, i. e. on account of the reasons implied in the complementary passage. For there, the text declares at first, with reference to the small ether, which is enjoined as the object of sight, ' If they should say to him,' &c. ; thereupon follows an objection, ( What is there that deserves to be sought for or that is to be understood ? ' and thereon a final decisive statement, ' Then he should say : As large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart. Both heaven and earth are contained within it/ Here the teacher, availing himself of the comparison of the ether within the heart with the known (universal) ether, precludes the conception that the ether within the heart is small — which conception is based on the statement as to the smallness of the lotus, i. e. the heart — and thereby precludes the pos- sibility of our understanding by the term ' the small ether,' the elemental ether. For, although the ordinary use of language gives to the word ' ether ' the sense of elemental ether, here the elemental ether cannot be thought of, because it cannot possibly be compared with itself. — But, has it not been stated above, that the ether, although one only, may be compared with itself, in consequence of an assumed dif- ference between the outer and the inner ether ? — That explanation, we reply, is impossible ; for we cannot admit that a comparison of a thing with itself may be based upon a merely imaginary difference. And even if we admitted

1 Viz. of that which is within it. Ananda Giri proposes two explanations : na £eti, paravlreshaTzatvenety atra paro daharak&ra upadanat tasminn iti saptamyanta-ta^abdasyeti jesha^. Yadva para^abdo * nta^sthavastuvishayas tadvwesha^atvena tasminn iti daharaka\rasyokter ity artha^. Ta^abdasya samnikrzsh/anvaya- yoge viprakrzsh/anvayasya g-aghanyatvad aka^antargata^ dhyeyam iti bhava^.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 14. I 77

Yadva para^abdo * nta^sthavastuvishayas tadvwesha^atvena tasminn iti daharaka\rasyokter ity artha^. Ta^abdasya samnikrzsh/anvaya- yoge viprakrzsh/anvayasya g-aghanyatvad aka^antargata^ dhyeyam iti bhava^.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 14. I 77

the possibility of such a comparison, the extent of the outer ether could never be ascribed to the limited inner ether. Should it be said that to the highest Lord also the extent of the (outer) ether cannot be ascribed, since another scriptural passage declares that he is greater than ether (6a. Bra. X, 6, 3, 2), we invalidate this objection by the remark, that the passage (comparing the inner ether with the outer ether) has the purport of discarding the idea of smallness (of the inner ether), which is prima facie established by the smallness of the lotus of the heart in which it is contained, and has not the purport of establishing a certain extent (of the inner ether). If the passage aimed at both, a split of the sen- tence 1 would result. — Nor, if we allowed the assumptive difference of the inner and the outer ether, would it be possible to represent that limited portion of the ether which is enclosed in the lotus of the heart, as containing within itself heaven, earth, and so on. Nor can we reconcile with the nature of the elemental ether the qualities of Self-hood, freeness from sin, and so on, (which are ascribed to the ' small ' ether) in the following passage, ' It is the Self free from sin, free from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, of true desires, of true purposes.' — Al- though the term ' Self ' (occurring in the passage quoted) may apply to the individual soul, yet other reasons exclude all idea of the individual soul being meant (by the small ether). For it would be impossible to dissociate from the individual soul, which is restricted by limiting conditions and elsewhere compared to the point of a goad, the attri- bute of smallness attaching to it, on account of its being enclosed in the lotus of the heart. — Let it then be assumed — our opponent remarks — that the qualities of all-pervading- ness, &c. are ascribed to the individual soul with the intention of intimating its non-difference from Brahman. — Well, we reply, if you suppose that the small ether is called all- pervading because it is one with Brahman, our own suppo-

1 A vakyabheda — split of the sentence — takes place according to the Mimatfzsa when one and the same sentence contains two new statements which are different. [34] N

178 vedAnta-s^tras.

[34] N

178 vedAnta-s^tras.

sition, viz. that the all-pervadingness spoken of is directly- predicated of Brahman itself, is the much more simple one. — Concerning the assertion that the term ' city of Brahman ' can only be understood, on the assumption that the indi- vidual soul dwells, like a king, in one particular spot of the city of which it is the Lord, we remark that the term is more properly interpreted to mean ' the body in so far as it is the city of the highest Brahman ; ' which interpretation enables us to take the term ' Brahman' in its primary sense1. The highest Brahman also is connected with the body, for the latter constitutes an abode for the perception of Brah- man 2. Other scriptural passages also express the same meaning, so, for instance, Pra. Up. V, 5, ' He sees the highest person dwelling in the city' (purusha = pumaya), &c, and Bri. Up. II, 5, 18, 'This person (purusha) is in all cities (bodies) the dweller within the city (purisaya).' — Or else (taking brahmapura to mean ^tvapura) we may understand the passage to teach that Brahman is, in the city of the individual soul, near (to the devout worshipper), just as Visrmu is near to us in the 5alagrama-stone. — Moreover, the text (VIII, 1, 6) at first declares the result of works to be perishable ('as here on earth whatever has been acquired by works perishes, so perishes whatever is acquired for the next world by good actions,' &c), and afterwards declares the imperishableness of the results flowing from a knowledge of the small ether, which forms the general sub- ject of discussion ('those who depart from hence after having discovered the Self and those true desires, for them there is freedom in all worlds'). From this again it is manifest that the small ether is the highest Self. — We now turn to the statement made by the purvapakshin, ' that the sacred text does not represent the small ether as that

1 While the explanation of Brahman by ^iva would compel us to assume that the word Brahman secondarily denotes the individual soul.

8 Upalabdher adhish/Mnam brahmawa deha ishyate I Tenasddharawatvena deho brahmapuram bhavet 11

Bhamatf.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I 5. I 79

8 Upalabdher adhish/Mnam brahmawa deha ishyate I Tenasddharawatvena deho brahmapuram bhavet 11

Bhamatf.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, I 5. I 79

which is to be sought for and to be understood, because it is mentioned as a distinguishing attribute of something else/ and reply as follows: If the (small) ether were not that which is to be sought for and to be understood, the description of the nature of that ether, which is given in the passage (' as large as this ether is, so large is that ether within the heart '), would be devoid of purport. — But — the opponent might say — that descriptive statement also has the purport of setting forth the nature of the thing abiding within (the ether) ; for the text after having raised an objec- tion (in the passage, ' And if they should say to him : Now with regard to that city of Brahman and the palace in it, i. e. the small lotus of the heart, and the small ether within the heart, what is there within it that deserves to be sought for or that is to be understood?') declares, when replying to that objection, that heaven, earth, and so on, are contained within it (the ether), a declaration to which the comparison with the ether forms a mere introduction. — Your reasoning, we reply, is faulty. If it were admitted, it would follow that heaven, earth, &c, which are contained within the small ether, constitute the objects of search and enquiry. But in that case the complementary passage would be out of place. For the text carrying on, as the subject of dis- cussion, the ether that is the abode of heaven, earth, &c. — by means of the clauses, ' In it all desires are contained/ 'It is the Self free from sin/ &c, and the passage, 'But those who depart from hence having discovered the Self, and the true desires ' (in which passage the conjunction 'and' has the purpose of joining the desires to the Self) — declares that the Self as well, which is the abode of the desires, as the desires which abide in the Self, are the objects of know- ledge. From this we conclude that in the beginning of the passage also, the small ether abiding within the lotus of the heart, together with whatever is contained within it as earth, true desires, and so on, is represented as the object of knowledge. And, for the reasons explained, that ether is the highest Lord.

15. (The small ether is Brahman) on account of

N 2

I SO VEDANTA-StjTRAS.

the action of going (into Brahman) and of the word (brahmaloka) ; for thus it is seen (i. e. that the indi- vidual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in Scripture) ; and (this going of the souls into Brahman constitutes) an inferential sign (by means of which we may properly interpret the word ' brahmaloka').

e. that the indi- vidual souls go into Brahman is seen elsewhere in Scripture) ; and (this going of the souls into Brahman constitutes) an inferential sign (by means of which we may properly interpret the word ' brahmaloka').

It has been declared (in the preceding Sutra) that the small (ether) is the highest Lord, on account of the reasons contained in the subsequent passages. These subsequent reasons are now set forth. —For this reason also the small (ether) can be the highest Lord only, because the passage complementary to the passage concerning the small (ether) contains a mention of going and a word, both of which intimate the highest Lord. In the first place, we read (Kh. Up. VIII, 3, 2), 'All these creatures, day after day going into that Brahma-world, do not discover it.' This passage which refers back, by means of the word ' Brahma-world,' to the small ether which forms the general subject-matter, speaks of the going to it of the creatures, i. e. the individual souls, wherefrom we conclude that the small (ether) is Brahman. For this going of the individual souls into Brahman, which takes place day after day in the state of deep sleep, is seen, i. e. is met with in another scriptural passage, viz. Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1, ' He becomes united with the True,' &c. In ordinary life also we say of a man who lies in deep sleep, c he has become Brahman,' ' he is gone into the state of Brahman.' — In the second place, the word ' Brahma-world/ which is here applied to the small (ether) under discussion, excludes all thought of the individual soul or the elemental ether, and thus gives us to understand that the small (ether) is Brahman.— But could not the word ' Brahma-world' convey as well the idea of the world of him whose throne is the lotus 1 ? — It might do so indeed, if we explained the compound ' Brahma-world ' as ' the world of Brahman.' But if we explain it on the ground of the co- ordination of both members of the compound — so that

1 I. e. Brahma, the lower Brahman.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 6. l8l

' Brahma-world ' denotes that world which is Brahman — then it conveys the idea of the highest Brahman only. — And that daily going (of the souls) into Brahman (mentioned above) is, moreover, an inferential sign for explaining the compound ' Brahma-world,' on the ground of the co-ordina- tion of its two constituent members. For it would be impossible to assume that all those creatures daily go into the world of the effected (lower) Brahman ; which world is commonly called the Satyaloka, i. e. the world of the True.

1 6. And on account of the supporting also (attri- buted to it), (the small ether must be the Lord) because that greatness is observed in him (accord- ing to other scriptural passages).

e. the world of the True.

1 6. And on account of the supporting also (attri- buted to it), (the small ether must be the Lord) because that greatness is observed in him (accord- ing to other scriptural passages).

And also on account of the ' supporting ' the small ether can be the highest Lord only.— How? — The text at first introduces the general subject of discussion in the passage, ' In it is that small ether; ' declares thereupon that the small one is to be compared with the universal ether, and that everything is contained in it ; subsequently applies to it the term ' Self,' and states it to possess the qualities of being free from sin, &c. ; and, finally, declares with reference to the same general subject of discussion, ' That Self is a bank, a limitary support (vidhrzti), that these worlds may not be confounded.' As ' support ' is here predicated of the Self, we have to understand by it a supporting agent. Just as a dam stems the spreading water so that the boundaries of the fields are not confounded, so that Self acts like a limitary dam in order that these outer and inner worlds, and all the different castes and Isramas may not be confounded. In accordance with this our text declares that greatness, which is shown in the act of holding asunder, to belong to the small (ether) which forms the subject of discussion ; and that such greatness is found in the highest Lord only, is seen from other scriptural passages, such as ' By the command of that Imperishable, O Gargi, sun and moon are held apart' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 9). Similarly, we read in another passage also, about whose referring to the highest

1 82 vedanta-sOtras.

Lord there is no doubt, ' He is the Lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things. He is a bank and a limitary support, so that these worlds may not be con- founded ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 32). — Hence, on account of the 'supporting,' also the small (ether) is nothing else but the highest Lord.

1 7. And on account of the settled meaning.

The small ether within cannot denote anything but the highest Lord for this reason also, that the word 'ether' has (among other meanings) the settled meaning of ' highest Lord.' Compare, for instance, the sense in which the word ' ether ' is used in Kk. Up. VIII, 14, 'He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names ;' and Kk. Up. I, 9, 1, 'All these beings take their rise from the ether,' &c. On the other hand, we do not meet with any passage in which the word ' ether ' is used in the sense of ' individual soul.' — We have already shown that the word cannot, in our passage, denote the elemental ether; for, although the word certainly has that settled meaning, it cannot have it here, because the elemental ether cannot possibly be com- pared to itself, &c. &c.

18. If it be said that the other one (i.e. the indi- vidual soul) (is meant) on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary passage), (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.

&c.

18. If it be said that the other one (i.e. the indi- vidual soul) (is meant) on account of a reference to it (made in a complementary passage), (we say) no, on account of the impossibility.

If the small (ether) is to be explained as the highest Lord on account of a complementary passage, then, the purvapakshin resumes, we point out that another complementary passage contains a reference to the other one, i. e. to the individual soul : ' Now that serene being (literally : serenity, complete satisfaction), which after having risen out from this earthly body and having reached the highest light, appears in its true form, that is, the Self; thus he spoke' {Kk. Up. VIII, 3,4). For there the word ' serenity,' which is known to denote, in another scriptural passage, the state of deep sleep, can convey the idea of the individual soul only when it is in

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 1 83

that state, not of anything else. The ' rising from the body' also can be predicated of the individual soul only whose abode the body is ; just as air, &c, whose abode is the ether, are said to arise from the ether. And just as the word 'ether,' although in ordinary language not denoting the highest Lord, yet is admitted to denote him in such passages as, ' The ether is the revealer of forms and names/ because it there occurs in conjunction with qualities of the highest Lord, so it may likewise denote the individual soul. Hence the term * the small ether ' denotes in the passage under discussion the individual soul, * on account of the reference to the other.'

Not so, we reply, ' on account of the impossibility.' In the first place, the individual soul, which imagines itself to be limited by the internal organ and its other adjuncts, can- not be compared with the ether. And, in the second place, attributes such as freedom from evil, and the like, cannot be ascribed to a being which erroneously transfers to itself the attributes of its limiting adjuncts. This has already been set forth in the first Sutra of the present adhikara^a, and is again mentioned here in order to remove all doubt as to the soul being different from the highest Self. That the reference pointed out by the purvapakshin is not to the individual soul will, moreover, be shown in one of the next Sutras (I, 3, 31).

19. If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter it appears that the individual soul is meant), (we point out that what is there referred to is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has become manifest (i. e. as it is non-different from Brahman).

The doubt whether, ' on account of the reference to the other,' the individual soul might not possibly be meant, has been discarded on the ground of * impossibility.' But, like a dead man on whom amrz'ta has been sprinkled, that doubt rises again, drawing new strength from the subsequent chapter which treats of Pra^&pati. For there he (Pra^pati)

1 84 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

For there he (Pra^pati)

1 84 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

at the outset declares that the Self, which is free from sin and the like, is that which is to be searched out, that which we must try to understand (Kk. Up. VIII, 7, 1) ; after that he points out that the seer within the eye, i. e. the individual soul, is the Self (' that person that is seen in the eye is the Self,' VIII, 7, 3) ; refers again and again to the same entity (in the clauses ' I shall explain him further to you/ VIII, 9, 3 ; VIII, 10, 4) ; and (in the explanations fulfilling the given promises) again explains the (nature of the) same individual soul in its different states ('He who moves about happy in dreams is the Self/ VIII, 10, 1 ; 'When a man being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest sees no dreams, that is the Self/ VIII, 11, 1). The clause attached to both these explanations (viz. ' That is the immortal, the fearless ; that is Brahman ') shows, at the same time, the individual soul to be free from sin, and the like. After that Pra^apati, having discovered a shortcoming in the condition of deep sleep (in consequence of the expostulation of Indra, ' In that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know these beings/ VIII, 11, 3), enters on a further expla- nation (' I shall explain him further to you, and nothing more than this '), begins by blaming the (soul's) connexion with the body, and finally declares the individual soul, when it has risen from the body, to be the highest person. (' Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light. That is the highest person.') — From this it appears that there is a possibility of the qualities of the highest Lord belonging to the individual soul also, and on that account we maintain that the term, 'the small ether within it/ refers to the individual soul. This position we counter-argue as follows. ' But in so far as its nature has become manifest.5 The particle ' but ' (in the Sutra) is meant to set aside the view of the purvapakshin, so that the sense of the Sutra is, ' Not even on account of the subsequent chapter a doubt as to the small ether being the individual soul is possible, because there also that which is meant to be intimated is the individual soul, in so far only as its (true) nature has become manifest.' The Sutra uses the expression ' he whose nature has become manifest/

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 1 85

1 85

which qualifies £*iva, the individual soul, with reference to its previous condition \ — The meaning is as follows. Pra^pati speaks at first of the seer characterised by the eye (' That person which is within the eye/ &c.) ; shows thereupon, in the passage treating of (the reflection in) the waterpan, that he (viz. the seer) has not his true Self in the body; refers to him repeatedly as the subject to be explained (in the clauses 'I shall explain him further to you ') ; and having then spoken of him as subject to the states of dreaming and deep sleep, finally explains the individual soul in its real nature, i. e. in so far as it is the highest Brahman, not in so far as it is indi- vidual soul ('As soon as it has approached the highest light it appears in its own form '). The highest light mentioned, in the passage last quoted, as what is to be approached, is nothing else but the highest Brahman, which is distinguished by such attributes as freeness from sin, and the like. That same highest Brahman constitutes — as we know from passages such as ' that art thou ' — the real nature of the individual soul, while its second nature, i. e. that aspect of it which depends on fictitious limiting conditions, is not its real nature. For as long as the indi- vidual soul does not free itself from Nescience in the form of duality — which Nescience may be compared to the mistake of him who in the twilight mistakes a post for a man — and does not rise to the knowledge of the Self, whose nature is unchangeable, eternal Cognition — which expresses itself in the form ' I am Brahman' — so long it remains the individual soul. But when, discarding the aggregate of body, sense- organs and mind, it arrives, by means of Scripture, at the knowledge that it is not itself that aggregate, that it does not form part of transmigratory existence, but is the True, the Real, the Self, whose nature is pure intelligence ; then

1 The masculine ' avirbhutasvarupa^ ' qualifies the substantive givak which has to be supplied. Properly speaking the giva, whose true nature has become manifest, i. e. which has become Brahman, is no longer giva ; hence the explanatory statement that the term g-iva is used with reference to what the £"iva was before it became Brahman,

1 86 VEDANTA-SljTRAS,

knowing itself to be of the nature of unchangeable, eternal Cognition, it lifts itself above the vain conceit of being one with this body, and itself becomes the Self, whose nature is unchanging, eternal Cognition. As is declared in such scriptural passages as ' He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9). And this is the real nature of the individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in its own form.

As is declared in such scriptural passages as ' He who knows the highest Brahman becomes even Brahman ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 9). And this is the real nature of the individual soul by means of which it arises from the body and appears in its own form.

Here an objection may be raised. How, it is asked, can we speak of the true nature (svarupa) of that which is unchanging and eternal, and then say that ' it appears in its own form (true nature) ?' Of gold and similar substances, whose true nature becomes hidden, and whose specific qualities are rendered non-apparent by their contact with some other substance, it may be said that their true nature is rendered manifest when they are cleaned by the application of some acid substance ; so it may be said, likewise, that the stars, whose light is during daytime overpowered (by the superior brilliancy of the sun), become manifest in their true nature at night when the overpowering (sun) has departed. But it is impossible to speak of an analogous overpowering of the eternal light of intelligence by whatever agency, since, like ether, it is free from all contact, and since, moreover, such an assumption would be contradicted by what we actually observe. For the (energies of) seeing, hearing, noticing, cognising constitute the character of the individual soul, and that character is observed to exist in full perfection, even in the case of that individual soul which has not yet risen beyond the body. Every individual soul carries on the course of its practical existence by means of the activities of seeing, hearing, cognising ; otherwise no practical existence at all would be possible. If, on the other hand, that character would realise itself in the case of that soul only which has risen above the body, the entire aggregate of practical exis- tence, as it actually presents itself prior to the soul's rising, would thereby be contradicted. We therefore ask : Wherein consists that (alleged) rising from the body ? Wherein con- sists that appearing (of the soul) in its own form ?

To this we make the following reply. — Before the rise of

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 1 87

We therefore ask : Wherein consists that (alleged) rising from the body ? Wherein con- sists that appearing (of the soul) in its own form ?

To this we make the following reply. — Before the rise of

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 1 87

discriminative knowledge the nature of the individual soul, which is (in reality) pure light, is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts consisting of body, senses, mind, sense- objects and feelings, and appears as consisting of the energies of seeing and so on. Similarly — to quote an analogous case from ordinary experience —the true nature of a pure crystal, i. e. its transparency and whiteness, is, before the rise of discriminative knowledge (on the part of the observer), non-discriminated as it were from any limiting adjuncts of red or blue colour ; while, as soon as through some means of true cognition discriminative knowledge has arisen, it is said to have now accomplished its true nature, i. e. transparency and whiteness, although in reality it had already done so before. Thus the discriminative knowledge, effected by vSruti, on the part of the individual soul which previously is non-discriminated as it were from its limiting adjuncts, is (according to the scriptural passage under dis- cussion) the soul's rising from the body, and the fruit of that discriminative knowledge is its accomplishment in its true nature, i. e. the comprehension that its nature is the pure Self. Thus the embodiedness and the non-embodiedness of the Self are due merely to discrimination and non-discrimi- nation, in agreement with the mantra, ' Bodiless within the bodies,' &c. (Ka. Up. I, 3, %%)> and the statement of Smrzti as to the non-difference between embodiedness and non- embodiedness ' Though dwelling in the body, O Kaunteya, it does not act and is not tainted' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 31). The individual soul is therefore called 'That whose true nature is non-manifest ' merely on account of the absence of discriminative knowledge, and it is called ' That whose nature has become manifest ' on account of the presence of such knowledge. Manifestation and non-manifestation of its nature of a different kind are not possible, since its nature is nothing but its nature (i. e. in reality is always the same). Thus the difference between the individual soul and the highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality, since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with anything.

And wherefrom is all this to be known? — From the instruc-

1 88 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

Thus the difference between the individual soul and the highest Lord is owing to wrong knowledge only, not to any reality, since, like ether, the highest Self is not in real contact with anything.

And wherefrom is all this to be known? — From the instruc-

1 88 VEDANTA-S^JTRAS.

tion given by Pra^apati who, after having referred to the ^iva (' the person that is seen in the eye,' &c.), continues ' This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman.' If the well-known seer within the eye were different from Brahman which is characterised as the immortal and fear- less, it would not be co-ordinated (as it actually is) with the immortal, the fearless, and Brahman. The reflected Self, on the other hand, is' not spoken of as he who is characterised by the eye (the seer within the eye), for that would render Pra^&pati obnoxious to the reproach of saying deceitful things. — So also, in the second section, the passage, ' He who moves about happy in dreams,' &c. does not refer to a being different from the seeing person within the eye spoken of in the first chapter, (but treats of the same topic) as appears from the introductory clause, ' I shall explain him further to you.' Moreover1, a person who is conscious of having seen an elephant in a dream and of no longer seeing it when awake discards in the waking state the object which he had seen (in his sleep), but recognises himself when awake to be the same person who saw something in the dream. — Thus in the third section also Pra^apati does indeed declare the absence of all particular cognition in the state of deep sleep, but does not contest the identity of the cognising Self (' In that way he does not know himself that he is I, nor all these beings '). The following clause also, ' He is gone to utter annihilation/ is meant to intimate only the annihilation of all specific cognition, not the annihilation of the cogniser. For there is no destruction of the knowing of the knower as — according to another scriptural pas- sage (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 30) — that is imperishable. — Thus, again, in the fourth section the introductory phrase of Pra^apati is, ' I shall explain him further to you and nothing different from this ; ' he thereupon refutes the con- nexion (of the Self) with the body and other limiting conditions (' Maghavat, this body is mortal,5 &c), shows the individual soul — which is there called ' the serene being ' —

1 To state another reason showing that the first and second chapters of Pra^apati's instruction refer to the same subject.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 1 89

in the state when it has reached the nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own form'), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest Brahman whose charac- teristics are immortality and fearlessness.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 1 9. 1 89

in the state when it has reached the nature of Brahman ('It appears in its own form'), and thus proves the soul to be non-different from the highest Brahman whose charac- teristics are immortality and fearlessness.

