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THE FRAGMENTS
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THE FRAGMENTS
OP THE WORK OF
HEEACLITUS OF EPHESUS
ON NATURE
TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK TEXT OF BYWATER,
WITH AM INTBODUOTIOM HISTOBIOAL AMD CRITICAL
BX
a. T. W. PATRICK, Ph.D.
FB0FBS80B OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE STATE UNIYEBSITY OF IOWA
* •••
• • #
• •• • • • •
» • • •• ••
' - ^ • "
• • • • • (
• - • •
• *
• • •
•'•- •• •
,••
• • • • • •• •
« j[II, 1-397 ;-^eichmuller^Neue Stud. z. Gesch. der
Begnflfe, Heft I, Glotha^876, and II, 1878)-^y water :
Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae, Oxford, 1877)-^dmund
Pfleiderer\ Die Philosophie des Heraklit vgn Ephesus
im Lichter der My sterienidee, (Berlin, 1886 j-^Eduard
Zeller : Die Philosophie der Qriechen^Bd. I, pp. 566-677.
/There may be mentioned also the following addi-
tional writings which have been consulted in the
preparation of these pages :-^ottlob Mayer) Heraklit
von Ephesus und Arthur Schopenhauer ^^ Heidelberg,
1886 ])(Campbell : Theaetetus of Plato, Appendix A,
Oxford, 1883 ; A. W. Benn : The Greek Philosophers,
London, I882)
2 HERACLITUS.
vAfter the introductory collection and arrangement
of the Heraclitic fragments by Schleiermacher, and
the scholarly discriminative work and additions of
Bernays, four attempts have been made successively
by Lassalle, Schuster, Teichmtiller, and Pfleiderer, to
reconstruct or interpret the philosophical system of
Heraclitus. The positions taken and the results
arrived at by these eminent scholars and critics are
largely, if not wholly, different and discordant. A
brief statement of their several positions will be our
best introduction to the study of Heraclitus at first
hand, and at the same time will offer us incidentally
some striking examples of prevalent methods of his-
toric criticism. )
A
brief statement of their several positions will be our
best introduction to the study of Heraclitus at first
hand, and at the same time will offer us incidentally
some striking examples of prevalent methods of his-
toric criticism. )
^ One of the greatest evils in circles of philosophical
and religious thought has always been the evil of over-
systemization. It is classification, or the scientific
method, carried too far. It is the tendency to arrange
under any outlined system or theory, more facts than
it will properly include. It is the temptation, in a
word, to classify according to resemblances which are
too faint or fanciful. In the field of historic criticism
this evil takes the form of over-interpretationA Just
as in daily life we interpret every sense perception
according to our own mental forms, s(\we tend to read
our own thoughts into every saying of the ancients,
and then proceed to use these, often without dis-
honesty, to support our favorite modern systems. j The
use of sacred writings will naturally occur to every one
as the most striking illustration of this over-interpre-
tation. Especially in the exegesis of the Bible has this
prostitution of ancient writings to every man's religious
views been long since recognized and condemned, and
if most recently this tendency has been largely cor-
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 3
rected in religious circles, it is all the more deplorable,
in philosophical criticism, to find it still flourishing.
^Unfortunately, this vice continues, and it appears
nowhere more plainly than in the interpretation of
Greek philosophy. There is a great temptation to
modem writers to use the Greek philosophers as props
to support their own systems — a temptation to inter-
pret them arbitrarily, to look down upon them patron-
izingly, as it were, showing that what they meant was
this or that modern thought, having only not learned
to express themselves as well as we have. Among his-
torians of philosophy this appears as a one-sidedness,
so that it is commonly necessary in reading a history
of philosophy to maj^ a correction for the author's
" personal equation." /The histories of Schwegler and
of Lewes are examples — the one biased by Hegel-
ianism, the other by Positivism. Undoubtedly, a cer-
tain personal equation is unavoidable, and it is as
impossible for an interpreter of Greek philosophy to
make himself wholly Greek as it is unfair to represent
the ancient thinker as wholly German or English.
But when this becomes complete one-sidedness, or
blindness to all but one series of an author's thoughts,
or a willful or even unintentional perversion of his
words, vigorous remonstrance is called for.
But when this becomes complete one-sidedness, or
blindness to all but one series of an author's thoughts,
or a willful or even unintentional perversion of his
words, vigorous remonstrance is called for.
This attempt to fully understand the ancients, to
make them speak in the phraseology of some modern
school, must be distinguished from the recent move-
ment, represented by Prof. Lagarde and others, in
interpreting historic thought and historic events
psychologically. This movement is certainly legiti-
mate, based as it is on the truth of the similarity of
constitution of all human minds, and the probability
that underlying all representative historic creeds are
great related if not identical' thoughts. Even here, of
4 HBRACLITUS.
course, the attempt to express these thoughts in the set
phrases of any one people is inadequate.
We proceed, then, tcQook at some of the work done
upon the philosophy of Heraclitus. Here we shall not
attempt any examination of Zeller's exposition, since
his work, though it is perhaps the very best that has
been done in this field, is critical rather than recon-
structive, and like his whole history of Greek philos-
ophy, is a marvel of candor as well as of immense
research. Even Zeller, however, has not wholly
escaped the charge of one-sidedness, since Benn, in the
preface to his work on the Greek philosophers, has
accused him of never having outgrown the semi-Hege-
lian prejudice of his youth/)
Lassalle.
(Lassalle, in two ponderous volumes )noted above
(page 1), Vjiade the first and most elaborate attempt
to reconstruct the system of the Ephesian philosopher.)
His work exhibits immense labor and study, and
(extended research in the discovery of new fragments
and of ancient testimony^together with some acuteness
in their use. ^assalle has a very distinct view of the
philosophy of Heraclitus. But it is not an original
view. It is, in fact, nothing but an expansion of the
short account of Heraclitus in Hegel's History of Phil-
osophy, although Lassalle makes no mention of him,y
except to quote upon his title-page Hegel's well-known
motto, ^* Es ist kein Satz des Heraklit, den ich nicht
in meine Logik aufgenommen." ^egel's conception
of Heraclitus is, in a word, as follows : Heraclitus'
♦ Absolute was the unity of being and non-being. His
whole system was an expansion of the speculative
thought of the principle of pure becoming. He appre-
hended, and was the first to apprehend, the Absolute
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 5
His
whole system was an expansion of the speculative
thought of the principle of pure becoming. He appre-
hended, and was the first to apprehend, the Absolute
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 5
as a process, as the unity of opposites, as dialectic
itself. His great contribution was the speculative
transition from the being of the Eleatics to the idea of
becoming?) Now how does Hegel support this position ?
There is in his Logic but one passage referring to Hera-
plitus. There he says, *^ Glancing at the principle of the
Eleatics, Heraclitus then goes on to say, ^ Being no more
is than non -being ' (oudeu fiaXXov to 8v too fxi] oi^roc iau),
a statement expressing the negative nature of abstract
being and its identity with non-being'' (Wallace,
The Logic of Hegel, p. 144 ; cp. Science of Logic,
Hegel's Werke, Vol. 3, p. 80). Hegel omits, in the
Logic, to give the reference to the above quotation,
but in his History of Philosophy (Werke, Vol. 13, p.
332) he quotes the same passage with the reference.
It is to Aristotle, Metaph. i. 4. We turn to the same
and find that it is a passage which Aristotle quotes
from the Atomists, Democritus and Leucippus, and
that it has not the slightest referenc e to Heraclitus,
who, indeed, is not mentioned in tlie same chapter.
This is rather discouraging, but the account in the
History of Philosophy, to which we now turn, is
scarcely less so. There Hegel begins his exposition
of Heraclitus as follows :
**1. Das allgemeine Princip. Dieser kiihne Qeist
(Heraclitus) hat zuerst das tiefe Wort gesagt, * Das
Seyn ist nicht mehr als das Nichtseyn,' es ist ebenso
wenig, Oder, * Seyn und Nichts sey dasselbe,' das
Wesen sey die Veranderung " (Gesch. d. Phil. Vol. 13,
p. 332).
Now it happens that Heraclitus said nothing of the
kind. As references Hegel gives Aristotle, Meta-
phys. i. 4; iv. 7; iv. 3. The first passage, as we have
already seen, is from the Atomists. The second turns
out upon examination to be simply the expression,
^
6 HBRACLITUS.
** All things are and are not" {nduza elvat xai fjtrj ehat)y
and the third is a statement of Aristotle that some
people supposed Heraclitus to have said that the same
thing could both be and not be the same. Moreover,
neither of these passages is Heraclitic in form, and
they are not even mentioned in Bywater's edition.
The only expression of Heraclitus that resembles in
form the above passage from Aristotle is that of frag.
^ 81, " Into the same river we step and we do not step.
^ ^ We Are and we. a re not." The over-interpretation by
OO is which this simple passage, expressing incessant phys-
. V '- ical change^ is transformed into the logical principle
^ 81, " Into the same river we step and we do not step.
^ ^ We Are and we. a re not." The over-interpretation by
OO is which this simple passage, expressing incessant phys-
. V '- ical change^ is transformed into the logical principle
--1 ^^ . ■ / of Hegel, "Das Seyn ist nicht mehr als das Nicht-
^ "^ seyn," "Sgyi V und Nirhtn nny flnnnMb fi," is audacious
--at least. Furthermore, we may say here in passing,
that neither the expressions zb 8v, (jltj ov, nor even rb
^vi^'l xq-vofjiei^ov, occur in any genuine saying of Heraclitus;
- V.V. .4 although if they did occur, it would be easy to show
cVv-t-. /that they could not mean at all what Hegel meant by
(VlVu.f'1/f ^^^^Sy non-being, and becoming. Even the Eleatic
'^j Being was not at all the same with that of Hegel, but
^ was finite, spherical, and something very much like
that which we should call material. But Heraclitus,
who indeed preceded Parmenides, said nothing of
being nor of non-being, nor did he speak of becoming
in the abstract, although the trustful reader of Hegel,
Lassalle, or Ferrier, might well suppose he spoke of
nothing else. That which these writers mistook for
becoming was, as we shall see later, only physical
change. With the loss of this comer-stone, the Hera-
clitic support of the Hegelian Logic fails, and Hegel's
boast that there was no sentence, of Heraclitus that
his Logic had not taken up becomes rather ludicrous,
especially if one will read through the remains of
jVo-i 0pco7roc
xal 7tp6(T0£i> 7] dxouaac xal dxouaauTe^ to TtpcoToi^. yo^ofxivayv
yap ndi^Tcou xara rbv koyou t6v8s dTtecpocac ioixaac nzcpcofxevoe
xal inecou xal ipymv zotooricDV bxoicjv iyo) dajYZUfiae^ dcaepecjv
sxaiTTOu xazd (puacv xal fpd^mi^ oxa}(; ij^ee (Ref . haer. ix.
9 ; = frag. 2). -
This is the passage of which Schuster says that if
Heraclitus had written nothing mor6 it would have
given him a place of honor in philosophy, for here for
the first time appeared the thought that has inspired
speculation and modern science since the Renaissance,
that truth is to be sought in the observation of Nature.
But we are unable to find here any such meaning.
The sense of the passage depends upon the sense of
Logos. Of course, if Schuster is free to translate this
word in any way he chooses, he can get from the pas-
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 21
But we are unable to find here any such meaning.
The sense of the passage depends upon the sense of
Logos. Of course, if Schuster is free to translate this
word in any way he chooses, he can get from the pas-
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 21
sage almost any meaning. He chooses to render it
the Voice of Nature or the Speech of the visible world.