Some (teachers) however are of opinion that if the highest Self is meant (in the fourth section) it would be inappropriate to understand the words ' This (him) I will explain further/ &c, as referring to the individual soul, and therefore suppose that the reference is (not to the individual soul forming the topic of the three preceding sections, but) to the Self possessing the qualities of freeness from sin, &c, which Self is pointed out at the beginning of the entire chapter (VII, 1). — Against this interpretation we remark that, in the first place, it disregards the direct enunciation of the pronoun (i. e. the ' this' in 'this I will explain') which rests on something approximate (i.e. refers to something mentioned not far off), and, in the second place, is opposed to the word ' further' (or ' again ') met with in the text, since from that interpretation it would follow that what had been discussed in the preceding sections is not again discussed in the subsequent section. Moreover, if Pra^-apati, after having made a promise in the clause, ' This I shall explain ' (where that clause occurs for the first time), did previously to the fourth section explain a different topic in each section, we should have to conclude that he acted deceitfully . — Hence (our opinion about the purport of the whole chapter remains valid, viz. that it sets forth how) the unreal aspect of the individual soul as such — which is a mere presentation of Nescience, is stained by all the desires and aversions attached to agents and enjoy ers, and is con- nected with evils of various kinds — is dissolved by true knowledge, and how the soul is thus led over into the opposite state, i. e. into its true state in which it is one with the highest Lord and distinguished by freedom from sin and similar attributes. The whole process is similar to that by which an imagined snake passes over into a rope as soon as the mind of the beholder has freed itself from its erroneous imagination.

Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadiya^ £a ke^it), are of opinion that the individual soul as such

1 90 VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.

Others again, and among them some of ours (asmadiya^ £a ke^it), are of opinion that the individual soul as such

1 90 VEDANTA-SfjTRAS.

is real. To the end of refuting all these speculators who obstruct the way to the complete intuition of the unity of the Self this ^ariraka-^astra has been set forth, whose aim it is to show that there is only one highest Lord ever unchanging, whose substance is cognition \ and who, by means of Nescience, manifests himself in various ways, just as a thaumaturg appears in different shapes by means of his magical power. Besides that Lord there is no other sub- stance of cognition. — If, now, the Sutrakara raises and refutes the doubt whether a certain passage which (in reality) refers to the Lord does refer to the individual soul, as he does in this and the preceding Sutras 2, he does so for the following purpose. To the highest Self which is eternally pure, intelligent and free, which is never changing, one only, not in contact with anything, devoid of form, the opposite characteristics of the individual soul are errone- ously ascribed ; just as ignorant men ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether. In order to remove this erroneous opinion by means of Vedic passages tending either to prove the unity of the Self or to disprove the doctrine of duality — which passages he strengthens by arguments — he insists on the difference of the highest Self from the individual soul, does however not mean to prove thereby that the soul is different from the highest Self, but, whenever speaking of the soul, refers to its distinction (from the Self) as forming an item of ordinary thought, due to the power of Nescience. For thus, he thinks, the Vedic injunctions of works which are given with a view to the states of acting and enjoying, natural (to the non-enlightened soul), are not stultified.— That, however, the absolute unity of the Self is the real purport of the Astra's teaching, the Sutrakara declares, for instance, in I, 1, 30 3. The refutation of the reproach of

1 I. e. of whom cognition is not a mere attribute.

2 Although in reality there is no such thing as an individual soul.

3 Nanu £-ivabrahma«or aikyam na kvapi sutrakaro mukhato vadati kim tu sarvatra bhedam eva, ato naikyam ish/am tatr&ha pratipadyam tv iti.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 21. 191

futility raised against the injunctions of works has already- been set forth by us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess full knowledge, and such as do not.

20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 21. 191

futility raised against the injunctions of works has already- been set forth by us, on the ground of the distinction between such persons as possess full knowledge, and such as do not.

20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.

The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out (by the purvapakshin) in the passage complementary to the passage about the small ether ('Now that serene being/ &c, VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of meaning.— On that account the Sutra declares that the reference has another meaning, i. e. that the reference to the individual soul is not meant to deter- mine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The indi- vidual soul which, in the passage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in the waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the nadis of the body, and enjoys the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state ; and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the subtle body, reaches the highest light, i. e. the highest Brahman previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there represented as the object of worship. — In this sense the reference to the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in reality the highest Lord is meant.

21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural

192 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant ; we reply that) that has been ex- plained (before).

The purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by Scripture (' In it is that small ether ') does not agree with the highest Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in another passage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it having been shown — under I, 2, 7 — that a rela- tive smallness may be attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is — as the Sutra points out — to be applied here also. — That smallness is, moreover, contradicted by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart) with the known (universal) ether. (' As large as is this ether, so large is the ether within the heart.3)

The same refutation is — as the Sutra points out — to be applied here also. — That smallness is, moreover, contradicted by that scriptural passage which compares (the ether within the heart) with the known (universal) ether. (' As large as is this ether, so large is the ether within the heart.3)

22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after), (that after which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and (because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), /ttikas.' This passage, which forms part of the injunction of the ish/i to the Nakshatras, declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the Agni to whom he offered 1.

Smritl also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for instance, 'Whatever were the names of the rz'shis and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time, thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of whatever individuality the gods of the

1 Asmin kalpe sarvesh&m pramnam dahapakapraka\raMri yo *yam agnir drwyate so*yam agni/£ purvasmin kalpe manushya^ san devatvapadaprapakaw karmanush/Myasmin kalpa eta^ ^anma labdhavan ata^ purvasmin kalpe sa manushyo bhavini^ samgr&m. aw'tyagnir iti vyapadiryate. — Sayarca on the quoted passage.

2 1 6 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

past ages were, equal to them are the present gods in name and form.'

3 1 . On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for the madhu-vidyi, &c. Gaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the gods for the Brahma-vidya).

2 1 6 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

past ages were, equal to them are the present gods in name and form.'

3 1 . On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for the madhu-vidyi, &c. Gaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the gods for the Brahma-vidya).

A new objection is raised against the averment that the gods, &c. also are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. The teacher, Caimini, considers the gods and similar beings not to have any claim. — Why? — On account of the impos- sibility, in the case of the so-called Madhu-vidya, &c. If their claim to the knowledge of Brahman were admitted, we should have to admit their claim to the madhu-vidya ('the knowledge of the honey ') also, because that also is a kind of knowledge not different (from the knowledge of Brahman). But to admit this latter claim is not possible ; for, according to the passage, ' The Sun is indeed the honey of the devas ' (K/i. Up. Ill, i,i), men are to meditate on the sun (the god Aditya) under the form of honey/ and how, if the gods themselves are admitted as meditating worshippers, can Aditya meditate upon another Aditya ? — Again, the text, after having enumerated five kinds of nectar, the red one, &c. residing in the sun, and after having stated that the five classes of gods, viz. the Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Maruts, and S&dhyas, live on one of these nectars each, declares that ' he who thus knows this nectar becomes one of the Vasus, with Agni at their head, he sees the nectar and rejoices,' &c, and indicates thereby that those who know the nectars enjoyed by the Vasus, &c, attain the greatness of the Vasus, &c. But how should the Vasus themselves know other Vasus enjoying the nectar, and what other Vasu-greatness should they desire to attain ? — We have also to compare the pas- sages ' Agni is one foot, Aditya is one foot, the quarters are one foot ' (Kh. Up. Ill, 18, o) ; ' Air is indeed the absorber ' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, i) ; ' Aditya is Brahman, this is the doctrine.' All these passages treat of the meditation on the Self of certain divinities, for which meditation these divinities them-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 32. 2\*]

selves are not qualified. — So it is likewise impossible that the rzshis themselves should be qualified for meditations con- nected with rzshis, such as expressed in passages like Bri. Up. II, 2, 4, ' These two are the rzshis Gautama and Bharad- va^a ; the right Gautama, the left Bharadva^a.5 — Another reason for the non-qualification of the gods is stated in the following Sutra.

32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.

32. And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.

To that sphere of light, the purvapakshin resumes, which is stationed in the sky, and during its diurnal revolutions illumines the world, terms such as Aditya, i. e. the names of devas, are applied, as we know from the use of ordinary language, and from Vedic complementary passages1. But of a mere sphere of light we cannot understand how it should be endowed with either a bodily form, consisting of the heart and the like, or intelligence, or the capability of forming wishes 2. For mere light we know to be, like earth, entirely devoid of intelligence. The same observation applies to Agni (fire), and so on. It will perhaps be said that our objection is not valid, because the personality of the devas is known from the mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura^as, and from the conceptions of ordinary life3; but we contest the relevancy of this remark. For the conceptions of ordi- nary life do not constitute an independent means of know- ledge ; we rather say that a thing is known from ordinary life if it is known by the (acknowledged) means of know- ledge, perception, &c. But none of the recognised means of knowledge, such as perception and the like, apply to the

1 As, for instance, ' So long as Aditya rises in the east and sets in the west ' (Kh. Up. Ill, 6, 4).

2 Whence it follows that the devas are not personal beings, and therefore not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

3 Yama, for instance, being ordinarily represented as a person with a staff in his hand, Varurca with a noose, Indra with a thunder- bolt, &c. &c.

2 1 8 vedAnta-sutras.

matter under discussion. Itihasas and pura^as again being of human origin, stand themselves in need of other means of knowledge on which to base. The arthavada passages also, which, as forming syntactical wholes with the injunctory passages, have merely the purpose of glorifying (what is enjoined in the latter), cannot be considered to constitute by themselves reasons for the existence of the personality, &c. of the devas. The mantras again, which, on the ground of direct enunciation, &c, are to be employed (at the dif- ferent stages of the sacrificial action), have merely the purpose of denoting things connected with the sacrificial performance, and do not constitute an independent means of authoritative knowledge for anything1. — For these reasons the devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

33. B&daraya/za, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidyS, on the part of the gods) ; for there are (passages indicatory of that).

— For these reasons the devas, and similar beings, are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.

33. B&daraya/za, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidyS, on the part of the gods) ; for there are (passages indicatory of that).

The expression ' on the other hand ' is meant to rebut the purvapaksha. The teacher, Badaraya^a, maintains the existence of the qualification on the part of the gods, &c. For, although the qualification of the gods cannot be ad- mitted with reference to the madhu-vidya, and similar topics of knowledge, in which the gods themselves are implicated, still they may be qualified for the pure knowledge of Brah- man, qualification in general depending on the presence of desire, capability, &c.2 Nor does the impossibility of quali- fication in certain cases interfere with the presence of qualifi- cation in those other cases where it is not impossible. To the case of the gods the same reasoning applies as to the case of men ; for among men also, all are not qualified for everything, Brahma^as, for instance, not for the ra^asuya-sacrifice 3.

1 On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according to the Mima#zsa, cp. Arthasa/rcgraha, Introduction.

2 See above, p. 197.

3 Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 219

1 On the proper function of arthavada and mantra according to the Mima#zsa, cp. Arthasa/rcgraha, Introduction.

2 See above, p. 197.

3 Which can be offered by kshattriyas only.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 219

And, with reference to the knowledge of Brahman, Scrip- ture, moreover, contains express hints notifying that the devas are qualified ; compare, for instance, Bri. Up. 1, 4, 10, ' Whatever Deva was awakened (so as to know Brahman) he indeed became that; and the same with rz'shis;5 Kh. Up. VIII, J, %, ' They said : Well, let us search for that Self by which, if one has searched it out, all worlds and all desires are obtained. Thus saying, Indra went forth from the Devas, Viro^ana from the Asuras.' Similar statements are met within Smrz'ti, so, for instance, in the colloquy of the Gandharva and Ya^avalkya1. — Against the objection raised in the preceding Sutra (32) we argue as follows. Words like ctditya, and so on, which denote devas, although having reference to light and the like, yet convey the idea of certain divine Selfs (persons) endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power; for they are used in that sense in mantras and arthavada passages. For the devas possess, in consequence of their pre-eminent power, the capability of residing within the light, and so on, and to assume any form they like. Thus we read in Scripture, in the arthavada passage explaining the words ' ram of Medhatithi,' which form part of the Subrahma/zya-formula, that ' Indra, having assumed the shape of a ram, carried off Medhatithi, the descendant of Ka^va ' (Sha^/v. Br. I, 1). And thus Smrtti says that ' Aditya, having assumed the shape of a man, came to Kunti.' Moreover, even in such substances as earth, in- telligent ruling beings must be admitted to reside, for that appears from such scriptural passages as c the earth spoke,' ' the waters spoke,' &c. The non-intelligence of light and the like, in so far as they are mere material elements, is admitted in the case of the sun (aditya), &c. also ; but — as already remarked — from the use of the words in mantras and

1 *Srautalihgen&numanaMdha/# daraayitva smartenapi tadbadha/ra darjayati smartam iti. Kiw atra brahma amr/tazrc ki/rc svid vedyam anuttamam, £intayet tatra vai gatvd gandharvo mam apn'^^ata, Visvavasus tato ra^an vedantagvzanakovida iti moksha- dharme ^anakaya^«avalkyasa^vadat prahlada^agarasazravada^ kdk- tanumanasiddhir ity artha^.

2 20 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

arthavadas it appears that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those material elements).

2 20 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

arthavadas it appears that there are intelligent beings of divine nature (which animate those material elements).

We now turn to the objection (raised above by the pur- vapakshin) that mantras and arthavadas, as merely sub- serving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not the cir- cumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something. This is exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves, grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road. — But, the purvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly analogous. In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception of their existence. In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand, which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own. For in general any minor syntac- tical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own. Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words constituting the negative sentence, i (Do) not drink wine,' one meaning only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last two words, ' drink wine.' — To this objection we reply, that the instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion). The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be accepted. In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand, the words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own which refers to some accom-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 221

In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand, the words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own which refers to some accom-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 33. 221

plished thing1, and only subsequently to that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on the function of glorifying the injunction. Let us examine, as an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, 'He who is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vctyu a white animal.' All the words contained in this passage are directly con- nected with the injunction. This is, however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding arthavada passage, ' For Vayu is the swiftest deity ; Vayu he ap- proaches with his own share ; he leads him to prosperity.' The single words of this arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected with a distinguished divinity. If the matter conveyed by the subordinate (arthavada) passage can be known by some other means of knowledge, the arthavada acts as a mere anuvada, i. e. a statement referring to something (already known) 2. When its contents are contradicted by other means of knowledge it acts as a so-called gu/zavada, i. e. a statement of a quality 3. Where, again, neither of the two mentioned conditions is found, a doubt may arise whether the arthav&da is to be taken as a gu«avada on account of the absence of other means of knowledge, or as an arthavada referring to something known (i. e. an anuvada) on account of the ab- sence of contradiction by other means of proof. The latter alternative '^ however, to be embraced by reflecting people. — The same reasoning applies to mantras also.

There is a further reason for assuming the personality of the gods. The Vedic injunctions, as enjoining sacrificial offerings to Indra and the other gods, presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the individual divinities, because

1 As opposed to an action to be accomplished.

2 Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, ' Fire is a remedy for cold.'

3 Of this nature is, for instance, the passage ' the sacrificial post is the sun ' (i. e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness, &c. ; a statement contradicted by perception).

22 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

2 Of this nature is, for instance, the arthavada, ' Fire is a remedy for cold.'

3 Of this nature is, for instance, the passage ' the sacrificial post is the sun ' (i. e. possesses the qualities of the sun, luminousness, &c. ; a statement contradicted by perception).

22 2 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

without such the sacrificer could not represent Indra and the other gods to his mind. And if the divinity were not represented to the mind it would not be possible to make an offering to it. So Scripture also says, ' Of that divinity for which the offering is taken he is to think when about to say vausha/' (Ai. Br. Ill, 8, i). Nor is it possible to con- sider the essential form (or character) of a thing to consist in the word only1; for word (denoting) and thing (denoted) are different. He therefore who admits the authorita- tiveness of the scriptural word has no right to deny that the shape of Indra, and the other gods, is such as we understand it to be from the mantras and arthavadas. — Moreover, itihasas and pura;zas also — because based on mantra and arthavada which possess authoritative power in the manner described — are capable or setting forth the per- sonality, &c. of the devas. Itihasa and pura^a can, besides, be considered as based on perception also. For what is not accessible to our perception may have been within the sphere of perception of people in ancient times. Smriti also declares that Vyasa and others conversed with the gods face to face. A person maintaining that the people of ancient times were no more able to converse with the gods than people are at present, would thereby deny the (incon- testable) variety of the world. He might as well maintain that because there is at present no prince ruling over the whole earth, there were no such princes in former times ; a position by which the scriptural injunction of the ra^asuya- sacrifice2 would be stultified. Or he might maintain that in former times the spheres of duty of the different castes and Isramas were as generally unsettled as they are now, and, on that account, declare those parts of Scripture which define those different duties to be purposeless. It is there- fore altogether unobjectionable to assume that the men of ancient times, in consequence of their eminent religious

1 And therefore to suppose that a divinity is nothing but a certain word forming part of a mantra.

2 The ra^asiry a- sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 223

2 The ra^asiry a- sacrifice is to be offered by a prince who wishes to become the ruler of the whole earth.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 223

merit, conversed with the gods face to face. Smrzti also declares that * from the reading of the Veda there results intercourse with the favourite divinity ' (Yoga Sutra II, 44). And that Yoga does, as Smr/ti declares, lead to the acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and so on, is a fact which cannot be set aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the great- ness of Yoga, ' When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether arise, the fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is no longer illness, old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body produced by the fire of Yoga' (vSVet. Up. II, 13). Nor have we the right to measure by our capabilities the capability of the rishis who see the mantras and brahma^a passages (i. e. the Veda). — From all this it appears that the itihasas and pura^as have an adequate basis. — And the conceptions of ordinary life also must not be declared to be unfounded, if it is at all possible to accept them.

The general result is that we have the right to conceive the gods as possessing personal existence, on the ground of mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura^as, and ordinarily prevailing ideas. And as the gods may thus be in the con- dition of having desires and so on, they must be considered as qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Moreover, the declarations which Scripture makes concerning gradual emancipation 1 agree with this latter supposition only.

34. Grief of him (i. e. of Ganasruti) (arose) on account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about himself; on account of the rushing on of that (grief) (Raikva called him .Sudra) ; for it (the grief) is pointed at (by Raikva).

(In the preceding adhikara^a) the exclusiveness of the claim of men to knowledge has been refuted, and it has been declared that the gods, &c. also possess such a claim. The present adhikara^a is entered on for the purpose of removing the doubt whether, as the exclusiveness of the

1 In one of whose stages the being desirous of final emancipation becomes a deva.

2 24 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the .Sudras also possess such a claim.

2 24 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

claim of twice-born men is capable of refutation, the .Sudras also possess such a claim.

The purvapakshin maintains that the vSudras also have such a claim, because they may be in the position of desiring that knowledge, and because they are capable of it ; and because there is no scriptural prohibition (ex- cluding them from knowledge) analogous to the text, ' Therefore * the 5udra is unfit for sacrificing ' (Taitt. Sa/^h. VII, i, i, 6). The reason, moreover, which disqualifies the vSudras for sacrificial works, viz. their being without the sacred fires, does not invalidate their qualification for know- ledge, as knowledge can be apprehended by those also who are without the fires. There is besides an inferential mark supporting the claim of the 5udras ; for in the so-called sa^/varga-knowledge he (Raikva) refers to Gana.yruti Pautraya^a, who wishes to learn from him, by the name of 5udra 'Fie, necklace and carriage be thine, O Sudra, together with the cows ' {Kh. Up. IV, 2, 3). Smrz'ti moreover speaks of Vidura and others who were born from vSudra mothers as possessing eminent knowledge. — Hence the vSudra has a claim to the knowledge of Brahman.

To this we reply that the 6udras have no such claim, on account of their not studying the Veda. A person who has studied the Veda and understood its sense is indeed qualified for Vedic matters ; but a Sudra does not study the Veda, for such study demands as its antecedent the upanayana-ceremony, and that ceremony belongs to the three (higher) castes only. The mere circumstance of being in a condition of desire does not furnish a reason for qualification, if capability is absent. Mere temporal capability again does not constitute a reason for qualification, spiritual capability being required in spiritual matters. And spiritual capability is (in the case of the vSudras) excluded by their being excluded from the study of the Veda. — The Vedic statement, moreover, that the vSudra is unfit for sacrifices intimates, because

1 The commentaries explain ' therefore ' by l on account of his being devoid of the three sacred fires/ This explanation does not, however, agree with the context of the Taitt. Sawh.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 225

Sawh.

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 34. 225

founded on reasoning, that he is unfit for knowledge also ; for the argumentation is the same in both cases1. — With reference to the purvapakshin's opinion that the fact of the word ' 6udra ' being enounced in the sa//zvarga-knowledge constitutes an inferential mark (of the Sudra's qualifica- tion for knowledge), we remark that that inferential mark has no force, on account of the absence of arguments. For the statement of an inferential mark possesses the power of intimation only in consequence of arguments being adduced ; but no such arguments are brought forward in the passage quoted 2. Besides, the word ' 6udra ' which occurs in the sa//zvarga-vidya would establish a claim on the part of the vSudras to that one vidycl only, not to all vidyas. In reality, however, it is powerless, because occurring in an arthavada, to establish the Sudras' claim to anything. — The word ' vSudra ' can moreover be made to agree with the con- text in which it occurs in the following manner. When Ganasruti Pautraya;za heard himself spoken of with dis- respect by the flamingo (' How can you speak of him, being what he is, as if he were like Raikva with the car ? ' IV, 1, 3), grief (suk) arose in his mind, and to that grief the rishi Raikva alludes with the word .Sudra, in order to show thereby his knowledge of what is remote. This explanation must be ac- cepted because a (real) born vSudra is not qualified (for the sa^varga-vidya). If it be asked how the grief (suk) which had arisen in Gana^ruti's mind can be referred to by means of the word .Sudra, we reply: On account of the rushing on (adrava^a) of the grief. For we may etymologise the word 5udra by dividing it into its parts, either as ' he rushed into grief (.Su^am abhidudrava) or as 'grief rushed on

1 The £udra not having acquired a knowledge of Vedic matters in the legitimate way, i. e. through the study of the Veda under the guidance of a guru, is unfit for sacrifices as well as for vidya\

2 The lihga contained in the word 'Sudra' has no proving power as it occurs in an arthavada-passage which has no authority if not connected with a corresponding injunctive passage. In our case the linga in the arthavada-passage is even directly contradicted by those injunctions which militate against the £udras' qualification for Vedic matters.

[34] Q

226 VED ANTA-S^TR AS.

him,' or as c he in his grief rushed to Raikva ; ' while on the other hand it is impossible to accept the word in its ordinary conventional sense. The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched upon in the legend *.

35. And because the kshattriyahood (of G&namiti) is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with ATaitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).

The circumstance (of the king actually being grieved) is moreover expressly touched upon in the legend *.

35. And because the kshattriyahood (of G&namiti) is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with ATaitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).

Ganamiti cannot have been a Sudra by birth for that reason also that his being a kshattriya is understood from an inferential sign, viz. his being mentioned together (in one chapter) with the kshattriya jftTaitraratha Abhipratarin. For, later on, i. e. in the passage complementary to the sawvarga- vidyd, a kshattriya TTaitrarathi Abhipratarin is glorified, 'Once while Saunaka Kipeya and Abhipratarin Kikshaseni were being waited on at their meal a religious student begged of them ' (Kh. Up. IV, 3, 5). That this Abhipratdrin was a iTaitrarathi (i. e. a descendant of -ftTitraratha) we have to infer from his connexion with a Kapeya. For we know (from 5ruti) about the connexion of iTitraratha himself with the Kapeyas (' the K&peyas made iTitraratha perform that sacrifice;' T&ndya. Br. XX, 12, 5), and as a rule sacrificers of one and the same family employ officiating priests of one and the same family. Moreover, as we understand from Scripture (' from him a iif aitrarathi descended who was a prince2') that he (^Taitraratha) was a prince, we must

1 Ha#zsavaky£d dtmano^nadaraw mitva g&nasmtek sug ut- pannety etad eva katha/rc gamyate yenasau judra^abdena su£yate tatraha spmyate £eti. Ananda Giri.

2 I translate this passage as I find it in all MSS. of -Sankara consulted by me (noting, however, that some MSS. read /fcaitrarathi- namaika^). Ananda Giri expressly explains tasmad by /fcitraratMd ity artha^. — The text of the TaWya Br. runs : tasmad ^aitrarathrnam eka^ kshatrapatir gayate, and the commentary explains : tasm&t kdrawad adyapi ^itrava^otpannana^ madhye eka eva ra^d kshatra-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 36. 227

understand him to have been a kshattriya. The fact now of Ganajruti being praised in the same vidyk with the kshattriya Abhipratirin intimates that the former also was a kshattriya. For as a rule equals are mentioned together with equals. That G&najruti was a kshattriya we more- over conclude from his sending his door-keeper and from other similar signs of power (mentioned in the text). — Hence the 5udras are not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman).

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in the case of the .Sudras).

— Hence the 5udras are not qualified (for the knowledge of Brahman).

36. On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in the case of the .Sudras).

That the .Sudras are not qualified, follows from that circumstance also that in different places of the vidy&s such ceremonies as the upanayana and the like are referred to. Compare, for instance, 5at. Br. XI, 5, 3, 13, 'He initiated him as a pupil;' Kk, Up. VII, 1, 1, 'Teach me, Sir! thus he approached him;' Pra. Up. I, 1, 'Devoted to Brahman, firm in Brahman, seeking for the highest Brahman they, carrying fuel in their hands, approached the venerable Pippal&da, thinking that he would teach them all that.' — Thus the following passage also, ' He without having made them undergo the upanayana (said) to them ' (Kh. Up. V, 11, 7), shows that the upanayana is a well-established cere- mony1.— With reference to the 6udras, on the other hand, the absence of ceremonies is frequently mentioned; so, for instance, Manu X, 4, where they are spoken of as 'once- born ' only ('the Sudra is the fourth caste, once-born '), and Manu X, 126, ' In the Sudra there is not any sin, and he is not fit for any ceremony/

patir baladhipatir bhavati. — Grammar does not authorise the form ^aitraratha used in the Sutra.

1 The king Awapati receives some Brdhma^as as his pupils without insisting on the upanayana. This express statement of the upanayana having been omitted in a certain case shows it to be the general rule.

Q 2

2 28 VED ANTA-stjTRAS.

37. And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate Cabala) on the ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a 6udra).

The 5udras are not qualified for that reason also that Gautama, having ascertained Cabala not to be a 6udra from his speaking the truth, proceeded to initiate and instruct him. ' None who is not a Brahma^a would thus speak out. Go and fetch fuel, friend, I shall initiate you. You have not swerved from the truth ' [Kh. Up. IV, 4, 5) ; which scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the vSudras not being capable of initiation).

38. And on account of the prohibition, in Smrz'ti, of (the 6udras') hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.

Up. IV, 4, 5) ; which scriptural passage furnishes an inferential sign (of the vSudras not being capable of initiation).

38. And on account of the prohibition, in Smrz'ti, of (the 6udras') hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.

The 5udras are not qualified for that reason also that Snm'ti prohibits their hearing the Veda, their studying the Veda, and their understanding and performing Vedic matters. The prohibition of hearing the Veda is conveyed by the following passages : ' The ears of him who hears the Veda are to be filled with (molten) lead and lac,J and ' For a .Sudra is (like) a cemetery, therefore (the Veda) is not to be read in the vicinity of a .Sudra.' From this latter passage the prohibition of studying the Veda results at once ; for how should he study Scripture in whose vicinity it is not even to be read ? There is, moreover, an express prohibition (of the vSudras studying the Veda). ' His tongue is to be slit if he pronounces it ; his body is to be cut through if he preserves it.' The prohibitions of hearing and studying the Veda already imply the prohibition of the knowledge and performance of Vedic matters ; there are, however, express prohibitions also, such as 'he is not to impart knowledge to the 6udra,' and 'to the twice-born belong study, sacrifice, and the bestowal of gifts.' — From those .Sudras, however, who, like Vidura and 'the religious hunter/ acquire knowledge in consequence of the after effects of former deeds, the fruit of their knowledge cannot be with-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 39. 2 29

held, since knowledge in all cases brings about its fruit. Smrz'ti, moreover, declares that all the four castes are qualified for acquiring the knowledge of the itihasas and pura^as ; compare the passage, ' He is to teach the four castes' (Mahabh.). — It remains, however, a settled point that they do not possess any such qualification with regard to the Veda.

39. (The pr&/za is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of the whole world).

The discussion of qualification for Brahma-knowledge — on which we entered as an opportunity offered — being finished we return to our chief topic, i. e. the enquiry into the purport of the Vedanta-texts. — We read (Ka. Up. II, 6, 3), ' Whatever there is, the whole world when gone forth trembles in the pra^a. It (the pra/za) is a great terror, a raised thunderbolt. Those who know it become immortal V — This passage declares that this whole world trembles, abiding in pra;/a, and that there is raised something very terrible, called a thunderbolt, and that through its knowledge immortality is obtained. But as it is not immediately clear what the pra;*a is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a discussion arises.

But as it is not immediately clear what the pra;*a is, and what that terrible thunderbolt, a discussion arises.

The purvapakshin maintains that, in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the term, pr&na. denotes the air with its five modifications, that the word 'thunderbolt' also is to be taken in its ordinary sense, and that thus the whole passage contains a glorification of air. For, he says, this whole world trembles, abiding within air with its five forms — which is here called pra^a — and the terrible thunderbolts also spring from air (or wind) as their cause. For in the air, people say, when it manifests itself in the form of Par^-anya, lightning, thunder, rain, and thunderbolts manifest themselves. — Through the knowledge of that air immortality

1 As the words stand in the original they might be translated as follows (and are so translated by the purvapakshin), ' Whatever there is, the whole world trembles in the pra^a, there goes forth (from it) a great terror, viz. the raised thunderbolt.'

2 30 vedAnta-sCtras.

also can be obtained ; for another scriptural passage says, 4 Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together. He who knows this conquers death.' — We therefore con- clude that the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.

also can be obtained ; for another scriptural passage says, 4 Air is everything by itself, and air is all things together. He who knows this conquers death.' — We therefore con- clude that the same air is to be understood in the passage under discussion.

To this we make the following reply. — Brahman only can be meant, on account of what precedes as well as what follows. In the preceding as well as the subsequent part of the chapter Brahman only is spoken of; how then can it be supposed that in the intermediate part all at once the air should be referred to? The immediately preceding passage runs as follows, ' That only is called the Bright, that is called Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal. All worlds are contained in it, and no one goes beyond it.' That the Brahman there spoken of forms the topic of our passage also, we conclude, firstly, from proximity; and, secondly, from the circumstance that in the clause, ' The whole world trembles in pra^a/ we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its constituting the abode of the whole world. That the word prd^a can denote the highest Self also, appears from such passages as ' the prd^a of prd^a ' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 1 8). Being the cause of trembling, moreover, is a quality which properly appertains to the highest Self only, not to mere air. Thus Scripture says, ' No mortal lives by the pra^a and the breath that goes down. We live by another in whom these two repose' (Ka. Up. II, 5, 5). And also in the passage subsequent to the one under discussion, (' From terror of it fire burns, from terror the sun burns, from terror Indra and Vdyu, and Death as the fifth run away,') Brahman, and not the air, must be sup- posed to be spoken of, since the subject of that passage is represented as the cause of fear on the part of the whole world inclusive of the air itself. Thence we again conclude that the passage under discussion also refers to Brahman, firstly, on the ground of proximity ; and, secondly, because we recognise a quality of Brahman, viz. its being the cause of fear, in the words, ' A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word * thunderbolt ' is here used to denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 40. 23 1

its being the cause of fear, in the words, ' A great terror, a raised thunderbolt.' The word * thunderbolt ' is here used to denote a cause of fear in general. Thus in ordinary life also a man strictly

I ADHYAYA, 3 PAD A, 40. 23 1

carries out a king's command because he fearfully considers in his mind, ' A thunderbolt (i. e. the king's wrath, or threatened punishment) is hanging over my head ; it might fall if I did not carry out his command.' In the same manner this whole world inclusive of fire, air, sun, and so on, regularly carries on its manifold functions from fear of Brahman ; hence Brahman as inspiring fear is compared to a thunderbolt. Similarly, another scriptural passage, whose topic is Brahman, declares, 'From terror of it the wind blows, from terror the sun rises ; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.' — That Brahman is what is referred to in our passage, further follows from the declara- tion that the fruit of its cognition is immortality. For that immortality is the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman is known, for instance, from the mantra, ' A man who knows him only passes over death, there is no other path to go ' (vSVet. Up. VI, 15). — That immortality which the piirva- pakshin asserts to be sometimes represented as the fruit of the knowledge of the air is a merely relative one ; for there (i.e. in the chapter from which the passage is quoted) at first the highest Self is spoken of, by means of a new topic being started (Bri. Up. Ill, 4), and thereupon the inferior nature of the air and so on is referred to. (' Everything else is evil.5)— That in the passage under discussion the highest Self is meant appears finally from the general subject- matter ; for the question (asked by Na&ketas in I, 2, 14, * That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future tell me that ') refers to the highest Self.

40. The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).

We read in Scripture, ' Thus does that serene being, arising from this body, appear in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' {Kh. Up. VIII, 13, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word ' light ' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels dark- ness, or the highest Brahman.

232 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

Up. VIII, 13, 3). Here the doubt arises whether the word ' light ' denotes the (physical) light, which is the object of sight and dispels dark- ness, or the highest Brahman.

232 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

The purvapakshin maintains that the word ' light ' denotes the well-known (physical) light, because that is the conven- tional sense of the world. For while it is to be admitted that in another passage, discussed under I, 1, 24, the word 'light' does, owing to the general topic of the chapter, divest itself of its ordinary meaning and denote Brahman, there is in our passage no similar reason for setting the ordinary meaning aside. Moreover, it is stated in the chapter treating of the nadis of the body, that a man going to final release reaches the sun (' When he departs from this body then he departs upwards by those very rays ; ' Kk. Up. VIII, 6, 5). Hence we conclude that the word 'light' denotes, in our passage, the ordinary light.

To this we make the following reply. — The word ' light ' can denote the highest Brahman only, on account of that being seen. We see that in the whole chapter Brahman is carried on as the topic of discussion. For the Self, which is free from sin, &c. is introduced as the general subject- matter in VIII, 7, 1 (' the Self which is free from sin ') ; it is thereupon set forth as that which is to be searched out and to be understood (VIII, 7, 1); it is carried on by means of the clauses, 'I shall explain that further to you' (VIII, 9, 3 ff.) ; after that freedom from body is said to belong to it, because it is one with light (' when he is free from the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him,' VIII, 13, 1) — and freedom from body is not possible outside Brahman — and it is finally qualified as 'the highest light, the highest person ' (VIII, 13, 3). — Against the statement, made by the purvapakshin, that Scripture speaks of a man going to re- lease as reaching the sun, we remark that the release there referred to is not the ultimate one, since it is said to be con- nected with going and departing upwards. That the ulti- mate release has nothing to do with going and departing upwards we shall show later on.

41. The ether is (Brahman), as it is designated as something different, &c. (from name and form).

Scripture says, c He who is called ether (aklra) is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which these

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 233

forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immor- tal, the Self ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1).

(from name and form).

Scripture says, c He who is called ether (aklra) is the revealer of all forms and names. That within which these

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 233

forms and names are contained is the Brahman, the Immor- tal, the Self ' {Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1).

There arising a doubt whether that which here is called ether is the highest Brahman or the ordinary elemental ether, the purvapakshin declares that the latter alternative is to be embraced, firstly, because it is founded on the con- ventional meaning of the word 'ether ;' and, secondly, because the circumstance of revealing names and forms can very well be reconciled with the elemental ether, as that which affords room (for all things). Moreover, the passage contains no clear indicatory mark of Brahman, such as creative power, and the like.

To this we reply, that the word c ether ' can here denote the highest Brahman only, because it is designated as a different thing, &c. For the clause, £That within which these two are contained is Brahman,' designates the ether as something different from names and forms. But, excepting Brahman, there is nothing whatever different from name and form, since the entire world of effects is evolved exclusively by names and forms. Moreover, the complete revealing of names and forms cannot be accom- plished by anything else but Brahman, according to the text which declares Brahman's creative agency, ' Let me enter (into those beings) with this living Self (^iva atman), and evolve names and forms ' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 2). But — it may be said — from this very passage it is apparent that the living Self also (i. e. the individual soul) possesses revealing power with regard to names and forms. — True, we reply, but what the passage really wishes to intimate, is the non- difference (of the individual soul from the highest Self). And the very statement concerning the revealing of names and forms implies the statement of signs indicatory of Brahman, viz. creative power and the like. — Moreover, the terms 'the Brahman, the Immortal, the Self (VIII, 14) indicate that Brahman is spoken of.

42. And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and departing.

2 34 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

In the sixth prapd^aka of the BnTiaddra^yaka there is given, in reply to the question, ' Who is that Self ? ' a lengthy exposition of the nature of the Self, ' He who is within the heart, among the pri/zas, the person of light, consisting of knowledge' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an additional statement about the nature of the transmi- grating soul (known already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

Up. IV, 3, 7). Here the doubt arises, whether the passage merely aims at making an additional statement about the nature of the transmi- grating soul (known already from other sources), or at establishing the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the passage is concerned with the nature of the transmigrating soul, on account of the introductory and concluding statements. For the intro- ductory statement, ' He among the pr&«as who consists of knowledge,' contains marks indicatory of the embodied soul, and so likewise the concluding passage, ' And that great unborn Self is he who consists of cognition,' &c. (IV, 4, 22). We must therefore adhere to the same subject- matter in the intermediate passages also, and look on them as setting forth the same embodied Self, represented in its different states, viz. the waking state, and so on.

In reply to this, we maintain that the passage aims only at giving information about the highest Lord, not at making additional statements about the embodied soul. — Why? — On account of the highest Lord being designated as different from the embodied soul, in the states of deep sleep and of departing from the body. His difference from the embodied soul in the state of deep sleep is declared in the following passage, ' This person embraced by the intelligent (pra^a) Self knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within.' Here the term, ' the person,' must mean the embodied soul ; for of him it is possible to deny that he knows, because he, as being the knower, may know what is within and without. The ' intelligent Self,' on the other hand, is the highest Lord, because he is never dissociated from intelligence, i. e. — in his case — all-embracing knowledge. — Similarly, the passage treating of departure, i. e. death (' this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self moves along groaning '), refers to the highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There also we have to understand by the ' embodied one ' the indi-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 235

— Similarly, the passage treating of departure, i. e. death (' this bodily Self mounted by the intelligent Self moves along groaning '), refers to the highest Lord as different from the individual Self. There also we have to understand by the ' embodied one ' the indi-

I ADHYAYA, 3 PADA, 42. 235

vidual soul which is the Lord of the body, while the c intel- ligent one ' is again the Lord. We thus understand that ' on account of his being designated as something different, in the states of deep sleep and departure/ the highest Lord forms the subject of the passage. — With reference to the purvapakshin's assertion that the entire chapter refers to the embodied Self, because indicatory marks of the latter are found in its beginning, middle, and end, we remark that in the first place the introductory passage (' He among the pra«as who consists of cognition') does not aim at setting forth the character of the transmigrating Self, but rather, while merely referring to the nature of the transmigrating Self as something already known, aims at declaring its identity with the highest Brahman; for it is manifest that the immediately subsequent passage, 'as if thinking, as if moving1,' aims at discarding the attributes of the transmigrating Self. The concluding pas- sage again is analogous to the initial one ; for the words, ' And that great unborn Self is he who/ &c, mean : We have shown that that same cognitional Self, which is observed among the prd^as, is the great unborn Self, i. e. the highest Lord. — He, again, who imagines that the pas- sages intervening (between the two quoted) aim at setting forth the nature of the transmigrating Self by represent- ing it in the waking state, and so on, is like a man who, setting out towards the east, wants to set out at the same time towards the west. For in representing the states of waking, and so on, the passage does not aim at describing the soul as subject to different states or transmigration, but rather as free from all particular conditions and trans- migration. This is evident from the circumstance that on kanaka's question, which is repeated in every section, * Speak on for the sake of emancipation/ Ya^avalkya replies each time, ' By all that he is not affected, for that person is not attached to anything' (Br/. Up. IV, 3, 14-16). And later on he says (IV, 3, %%\ i He is not followed by

1 The stress lies here on the ' as if/ which intimate that the Self does not really think or move.

236 vedanta-sOtras.

good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore, to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.

236 vedanta-sOtras.

good, not followed by evil, for he has then overcome all the sorrows of the heart.' We have, therefore, to conclude that the chapter exclusively aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self.

43. And on account of such words as Lord, &c.

That the chapter aims at setting forth the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, we have to conclude from that circumstance also that there occur in it terms such as Lord and so on, intimating the nature of the non-transmigrating Self, and others excluding the nature of the transmigrating Self. To the first class belongs, for instance, ' He is the lord of all, the king of all things, the protector of all things/ To the latter class belongs the passage, ' He does not be- come greater by good works, nor smaller by evil works.' — From all which we conclude that the chapter refers to the non-transmigrating highest Lord.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 237

FOURTH PADA.

Reverence to the highest Self!

1. If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference (i. e. the pradhana) ; we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers to what is con- tained in the simile of the body (i.e. the body itself) ; and (that the text) shows.

In the preceding part of this work — as whose topic there has been set forth an enquiry into Brahman — we have at first defined Brahman (I, 1, 2) ; we have thereupon refuted the objection that that definition applies to the pradhana also, by showing that there is no scriptural authority for the latter (1, 1, 5), and we have shown in detail that the common purport of all Vedanta-texts is to set forth the doctrine that Brahman, and not the pradhana, is the cause of the world. Here, however, the Sankhya again raises an objection which he considers not to have been finally disposed of.

It has not, he says, been satisfactorily proved that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhana ; for some ^akhas contain expressions which seem to convey the idea of the pradhana. From this it follows that Kapila and other supreme rzshis maintain the doctrine of the pradhana being the general cause only because it is based on the Veda. — As long therefore as it has not been proved that those passages to which the Sankhyas refer have a different meaning (i. e. do not allude to the pradhana), all our previous argumentation as to the omniscient Brahman being the cause of the world must be considered as unsettled. We there- fore now begin a new chapter which aims at proving that those passages actually have a different meaning.

The Sankhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i. e. the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some .sakhas. We read, for instance, they say, in the Kanaka (I, 3, 11), ' Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped,

238 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.