In this he is not supported by any other critics. By
ancient commentators of Heraclitus the Logos was
understood as Reason, and in this general sense it is
taken by modem commentators including Heinze,
Zeller, Teichmiiller, and Pfleiderer, although more
specifically they see that, in harmony with the whole
Heraclitic philosophy, it is to be taken as Reason
immanent in the world as Order or Law. Schuster
objects that Logos could not mean Reason, since before
the time of Heraclitus it had never been so used, and
no author would venture to introduce at the very
beginning of his work words with new meanings. But
precisely the same objection applies to its meaning the
Speech of Nature, for the whole point in Schuster's
exposition is that this was an original idea with
Heraclitus. If the Logos is conceived as Order, this
objection is met, since this meaning is given in the
derivation of the word. Moreover, if Schuster could
show that the word meant ^' speech " or ** discourse,"
then the discourse referred to must have been not that
of Nature but of the author himself. Finally, if we
adopt Reason as the meaning of Logos here, the
whole passage, so far from supporting, directly refutes
Schuster's sensational theory of knowledge. Another
argument for the empiricism of Heraclitus, Schuster
seeks in his denunciation of the people for their failure
to interest themselves in acquiring knowledge by
empirical investigation of the things that surround
them, which he bases on a couple of passages from
Clement and M. Aurelius (see above, p. 12). Heraclitus,
in fact, said nothing of the kind; but Schuster, by
conjectural reconstruction of the text and an arbitrary
22 HERACLITUS,
translation, extracts a theoretical meaning from simple
sentences which no one who had not a preconceived
theory to support would ever imagine to mean more
than a reproach upon the masses for their superficiality
and neglect of interest in a deeper knowledge of the
world (see Schuster, p. 17, and cp. frags. 5, 93). What
Heraclitus' theory of knowledge really was we shall
see more fully in the examination of Pfleiderer's posi-
tion later. Here it is sufficient to add that, whatever
empirical tendency his philosophy may have had, any
such positive doctrine as that which Schuster ascribes
to him was far beyond the time of Heraclitus.
Here it is sufficient to add that, whatever
empirical tendency his philosophy may have had, any
such positive doctrine as that which Schuster ascribes
to him was far beyond the time of Heraclitus.
Schuster's interpretation of the Heraclitic '/^pyjafioaovr]
and x6po efore
metaphysics, when the latter did come, men were
compelled to express its truths in such physical terms
as they were in possession of. He therefore who will
see in the sentences of Heraclitus nothing beyond their
physical and literal meaning, will miss the best part of
his philosophy. For instance, Teichmiiller interprets
the saying that day and night are the same, as meaning
that they are made up of the same physical constitu-
ents (see above, p. 24). If possible, this is worse than
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 33
Schuster's explanation that they are the same because
they are each similar divisions of time(!), an explana-
tion which Teichmiiller very well ridicules (Id. I, p. 49).
No such childish interpretations of this passage are
necessary when it is seen that this is simply another
antithesis to express Heraclitus' great thought of the
unity of opposites, on the ground that by the universal
law of change, opposites are forever passing into each
other, as indeed is said in so many words in a passage
from Plutarch which these critics seem to have
slighted (Consol. ad Apoll. 10, p. 106; see frag. 78).
Equally unnecessary and arbitrary is Teichmiiller's
singular attempt to prove on physical grounds the
identity of the two gods, Dionysus and Hades (see
above, p. 24).
In pursuance of his method, Teichmiiller supposes
that the Heraclitic fire was real fire sucH as our senses
perceive, fire that bums and crackles and feels warm.
No other critic agrees with him in this. Zeller espec-
ially opposes this conception (Vol. I, p. 588). It is not
to be supposed that Teichmiiller understands Hera-
clitus to mean that the present world and all its
phenomena are real fire. Fire he conceives to be,
rather, the first principle or d.pyrj^ the real essence of
the universe, chosen as water was by Thales or air by
Anaximenes, only with more deliberation, since fire
has the peculiarity of taking to itself nourishment. In
a word, since anybody can see that our present earth,
water, and air, are not fire that burns and crackles,
all that Teichmiiller can mean is that this kind of fire
was the original thing out of which the present world
was made. But there is not the least support for this
meaning in any saying of Heraclitus. In all the sen-
tences, fire is conceived as something of the present,
34 HERACLITUS.
But there is not the least support for this
meaning in any saying of Heraclitus. In all the sen-
tences, fire is conceived as something of the present,
34 HERACLITUS.
something directly involved in the ceaseless change of
the world. "Fire, {i, e,, z£/?ayv6c, the thunderbolt),'*
he says, "rules all" (Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10;
= frag. 28). "This world, the same for all, neither
any of the gods nor any man has made, but it always
was, and is, and shall be, an ever living fire *' (Clement
of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 711; =frag. 20). "Fire is
exchanged for all things and all things for fire'*
(Plutarch, de EI. 8, p. 388 ; = frag. 22). These passages
are sufficient to show that Teichmiiller's conception of
the fire is untenable. We may, however, mention the
fact noted by Zeller (Vol. I, p. 588), that both Aristotle
(de An. i. 2, 405, a, 25) and Simplicius (Phys. 8, a)
explain that Heraclitus chose to call the world fire
" in order to express the absolute life of Nature, and to
make the restless change of phenomena comprehen-
sible."
Another point that demands criticism is the idea of
actuality and potentiality which Teichmiiller finds
hidden in Heraclitus' philosophy and metaphorically
expressed by sunset, death, sleep, etc. Since there is
a qualitative interchange of the elements, they must
be in some sense the same. Water is fire and fire is
water. But since water is not actually fire, it must be
so potentially. Therefore, water is potential fire.
Such is Teichmiiller's reasoning, as we have seen. Of
course, it can be reversed with equal right. Since fire
is not actually water, it must be so potentially. There-
fore, fire is potential water. Which is to say that we
have h^re a simple reversible series in which there is
not only an eternal progress (or regress) from fire to
water, but equally, and under the same conditions, an
eternal regress (or progress) from water to fire.
Either, therefore, may, with as good right as the other,
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 35
Either, therefore, may, with as good right as the other,
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 35
represent actuality or potentiality. In other words,
actuality and potentiality are superfluous ideas in this
system. In fact, this antithesis has no place in meta-
physics outside the philosophy of Aristotle, and he
who has failed to see that right in this connection lies
the main difference between the philosophy of Aris-
totle and that of Heraclitus, has missed the most vital
part of the latter. With Aristotle there is an eternal
progress but no regress. The potential is ever passing
into the actual, but not the reverse. To be sure, a
thing may be both actual arid potential, but not as
regards the same thing. The hewn marble is potential
as regards the statue and actual as regards the rough
marble, but of course the hewn marble and the statue
cannot be reciprocally potential or actual. Matter is
eternally becoming form, but not the reverse. Thus
follows Aristotle's necessary assumption of a prime
mover, an inexhaustible source of motion, itself un-
moved — pure actuality, without potentiality. Hence
the mainspring of the peripatetic philosophy is the
unmoved moving first cause. But the philosophy of
the Ephesian is the reverse of all this. With him
there is no fixed being whatever (see Teichmiiller him-
self, I, p. 121 : " Es bleibt dabei nichts Festes zuriick,"
etc.), no unmoved first cause outside the shifting
world which is its own God and prime mover. Thus
Teichmiiller, in identifying the Heraclitic fire with the
Aristotelian pure actuality, overlooked the slight differ-
ence that while the one is absolute motion, the other is
absolute rest ! We are glad, however, not to find this
Aristotelian notion, which, though prevalent in meta-
physics, has never added a ray of light to the subject,
present in the philosophy of the Ephesian, and we see
here another case of over-interpretation by which
36 HBRACLITUS.
Heraclitus' innocent use of such terms as sunset, death,
and self-conceahnent, caused Aristotelian metaphysics
to b0 forced upon him.
Heraclitus' innocent use of such terms as sunset, death,
and self-conceahnent, caused Aristotelian metaphysics
to b0 forced upon him.
In tracing the history of ideas, much emphasis has
been laid by Teichmiiller, as we have seen, upon the
idea of purification {xdOapac(:) as it appears in Hera-
clitus, and in connection therewith he has found the
beginning of the idea of the " apartness " or " separa-
tion " of the inunaterial world, an idea so enormously
enlarged by Anaxagoras and Plato. As regards the
Catharsis proper, Teichmiiller has rendered a service
by pointing out Heraclitus' connection with the idea ;
but in reading Teichmiiller's book, one would be easily
led to believe that the Catharsis idea is much more
prominent in Heraclitus than it really is, and as
regards the doctrine of " separation," it seems at once
so incongruous with the system as a whole that we
must inquire what foundation, if any, there is for it.
The student of Heraclitus knows, although the reader
of Teichmiiller might not suspect, that the words
xddapffe^j xadap6(;, tihxpcvi(:^ eckxpii^eea, y^copcazov^ y^coptadii^j
ixksxToiy themselves do not occur in the authentic remains
of his writings. One exception is to be noted. The word
xey^copcaiihov occurs in the passage from Stobaeus
already noticed (see above, p. 25). It is as follows :
^'Oxoacov X6'fou(; fjxouaa oudsci; dipexi^itzat ic roDro, ctJore
yci^waxscu ore (T0 ou (Stobaeus
Floril. iii. 81). This passage TeichmuUer uses as his
text in establishing the connection of Heraclitus with
the doctrine of '' separation," unfortimately, however,
first because he has not found the correct interpreta-
tion of it, and second, because, if he had, it would
stand in direct contradiction to the doctrine of imma-
nence which he spends all the next chapter in estab-
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 37
lishing for Heraclitus. Io • 7ji> di as fjLU £pou lapLupbrep^ 'fje?Jou. — ix. 16.
With the religion of the Mysteries, in its older and
purer form, Heraclitus was in full sympathy. By his
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 41
family he was brought into close connection with it.
Ephesus, too, his city, was a religious centre. Dio-
genes (ix. 6) relates that he deposited his book in the
temple of Artemis. Heraclitus, indeed, was not a
friend of the popular religion, but that was because of
its abuses, and it was in particular the popular Olym-
pian religion that he attacked. The connection of the
Ephesian with the Mysteries may be considered as a
deep-seated influence which their underlying princi-
ples exerted upon him. These religious principles he
turned into metaphysics. His system as a whole was
religious and metaphysical (Pfleiderer, p. 32 f.).
The connection of the
Ephesian with the Mysteries may be considered as a
deep-seated influence which their underlying princi-
ples exerted upon him. These religious principles he
turned into metaphysics. His system as a whole was
religious and metaphysical (Pfleiderer, p. 32 f.).
With this introduction, Pfleiderer proceeds as fol-
lows. Heraclitus' starting point lay positively in his
theory of knowledge, which was a doctrine of specu-
lative intuition and self -absorption. In this sense our
author understands the fragment from Plutarch (adv.
Colot. 20, p. 1118 ; = frag. 80), ' Edc^Tjadfjoju ifxtwoTov, " I
searched within myself," that is, I wrapped myself in
thought, and so in this self -absorption I sought the
kernel of all truth. Hence his contempt for the masses
who act and speak without insight. But does not this
conflict with those Heraclitic sentences which place
the standard of truth and action in the common or
universal {^oi^ou) ? (cp. frags. 92, 91). Do these not lead
as Schuster holds, to the rule, Verum est, quod semper,
quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est? No,
says Pfleiderer, the common here does not mean the
general opinion of the majority. All such interpret-
ations are sufiiciently refuted by that other passage,
^' To me, one is ten thousand if he be the best " (frag.
113). What Heraclitus really meant by the common
(f ?>i^6i^) was "the true inward universality." Absorp-
tion into one's inner self was absorption into that
42 HERACLITUS.
ground of reason which is identical with the divine
principle of the world. By this universal reason under
which he contemplated all things, Heraclitus meant
nothing different from what by Spinoza was expressed
by "sub specie aetemitatis/' and in subsequent phi-
losophy by "intellectual intuition" and "the stand-
point of universal knowledge.'^ Heraclitus fell back
upon that universal instinct which in the form of
human language is exhibited as the deposit of succes-
sive ages, and which again he did not distinguish
from the voice of the Sibyl, representative of divine
revelation. As respects the source of knowledge,
Heraclitus as little as Spinoza, Fichte and Hegel,
looked to himself as individual, but rather to that
singular and qualitative, divine source in which the
individual participates (Pfleiderer, p. 46 flf.).
The senses, though they do not give us the whole
truth, yet furnish the sufficient data that are to be
interpreted by the light of reason. The errors of the
masses do not arise from trusting the senses, for the
latter give not a false, but a partial account. Their
error lies in missing the spiritual band which unites
the manifold of sense into the higher unity, an error
distinctive of the popular polytheism as against the
religion of the Mysteries (Id. p. 70).
Their
error lies in missing the spiritual band which unites
the manifold of sense into the higher unity, an error
distinctive of the popular polytheism as against the
religion of the Mysteries (Id. p. 70).