The Sankhyas maintain that that also which is based on inference, i. e. the pradhana, is perceived in the text of some .sakhas. We read, for instance, they say, in the Kanaka (I, 3, 11), ' Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped,

238 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.

beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person.' There we recognise, named by the same names and enumerated in the same order, the three entities with which we are acquainted from the Sankhya-smr/ti, viz. the great principle, the Un- developed (the pradhana), and the soul 1. That by the Un- developed is meant the pradhana is to be concluded from the common use of Smrzti and from the etymological inter- pretation of which the word admits, the pradhana being called undeveloped because it is devoid of sound and other qualities. It cannot therefore be asserted that there is no scriptural authority for the pradhana. And this pradhana vouched for by Scripture we declare to be the cause of the world, on the ground of Scripture, Smr/ti, and ratiocination. Your reasoning, we reply, is not valid. The passage from the Kanaka quoted by you intimates by no means the existence of that great principle and that Undeveloped which are known from the Sankhya-smrzti. We do not recognise there the pradhana of the Sankhyas, i. e. an inde- pendent general cause consisting of three constituting elements ; we merely recognise the word ' Undeveloped,' which does not denote any particular determined thing, but may — owing to its etymological meaning, 'that which is not developed, not manifest * — denote anything subtle and difficult to distinguish. The Sankhyas indeed give to the word a settled meaning, as they apply it to the pradhana ; but then that meaning is valid for their system only, and has no force in the determination of the sense of the Veda. Nor does mere equality of position prove equality of being, unless the latter be recognised indepen- dently. None but a fool would think a cow to be a horse because he sees it tied in the usual place of a horse. We, moreover, conclude, on the strength of the general subject- matter, that the passage does not refer to the pradhana the fiction of the Sankhyas, ' on account of there being referred

1 The Great one is the technical Sankhya-term for buddhi, avyakta is a common designation of pradhana or prakrz'ti, and purusha is the technical name of the soul. Compare, for instance, S&rikhya K&r. 2, 3.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 239

Compare, for instance, S&rikhya K&r. 2, 3.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I. 239

to that which is contained in the simile of the body.' This means that the body which is mentioned in the simile of the chariot is here referred to as the Undeveloped. We infer this from the general subject-matter of the passage and from the circumstance of nothing else remaining. — The immediately preceding part of the chapter exhibits the simile in which the Self, the body, and so on, are compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot, &c, ' Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect the charioteer, and the mind the reins. The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Self) is in union with the body, the senses and the mind, then wise people call him the enjoyer.' The text then goes on to say that he whose senses, &c. are not well controlled enters into saws&ra, while he who has them under control reaches the end of the journey, the highest place of Vish/zu. The question then arises : What is the end of the journey, the highest place of Visrmu ? Whereupon the text explains that the highest Self which is higher than the senses, &c, spoken of is the end of the journey, the highest place of Vishnu. ' Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the great Self is beyond the in- tellect. Beyond the great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person. Beyond the Person there is nothing — this is the goal, the highest Road.' In this passage we recognise the senses, &c. which in the preceding simile had been compared to horses and so on, and we thus avoid the mistake of abandoning the matter in hand and taking up a new subject. The senses, the intellect, and the mind are referred to in both passages under the same names. The objects (in the second passage) are the objects which are (in the former passage) designated as the roads of the senses ; that the objects are beyond (higher than) the senses is known from the scriptural passage representing the senses as grahas, i. e. graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i. e. superior to the grahas (Bri. Up. Ill, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects, because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the mind. The intellect

24O VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

e. graspers, and the objects as atigrahas, i. e. superior to the grahas (Bri. Up. Ill, 2). The mind (manas) again is superior to the objects, because the relation of the senses and their objects is based on the mind. The intellect

24O VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

(buddhi) is higher than the mind, since the objects of enjoy- ment are conveyed to the soul by means of the intellect. Higher than the intellect is the great Self which was repre- sented as the lord of the chariot in the passage, ' Know the Self to be the lord of the chariot/ That the same Self is referred to in both passages is manifest from the repeated use of the word ' Self ; ' that the Self is superior to intelli- gence is owing to the circumstance that the en j oyer is naturally superior to the instrument of enjoyment. The Self is appropriately called great as it is the master. — Or else the phrase 'the great Self may here denote the intellect of the first-born Hira^yagarbha which is the basis of all intellects ; in accordance with the following Smrzti- passage ' it is called mind, the great one ; reflection, Brahman ; the stronghold, intellect; enunciation, the Lord; highest knowledge, consciousness; thought, remembrance1,' and like- wise with the following scriptural passage, ' He (Hira^ya- garbha) who first creates Brahman and delivers the Vedas to him' (SVet. Up. VI, 18). The intellect, which in the former passage had been referred to under its common name buddhi, is here mentioned separately, since it may be repre- sented as superior to our human intellects. On this latter explanation of the term 'the great Self,5 we must assume that the personal Self which in the simile had been compared to the charioteer is, in the latter passage, included in the highest person (mentioned last) ; to which there is no objec- tion, since in reality the personal Self and the highest Self are identical. — Thus there remains now the body only which had before been compared to a chariot. We therefore con-

1 Sawkalpavikalparupamananajaktya haira^yagarbhi buddhir manas tasya^ vyash/imanaAsu samash/itayd vyaptim aha mahan iti. Sa^kalpadi^aktitaya tarhi sawdehatmatva/^ tatraha matir iti. Mahatvam upapadayati brahmeti. Bhogyag-atadharatvam aha pur iti. Ni^ayatmakatvam aha buddhir iti. Kirti.raktimattvam alia khyatir iti. Niyamanajaktimatvam aha fovara iti. Loke yat prakrzsh/aff* ^/zanam tato*natirekam aha pra^eti. Tatphalam api tato narthantaravishayam ity aha sawvid iti. ^itpradhanatvam aha Mix iti. ^atasarvarthanusawdhana^aktim alia smritis Mi. Ananda Giri.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 24 1

Niyamanajaktimatvam aha fovara iti. Loke yat prakrzsh/aff* ^/zanam tato*natirekam aha pra^eti. Tatphalam api tato narthantaravishayam ity aha sawvid iti. ^itpradhanatvam aha Mix iti. ^atasarvarthanusawdhana^aktim alia smritis Mi. Ananda Giri.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2. 24 1

elude that the text after having enumerated the senses and all the other things mentioned before, in order to point out the highest place, points out by means of the one remaining word, viz. avyakta, the only thing remaining out of those which had been mentioned before, viz. the body. The entire passage aims at conveying the knowledge of the unity of the inward Self and Brahman, by describing the soul's passing through sa^sara and release under the form of a simile in which the body, &c. of the soul — which is affected by Nescience and therefore joined to a body, senses, mind, intellect, objects, sensations, &c. — are compared to a chariot, and so on. — In accordance with this the subsequent verse states the difficulty of knowing the highest place of Vishnu (' the Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect '), and after that the next verse declares Yoga to be the means of attaining that cognition. ' A wise man should keep down speech in the mind, he should keep down the mind in intelligence, intelligence he should keep down within the great Self, and he should keep that within the quiet Self/ — That means : The wise man should restrain the activity of the outer organs such as speech, &c, and abide within the mind only ; he should further restrain the mind which is intent on doubtful external objects within intelli- gence, whose characteristic mark is decision, recognising that indecision is evil; he should further restrain intelligence within the great Self, i. e. the individual soul or else the fundamental intellect ; he should finally fix the great Self on the calm Self, i. e. the highest Self, the highest goal, of which the whole chapter treats. — If we in this manner review the general context, we perceive that there is no room for the pradhana imagined by the Sahkhyas.

2. But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).

It has been asserted, under the preceding Sutra, that the term ' the Undeveloped ' signifies, on account of the general [34] R

242 vedAnta-s^jtras.

subject-matter and because the body only remains, the body and not the pradhana of the Sankhyas. — But here the following doubt arises : How can the word ' unde- veloped ' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i. e. that which is developed or manifested ?

— But here the following doubt arises : How can the word ' unde- veloped ' appropriately denote the body which, as a gross and clearly appearing thing, should rather be called vyakta, i. e. that which is developed or manifested ?

To this doubt the Sutra replies that what the term avyakta denotes is the subtle causal body. Anything subtle may be spoken of as Undeveloped. The gross body indeed cannot directly be termed 'undeveloped,' but the subtle parts of the elements from which the gross body originates may be called so, and that the term de- noting the causal substance is applied to the effect also is a matter of common occurrence ; compare, for instance, the phrase ' mix the Soma with cows, i.e. milk ' (Rig-veda, S. IX, 46, 4). Another scriptural passage also — ' now all this was then undeveloped' (Br/. Up. I, 4, 7) — shows that this, i. e. this developed world with its distinction of names and forms, is capable of being termed undeveloped in so far as in a former condition it was in a merely seminal or potential state, devoid of the later evolved distinctions of name and form.

3. (Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord) ; (for such an admission is) according to reason.

Here a new objection is raised. — If, the opponent says, in order to prove the possibility of the body being called undeveloped you admit that this world in its antecedent seminal condition before either names or forms are evolved can be called undeveloped, you virtually concede the doctrine that the pradhana is the cause of the world. For we Sankhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent condition of the world.

Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 3. 243

For we Sankhyas understand by the term pradhana nothing but that antecedent condition of the world.

Things lie differently, we rejoin. If we admitted some antecedent state of the world as the independent cause of the actual world, we should indeed implicitly admit the

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 3. 243

pradhana doctrine. What we admit is, however, only a previous state dependent on the highest Lord, not an independent state. A previous stage of the world such as the one assumed by us must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For without it the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as he could not become active if he were destitute of the po- tentiality of action. The existence of such a causal poten- tiality renders it moreover possible that the released souls should not enter on new courses of existence, as it is destroyed by perfect knowledge. For that causal potenti- ality is of the nature of Nescience ; it is rightly denoted by the term ' undeveloped ; ' it has the highest Lord for its substratum ; it is of the nature of an illusion ; it is a universal sleep in which are lying the transmigrating souls destitute for the time of the consciousness of their individual character1. This undeveloped principle is some- times denoted by the term cika^a, ether ; so, for instance, in the passage, ' In that Imperishable then, O Gargt, the ether is woven like warp and woof (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 11). Sometimes, again, it is denoted by the term akshara, the Imperishable; so, for instance (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2), 'Higher, than the high Imperishable.' Sometimes it is spoken of as M&ya, illusion ; so, for instance (Sve. Up. IV, 10), ' Know then Prakr/ti is M£y&, and the great Lord he who is affected with M&ya.' For May& is properly called un- developed or non-manifested since it cannot be defined either as that which is or that which is not. — The statement of the Kanaka that ' the Undeveloped is beyond the Great

1 Nanu na bi^ajaktir vidyaya dahyate vastutvad atmavan nety &ha avidyeti. Ke&t tu prati^ivam avidya^aktibhedam ikkh&nti tan na avyaktavyakn'tadirabdayas tasya bhedakabhavad ekatve^pi sva^aktya vi&trakaryakaratv&d ity aha avyakteti. Na ^a tasya ^iva-rrayatvaffz ^ivajabdava^yasya kalpitatvad avidyarupatvat ta^Ma- bdalakshyasya brahmavyatirekad ity alia parame^vareti. Maya- vidyayor bhedad favarasya maya\rrayatva/rc ^lvanam avidya^rayateti vadanta/rc pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino may& paratantra tathaishapity arthafc. Pratitau tasyar Man&peksham aha mahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.

R 2

244 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

Maya- vidyayor bhedad favarasya maya\rrayatva/rc ^lvanam avidya^rayateti vadanta/rc pratyaha mayamayiti. Yatha mayavino may& paratantra tathaishapity arthafc. Pratitau tasyar Man&peksham aha mahasuptir iti. Ananda Giri.

R 2

244 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

one ' is based on the fact of the Great one originating from the Undeveloped, if the Great one be the intellect of Hira^yagarbha. If, on the other hand, we understand by the Great one the individual soul, the statement is founded on the fact of the existence of the individual soul depending on the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience. For the continued existence of the individual soul as such is altogether owing to the relation in which it stands to Nescience. The quality of being beyond the Great one which in the first place belongs to the Undeveloped, i. e. Nescience, is attri- buted to the body which is the product of Nescience, the cause and the effect being considered as identical. Al- though the senses, &c. are no less products of Nescience, the term ' the Undeveloped ' here refers to the body only, the senses, &c. having already been specially mentioned by their individual names, and the body alone being left. — - Other interpreters of the two last Sutras give a somewhat different explanation1. — There are, they say, two kinds of body, the gross one and the subtle one. The gross body is the one which is perceived ; the nature of the subtle one will be explained later on. (Ved. Su. Ill, I, i.) Both these bodies together were in the simile compared to the chariot ; but here (in the passage under discussion) only the subtle body is referred to as the Undeveloped, since the subtle body only is capable of being denoted by that term. And as the soul's passing through bondage and release depends on the subtle body, the latter is said to be beyond the soul, like the things (arthavat), i. e. just as the objects are said to be beyond the senses because the activity of the latter depends on the objects. — But how — we ask those interpreters— is it possible that the word ' Undeveloped ' should refer to the subtle body only, while, according to your opinion, both bodies had in the simile been represented as a chariot, and so equally constitute part of the topic of the chapter, and equally remain (to be mentioned in the

^ 1 Sutradvayasya vr/ttikrz'dvyakhyanam uttMpayati. Go. An, A&iryade,riyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.

I ADHYAYA, \ PADA, 4. 245

Go. An, A&iryade,riyamatam utthapayati. An. Gi.

I ADHYAYA, \ PADA, 4. 245

passage under discussion)? — If you should rejoin that you are authorised to settle the meaning of what the text actually mentions, but not to find fault with what is not mentioned, and that the word avyakta which occurs in the text can denote only the subtle body, but not the gross body which is vyakta, i. e. developed or manifest ; we invalidate this rejoinder by remarking that the determin- ation of the sense depends on the circumstance of the passages interpreted constituting a syntactical whole. For if the earlier and the later passage do not form a whole they convey no sense, since that involves the abandonment of the subject started and the taking up of a new subject. But syntactical unity cannot be established unless it be on the ground of there being a want of a complementary part of speech or sentence. If you therefore construe the connexion of the passages without having regard to the fact that the latter passage demands as its complement that both bodies (which had been spoken of in the former passage) should be understood as referred to, you destroy all syntactical unity and so incapacitate yourselves from arriving at the true meaning of the text. Nor must you think that the second passage occupies itself with the subtle body only, for that reason that the latter is not easily distinguished from the Self, while the gross body is easily so distinguished on account of its readily perceived loath- someness. For the passage does not by any means refer to such a distinction — as we conclude from the circumstance of there being no verb enjoining it — but has for its only subject the highest place of Vishnu, which had been men- tioned immediately before. For after having enumerated a series of things in which the subsequent one is always superior to the one preceding it, it concludes by saying that nothing is beyond the Person. — We might, however, accept the interpretation just discussed without damaging our general argumentation ; for whichever explanation we receive, so much remains clear that the Kanaka passage does not refer to the pradhana.

4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because

246 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.

4. And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because

246 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

there is no statement as to (the avyakta) being something to be cognised.

The Sankhyas, moreover, represent the pradh&na as some- thing to be cognised in so far as they say that from the knowledge of the difference of the constitutive elements of the pradhana and of the soul there results the desired isolation of the soul. For without a knowledge of the nature of those constitutive elements it is impossible to cognise the difference of the soul from them. And some- where they teach that the pradh&na is to be cognised by him who wishes to attain special powers. — Now in the passage under discussion the avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge ; we there meet with the mere word avyakta, and there is no sentence intimating that the avyakta is to be known or meditated upon. And it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of things which (knowledge) is not taught in the text is of any advantage to man. — For this reason also we maintain that the word avyakta cannot denote the pradh&na. — Our interpretation, on the other hand, is unobjectionable, since according to it the passage mentions the body (not as an object of know- ledge, but merely) for the purpose of throwing light on the highest place of Vishnu, in continuation of the simile in which the body had been compared to a chariot.

5. And if you maintain that the text does speak (of the pradh&na as an object of knowledge) we deny that; for the intelligent (highest) Self is meant, on account of the general subject-matter.

Here the Sankhya raises a new objection, and maintains that the averment made in the last Sutra is not proved, since the text later on speaks of the pradhana — which had been referred to as the Undeveloped — as an object of knowledge. ' He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death ' (Ka. Up. II, 3, 1 5). For here the text speaks of the pradh&na,

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 247

which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sankhya-smr/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con- clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta.

247

which is beyond the great, describing it as possessing the same qualities which the Sankhya-smr/ti ascribes to it, and designating it as the object of perception. Hence we con- clude that the pradhana is denoted by the term avyakta.

To this we reply that the passage last quoted does repre- sent as the object of perception not the pradhana but the intelligent, i. e. the highest Self. We conclude this from the general subject-matter. For that the highest Self continues to form the subject-matter is clear from the fol- lowing reasons. In the first place, it is referred to in the passage, 'Beyond the person there is nothing, this is the goal, the highest Road ; ' it has further to be supplied as the object of knowledge in the passage, ' The Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth,5 because it is there spoken of as difficult to know ; after that the restraint of passion, &c. is enjoined as conducive to its cognition, in the passage, ' A wise man should keep down speech within the mind;' and, finally, release from the jaws of death is declared to be the fruit of its knowledge. The Sarikhyas, on the other hand, do not suppose that a man is freed from the jaws of death merely by perceiving the pradhana, but connect that result rather with the cognition of the intelli- gent Self. — The highest Self is, moreover, spoken of in all Vedanta-texts as possessing just those qualities which are mentioned in the passage quoted above, viz. absence of sound, and the like. Hence it follows, that the pradhana is in the text neither spoken of as the object of knowledge nor denoted by the term avyakta,

6. And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana).

To the same conclusion we are led by the consideration of the circumstance that the Ka/^avallt-upanishad brings forward, as subjects of discussion, only three things, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na&ketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired

2 48 vedanta-s£tr as.

the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. These three things only Yama explains, bestowing thereby the boons he had granted, and to them only the questions of Na&ketas refer. Nothing else is mentioned or enquired

2 48 vedanta-s£tr as.

about. The question relative to the fire sacrifice is con- tained in the passage (Ka. Up. I, i, 13), ' Thou knowest, O Death, the fire sacrifice which leads us to Heaven ; tell it to me, who am full of faith.5 The question as to the indi- vidual soul is contained in I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead, some saying, he is ; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee ; this is the third of my boons.5 And the question about the highest Self is asked in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that.5 — The corresponding answers are given in I, 1, 15, 'Yama then told him that fire sacrifice, the beginning of all the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many ; ' in the passage met with con- siderably later on (II, 5, 6; 7), 'Well then, O Gautama, I shall tell thee this mystery, the old Brahman and what happens to the Self after reaching death. Some enter the womb in order to have a body as organic beings, others go into inorganic matter according to their work and according to their knowledge ; 5 and in the passage (I, 2, 18), ' The knowing Self is not born nor does it die,' &c. ; which latter passage dilates at length on the highest Self. But there is no ques- tion relative to the pradhana, and hence no opportunity for any remarks on it.

Here the Sankhya advances a new objection. Is, he asks, the question relative to the Self which is asked in the pas- sage, ' There is that doubt when a man is dead/ &c, again resumed in the passage, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that,5 &c., or does the latter passage raise a distinct new question ? If the former, the two questions about the Self coalesce into one, and there are therefore altogether two questions only, one relative to the fire sacrifice, the other relative to the Self. In that case the Sutra has no right to speak of questions and explanations relating to three subjects. — If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions asked.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 249

— If the latter, you do not consider it a mistake to assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and can therefore not object to us if we assume an explanation about the pradhana in excess of the number of questions asked.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 249

To this we make the following reply. — We by no means assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, being prevented from doing so by the influence of the opening part of that syntactical whole which constitutes the Ka^avalli-upanishad. The Upanishad starts with the topic of the boons granted by Yama, and all the following part of the Upanishad — which is thrown into the form of a colloquy of Yama and Na^iketas — carries on that topic up to the very end. Yama grants to Na^iketas, who had been sent by his father, three boons. For his first boon Na&ketas chooses kindness on the part of his father towards him, for his second boon the knowledge of the fire sacrifice, for his third boon the knowledge of the Self. That the knowledge of the Self is the third boon appears from the indication contained in the passage (I, 1, 10), * There is that doubt — ; this is the third of my boons.' — If we therefore supposed that the passage, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ &c, raises a new question, we should thereby assume a question in excess of the number of boons granted, and thus destroy the connexion of the entire Upanishad. — But — the Sankhyawill perhaps interpose — it must needs be admitted that the pas- sage last quoted does raise a new question, because the subject enquired about is a new one. For the former question refers to the individual soul, as we conclude from the doubt ex- pressed in the words, ' There is that doubt when a man is dead — some saying, he is ; others, he is not.' Now this individual soul, as having definite attributes, &c, cannot constitute the object of a question expressed in such terms as, * This which thou seest as neither this nor that,' &c. ; the highest Self, on the other hand, may be enquired about in such terms, since it is above all attributes. The appearance of the two questions is, moreover, seen to differ ; for the former question refers to existence and non-existence, while the latter is concerned with an entity raised above all definite attributes, &c. Hence we conclude that the latter question, in which the former one cannot be recognised, is a separate question, and does not merely resume the subject of the former one. — All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unitv of the highest Self and the

2 ;0 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

— All this argumentation is not valid, we reply, since we maintain the unitv of the highest Self and the

2 ;0 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

individual Self. If the individual Self were different from the highest Self, we should have to declare that the two questions are separate independent questions, but the two are not really different, as we know from other scrip- tural passages, such as ' Thou art that.' And in the Upani- shad under discussion also the answer to the question, ( That which thou seest as neither this nor that,' viz. the passage, ' The knowing Self is not born, it dies not ' — which answer is given in the form of a denial of the birth and death of the Self — clearly shows that the embodied Self and the highest Self are non-different. For there is room for a denial of something only when that something is possible, and the possibility of birth and death exists in the embodied Self only, since it is connected with the body, but not in the highest Self. — There is, moreover, another passage conveying the same meaning, viz. II, 4, 4, 'The wise when he knows that that by which he perceives all objects in sleep or in waking, is the great omnipresent Self, grieves no more.' This passage makes the cessation of all grief dependent on the knowledge of the individual Self, in so far as it possesses the qualities of greatness and omnipresence, and thereby declares that the individual Self is not different from the highest Self. For that the cessation of all sorrow is con- sequent on the knowledge of the highest Self, is a recognised Vedanta tenet. — There is another passage also warning men not to look on the individual Self and the highest Self as different entities, viz. II, 4, 10, ' What is here the same is there ; and what is there the same is here. He who sees any difference here goes from death to death.' — The fol- lowing circumstance, too, is worthy of consideration. When Na&ketas has asked the question relating to the existence or non-existence of the soul after death, Yama tries to induce him to choose another boon, tempting him with the offer of various objects of desire. But Na&ketas remains firm. Thereupon Death, dwelling on the distinction of the Good and the Pleasant, and the distinction of wisdom and ignor- ance, praises Na&ketas, ' I believe Na&ketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away ' (I, 2, 4) ; and later on praises the question

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 6. 25 I

25 I

asked by Na^iketas, ' The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind ' (I, 3, 12). Now all this means to intimate that the individual Self and the highest Self are non-different. For if Na^iketas set aside the question, by asking which he had earned for himself the praise of Yama, and after having received that praise asked a new question, all that praise would have been bestowed on him unduly. Hence it follows that the question implied in I, 3, 14, ' That which thou seest as neither this nor that/ merely resumes the topic to which the question in I, 1, 20 had referred. — Nor is there any basis to the objection that the two questions differ in form. The second question, in reality, is concerned with the same distinction as the first. The first enquires about the existence of the soul apart from the body, &c. ; the second refers to the circumstance of that soul not being subject to sa^sara. For as long as Nescience remains, so long the soul is affected with definite attributes, &c. ; but as soon as Nescience comes to an end, the soul is one with the highest Self, as is taught by such scriptural texts as ' Thou art that.' But whether Nescience be active or inactive, no difference is made thereby in the thing itself (viz. the soul). A man may, in the dark, mistake a piece of rope lying on the ground for a snake, and run away from it, frightened and trembling; thereon another man may tell him, ' Do not be afraid, it is only a rope, not a snake ; ' and he may then dismiss the fear caused by the imagined snake, and stop running. But all the while the presence and subse- quent absence of his erroneous notion, as to the rope being a snake, make no difference whatever in the rope itself. Exactly analogous is the case of the individual soul which is in reality one with the highest soul, although Nescience makes it appear different. Hence the reply contained in the passage, ' It is not born, it dies not/ is also to be con- sidered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20. — The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which

252 VEDANTA-S#TRAS.

Hence the reply contained in the passage, ' It is not born, it dies not/ is also to be con- sidered as furnishing an answer to the question asked in I, 1, 20. — The Sutra is to be understood with reference to the distinction of the individual Self and the highest Self which

252 VEDANTA-S#TRAS.

results from Nescience. Although the question relating to the Self is in reality one only, yet its former part (I, 1, 20) is seen specially to refer to the individual Self, since there a doubt is set forth as to the existence of the soul when, at the time of death, it frees itself from the body, and since the specific marks of the sawsara-state, such as activity, &c. are not denied ; while the latter part of the question (I, 2, 14), where the state of being beyond all attributes is spoken of, clearly refers to the highest Self. — For these reasons the Sutra is right in assuming three topics of question and explanation, viz. the fire sacrifice, the individual soul, and the highest Self. Those, on the other hand, who assume that the pradhana constitutes a fourth subject discussed in the Upanishad, can point neither to a boon connected with it, nor to a question, nor to an answer. Hence the pradhana hypothesis is clearly inferior to our own.

7. And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.

While the Sankhyas employ the term ' the Great one,' to denote the first-born entity, which is mere existence 1 (? viz. the intellect), the term has a different meaning in Vedic use. This we see from its being connected with the Self, &c. in such passages as the following, ' The great Self is beyond the Intellect ' (Ka. Up. I, 3, 10) ; ' The great omnipresent Self' (Ka. Up. I, 2, %%) ; ' I know that great person ' (6Ve. Up. Ill, 8). We thence conclude that the word avyakta also, where it occurs in the Veda, cannot denote the pradhina. — The pradhana is therefore a mere thing of inference, and not vouched for by Scripture.