The theory of knowledge, Heraclitus' starting point,
being thus disposed of, Pfleiderer proceeds to discuss
the material principles of his philosophy in their
abstract metaphysical form. The keynote here is the
indestructibility of life. The oscillating identity of
life and death, a truth adopted from the Mysteries, is
taken up by Heraclitus and elevated into a universal
and metaphysical principle. It is based on the simple
observation of Nature, which sees the life and light
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL,
43
I
I
warmth of summer pasBing into the death and
darkneBS and cold of winter, only to be revived and
restored in the never-failing spring. So on a smaller
scale, day passes into night, but night ever again into
day, So everywhere in Nature nothing passes away
but to revive again. From this follows the hope of
the universality of this law, the indestructibility of
human life, and the resolution of the opposition be-
tween the light, warm life here above and the dark,
cold death below. This is the hopeful element which
characterizes the philosophy of the Ephesian. Over
against it was the hopeless creed of the masses, whose
complaint over the inexorable destiny of death found
expression from the earliest times in the despairing
lines of the poets. The conunon view does not see too
much continuance and constancy in reality, but too
little. " What we see waking," says Heraclitus, "is
death, what we see sleeping is a dream " (Clement of
Alex, iii, 3, p. 520 ; =frag, Gi). Which means, that like
the unreality and inconstancy of dreams is this ephem-
eral and perishing existence which we, the vulgar
people, see when awake. Reversing this gloomy view,
the Mysteries taught that Hades and Dionysus were
the same (cp. frag. 127), That is, the god of death
feared in the world below, is identical with the god of
life and joy of the world here above, which is to say
that the regenerative power of life persists even in
death and shall overcome it (Pfteiderer, p. 74 fF.},
From this theory of the indestructibility of the fire
force of life, Heraclitus passes to the ancillary truth of
the unity of opposition in general. Hence he asserted
the identity of day and night, winter and summer,
yoiing and old, sleeping and waking, hunger and
satiety (cp. frags. 36, 78), His whole theory of the
44
HERACUTUS.
harmony of opposites was, as it were, apologetic.
life rules in death, why does death exist 'i It was in
answer to this question that Heraclitus developed his
science of opposition and strife, by showing the pres-
ence here of a general law {Pfleiderer, p. 84 ff.).
harmony of opposites was, as it were, apologetic.
life rules in death, why does death exist 'i It was in
answer to this question that Heraclitus developed his
science of opposition and strife, by showing the pres-
ence here of a general law {Pfleiderer, p. 84 ff.).
In the same spirit Pfleiderer interprets the much ^
contested figure of the harmony of the world as the j
harmony of the bow and the lyre (see frags. 45, 56).
Without rejecting the interpretation suggested by I
Bemays (Rhein. Mus. vii. p. 94) and followed by most
other critics, which refers the figure to the form of '
the bow and of the lyre, their opposite stretching arms
producing harmony by tension, Pfleiderer finds in the
comparison still another meaning. The bow and the
lyre are both attributes of Apollo, the slayer and the
giver of life and joy. Thus the harmony between the
bow and the lyre, as attributes of one god — symbols
respectively of death and of life and joy — expresses the |
great thought of the harmony and reciprocal inter-
change of death and life (Pfleiderer, p. 89 ff.).
The Heraclitic flux of all things, says Pfleiderer, was 1
not antecedent to his abstract teachings, but the logi- j
cal consequence thereof. The identity of life and 1
death led him to the identity of all opposites. But
opposites are endlessly flowing or passing into each
other. Hence from the principle that everything is
opposition, follows the principle that everything flows.
The universal flux is only a picture to make his relig-
ious metaphysical sentences intelligible (Id, p. 100 ff.).
The Heraclitic fire is real fire as opposed to the
logical symbol of Lassalle, but not the strictly sensible
fire that burns and crackles, as Teichmiiller supposes.
It is rather a less definite conception, which is taken
now as fire, now as warmth, warm air or vapor. It is
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 45
the concrete form or intuitional correlate of the meta-
physical notion of life (Id. p. 120 flf.)-
" The way up and down " refers not only to the trans-
mutations of fire, water, and earth, but holds good in
general for the oscillation of opposites, and particularly
for the polarity of life and death (Id. p. 140).
As one result of his investigation, Pfleiderer affirms
a strong optimistic element in the philosophy of the
Ephesian. He contests the opinion of Schuster and
Zeller that the endless destruction of single existences
is kindred to the pessimistic doctrine of Anaximander,
of the extinction of all individuals as an atohement
for the ** injustice " of individual existence. The pro-
cess indeed goes on, but it has a bright side, and it is
this that Heraclitus sees. Life, to be sure, is ever pass-
ing into death, but out of death life ever emerges. It
is this thought, the powerlessness of death over the
indestructible fire force of life, which Heraclitus em-
phasizes (Id. p. 180 flf.).
Life, to be sure, is ever pass-
ing into death, but out of death life ever emerges. It
is this thought, the powerlessness of death over the
indestructible fire force of life, which Heraclitus em-
phasizes (Id. p. 180 flf.).
Still more decided is his rational optimism, his un-
swerving belief in a world well ordered and disposed.
A deep rationality characterizes the universe (cp. frags.
2, 1, 91, 92, 98, 99, 96, 19). To express this idea, Hera-
clitus used the word Logos, which after his time played
so prominent a part in the older philosophy. This
word, passing even beyond its signification of " well
ordered relation," conveyed finally with Heraclitus,
as ^oT-oc f yvoc, rather the idea of Reason immanent in
the world (Pfieiderer, p. 231 flf.).
In the invisible harmony we find the same general
thought. As distinguished from the visible harmony,
which meant that external order of Nature insuring to
the trustful peasant the never failing return of summer
and winter, heat and frost, day and night,— the invisi-
46 . HBRACLITUS.
ble harmony was that all-embracing harmony which
is revealed to thought as the rational union of all
oppositions. Against this theodicy there is no valid
objection to be derived from the accounts which repre-
sent the Ephesian philosopher as sad and complain-
ing, nor from the passages descriptive of the evils
of life and the weakness of men (cp. frags. 86, 55, 112,
etc.). In all cases these refer not to the philosopher's
own opinions, but to the errors of the ignorant masses
(Pfleiderer, p. 235 f£.).
The future existence of the soul, though not consis-
tent with his physics and metaphysics, was neverthe-
less held from the religious and ethical standpoint. In
fact it was involved, as has been shown, in Heraclitus'
point of departure, so that we have less reason to com-
plain of inconsistency in his case than we have, in
reference to the same matter, in the case of the Stoics
later (Id. p. 210).
We have given, perhaps, more space to the exposi-
tion of Pfleiderer's work than it relatively deserves,
because it is the last word that has been spoken on
Heraclitus, because, also, it has deservedly brought
into prominence the optimism and the religious char-
acter of his philosophy, and because finally it presents
another instructive example of over-systemization. It
claims our attention, too, because the view it proposes
is a complete reversal of the prevalent conception of
Heraclitus, and if seriously taken, chknges the whole
tenor of his philosophy.
In what follows we shall examine chiefly the two
main points in Pfleiderer's work, namely, the theory
of knowledge and the connection with the Greek
Mysteries ; the latter, because it is Pfleiderer's particu-
HISTORICAL. ANB CRITICAL. 47
In what follows we shall examine chiefly the two
main points in Pfleiderer's work, namely, the theory
of knowledge and the connection with the Greek
Mysteries ; the latter, because it is Pfleiderer's particu-
HISTORICAL. ANB CRITICAL. 47
lar contribution, and the former, because it will open
to us an important aspect of the Ephesian's philosophy.
In the first place, however, it can by no means be
admitted that the doctrine of the flux and the harmony
of opposites represent the negative side of his system,
and are secondary to his theory of knowledge and
his religious dogmas. The unanimous testimony of
the ancients cannot be thus easily set aside. That of
Plato and Aristotle alone is decisive. Pfleiderer objects
that Plato's purpose, which was to establish the
changelessness of noumena against the change of
phenomena, led him to emphasize the flux of Hera-
clitus. But if Heraclitus' positive teachings were, as
Pfleiderer says, first of all the theory of knowledge,
this and not the flux must have been emphasized in the
Theaetetus where the theory of knowledge was Plato's
theme. It is sufficient, however, here to note that
what Heraclitus has stood for in philosophy from his
own time to the present, is the doctrine of absolute
change, and this doctrine may, therefore, properly be
called the positive side of his philosophy. If what
Pfleiderer means is that the theory of knowledge and
not the flux was his starting point, he would have a
shadow more of right. It is, however, misleading to
say that his theory of knowledge was his starting
point, for, as we have indicated in our examination of
Schuster's work, Heraclitus was not concerned with a
theory of knowledge as such. To state in a word what
his point of departure really was, regarded from a
common-sense view, it was his conviction that he was
in possession of new truth which the blindness and
ignorance of men prevented them from seeing (the
point of departure indeed of almost every one who
writes a book), and the three leading ideas in this
Lr> 5/ philosophy has well said that "philosophy did not
,) ,; . A ' sliced the myth of Kore and Demeter to make known
the alternation of natural conditions, the passage from
death to life and life to death ; daily observation taught
it" (Vol. 1, p. 60).
The intrinsic weakness of Pfleiderer^s position is
best seen when he attempts to pass to the doctrine of
the flux. It taxes the imagination to see how the
identity of life and death should lead to the universal
principle ndi^ra ^(opet xae ou8ki^ /lii^sc. Pfleiderer would
have us believe that the eternal flux was a subordinate
thought — a mere picture to help the mind to conceive
N
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 56
It taxes the imagination to see how the
identity of life and death should lead to the universal
principle ndi^ra ^(opet xae ou8ki^ /lii^sc. Pfleiderer would
have us believe that the eternal flux was a subordinate
thought — a mere picture to help the mind to conceive
N
HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 56
the primary metaphysical truth of the unity of oppo-
sites. We have already attempted to show that any
explanation of the Heraclitic philosophy must be wrong
which reduces the doctrine of the flux to a subordinate
position. Here it is sufficient to add that if Heraclitus
iiad been seeking a picture to illustrate the optimistic
endurance of life even in death, and the rational unity
and harmony of opposite powers, he could not possibly
have chosen a more unfortunate figure than the ever-
flowing river into which one cannot step twice. Pflei-
derer, in saying that Heraclitus chose the picture of the
evanescence of things to illustrate his law of opposites
and the endurance of life, seems to have forgotten
that on a previous page (above, p. 602) he said that the
hopeless creed of the masses, against which the Ephe-
sian was trying to establish the triumph of life, saw
not too much permanence and constancy in the world,
but too little.
We are forced, therefore, to conclude not only that
Pfleiderer has failed to establish any especial depend-
ence of Heraclitus upon the religion of the Greek Mys-
teries, but also that his supposed discovery that we
have here a metaphysical philosophy developed from
the material principle of the oscillating identity of life ^ QYcS't
and death, is an assumption without basis in fact. ^ 'P^y'-
In redeeming the Ephesian from the charge of pessi- p^O
mism, Pfleiderer has done a good work. But here
again he has gone too far, in finding not only a well
grounded rational optimism in the doctrine of a world-
ruling Order, but also a practical optimism in the idea
of the indestructibility of life, an idea which, although
it appears on every page of Pfleiderer's book, is not to
be found in any saying oi Heraclitus or in any record
of his philosophy.
c'.y
t
i
I
56 HERACLITUS.
Section II. — Reconstructive.
I.
c'.y
t
i
I
56 HERACLITUS.
Section II. — Reconstructive.
I.
^ Alaving examined the four preceding fundamentally
^ different views of the philosophy of Heraclitus, and
having discovered that the opinions of modern critics
on the tenor of this philosophy furnish a new and un-
expected illustration of Heraclitus' own law of abso-
lute instability, it remains to be considered whether it
is possible to resolve^as he did/ this general diversity
into a higher unity, and in this case to verify his law
that in all opposition there is harmony. If such a
unity is sought as that attempted by Lassalle, Schuster,
and Pfleiderer, it may be said at once that the task is
impossible. All such ambitious attempts in construc-
tive criticism in the case of Heraclitus are certain to
result, as we have seen, in over-interpretation, and
while they may leave a completed picture in the mind
of the reader, they do not leave a true one. Not only
is such a unified view of the philosophy of the Ephe-
sian unattainable, but it is unnecessary. It is quite
certain that had we before us his original book in its
entirety, we should find therein no fully consistent
system of philosophy. Yet it is just this fact that
modem critics forget. While they point out errors
and contradictions by the score in the books of their
fellow critics, they allow for no inconsistencies on the
part of the original philosopher. Presuppositions of
harmony between all the sentences of an ancient
writer have led to much violence of interpretation.