8. (It cannot be maintained that a^a means the

1 The commentators give different explanations of the Satta- matra of the text. — Sattamatre sattvapradhanaprakrz'ter adya- paritfame. Go. An. — Bhogapavargapurusharthasya maha^abdi- tabuddhikaryatvat purushapekshitaphalakara/zazrc sad u^yate tatra bhavapratyayo * pi svarupartho na samanyava^i karyanumeyaw mahan na pratyaksham iti matra^abda^. Ananda Giri.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 8. 253

pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated ; as in the case of the cup.

Ananda Giri.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 8. 253

pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated ; as in the case of the cup.

Here the advocate of the pradhana comes again forward and maintains that the absence of scriptural authority for the pradhana is not yet proved. For, he says, we have the following mantra (6Ve. Up. IV, 5), ' There is one ag& \ red, white, and black, producing manifold offspring of the same nature. There is one a^a who loves her and lies by her ; there is another who leaves her after having enjoyed her.' — - In this mantra the words ' red/ * white/ and ' black ' denote the three constituent elements of the pradhana. Passion is called red on account of its colouring, i. e. influencing pro- perty ; Goodness is called white, because it is of the nature of Light ; Darkness is called black on account of its covering and obscuring property. The state of equipoise of the three constituent elements, i. e. the pradhana, is denoted by the at- tributes of its parts, and is therefore called red — white — black. It is further called a^a, i. e. unborn, because it is acknow- ledged to be the fundamental matter out of which everything springs, not a mere effect. — But has not the word a^u the settled meaning of she-goat ? — True ; but the ordinary meaning of the word cannot be accepted in this place, because true knowledge forms the general subject-matter. — That pradhana produces many creatures participating in its three constituent elements. One unborn being loves her and lies by her, i. e. some souls, deluded by ignorance, approach her, and falsely imagining that they experience pleasure or pain, or are in a state of dulness, pass through the course oftransmigratory existence. Other souls, again, which have attained to discriminative knowledge, lose their attachment to prakrzti, and leave her after having enjoyed her, i. e. after she has afforded to them enjoyment and release. — On the ground of this passage, as interpreted above, the

1 As the meaning of the word a^a is going to be discussed, and as the author of the Sutras and *Sarikara seem to disagree as to its meaning (see later on), I prefer to leave the word untranslated in this place. — Sankara reads — and explains, — in the mantra, sarupa^ (not sarupam) and bhuktabhog&m, not bhuktabhogyam.

254 vedanta-s6tr as.

followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana hypothesis.

— Sankara reads — and explains, — in the mantra, sarupa^ (not sarupam) and bhuktabhog&m, not bhuktabhogyam.

254 vedanta-s6tr as.

followers of Kapila claim the authority of Scripture for their pradhana hypothesis.

To this argumentation we reply, that the quoted mantra by no means proves the Sankhya doctrine to be based on Scripture. That mantra, taken by itself, is not able to give additional strength to any doctrine. For, by means of some supposition or other, the terms a^*a, &c. can be reconciled with any doctrine, and there is no reason for the special assertion that the Sankhya doctrine only is meant. The case is analogous to that of the cup mentioned in the mantra, * There is a cup having its mouth below and its bottom above' (Br/. Up. II, 2, 3). Just as it is impossible to decide on the ground of this mantra taken by itself what special cup is meant — it being possible to ascribe, somehow or other, the quality of the mouth being turned downward to any cup — ; so here also there is no special quality stated, so that it is not possible to decide from the mantra itself whether the pradhana is meant by the term a^-a, or some- thing else. — But in connexion with the mantra about the cup we have a supplementary passage from which we learn what kind of cup is meant, ' What is called the cup having its mouth below and its bottom above is this head/ — Whence, however, can we learn what special being is meant by the a^-a of the vSveta^vatara-upanishad ? — To this question the next Sutra replies.

9. But the (elements) beginning with light (are meant by the term a^i) ; for some read so in their text.

By the term a^a we have to understand the causal matter of the four classes of beings, which matter has sprung from the highest Lord and begins with light, i. e. comprises fire, water, and earth. — The word ' but ' (in the Sutra) gives emphasis to the assertion. — This a^a. is to be considered as comprising three elementary substances, not as consisting of three gu^as in the Sankhya sense. We draw this conclusion from the fact that one ^akha, after having related how fire, water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on. ' The red colour of burning fire

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9. 255

We draw this conclusion from the fact that one ^akha, after having related how fire, water, and earth sprang from the highest Lord, assigns to them red colour, and so on. ' The red colour of burning fire

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 9. 255

(agni) is the colour of the elementary fire (te^as), its white colour is the colour of water, its black colour the colour of earth/ &c. Now those three elements — fire, water, and earth — we recognise in the vSVetcLrvatara passage, as the words red, white, and black are common to both passages, and as these words primarily denote special colours and can be applied to the Sankhya gu/zas in a secondary sense only. That passages whose sense is beyond doubt are to be used for the interpretation of doubtful passages, is a generally acknow- ledged rule. As we therefore find that in the 5veta^vatara — after the general topic has been started in 1, 1, ' The Brahman- students say, Is Brahman the cause?' — the text, previous to the passage under discussion, speaks of a power of the highest Lord which arranges the whole world (' the Sages devoted to meditation and concentration have seen the power belonging to God himself, hidden in its own qualities ') ; and as further that same power is referred to in two subsequent complementary passages (' Know then, Prakrzti is Maya, and the great Lord he who is affected with Maya ; ' ' who being one only rules over every germ ;' IV, 10, 11) ; it cannot possibly be asserted that the mantra treating of the a^*a refers to some independent causal matter called pradhana. We rather assert, on the ground of the general subject-matter, that the mantra describes the same divine power referred to in the other passages, in which names and forms lie unevolved, and which we assume as the antecedent condition of that state of the world in which names and forms are evolved. And that divine power is represented as three-coloured, because its products, viz. fire, water, and earth, have three distinct colours. — But how can we maintain, on the ground of fire, water, and earth having three colours, that the causal matter is appropriately called a three-coloured a£*a? if we consider, on the one hand, that the exterior form of the genus a^a (i. e. goat) does not inhere in fire, water, and earth ; and, on the other hand, that Scripture teaches fire, water, and earth to have been pro- duced, so that the word a^a cannot be taken in the sense 'non-produced1/ — To this question the next Sutra replies.

1 Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the

256 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing con- trary to reason (in a^a denoting the causal matter) ; just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.

1 Here there seems to be a certain discrepancy between the

256 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

10. And on account of the statement of the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing con- trary to reason (in a^a denoting the causal matter) ; just as in the case of honey (denoting the sun) and similar cases.

The word a£*a neither expresses that fire, water, and earth belong to the goat species, nor is it to be explained as meaning 'unborn;' it rather expresses an assumption, i.e. it intimates the assumption of the source of all beings (which source comprises fire, water, and earth), being compared to a she-goat. For as accidentally some she-goat might be partly red, partly white, partly black, and might have many young goats resembling her in colour, and as some he-goat might love her and lie by her, while some other he-goat might leave her after having enjoyed her ; so the universal causal matter which is tri-coloured, because comprising fire, water, and earth, produces many inanimate and animate beings similar to itself, and is enjoyed by the souls fettered by Nescience, while it is abandoned by those souls which have attained true knowlege. — Nor must we imagine that the distinction of individual souls, which is implied in the preceding explanation, involves that reality of the multi- plicity of souls which forms one of the tenets of other philo- sophical schools. For the purport of the passage is to intimate, not the multiplicity of souls, but the distinction of

views of the Sutra writer and -Sahkara. GovincMnanda notes that according to the Bhashyakr/'t ag& means simply maya — which interpretation is based on prakarawa— while, according to the Sutra- krz't, who explains a^a on the ground of the iTMndogya-passage treating of the three primary elements, a^a denotes the aggregate of those three elements constituting an avantaraprakrzti. — On *Sah- kara's explanation the term a^a presents no difficulties, for mayd is a^-a, i.e. unborn, not produced. On the explanation of the Sutra writer, however, a^u cannot mean unborn, since the three primary elements are products. Hence we are thrown back on the r&d/ii signification of a^a, according to which it means she-goat. But how can the avantara-prakrz'ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next Sutra replies.

I ADHYAYA, \ PADA, II. 257

Hence we are thrown back on the r&d/ii signification of a^a, according to which it means she-goat. But how can the avantara-prakrz'ti be called a she-goat? To this question the next Sutra replies.

I ADHYAYA, \ PADA, II. 257

the states of bondage and release. This latter distinction is explained with reference to the multiplicity of souls as ordinarily conceived ; that multiplicity, however, depends altogether on limiting adjuncts, and is the unreal product of wrong knowledge merely ; as we know from scriptural passages such as, ' He is the one God hidden in all beings, all-pervading, the Self in all beings,5 &c. — The words ' like the honey ' (in the Sutra) mean that just as the sun, although not being honey, is represented as honey (Kh. Up. Ill, 1), and speech as a cow (Br/. Up. V, 8), and the heavenly world, &c. as the fires (Br/. Up. VI, 2, 9), so here the causal matter, although not being a she-goat, is metaphori- cally represented as one. There is therefore nothing con- trary to reason in the circumstance of the term a^a being used to denote the aggregate of fire, water, and earth.

11. (The assertion that there is scriptural autho- rity for the pradhana, &c. can) also not (be based) on the mention of the number (of the Sankhya categories), on account of the diversity (of the categories) and on account of the excess (over the number of those categories).

The attempt to base the Sankhya doctrine on the mantra speaking of the a^*a having failed, the Sankhya again comes forward and points to another mantra : ' He in whom the five "five-people" and the ether rest, him alone I believe to be the Self; I who know believe him to be Brahman' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 17). In this mantra we have one word which expresses the number ftvz, viz. the five-people, and then another word, viz. five, which qualifies the former ; these two words together therefore convey the idea of five pentads, i.e. twenty-five. Now as many beings as the number twenty- five presupposes, just so many categories the Sankhya system counts. Cp. Sankhya Karika, 3 : ' The funda- mental causal substance (i.e. the pradhana) is not an effect. Seven (substances), viz. the Great one (Intellect), and so on, are causal substances as well as effects. Sixteen are effects. The soul is neither a causal substance nor an effect.' [34] S

258 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

As therefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five categories taught in the Sankhya-smrzti, it follows that the doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.

As therefore the number twenty-five, which occurs in the scriptural passage quoted, clearly refers to the twenty-five categories taught in the Sankhya-smrzti, it follows that the doctrine of the pradhana, &c. rests on a scriptural basis.

To this reasoning we make the following reply. — It is impossible to base the assertion that the pradhana, &c. have Scripture in their favour on the reference to their number which you pretend to find in the text, ' on account of the diversity of the Sankhya categories.' The Sankhya categories have each their individual difference, and there are no attributes belonging in common to each pentad on account of which the number twenty-five could be divided into five times five. For a number of individually separate things can, in general, not be combined into smaller groups of two or three, &c. unless there be a special reason for such combination. — Here the Sankhya will perhaps rejoin that the expression five (times) five is used only to denote the number twenty-five which has five pentads for its constituent parts; just as the poem says, 'five years and seven Indra did not rain,' meaning only that there was no rain for twelve years. — But this explanation also is not tenable. In the first place, it is liable to the objection that it has recourse to indirect indication 1. — In the second place, the second ' five ' constitutes a compound with the word 'people,' the Brahma/za-accent showing that the two form one word only2. To the same conclusion we are led by another passage also (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 3, 2, pankkniitn tva pa^a^ananam, &c.) where the two terms constitute one word, have one accent and one case-

1 Indication (laksha#a, which consists in this case in five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct meaning.

2 That ^nk&gzx&h is only one word appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which udatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika Sutra for the accentuation of the ^atapatha-brahmawa.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, II. 259

2 That ^nk&gzx&h is only one word appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which udatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika Sutra for the accentuation of the ^atapatha-brahmawa.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, II. 259

termination. The word thus being a compound there is neither a repetition of the word 'five,' involving two pentads, nor does the one five qualify the other, as the mere secondary member of a compound cannot be qualified by another word. — But as the people are already denoted to be five by the compound ' five-people,' the effect of the other 'five' qualifying the compound will be that we understand twenty-five people to be meant; just as the expression 'five five-bundles' (panka, pankapvXyah) conveys the idea of twenty-five bundles. — The instance is not an analogous one, we reply. The word ' pa#/£apuli ' denotes a unity (i. e. one bundle made up of five bundles), and hence when the question arises, ' How many such bundles are there ? ' it can be qualified by the word ' five,' indicating that there are five such bundles. The word pa^a^ana//, on the other hand, conveys at once the idea of distinction (i.e. of five distinct things), so that there is no room at all for a further desire to know how many people there are, and hence no room for a further qualification. And if the word 'five' be taken as a qualifying word it can only qualify the numeral five (in five-people); the objection against which assumption has already been stated. — For all these reasons the expression the five five-people cannot denote the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas. — This is further not possible ' on account of the excess.' For on the Sankhya interpretation there would be an excess over the number twenty-five, owing to the circumstance of the ether and the Self being mentioned separately. The Self is spoken of as the abode in which the five five-people rest, the clause ' Him I believe to be the Self being connected with the 'in whom' of the antecedent clause. Now the Self is the intelligent soul of the Sahkhyas which is already included in the twenty-five categories, and which therefore, on their interpretation of the passage, would here be mentioned once as constituting the abode and once as what rests in the abode! If, on the other hand, the soul were supposed not to be comprised in the twenty-five categories, the Sankhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the categories being twenty-five. The same

S 2

2 6o vedanta-sOtras.

If, on the other hand, the soul were supposed not to be comprised in the twenty-five categories, the Sankhya would thereby abandon his own doctrine of the categories being twenty-five. The same

S 2

2 6o vedanta-sOtras.

remarks apply to the separate mention made of the ether. — How, finally, can the mere circumstance of a certain number being referred to in the sacred text justify the assumption that what is meant are the twenty-five Sankhya categories of which Scripture speaks in no other place? especially if we consider that the word ^ana has not the settled meaning of category, and that the number may be satisfactorily accounted for on another interpretation of the passage.

How, then, the Sankhya will ask, do you interpret the phrase 'the five five-people?' — On the ground, we reply, of the rule Pacini II, i, 50, according to which certain compounds formed with numerals are mere names. The word pankaganAk thus is not meant to convey the idea of the number five, but merely to denote certain classes of beings. Hence the question may present itself, How many such classes are there? and to this question an answer is given by the added numeral 'five.' There are certain classes of beings called five-people, and these classes are five. Analogously we may speak of the seven seven- rzshis, where again the compound denotes a class of beings merely, not their number. — Who then are those five- people? — To this question the next Sutra replies.

12. (The pa^a^ana/^ are) the breath and so on, (as is seen) from the complementary passage.

The mantra in which the pa^a^ana^ are ^mentioned is followed by another one in which breath and four other things are mentioned for the purpose of describing the nature of Brahman. ' They who know the breath of breath, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of food, the mind of mind V Hence we conclude, on the ground of proximity, that the five-people are the beings mentioned in this latter mantra. — But how, the Sankhya asks, can the word ' people ' be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear, and so on ? — How, we ask in return, can it be

1 So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad ; the Ka«va recension has not the clause ' the food of food/

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 12. 26 1

— But how, the Sankhya asks, can the word ' people ' be applied to the breath, the eye, the ear, and so on ? — How, we ask in return, can it be

1 So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad ; the Ka«va recension has not the clause ' the food of food/

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 12. 26 1

applied to your categories? In both cases the common meaning of the word ' people ' has to be disregarded ; but in favour of our explanation is the fact that the breath, the eye, and so on, are mentioned in a complementary passage. The breath, the eye, &c. may be denoted by the word ' people ' because they are connected with people. Moreover, we find the word * person/ which means as much as 'people/ applied to the pra^as in the passage, 'These are the five persons of Brahman5 (Kk. Up. Ill, 13, 6) ; and another passage runs, ' Breath is father, breath is mother,' &c. {Kk. Up. VII, 15, 1). And, owing to the force of composition, there is no objection to the compound being taken in its settled conventional meaning *. — But how can the conventional meaning be had recourse to, if there is no previous use of the word in that meaning? — That may be done, we reply, just as in the case of udbhid and similar words 2. We often infer that a word of unknown meaning refers to some known thing because it is used in connexion with the latter. So, for instance, in the case of the fol- lowing words : ' He is to sacrifice with the udbhid ; he cuts the yupa ; he makes the vedi.' Analogously we conclude that the term pa^a^ana/^, which, from the grammatical rule quoted, is known to be a name, and which there- fore demands a thing of which it is the name, denotes the breath, the eye, and so on, which are connected with it through their being mentioned in a complementary passage. — Some commentators explain the word pa«£a-

1 This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to ^ana when applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of lakshawa; while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhana being ^ana because it produces, the mahat &c. being ^ana because they are produced). The Vedantin points out that the compound pa^a^ana^ has its own xhdhi- meaning, just as a^vakarwa, literally horse-ear, which conventionally denotes a certain plant.

2 We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that the yupa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.

262 VEDANTA-SUTR AS.

2 We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that the yupa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.

262 VEDANTA-SUTR AS.

ganak to mean the Gods, the Fathers, the Gandharvas, the Asuras, and the Rakshas. Others, again, think that the four castes together with the Nishadas are meant. Again, some scriptural passage (Rzg-veda Sa^h. VIII, 53, 7) speaks of the tribe of ' the five-people,' meaning thereby the created beings in general ; and this latter explanation also might be applied to the passage under discussion. The teacher (the Sutrakara), on the other hand, aiming at showing that the passage does not refer to the twenty-five categories of the Sankhyas, declares that on the ground of the complementary passage breath, &c. have to be under- stood.

Well, let it then be granted that the five-people mentioned in the Madhyandina-text are breath, &c. since that text mentions food also (and so makes up the number five). But how shall we interpret the Ka^va-text which does not mention food (and thus altogether speaks of four things only) ? — To this question the next Sutra replies.

13. In the case of (the text of) some (the Ka^vas) where food is not mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding mantra).

The Ka;2va-text, although not mentioning food, makes up the full number five, by the light mentioned in the mantra preceding that in which the five-people are spoken of. That mantra describes the nature of Brahman by saying, ' Him the gods worship as the light of lights.'— If it be asked how it is accounted for that the light mentioned in both texts equally is in one text to be employed for the expla- nation of the five-people, and not in the other text ; we reply that the reason lies in the difference of the requirements. As the Madhyandinas meet in one and the same mantra with breath and four other entities enabling them to interpret the term, 'the five-people,' they are in no need of the light mentioned in another mantra. The Ka/zvas, on the other hand, cannot do without the light. The case is analogous to that of the Sho^arin-cup, which, according to different

I ADHYAYA, \ PADA, 1 4. 263

passages, is either to be offered or not to be offered at the atiratra-sacrifice.

We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine of the pradhana. That this doctrine can- not be proved either by Smrzti or by ratiocination will be shown later on.

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta- passages with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on ; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being re- presented (in one passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta- passages with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on ; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being re- presented (in one passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).

In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has been established ; it has been shown that all the Vedanta-texts have Brahman for their common topic ; and it has been proved that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhana. — But now a new objection presents itself

It is not possible — our opponent says — to prove either that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict one another. All the Vedanta-passages which treat of the creation enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality speak of different creations. In one place it is said that from the Self there sprang the ether (Taitt. Up. II, 1); in another place that the creation began with fire (K/i. Up. VI, 2, 3) ; in another place, again, that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr. Up.VI, 4) ; in another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water (above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the earth) (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 3; 3). There no order is stated at all. Somewhere else it is said that the creation origi- nated from the Non-existent. ' In the beginning this was non-existent ; from it was born what exists' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) ; and, ' In the beginning this was non-existent ; it became existent; it grew' (Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1). In another place,

264 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the ante- cedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent men- tioned in its stead. ' Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not ; but how could it be thus, my dear ? How could that which is be born of that which is not?' (Kk. Up. VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place, again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place spontaneously, ' Now all this was then undeveloped. It became developed by form and name ' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 7)* — As therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of an accomplished matter 1, the Vedanta-passages cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of Smrzti and Reasoning.

To this we make the following reply. — Although the Vedanta-passages may be conflicting with regard to the order of the things created, such as ether and so on, they do not conflict with regard to the creator, 'on account of his being represented as described.' That means : such as the creator is described in any one Vedanta-passage, viz. as all-knowing, the Lord of all, the Self of all, without a second, so he is represented in all other Vedanta-passages also. Let us consider, for instance, the description of Brahman (given in Taitt. Up. II, 1 fT.). There it is said at first, 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman.' Here the word 'knowledge,' and so likewise the statement, made later on, that Brahman desired (II, 6), intimate that Brah- man is of the nature of intelligence. Further, the text declares 2 that the cause of the world is the general Lord, by representing it as not dependent on anything else. It further applies to the cause of the world the term ' Self (II, 1), and it represents it as abiding within the series of sheaths begin-

1 Option being possible only in the case of things to be accom- plished, i.e. actions.

2 According to Go. An. in the passage, 'That made itself its Self (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, 'He created air (II, 6).

I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 1 4. 265

actions.

2 According to Go. An. in the passage, 'That made itself its Self (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, 'He created air (II, 6).

I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 1 4. 265

ning with the gross body ; whereby it affirms it to be the internal Self within all beings. Again — in the passage, ' May I be many, may I grow forth ' — it tells how the Self became many, and thereby declares that the creator is non- different from the created effects. And — in the passage, 'He created all this whatever there is' — it represents the creator as the Cause of the entire world, and thereby declares him to have been without a second previously to the creation. The same characteristics which in the above passages are predicated of Brahman, viewed as the Cause of the world, we find to be predicated of it in other passages also, so, for instance, ' Being only, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second. It thought, may I be man)', may I grow forth. It sent forth fire 3 (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 1 ; 3), and ' In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing else blinking whatsoever. He thought, shall I send forth worlds? ' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1 ; 2.) The Vedanta-passages which are concerned with setting forth the cause of the world are thus in harmony through- out.— On the other hand, there are found conflicting state- ments concerning the world, the creation being in some places said to begin with ether, in other places with fire, and so on. But, in the first place, it cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world affects the statements concerning the cause, i. e. Brahman, in which all the Vedanta-texts are seen to agree — for that would be an altogether unfounded generalization; — and, in the second place, the teacher will reconcile later on (II, 3) those con- flicting passages also which refer to the world. And, to consider the matter more thoroughly, a conflict of state- ments regarding the world would not even matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar topics are not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither observe nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on those matters in any way ; nor have we the right to assume such a thing ; because we conclude from the intro- ductory and concluding clauses that the passages about the creation and the like form only subordinate members of passages treating of Brahman. That all the passages

266 vedanta-sIjtras.

That all the passages

266 vedanta-sIjtras.

setting forth the creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture itself declares ; compare Kh. Up. VI, 8, 4, ' As food too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. water. And as water too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. fire. And as fire too is an offshoot, seek after its root, viz. the True/ We, moreover, understand that by- means of comparisons such as that of the clay (Kh. Up. VI, i, 4) the creation is described merely for the purpose of teaching us that the effect is not really different from the cause. Analogously it is said by those who know the sacred tradition, ' If creation is represented by means of (the similes of) clay, iron, sparks, and other things ; that is only a means for making it understood that (in reality) there is no difference whatever' (Gaudap. Ka. Ill, 15). — On the other hand, Scripture expressly states the fruits connected with the knowledge of Brahman, ' He who knows Brahman obtains the highest ' (Taitt. Up. II, 1) ; ' He who knows the Self overcomes grief ' {Kh. Up. VII, 1, 3); 'A man who knows him passes over death' (vSVe. Up. Ill, 8). That fruit is, moreover, apprehended by intuition (pratyaksha), for as soon as, by means of the doctrine, ' That art thou,' a man has arrived at the knowledge that the Self is non- transmigrating, its transmigrating nature vanishes for him.

It remains to dispose of the assertion that passages such as ' Non-being this was in the beginning ' contain conflicting statements about the nature of the cause. This is done in the next Sutra.

15. On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).

The passage ' Non-being indeed was this in the beginning ' (Taitt. Up. II, 7) does not declare that the cause of the world is the absolutely Non-existent which is devoid of all Selfhood. For in the preceding sections of the Upani- shad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is (' He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 5. 267

For in the preceding sections of the Upani- shad Brahman is distinctly denied to be the Non-existing, and is defined to be that which is (' He who knows the Brahman as non-existing becomes himself non-existing.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, I 5. 267

He who knows the Brahman as existing him we know himself as existing ') ; it is further, by means of the series of sheaths, viz. the sheath of food, &c, represented as the inner Self of everything. This same Brahman is again referred to in the clause, ' He wished, may I be many;' is declared to have originated the entire creation ; and is finally referred to in the clause, ' Therefore the wise call it the true.' Thereupon the text goes on to say, with reference to what has all along been the topic of discussion, ' On this there is also this jloka, Non-being indeed was this in the beginning,5 &c. If here the term ' Non-being ' denoted the absolutely Non-existent, the whole context would be broken ; for while ostensibly referring to one matter the passage would in reality treat of a second altogether different matter. We have therefore to conclude that, while the term ' Being ' ordinarily denotes that which is differentiated by names and forms, the term ' Non-being ' denotes the same substance previous to its differentiation, i. e. that Brahman is, in a secondary sense of the word, called Non-being, previously to the origination of the world. The same interpretation has to be applied to the passage ' Non-being this was in the beginning' {Kh. Up. Ill, 19, 1); for that passage also is connected with another passage which runs, { It became being ;' whence it is evident that the ' Non- being ' of the former passage cannot mean absolute Non- existence. And in the passage, ' Others say, Non-being this was in the beginning ' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 1), the reference to the opinion of ' others ' does not mean that the doctrine referred to (according to which the world was originally absolutely non-existent) is propounded somewhere in the Veda ; for option is possible in the case of actions but not in the case of substances. The passage has therefore to be looked upon as a refutation of the tenet of primitive absolute non-existence as fancifully propounded by some teachers of inferior intelligence ; a refutation undertaken for the purpose of strengthening the doctrine that this world has sprung from that which is. — The following passage again, ' Now this was then undeveloped/ &c. (Br/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert that the evolution of

268 vedanta-s6tras.

— The following passage again, ' Now this was then undeveloped/ &c. (Br/. Up. I, 4, 7), does not by any means assert that the evolution of

268 vedanta-s6tras.

the world took place without a ruler ; as we conclude from the circumstance of its being connected with another passage in which the ruler is represented as entering into the evolved world of effects, ' He entered thither to the very tips of the finger-nails/ &c. If it were supposed that the evolution of the world takes place without a ruler, to whom could the subsequent pronoun 'he' refer (in the passage last quoted) which manifestly is to be connected with something previously intimated? And as Scripture declares that the Self, after having entered into the body, is of the nature of intelligence (' when seeing, eye by name ; when hearing, ear by name ; when thinking, mind by name '), it follows that it is intelligent at the time of its entering also. — We, moreover, must assume that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present seen to develop itself by names and forms, viz. under the rulership of an intelligent creator; for we have no right to make assumptions contrary to what is at present actually observed. Another scriptural passage also declares that the evolution of the world took place under the superintendence of a ruler, ' Let me now enter these beings with this living Self, and let me then evolve names and forms y (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2). The in- transitive expression ' It developed itself (vyakriyata; it became developed) is to be viewed as having reference to the ease with which the real agent, viz. the Lord, brought about that evolution. Analogously it is said, for instance, that 'the cornfield reaps itself (i.e. is reaped with the greatest ease), although there is the reaper sufficient (to account for the work being done). — Or else we may look on the form vyakriyata as having reference to a necessarily implied agent ; as is the case in such phrases as ' the village is being approached ' (where we necessarily have to supply ' by Devadatta or somebody else ').

16. (He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the * work ') denotes the world.

In the Kaushitaki-brahma^a, in the dialogue of Balaki and A^ata^atru, we read, ' O Balaki, he who is the maker of

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 6. 269

those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.

269

those persons, he of whom this is the work, he alone is to be known' (Kau. Up. IV, 19). The question here arises whether what is here inculcated as the object of knowledge is the individual soul or the chief vital air or the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the vital air is meant. For, in the first place, he says, the clause ' of whom this is the work' points to the activity of motion, and that activity rests on the vital air. In the second place, we meet with the word ' pra/za ' in a complementary passage (' Then he becomes one with that pra/za alone '), and that word is well known to denote the vital air. In the third place, pra^a is the maker of all the persons, the person in the sun, the person in the moon, &c, who in the preceding part of the dialogue had been enumerated by Balaki ; for that the sun and the other divinities are mere differentiations of pra^a we know from another scriptural passage, viz. ' Who is that one god (in whom all the other gods are contained)? Pra/za and he is Brahman, and they call him That ' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 9). — Or else, the purvapakshin continues, the passage under discussion represents the individual soul as the object of knowledge. For of the soul also it can be said that ' this is the work,' if we understand by ' this ' all meritorious and non-meritorious actions ; and the soul also, in so far as it is the enjoyer, can be viewed as the maker of the persons enumerated in so far as they are instru- mental to the soul's fruition. The complementary passage, moreover, contains an inferential mark of the individual soul. For A^ata^atru, in order to instruct Balaki about the ' maker of the persons ' who had been proposed as the object of knowledge, calls a sleeping man by various names and convinces Balaki, by the circumstance that the sleeper does not hear his shouts, that the pra^a and so on are not the enjoyers ; he thereupon wakes the sleeping man by pushing him with his stick, and so makes Balaki compre- hend that the being capable of fruition is the individual soul which is distinct from the pra^a. A subsequent passage also contains an inferential mark of the individual soul, viz. ' And as the master feeds with his people, nay, as his people feed on the master, thus does this conscious Self feed with

2 70 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

the other Selfs, thus those Selfs feed on the conscious Self (Kau. Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the pra/za, it may itself be called pra^a. — We thus conclude that the passage under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief vital air ; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks whatever.

Up. IV, 20). And as the individual soul is the support of the pra/za, it may itself be called pra^a. — We thus conclude that the passage under discussion refers either to the individual soul or to the chief vital air ; but not to the Lord, of whom it contains no inferential marks whatever.

To this we make the following reply. — The Lord only can be the maker of the persons enumerated, on account of the force of the introductory part of the section. Balaki begins his colloquy with A^-ata^atru with the offer, ' Shall I tell you Brahman ? ' Thereupon he enumerates some individual souls residing in the sun, the moon, and so on, which participate in the sight of the secondary Brahman, and in the end becomes silent. A^ataj-atru then sets aside Balaki's doctrine as not referring to the chief Brahman — with the words, ' Vainly did you challenge me, saying, Shall I tell you Brahman,5 &c. — and proposes the maker of all those individual souls as a new object of knowledge. If now that maker also were merely a soul participating in the sight of the secondary Brahman, the introductory statement which speaks of Brahman would be futile. Hence it follows that the highest Lord himself is meant. — None, moreover, but the highest Lord is capable of being the maker of all those persons as he only is absolutely independent. — Further, the clause lof whom this is the work ' does not refer either to the activity of motion nor to meritorious and non-meritorious actions ; for neither of those two is the topic of discussion or has been men- tioned previously. Nor can the term ' work ' denote the enumerated persons, since the latter are mentioned separ- ately— in the clause, ' He who is the maker of those per- sons ' — and as inferential marks (viz. the neuter gender and the singular number of the word karman, work) contradict that assumption. Nor, again, can the term c work ' denote either the activity whose object the persons are, or the result of that activity, since those two are already implied in the mention of the agent (in the clause, * He who is the maker '). Thus there remains no other alternative than to

I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, I 7. 271

Thus there remains no other alternative than to

I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, I 7. 271

take the pronoun ' this ' (in ' He of whom this is the work ') as denoting the perceptible world and to understand the same world — as that which is made — by the term ' work.' — We may indeed admit that the world also is not the previous topic of discussion and has not been mentioned before ; still, as no specification is mentioned, we conclude that the term 'work' has to be understood in a general sense, and thus denotes what first presents itself to the mind, viz. everything which exists in general. It is, more- over, not true that the world is not the previous topic of discussion ; we are rather entitled to conclude from the cir- cumstance that the various persons (in the sun, the moon, &c.) which constitute a part of the world had been specially mentioned before, that the passage in question is concerned with the whole world in general. The conjunction 'or' (in ' or he of whom,' &c) is meant to exclude the idea of limited makership ; so that the whole passage has to be inter- preted as follows, e He who is the maker of those persons forming a part of the world, or rather — to do away with this limitation — he of whom this entire world without any exception is the work.' The special mention made of the persons having been created has for its purpose to show that those persons whom B&laki had proclaimed to be Brahman are not Brahman. The passage therefore sets forth the maker of the world in a double aspect, at first as the creator of a special part of the world and thereupon as the creator of the whole remaining part of the world ; a way of speaking analogous to such every-day forms of ex- pression as, ' The wandering mendicants are to be fed, and then the Brahma/zas V And that the maker of the world is the highest Lord is affirmed in all Vedanta-texts.

17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air ; we reply that that has already been explained.

1 By the Brahma^as being meant all those Brahmarcas who are not at the same time wandering mendicants.

272 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

17. If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air ; we reply that that has already been explained.

1 By the Brahma^as being meant all those Brahmarcas who are not at the same time wandering mendicants.

272 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

It remains for us to refute the objection that on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air, which are met with in the complementary- passage, either the one or the other must be meant in the passage under discussion, and not the highest Lord. — We therefore remark that that objection has already been disposed of under I, 1, 31. There it was shown that from an interpretation similar to the one here proposed by the purvapakshin there would result a threefold meditation, one having Brahman for its object, a second one directed on the individual soul, and a third one connected with the chief vital air. Now the same result would present itself in our case, and that would be unacceptable as we must infer from the introductory as well as the concluding clauses, that the passage under discussion refers to Brah- man. With reference to the introductory clause this has been already proved ; that the concluding passage also refers to Brahman, we infer from the fact of there being stated in it a pre-eminently high reward, ' Warding off all evil he who knows this obtains pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy.' — But if this is so, the sense of the passage under discussion is already settled by the discussion of the passage about Pratarda^a (I, [, 31); why, then, the present Sutra ? — No, we reply ; the sense of our passage is not yet settled, since under I, 1, 31 it has not been proved that the clause, ' Or he whose work is this/ refers to Brahman. Hence there arises again, in con- nexion with the present passage, a doubt whether the individual soul and the chief vital air may not be meant, and that doubt has again to be refuted. — The word pra^a occurs, moreover, in the sense of Brahman, so in the passage, 'The mind settles down on pra^a' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 2). — The inferential marks of the individual soul also have, on account of the introductory and concluding clauses referring to Brahman, to be explained so as not to give rise to any discrepancy.

18. But Caimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has another purport, on account of

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, l8. 273

the question and answer ; and thus some also (read in their text).

18. But Caimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has another purport, on account of

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, l8. 273

the question and answer ; and thus some also (read in their text).

Whether the passage under discussion is concerned with the individual soul or with Brahman, is, in the opinion of the teacher £aimini, no matter for dispute, since the reference to the individual soul has a different purport, i. e. aims at intimating Brahman. He founds this his opinion on a question and a reply met with in the text. After A^dta^atru has taught Balaki, by waking the sleeping man, that the soul is different from the vital air, he asks the following question, ' Balaki, where did this person here sleep? Where was he? Whence came he thus back?' This question clearly refers to something different from the individual soul. And so likewise does the reply, 'When sleeping he sees no dream, then he becomes one with that pra^a alone ;' and, ' From that Self all pra^as proceed, each towards its place, from the pra^as the gods, from the gods the worlds.' — Now it is the general Vedanta doctrine that at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds, inclusive of pra«a, and so on. When Scripture therefore represents as the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep of the soul, characterised by absence of consciousness and utter tran- quillity, i. e. a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the soul returns when the sleep is broken ; we understand that the highest Self is meant. — Moreover, the Va^asaneyuakha, which likewise contains the colloquy of Balaki and A^ata^atru, clearly refers to the individual soul by means of the term, ' the person consisting of cog- nition ' (vi^Tzanamaya), and distinguishes from it the highest Self (' Where was then the person consisting of cognition ? and from whence did he thus come back?'B;^'. Up. II, 1, 16) ; and later on, in the reply to the above question, declares that ' the person consisting of cognition lies in the ether within the heart.' Now we know that the word ' ether ' may be used to denote the highest Self, as, for instance, in [34] T

2 74 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

the passage about the small ether within the lotus of the heart (Kk. Up. VIII, i, 1). Further on the Br/. Up. says, 'All the Selfs came forth from that Self;' by which state- ment of the coming forth of all the conditioned Selfs it intimates that the highest Self is the one general cause. — The doctrine conveyed by the rousing of the sleeping person, viz. that the individual soul is different from the vital air, furnishes at the same time a further argument against the opinion that the passage under discussion refers to the vital air.

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

We read in the Br/hadara/zyaka, in the Maitreyi-brah- ma/za the following passage, ' Verily, a husband is not dear that you may love the husband, &c. &c. ; verily, everything is not dear that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self therefore everything is dear. Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O Maitreyt ! When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known ' (Br/. Up. IV, 5, 6).— Here the doubt arises whether that which is repre- sented as the object to be seen, to be heard, and so on, is the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the highest Self. — But whence the doubt ?— Because, we reply, the Self is, on the one hand, by the mention of dear things such as husband and so on, indicated as the enjoyer whence it appears that the passage refers to the individual soul ; and because, on the other hand, the declaration that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known points to the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that the passage refers to the individual soul, on account of the strength of the initial statement. The text declares at the outset that all the objects of enjoyment found in this world, such as husband, wife, riches, and so on, are dear on account of the Self, and thereby gives us to understand that the enjoying (i. e. the

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 1 9. 275

individual) Self is meant ; if thereupon it refers to the Self as the object of sight and so on, what other Self should it mean than the same individual Self? — A subsequent passage also (viz. * Thus does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out of these elements, and vanish again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge5), which describes how the great Being under discussion rises, as the Self of knowledge, from the elements, shows that the object of sight is no other than the cognitional Self, i.e. the individual soul. The concluding clause finally, ' How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' shows, by means of the term 'knower,' which denotes an agent, that the individual soul is meant. The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything becomes known must therefore not be inter- preted in the literal sense, but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is known through its relation to the enjoying soul.

The declaration that through the cognition of the Self everything becomes known must therefore not be inter- preted in the literal sense, but must be taken to mean that the world of objects of enjoyment is known through its relation to the enjoying soul.

To this we make the following reply. — The passage makes a statement about the highest Self, on account of the connected meaning of the entire section. If we consider the different passages in their mutual connexion, we find that they all refer to the highest Self. After Maitreyi has heard from Ya^avalkya that there is no hope of immor- tality by wealth, she expresses her desire of immortality in the words, ' What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal ? What my Lord knoweth tell that to me;' and thereupon Ya^avalkya expounds to her the knowledge of the Self. Now Scripture as well as Smrz'ti declares that immortality is not to be reached but through the knowledge of the highest Self. — The statement further that through the knowledge of the Self everything becomes known can be taken in its direct literal sense only if by the Self we understand the highest cause. And to take it in a non-literal sense (as the purvapakshin proposes) is inad- missible, on account of the explanation given of that state- ment in a subsequent passage, viz. ' Whosoever looks for the Brahman class elsewhere than in the Self, is aban- doned by the Brahman class.' Here it is said that who-

T 2

2 76 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

ever erroneously views this world with its Brahmans and so on, as having an independent existence apart from the Self, is abandoned by that very world of which he has taken an erroneous view ; whereby the view that there exists any difference is refuted. And the immediately subsequent clause, * This everything is the Self/ gives us to understand that the entire aggregate of existing things is non-different from the Self ; a doctrine further confirmed by the similes of the drum and so on. — By explaining further that the Self about which he had been speaking is the cause of the universe of names, forms, and works (' There has been breathed forth from this great Being what we have as Rig- veda,' &c.) Ya^/zavalkya again shows that it is the highest Self. — To the same conclusion he leads us by declaring, in the paragraph which treats of the natural centres of things, that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge. — From all this it follows that what the text represents as the object of sight and so on is the highest Self.

We now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin that the passage teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in the early part of the chapter, denoted as something dear.

We now turn to the remark made by the purvapakshin that the passage teaches the individual soul to be the object of sight, because it is, in the early part of the chapter, denoted as something dear.

20. (The circumstance of the soul being repre- sented as the object of sight) indicates the fulfil- ment of the promissory statement ; so Asmarathya thinks.

The fact that the text proclaims as the object of sight that Self which is denoted as something dear indicates the fulfilment of the promise made in the passages, ' When the Self is known all this is known,' ' All this is that Self.' For if the individual soul were different from the highest Self, the knowledge of the latter would not imply the knowledge of the former, and thus the promise that through the knowledge of one thing everything is to be known would not be fulfilled. Hence the initial

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 21. 2*JJ

statement aims at representing the individual Self and the highest Self as non-different for the purpose of fulfilling the promise made. — This is the opinion of the teacher A^marathya *.

21. (The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) is such (i. e. one with the highest Self) ; thus Au^ulomi thinks.

The individual soul which is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts, viz. body, senses, and mind (mano-buddhi), attains through the instrumentality of knowledge, meditation, and so on, a state of complete serenity, and thus enables itself, when passing at some future time out of the body, to become one with the highest Self; hence the initial statement in which it is represented as non-different from the highest Self. This is the opinion of the teacher Au^/ulomi. — Thus Scrip- ture says, 'That serene being arising from this body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' {Kh. Up. VIII, ii, 3).— In another place Scripture intimates, by means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, ' As

— Thus Scrip- ture says, 'That serene being arising from this body appears in its own form as soon as it has approached the highest light' {Kh. Up. VIII, ii, 3).— In another place Scripture intimates, by means of the simile of the rivers, that name and form abide in the individual soul, ' As

1 The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows : As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire ; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls also — which are effects of Brahman — are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence ; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and some- how non-different. — The technical name of the doctrine here represented by Ajmarathya is bhedabhedav&da.

2 78 vedanta-s6tras.

the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, having lost their name and their form, thus a wise man freed from name and form goes to the divine Person who is greater than the great ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 8). I. e. as the rivers losing the names and forms abiding in them disappear in the sea, so the individual soul also losing the name and form abiding in it becomes united with the highest person. That the latter half of the passage has the meaning here assigned to it, follows from the parallelism which we must assume to exist between the two members of the comparison \

22. (The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul) ; so Klrakrztsna thinks.

Because the highest Self exists also in the condition of the individual soul, therefore, the teacher Klrakrz'tsna thinks, the initial statement which aims at intimating the non-difference of the two is possible. That the highest Self only is that which appears as the individual soul, is evident from the Brahma/za- passage, ' Let me enter into them with this living Self and evolve names and forms/ and similar passages. We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, ' The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, is, y)2.

We have also mantras to the same effect, for instance, ' The wise one who, having produced all forms and made all names, sits calling the things by their names' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, is, y)2.

1 Bhamati : The individual soul is absolutely different from the highest Self ; it is inquinated by the contact with its different limiting adjuncts. But it is spoken of, in the Upanishad, as non-different from the highest Self because after having purified itself by means of knowledge and meditation it may pass out of the body and become one with the highest Self. The text of the Upanishad thus transfers a future state of non-difference to that time when difference actually exists. Compare the saying of the Pa^aratrikas : ' Up to the moment of emancipation being reached the soul and the highest Self are different. But the emancipated soul is no longer different from the highest Self, since there is no further cause of difference/ — The technical name of the doctrine advocated by Au^ulomi is satyabhedavada.

2 Compare the note to the same mantra as quoted above under I, i, ii.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PADA, 2 2. 279

And where Scripture relates the creation of fire and the other elements, it does not at the same time relate a sepa- rate creation of the individual soul ; we have therefore no right to look on the soul as a product of the highest Self, different from the latter. — In the opinion of the teacher Karakr/tsna the non-modified highest Lord himself is the individual soul, not anything else. Aj'marathya, although meaning to say that the soul is not (absolutely) different from the highest Self, yet intimates by the expression, ' On account of the fulfilment of the promise ' — which de- clares a certain mutual dependence — that there does exist a certain relation of cause and effect between the highest Self and the individual soul 1. The opinion of Au^ulomi again clearly implies that the difference and non-difference of the two depend on difference of condition2. Of these three opinions we conclude that the one held by KcUa- krztsna accords with Scripture, because it agrees with what all the Vedanta-texts (so, for instance, the passage, ' That art thou ') aim at inculcating. Only on the opinion of Kaiakr/tsna immortality can be viewed as the result of the knowledge of the soul ; while it would be impossible to hold the same view if the soul were a modification (product) of the Self and as such liable to lose its exist- ence by being merged in its causal substance. For the same reason, name and form cannot abide in the soul (as was above attempted to prove by means of the simile of the rivers), but abide in the limiting adjunct and are ascribed to the soul itself in a figurative sense only. For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

For the same reason the origin of the souls from the highest Self, of which Scripture speaks in some places as analogous to the issuing of sparks from the fire, must be viewed as based only on the limiting adjuncts of the soul.

The last three Sutras have further to be interpreted so as to furnish replies to the second of the purvapakshin's argu- ments, viz. that the BrzhadaraTzyaka passage represents as

1 And not the relation of absolute identity.

2 I. e. upon the state of emancipation and its absence.

2 80 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

the object of sight the individual soul, because it declares that the great Being which is to be seen arises from out of these elements. * There is an indication of the fulfilment of the promise ; so A^marathya thinks.5 The promise is made in the two passages, ' When the Self is known, all this is known,' and ' All this is that Self.' That the Self is every- thing, is proved by the declaration that the whole world of names, forms, and works springs from one being, and is merged in one being x ; and by its being demonstrated, with the help of the similes of the drum, and so on, that effect and cause are non-different. The fulfilment of the promise is, then, finally indicated by the text declaring that that great Being rises, in the form of the individual soul, from out of these elements ; thus the teacher Aj-marathya thinks. For if the soul and the highest Self are non-different, the promise that through the knowledge of one everything becomes known is capable of fulfilment. — £ Because the soul when it will depart is such ; thus Au^/ulomi thinks.' The statement as to the non-difference of the soul and the Self (implied in the declaration that the great Being rises, &c.) is possible, because the soul when — after having purified itself by knowledge, and so on — it will depart from the body, is capable of becoming one with the highest Self. This is Au^ulomi's opinion, — 'Because it exists in the con- dition of the soul ; thus Kayakrztsna opines.' Because the highest Self itself is that which appears as the indivi- dual soul, the statement as to the non-difference of the two is well-founded. This is the view of the teacher Kajakn'tsna.