Our interest in Heraclitus is not in his system as such,
but in his great thoughts which have historic signifi-
cance. These we should know, if possible, in their
t
RJICONSTRUCTIVB. 67
original meaning and in their connection with preced-
ing and succeeding philosophy. Before concluding
this introduction, then, it will be of advantage to re-
capitulate the results of the foregoing criticism, and
to place together such conclusions concerning the chief
Heraclitic thoughts as we have drawn either from the
agreement or the disagreement of the various criticerj
''^We shall best understand Heraclitus if we fix well
in mind his immediate starting-point. As we found |
above in the examination of Pfleiderer's position) (p. I
47),(the Ephesian philosopher was first and primarily
a, preacher. To him the people almost without excep- ^^ "^"^
tion, were blind, stupid, and beastly. Heraclitus "^^^ ^^
hated them. They got no farther than crude sense SCc* A'
pBrception)(cp. frags. 4, 6, 3), failing not only to recog- Tq PC'C
nize the invisible harmony of the changing world, but Uf-xj ft/
even the change itself (cp. frag. 2). They believed ^..
Heraclitus "^^^ ^^
hated them. They got no farther than crude sense SCc* A'
pBrception)(cp. frags. 4, 6, 3), failing not only to recog- Tq PC'C
nize the invisible harmony of the changing world, but Uf-xj ft/
even the change itself (cp. frag. 2). They believed ^..
things were fixed because they appeared so at first *^''^ ^ *"
sight. They preferred the lower passions to the higher "^ " ^^ ^
senses (cp. frag. lll)^JIe is from first to last a misan- U^Hv.-/'s/^
thrope. He despises the people, yet as if constrained "^-^'J wXa
by a divine conmaand, he must deliver his messag^(cp. ', -.. ^ '': c r
frags. 1, 2)./To understand Heraclitus we must free our i^j a ^ f^
minds from conceptions of every other Greek philoso- »/^^ .j
pher, except, perhaps, his fellow lonians. Never after- /^ / cu
wards did philosophy exhibit such seriousness.) We ^ .
can no more imagine Heraclitus at Athens than we . ^.^^
can think of Socrates away from it. ^Althoughjas we . ^
shall see,\the philosophy of Plato stood in vital con-
nection with that of Heraclitus, no contrast could be
greater than the half playful speculative style of the
former, and the stem, oracular and dogmatic utter-
ances of the latter. jWe shall find no parallel except
in Jewish literature. Cindeed, Heraclitus was a pro-
i
\>l t-^
^ ri \\
58 HKRACLITUS.
. phet. As the prophets of Israel hurled their messages
' ^.^-^ in actual defiance at the people, hardly more does the
Ephesian seem to care how his words are received, if
only he gets them spokenA Not more bitter and mis-
^^ ^ anthropic is Hosea in his denunciation of the people's
' sins (cp. ch. iv. 1, 2 flf.), than is our philosopher in his
contempt for the stupidity and dullness of the masses.
(At the very opening of his book he says, from his lofty
position of conscious superiority : " This Law which I
unfold, men insensible and half asleep will not hear,
and hearing, will not comprehend'^ (frag. 2 ; cp. frags.
3, 5, 94. 95).
NoTvCa^hat was the prime error of the people which
so aroused the Ephesian, and what was the message
ck which he had to deliver to them f^ Zeller is wrong in
2 ; cp. frags.
3, 5, 94. 95).
NoTvCa^hat was the prime error of the people which
so aroused the Ephesian, and what was the message
ck which he had to deliver to them f^ Zeller is wrong in
saying (Vol. 1, p. 576) that, according to Heraclitus, the
radical error of the people was in attributing to things
a permanence of being which they did not possess/in
no passage does he censure the people for this. I What
he blames them for is their insensibility, for looking
low when they ought to look high — in a word, for
blindness to the Divine Law or the Universal Reason
• 7 (frags. 2, 3, 4, 51, 45, 14).^ (He blames them for
not recognizing the beauty of strife (frag. 43), and
the law of opposites (frag. 45). He blames them
for their grossness and beastliness (frags. 86, 111).
Finally, he blames them for their immorality (frag.
124), their silliness in praying to idols (frag. 126),
and their imbecility in thinking they could pimfy
themselves by sacrifices of blood (frag. 130)j/(jVe
*y see therefore how wholly impossible it is to under-
stand Heraclitus unless we consider the ethical and
^ f religious character of his mind. Thus Zeller, in as far
as he has attempted to give us a picture of Heraclitus'
i ta
I'f
RECONSTRUCTIVE. 69
system, has failed by starting with the doctrine of the
flux and overlooking the religious motive^) This is not
to say, as Pfleiderer has done, that Ijhe flux/ was
/ ^ merely a negative teaching, (jf ext to the recognition
of the Eternal Law, it was the most positive of his
teachings, and was the groimd of his influence upon
subsequent thought.^ As such it is of chief interest to
us ; but as far as we wish to get a picture of Heraclitus
himself, we must think first of his religious and ethical
point of departure. Thus(i^ content of Heraclitus'
message to his countrymen was ethical. It was a
call to men everywhere to wake t^p,jto purify their
^ap^dpoui; ^y;fcfcj^and see things in their reality.^
/What now was this reality which he with his finer
I jL insight saw, but which ruder souls were blind to ?
This brings us to the theoretical side or the philo -^»
It was a
call to men everywhere to wake t^p,jto purify their
^ap^dpoui; ^y;fcfcj^and see things in their reality.^
/What now was this reality which he with his finer
I jL insight saw, but which ruder souls were blind to ?
This brings us to the theoretical side or the philo -^»
/ V sophical content of Heraclitus' messagejWHere comes
in the contribution of Teichmiiller, who^as we saw^,
/clearly pointed out that the great new thought of the
jlphesi an was the unit xJZL^he manifold, as opposed to
the unity over against the manifold, taught by
Xenophanes. It was the unity of opposition, the
harmony of strife. ' Tt was Order immanent in cease-^
less" change.^ To use a phrase of Campbell's, " The
Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity
and perfect law " (Plat. Theaet. Appendix, p. 244)^his
was the central thought of Heraclitusy** the grandeur
of which," says Campbell, ** was far beyond the com-
prehension of that time." But, it may be said, if we
have rightly apprehended Heraclitus' position as a
prophet and preacher, this was rather strong meat to
' feed the masses. But the 7:o)J.oc with Heraclitus was a
very broad term. It included everybody. The arro-
gance of this man was sublime. Neither Homer nor
60 HBRACLITUS.
But the 7:o)J.oc with Heraclitus was a
very broad term. It included everybody. The arro-
gance of this man was sublime. Neither Homer nor
60 HBRACLITUS.
Hesiod nor Pythagoras nor Xenophanes escaped his
lash (cp. frags. 16, 17, 119, 114). He had especially
in mind the so-called '*men of repute," and said they
were makers and witnesses of lies (cp. frag. 118). The
whole male population of Ephesus, he said, ought to
be hung or expelled on account of their infatuation
and blindness (cp. frag. 114). Addressing such an
audience, indeed, his message had to be pitched high.
I >z (jVe have in the Ephesian sage a man who openly
claimed to have an insight- superior to all the world,
and the history of thought has vindicated his claim.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that Heraclitus
did, in a measure, try to make the world-ruling Law
intelligible. He pictured it now as Justice, whose
handmaids, the Erinyes, will not let the sun overstep
his bounds (frag. 29) ; now as Fate, or the all-determin-
ing Destiny^Stobaeus, Eel. i. 5, p. 178 ; cp. frag. 63) ;
/now as simple Law (frags. 23, 91), now as Wisdom
Ifrag. 65), intelligent Will (frag. 19), God (frag. 36),
Zeus (frag. 65). Respecting the latter term he ex-
pressly adds that it is misleading. So we see that
Heraclitus did what some modem philosophers have
been blamed for doing — he put his new thoughts into
old religious formulas. But it was more justifiable in
the case of the Ephesian. He did so, not to pr.esent a
semblance of orthodoxy, but to tify to make his idea
intelligible/) In fact, Heraclitus, no less than Xeno-
phanes, was a fearless, outspoke^ enemy of the popular
anthropomorphisms. " This world, the same for all,''
he says, '' neither any of the gods nor any man has
made, but it always was, and is, and shall be, an ever
living fire, kindled and quenched according to law *'
(frag. 20 ; cp. frag. 126).
At this point it is natural to ask ourselves/ what,
KECONSTRUCTIVB. 61
" This world, the same for all,''
he says, '' neither any of the gods nor any man has
made, but it always was, and is, and shall be, an ever
living fire, kindled and quenched according to law *'
(frag. 20 ; cp. frag. 126).
At this point it is natural to ask ourselves/ what,
KECONSTRUCTIVB. 61
more exactly considered, Heraclitus meant by his Uni-
versal Order, his Divine Lam xoci^6 pf these the first i^Ahe notion of JLaw and
Order absolute and immanent in the world, an idea so
large that no Greek follower could grasp it, and yet
vital to Heraclitus' system,yfor without it his philo-
sophy becomes the philosophy of desperation, the source
among the ingenuous Greeks of the nihilism of Gor-
gias or the universal doubt of the skeptics, and among
the brooding modems the source of the pessimism of
Schopenhauer. ^\To Heraclitus again we trace) as
Teichmiiller has shown/the closely related doctrine of
the immanence of God in the world, so that we have in
him one source of the pantheistic systems. 6,To Hera-
clitus, finally, we trace the physical law of opposites, >
the thought that all order and harmony and apparent
permanence are the result of opposite tension, the bal-
ance of centrifugal and centripetal forces. (Less in-
volved in the history of philosophy, though most im-
portant to Heraclitus, and in themselves most interest-
ing to us of modern times, are his great ethical thoughts )
Thich we have already outlined.
The determinative ideas of the Ephesian may be
summed up in ^ word by saying that they represent
all that way of thinking against which Socrates and
Plato raised the whole weight of their authority/
Without repeating here the facts, well enough known
to everybody, of the Socratic reaction in Greek philo-
sophy, we must sketch one or two phases of it in order
to establish the influence and explain the final defeat
of the Heraclitic philosophy. /^In Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle, philosophy underwent a change more radical
76 HERACLITUS.
than any other in its history, a change that was ulti-
mately to revolutionize all thought, and through its
influence on Christian theology, to enter as a large
determining element into all western civilization.
Heraclitus is the representative of what philosophy
was before that change.^
than any other in its history, a change that was ulti-
mately to revolutionize all thought, and through its
influence on Christian theology, to enter as a large
determining element into all western civilization.
Heraclitus is the representative of what philosophy
was before that change.^
Socrates said he couTd not understand the book of
Heraclitus. ^That was not strange. The Ephesian
could have told him the reason why. The man who
could learn nothing from the fields and trees (see
Plato's Phaedrus, p. 230), who spent all his time in
the Agora conversing with other men about virtue,
and who never seemed to realize that there was a
world above the heads and under the feet of men,
was not likely to understand the book of Heraclitus.
Could the Ephesian philosopher have taken the Atheni-
an logician out and given him a few lessons from Nature
at first hand, could he have induced him to desist for a
while from his boring into human intellects in search
of a definition, and got his gaze lifted up to the clouds
and stars, and put him in actual contact with the
nepci^oi^, he would have been an apter scholar with the
book. But it is quite impossible even in fancy to
think of these two men together. The conmiuner
with Nature, the stern misanthropic sage and prophet
of Ephesus had no points in conunon with the society-
loving Athenian sophist. They were radically differ-
ent, and on this difference hangs the secret of the
development of philosophy for two thousand years.
Socrates was not a Greek at all. He denied the most
characteristic traits of his nation. He was a modern
in many true senses. He was a curiosity at Athens,
and consequently very much in vogue.
Socrates represents the birth of self -consciousness. In
?
RECONSTRUOTIVB. . 77
Socrates was not a Greek at all. He denied the most
characteristic traits of his nation. He was a modern
in many true senses. He was a curiosity at Athens,
and consequently very much in vogue.
Socrates represents the birth of self -consciousness. In
?
RECONSTRUOTIVB. . 77
practicing his maieutic art to this end, he little thought
that he was giving the death-blow to the most beauti-
ful trait of his countrymen, namely, the instinctive,
the unconscious, the naive. No doubt this new birth
had to take place some time, but under Socrates'
direction it was premature. The old methods were
not yet dead. Here historians of philosophy err. They
say the pre-Socratic philosophers of Nature had in vain
tried to solve the problems of the world, and it was high
time for a critical philosophy that should begin with
man. In vain, indeed ! Had the naturalists labored in
vain when the foundation of the atomic philosophy had
been laid in Abdera, that of mathematics in Italy, and
a far-seeing metaphysics and ethics in Ephesus ? Soc-
rates and Plato took fright too easily at the Sophists.
Their philosophy would have died with them. Not so
that of Democritus, Pythagoras, and Heraclitus. Soc-
rates was a professor of clear thinking. Clear thinking
is in itself well, but two solid centuries of clear think-
ing from Descartes to Hegel have in modern times
ended in failure. We long to know what natural
thinking would have accomplished if it had been left
an open field a while longer in Greece. Then again
clear thinking was overdone. It was, to be sure, not
Socrates' fault that his method was afterwards abused,
but as a matter of fact it took in later history a patho-
logical turn that has resulted in wide-spread evils.
Over self-consciousness, too much inwardness and
painful self -inspection, absence of trust in our instincts
and of the healthful study of Nature, which in ethics
are illustrated in modern questions of ta0aTeiv, hioc to afi(j>ialiijTeiv
'Icjveg 6e nal ayxt-PcLTelv^ nal ayxi-Paaii^ *B.pdK7ieiTog,
X. — Themistius, Or. v. p. 69 (=r xii. p. 159). Context : — Nature
according to Heraclitus, loves to conceal herself ; and before nature
the creator of nature, whom therefore we especially worship and
adore because the knowledge of him is difficult.
Philo, Qu. in Gen. iv. 1, p. 237, Aucher.: Arbor est secundum
Heraclitum natura nostra, quae se obducere atque abscondere amat.
Compare idem de Profug. 32, p. 573 ; de Somn. i. 2, p. 621 ; de
Spec. legg. 8, p. 344.
XI. — Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 21, p. 404. Context : — And I think
you know the saying of Heraclitus that ** The God," etc.
lamblichus, de Myst. iii. 15.
Idem from Stobaeus Floril. Ixxxi. 17.
Anon, from Stobaeus Floril. v. 72.
Compare Lucianus, Vit. auct. 14.
XII. — Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 6, p. 397. Context; — But the
Sibyl, with raging mouth, according to Heraclitus, uttering things
solemn, rude and unadorned, reaches with her voice over a
ON NATURE. 87
Ixxxi. 17.
Anon, from Stobaeus Floril. v. 72.
Compare Lucianus, Vit. auct. 14.
XII. — Plutarch, de Pyth. orac. 6, p. 397. Context; — But the
Sibyl, with raging mouth, according to Heraclitus, uttering things
solemn, rude and unadorned, reaches with her voice over a
ON NATURE. 87
XIII. — Whatever concerns seeing, hearing, and
learning, I particularly honor."
XIV. — Polybius iv. 40. Especially at the present
time, when all places are accessible either by land or by
water, we should not accept poets and mythologists as
witnesses of things that are unknown, since for the
most part they furnish us with unreliable testimony
about disputed things, according to Heraclitus.
XV. — The eyes are more exact witnesses than the
ears.*
thousand years, because of the God. And Pindar says that Cadmus
heard from the God a kind of music neither pleasant nor soft nor
melodious. For great holiness permits not the allurements of
pleasures.
Clement of Alex. Strom, i. 15, p. 358.
lamblichus, de Myst. iii. 8.
See also pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. yiii.
XIII. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 9, 10. Context: — And that
the hidden, the unseen and unknown to men is [better], he (Hera-
clitus) says in these words, " A hidden harmony is better than a
visible ' ' (= frag. 47). He thus praises and admires the unknown and
unseen more than the known. And that that which is discoverable
and visible to men is [better], he says in these words, "Whatever
concerns seeing, hearing, and learning, I particularly honor," that
is, the visible above the invisible. From such expressions it is easy
to understand him. In the knowledge of the visible, he says, men
allow themselves to be deceived as Homer was, who yet was wiser
than all the Greeks ; for some boys killing lice deceived him saying,
** What we see and catch we leave behind ; what we neither see nor
catch we take with us " (frag. 1, Schuster). Thus Heraclitus honors
in equal degree the seen and the unseen, as if the seen and unseen
were confessedly one. For what does he say ? "A hidden harmony
is better than a visible," and, " Whatever concerns seeing, hearing,
and learning, I particularly honor," having before particularly
honored the invisible.
XV. — Polybius xii. 27. Context : — There are two organs given to
us by nature, sight and hearing, sight being considerably the more
truthful, according to Heraclitus, **For the eyes- are more exact
witnesses than the ears."
Compare Herodotus i. 8.
88 HBRACLITUS.
XVI. — Much learning does not teach one to have
understanding, else it would have taught Hesiod and
Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus.
XVII. — Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised
investigation most of all men, and having chosen out
these treatises, he made a wisdom of his own — much
learning and bad art.
XVIII. — Of all whose words I have heard, no one
attains to this, to know that wisdom is apart from all.^
XVII. — Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, practised
investigation most of all men, and having chosen out
these treatises, he made a wisdom of his own — much
learning and bad art.
XVIII. — Of all whose words I have heard, no one
attains to this, to know that wisdom is apart from all.^
XIX. — There is one wisdom, to understand the intel-
ligent will by which all things are governed through
all.«
XX. — This world, the same for all, neither any of
XVI. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 1. Context: — He (Heraclitus) was
proud and disdainful above all men, as indeed is clear from his
work, in which he says, " Much learning does not teach," etc.
Aulu^ Gellius, N. A. praef. 12.
Clement of Alex. Strom, i. 19, p. 373.
Athenaeus xiii. p. 610 B.
lulianus, Or. vi. p. 187 D.
Proclus in Tim. 31 F.
Serenus in Excerpt. Flor. loann. Damasc. ii. 116, p. 205, Meinek.
Compare pseudo-Democritus, fr. mor. 140 Mullach.
XVII. — Diogenes Laert. viii. 6. Context : — Some say, foolishly,
that Pythagoras did not leave behind a single writing. But Hera-
clitus, the physicist, in his croaking way says, "Pythagoras, son of
Mnesarchus," etc.
Compare Clement of Alex. Strom, i. 21, p. 396.
XVIII.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 81.
XIX. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 1. Context : — See frag. 16.
Plutarch, de Iside 77, p. 382. Context : — Nature, who lives and
sees, and has in herself the beginning of motion and a knowledge of
the suitable and the foreign, in some way draws an emanation and
a share from the intelligence by which the universe is governed,
according to Heraclitus.
Compare Cleanthes H. in lov. 36.
Compare pseudo-Linus, 13 Mullach.
XX. — Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 711. Context : — Heracli-
tus of Ephesus is very plainly of this opinion, since he recognizes
ON NATURE. 89
the gods nor any man has made, but it always was,
and is, and shall be, an ever living fire, kindled in due
measure, and in due measure extinguished.'
XXI. — The transmutations of fire are, first, the sea ;
and of the sea, half is earth, and half the lightning
flash.8
XXII. — All things are exchanged for fire and fire for
all things, just as wares for gold and gold for wares.
that there is an everlasting world on the one hand and on the other
a perishable, that is, in its arrangement, knowing that in a certain
manner the one is not different from the other. But that he knew
an everlasting world eternally of a certain kind in its whole essence,
he makes plain, saying in this manner, " This world the same for
all,'' etc.
Plutarch, de Anim. jjrocreat. 5, p. 1014. Context : — This world,
says Heraclitus, neither any god nor man has made ; as if fearing
that having denied a divine creation, we should suppose the creator
of the world to have been some man.
Simplicius in Aristot. de cael. p. 132, Karst.
Simplicius in Aristot. de cael. p. 132, Karst.
Olympiodorus in Plat. Phaed. p. 201, Finckh.
Compare Cleanthes H., lov. 9.
Nicander, Alexiph. 174.
Epictetus from Stob. Floril. cviii. 60.
M. Antoninus vii. 9.
Just. Mart. Apol. p. 93 C.
Heraclitus, Alleg. Horn. 26.
XXI. — Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 712. Context : — And that
he (Heraclitus) taught that it was created and perishable is shown
by the following, ** The transmutations," etc.
Compare Hippolytus, Ref . haer. vi. 17.
XXII.— Plutarch, de EI. 8, p. 388. Context :— For how that (scil.
first cause) forming the world from itself, again perfects itself from
the world, Heraclitus declares as follows, " All things are exchanged
for fire and fire for all things,'* etc.
Compare Philo, Leg. alleg. iii. 3, p. 89. Context, see frag. 24.
Idem, de Incorr. mundi 21, p. 508. — Lucianus, Vit. auct. 14.
Diogenes Laert. ix. 8.
Heraclitus, Alleg. Hom. 43.
Plotinus, Enn. iv. 8, p. 468.— lamblichus from Stob. Eel. i. 41.
Eusebius, Praep. Evang. xiv. 3, p. 720.— Simplicius on Aristot.
Phys. 6, a.
90 HERACLITUS.
XXIII. — The sea is poured out and measured to the
same proportion as existed before it became earth.*
XXIV.— Cravmg and Satiety.^®
XXV. — Fire lives in the death of earth, air lives in
the death of fire, water lives in the death of air, and
earth in the death of water.^
XXVI. — Fire coming upon all things, will sift and
seize them.
XXIII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 712 (= Eusebius, P. E.
xiii. 13, p. 676). Context : — For he (Heraclitus) says that fire is
changed by the divine Reason which rules the universe, through air
into moisture, which is as it were the seed of cosmic arrangement,
and which he calls sea ; and from this again arise the earth and the
heavens and all they contain. And how again they are restored and
ignited, he shows plainly as follows, " The sea is poured out," etc.
XXIV. — Hippolytus, Ref . haer. ix. 10. Context : — And he (Hera-
clitus) says also that this fire is intelligent and is the cause of the
government of all things. And he calls it craving and satiety. And
craving is, according to him, arrangement {6LaK6Gfiriaiq)j and satiety is
conflagration {eKnvpoxjig). For, he says, " Fire coming upon all things
will separate and seize them" (= frag. 26).
Philo, Leg. alleg. iii. 3, p. 88. Context: — ^And the other (scil.
6 yovoppvifq)j supposing that all things are from the world and are
changed back into the world, and thinking that nothing was made
by God, being a champion of the Heraclitic doctrine, introduces
craving and satiety and that all things are one and happen by
change.
Philo, de Victim. 6, p. 242.
Plutarch, de EI. 9, p. 389.
XXV. — Maximus Tyr. xli. 4, p. 489. Context: — You see the
change of bodies and the alternation of origin, the way up and
down, according to Heraclitus. And again he says, "Living in
their death and dying in their life (see frag. 67). Fire lives in the
death of earth," etc.
9, p. 389.
XXV. — Maximus Tyr. xli. 4, p. 489. Context: — You see the
change of bodies and the alternation of origin, the way up and
down, according to Heraclitus. And again he says, "Living in
their death and dying in their life (see frag. 67). Fire lives in the
death of earth," etc.
M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
Plutarch, de EI. 18, p. 392.
Idem, de Prim. frig. 10, p. 949. Comp. pseudo-Linus 21, Mull.
XXVI. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context, see frag. 24.
Compare Aetna v. 536 : quod si quis lapidis miratur fusile robur,
cogitet obscuri verissima dicta libelli, Heraclite, tui, nihil insuper-
abile ab igni, omnia quo rerum naturae semina iacta.
ON NATURE. 91
XXVII. — How can one escape that which never
sets?"
XXVIII. — Lightning rules all.
XXIX. — The sun will not overstep his bounds, for if
he does, the Erinyes, helpers of justice, will find him
out.
XXX.— The limits of the evenmg and morning are
theTBear, and opposite the Bear, the bounds of bright
Zeus.
XXXI. — If there were no sun, it would be night.
XXVII.— Clement of Alex. Paedag. 11. 10, p. 229. Context :— For
one may escape the sensible light, but the Intellectual it is impossible
to escape. Or, as Heraclitus says, ''How can one escape that which
never sets?'*
XXVIII. — Hippolytus, Ref . haer. ix. 10. Context : — ^And he (Hera-
clitus) also says that a judgment of the world and all things in it
takes place by fire, expressing it as follows, " Now lightning rules
all,'* that is, guides it rightly, meaning by lightning, everlasting fire.
Compare Cleanthes H., lovem 10.
XXIX.— Plutarch, de Exil. II, p. 604. Context .-—Each of the
planets, rolling in one sphere, as in an island, preserves its order.