But, an objection may be raised, the passage, ' Rising from out of these elements he vanishes again after them. When he has departed there is no more knowledge/ intimates the final destruction of the soul, not its identity with the highest Self! — By no means, we reply. The passage means to say

1 Upapaditazra £eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti ^esha^. Upapa- danaprakaraw su^ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinai- kaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina ^aikapralayatvaw sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 2 2. 28 I

— By no means, we reply. The passage means to say

1 Upapaditazra £eti, sarvasyatmamatratvam iti ^esha^. Upapa- danaprakaraw su^ayati eketi. Sa yathardrendhanagner ityadinai- kaprasavatvam, yatha sarvasam apam ityadina ^aikapralayatvaw sarvasyoktam. An. Gi.

I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 2 2. 28 I

only that on the soul departing from the body all specific cognition vanishes, not that the Self is destroyed. For an objection being raised — in the passage, ' Here thou hast bewildered me, Sir, when thou sayest that having departed there is no more knowledge' — Scripture itself explains that what is meant is not the annihilation of the Self, ' I say nothing that is bewildering. Verily, beloved, that Self is imperishable, and of an indestructible nature. But there takes place non- connexion with the matras.' That means : The eternally unchanging Self, which is one mass of knowledge, cannot possibly perish ; but by means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the matras, i. e. the elements and the sense organs, which are the product of Nescience. When the connexion has been solved, specific cognition, which depended on it, no longer takes place, and thus it can be said, that * When he has departed there is no more knowledge.'

The third argument also of the purvapakshin, viz. that the word ' knower ' — which occurs in the concluding pas- sage, ' How should he know the knower? ' — denotes an agent, and therefore refers to the individual soul as the object of sight, is to be refuted according to the view of Kaiakrztsna. — Moreover, the text after having enumerated — in the passage, * For where there is duality as it were, there one sees the other,' &c. — all the kinds of specific cognition which belong to the sphere of Nescience declares — in the subsequent passage, ' But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' — that in the sphere of true knowledge all specific cognition such as seeing, and so on, is absent. And, again, in order to obviate the doubt whether in the absence of objects the knower might not know himself, Ya^viavalkya goes on, 'How, O beloved, should he know himself, the knower?' As thus the latter passage evidently aims at proving the absence of specific cognition, we have to con- clude that the word ' knower ' is here used to denote that being which is knowledge, i. e. the Self. — That the view of Ka\rakrztsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not

282 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

e. the Self. — That the view of Ka\rakrztsna is scriptural, we have already shown above. And as it is so, all the adherents of the Vedanta must admit that the difference of the soul and the highest Self is not

282 VEDANTA-stjTRAS.

real, but due to the limiting adjuncts, viz. the body, and so on, which are the product of name and form as presented by Nescience. That view receives ample confirmation from Scripture; compare, for instance, ' Being only, my dear, this was in the beginning, one, without a second ' (Kh. Up. VI, 2, 1) ; ' The Self is all this ' (Kh. Up. VII, 25, 2) ; ' Brahman alone is all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'This everything is that Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6) ; 'There is no other seer but he ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 7, 23) ; ' There is nothing that sees but it ' (Bri. Up. Ill, 8, 1 1). — It is likewise confirmed by Smrz'ti ; compare, for instance, 'V&sudeva is all this' (Bha. Gi. VII, 19); 'Know me, O Bharata, to be the soul in all bodies' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 2) ; 'He who sees the highest Lord abiding alike within all creatures ' (Bha. Gi. XIII, 27). — The same conclusion is supported by those passages which deny all difference ; compare, for instance, ' If he thinks, that is one and I another ; he does not know ' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10) ; ' From death to death he goes who sees here any diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And, again, by those passages which negative all change on the part of the Self; compare, for instance, ' This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless is indeed Brahman ' (Bri. Up. IV, 24). — Moreover, if the doctrine of general identity were not true, those who are desirous of release could not be in the possession of irrefutable knowledge, and there would be no possibility of any matter being well settled ; while yet the knowledge of which the Self is the object is declared to be irrefutable and to satisfy all desire, and Scripture speaks of those, ' Who have well ascertained the object of the knowledge of the Vedanta ' (Mu. Up. Ill, 2, 6). Compare also the passage, ' What trouble, what sorrow can there be to him who has once beheld that unity?' (Is. Up. 7.) — And Smriti also represents the mind of him who contemplates the Self as steady (Bha. Gt. II, 54).

As therefore the individual soul and the highest Self differ in name only, it being a settled matter that perfect know- ledge has for its object the absolute oneness of the two ; it is senseless to insist (as some do) on a plurality of Selfs, and to maintain that the individual soul is different from the

I ADHYAYA, 4 PAD A, 2$. 283

283

highest Self, and the highest Self from the individual soul. For the Self is indeed called by many different names, but it is one only. Nor does the passage, 'He who knows Brahman which is real, knowledge, infinite, as hidden in the cave' (Taitt. Up. II, 1), refer to some one cave (different from the abode of the individual soul) 1. And that nobody else but Brahman is hidden in the cave we know from a subsequent passage, viz. * Having sent forth he entered into it' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), according to which the creator only entered into the created beings. — Those who insist on the distinction of the individual and the highest Self oppose themselves to the true sense of the Vedanta-texts, stand thereby in the way of perfect knowledge, which is the door to perfect beatitude, and groundlessly assume release to be something effected, and therefore non-eternal 2. (And if they attempt to show that moksha, although effected, is eternal) they involve themselves in a conflict with sound logic.

23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative in- stances.

It has been said that, as practical religious duty has to be enquired into because it is the cause of an increase of happiness, so Brahman has to be enquired into because it is the cause of absolute beatitude. And Brahman has been defined as that from which there proceed the origination, sustentation, and retractation of this world. Now as this definition comprises alike the relation of substantial caus- ality in which clay and gold, for instance, stand to golden ornaments and earthen pots, and the relation of operative

1 So according to Go. An. and An. GL, although their inter- pretations seem not to account sufficiently for the ekam of the text. — K&mkid evaikam iti ^ivasthanad anyam ity artha^. Go. An. — Crivabhavena pratibimbadharatiriktam ity artha^. An. Gi.

2 While release, as often remarked, is eternal, it being in fact not different from the eternally unchanging Brahman.

284 VED ANTA-S SVetaketu ! ' teaches that the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the em- bodied soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world — which is based on the individual soul — having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in

II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 1 4. 323

But only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness would have to be assumed in Brahman, in

II ADHYAYA, I PAD A, 1 4. 323

addition to the element of unity. — Scriptural passages also (such as, ' When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' Bri. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain states ; for the passage * Thou art that ' shows that the general fact of Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state. Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Kh. VI, 16) that the false-minded is bound while the true- minded is released, declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called false- minded * ? Another scriptural passage (' from death to death goes he who perceives therein any diversity,' Brt. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction. — Moreover, on the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknow- ledge that some kind of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the cognition of manifoldness if both are true ?

Other objections are started. — If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c, become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects ; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has presented itself. Moreover, all the texts em- bodying injunctions and prohibitions will lose their pur- port if the distinction on which their validity depends

1 In the passage alluded to he is called so by implication, being compared to the ' false-minded ' thief who, knowing himself to be guilty, undergoes the ordeal of the heated hatchet.

Y 2

324 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

does not really exist. And further, the entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine ?

And if the doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine ?

These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen ; just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions is untrue ; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real perception without sus- pecting the perception to be a merely apparent one. — But how (to restate an objection raised above) can theVedanta- texts if untrue convey information about the true being of Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake (i. e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing 1. — This objection, we reply, is with- out force (because as a matter of fact wre do see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,)

1 Le. ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes,

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 325

ordinary experience does not teach us that real effects spring from unreal causes,

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 325

and effects (of what is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a river take place with regard to a dreaming person. — But, it will be said, these effects themselves are unreal ! — These effects themselves, we reply, are unreal indeed ; but not so the consciousness which the dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result ; for it is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal, but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of them to be unreal likewise. — (We remark in passing that) by this fact of the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to be con- sidered as refuted *. — Scripture also (in the passage, ' If a man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer there- from success in his work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage, after having declared that from the observation of certain un- favourable omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues ' if somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real fact, viz. death, is notified. — It is, moreover, known from the ex- perience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the

1 Svapna^agraddehayor vyabhi£are*pi pratyabhi^-Mnat tadanu- gatatmaikyasiddhe^ ^aitanyasya ka, dehadharmatve rupadivat tadanu- palabdhiprasahgad avagator Mbadhat tadrupasyatmano dehadvayati- rekasiddher dehamatratmavado na yukta ity artha^. An. Gi.

326 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

An. Gi.

326 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

Self are altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required for full satisfaction1. An injunction as, for instance, ' He is to sacrifice ' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected ; but passages such as, 'Thou art that/ ' I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else remains a desire is possible ; but there is nothing else which could be desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brah- man. Nor can it be maintained that such states of con- sciousness do not actually arise ; for scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said ' (Kh. Up. VII, 18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness, because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any oppor- tunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various elements.

But — it may be said — (that would not be a mere assump- tion, but) Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on, declares itself in favour of a Brahman

1 As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to assume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahara ; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 327

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 327

capable of modification ; for we know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo modifications. — This objection — we reply — is without force, because a number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brah- man, teach it to be absolutely changeless (ku/astha). Such passages are, ' This great unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is indeed Brahman' (Br/. Up. IV, 4, 25) ; ' That Self is to be described by No, no' (Br/. Up. Ill, 9, 26); ' It is neither coarse nor fine' (Br/. Up. Ill, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the quali- fication, 'absolutely changeless' (ku/astha), precludes this. For the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes. And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated. — Moreover, while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification, passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self leads to a result ; for in the passage which begins, ' That Self is to be described by No, no,' we read later on, ' O kanaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness ' (Br/. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then 1 to accept the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as having no special fruit of its own — as, for instance, the passages about Brahman modifying itself into the form of this

1 Tatreti, sr/sh/yadijrutina/rc svarthe phalavaikalye satiti yavat. An. Gi.

328 VED ANTA-Sti TR AS.

An. Gi.

328 VED ANTA-Sti TR AS.

world — is merely to be applied as a means for the cogni- tion of the absolute Brahman, but does not bring about an independent result ; according to the principle that whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in con- nexion with something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the latter 1. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that) would undergo corresponding modifications2 would be inappro- priate, as the state of final release (which the soul obtains through the knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging. But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brah- man to be changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled. — This objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i. e. those qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, ' From that Self sprang ether,' &c. ; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient, omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhana or any other principle. That tenet we have stated in I, i, 4, and here we do not teach anything contrary to it. — But how, the question may be asked, can you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the absolute unity and non-duality of the Self? — Listen how. Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form, the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either

1 A Mimawsa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is inde- pendent when a special result is assigned to it by the sacred texts ; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely auxiliary to another act.

2 According to the *$ruti 'in whatever mode he worships him into that mode he passes himself/

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 329

2 According to the *$ruti 'in whatever mode he worships him into that mode he passes himself/

II ADHYAYA, I PADA, 1 4. 329

as being (i. e. Brahman), nor as different from it 1, the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, called in 5ruti and Smrtti the illusion (maya), power (^akti), or nature (prakrzti) of the omniscient Lord. Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from scrip- tural passages such as the following, ' He who is called ether is the revealer of all forms and names ; that within which these forms and names are contained is Brahman' (Kh. Up. VIII, 14, 1); cLet me evolve names and forms' (Kk. Up. VI, 3, 2) ; ' He, the wise one, who having divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)' (Taitt. Ar. Ill, 12, 7) ; ' He who makes the one seed manifold ' (6Ve. Up. VI, 12). — Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts of name and form, the products of Nes- cience; just as the universal ether depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the limiting ad- juncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the so-called ^ivas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (vi^Tzancitman), which indeed are one with his own Self — just as the portions of ether enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether — but are limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i. e. bodies) produced from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience ; while in reality none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared, by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also says, ' Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else, that is the Infinite' (Kh. Up. VII, 24, 1) ; ' But when the Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (Bri* Up. II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedanta-texts declare that for him who has reached the

1 Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na huvaratvena te niru^yete ^adagWayor abhedayogat napi tato^nyatvena niruktim arhataA svatantryewa sattasphurtyasambhavdt na hi g-a^/am a§-a $ punaj £a taduktasyarthasya buddhyanusa- re/zakshepasyakn'tatvan notkrzsh/abuddhaya iti madhyamika^. Anyais tu .nshyair guru#a sarvasunyatva upadish/e ^Mnatiriktasya sarvasya junyatvam astu nameti guruktir yoga iti bauddai^ pari- bhashitopeta^ tad upari £a £7zanasya tu .ranyatvaw na sa/rcbhavati tathatve ^agadandhyaprasahgat sunyasiddher apy asawbhavai £eti buddhamate a/$aratvena paribhashita akshepo*pi krz'ta iti yoga- £ara^, vi^anamatrastitvavadina^. Tadanantaram anyai^ jishyaiA

[34] d d

402 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

Tadanantaram anyai^ jishyaiA

[34] d d

402 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

who maintain that everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is either element (bhuta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is either mind (kitta) or mental (£aitta). The elements are earth, water, and so on ; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of atoms ; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of fire hot, those of air mobile. — The inward world consists of the five so-called ' groups' (skan- dha), the group of sensation (rupaskandha), the group of knowledge (vi^anaskandha), the group of feeling (vedand- skandha), the group of verbal knowledge (sam^Tzaskandha), and the group of impressions (sa^skaraskandha) x ; which

pratitisiddhasya kathaw .mnyatvaztf vaktuw jakyam ato ^anavad vahy&rtho*pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva so*stu, parazrc tu so *numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathahgikrz'tyaivatf* jishyamatim anusn'tya kiyatparyantazra sutratf* bhavishyatiti tai^ przsh/am atas te sautrantika^. Anye punar yady aya#z gha/a iti pratitibalad vahyo*rtha upeyate tarhi tasyd eva pratiter aparokshatvat sa kathazrc paroksho*to vahyo*rtho na pratyaksha iti bMsM viruddh- ety akshipann atas te vaibhashika^.

1 The rupaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c. ; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as £aittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as ^aittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses. — The vi^anaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity alayavi^anapravaha^), according to all commentators ; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidydbharawa, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpakazrc nirvikalpakaw £a pravrz'ttivi^/za- nasam^/zitam). — The vedanaskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c. —The samgTzaskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur ajva ityadi^abdasam^alpitapratyaya^, An. Gi. ; gaur a^va ityevaw n&mavirish/asavikalpaka# pratyaya^, Go. An. ; s&mgna, ya^adattadipadatadullekhi savikalpapratyayo v&, dvitiyapakshe vi^anapadena savikalpapratyayo na grahya^, Brahmavidyabh.). The sazrcskaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c, dharma and adharma. — Compare also the Bhamati. — The vi^anaskandha is £itta, the other skandhas £aitta.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8. 403

taken together constitute the basis of all personal exist- ence \

The sazrcskaraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c, dharma and adharma. — Compare also the Bhamati. — The vi^anaskandha is £itta, the other skandhas £aitta.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 8. 403

taken together constitute the basis of all personal exist- ence \

With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks. — Those two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on Baud- dha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about. For the parts con- stituting the (material) aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhi^valana) of intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about previously2. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelli- gent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord, which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account ; for that would imply their never ceasing to be active3. Nor can the cause of aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i. e. the alayavi^ana-pravaha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as not dif- ferent from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedantins ; or non-permanent ;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion of the atoms 4.

1 It has to be kept in view that the sarvastitvavadins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (kshamkatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.

2 Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.

3 In consequence of which no release could take place.

4 The Brahmavidyabhara/za explains the last clause— from ksha- mkatva^ fa — somewhat differently: Api ka. paramawunam api kshamkatvabhyupagam&n melanazra na sambhavati, paramawunaw melana#z parama/mkriyadhinam, tatha kz. svakriyaw prati parama- numm kara/zatvat kriyapurvaksharce paramazmbhir bhavyam, kriyst

D d 2

404 VED ANT A-StJ TR AS.

(And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.) — For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.

(And in the latter case we are not further advanced than before.) — For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.

19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality ; we say ' No/ because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links).

Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality1 of Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.

The series beginning with Nescience comprises the fol- lowing members : Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six, touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like2. All these terms con-

jrayataya kriyaksha?ze*pi tesham avasthanam apekshitam evam melanakshane*pi, nahi melanajrayasyabhave melanarupa prav/7'ttir upapadyate, tatM ka sthiraparama^usadhyd melanarupa pmvrzttiA kathazrc tesham ksha^ikatve bhavet. — Ananda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.

1 The kdra^atvdt of *Sankara explains the pratyayatvat of the Sutra ; karyaw praty ayate ^anakatvena gaM/$ati.

2 The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series. — The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyabhara^a : Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c. — Impression (affection, sa^skara) comprises desire, aversion, &c, and the activity caused by them. — Knowledge (vi^Tzana) is the self-consciousness (aham ity alayavi^dnasya vn'ttilabha^) springing up in the embryo. — Name and form is the rudimentary flake- or bubble-like condition of the embryo. — The

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 1 9. 405

stitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover, all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water- wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take place.

And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like water- wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on could not take place.

This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation of the aggre- gates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown — when examining the Vaii-eshika doctrine — that the formation of aggregates cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and individual souls in

abode of the six (sha^/ayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses. — Touch (sparja) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part. — Feeling (vedana) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom. — Desire (trzsh/za) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones. — Activity (upadana) is the effort resulting from desire. — Birth is the passing out from the uterus.— Species (g&ti) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs. — Decay (gzri). — Death (mara/zam) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumursha). — Grief (joka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith. — Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that ac- count.— Pain (du/^kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses. — Durmanas is mental affliction. — The ' and the like ' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.

406 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

— Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that ac- count.— Pain (du/^kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses. — Durmanas is mental affliction. — The ' and the like ' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.

406 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

which the adrzsh/a abides1 ; how much less then are aggre- gates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and that which abides in them (the adrzsh/a). — Let us then assume (the Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of the aggregate. — But how — we ask — can they be the cause of that without which — as their abode — they themselves are not capable of exist- ence? Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sawsara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions ; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned into an elephant or a god and again become a man ; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system. — Moreover, that for the purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is. according to your doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else ; hence final release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself

1 Ananda Giri and Go. Ananda explain : A.rraya\n*ayibhuteshv iti bhoktr/vijesha^am adr/sh/a^rayeshv ity artha^. — The Brahma- vidyabhara^a says : Nityeshv ajraya^rayibhuteshv a^ushv abhyupa- gamyamaneshu bhoktrzshu ka, satsv ity anvaya^. Ajraystarayibhu- teshv ity asyopakaryopakarakabhavaprapteshv ity artha^. — And with regard to the subsequent ajrayairayifunyeshu : asraylsrayitvaju- nyeshu, ayaw bhava^, sthireshu parama^ushu yadanvaye parama- nunam sa;;2ghatapatti^ yadvyatireke k& na tad upakarakam upakar- ya^ paramaTzava/fc yena tatkrz'to bhoga^ prarthyate sa tatra karteti grahituw jakyate, kshamkeshu tu paramawushu anvayavyatireka- grahasyanekaksha^asadhyasyasawbhavan nopakaryopakarakabhavo nirdharayituw ^akya^. — Ananda Giri remarks on the latter : Adrt- sh/ajrayakartrzrahityam aha\srayeti. Another reading appears to be a,raya\yraya,ranyeshu.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 20. 407

— Ananda Giri remarks on the latter : Adrt- sh/ajrayakartrzrahityam aha\srayeti. Another reading appears to be a,raya\yraya,ranyeshu.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 20. 407

only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as permanently existing up to the time of enjoy- ment and release, and that would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency. — There may therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, &c, but, in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates.

20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.

We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they can- not be made to account for the existence of aggregates ; we are now going to prove that they cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.

Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit that when the thing existing in the second moment 1 enters into being the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence. — Let it then be said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence. — That also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected with a second moment (which contra- dicts the doctrine of universal momentariness). — Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its

1 Bauddhanaw kshawapadena gha/adir eva padartho vyavahriyate na tu tadatirikta^ ka^it kshawo nama kalo*sti. Brahmavidy&bh.

408 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

— Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity constitute its

1 Bauddhanaw kshawapadena gha/adir eva padartho vyavahriyate na tu tadatirikta^ ka^it kshawo nama kalo*sti. Brahmavidy&bh.

408 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

causal energy. — That assumption also is fruitless, because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not imbued with the nature of the cause (i. e. in which the nature of the cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the cause does continue to exist in the effect is im- possible (on the Bauddha doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus necessitate the abandon- ment of the doctrine of general non-permanency. — Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the effect ; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all cases \ — Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a things own form or another state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing, it would follow that the word ' thing ' and the words ' origination ' and ' cessation ' are interchangeable (which is not the case). — Let then, secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in consequence of which the terms ' origination ' and ' cessa- tion ' may denote the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is called thing. — In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be abandoned. — Let then, as the third alternative, origination and cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo is from a horse. — That too cannot be, we reply ; for it would lead to the conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would be led up to, if we under- stood by the origination and cessation of a thing merely its perception and non-perception ; for the latter are attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself. — Hence

1 And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c, and material causes such as clay, &c. ?

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 409

we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause ; while yet the effect takes place), there results con- tradiction of the admitted principle ; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

?

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 21. 409

we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.

21. On the supposition of there being no (cause ; while yet the effect takes place), there results con- tradiction of the admitted principle ; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).

It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non- permanency, the former momentary existence, as having already been merged in non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one. — Perhaps now the Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no cause. — That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate when in conjunction with four kinds of causes1. Moreover, if anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to prevent that anything might originate at any time. — If, on the other hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things 2 are momentary merely.

1 These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati- pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakaripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (alambana- pratyaya). — -I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyabharawa : Adhipatir indriyaw tad dhi ^akshuradirupam utpannasya gTzanasya rupadivishayata^ niya/£Mati niyamaka^ ^aloke adhipatir ity uky&te. Sahak&ri &\6k3,/i. Samanantarapratyaya^ purvag"#anam,bauddhamate hi kshamka^Tzanasa/fttatau purvagTzanam uttarag-Mnasya karana#z tad eva £a mana ity u^yate. Alambana/rc gha/adiA Etan hetun pratiya pr&pya ^akshuradi^anyam ity adi.

2 Sa/ftskara iti, tanmate purvaksha^a eva hetubhuta^ sa^skaro vasaneti £a vyavahriyate karyaw tu tadvishayataya karmavyutpattya sa/raskara^, tatha k& karyakara^atmaka*^ sarva/rc bhavarupa^ ksha- mkam iti prati^artha^. Brahmavidyabharawa.