* " For the sun,'* says Heraclitus, ** will not overstep his bounds,'* etc.
Idem, de Iside 48, p. 370.
Comp. Hippolytus, Ref. haer. vi. 26.
lamblichus, Protrept. 21, p. 132, Arcer.
Pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. ix.
XXX. — Strabo i. 6, p. 3. Context : — And Heraclitus, better and
more Homerically, naming in like manner the Bear instead of the
northern circle, says, "The limits of the evening and morning
are the Bear, and opposite the Bear, the bounds of bright Zeus."
For the northern circle is the boundary of rising and setting, not the
Bear.
XXXI. — Plutarch, Aq. et ign. comp. 7, p. 957.
Idem, de Fortuna 3, p. 98. Context : — And just as, if there were
no sun, as far as regards the other stars, we should have night, as
Heraclitus says, so as far as regards the senses, if man had not mind
and reason, his life would not differ from that of the beasts.
Compare Clement of Alex. Protrept. II, p. 87.
Macrobius, Somn. Scip. i. 20.
92 HBRACLITUS.
XXXII. — The stin is new every day.
Compare Clement of Alex. Protrept. II, p. 87.
Macrobius, Somn. Scip. i. 20.
92 HBRACLITUS.
XXXII. — The stin is new every day.
XXXIII. — Diogenes Laertius i. 23. He (scil. Thales)
seems, according to some, to have been the first to
study astronomy and to foretell the eclipses and
motions of the sun, as Eudemus relates in his account
of astronomical works. And for this reason he is
honored by Xenophanes and Herodotus, and both
Heraclitus and Democritus bear witness to him.
XXXIV.— Plutarch, Qu. Plat. viii. 4, p. 1007. Thus
Time, having a necessary union and connection with
heaven, is not simple motion, but, so to speak, motion
in an order, having measured limits and periods. Of
which the sun, being overseer and guardian to limit,
direct, appoint and proclaim the changes and seasons
which, according to Heraclitus, produce all things, is
the helper of the leader and first God, not in small or
j
trivial things, but in the greatest and most important. |
XXXV. — Hesiod is a teacher of the masses. They ;
suppose him to have possessed the greatest knowledge,
who indeed did not know day and night. For they !
* i
are one.^^ *
— . j
XXXII. — Aristotle, Meteor, ii. 2, p. 355 a 9. Context: — Con-
cerning the sun this cannot happen, since, being nourished in the i
same manner, as they say, it is plain that the sun is not only, as
Heraclitus says, new every day, but it is continually new. j
Alexander Aphrod. in Meteor. 1. 1. fol. 93 a. j
Olympiodorus in Meteor. 1. 1. fol. 30 a. !
Plotinus, Enn. ii. 1, p. 97. '
Proclus in Tim. p. 334 B.
Compare Plato, Rep. vi. p. 498 B.
Olympiodorus in Plato, Phaed. p. 201, Finckh. i
XXXIV.—Compare Plutarch, de Def. orac. 12, p. 416. |
M. Antoninus ix. 3. !
Pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. v. i
XXXV. — Hippolytus, Ref . haer. ix. 10. Context : — Heraclitus says
that neither darkness nor light, neither evil nor good, are different, i
but they are one and the same. He found fault, therefore, with '
ON NATURB. 93
XXXVI. — God is day and night, winter and sum-
mer, war and peace, plenty and want. But he is
changed, just as when incense is mingled with incense,
but named according to the pleasure of each.^*
XXXVII.— Aristotle, de Sensu 5, p. 443 a 21. Some
think that odor consists in smoky exhalation, common
to earth and air, and that for smell all things are con-
verted into this. And it was for this reason that
Heraclitiis thus said that if all existing things should
become smoke, perception would be by the nostrils.
XXXVIII.— Souls smell in Hades.^*
XXXIX. — Cold becomes warm, and warm, cold ; wet
becomes dry, and diy, wet.
XL. — It disperses and gathers, it comes and goes.^®
Hesiod because he knew [not] day and night, for day and night, he
says, are one, expressing it somewhat as follows: *' Hesiod is a
teacher of the masses," etc.
— Cold becomes warm, and warm, cold ; wet
becomes dry, and diy, wet.
XL. — It disperses and gathers, it comes and goes.^®
Hesiod because he knew [not] day and night, for day and night, he
says, are one, expressing it somewhat as follows: *' Hesiod is a
teacher of the masses," etc.
XXXVI.— Hippolytus, Ref . haer. ix. 10. Context :— For that the
primal (Gr. irparov, Bernays reads irotrrrbv^ created) world is itself the
demiurge and creator of itself, he (Heraciitus) says as follows:
" God is day and," etc.
Compare idem, Ref. haer. v. 21.
Hippocrates, ^epl SialrTig i. 4, Littr.
XXXVIII.— Plutarch, de Fac. in orbe lun. 28, p. 943. Context :—
Their (scil. the souls') appearance is like the sun's rays, and their
spirits, which are raised aloft, as here, in the ether around the moon,
are like fire, and from this they receive strength and power, as
metals do by tempering. For that which is still scattered and
diffuse is strengthened and becomes firm and transparent, so that it
is nourished with the chance exhalation. And finely did Heraciitus
say that '' souls smell in Hades."
XXXIX. — Schol. Tzetzae, Exeget. Iliad, p. 126, Hermann. Con-
text : — Of old, Heraciitus of Ephesus was noted for the obscurity of
his sayings, "Cold becomes warm,*' etc.
Compare Hippocrates, 'J^epl diairifg i. 21.
Pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. v. — Apuleius, de Mundo 21.
XL.— Piijtarch, de EI. 18, p. 392. Context, see frag. 41.
Compaire pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. vi.
94 HBRACLITUS.
XLI. — Into the same river you could not step twice,
for other waters are flowing.
XLII. — fTo those entering the same river, other and
still other waters flow.f
XLIII.— Aristotle, Eth. End. vii. 1, p. 1235 a 26.
And Heraclitus blamed the poet who said, ** Would
XLI.— Plutarch, Qu. nat. 2, p. 912. Context :— For the waters of
fountains and rivers are fresh and new, for, as Heraclitus says,
" Into the same river," etc.
Plato, Crat. 402 A. Context :— Heraclitus is supposed to say that
all things are in motion and nothing at rest ; he compares them to
the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same
river twice (Jowett's transl.).
Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5, p. 1010 a 13. Context :— From this
assumption there grew up that extreme opinion of those just now
mentioned, those, namely, who professed to follow Heraclitus, such
as Cratylus held, who finally thought that nothing ought to be said,
but merely moved his finger. And he blamed Heraclitus because
he said you could not step twice into the same river, for he himself
thought you could not do so once.
Plutarch, de EI. 18, p. 392. Context :— It is not possible to step
twice into the same river, according to Heraclitus, nor twice to find
a perishable substance in a fixed state ; but by the sharpness and
quickness of change, it disperses and gathers again, or rather not
again nor a second time, but at the same time it forms and is
dissolved, it comes and goes (see frag. 40).
40).
Idem, de Sera num. vind. 15, p. 559.
Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. f . 17 a.
XUI. — Arius Didymus from Eusebius, Praep. evang. xv. 20, p. 821.
Context : — Concerning the soul, Cleanthes, quoting the doctrine of
Zeno in comparison with the other physicists, said that Zeno affirmed
the perceptive soul to be an exhalation, just as Heraclitus did. For,
wishing to show that the vaporized souls are always of an intellectual
nature, he compared them to a river, saying, "To those entering the
same river, other and still other waters flow." And souls are
exhalations from moisture. Zeno, therefore, like Heraclitus, called
the soul an exhalation.
Compare Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. hyp. iii. 115.
XLIII.— Plutarch, de Iside 48, p. 370. Context :— For Heraclitus
in plain terms calls war the father and king and lord of all (zzfrag.
44), and he says that Homer, when he prayed — ** Discord be damned
ON NATURE. 95
oc ^i re rerpaKSpaw og
Tpelg 6* kXdijMvg 6 Kdpa^ yrjpdai^Tai, dvrdp 6 ^ivi^
kwea Tovg KdpoKa^ • SsKa 6* TJfxelg Tovg ^ivucag
vvfjL(f>ai €V7r?i6Kafioif Kovpai Atbg diyid^oio,
Censorinus, de D. N. 17.
Compare Plutarch, Plac. Philos. v. 24, p. 909.
LXXXVIIL—Crameri A. P. i. p. 324.
Compare Philo, Qu. on Gen. ii. 5, p. 82 Aucher.
Plutarch, de Orac. def . 12, p. 416.
LXXXIX.— Philo, Qu. in Gen. ii. 5, p. 82 Aucher.
XCI.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 84.
Compare Cleanthes H., lov. 24.
Hippocrates, tt. Tpo ^g 15. Plutarch, de Iside 45, p. 369.
Plotinus, Enn. vi. 5, p. .668. Empedocles v. 231 Stein.
ON NATURE. 107
a city holds fast to its law. For all human laws are
dependent upon one divine Law, for this rules as far
as it wills, and suffices for all, and overabounds.
XCII. — Although the Law of Reason is common, the
majority of people live as though they had an under-
standing of their own.
XCIII. — They are at variance with that with which
they are in most continual association.
XCIV. — We ought not to act and speak as though
we were asleep.
XCV. — Plutarch, de Superst. 3, p. 166. Heraclitus
says : To those who are awake, there is one world in
common, but of those who are asleep, each is with-
drawn to a private world of his own.
XCVI. — For hiunan nature does not possess under-
standing, but the divine does.
XCII. — Sextus Emp. adv. Math. vii. 133. Context : — For haying
thus statedly shown that we do and think everything by participa-
tion in the divine reason, he (Heraclitus), after some previous expo-
sition, adds : It is necessary, therefore, to follow the common (for by
|wdf he means 6 Koivdg, the common). For although the law of
reason is common, the majority of people live as though they had
an understanding of their own. But this is nothing else than an
explanation of the mode of the universal disposition. As far, there-
fore, as we participate in the memory of this, we are true ; but in as
far as we act individually, we are false.
As far, there-
fore, as we participate in the memory of this, we are true ; but in as
far as we act individually, we are false.
XCIII. — M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
XCIV. — M. Antoninua iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
XCV. — Compare pseudo-Pythagoras from Hippolytus, Ref . haer.
vi. 26.
lamblichus, Protrept. 21, p. 132, Arcer.
XCVI. — Origen, c. Cels. vi. 12, p. 291. Context : — Nevertheless he
(Celsus) wanted to show that this was a fabrication of ours and taken
from the Greek philosophers, who say that human wisdom is of one
kind, and divine wisdom of another. And he brings forward some
phrases of Heraclitus, one where he says, "For human nature does
not possess understanding, but the divine does.** And another,
" The thoughtless man understands the voice of the Deity as little
as the child understands the man " ("i^ifrag. 97).
108 HERACLITUS.
XCVII. — The thoughtless man understands the
voice of the Deity as little as the child understands the
man.®
XCVIII.— Plato, Hipp. mai. 289 B. And does not
Heraclitus, whom you bring forward, say the same,
that the wisest of men compared with God appears
an ape in wisdom and in beauty and in all other
things ?
XCIX. — Plato, Hipp. mai. 289 A. You are ignorant,
my man, that there is a good saying of Heraclitus, to
the effect that the most beautiful of apes is ugly when
compared with another kind, and the most beautiful
of .earthen pots is ugly when compared with maiden-
kind, as says Hippias the wise.
C. — The people must fight for their law as for their
walls.
CI. — Greater fates gain greater rewards.
CII. — Gods and men honor those slain in war.
CHI. — Presumption must be quenched even more
than a fire.^
XCVII.— Origen, c. Cels. vi. 12, p. 291. Context, see frag. 96.
Compare M. Antoninus iv. 46. Context, see frag. 5.
XCVIII. — Compare M. Antoninus iv. 16.
XCIX. — Compare Plotinus, Enn. vi. 3, p. 626.
Aristotle, Top. iii. 2, p. 117 b 17.
C. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 2. Context : — And he (Heraclitus) used to
say, ** It is more necessary to quench insolence than a fire '^ (= frag.
103). And, ** The people must fight for their law as for their walls."
CI. — Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 7, p. 586. Context : — Again
Aeschylus, grasping this thought, says, "To him who toils, glory
from the gods is due as product of his toil.'* " For greater fates gain
greater rewards," according to Heraclitus.
TheodoretuB, Therap. viii. p. 117, 33.
Compare Hippolytus, Ref. haer. v. 8.
CII. — Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 4, p. 571. Context : — Heraclitus
said, " Gods and men honor those slain in war."
Theodoretus, Therap. viii. p. 117, 33.
cm. — Diogenes Laert. ix. 2. Context, see frag. 100.
ON NATURE. 109
CIV. — For men to have whatever they wish, would
not be well. Sickness makes health pleasant and
good ; hunger, satiety ; weariness, rest.
— Diogenes Laert. ix. 2. Context, see frag. 100.
ON NATURE. 109
CIV. — For men to have whatever they wish, would
not be well. Sickness makes health pleasant and
good ; hunger, satiety ; weariness, rest.
CV. — It is hard to contend against passion, for
whatever it craves it buys with its life.
CVI. — fit pertains to all men to know themselves
and to learn self-control, f
CVII. — t Self -control is the highest virtue, and wis-
dom is to speak truth and consciously to act according
to nature. t^
CVIII. — It is better to conceal ignorance, but it is
hard to do so in relaxation and over wine.
CIV.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 83, 4.
Compare Clement of Alex. Strom, ii. 21, p. 497.
Theodoretus, Therap. xi. p. 152, 25. Context: — Heraclitus the
Ephesian changed the name but retained the idea, for in the place
of pleasure he put contentment.
CV. — lamblichus, Protrept. p. 140, Arcer. Context: — Heraclitus
is a witness to these statements, for he says, "It is hard to contend
against passion," etc.
Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ii. 2, p. 1105 a 8.
Idem, Eth. Eud. ii. 7, p. 1223 b 22.
Idem, Pol. V. 11, p. 1315 a 29.
Plutarch, de Cohib. ira 9, p. 457.
Idem, Erot. 11, p. 755.
Compare Plutarch, Coriol. 22.
Pseudo-Democritus fr. mor. 77, Mullach.
Longinus, de Subl. 44.
CVI.— Stobaeus Floril. v. 119.
CVII.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 84.
CVIII. — Plutarch, Qu. Conviv. iii. proem., p. 644. Context : —
Simonides, the poet, seeing a guest sitting silent at a feast and con-
versing with no one, said, " Sir, if you are foolish you are doing
wisely, but if wise, foolishly,'* for, as Heraclitus says, "It is better
to conceal ignorance, but it is hard," etc.
Idem, de Audiendo 12, p. 43.
Idem, Virt. doc. posse 2, p. 439.
Idem, from Stob. Floril. xviii. 32.
110 HERACLITUS.
CIX. — ^flt is better to conceal ignorance than to ex-
pose it.f
ex. — It is law, also, to obey the will of one.*^
CXI. — For what sense or understanding have they ?
They follow minstrels and take the multitude for a
teacher, not knowing that many are bad and few good.
For the best men choose one thing above all — immortal
glory among mortals ; but the masses stuff themselves
like cattle.
CXII. — In Priene there lived Bias, son of Teutamus,
whose word was worth more than that of others.
CXIII. — To me, one is ten thousand if he be the best.
CXIV. — The Ephesians deserve, man for man, to be
hung, and the youth to leave the city, inasmuch as
they have banished Hermodorus, the worthiest man
among them, saying : " Let no one of us excel, and if
CIX.— Stobaeus Floril. iii. 82.
ex.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 14, p. 718 (Euseb. P. E. xiii. 13,
p. 681). Context, see frag. 65.
13,
p. 681). Context, see frag. 65.
CXI. — ^The passage is restored as above by Bemays (Heraclitea i.
p. 34), and By water (p. 43), from the following sources :
Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 9, p. 682.
Proclus in Alcib. p. 255 Creuzer, = 525 ed, Cous. ii.
Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 7, p. 586.
CXII. — Diogenes Laert. i. 88. Context: — And the fault-finding
Heraclitus has especially praised him (Bias), writing, "In Priene
there lived Bias, son of Teutamus, whose word was worth more than
that of others," and the Prienians dedicated to him a grove called
the Teutamion. He used to say, " Most men are bad.'*
CXIII. — Theodorus Prodromus in Lazerii Miscell. i. p. 20.
Idem, Tetrastich, in Basil. I (fol. k 2 vers. ed. Bas.).
Galenus, ^epl dcayv^aeug af^vyfiuv i. 1 ; t. 3, p. 53 ed. Bas.
Symmachus, Epist. ix. 115.
Compare Epigramm. from Diogenes Laert. ix. 16.
Cicero, ad. Att. xvi. 11.
Seneca, Epist. 7.
CXIV. — Strabo xiv. 25, p. 642. Context : — Among distinguished
men of the ancients who lived here (Ephesus) were Heraclitus,
ON NATURE. Ill
there be any such, let him go elsewhere and among
other people."
CXV.— Dogs, also, bark at what they do not know.
CXVI.— By its incredibility, it escapes their knowl-
edge.*"^
CXVII.— A stupid man loves to be puzzled by every
discourse.
CX VIII.— The most approved of those who are of
repute knows how to cheat. Nevertheless, justice will
catch the makers and witnesses of lies.^
CXIX.— Diogenes Laert. ix. 1. And he (Heraclitus)
caUed the obscure, and Hermodorus, of whom Heraclitus himself
said, "The Ephesians deserve,** etc.
Cicero, Tusc. v. 105.
Musonius from Stob. Floril. xl. 9.
Diogenes Laert. ix. 2.
lamblichus, de Vit. Pyth. 30, p. 154 Arcer.
Compare Lucian, Vit. auct. 14.
Pseudo-Diogenes, Epist. 28, 6.
CXV. — Plutarch, An seni sit ger. resp. vii. p. 787. Context : — ^And
envy, which is the greatest evil public men have to contend with, is
least directed against old men. "For dogs, indeed, bark at what
they do not know,** according to Heraclitus.
CXVI. — Plutarch, Coriol. 38. Context ;— But knowledge of divine
things escapes them, for the most part, because of its incredibility,
according to Heraclitus.
Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 13, p. 699. Context, see Crit. Note 36.
CXVII.— Plutarch, de Audiendo 7, p. 41. Context :— They re-
proach Heraclitus for saying, " A stupid man loves,** etc.
Compare idem, de Aud. poet. 9, p. 28.
CXVIII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 1, p. 649. Context :— " The
most approved of those who are of repute knows how to be on his
guard {(pvXdaaeiv, see Crit. Note 37). Nevertheless, justice will catch
the makers and witnesses of lies,*' says the Ephesian. For this
man who was acquainted with the barbarian philosophy, knew of
the purification by fire of those who had lived evil lives, which
afterwards the Stoics called the conflagration {kKnipuaiv).
Note 37). Nevertheless, justice will catch
the makers and witnesses of lies,*' says the Ephesian. For this
man who was acquainted with the barbarian philosophy, knew of
the purification by fire of those who had lived evil lives, which
afterwards the Stoics called the conflagration {kKnipuaiv).
CXIX. — Schleiermacher compares Schol. Ven. ad Iliad xviii. 251
and Eustathius, p. 1142, 5 ed. Rom., which, however, Bywater does
not regard as referring to Heraclitus of Ephesus.
112 HERACLITUS.
used to say that Homer deserved to be driven out of
the lists and flogged, and Archilochus likewise.
CXX. — One day is like all.
CXXI. — A man's character is his daemon.®
CXXII. — There awaits men after death what they
neither hope nor think.
CXXIII. — And those that are there shall arise and
become guardians of the living and the dead.^
CXXiy. — Night-roamers, Magians, bacchanals, rev-
elers in wine, the initiated.
CXX. — Seneca, Epist. 12. Context : — Heraclitus, who got a nick-
name for the obscurity of his writing, said, **One day is like all.**
His meaning is variously understood. If he meant all days were
equal in number of hours, he spoke truly. But others say one day
is equal to all in character, for in the longest space of time you
would find nothing that is not in one day, both light and night and
alternate revolutions of the earth.
Plutarch, Camill. 19. Context : — Concerning unlucky days, whether
we should suppose there are such, and whether Heraclitus did right
in reproaching Hesiod who distinguished good and bad days, as
being ignorant that the nature of every day is one, has been
examined in another place.
CXXI.— Plutarch, Qu. Platon. i. 2, p. 999. Context :— Did he,
therefore (viz. Socrates) call his own nature, which was very critical
and productive, God? Just as Menander says, " Our mind is God."
And Heraclitus, " A man's character is his daemon.'*
Alexander Aphrod. de Fato 6, p. 16, Orell.
Stobaeus Floril. civ. 23. Comp. pseudo-Heraclitus, Epist. 9.
CXXII.— Clement of Alex. Strom, iv. 22, p. 630. Context :— With
him (Socrates), Heraclitus seems to agree when he says in his dis-
course on men, " There awaits men," etc.
Idem, Protrept. 2, p. 18. Theodoretus, Therap. viii. p. 118, 1.
Themistius (Plutarch) from Stob. Floril. cxx. 28.
CXXIII. — Hippolytus, Ref. haer. ix. 10. Context: — And he
(Heraclitus) says also that there is a resurrection of this visible flesh
of ours, and he knows that God is the cause of this resurrection,
since he says, ** And those that are there shall arise," etc.
Compare Clement of Alex. Strom, v. 1, p. 649.
CXXI V. — Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 18. Context : — Rites
worthy of the night and of fire, and of the great-hearted, or rather
ON NATURE. 113
CXXV.— For the things which are considered
mysteries among men, they celebrate sacrilegiously.
CXXVI.— And to these images they pray, as if one
should prattle with the houses knowing nothing of
gods or heroes, who they are.
113
CXXV.— For the things which are considered
mysteries among men, they celebrate sacrilegiously.
CXXVI.— And to these images they pray, as if one
should prattle with the houses knowing nothing of
gods or heroes, who they are.
CXXVII.— For were it not Dionysus to whom they
institute a procession and sing songs in honor of the
pudenda, it would be the most shameful action. But
Dionysus, in whose honor they rave in bacchic frenzy,
and Hades are the same.*®
CXXVIII.— lamblichus, de Mysteriis v. 15. I distin-
guish two kinds of sacrifices. First, those of men
wholly purified, such as would rarely happen in the
case of a single individual, as Heraclitus says, or of a
of the idle-minded people of the Erechthidae, or even of the other
Greeks, for whom there awaits after death what they do not hope
(see frag. 122). Against whom, indeed, does Heraclitus of Ephesus
prophesy? Against night-roamers, Magians, bacchanals, revelers
in wine, the initiated. These he threatens with things after death
and prophesies fire for them, for they celebrate sacrilegiously the
things which are considered mysteries among men (= frag. 125).
CXXV.— Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 19. Context, see frag.
124.
Compare Arnobius, adv. Nat. v. 29.
CXXVI.— Origen, c. Cels. vii. 62, p. 384.
Idem i. 5, p. 6.
Clement of Alex. Protrept. 4, p. 44. Context ; — But if you will
not listen to the prophetess, hear your own philosopher, Heraclitus,
the Ephesian, imputing unconsciousness to images, " And to these
images," etc.
CXXVII.— Clement of Alex. Protrept. 2, p. 30. Context:— In
mystic celebration of this incident, phalloi are carried through the
cities in honor of Dionysus. ** For were it not Dionysus to whom
they institute a procession and sing songs in honor of the pudenda,
it would be the most shamful action," says Heraclitus. ** But Hades
and Dionysus are the same, to whom they rave in bacchic frenzy,"
not for the intoxication of the body, as I think, so much as for the
shameful ceremonial of lasciviousness.
Plutarch, de Iside 28, p. 362.
fp-
114 HBRACLITUS.
certain very few men. Second, material and corporeal
sacrifices and those arising from change, such as are
fit for those still fettered by the body.
CXXIX.— Atonements.*!
CXXX. — When defiled, they purify themselves with
blood, just as if any one who had fallen into the mud
should wash himself with mud 1
- - - — - - - _ _^ - - - — ^
CXXIX.— lamblichus, de Mys. i. 11. Context : — Therefore Hera-
clitus rightly called them (scil. what are offered to the gods) ** atone-
ments," since they are to make amends for evils and render the
souls free from the dangers in generation.
Compare Hom. Od. xxii. 481. See Crit. Note 41.
i. 11. Context : — Therefore Hera-
clitus rightly called them (scil. what are offered to the gods) ** atone-
ments," since they are to make amends for evils and render the
souls free from the dangers in generation.
Compare Hom. Od. xxii. 481. See Crit. Note 41.