4 1 o vedanta-sCtras.

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.

Brahmavidyabharawa.

4 1 o vedanta-sCtras.

22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.

The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on constantly, assume that ' whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced (samskrita) and momentary.' To the triad there mentioned they give the names * cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind/ ' cessation not dependent on such an act/ and ' space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely negative character (abhavamatra), devoid of all positive characteristics. By ' cessation dependent on a sub- lative act of the mind/ we have to understand such destruc- tion of entities as is preceded by an act of thought 1 ; by ' cessation not so dependent ' is meant destruction of the opposite kind 2 ; by ' space ' is meant absence in general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three non-existences ' space ' will be refuted later on (Sutra 24) ; the two other ones are refuted in the present Sutra.

Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, ' on account of the absence of interruption/ For both kinds of cessation must have reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the single members constituting the series. — The former alternative is impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted3. — The latter

1 As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.

2 I.e. the insensible continual decay of things. — Viparita iti pratiksha«a/# gha/adinazra yuktya sadhyamano * kuralair avagantum a^akya^ siikshmo vina\ro*pratisa#zkhyanirodha^. Brahmav.

3 A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped ; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued ; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 23. 4 1 I

alternative is likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence), since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence1. And in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues to exist without any interrup- tion.— For these reasons the two kinds of cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.

23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto, must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'2. As therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine must be declared unsatis- factory.

exist, since the Bauddhas define the satta of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadanrarcasawgraha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.

1 Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground. — Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.

2 The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.

4 1 2 vedanta-s6tr AS.

24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non- entity).

We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa/^khyavirodha and aprati0) cannot be shown to be such ; we now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, aklra).

We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two (viz. prati-sa/^khyavirodha and aprati0) cannot be shown to be such ; we now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, aklra).

With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of space no less than in the case of the two so- called non-entities treated of in the preceding Sutras. That space is a real thing follows in the first place from certain scriptural passages, such as ' space sprang from the Self.' — To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the other qualities. — Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow that while one bird is flying — whereby space is occupied — there would be no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering bodies *. — Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, ' On what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following

1 What does enable us to declare that there is avara^abhava in one place and not in another ? Space ; which therefore is some- thing real.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 25. 413

question occurs, ' On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the sup- position of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation. — Further, there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three kinds of nega- tive entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non- eternity can be predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are. not a mere undefinable negation.

25. And on account of remembrance.

Anything with regard to which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such as jars and the like are. not a mere undefinable negation.

25. And on account of remembrance.

The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdhrz) also ; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance which is con- sequent on the original perception. That remembrance can take place only if it belongs to the same person who pre- viously made the perception ; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious state expressed in the sentences, ' I saw that thing, and now I see this thing/ if the seeing person were not in both cases the same ? That the consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every one ; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be, '/ remember ; another person made the observation.' But no such state of consciousness does arise. — When, on the other hand, such a state of consciousness does arise, then every- body knows that the person who made the original observa- tion, and the person who remembers, are different persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, i I remember that that other person saw that and that' —

4 1 4 vedanta-sOtras.

In the case under discussion, however, the Vaina^ika him- self— whose state of consciousness is, ' I saw that and that ' — knows that there is one thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is hot and gives light.

As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and subsequent remembrance, the Vainlsika has necessarily to abandon the doctrine of universal momentari- ness. And if he further recognises all his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the similarity (of the different self-cognitions ; each, however, being momentary only), wTe reply that the cognition of similarity is based on two things, and that for that reason the advo- cate of universal momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity of two successive momen- tary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness. — Should it be said that the cog- nition 'this is similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute this by the remark that the fact of different terms — viz. ' this ' and ' that ' — being used points to the existence of different things (which the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to that'

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26. 415

If the mental act of which similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to that'

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 26. 415

would be devoid of meaning ; we should in that case rather speak of 'similarity' only. — Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and such must also be represented as such and such ; attempts to represent it as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought ; for (in recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the con- scious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation. — - For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be rejected.

26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.

The system of the Vainlrikas is objectionable for this reason also that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, ' On account of the mani- festation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at once,

4 1 6 VED ANT A-SU TR AS.

as then no specification would be required *. Hence, as we see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from non-entity.

as then no specification would be required *. Hence, as we see that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from non-entity.

To this Bauddha tenet we reply, (' Entity does) not (spring) from non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring from non-entity, the as- sumption of special causes would be purportless, since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency, we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns of hares, &c. — a thing certainly not actually observed. — If, again, it should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having special distinctions — just as, for instance, blueness and the like are special qualities of lotuses and so on — we point out that in that case the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no case non- existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely. — Further, if existence sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with non-existence ; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely positive entities distinguished by their various special characteristics. Nor2 does any one

1 If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is' capable. — Cp. on this point the Sarvadamfla- sa/rcgraha.

2 This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2J. 417

— Cp. on this point the Sarvadamfla- sa/rcgraha.

2 This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 2J. 417

think that things of the nature of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the like ; but every- body knows that things of the nature of clay are the effects of clay only. — The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is false ; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c, are the causes of effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as the cause of the sub- sequent condition (i. e. the sprout) not the earlier condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole undergoes decomposition). — Hence as we see on the one hand that no entities ever originate from non- entities such as the horns of a hare, and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as gold and the like, the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from non-existence has to be rejected. — We finally point out that, according to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the atoms ; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly perplex the mind of every one ?

27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non- active people also.

If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive people also would obtain their purposes, since ' non-existence ' is a thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman even if he did not cultivate his field ; vessels would shape themselves even if the potter did not fashion the clay ; and the weaver too [34] e e

4 1 8 vedAnta-sOtras.

lazy to weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is absurd and not maintained by anybody. — Thus the doctrine of the origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.

28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them).

All which of course is absurd and not maintained by anybody. — Thus the doctrine of the origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.

28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them).

There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting for the existence of aggregates, &c, we are now confronted by those Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vign&na) exist. — The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things ; but it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions alone are real.

According to this latter doctrine the process, whose con- stituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the result of knowledge \ is an altogether internal one, existing in so far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from consciousness, we reply that we base our

1 According to the vigTzanav&din the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhasa) is the result of knowledge ; the cognition in so far as it is power is m&na, knowledge ; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramatr/, knowing subject.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 28. 419

doctrine on the impossibility of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms. Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms1. — In the same way we can show that the external things are not universals and so on 2,

Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as different nor as non-different from the atoms1. — In the same way we can show that the external things are not universals and so on 2,

Moreover, the cognitions — which are of a uniform nature only in so far as they are states of consciousness — undergo, according to their objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external things becomes altogether gratuit- ous. From the fact, moreover, of our always being con- scious of the act of knowledge and the object of knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the other also ; and that would not happen if the two were essentially distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain that there are no outward things. —

1 If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms ; if they are non- different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.

2 Avayavavayavirupo vahyo*rtho n&sti ken ma, bhud ^tivyaktya- dirupas tu syad ity a\yankyaha evam iti. GatyMin&m vyaktyadinam Mtyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasangad atyantabhinnatve tadvade- vatadbhsivad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhe- dava^* gativyaktyadibhedo^pi nastity artha^.

e e 2

420 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

GatyMin&m vyaktyadinam Mtyantabhinnatve svatantryaprasangad atyantabhinnatve tadvade- vatadbhsivad bhinnabhinnatvasya viruddhatvad avayavavayavibhe- dava^* gativyaktyadibhedo^pi nastity artha^.

e e 2

420 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although there is all the while no external object ; hence we conclude that the ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are like- wise independent of external objects ; for they also are simply ideas. — If we be asked how, in the absence of ex- ternal things, we account for the actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained from the impressions left by previous ideas *. In the beginningless sawsara ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows, moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments : we both (the Vedantins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental im- pressions, without any external object ; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental impressions. — Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things exist.

To all this we (the Vedantins) make the following reply. — The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing cor- responding to the idea, whether it be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing, and that no such thing exists,

1 V&san&, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28. 42 1

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28. 42 1

any more than we listen to a man who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied? — If the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the out- ward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they practically accept the general consciousness which testifies to the existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to refute it they speak of the external things as ' like something external/ If they did not them- selves at the bottom acknowledge the existence of the ex- ternal world, how could they use the expression 'like something external ? ' No one says, ' Vish^umitra appears like the son of a barren mother.' If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us as something external, not like something external. — But — the Bauddha may reply — we conclude that the object of perception is only like something external because external things are impossible. — This conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or non-operation of the means of right knowledge ; while, on the other hand, the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities. Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are,

42 2 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.

Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things are,

42 2 VEDANTA-SlJTRAS.

according to their nature, apprehended by all the instru- ments of knowledge ; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or non-difference from atoms ? — ■ Nor, again, does the non-existence of objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the objects ; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms of the objects, and the objects are actually appre- hended as external. — For the same reason (i. e. because the distinction of thing and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to be con- sidered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical. Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness ; just as when we see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one per- manent factor (from the two — or more — varying factors) is proved throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versa the difference of the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one (permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a jar ; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct while the jar is one and the same ; in the same wTay as when conscious of the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.

Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot apprehend — or be apprehended by — each other. From this it follows that certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld ; so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other ; the doctrine that everything is momentary, void, &c. ; the doc- trine of the distinction of individuals and classes ; the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 28. 423

doctrine that a former idea leaves an impression giving rise to a later idea ; the doctrine of the distinction, owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and non-existence ; the doctrine of bondage and release (de- pending on absence and presence of right knowledge) \

Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so ; we reply that by main- taining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make your- self guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing by means of the idea different from the thing ! Indeed a proof of extraordinary philosophic insight! — It cannot, moreover, be asserted in any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our consciousness ; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea is to be apprehended by some- thing different from it, that something also must be appre- hended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And, moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cogni- tion is of an essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further cognition is uncalled for ; for as they are both equally illuminating the one cannot give light to the other. — But both these objections are unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the idea (is conscious of the idea), there re- sults nor egressus ad infinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witness-

1 For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in addition to the transitory ideas.

424 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

The existence of the witness-

1 For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in addition to the transitory ideas.

424 VEDANTA-sftTRAS.

ing Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied. — Moreover, if you maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge, and which are without a knowing being ; which is no better than to assert that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea itself implies consciousness ; we reply that, as observation shows, the lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on (while our Self is one and permanent). — We thus have proved that an idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render it manifest.

29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream.

We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike. — The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the difference of their character. They differ as follows. — The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. ' I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man ; no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 425

They differ as follows. — The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness. ' I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man ; no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 30. 425

false idea arose/ In an analogous manner the things of which we are conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary con- sciousness. Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and the like, are never negated in any state. — Moreover, the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness ; and the distinction between remembrance and immediate con- sciousness is directly cognised by every one as being founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness ; for we certainly cannot allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter' s own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its having attributes in common with water. And the dif- ference of nature between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.

30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Bauddha view) on account of the absence of perception (of external things).

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the

426 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Bauddha view) on account of the absence of perception (of external things).

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the

426 VEDANTA-S^TRAS.

variety of mental impressions, without any reference to external things, and remark that on your doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad i nf i n i t u m, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position. — The same argu- ment, i. e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. ' the perception of external things is admitted to take place also without mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not ad- mitted to originate independently of the perception of external things.' — Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and modifications cannot, as experi- ence teaches, take place unless there is some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge.

31. And on account of the momentariness (of the alayavi^ana, it cannot be the abode of mental impressions).

If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition (alayavi^ana 1) assumed by you may constitute the abode

1 The vi^zanaskandha comprises vi^/zanas of two different kinds, the alayavigTzana and the pravrz'ttivi^zana. The alayavi^ana com- prises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego ; the pravMtivi^Tzana comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 32. 427

The alayavi^ana com- prises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer to the ego ; the pravMtivi^Tzana comprises those ideas which refer to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas of the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PA DA, 32. 427

of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions (pravrztti-vi^ana). For unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future 19 or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your alayavi^/zana to be something permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet of the alayavi^Tzana as well as everything else being momentary. — Or (to explain the Sutra in a different way) as the tenet of general momen- tariness is characteristic of the systems of the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the latter.

We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the ex- ternal world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i. e. that absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of know- ledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence) — for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances.

32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

No further special discussion is in fact required. From

latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class.

1 Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent.

428 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

No further special discussion is in fact required. From

latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the antecedent ideas of the former class.

1 Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents itself to consciousness is not non-existent.

428 VEDANTA-stiTRAS.

whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foun- dation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly. — Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused. — So that — and this the Sutra means to indicate — Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely dis- regarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness.

33. On account of the impossibility (of contra- dictory attributes) in one thing, (the Gaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).

Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the Gymnosophists (Gainas).

The Gainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (^iva), non-soul (a^iva), the issuing outward (asrava), restraint (sawvara), destruction (nir^-ara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)1. Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under these two. — They also set forth a set of categories different from the two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called

1 Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects of their enjoyment; asrava is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects ; sazrcvara is the restraint of the activity of the senses; nirg-ara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works constitute bondage ; and release is the ascending of the soul, after bondage has ceased, to the highest regions. — For the details, see Professor Cowell's translation of the Arhata chapter of the Sarvadar,ra7zasa#zgraha.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PAD A, 33. 429

astikayas (' existing bodies,' i. e. categories), viz. the cate- gories of soul (^iva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space (alcana). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful ways1. — To all things they apply the following method of reasoning, which they call the saptabhangtnaya : somehow it is; somehow it is not ; somehow it is and is not ; somehow it is indescrib- able ; somehow it is and is indescribable ; somehow it is not and is indescribable ; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable.

To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions as that of unity and eternity2.

This doctrine we meet as follows. — Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible ' on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing ; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such ; the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such or not such ' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself some- thing, falls as such under the alternative predications ' some- how it is/ ' somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion ; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tirthakara (Cina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether

1 Cp. translation of Sarvadanra#asa#zgraha, p. 59.

2 And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.

430 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

translation of Sarvadanra#asa#zgraha, p. 59.

2 And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.

430 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

indeterminate ? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doc- trine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. — Again, if we apply the Caina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five ; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described ; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. — If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non- soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indeter- mination. — As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories — being excluding non-being and vice versa non-being ex- cluding being — the doctrine of the Arhat must be rejected, — The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions made by the Camas as to the impossibility of deciding whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or non-separateness, and so on. — The Caina doctrine that

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 34. 43 1

aggregates are formed from the atoms — by them called pudgalas — we do not undertake to refute separately as its refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given in a previous part of this work.

34. And likewise (there results from the £aina doctrine) non-universality of the Self.

34. And likewise (there results from the £aina doctrine) non-universality of the Self.

We have hitherto urged against the £aina doctrine an objection resulting from the syadvada, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent. — The Gainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen that the soul of a man — which is of the size of the human body — when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not be able to fill the whole of it ; or else that a human soul being relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old age. — But why, the £aina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of under- going compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one ? — Do you, we ask in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul may occupy the same place or not ? — If you do not admit it, it follows that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of limited dimensions. — If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle only, the extension of all the par- ticles together will remain inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body

432 VED ANTA-SUTR AS.

of limited size contains an infinite number of soul par- ticles.

Well then, the Gaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw from it whenever it enters a small body. — To this hypothesis the next Sutra furnishes a reply.

35. Nor is noncontradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of the soul).

— To this hypothesis the next Sutra furnishes a reply.

35. Nor is noncontradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of the soul).

Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is liable to change it follows that it is non- permanent, like the skin and similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the £aina doctrine of bondage and release is untenable ; according to which doctrine ' the soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of works and sunk in the ocean of sa^/sara, rises when its bonds are sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is freed from the encumbering clay1/ — Moreover, those particles which in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine which are the permanent and which the temporary parts. — We have further to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it. They cannot spring from the material elements

1 Cp. Sarvadai\ra;zasa;wgraha translation, p. 58.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 36. 433

and re-enter the elements ; for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence of some other, general or special, reservoir of soul-particles.— Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul would be of in- definite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and departing is itself indefinite. — On account of all these and similar difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns attach themselves to, and detach them- selves from, the soul.

— On account of all these and similar difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns attach themselves to, and detach them- selves from, the soul.

The Sfitra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sutra has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent, just as the stream of water is permanent (al- though the water continually changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth and so on, are non-permanent. — To this rejoinder our Sutra replies that if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Caina view impossible.

36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of size, at any time).

Moreover, the Camas themselves admit the permanency of the final size of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be permanent \ and that hence

1 The inference being that the initial and intervening sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul, like its final size.

[34] F f

434 VEDANTA-sfiTRAS.

there is no difference between the three sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies. — Or else (to explain the Sutra in a somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also is perma- nent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the same size — whether minute or infinite — and not of the varying size of its bodies. — For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the inappropriateness (of that doc- trine).

— For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the inappropriateness (of that doc- trine).

The Sutrak&ra now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine, according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as he is the general ruler. — But how do you know that that is the purport of the Sutra (which speaks of the Lord ' without any qualification ') ? — From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the present Sutra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general, the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory, and the Sutrak&ra would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore must assume that the purport of the present Sutra is to make an energetic attack on the doctrine of those who main- tain that the Lord is not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause of the world ; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedantic tenet of the unity of Brahman.

The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedanta are of various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sankhya and Yoga systems assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 37. 435

pradh&na and of the souls, and that pradMna, soul, and Lord are of mutually different nature. — The Mcthcrvaras (.Saivas) maintain that the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord Pa^upati (Siva) to the end of breaking the bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa^upati is, according to them, the Lord, the operative cause. — Similarly, the Vaueshikas and others also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of the world.

the soul); Pa^upati is, according to them, the Lord, the operative cause. — Similarly, the Vaueshikas and others also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of the world.

Against all these opinions the Sutra remarks ' the Lord, on account of the ^appropriateness/ I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the ruler of the pradhana and the soul should be the cause of the world, on account of the inap- propriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low, intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is not removed by the con- sideration that the works of living beings and the result- ing dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no beginning ; for in past time as well as in the present mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is, moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyayikas themselves that ' imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action ' (Nyaya Sutra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same ; for the

F f 2

436 VEDANTA-StJTRAS.

Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with pity). — Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul ; for from that it follows that he must be devoid of all activity.

38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhana).

— Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul ; for from that it follows that he must be devoid of all activity.

38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhana).

Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhana and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be ? It cannot be con- junction (sawyoga), because the Lord, as well as the pra- dMna and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not settled as yet1. — How, then, it may be asked, do you — the Ved&ntins — establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord and the world)? — There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume is that of identity (tad&tmya). The adherent of Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our adver- sary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances furnished by experience,

1 The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and the pradhana and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world considered as the effect of the pradhana acted upon by the Lord ; for that the world is the effect of the pradhana is a point which the Vedantins do not accept as proved.

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 40. 437

may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Ved&ntin ; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord. — For all these reasons the SMkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

39. And on account of the impossibility of ruler- ship (on the part of the Lord).

— For all these reasons the SMkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

39. And on account of the impossibility of ruler- ship (on the part of the Lord).

The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an un- tenable hypothesis, for the following reason also. — Those philosophers are obliged to assume that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhana, &c. just as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be admitted ; for the pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and therefore not an object of percep- tion, is on that account of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.

40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhana is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the pradhana in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.

This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused

438 vedanta-sCtras.

by the pradh&na. If the analogy between the pradh&na and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.

Or else the two preceding Sutras may be explained in a different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of countries, are never without some material abode, i. e. a body ; hence, if we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a material substratum ; for experience teaches us that action requires a material substrate. — Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even previously to creation). — This assumption also will not do ; for if the Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigra- tory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

— This assumption also will not do ; for if the Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigra- tory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the following reason also.— They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and like- wise that the pradMna, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of the pradhana, the souls, and himself, or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doc- trine under discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration ; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite extent, such as jars and the like, at sometime cease to exist. The numerical measure of pradh&na, souls, and Lord is

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 42. 439

defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one \ From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa^sara, that means their sa^sara comes to an end, and their subjection to the sawsara comes to an end. Gra- dually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire sa^sara and the sa/^sara state of all souls. But the pradhana which is ruled by the Lord and which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by sa^sara. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his om- niscience and ruling power have no longer any objects. But if the pradhana, the souls, and the Lord, all have an end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general void. — Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i. e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhana, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord. — But that also is impossible, because it would compel us to aban- don a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.

For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears unacceptable.

42. On account of the impossibility of the ori- gination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be accepted).

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now

1 I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows its measure.

440 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now

1 I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the omniscient Lord knows its measure.

440 VEDANTA-SUTRAS.

going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he is the material as well as the operative cause. — But, it may- be objected, in the previous portions of the present work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i. e. a Lord who is the material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recog- nised principle that Smrzti, in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative ; why then should we aim at controverting the doctrine stated ? — It is true, we reply, that a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the Vedanta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy ; another part of the system, how- ever, is open to objection, and that part we intend to attack.

The so-called Bhagavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat) Vasudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyuha), as V&sudeva, Sankarsha^a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vasudeva denotes the highest Self, Sankarsha^a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind (manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (ahankara). Of these four Vasudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three others are the effects. — The believer after having worshipped Vasudeva for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana), procuring of things to be offered (upadana), oblation (i^ya), recitation of prayers, &c. (svadhyaya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the highest Being.

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Naraya/za, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways ; for various scriptural passages, such as ' He is one- fold, he is threefold' (Kh. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentra- tion of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach,

II ADHYAYA, 2 pAdA, 44. 44!

Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentra- tion of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach,

II ADHYAYA, 2 pAdA, 44. 44!

&c. ; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Smrzti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that Sahkarsha^a springs from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from Sankarsha^a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vasudeva, i. e. the highest Self, there should originate Sahkarsha^a, i. e. the individual soul ; for if such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imper- fections which belong to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by entering into its cause. — That the soul is not an originated thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhagavata hypothesis is unacceptable.

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.

The Bh&gavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman. But the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed Sankarsha/za, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. the ahankara termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural passage in their favour.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (V&sudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i. e. the objection raised in Siitra 42).

Let us then — the Bhagavatas may say — understand by Sankarsha/za, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c, but rather Lords, i. e. powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory.

44 2 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a sub- stratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imper- fections. Hence the objection urged in Sutra 42 does not apply.

44 2 VEDANTA-stfTRAS.

All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a sub- stratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imper- fections. Hence the objection urged in Sutra 42 does not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the ' non-exclusion of that/ i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of origination, can be established. — Do you, in the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, Vasudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self? — If so, you commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vasu- deva.— Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal attributes ? — In that case the objection urged in Sutra 4a remains valid. For Sankarsha/za cannot be produced from V&sudeva, nor Pradyumna from Sankarsha^a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause — as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than the effect) — and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. But the followers of the Pa^aratra do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between Vasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of Vasudeva, without any special distinc- tions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme Being.

45. And on account of contradictions.

Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhagavata system, with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and

II ADHYAYA, 2 PADA, 45. 443

ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place spoken of as Selfs, holy Vasudevas, and so on. — Moreover, we meet with passages contradictory of the Veda. The follow- ing passage, for instance, blames the Veda, ' Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas Sa^ilya studied this jastra.' — For this reason also the Bhagavata doctrine can- not be accepted.

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