CXXX. — Elias Cretensis in Greg. Naz. 1. 1. (cod. Vat. Pii. 11, 6,
fol. 90 r). Context : — ^And Heraclitns, making sport of these people,
says, "When defiled, they purify themselves with blood, just as if
any one who had fallen into the mud should wash himself with
mudr* For to suppose that with the bodies and blood of the
unreasoning animals which they oflfer to their gods they can cleanse
the impurities of their own bodies, which are stained with vile
contaminations, is like trying to wash off mud from their bodies by
means of mud.
Gregory Naz. Or. xxv. (xxiii.) 15, p. 466 ed. Par. 1778.
Apollonius, Epist. 27.
Compare Plotinus, Enn. i. 6, p. 54.
CRITICAL NOTES. 115
CRITICAL NOTES.
Fragment 1.
Note 1. — Instead of X vla y Kid tpy dTis avToi(ri fiaprvpefi
Trapfdvrag dTTiivai,
I V • KoKoi fjLdpTVp€s dpBpdmoUTi 6 ois xprjtrSai /xapruat TTfpi r5>v ayvoovfiivtoVf onrep oi npo rffi&v TTtpi
r&v nXeioTtov, dmiTTOvg dfKlnaprjTovfiivtov 7raptxdfi€Voi ^ciSaioarar Kara r6v
'HpaicXetTop.
X V • *0(j}6aXfio\ tS>v ooTiov aKptfieartpoi pApTVp€S>
XVI. IJdKvfiaBitj v6ov tx^^iv ov bidd(rKH * 'Hcriobov yap &v idiba^e koi
TlvBayopijv aZrls re ^^vo^dvta Koi 'Eiearaiop.
X V II. TlvBaydprjs Mvrj(rdp)(ov iaropirjv flaKrja€ dvBpmnav fmKiara
TrdvTojv, Koi iicKe^dfKvos ravrag rds ovyypa v»
XX. Kdarpiop t6v avrov dirdvTtav oijrt rts B(S>v oSt€ dvBpGainav
(iroiTjo'ff oXX ^v a(€t koi t Vt &an€p x.pv(Tov
Xpiipjora KcX xpr^pjcertav xpv€f6s»
XXIII. QaXaacra diax^^Tai koX ficrpcerai is tov avTov \6yov okoios
irpdoBev rjv ^ ytveaBai Ty^y.
XXIV. XprjapoavvTj . . . Kdpos,
XXV. Z^ irvp TOP yrjs BdvaTovj Koi d^p Cfj tov irvpos Bdvarov * vdtop
Cjj TOV depos BdvaTOVf yrj t6v vbaTog,
XXVI. UdvTa t6 TTvp infXBov Kpivtei koL KaToKrj'^eTai.
XXVII. T^ fiiy bvvdv TTOTc 7rS>s av Tig \dBoi ;
XXVIII. Ta de irdvra olaKiCd K€pavv6g.
XXIX. "HXiof ovx vTrep^^flrerai ptTpa * e/ dc /xi/i ^Epivv€g pty bUrjg
fTTiKOvpoi f^evprjo'ova'i.
XXX. * Hovg Ka\ iaTTeprjs T€ppaTa ^ tipKTOg, Ka\ dtrrlop Trjg apicrov oZpog
alBpiov Ai6g,
XXXI. E^ prj rfKiog rjvf ^v^p6vri hv ^v»
126 HBRACLITUS.
XXXIII. Diogenes Laert. i. 23: doicct de (scil. eoX^y) Kara
Tivas np&Tos daTpo\oyrj v avp.Tr\oKriv kclL (rvvapfioy^v 6 xp6voi ov\
&n\S>s ioTi Klvrjais aK\\ aawep eipi/rai, Kivrjcris iv ra^et fxtrpov fX^^^ *°'
•
iripara kclI 7r€pi6bovs. &v 6 ^los cViardri;; a>p Koi iricoTruf , 6pi(€iv koi
Ppafievtiv Koi dvadfiKvvvai Koi dva(f)alv€tv fifrafioXas Koi &pas at ndpra
^ipovdiy Kad *Hpa/cX€irop, ovbe Vf dWa tS>v p.^yltrrtav
Koi Kvpiayrdrav r^ ^efidvi koi 9rpa>ra> ^e^ yiverai avv€py6s*
AiddfTKaXos be nXtioTciv 'Haiobos ' tovtov fTrlirravTcu TrXeiora
fldfvaif oaris fifjjprjv koi evtppdvrjv ovk eyiWcrice * ?(m yap ev*
XXXVI. 'O Bchs Tipjfpri evKJypdvfjj ;(ci/liq>i/ BepoSt TroXc/xof €lpTivrj, Kopos
XifjLos * aXXoiovrai de oKcaarrep SKdrav avfjLfJuy^ Bvoap.ao'i '
6vop.d(eTai KaB rfbov^p tKaarov.
XXXVII. Aristoteles de Sensu 5, p. 443 a 21 : doK€l d' hiois
rj KaTTvoadrjs dvaBvp.laais uvai 6 koi
ndvTts €'!n €povTai iifi rovro irtpX 6(rp.TJs ' di6 Kal 'HpdieXeirof ovrcar
ftprjKtv, cDf e^ ndvra ra Svra Kairvhs yeVoiro, pilv^s hv diayvoUv.
XXXVIII. At yjrvxal ocrfwivrat KaB* qdrjv,
XXXIX. Ta yjtvxpa Beperaiy BtppJov ^v;(CTat, vypov avaiveraij KOp-
€p6fi€Pov €a>ura> o/xoXoy/ci * naXivrpoiros
dpfiopii} oKoxnr^p t6^ov Koi Xvprjs,
XLVI. Aristoteles Eth. Nic. viii. 2, p. 1155 b 1 : koi ttc/jI
avTojp TovTOP dpoartpop cVi^i/rovcri koi (pvaiKOirepop * Evptiridrjs p^p
(jidtTKoop ipap pip Spppov yaiap (ffpapBeia'aVf ipdp de (r€pp6p ovpaphp ttXj;-
povpcpop SpPpov rreaeip es yalap * Koi 'HpaieXciror t6 dpri^ovp avptfytpoPy
Koi €K tS>p dia(f)€p6pT(0P KoKXiaTTip &ppopiap^ Koi ndpra kot tpip ylptaBai,
XL V II. 'Appopii] difyap^s (papfprjs Kpdaatop,
XL V III. Mrf €iKri n€p\ t5>p pcyicrrap avpfiaXapfBa.
XLIX. Xp^ €^ pdXa TToWStP toTopas ^(Xoiro^ov; apdpas tipat,
L. Tpa p dppcaarovPTcaPy ravra ipya^dpepoi rd dyaBd koi
I ra? p6 €p6fi€vov bia(l>€p6fi€P0Vy
avv^dov di^dop * €K irdvT(OP cv icai €^ tvos Trdpra, ^
LX. AiKrjs odvofia otK hv jjdeaaVf et ravra, firj rjv>
LXI. Schol. B. in II. iv. 4, p. 120 Bekk. : dnpms a s Tt noXepoi Koi fidx^^ '?/**" M^" dcti'a boKfiy r^ de ^eoJ ovde
ravra ddvd, crvi'TcXet yap dnavra 6 Be6s npbi dppoviav tS>v oXcdv, oIkovo-
ponv ra avp.(l>€povraf oncp Kal *H/>a#c\€tTOff Xeyct, wy t^ fUv $€(0 KtiKa irdvra
Kal dyaOa Kal d/xaia, avOptonoi be d pev dbiKa imeikriclyaaiVj a dc dt#caia.
LXII. Eldfvai xph '■o*' TToXepop iovra fwov, kcll diKrjv tpiv ' Ka\ yivd-
pfva irdvra Kar tpiv KaX J ;^pf w/iiei/a J.
LXI 11. *EoTi yap (Ipappeva trdvras * * * *.
LXIV. Qdvaros iari 6x00*0 iyepBevrfs 6p€op.ev, oKoaa de evdopres
VTTVOS.
IjXV. *Ei/ ro (TO^hv povvov ' XeytfrBai ovk e^eXct Kal eBfkei Zrjvoe
oHvopa,
LX V I. ToO /SioO oHifopa PloSf tpyov be Odvaros*
LXVII. *K.6dvaroi Bvrjroif Bvrjfroi dBdvaroi, CSiirrcs r6v eKtipiOP Bdparop
rhp be iK€lpv>p filov reBpewret.
LXVIII. S^vxtjo"^ y^p Bdvaros vbaap ycveV^at, vbari be Bdvaroi yrjp
yepeaBai ' eK y^s be vbfop yiperai, e^ vbaros be ^v^q*
LXIX. *0b6s dpca Korto pia KaX cavr^.
LXX. ^vpov dpx^l KOi trepas,
LXXI. "^vxj^s neipara ovk dp i^evpoio ndcap eimropevoptpos obdp,
LXXII. ^vxii rdrrj KaX dpiarr} "f". •
LXXVII. "ApBpioiroff oK aKOVT€S (apud Hesiod. ff. 163 Goettling) trrj
TpidKovra iroiovai t^p ytpcap KaO ^HpajcXeirop * ip S XP^^V yepp&pra
napt^fi t6p €^ avTov yeyepprjp^pop 6 ytpp^tras,
^vxii rdrrj KaX dpiarr} "f". •
LXXVII. "ApBpioiroff oK aKOVT€S (apud Hesiod. ff. 163 Goettling) trrj
TpidKovra iroiovai t^p ytpcap KaO ^HpajcXeirop * ip S XP^^V yepp&pra
napt^fi t6p €^ avTov yeyepprjp^pop 6 ytpp^tras,
LXXXVIII. lo. Lydus de Mensibus iii. 10, p. 37 ed. Bonn :
6 TpuiKopra dpiBp^s (fyvaiKdyrards icmp ' h yap ip popdai rpidsy rovro eV
dcKdai TpiaKoprds. irrtX koI 6 rov prjphs kvkKos (ntpt(rniK€P iK T€a' p Tr€ioi pdpoi im6 Ms rov Btlov * Kpar€€i yap
ToaovTOP oKoo'op iBiXii Kal i^apK€€i iraat Kal nepiyipfrai,
XCII. Tov \6yov d' idpTos ^vpov, ^coovo'i ot ttoXXoI cos Ibirjp cxpprts
^povr^aip,
XGIII. *Qi /LtdXiora 8iriP(K€ v cKaarrov
els XBtov d7roaTp€(l)far6ai,
X'C VI. H^of yap dv6pam€iov pjev ovk e;^€4 yvcjfia?, Btlov bt ex««
XC V II. 'Avffp vTfinos IJKovtjc irphs balpxivo^ oKtoawcp irais irp6s dvdp6£,
XC VIII. Plato Hipp. mai. 289 B : fj ol Koi ^Upd^XeiTos tqMp
TovTo X«y€t, hv (TV endycif ori dv6pd>ir ^^ "P" mB^KOiv 6 KoWicrros al(rxpo5 oXXo) yevei
avfipdXXeiv, Koi x^p^^ h 'caXXion; alo'XpO' TrapBevcav yivu (rvfifidWeiVf &?
(I)rj(riv iTnrias 6 tro^s*
C. Md^etrOai, xph '''^^ brjiJLop virtp rov vdfiov okchs imtp Ttix^os,
CI. Mopoi yap fjLt(ou€s fjJ^ovas polpas Xayxdvovai*
CII. ^KpriK^Tovs Beoi ripSi(n xai duBpairoi.
cm. ^Yfipiv xph O'fifwveiv fiaWop § frvpKaXrfv.
CI V • *AvBpamoia'i yiveaBai OKdaa BeXovai oi>K ap^ivop* povtros vyUiav
€iroirja€ ^dv Ka\ dyaBdpj Xifibs K6pop, Kdfiaros dvdiravaip*
C V. Qvfi^ fidxf(rBai ;^aX€7r(5v* o rt yap hp XP^^Cv ytVccr^at, yjfvx^s
U>P€€Tai,
CVI. J*ApBpoimoia'i Trdat /xtVecrrt yiypa>aK€tp eavrovs Ka\ (roxftpopeipj,
C V II. I ^cafftpopcLP dp€Tri fieylcrrrj ' koi tro^iri dXijBea Xeyeip Kal noielp
Kara (jivo'tp etratopras "f .
C V III. *ApjaBlrip afi€iPOP Kpxmrtw * epyop bi ip dpeati Ka\ trap' oIpov,
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TEXT. 131
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